José Sevilla Ruiz et al., Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small businesses in the face of 008 financial crisis and COVID-19 (2025)

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Article by Jose Sevilla, Cristina Ruiz-Martin, Juan Jose Nebro and Adolfo Lopez-Paredes in the International Journal of Production Management and Engineering, 13(1), 2025, comparing how large and small firms in Spain survived the 2008 financial crisis and COVID-19. The authors note that the Spanish economy leans on tourism and hospitality, has few large companies and little technology business. Applying a three-phase resilience model of absorption, adaptation and learning to firm survival from 2007 to 2023, they propose that large companies that came through 2008 were better prepared for COVID-19. They report that business closures in Spain followed global trends.

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“José Sevilla Ruiz et al., Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small businesses in the face of 008 financial crisis and COVID-19 (2025).” Original at web.archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/jos-sevilla-ruiz-et-al-resilience-of-spanish-firms-a-comparative-analy-c3f0c7c448/, SHA-256 60ca87577a212c26133233c8fb4d55fd486abeeb1fe53827b204a08c66e511bb.

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I International Journal of https://doi.org/10.4995/ijpme.2025.21740

J Production Management Received: 2024-05-15 Accepted: 2024-09-29

PME and Engineering

Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small
businesses in the face of 2008 financial crisis and COVID-19
a1 b a2 a3
Jose Sevilla , Cristina Ruiz-Martin , Juan Jose Nebro , Adolfo Lopez-Paredes
a
Department of Economics and Business Administration, University of Malaga, C/ Ejido, 6, 29013 Málaga Spain.
b
Carleton University. 1125 Colonel By Dr, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canadá.
a
pepe.sevilla@uma.es, b cristinaruizmartin@sce.carleton.ca, a2 jjnm@uma.es, a3 loppar@uma.es

Abstract:
The global impact of the COVID-19 crisis has revealed divergent outcomes for businesses, with large corporations
thriving while small companies facing challenges. Analyzing the Spanish market, which relies heavily on
tourism and lacks large international companies, challenges conventional analyses. Despite these anomalies,
business closures align with global trends. Applying the dynamic organizational resilience model —Absorption,
Adaptation, and Learning— we propose that large Spanish companies, having weathered the 2008 financial
crisis, were better equipped for COVID-19. This article investigates whether deploying organizational resilience
justifies the Spanish market’s response, exploring the influence of company size and crisis type on survival
capacity between 2007 and 2023.
Key words:
Organizational resilience; Spanish market; 2008 financial crisis; COVID-19 crisis.

1. Introduction analyses (ONTSI, 2021; Spanish National Institute
of Statistics, 2023), have had a substantial impact on
The COVID-19 crisis has had a different impact how companies traversed the COVID-19 crisis: 1)
on businesses worldwide. While large corporations The Spanish economy (and the companies operating
have not only survived but, in many cases, thrived within it) heavily depends on tourism, leisure and
significantly, small businesses have faced severe hospitality businesses; 2) Large companies are scarce
challenges, and for many of them, their post- in the Spanish market, and those considered large are
pandemic survival is considered compromised. not very large on an international scale. 3) Spanish
The evolution of companies in bankruptcy in companies’ involvement in technology businesses is
Spain during the COVID-19 crisis reveals a trend minimal.
similar to that reported globally. However, there
are peculiarities and factors in the Spanish market To understand the Spanish market, we use the theory
that do not align with the proposed analyses and and models of organizational resilience. Among
explanations, especially the severe impact of the the various models explaining and conceptualizing
COVID-19 crisis on economies highly dependent on organizational resilience, the dynamic three-phase
tourism and less diversified economies (World Bank, formulation —Absorption, Adaptation, and Learning
2022). Studies on post-COVID-19 recovery indicate (Sevilla-Ruiz et al., 2023)— holds particular
that large and technology-oriented companies relevance. In the first phase, the organization absorbs
handled the crisis more comfortably (OECD, 2021). the impact of change as best as possible. Second,
This contrasts with three significant peculiarities the organization restructures and adjusts to work
in the Spanish market, which, according to several in new conditions. Finally, conclusions are drawn,

To cite this article: Sevilla, J., Ruiz-Martin, C., Nebro, J.J., & Lopez-Paredes, A. (2025). Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large
and small businesses in the face of 2008 financial crisis and COVID-19. International Journal of Production Management and Engineering, 13(1), 45-58.
https://doi.org/10.4995/ijpme.2025.21740

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 45
http://polipapers.upv.es/index.php/IJPME
Sevilla et al.

and the organization learns from the experience. continuity refers to the process of creating prevent
This helps us understand the Spanish market during and recovery systems to deal with potential threats
the COVID-19 crisis because, in our view, large to a company (Cerullo and Cerullo, 2004). In this
Spanish companies deployed this process during sense, the goal of Business continuity is to enable
the 2008 financial crisis, while SMEs were not able ongoing operations during and after a disruption,
to deploy and complete the process. Consequently, ensuring that critical business functions can continue
large companies were able to handle the impacts of despite adverse circumstances.
the COVID-19 crisis better than SMEs.
The main differences between the two disciplines are
This article aims to address whether the deployment in their scope and focus. Organizational resilience
of the dynamic organizational resilience process has a broader scope, focusing on the organization’s
justifies how firms performed in the Spanish market overall ability to adapt and thrive in the face of
during the COVID-19 crisis. Analyzing the Spanish various disruptions, including long-term changes.
market from this perspective between 2007 and 2023, Business continuity is more focused on ensuring
two questions arise: 1) Does the size of the company that specific critical functions can continue during
influence its survival capacity in any crisis? 2) Does and after a disruption. Additionally, organizational
the type of crisis influence the type of companies that resilience encompasses cultural, strategic, and
survive? operational dimensions, promoting flexibility,
innovation, and continuous learning, while business
To address these questions, we first analyze the continuity is primarily operational, focusing on
composition of the Spanish market to demonstrate maintaining essential services and functions.
the scarcity of large companies and their minimal
participation in digital services. Next, we present In the following sections, we will present, analyze,
the dataset of bankrupt companies in Spain between and discuss data and reports showing the major
2005 and 2022. We also introduce the analysis stressors and challenges faced by the Spanish market
techniques used to determine the data’s relevance in recent years, with particular emphasis on the last
and representativeness. Once the validity of the two major global crises: the 2008 Financial Crisis
data is established, we analyze it to address research and the COVID-19 pandemic.
questions 1 and 2 and highlight the implications
on organizational resilience by comparing the
performance of large companies and SMEs. 3. Spanish Market Composition:
Companies by Number of
2. Framing the study within Employees
the context of organizational
In this section, we analyze and describe the
resilience distribution of companies by number of employees
in the Spanish market.
Before presenting, analyzing, and discussing the data
from the Spanish market, it is important to justify (1) In recent decades, the Spanish market has
how this study fits within the context of organizational undergone significant transformations (Faris
resilience and (2) what is the dependency and et al., 2020; Ferrer et al., 2022; Hernández and
relationship with business continuity. Martínez, 2017), prompting a comprehensive
analysis of the distribution of companies based
Organizational resilience and business continuity on their employee size. Using data from Spanish
are two disciplines that might appear to compete governmental sources (Spanish National Institute
with one another. However, this is not the case. of Statistics, 2023), we categorize companies into
Organizational resilience refers to an organization’s four groups: microenterprises (up to 9 employees),
ability to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and small enterprises (10 to 49 employees), medium-
adapt to incremental changes and sudden disruptions sized enterprises (50 to 249 employees), and large
to survive and thrive (Ruíz-Martín et al., 2018). It enterprises (more than 300 employees) (European
encompasses a variety of practices and attributes that Commission, 2003). Notably, microenterprises,
allow an organization to maintain essential functions constituting 80% of the market, have a vital role in
during a crisis and recover faster afterward. Business the economy, particularly in family businesses. SMEs

46 Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small businesses in the face of 2008
financial crisis and COVID-19

enterprises contribute significantly to the business To validate the data stratification, a non-linear analysis
network, with a focus on diverse sectors, while large using Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) was conducted.
enterprises, though a minority, influence strategic SOMs, also known as Kohonen maps, are unsuper-
sectors like energy and telecommunications. Trends vised learning algorithms widely utilized for dimen-
highlight the dominance of smaller enterprises, the sionality reduction, clustering, and pattern recognition
concentration of large enterprises in key sectors, and across various fields (Amerijckx et al., 1998; Ko-
the critical role of medium-sized enterprises in job honen, 2013; Sarlin and Eklund, 2011). Comprising
creation and economic diversification. This analysis nodes arranged in a grid, each representing a category,
serves as a valuable foundation for policymaking, SOMs learn through competition and cooperation
entrepreneurship support, and enhancing business mechanisms during the training phase. They effec-
competitiveness in the dynamic Spanish market. tively reduce dimensionality, allowing visualization
of high-dimensional data in lower-dimensional spaces
Figure 1 illustrates the average distribution of while preserving topological relationships.
companies in the Spanish market based on their
number of employees between 2005 and 2022. It SOMs excel in clustering, identifying patterns, and
can be observed that microenterprises are 80% of the detecting outliers. They are applicable to tasks like
market, and the proportion of large companies does image classification and speech analysis. Operating
not exceed 0.4%. in unsupervised learning, they accommodate unstruc-
tured or unlabeled datasets. However, their perfor-
mance can be sensitive to initial parameters (such as
grid dimensions, lambda factor, or initial weights),
and the interpretability of results may pose challenges.
As the size and dimensionality increase, computation-
al complexity grows.

Considering these factors, SOMs are deemed suitable
for evaluating the appropriateness of bankruptcy data
for the intended purpose. Employing SOMs will as-
sess the independence of data on bankrupt companies,
ensuring low coupling between time series and ad-
equate representation within each category.

4.1. Model’s data set validation
The objective of this initial analysis is to determine
whether the categories we defined for the companies
Figure 1. Spanish market composition.
in bankruptcy are suitable. We aim to understand
whether the different categories are independent of
each other or if, conversely, there is some level of
4. Model’s data set: Companies in coupling among them.
Bankruptcy in Spain between
Figure 2 shows the quarterly evolution of companies
2005 and 2022 in bankruptcy across different categories between
2005 and 2022. We employ a Self-Organizing Map
The data for our study comes from the INE (National (SOM) to estimate the degree of similarity among the
Institute of Statistics) (Spanish National Institute various time series. It is known that a SOM tends to
of Statistics, 2023) and represents the number of group similar time series together in nearby nodes.
companies in bankruptcy in Spain between 2005 and
2022, inclusive. The companies are grouped based When using the SOM to create the classification, we
on their number of employees into a total of eight follow a 3-step process:
categories: No employees, 1 to 2 employees, 3 to 5
employees, 6 to 9 employees, 10 to 19 employees, 20 1. Normalization of time series: Each element
to 49 employees, 50 to 99 employees, and companies of every temporal series is normalized by the total
with more than 100 employees. number of companies at the national level within

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Sevilla et al.

Figure 2. Bankruptcy situations across different categories between the years 2005 and 2022.

that category and year. For instance, the number of - For each value of lambda and for each
companies in bankruptcy during the second quarter grid dimension, we conduct 1000 different
of 2009 in the 5-9 employees category is normalized simulations, with each simulation initializing the
by the total number of companies in 2009. initial set of weights randomly.
1.1 Selection of temporal series: The following 3. Similarity matrix generation: When the SOM
temporal series are chosen: a) Period 2005-2022 maps two categories to the same grid node, it indicates
as it contains the whole set of data available. b) that the time series of both categories are similar. In
Period 2005-2007 as it covers the period pre-2008 each simulation, we calculate the number of times
financial crisis. c) Period 2008-2013, which is the each category is mapped to the same grid node as
2008 financial crisis. d) Period 2014-2020 which is any of the other categories. Finally, we obtain a
the post 2008 crisis and pre-COVID. e) Period 2020- similarity matrix representing the percentage of times
2022, which is the COVID era. each category A has been mapped to the same grid
node as category B. This matrix will be symmetric,
2. Tuning parameters of the SOM: SOMs are with all elements on its main diagonal having a
regulated by three parameters: the lambda parameter, value of 100%, and, for example, if the matrix cell
which controls the degree of the SOM, the initial corresponding to coordinates (1-2):(50:99) had a
weights of neural connections, and the topology of value of 75%, it would indicate that in 75% of the
the SOM (Kohonen, 2013). As mentioned before, simulations, categories 1-2 and 50-99 have been
different values of these parameters can lead to mapped by the SOM to the same grid node. The
different classifications for the same input data higher the value of the cell matrix, the higher the
group. Hence: similarity between the corresponding time series of
the categories.
- We perform multiple SOM trainings, varying the
lambda parameter between 0.5 and 0.9.
A similarity matrix is obtained for each lambda value,
- We use various grid dimensions: 8:1, 4:2, 2:4, each selected temporal period in point (1.1) and
and 3:3, where the i in the pair i:j represents the each gris topology. Since the dataset and generated
number of rows and j represents the number of similarity matrices are extensive to be presented in
columns. this section, we only include the similarity matrices

48 Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small businesses in the face of 2008
financial crisis and COVID-19

Table 1. Similarity Matrix for lambda=0.5 period 2008- Table 3. Similarity Matrix for lambda=0.5 period 2020-
2013 topology 3×3 2022 topology 3×3.

2008-2013 lambda=0.5 2020-2022 lambda=0.5
0-0 1-2 3-5 6-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 >100 0-0 1-2 3-5 6-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 >100
0-0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0-0 100 100 100 19 19 19 19 71
1-2 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 1-2 100 100 100 19 19 19 19 71
3-5 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 3-5 100 100 100 19 19 19 19 71
6-9 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 6-9 19 19 19 100 100 100 100 46
10-19 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 10-19 19 19 19 100 100 100 100 46
20-49 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 20-49 19 19 19 100 100 100 100 46
50-99 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 50-99 19 19 19 100 100 100 100 46
>100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 >100 71 71 71 46 46 46 46 100

Table 2. Similarity Matrix for lambda=0.8 period 2008- Table 4. Similarity Matrix for lambda=0.8 period 2020-
2013 topology 3×3. 2022 topology 3×3.

2008-2013 lambda=0.8 2020-2022 lambda=0.8
0-0 1-2 3-5 6-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 >100 0-0 1-2 3-5 6-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 >100
0-0 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0-0 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-2 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1-2 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
3-5 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 3-5 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
6-9 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 6-9 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
10-19 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 10-19 0 0 0 0 100 81 0 0
20-49 0 0 0 0 0 100 11 0 20-49 0 0 0 0 81 100 0 0
50-99 0 0 0 0 0 11 100 0 50-99 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
>100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 >100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100

for the periods 2008-2013 and 2020-2022, lambda 2011; Dörr et al., 2022; OECD, 2021; Titus, 2004;
values of 0.5 and 0.9 and grid topology 3x3 in Tables World Bank, 2019). Additionally, it shows that the
1 to 4. categories chosen are independent of each other,
and thus, the data chosen for our analysis is valid,
The results in the rest of the temporal intervals and it adequately models the Spanish market from
analyzed are similar to what is observed in Tables the perspective of company survival during times
1 to 4. It can be observed that for small values of of crisis. For the Spanish market, the boundary
the lambda parameter, the SOM clearly distinguishes between large and small companies, in terms of their
between the performance of small-sized companies performance, appears to be around 10 employees
and large-sized companies. As the lambda parameter (the Spanish market is not characterized by the
increases, the SOM tends to segregate each category dominance of large companies).
of companies and classify them individually, except
for the category of 0 employees and 1-2 employees,
4.2. Seasonal decomposition analysis
which are consistently classified together. This
suggests that, overall, the performance reflected by Once we have verified the suitability of initial data
the analyzed data aligns with existing studies based stratification, we can perform the multiplicative
on the companies’ size (Cader and Leatherman, seasonal decomposition of the original data series.

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Sevilla et al.

The goal is to obtain a graphical representation of
these series that visually highlights the different
trends experienced by each of the analyzed categories
in the previous section.
In multiplicative seasonal decomposition, the
equations used to obtain the components of trend (T),
seasonality (S), and residuals (R) from the original
data (Y) are as follows (Box et al., 2015; Hyndman
and Athanasopoulos, 2018):

Trend (T): The trend is calculated using
an exponential smoothing (Holt-Winters):
T(t) = k * Y(y) + (1 – k) * T(t-1).
Figures 4. Residuals QQ plot for category 0.
Seasonality (S): Seasonality in the multiplicative
approach is obtained by dividing the original series
by the estimated trend: S(t) = Y(t) / T(t).

Residuals (R): They can be obtained by subtracting
the trend (T) and seasonality (S) from the original
series (Y): R(t) = Y(t) / (T(t) * S(t)).

Figure 3. displays the trends obtained for each of the
data series.

The goodness of the decomposition can be verified
by analyzing the residuals’ QQ plots (Figure 4
– companies with zero employees and Figure 5 –
companies with 100 employees). The residuals form
straight lines intersecting at (0, 1), meaning that they Figures 5. Residuals QQ plot for category 100.
follow a normal distribution. Similar results were
obtained for the remaining categories. The chart in Figure 3 reveals that, in the Spanish
market, small businesses exhibited better performance
This indicates that the model fit is appropriate, and than larger enterprises prior to the 2008 financial
the trends presented in Figure 3 are valid. crisis. Furthermore, large companies were affected

Figure 3. Bankruptcy seasonal decomposition 2005 - 2022.

50 Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small businesses in the face of 2008
financial crisis and COVID-19

earlier and more severely by the 2008 financial et al., 2017). Despite challenges, SMEs consistently
crisis. However, starting in 2014, the performance of outperformed large firms, with marginal differences
larger companies has been notably better than that in liabilities.
of small businesses, which have never been able to
regain their pre-2008 financial crisis performance.
In 2015 (CEDEC, 2015), challenges for Spanish
Additionally, they have been much more profoundly
SMEs were identified as internationalization,
impacted by the COVID crisis.
financing, and digital-focused innovation. OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development) emphasized SMEs’ role in low-
5. The 2008 Financial and productivity sectors, advocating digitalization for
COVID-19 Crisis: Challenges for productivity boost and global integration.
the Spanish SMEs
In 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic, the OECD
This section focuses on the challenges faced by (OECD, 2019) remarked the following points
Spanish SMEs across different economic periods regarding the SMEs in Spain: a) They create most of
from 2007 to 2022. Initially, we outline challenges the jobs in low-productivity and low-wage sectors.
before the 2008 financial crisis, followed by b) Innovation is crucial for boosting productivity,
competencies aiding survival during the crisis, and digitalization offers SMEs new opportunities
challenges in the 2015-2019 period, and the to be part of the new production revolution. c)
consensus on post-COVID-19 challenges. Digitalization can also help SMEs integrate into
global markets and global value chains. d) SMEs
The pre-2008 challenges for Spanish SMEs, need to better prepare for the digital transition. e)
identified by Camisón-Zorzona and de Lucio- Achieving these goals requires innovative policy
Fernández (2010), include internationalization, action and a whole-of-government approach. By
business organization, financing access, innovation, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a severe
and production efficiency enhancement. The 2008 recession. Lockdowns caused economic contractions,
financial crisis originated from a US housing market escalating unemployment, and increasing fiscal
bubble (Acharya et al., 2009; Jickling, 2009; Larissa- deficits.
Margareta et al., 2009), and profoundly impacted
Spain (Ortega and Peñalosa, 2012). Real estate In a study conducted in December 2021 by SAGE
and construction suffered, leading to bankruptcies (2022), the ability to adapt to change and the
and job losses (Betrán and Pons, 2017; Kapelko challenges derived from the COVID-19 pandemic
et al., 2017; Ortega and Peñalosa, 2012). Financial have been strongly driven by the following factors:
institutions faced crises that affected lending a) Customer-focused technology. b) Technology for
activities (Betrán and Pons, 2017). Unemployment internal processes. c) Development of new goods
surged, altering consumption patterns and impacting and services. d) Overhead cost reduction.
export-oriented industries. Academic consensus
on 2008 crisis survival factors includes strong According to the report presented by the insurance
financial management (Attig et al., 2016; Corbet, company Hiscox in 2022 (Hiscox España, 2022),
2016; Demırhan and Anwar, 2014; Tong and Wei, the main challenges to be addressed by Spanish
2011), income diversification (Brighi and Venturelli, SMEs are a) Hyperinflation and defaults, b) Supply
2014; Carroll and Stater, 2009; Vallascas et al., chain crisis and geopolitical instability. The study
2012), adaptability (Buheji, 2018; Meléndez, 2012; also highlights the strategic challenges of SMEs
Pal et al., 2012), brand strength (Giannarakis and in the Spanish market as: a) Digitalization, digital
Theotokas, 2011; Grundey, 2009; Raithel et al., marketing, and opening new commercial channels
2010), financing access (Banco de España, 2009; through e-commerce. b) Innovation to move forward.
Chor and Manova, 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., c) Search for strategic allies. SAGE (2022) also
2020; Sannajust and others, 2014), and cost reduction mentions the increase in costs and liquidity problems
(Fabiani et al., 2015; Su and Tang, 2016). Innovation as two of the main issues faced by Spanish SMEs.
emerges as a vital factor in transcending crises.
Spanish SMEs faced significant 2008 crisis impacts, Table 5 summarizes all the previous findings. It
with the Spanish Central Bank noting heightened presents a comparison between the challenges and
deterioration between 2008 and 2012 (Menéndez difficulties faced by SMEs identified in academic
literature and by economic institutions and

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Sevilla et al.

Table 5. Spanish’s SME challenges evolution from 2007 to the present, according to scholars.

Pre 2008 Crisis 2008 Crisis Recovery 2014-2019 Challenges COVID crisis Recovery
Financial management Financial management
Internationalization Internationalization
Income diversification Income diversification
Management and business
Adaptability and flexibility Adaptability and flexibility
organization
Brand Strength
Access to financing and Access to financing and
Access to financing and capital
capital capital
Productivity and efficiency Cost reduction Cost reduction
Innovation Innovation Innovation Innovation
Digitalization Digitalization

organizations during the 2008 crisis, the COVID-19 depends on the size of the company; Second, the type
pandemic, and the period between both events. The of crisis also influences the type of companies that
concepts that pursue the same objectives according survive it. Specifically, during the financial crisis of
to the cited sources are presented in the same row. 2008, which was a liquidity crisis, larger companies
For example, productivity and efficiency aim for experienced the impact of the crisis earlier and more
an improvement in the organization’s costs, while pronouncedly than smaller companies. However, the
management and business organization aim to market tendency during the COVID-19 crisis, which
enhance the organization’s adaptability capacity. was a demand crisis, followed an opposite pattern:
Large companies were significantly less affected by
Comparing post-2008 financial crisis and post-
the crisis than SMEs.
COVID scenarios in Table 5, commonalities emerge,
notably digitalization as a new factor. Access to Various international studies (Dörr et al., 2022;
financing, a concern in the 2008 recovery, now affects European Union, 2021; OECD, 2021) show that
only 14% of SMEs, signaling improved conditions. the COVID-19 crisis has had a highly unfavorable
However, 2022 shows a decrease in companies influence on SMEs, while large corporations have
reporting no financing obstacles, indicating an not only survived in better conditions but have also
evolving financial landscape post-COVID. Notably, thrived and grown notably during this period. This
brand strength and reputation, absent in available conduct, in principle, is similar to the observed
studies, may be due to their substantial cost, possibly conduct in the Spanish market; however, upon
challenging for many SMEs. These insights highlight deeper analysis, two notable differences between
dynamic shifts in challenges and opportunities, the two scenarios become apparent: In the Spanish
emphasizing the evolving role of digitalization in the market, there are scarcely any very large companies
post-COVID SME landscape. with a significant global market share, and these
companies have minimal activity in the technological
or pharmaceutical markets (BMEX, 2024).
6. Discussion
To seek an explanation for this phenomenon, a
It is well-known that there are differences in comparison is made for the Spanish market of the
management and perception of the environment responses and conduct exhibited by large companies
and associated risks between large corporations and and SMEs during the financial crisis of 2008 and
SMEs (Mafimisebi et al., 2023). As we have discussed the COVID-19 crisis. The analysis of these two
throughout the previous sections, the tendency of the events suggests that, while large Spanish companies
Spanish market during the COVID-19 crisis can be managed to learn and modify their conduct (at least
explained based on this fact. The preceding sections partially) after the financial crisis of 2008, Spanish
have presented and analyzed a series of statistical data SMEs did not leverage those circumstances as much,
suggesting two facts: First, in the Spanish market, and the modification of their practices and action
the survival of companies during times of crisis patterns was not as profound as necessary.

52 Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small businesses in the face of 2008
financial crisis and COVID-19

According to International Leaders UK (2023) directly relating to the question that initiates this
the major challenges for SMEs in Europe in 2023 section: Referring to Table 5, Could the contrast
include competitive pressure generated by the ease in how large and small companies address these
of doing business and reaching new customers aspects account for the observed divergence in their
provided by the digital economy, talent attraction performance following the 2008 crisis? Is it possible
and retention, access to financing, digitization, that, in the Spanish market, large companies have
cybersecurity, regulatory and normative systems, improved their resilience capacity after the 2008
and sustainability. When we compare these points crisis, while small companies have not learned
with those reflected in Table 5, we find only two enough from that crisis?
common points: digitization and access to financing.
If we focus on the innovation section, we find
If we study Table 5, we can see that access to that 85% of SMEs and 77% of large companies
capital and sources of financing, surprisingly, does in Spain believe that there is not enough support
not appear in the reports and analyses regarding for innovation. When comparing investment in
the situation of SMEs after COVID. According to innovation between large and small companies,
Leyton (2021) and SAGE (2022) the reason for this 26% of large companies increased their innovation
is that the Spanish government’s measures to ensure investment in 2020, while only 11% of SMEs did the
liquidity and access to financing in the Spanish same (Leyton, 2021). According to data provided by
market after the COVID crisis have been successful, the INE, this difference is even more pronounced, as
and at present, Spanish SMEs do not encounter more 38% of companies with over 250 employees invested
problems than usual in this regard. It is worth noting, in innovation, compared to 25% of companies in
however, that this is not an exclusive issue of the the range of 50 to 250 employees, and only 10% of
Spanish market; both SMEs and large companies companies with 10 to 49 employees did the same.
consider accessing national and European funds to In the period 2009-2020, the difference between
be a laborious and complicated process that is not large companies investing in innovation compared
always worthwhile. It is important to point out that to SMEs doing the same increased by 3.9% Spanish
of all the points mentioned in Table 5, this is the only National Insitute of Statistics, 2023).
one over which companies have no control, and it
does not depend on them to improve it. Regarding competitiveness, Eurostat statistics for
the entire EU in the period between 2011 and 2018,
Regarding digital transformation, from 2016 Russo et al. (2022) show that the competitiveness
onwards, there has been a strong institutional push of SMEs (i.e., companies with fewer than 250
in Europe to initiate what is known as the digital employees) significantly declined compared to that
transformation. Just as ease of access to financing of large enterprises. Three key indicators illustrate
is not within the control of companies but rather a this trend: 1) The increase in turnover was eight
market condition, digital transformation has not times smaller for SMEs than for large enterprises,
been a natural movement for companies in Europe. resulting in a significant loss of market share for
Instead, it is occurring due to institutional pressure SMEs. 2) Almost all new jobs were created by large
and the development of the 2030 agenda (González- enterprises, leading to a decrease in the SMEs’ share
Varona et al., 2021; Mićić, 2017). of total employment from 67% to 63%. 3) The value
added, reflecting income from operations, increased
Table 5 shows that Spanish SMEs have essentially by 11% in large enterprises but remained stagnant
been facing the same issues since at least the second for SMEs. Consequently, SMEs represented 52% of
half of the 2000s. We have observed that there are the value added in 2018, down from 58% in 2011.
certain challenges identified in the European context
that do not appear in the analyses conducted in the Financial management in large companies and small
Spanish market, and conversely, the challenges businesses (SMEs) presents significant differences
identified in the Spanish market do not appear in due to disparities in size, organizational structure,
the analysis for the European market (except for access to resources, and financial needs. It’s
access to financial resources and digitization, but we important to note that these deficiencies can vary
have argued about the exceptional nature of these by industry and region, and not all SMEs face the
two points). All of this leads us to conjecture that same challenges. However, these are some common
the situation of Spanish SMEs is due to endemic financial challenges that SMEs encounter compared
conditions in the Spanish economy and society, to large enterprises (Deloof, 2003; Durnev and

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 53
Sevilla et al.

Kim, 2005; Ongena et al., 2013). 1) Limited Access combination with the SMEs’ financial management
to Capital: SMEs often face difficulties in accessing issues, suggest that financial management in
adequate sources of financing. Large enterprises Spanish SMEs is improvable.
typically have more options and resources for
obtaining funding through capital markets and The data and discussion presented in the paper
issuing stocks or bonds. 2) Risk Management: suggest that Spanish SMEs and large companies
SMEs sometimes lack the resources and expertise recurrently face the same stressors and challenges,
for robust risk management. Large enterprises which sometimes become more pronounced but
generally have dedicated departments for financial seem to always be present. However, they have
risk management and hedging strategies. 3) addressed them from different perspectives. SMEs
Limited Financial Information: SMEs may have have taken a business continuity approach, while
less sophisticated accounting systems and fewer large companies has address them from a resilience
resources for generating detailed financial reports. perspective following the three phases (absorption-
Large enterprises usually have more advanced adaptation-learning) model.
financial information systems and greater capacity
for financial analysis. 4) Limited Diversification: The various publications and reports available
SMEs often heavily depend on a small number of over the past years indicate that these problems
customers or products, making them more vulnerable are well known both by the government and the
to market fluctuations. Large enterprises typically companies themselves (Camisón-Zorzona and
have a greater diversification of products and clients. de Lucio-Fernández, 2010; Ortega and Peñalosa,
5) Limited Human Resources: SMEs may struggle 2012; CEDEC, 2015; SAGE, 2022). From these
to attract and retain qualified financial talent. Large same reports, we deduce that over the years both
enterprises often have larger finance departments the companies and the respective governments
and can offer more attractive compensation have developed practices and policies aimed at
packages. 6) Limited Strategic Planning: SMEs correcting them. However, the data also indicates
may lack resources for long-term financial that for SMEs, the practices have not had a
strategic planning. Large enterprises frequently significant structural impact, as the problems
have dedicated strategic planning departments. 7) remain similar over the years. This suggests that
Treasury and Liquidity Management: SMEs may the issues have been addressed from a perspective
face challenges in effectively managing liquidity closer to business continuity, which is more short-
and treasury, which can lead to cash flow issues. term and focused on maintaining and securing
Large enterprises usually have more robust cash critical functions, rather than organizational
management processes. 8) Limited Negotiating resilience, which, as we have previously discussed,
Power: SMEs may have less negotiating power aims for organizational transformation through the
regarding financial agreements with banks and incorporation of knowledge acquired during times
suppliers compared to large enterprises. 9) Limited of crisis.
Economies of Scale: SMEs often have higher unit
costs due to a lack of economies of scale compared Various studies (Duchek 2020; Mokhtarifar et al.,
to large enterprises. 10) Regulatory Compliance: 2024; Garrido-Moreno et al., 2024) show that when
SMEs may struggle with regulatory compliance companies can deploy the process of absorption-
due to a lack of resources and expertise in this adaptation-learning, they achieve structural
area, while large enterprises often have dedicated improvements and adaptations that enable them
compliance departments. to more effectively manage and navigate highly
disruptive situations, which has not been the case
According to the Spanish Family Business agency for SMEs.
(Instituto de la empresa familiar, 2023), in the
Spanish market, 89% of the enterprises are family The presented data suggest a different pattern for
enterprises, only 52% of the CEOs have a university large companies, who have been able to deploy,
education, 61% of the companies are directed by with varying degrees of success, the resilience
one single person, and the skills and knowledge of process in its three phases (absorption-adaptation-
the candidate are relevant for selecting a CEO only learning).
for the 19% of the companies. These numbers, in

54 Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Resilience of Spanish Firms: a comparative analysis of large and small businesses in the face of 2008
financial crisis and COVID-19

By jointly analyzing the trends in bankruptcy Can the evolution of the number of companies in
evolution after the 2008 financial crisis and the insolvency across different enterprise categories
major problems previously mentioned, for large (based on the number of employees) in Spain be
companies in Spain, we can conclude that they explained from the perspective of organizational
have somehow managed to deploy the complete resilience?
cycle of organizational resilience (absorption-
adaptation-learning) that would have allowed them The response of the Spanish market during the
to capitalize on and leverage the lessons provided COVID-19 crisis can be generally explained
by the 2008 financial crisis when dealing with the based on the antecedents and response of Spanish
COVID-19 pandemic. companies to the 2008 financial crisis. In our view,
this provides evidence that supports theoretical
models conceptualizing organizational resilience
7. Conclusions and future work as a dynamic process consisting of three phases:
1) Absorption. 2) Adaptation. 3) Learning. Above
The purpose of the article was to discern whether all, the ability to fully deploy the resilience process
the evolution of the number of companies in increases the chances of being resilient in the future.
insolvency across different enterprise categories
(based on the number of employees) in Spain can Additionally, we have found indications that there
be explained from the perspective of organizational may be a positive correlation between the degree
resilience. From this premise, three questions arise: of implementation of the digital economy and the
1) Does the size of a company influence its survival recovery capacity after a highly disruptive crisis
capacity during any crisis? 2) Does the type of such as the COVID-19 crisis.
crisis influence the type of companies that survive?
3) Can the evolution of the number of companies Limitations of the study: The statistical data
in insolvency across different enter-prise categories available for this study is neither exhaustive nor
(based on the number of employees) in Spain be complete, and it would be beneficial to have data
explained from the perspective of organizational from other countries with economies of similar size
resilience? and dynamics to assert the presented conclusions
more rigorously.
In the paper, we have provided the data and
references we consider necessary to answer these Future work: We understand that the results
questions appropriately. presented are significant when dealing with highly
disruptive events, such as the 2008 and COVID-19
Does the size of a company influence its survival crises. It would be interesting to extend the analysis
capacity during any crisis? of the research questions posed to more routine
situations where the nature of events is not as
According to the statistical data available, the size of dramatic, and therefore, they do not affect as many
a company does appear to be related to its survival organizations simultaneously but still compromise
capacity during a crisis of disruptive magnitude. the stability and viability of some. To conduct this
There is not enough information to extend this work, more information is needed, which can only
conclusion to crises of a lesser scale. come from the organizations themselves.

Does the type of crisis influence the type of
companies that survive? Acknowledgments
The type of crisis may have some influence on Not completed for double-blind review.
the type of companies that survive it. The data we
have covers the years 2005 to 2023, which includes
only two crises of disruptive magnitude (the 2008 Authors contribution
financial crisis and the COVID-19 crisis), so
extending this conclusion on a general level cannot Not completed for double-blind review.
be done.

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Int. J. Prod. Manag. Eng. (2025) 13(1), 45-58 55
Sevilla et al.

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