Memo in Support Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. John Cobb v. Charleston County School District, No. 2:25-cv-08752 (D.S.C.), Doc. 24-1 (August 10, 2026)
Summary
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, filed August 10, 2026 by Charleston County School District in United States ex rel. John Cobb v. Charleston County School District, Case No. 2:25-cv-08752-DCN, in the District of South Carolina. It argues the Amended Complaint alleges False Claims Act violations in the District's receipt of $3 million in federal funds through the Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund and the CARES Act but does not plead a specific false claim that caused the government to pay money. It asks the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety and with prejudice, over the signature /s/ Elizabeth Palmer of Saxton & Stump.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Cite this document
“Memo in Support Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. John Cobb v. Charleston County School District, No. 2:25-cv-08752 (D.S.C.), Doc. 24-1 (August 10, 2026).”
Original at storage.courtlistener.com. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/memo-in-support-memorandum-in-support-of-motion-to-dismiss-amended-com-fc76fe9b62/
, SHA-256 34dd4c782a966ed4806da76a4c69daefde4152e0c240e2847febd357efafc3c4.Full text
2:25-cv-08752-DCN Date Filed 08/10/26 Entry Number 24-1 Page 1 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel.,
JOHN COBB,
Case No. 2:25-cv-08752-DCN
Plaintiff-Relator,
v. DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL AMENDED COMPLAINT
DISTRICT,
Defendant.
Defendant Charleston County School District (the “District”), by and through its
undersigned counsel, hereby moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In short, the Complaint alleges violation of
the False Claims Act but fails to “describe the time, place, and contents of the false representations,
as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.”
United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 454
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370,
379 (4th Cir. 2008)).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff John Cobb (“Plaintiff”) 1 alleges the District violated the False Claims Act “FCA”)
in its receipt of $3 million in federal funds received through the Elementary and Secondary School
Emergency Relief Fund (“ESSER”) and CARES Act. By Order entered on June 25, 2025 (ECF
#22), the Court granted, in part, the District’s Motion for a More Definite Statement, finding that
a more definite statement was “necessary to address Relator’s vague, shotgun pleading.”
1
On December 17, 2025, the United States declined to intervene in this matter. ECF No. 10.
2:25-cv-08752-DCN Date Filed 08/10/26 Entry Number 24-1 Page 2 of 7
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF #23), while lengthier, fails to satisfy the pleading
requirements of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6). The Amended Complaint fails to “connect the
dots…between the alleged false claims and government payment.” United States ex rel. Grant v.
United Airlines Inc., 912 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 2018). In fact, the Amended Complaint fails to
even allege the submission of a specific false or fraudulent claim that resulted in the government’s
payment of money to the District.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the legal
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243
(4th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007), and must “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When considering a
motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the
complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, “when the allegations in a
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency
should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and
the court. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Legal conclusions,
“couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,” will not
do. United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc., 707 F.3d 451,
454 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
2
2:25-cv-08752-DCN Date Filed 08/10/26 Entry Number 24-1 Page 3 of 7
II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 governs the pleading of special matters and subsection
(b) mandates that when alleging fraud, a party “must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). In addition to meeting the plausibility standard
of Iqbal, fraud claims under the FCA must be pleaded with particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b).
United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc., 127 F.4th 472, 485 (4th Cir.
2025). To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff asserting a claim under the Act “must, at a minimum,
describe the time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the
person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Nathan, 707 F.3d at 455
(quoting United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir.
2008)). “These circumstances are often ‘referred to as the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of
the alleged fraud.” Wheeler, 127 F.4th at 485.
More specifically:
The multiple purposes of Rule 9(b), namely, of providing notice to a defendant of
its alleged misconduct, of preventing frivolous suits, of “eliminat[ing] fraud actions
in which all the facts are learned after discovery,” and of “protect[ing] defendants
from harm to their goodwill and reputation,” are as applicable in cases brought
under the Act as they are in other fraud cases. Indeed, such purposes may apply
with particular force in the context of the Act, given the potential consequences
flowing from allegations of fraud by companies who transact business with the
government. Moreover, we have emphasized that a claim brought under the Act
that “rest[s] primarily on facts learned through the costly process of discovery . . .
is precisely what Rule 9(b) seeks to prevent.”
Nathan, 707 F.3d at 456 (quoting Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776,
783–85 (4th Cir. 1999)).
3
2:25-cv-08752-DCN Date Filed 08/10/26 Entry Number 24-1 Page 4 of 7
ARGUMENT
I. Plaintiff Fails to Sufficiently Plead a Violation of the False Claims Act.
The FCA is an anti-fraud statute that imposes liability for those who make false statements
and submit false claims to the Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). “A false statement is
actionable under the Act only if it constitutes a ‘false or fraudulent claim.’” Nathan, 707 F.3d at
454. To state a claim under the FCA, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that the defendant made a
false statement or engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct; (2) such statement or conduct was
made or carried out with the requisite scienter; (3) the statement or conduct was material; and (4)
the statement or conduct caused the government to pay out money or to forfeit money due.” United
States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. (Harrison II), 352 F.3d 908, 913 (4th
Cir. 2003). “Failure to adequately allege any of these elements dooms a claim.” Wheeler, 127 F.4th
472, 487 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States ex rel. Taylor v. Boyko, 39 F.4th 177, 188 (4th Cir.
2022)).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the District obtained ESSER/CARES
funds by submitting Expenditure Reports for reimbursement to the S.C. Department of Education.
(ECF #23, ¶ 24) He alleges that by virtue of a certification contained within the Expenditure
Reports, the District made three express representations each time it submitted a Report: first, that
the expenditures were incurred and paid in accordance with program rules and regulations; second,
that payment was not duplicated or reimbursed from any other source; and third, that substantiating
invoices and records were on file and available for audit. (Id., ¶ 26)
Plaintiff alleges that each Expenditure Report submitted in connection with three separate
projects was fraudulent because the contracts related to those projects were “directly negotiated
with vendors without the proper procurement and competitive bidding process.” (Id., ¶¶ 27, 29)
4
2:25-cv-08752-DCN Date Filed 08/10/26 Entry Number 24-1 Page 5 of 7
The first project described in the Amended Complaint is the District 23 St. Paul’s
(“D23SP”) project which “was designed to provide social and emotional support, including theater
programs, teacher training, teacher salary, consultant salaries, community involvement and other
related expenses.” (Id., ¶ 40) Plaintiff alleges that hiring of the D23SP project manager, Victor
Young, was improper because it failed to follow standard procurement procedures and, therefore,
that federal funds were misused by virtue of the District’s payments to Young. (Id., ¶¶ 40, 42-43)
Also in relation to the D23SP project, Plaintiff alleges that Charleston Stage was wrongfully paid
$221,000 of federal funding because: 1) the contract with Charleston Stage did not follow proper
procurement procedures; and 2) the funds were used for “general school enrichment activities
rather than their intended purpose of COVID-19 recovery.” (Id., ¶ 41) The Amended Complaint
does not tie the allegations related to the D23SP project to the submission of a claim, that was false
or fraudulent, and that resulted in the government’s payment of money to the District.
The second project identified in the Amended Complaint is the “D20PCP” project which
involved “providing daycare and tutorial services to students and teachers, and student
entrepreneurship…” (Id., ¶ 46) It appears that Plaintiff’s contention with regard to this project is
the District’s payment of an “unusually high salary of $200,000” to Barbara Dilligard, an
independent contractor, for grant writing and related consulting services. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
the District failed to follow proper procurement procedures in contracting with Dilligard and that
the payments made to Dilligard were an improper use of federal funding. (Id., ¶¶ 46-47) The
Amended Complaint does not tie the allegations related to the D20PCP project to the submission
of a claim, that was false or fraudulent, and that resulted in the government’s payment of money
to the District.
The third and final project identified in the Amended Complaint is the “D4NC” project
which involved the construction of a new athletic field at North Charleston High School. (Id., ¶
5
2:25-cv-08752-DCN Date Filed 08/10/26 Entry Number 24-1 Page 6 of 7
49) Plaintiff alleges the D4NC project did not comply with federal procurement protocol and was
an improper use of ESSER funds. (Id.) Plaintiff broadly alleges that the District submitted “false
or fraudulent claims to the State in order to obtain federal funds to be used for the athletic field
project, despite the project not qualifying under the ESSER rules and regulations.” (Id.)
Additionally, not only does Plaintiff fail to allege that the purportedly false claims caused the
government to pay money, but he also concedes that the District’s proposal was denied. (Id., ¶ 50)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to allege the “who, what, when, where and how of the
alleged fraud” as required to defeat a motion to dismiss. United States v. Savannah River Nuclear
Sols., LLC, 2016 WL 7104823, at *9 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2016) (quoting United States ex rel. Ahumada
v. NISH, 756 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2014). In a FCA lawsuit, a plaintiff must “connect the dots,
even if unsupported by precise documentation, between the alleged false claims and government
payment.” United States ex rel. Grant v. United Airlines Inc., 912 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 2018).
It is not enough for a plaintiff to “merely to describe a private scheme in detail but then to allege
simply and without any stated reason for his belief that claims requesting illegal payments must
have been submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted to the Government.”
Nathan, 707 F.3d at 456–57.
The Amended Complaint fails to allege the presentment of a specific claim, let alone a
false claim, that was material and caused the federal government to pay funds to the District. The
Amended Complaint should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Charleston County School District asks this Court to grant
its Motion to Dismiss and to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety and with prejudice.
SAXTON AND STUMP
6
2:25-cv-08752-DCN Date Filed 08/10/26 Entry Number 24-1 Page 7 of 7
By: /s/ Elizabeth Palmer
Alice F. Paylor, District Court ID #4017
Isabelle S. Young, District Court ID #14209
Elizabeth Palmer, District Court ID # 9716
Saxton & Stump, LLC
151 Meeting Street, Suite 400
Charleston, SC 29401
(843) 414-5080
afp@saxtonstump.com
iyoung@saxtonstump.com
ep@saxtonstump.com
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
Charleston, SC
August 10, 2026
7
File and source
- File
- 24-att1-memo-in-support-memorandum-in-support-of-motion-to-dismiss-a.pdf
- Size
- 217,255 bytes
- SHA-256
- 34dd4c782a966ed4806da76a4c69daefde4152e0c240e2847febd357efafc3c4
- Original
- storage.courtlistener.com