Federal Pandemic Relief and Academic Recovery (NBER Working Paper 32897, September 2024)
Summary
NBER Working Paper 32897, dated September 2024, is titled Federal Pandemic Relief and Academic Recovery and lists as authors Dewey, Fahle, Kane, Reardon and Staiger. The abstract measures the effect of district use of federal pandemic relief during the 2022-23 school year for a sample of more than 5000 districts in 29 states. It reports that each $1000 in spending per student was associated with a .0086 SD improvement in math and a .0049 SD improvement in reading. As a placebo test, the authors find no relationship between federal dollars that were not yet spent during the 2022-23 year. The paper concludes that federal dollars contributed to the recovery and helped narrow gaps in achievement that had widened during the pandemic.
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NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
FEDERAL PANDEMIC RELIEF AND ACADEMIC RECOVERY
Dan C. Dewey
Erin M. Fahle
Thomas J. Kane
Sean F. Reardon
Douglas O. Staiger
Working Paper 32897
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32897
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
September 2024
We thank Pete Claar at SchoolDigger, Sadie Richardson, Julia Paris, Demetra Kalogrides, Jie
Min, and Jiyeon Shim for their assistance in producing the Stanford Education Data Archive
(SEDA) data used in this paper. We thank staff at the U.S. Department of Education and Sarah
Reber at Brookings Institution for providing data and technical details regarding the Title I
program. We received data on spending of federal relief dollars from Dennis and Julie Roche at
Burbio and Marguerite Roza at the Edunomics Lab at Georgetown University. Victoria
Carbonari and Dean Kaplan at the Harvard Center for Education Policy Research provided
research assistance. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and the National
Assessment Governing Board provided data on student achievement by state which we used to
rescale state proficiency data. The research was supported by grants from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, Bloomberg Philanthropies, and Kenneth C. Griffin. The Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation has separately provided funding to the Stanford Education Data
Archive. The opinions expressed here are ours and do not represent views of NCES, the U.S.
Department of Education, or any of the funders. The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
At least one co-author has disclosed additional relationships of potential relevance for this
research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w32897
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been
peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies
official NBER publications.
© 2024 by Dan C. Dewey, Erin M. Fahle, Thomas J. Kane, Sean F. Reardon, and Douglas O.
Staiger. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted
without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
Federal Pandemic Relief and Academic Recovery
Dan C. Dewey, Erin M. Fahle, Thomas J. Kane, Sean F. Reardon, and Douglas O. Staiger
NBER Working Paper No. 32897
September 2024
JEL No. I20, I21, I22, I24, I28
ABSTRACT
We measure the effect of district use of federal pandemic relief during the 2022-23 school year for
a sample of more than 5000 districts in 29 states. We rely on several plausibly exogenous sources
of variation in federal grants: differences in state Title I funding formulas, estimation error
in Census local area poverty rates and differences in eligibility for federal Title I and subsidized
lunch eligibility. We find that each $1000 in spending per student was associated with
a .0086 SD improvement in math and a .0049 SD improvement in reading. Both are
consistent with a recent meta-analysis of spending impacts by Jackson and Mackevicius (2023).
As a placebo test, we find no relationship between federal dollars that were not yet spent
during the 2022-23 year. We also find similar results using synthetic control group methods to
compare high-poverty districts with high and low amounts of federal aid, but with similar trends
in achievement through 2022. Because the federal aid was targeted at higher poverty
districts, we find the federal dollars not only contributed to the recovery, but also helped
narrow the gaps in achievement which had widened during the pandemic.
Dan C. Dewey Sean F. Reardon
Harvard University Stanford University
daniel_dewey@gse.harvard.edu CERAS Building
520 Galvez Mall, #526
Erin M. Fahle Stanford, CA 94305-3084
Stanford University sean.reardon@stanford.edu
520 Galvez Mall
Stanford, CA 94305 Douglas O. Staiger
efahle@stanford.edu Dartmouth College
Department of Economics
Thomas J. Kane HB6106, 301 Rockefeller Hall
Harvard Graduate School of Education Hanover, NH 03755-3514
Center for Education Policy Research and NBER
50 Church St., 4th Floor douglas.staiger@dartmouth.edu
Cambridge, MA 02138
and NBER
kaneto@gse.harvard.edu
I Introduction
Since the beginning of the War on Poverty, social scientists have been investigating the
link between unequal school spending and gaps in achievement by race and income (see, e.g.,
Coleman et al 1966; Handel & Hanushek 2023; Jackson & Mackevicius 2024). Over the decades,
research has shown that certain interventions—such as pre-school, reduced class size in early
grades, summer learning and high-dosage tutoring—do have positive causal impacts on student
achievement (Harris 2009; Nickow, Oreopolous, Quan 2020). So, while there is no longer a
question of whether more money for schools could improve student outcomes, there is still a
question of efficiency: when given additional funds, how effectively do school boards and district
leaders spend them to improve student outcomes and by how much?
The recent influx of federal pandemic relief provides a fresh opportunity to test the
relationship between spending and achievement. During 2020 and 2021, the federal government
approved three aid packages totaling nearly $190 billion for elementary and secondary schools,
ninety percent of which was provided directly to local school districts with little federal or state
oversight. The aid was not based on student learning losses nor on the amount of time students
were out of school. In fact, the final package of aid was approved in March 2021, while many
schools were still operating remotely and before the magnitude of losses were even known.
Instead, the federal aid was distributed based on districts’ funding under the federal Title I program
in fiscal years 2019 and 2020.
Because Title I funding is based on local poverty rates for school-age children, the federal
relief went primarily to higher poverty districts. Therefore, our primary empirical challenge is
distinguishing between the effect of the additional spending and the effect of community poverty.
We take two different approaches to accomplish this.
First, we measure the relationship between federal pandemic relief spending per student
and the change in district achievement between spring 2022 and 2023, while statistically
controlling for a variety of district characteristics, such as student demographics and two different
measures of community poverty (the share of school-age children living in the district meeting
Title I eligibility criteria and the share of public school students eligible for federal subsidized
lunches).
Our estimate of the impact of the federal relief spending is in line with a recent meta-
analysis of pre-pandemic studies on the effect of education spending (Jackson and Mackevicius,
2024). While Jackson and Mackevicius (2024) report an impact of .0079 SD per $1000 increase
in spending per student, we find a .0086 SD rise in math and a .0049 SD rise in reading scores per
$1000 of federal relief spending. After controlling for federal relief dollars spent and other district
characteristics, we find no relationship between federal relief dollars that had not yet been spent
by May-June 2023 and achievement growth during 2022-23. We take the latter as a form of placebo
test, since dollars not yet spent should have no relationship to achievement growth.
We investigate the role of three specific sources of variation in district spending. To test
whether our findings are driven by the timing of district expenditures, we use total federal relief
per student as an instrumental variable for district spending (essentially assuming districts spent
the same share of funds during the 2022-23 school year) and find that the districts which received
larger allocations increased more and that the implied effect of dollars spent was similar to our
earlier estimates.
We also focus on the differences in relief spending driven by differences in state Title I
funding formulae. The majority of the pandemic relief ($175 billion of $190 billion) was based on
Title I allocations during fiscal year 2020. Since the pandemic relief amounted to more than 10
times the federal Title I funding in that year, the funding magnified pre-existing anomalies in the
Title I formula. For instance, if a district in one state received $500 more Title I dollars per student
than a similar district in another state during fiscal year 2020, they would have received roughly
$5,000 more per student in federal pandemic aid. When we focus on the differences in spending
attributable to differences in state Title I formulae, we also see positive impacts consistent with
prior research.
Finally, we focus on differences in relief spending driven by seemingly random fluctuations
in district poverty estimates provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Although the latter are the
most plausibly exogenous source of variation we use, these estimates are also the most imprecise:
while not statistically distinguishable from zero, they are also not distinguishable from Jackson
and Mackevicius (2024) or our other estimates.
As a second test, we identify high poverty districts with similar trends in achievement
between 2016 and 2022, but which received differing amounts of federal aid per student. While
our first strategy prioritized controlling for measurable district characteristics, the second strategy
prioritizes controlling for any unmeasured factors underlying district achievement trends. Of 732
districts with more than 70 percent of students receiving federal lunch subsidies in our data, we
identify 143 districts which received unusually large ESSER allocations per student (more than
$8200 per student) and compare them with combinations of districts with unusually small ESSER
allocations (less than $4600 per student), but with similar trends in achievement between 2016 and
2022. We find that the average scores for students in high-grant districts increased by .055 SD
more in math and .048 SD more in reading between 2022 and 2023. Given a difference in spending
between the two groups of $2800 per student, our second set of estimates imply an impact per
dollar spent of roughly .02 standard deviations per $1000 spent, roughly double our first set of
estimates, though the confidence intervals on these estimates are large and do not rule out effects
of the same magnitude as Jackson and Mackevicius (2024).
As a final test, we report results using more detailed spending data in California. We find
that dollars spent prior to 2022 testing or after 2023 testing were not related to 2022 to 2023
improvement. We also find larger effects for dollars spent on academic recovery efforts, as
opposed to other allowable uses.
In sum, our results imply that the federal pandemic relief contributed to academic recovery
during the 2022-23 school year, and that the impacts were in line with what would have been
expected from prior research. Because the federal relief dollars were disproportionately targeted
at low-income districts, our results imply that they helped narrow the gaps which widened during
the pandemic. We close by discussing ways that any additional aid—such as from states—could
be structured to yield larger impacts on student achievement and close the remaining gaps
II Literature Review
In a recent review of the literature, Jackson and Mackevicius (2024) identify 32 studies
employing quasi-experimental designs to study the effect of school spending on student outcomes.
The authors excluded cross-sectional correlational analyses and limited themselves to studies using
more plausibly exogenous design-based controls—regression discontinuity, difference-in-
differences, event studies or instrumental variables. For the subset of studies using test scores as
an outcome, their meta-analysis implied an average impact of .0316 standard deviations per $1000
increase in spending over 4 years. Since we are looking at the impact of higher spending within a
single academic year, 2022-23, we divide the estimated impact by four, yielding an estimate of
.0079 standard deviations per $1000 in a single year.
Although .0079 SD per $1000 is the mean impact of spending from general revenues, many
targeted academic interventions have been shown to have greater impact per dollar spent. For
instance, in summarizing the research from the Tennessee class size experiment, Harris (2009)
concluded that the Tennessee classroom size experiment, which reduced K-3 class size from an
average of 22 students per teacher to 15 students per teacher, generated average gains of .063 SD
per $1000 spent. 1 Harris (2009) also summarized the evidence from an evaluation of the Success
0F
for All whole school reform model (Borman et al. 2007), and concluded that the implied impact
was .085 SD per $1000 spent (when converted from 2007 to 2022 dollars). More recently, Guryan
et al. (2023) report on the effect of two high-dosage tutoring programs for secondary students,
finding a pooled impact of .28 standard deviations for those participating in a program costing
$3500 per student. That would have translated into .08 standard deviations per $1000 spent—
roughly 10 times the impact of an increase in general funds reported by Jackson and Mackevicius
(2024). Thus, even if more spending is related to higher student outcomes, there may be
opportunities to increase the bang for the buck.
The federal pandemic relief dollars were not intended solely for academic recovery. Indeed,
the American Rescue Plan only required districts to spend a minimum of 20 percent on academic
recovery. For instance, many districts purchased masks for students and teachers and distributed
food and devices. Yet, in a typical year, districts spend a much larger share of their revenues on
instruction. Of the $769 billion in annual expenditures for public K-12 education in 2018-19 (the
year before the pandemic), the National Center for Education Statistics reports that public school
districts spent more than 20 percent (52 percent) on instruction. 2 For this reason, one might have
1F
expected the impact per dollar spent to have been lower than found in the prior research.
1
Table 3 in Harris (2009) reports a short term cost effectiveness ratio for participating students of .086 standard
deviations per $1000 of 2007 dollars. We converted to 2022 dollars using the CPI-U, dividing by 1.37.
2
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d23/tables/dt23_236.10.asp?current=yes
III Data
To measure the impact of the federal pandemic relief dollars, we use data on test scores,
district-level poverty rates, Title I funding, federal pandemic relief funding, district characteristics
and the percent of the 2020-21 school year that the district was operating remotely or a hybrid of
remote and in-person instruction. We obtain these data from multiple sources, describing each
source of data in the following sections.
Test score data
Our outcome measures are estimates of district average test scores, based on state
standardized tests in math and reading in grades 3 through 8, from 2016-2019 and in 2022 and
2023. 3 Most states do not report average test scores, however. Instead, they report the proportion
of students in a district who score at each of several state-defined proficiency levels. Assuming
that the raw scores in each district are normally distributed, we use heteroskedastic ordered probit
models to estimate the mean score in each district from the counts in each proficiency category
(for details on this method, see Reardon, Kalogrides, & Ho, 2021; Reardon, Shear, Castellano, &
Ho, 2017; Shear & Reardon, 2021). The method yields estimates of district average scores that are
comparable among districts in the same state-year-grade. However, state math and reading tests,
and the scale in which scores are reported, differ among states and grades; in some cases, they vary
over time within the same state-grade. To put the scores from each state’s test on the same scale,
we link the state test scores to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test scale,
using methods described in Reardon, Kalogrides, and Ho (2021). We then standardize the scores
within each grade relative to the national student-level distribution of scores in 2019. Following
this, we estimate average district scores that are comparable over time and across states within
each grade. To pool the average scores across grades within a district, we regress average scores
on a linear grade term (centered at grade 5.5, so that our estimates apply to the middle grade of the
data even in cases where data is missing for one or mode grades in a district). Details on the
construction of the estimates are provided in Fahle et al (2024b).
Because many states waived testing requirements in 2020 and 2021 due to the pandemic,
we measure pandemic losses by comparing achievement in Spring 2019 and Spring 2022. Thus,
we measure academic recovery as the change in average test scores from Spring 2022 to Spring
2023, even though many districts will have started recovery efforts during the 2021-22 school year.
Because the NAEP test was not administered in 2023 (and the 2024 results are not yet
available), we cannot yet put the 2023 proficiency categories on the NAEP scale. Instead, we
contacted the department of education in each state and inquired about any changes to state
assessments or proficiency definitions. 29 of the 42 states for whom we had 2022 district-level
3
We use test score data from the Spring of 2016-2019 and from Spring 2022 and Spring 2023. Data for the years
2016-2019 is available for all states from EDFacts. We collected 2022 and 2023 test score results from state
department of education websites.
scores reported that their tests and proficiency thresholds remained unchanged. We then use our
estimates of the 2022 proficiency thresholds to estimate 2023 district scores in that subset of
states. 4
.
Because students in any given state take the same tests in a given grade and year, a
comparison of test score changes between two districts in the same state does not depend on our
method of linking test scores to a common scale across states and over time (using NAEP though
2022 and using the stability of state proficiency thresholds from 2022-2023). But comparisons
between districts in different states do rely on the accuracy of the linking. The linking is not exact,
both because the state NAEP estimates used for linking contain sampling error, and because, even
when a state does not change its test from one year to the next, the tests are not identical—they
contain different items—and so their scales are not perfectly identical. As a result, within-state
comparisons of changes (including estimates from state fixed effects models) are less error-prone
than between-state comparisons. That said, Reardon, Kalogrides, and Ho (2021) demonstrated that
the NAEP-based linking yield valid comparisons across states, albeit with some uncertainty.
Because we control for local area poverty rates from the Census Bureau, we focus on
traditional school districts which have geographic boundaries. Although some charter schools are
administered by their local district and, thus, are included with the district estimates, we do not
include independent charter schools which constitute their own local education agency.
Our final analysis sample consists of 5812 districts in 29 states. Table 1 reports the
characteristics of our final analysis sample against the full set of traditional public school districts
in the 42 states whose achievement we measured in 2019 and 2022.
The analysis sample is similar to the full sample. The achievement losses in math and
reading (.149 and .095 SD respectively) were comparable to those in the full sample of 42 states
(.154 and .092 SD respectively). The students were similar demographically and the amount of aid
districts received under ESSER II and the American Rescue Plan were similar ($3167 vs. $3129
per student). The primary difference is that the average district in the analysis sample spent a
somewhat larger share of the 2021 school year in remote and hybrid instruction (30 and 43 percent
respectively vs. 24 and 37 percent in the full set of states.)
4
When the 2024 NAEP results become available in early 2025, we will update our 2023 estimates, by interpolating
between the 2022 and 2024 NAEP-based estimates.
Local Area Poverty Estimates
To identify sources of variation in Title I grants, we use estimates of the number and
percentage of eligible children living in more than 13,000 geographical school districts for fiscal
years 2013 through 2023. Although the number of eligible children includes children in other
categories (such as the number of foster children, neglected and delinquent children and students
attending Bureau of Indian Education schools in the district), the primary driver of Title I
allocations is the estimated number and percentage of school age children (those aged 5-17) living
in poverty.
The Census bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program provides
the poverty estimates annually, using administrative data (from the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) and geographically-linked federal tax records) as well as survey data
from the American Community Survey.
Because many school districts are quite small, the poverty rate estimates are subject to
substantial measurement error. As an illustration, Figure 1 plots the annual changes in the percent
of 5–17-year-olds estimated to meet Title I eligibility between fiscal year 2013 and 2023 (on the
vertical axis). On the horizontal axis, we plot the number of 5–17-year-olds estimated to live within
the district boundaries. There are obviously large swings in the share of 5–17-year-olds considered
to be eligible for Title I (sometimes larger than 25 percentage points in the smaller districts).
Figure 2 portrays the trend over time in estimated eligibility rates in one district, Gary,
Indiana, between 2013 and 2023. The dotted line portrays the trend in the estimates. The rate
increased sharply in Fiscal Year 2020, which was fortunate for residents of Gary since 2020 was
the year upon which the bulk of the federal pandemic relief dollars were based. As a result, Gary’s
Title I allocation increased by 23 percent between 2019 and 2020, from $11.4 million to $14.0
million. Given that the ESSER II and American Rescue Plan allocations were based on the 2020
estimates, the change resulted in $26 million more in federal ESSER dollars.
However, not all of the fluctuation depicted in Figure 2 appears to be random. Eligibility
rates have been drifting down in Gary since 2013. That means that it would be problematic to use
any change over time in eligibility rates as an instrument for federal pandemic relief. For instance,
if eligibility rates had been higher in 2020 than in 2023, it would mean that a district received a
larger ESSER grant than other districts with the same 2023 eligibility rate. But it might also mean
that the community was becoming richer (less poor), with an expected upward trend in
achievement. Due to the underlying trend in true eligibility, the estimated effect of spending could
be biased upward.
Thus, we attempted to isolate the seemingly random fluctuation in eligibility rates due to
measurement error from the systemic, structural trend. To do so, we used a Hodrick-Prescott time
series filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) to separate out the structural trend in the time series
(portrayed by the red curve) from the actual (the dotted line). Changes in eligibility along the
structural trend (the red line) could be directly related to achievement and thus could lead to bias.
But if the fluctuation in eligibility rates around the trend line truly were due to measurement error
in the American Community Survey and other sources, they would be related to ESSER grants but
should not be directly related to achievement. To find the variation ESSER funding which was
truly “as good as random”, we use the difference between what the district actually received in FY
2020 vs. the amount the district would have received if the percentage of eligible children had
followed the structural trend (the red line).
In Figure 3, we plot the difference in grants per child aged 5-17 due to the seemingly random
fluctuations in eligibility rates around the structural trend (along the vertical axis). We plot the
differences by the number of school-age children (ages 5-17) in each district (on the horizontal
axis). Note that much of the variation is isolated to small districts, with fewer than 5,000 school
age children. Moreover, because hold harmless provisions mute the effect of downward
fluctuations, most of the points are positive. Although the results are imprecise, we use this
variation as an instrumental variable in our empirical analysis.
Title I Program Data
In addition to the data on the number and proportion of children estimated to be eligible in
each district, we received data on the Title I allocations for fiscal years 2013 through 2023. States
adjust the Title I allocations calculated based on the population living within school district
boundaries, redistributing those dollars to the traditional public schools and to charter districts
based on estimates of the number of poor children they educate. In addition, a state can request
approval to use alternate data (e.g., school lunch data) to redistribute the federal department’s
allocations for small districts (defined in ESEA as having a total Census population below 20,000).
Currently 11 States have the federal department’s approval to redistribute their small LEAs'
allocations. We obtained data on state-adjusted Title I allocations for districts from ED Data
Express and used them to allocate Title I aid proportionately.
Federal Pandemic Relief Spending
The first package of federal pandemic relief for schools ($13.2 billion) had to be obligated
by districts by the end of September 2022. Because we are investigating achievement gains
between Spring 2022 and Spring 2023, we focus on the second two packages, ESSER II ($54
billion) and the American Rescue Plan or ESSER III ($122 billion). We received data from a
private company, Burbio, on the amount of ESSER III funding each district received as well as the
amount of money districts reported spending as of specific dates (although the dates varied by
state). For 5 states, we supplemented the Burbio data with data from the website Edunomics.org,
including ESSER II allocations. Since ESSER II and ESSER III were distributed proportionally
within each state using the same rules, we impute missing ESSER II allocations using the district’s
ESSER III allocation and the ratio of the state’s total ESSER II and III allocations. We used the
total amount districts reported having spent from ESSER II/III in the earliest available reporting
window in May 2023 or later. Since ESSER II had to be obligated by September 2023 we assume
all ESSER II allocation was spent between Spring 2022 and Spring 2023. Due to ESSER III data
availability, 50% of districts have reporting windows before August 2023, with 80% before
December 2023. This means our spending measures likely overstate the amount spent between
Spring 2022 and Spring 2023, as we may be capturing spending either prior to Spring 2022 or after
Spring 2023, thereby making our estimates more conservative. We find that controlling flexibly
for the date spent does not impact our regression results.
For districts in California, we also used more detailed data on expenditures of federal
dollars by quarter and by use. (Districts reported separately expenditures for academic recovery
and other uses.)
Federal Subsidized Lunch Eligibility
We use district free and reduced-price lunch eligibility (FRLE) rate estimates computed
from the Longitudinal Imputed School Dataset (LISD) (Reardon et al, 2024). The LISD includes
reported or imputed school-level FRLE rates for each public school in the U.S. for the school years
1998-99 through 2022-23. The FRLE rates are based on data from the Common Core of Data
(CCD). In the CCD, however, FRLE rates are missing in some cases and clearly erroneous in
others; in addition, schools that are identified as using providing meals through the Community
Eligibility Provision (CEP) often have FRLE rates reported as 100%, even though not all students
in the school are individually eligible for FRL. In cases of missing or erroneous FRLE values, the
reported values are replaced by imputed FRLE rates. The imputation uses data from the same
school in other years, and uses FRLE rates, racial composition, the proportion of students identified
as economically disadvantaged in the EDFacts data, the school’s direct certification rate, the
school’s Title I status, and the child poverty rate in the school’s census tract (as measured by the
5-year ACS) (details on the imputation process are available in Reardon et al, 2024). District FRLE
rates are computed as an enrollment-weighted average of the LISD FRLE rates among each
district’s schools.
There are a number of differences between district poverty as measured by federal free
lunch participation and the local area poverty rates on which the Title I program relies. The federal
FRLE rates are based on the number of students who apply for federally subsidized lunches (or
are imputed for CEP schools, where all students are eligible), whereas the Title I formula percent
is based on estimated poverty rates within a district’s boundaries. FRLE rates include students with
incomes less than 185% of the poverty line while Title I eligibility includes only residents below
the poverty line. FRPL is based on data reported by public schools; Title I eligibility is based on
all children age 5-17 living in the district boundaries, regardless of whether they attend a district-
administered public school (as opposed to not being enrolled, being home-schooled, or attending
a private school, a non-district-administered charter school, or a school outside the district).
Moreover, Title I eligibility is based in part on sample-based poverty rate estimates (from the
ACS), whereas FRLE rates are based on administrative counts from the schools.
Thus, we have two measures of local community poverty: the share of students receiving
federal subsidized lunches and the local area poverty rates provided by Census. In our analysis,
we use both as controls for local area poverty.
Percent of 2020-21 School Year in Remote/Hybrid Instruction
We created a measure of the share of the 2020-21 school year each district was operating
remotely or some hybrid or remote and in-person instruction by combining two data sources. The
Return to Learn (R2L) tracker, assembled by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), includes
weekly district-level data on mode of instruction (in-person, hybrid, or remote) from August 2020
through June 2021 for 98 percent of enrollment in U.S. school districts with 3 or more schools.
The R2L data are based on public information released by school districts and define a district as
remote if no students older than first grade had an in-person option. We take the average weekly
value from the week of September 7, 2020, through the week of June 7, 2021, the period during
which 95%+ of included districts have available data.
Our second source of data, the COVID-19 School Data Hub (CSDH) tracks whether a
school or district was remote, hybrid, or in-person in 48 states throughout the 2020-21 school year.
The CSDH data are based on a survey of state education agencies, and as a result, the CSDH data
vary substantially by state in terms of frequency (ranging from weekly to semesterly) and unit
(district or school) of available data. The CSDH data define a district as remote if “all or most”
students participated in virtual schooling. We take the average value from October 2020 through
May 2021, the months in which all states have available data.
Each measure is likely subject to error. Under the assumption that such errors would be
independent, we take the average of the R2L and CSDH values to average out the noise in each.
We impute the average when either value is missing. For example, if a district is missing R2L
values, we regress the R2L/CSDH average value on the CSDH value among districts that have
both values and use the prediction from this regression to impute that district’s average value.
IV How the Title I Program Works
Because the federal pandemic relief was based on Title I allocations, the legislative
compromises which have shaped the Title I funding formula over the years also determined how
the federal relief dollars were distributed. Figure 4 reports the mean Title I allocation per
population aged 5-17 by the percentage of school-age children eligible for Title I for each of seven
states. 5 Title I allocations per child are typically zero for the lowest poverty districts (those with
4F
5
These figures were fitted with a linear spline function, with knots at 2 percent, 5 percent and 15 percent eligible.
Although not a perfect fit (for instance, large districts can qualify for a concentrated grant even if they have fewer than
15 percent poor children, as long as they have more than 6500 eligible children), the fitted spline functions shown in
Figure 4 are a good summary. The fitted splines explain 98 percent of the variance in Title I grants per population for
those districts not subject to hold harmless provisions.
fewer than two percent eligible children). The relationship between eligibility and allocations
steepens at five and fifteen percent eligible children. The reason is that there are four types of Title
I grants (basic, targeted, educational finance incentive grants and concentrated grants), each of
which has a different eligibility threshold. A district becomes eligible for a basic grant starting at
two percent eligible children. The targeted and education finance incentive grants start at five
percent; the concentrated grants start at 15 percent. As each type of grant is layered in, the
relationship between grant dollars and the percentage of children who are eligible becomes steeper.
At any given percentage of eligible children (equivalent to drawing a vertical line in Figure
4), Title I grants vary depending upon the state where the district is located. For instance, a district
with 40 percent of children meeting the eligibility formula would have received $572 per child in
Tennessee, $652 per child in Alabama, $742 in California, $769 in Ohio, $870 in Illinois, $957 in
Massachusetts, $1069 in South Dakota and $1602 in New Hampshire. 6 In other words, for very
5F
poor districts, there is roughly a $1000 difference in Title I allocations per child for those in New
Hampshire vs. those in Alabama or Tennessee.
Such differences in state formulae are driven by two primary factors: state average per
pupil expenditures and the minimum grants for small states. 7 In general, when states increase their
6F
average per pupil spending, districts will receive more Title I funding for each poor child. Higher
spending per pupil is the primary reason why districts in Massachusetts or Illinois receive more
funding than districts in Alabama and Tennessee with the same percentage of eligible children.
However, poor districts in small states also benefit tremendously from the way the Title I
funding formula works. The states with the largest Title I grants in Figure 4 (New Hampshire and
South Dakota) are not particularly high spending states. One reason is that federal law guarantees
that small states receive a minimum share of appropriations for each of the four Title I grant
programs. But, in Figure 4, it is not just the average grant that is higher in South Dakota and New
Hampshire; the slope is steeper—meaning that poor districts especially benefit from the small state
minimum. The reason for the steeper slope is an indirect result of the fact that Title I is not fully
funded. For example, based on program rules, districts were eligible for 7 times more funding
under the Title I basic grant program than Congress appropriated in FY 2021 (Gordon and Reber
2023). When appropriations fall short of authorized grants, Title I allocations are proportionally
reduced within a state. Thus, when a state’s appropriation is boosted by the small state minimum,
the allocations are increased proportionally, meaning that districts in small states receive
allocations closer to authorized formula. The states that benefited from the small state minimums
in FY 2020 were Vermont, Wyoming, North Dakota, New Hampshire, DC, Alaska, South Dakota
and Montana (Gordon and Reber 2023).
Finally, all four types of Title I grants are subject to “hold harmless” provisions. Depending
on its current poverty rate, a district is guaranteed a minimum of between 85 and 95 percent of
6
For an excellent explanation of the Title I formula, see Gordon and Reber (2023).
7
On paper, there are other factors that matter as well, such as the “state equity factor” (based on the coefficient of
variation in expenditures per student across districts in the state) and the “state effort factor” (a function of the ratio
of education spending per child and per capita income). However, as Gordon and Reber (2023) show, those
adjustments have little effect on the state differences illustrated in Figure 4.
their Title I grant from the previous year. That means that a positive fluctuation in a district’s
poverty rate will not only increase a district’s grant in that year, but often for several years
afterward. The hold harmless provisions also dampen the effect of negative fluctuations.
In Figure 5, we report the variation in ESSER II and ARP grants received per student by
the percentage of students receiving federally subsidized lunches. Note that while average funding
per student is higher in higher poverty districts, the range in the size of grants per student also fans
out. In the highest poverty districts (those with 80-100 percent of students receiving subsidized
lunches), the 10th percentile district received $3618 per eligible student. However, the 90th
percentile district in that group received over $7,000 more per student ($10,720). An important
driver of the fanning out is the difference in state Title I allocations per student illustrated in Figure
4.
Total funding for the Title I program was $16 billion in FY 2020, while the total funding
for ESSER II and ARP was $175 billion—slightly more than 10 times more. Because the federal
relief funds were distributed proportional to each district’s FY 2020 Title I allocation, the relief
packages essentially multiplied the differences in the state formulae by 10: a $1000 difference in
Title I grant per student became a $10,000 difference in federal pandemic relief per student. In our
analysis, we use this variation to investigate the impact of federal pandemic relief on student
achievement.
V. Effect of District Spending Controlling for District Characteristics
We take two different approaches to measuring the impact of ESSER spending on recovery
during 2022-23. In this section, we focus on the relationship between the change in achievement
between 2022 and 2023 and federal pandemic relief spending, controlling for district
characteristics. In a second set of analyses, we identify a subset of high-poverty districts with large
ESSER grants and compare their recovery to a group of similarly high-poverty districts with much
smaller grants, but with similar trends in achievement between 2016 and 2022. In this section, we
prioritize controlling for district characteristics. In the next section, we prioritize controlling for
underlying trends in achievement. As we will show, we find similar answers using the two
approaches.
Suppose student achievement in any year is a function of district expenditure per student
in that year (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ), student characteristics (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) and a district fixed effect (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ). The district
fixed effect, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 , is meant to capture the many unmeasured determinants of achievement in that
district which remain fixed over time:
(1) 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
where the outcome measure, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , is measured in student-level standard deviations in 2019,
i is a subscript for district. Taking the difference in equation (1) between 2022 and 2023, the change
in achievement could then be expressed as:
(2) 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖23 − 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,22 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖23 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖22 ) + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖22 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀̃𝑖𝑖
where 𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾 and 𝜀𝜀̃𝑖𝑖 represent the difference in intercepts, coefficient on district
characteristics and the error terms between 2023 and 2022 respectively. Note that the district fixed
effects no longer play a role. In other words, by focusing on changes in outcomes and increases in
expenditures, we are implicitly controlling for many unmeasured determinants of student
outcomes, as long as those factors remain fixed over time. Nevertheless, if the role of unmeasured
district characteristics were changing between 2022 and 2023, such that unmeasured determinants
of the change in achievement (𝜀𝜀̃𝑖𝑖 ) was correlated with the change in expenditures, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖23 −
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖22 , our estimate of 𝛽𝛽1 could still be biased. (That is a primary reason we check our results
with the second strategy, finding districts with similar trends in achievement through 2022.)
Because the data on district spending have not been released by the National Center on
Education Statistics, we use the ESSER allocation per student and spending per student as proxies
for increases in district revenues and expenditures respectively. This is a reasonable assumption in
the case of expenditures from state revenues, as maintenance of effort provisions in the federal law
required states to maintain spending. 8 If state governments tried to reduce their contribution, it
7F
would negatively impact their Title I revenues in the future. Nevertheless, if some local
governments did cut back their contributions, a $1000 allocation per student in ESSER dollars
would have resulted in less than $1000 in additional expenditures, leading us to understate the
impact per federal dollar in aid.
To estimate the impact per dollar spent for the average student, we weight school districts
in the regression models by the size of their grade 3-8 enrollment (the grades for whom our test
score measures apply). The estimates from these regressions are shown in Tables 2 and 3. As
reported in the first column of Table 2, the coefficient on ESSER allocation per student is .0045
SD per $1000 in math.
In the second column, we split the ESSER II+III allocation per student into two parts: the
amount spent as of May/June 2023 and the amount not yet spent. In column (2), the coefficient on
ESSER dollars spent per student is .0059 SD per $1000. In other words, among districts that
received the same allocations, those that spent more during the 2022-23 school year saw faster
growth during the 2022-23 school year. The coefficient on dollars unspent serves as a sort of
placebo test: if we had found that dollars not yet spent were related to improved achievement, that
would suggest there is some unmeasured factor related both to ESSER allocations and improved
achievement. We find no association between dollars unspent and achievement gains.
As noted above, our equating of state test results may result in a state-level estimation error,
common to all districts in a state. To address the concern that this error might be correlated with
8
The maintenance of effort requirements under ESSER did not apply to local governments. However, ss the
Department of Education indicated in E-14 of ESSER-and-GEER-Use-of-Funds-FAQs-December-7-2022-Update-
1.pdf (ed.gov), any district that chose to replace state or local funds with federal ESSER funds risked failing to meet
the maintenance of effort requirement under the Title I program itself.
between-state differences in spending, we add controls for state fixed effects in column (3). The
results are unchanged.
In column (4), we add controls for district characteristics and state fixed effects. The district
characteristics include bins for the percentage of students receiving federal subsidized lunch (0-
10, 11-20, …, 90-10), the log of enrollment in grades 3-8 (to control for district size), the percent
of students who are Black, the percent Hispanic, the urbanicity of the district (in four categories),
as well as the changes in log enrollment, percent black, percent Hispanic and percent receiving
federally subsidized lunch between 2022 and 2023. The results are unchanged.
In column (5), we add controls for the percent of the 2020-21 school year that students
were operating in remote or hybrid instructional mode. As noted above, higher poverty districts
received more ESSER funding on average. And they also were remote for longer during the 2020-
21 school year. Even though the federal funding was not based on the achievement losses, districts
that were remote for longer likely received more aid. If the districts who were remote for longer
simply bounced back more, we could be overstating the effect of spending. Our findings suggest
that the districts that were remote for more of the 2020-21 school year did bounce back somewhat
more—.03 SD for a 100 percent difference in percent remote and .02 SD for percent hybrid.
However, the coefficient on ESSER spending per student is unchanged when we add a control for
remote/hybrid learning.
In column (6), we add controls for the percentage of students in the district estimated by
the Census to be eligible for Title I. To allow for a flexible functional form, we include dummies
with a bin size of 2 percentage points for percentage of students eligible. The estimated coefficient
rises slightly to .0069 SD per $1000 spent.
In column (7), we control also for the district’s trend in achievement prior to 2022. We use
the linear trend in achievement between 2016 and 2019. The results are unchanged. Note that we
control more rigorously for prior trends in achievement in the synthetic control estimates in the
next section.
There are a few districts with unusually high ESSER allocations per student, which have
considerable leverage influencing the coefficient estimate. In column (8), when we drop districts
receiving more than $16,000 in ESSER funds per student, the coefficient rises to .0086. 9 8F
In the remaining columns of Table 2, we estimate the impact of ESSER spending using
two-stage least squares. With the two-stage least squares analyses, we isolate the effect of
differences in federal relief spending driven by three specific sources: total ESSER allocations per
student, state Title I funding formulae and seemingly random fluctuations in poverty rate estimates
within each district.
In column (9), we instrument for spending using the total allocation of ESSER II and
American Rescue Plan dollars per student that each district received. If district-level differences
in timing of spending were endogenous—e.g. the districts with the most capable leadership were
able to spend a larger share of their funds during the 2022-23 year—then we could be overstating
9
We tested for declining payoffs to higher grants using a quadratic function of ESSER spending per student. We could
not reject a linear relationship between spending and achievement.
the effect of spending since spending would partially reflect districts’ ability to execute. On the
other hand, if the districts with the most intractable challenges spent a larger share of their grants
during the 2022-23 year, we could be underestimating the payoff. Moreover, there is likely some
measurement error in the annual spending estimates, depending on when districts logged
individual expenditures. Thus, by using ESSER allocations as an instrumental variable for 2022-
23 spending, we isolate the spending differences which were due to the differences in allocations—
essentially assuming that each district spent the same share of their federal relief dollars during
2022-23—and adjusting for possible measurement error in the timing of expenditures. The results
in column (9) imply that we are not overstating the effect of spending due to endogeneity of timing.
Our estimates are slightly higher, implying a gain of .0106 SD per $1000 of spending.
In column (10), we focus on the variation in spending which was due to the differences in
state Title I funding formulae. We continue to control flexibly for the percentage of the population
eligible for Title I in fiscal year 2020—including dummy variables for each two percentage points.
As an instrument, we use the district allocation per population aged 5-17 based on the state
formulae, using the share of students eligible for Title I in fiscal year 2020. In doing so, we exclude
other sources of variation in spending per student—not only the timing of district spending
decisions, but also increases in Title I grants due to hold harmless provisions (which reflect
eligibility in prior years) and differences in the ratio of students enrolled in public schools to the
number of school-age children estimated by Census to reside in the district (recall that the
percentage of eligible children used in Title I is based on the resident population and is not limited
to those enrolled in public schools). We estimate that a $1000 difference in spending was associated
with a .0168 SD improvement in achievement.
In the last column of Table 2, we instrument for spending using seemingly random
fluctuations around a trend in the percentage of children who are eligible. The point estimate based
on such variation is not statistically significant, but the standard error is quite large at .023 standard
deviations per student.
Table 3 reports similar estimates for reading. 10 The OLS estimates follow a similar pattern
to those in math, although are somewhat smaller at .0049 standard deviations per $1000
expenditure in column (8).
V Matching on Prior Achievement Trends (Synthetic Control Group
Estimates)
The analysis in the prior section prioritized controlling for district’s characteristics. In this
section, we prioritize controlling for prior trends in achievement. Specifically, we use synthetic
control methods to compare districts with large and small grants, but which had similar prior
achievement trends. As illustrated in Figure 5, federal relief varied dramatically—particularly
The gains on the state reading test in Ohio and Illinois were suspiciously large and inconsistent with interim
10
assessment data from NWEA. However, the results for reading are largely unchanged if we exclude those two states.
among high poverty districts. Of the 732 high-poverty districts, with more than 70 percent of
students receiving free/reduced price lunches, we identified 143 districts with ESSER grants in the
top quartile (more than $8,188 dollars per student in ESSER allocation.) We label these the
“treated” districts, since they received the largest grants. For comparison, we identified 236 donor
districts which received less than $4,563 per student (the bottom quartile of districts when
weighted by enrollment).
For each of the 143 treated districts, we created a synthetic control district following
Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueler (2010). The synthetic control is a weighted average of donor
districts that matches the pre-treatment trend of the treated district. The weights are constrained to
be non-negative and are chosen to maximize the match between each treatment district and its
comparisons in terms of their pre-treatment achievement. To capture prior trends in achievement,
we matched on three measures: the pre-pandemic change in test scores from 2016 to 2019; the pre-
pandemic level of test scores in 2019, and the pandemic change in test scores from 2019 to 2022.
In addition, we matched on the log of enrollment in grades 3-8 and the proportion of the 2020-21
school year that the district was remote. Finally, we apply an additional bias correction (Abadie
and L’hour, 2021) to districts’ scores that adjust for remaining discrepancies between the treated
and synthetic control districts’ characteristics, analogous to the use of regression adjustment after
propensity score matching.
For each of the 143 treated districts, we constructed the difference between the treated
district and the synthetic control district for two outcomes: their test scores in 2023 and their
ESSER spending in 2022-23. We averaged these differences across the 143 treated districts
weighting by the enrollment in the treated district to obtain overall estimates of the difference in
spending and test scores between treated districts with high ESSER spending and their synthetic
control districts with low ESSER spending. The ratio of the test score difference to the spending
difference yields an estimate of the impact of spending on test scores (analogous to a Wald
estimator) among this set of high poverty districts. Since this estimate is simply a difference in
(weighted) means between the treatment districts and donor districts, we calculated standard errors
using standard methods that are robust to heteroskedasticity. 11 F
11
More specifically, to generate standard errors, we estimated the following regression with robust standard errors
using our full sample of 143 treated and 236 donor districts:
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
(1) 𝑆𝑆2023 = 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
where the dependent variable is the bias-corrected test score of each district in 2023 and Treat=1 if the district was a
treated district. We weight each treated district (i) by its enrollment in grades 3-8 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ), and weight each donor
district (j) by ∑𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the synthetic weights for comparison group district j used for treatment
group district i. The estimated impact from this regression (𝛽𝛽̂1 ) is equal to the average difference in the outcome
between the treated districts and their synthetic control group, weighted by treated district enrollment size. The
standard errors from this regression treat the synthetic control weights as known constants and ignore sampling
variation. In addition to the change in achievement, we use the above framework to estimate differences in allocation
per student and spending per student relative to the comparisons.
Table 4 reports the mean characteristics of the treatment group and the synthetic
comparison groups for math. As reported in column (1), the treatment group had mean
achievement in math of -.531 (half a standard deviation below the 2019 average). Before applying
the weights, the mean achievement of the donor districts was somewhat higher, -.350 SD below
the national average in 2019. However, after applying the weights, the 2019 mean achievement for
the synthetic controls was much closer to the treatment group, -.523 vs. -531. Likewise, the mean
loss in achievement between 2019 and 2022 was -.146 SD in the treatment group and -.140 SD in
the synthetic control group after applying the weights. In other words, the weights resulted in
combinations of the donor districts which were much more similar in terms of prior trends to the
treatment districts.
Although the synthetic control group was similar in prior outcomes, the weighting left
substantial differences in other characteristics. For instance, the treatment districts remained quite
a bit larger than the synthetic control districts, with mean log enrollment of 8.97 vs. 10.97. The
synthetic control group spent an average of 52 percent of the 2020-21 year remote vs. 61 percent
for the treatment group. The bias correction method adjusts for these remaining discrepancies.
In Table 5, we report mean characteristics for treatment and comparison groups when the
weights are chosen to match on prior reading scores. The treated districts had an average
achievement .436 standard deviations below the national average in 2019, had a small loss in
achievement of .008 standard deviations between 2016 and 2019 and suffered a loss of .071
standard deviations between 2019 and 2022. The synthetic control districts had similar prior
outcomes: mean achievement .428 standard deviations below the national average in 2019, little
loss of .008 SD between 2016 and 2019 and a loss of .070 standard deviations between 2019 and
2022.
In Table 6, we report the estimated impacts on the treated districts relative to their controls:
in math, we estimated that the treated districts grew by .055 standard deviations more than their
comparisons (a statistically significant difference given the standard error of .0179). We also
estimated that the treated districts spent $2787 more per student between 2022 and 2023 out of the
ESSER dollars. Dividing the .0549 estimated impact on achievement by the $2787 difference in
spending yields an implied impact per dollar spent of .0197 SD per $1000 spending per student.
In reading, we estimated a similar impact of .0190 SD per $1000 spent per student. Although the
estimated impact on reading was statistically significant at the .10 level, it was not significant at
the conventional .05 level. 12
Figure 6 illustrates the synthetic control results by plotting the trend over time in the
average bias corrected test scores for the treatment districts and the synthetic control districts. In
12
We did two additional robustness tests. First, we formed synthetic comparisons for the comparison districts and
estimated “impacts” for them. As expected, we found no difference in outcomes. Second, we repeated the exercise
with “low-poverty” districts, those with fewer than 20 percent of students receiving federal lunch subsidies. The
estimated difference in allocation per student between “treated” districts (those in the top quartile of grants per student)
and their synthetic comparisons made up of those in the bottom quartile was much smaller than the high poverty
districts, $986 as opposed to $6,087 dollars per student. The difference in spending was even smaller: $662 per student.
Accordingly, we would expect smaller impacts. And, indeed, we found no statistically significant difference in 2022
to 2023 growth using the methods described above.
both math and reading, the treatment and control districts followed a similar trend between 2016
and 2022 (by construction) but then diverge between 2022 and 2023, with both math and reading
test scores growing by about .05 s.d more in treatment districts with high ESSER spending
compared to control districts with lower ESSER spending.
VI More Detailed Spending Data from California
We briefly summarize similar analyses using more detailed spending data from California.
In the national analysis, we were limited to using cumulative spending from ESSER II and III
reported as of June 2023—or as soon afterward as available. Because some of the spending
occurred before Spring 2022 testing or after Spring 2023 testing, our analyses likely overstate the
total amount of spending between the two testing periods (and understate the impact per dollar
spent.) Yet, because California reported district spending data on a quarterly basis, we could more
closely match our estimates of district spending to the period corresponding to the Spring 2022 to
2023 testing periods.
In column (8) of Table 2, we reported that $1000 in ESSER spending per student was
associated with a .0086 standard deviation rise in math achievement. In the second column, we
report the same specification restricted to the California districts. The implied effect of cumulative
spending was very similar to the national sample, 0.0080 standard deviations per $1000 spent.
In column (3), we break the ESSER II and III allocations into three parts: spending before
end of June 2022, spending between end of June 2022 and June 2023, and dollars not yet spent as
of June 2023. In California, the correlation between the cumulative spending measure and the June
2022 to June 2023 spending was 0.874. Importantly, we find no relationship between dollars
outside of the testing window—before Spring 2022 or after Spring 2023—and student
achievement gains. However, the coefficient on dollars spent between the testing period essentially
doubles to 0.0162 standard deviations per $1000 dollar.
Another advantage of the California data is that districts were asked to distinguish between
dollars spent for academic recovery and for other purposes, such as facility upgrades. Districts
were required to spend at least 20 percent of their ESSER III dollars on academic recovery.
Because the limitation only applied to ESSER III, we do not have the academic/non-academic
breakdown for ESSER II. Thus, we break the ESSER II and III applications into five parts: (i)
dollars spent before Spring 2022, (ii) ESSER II dollars spent between Spring 2022 and Spring
2023, (iii) ESSER III spending on academic recovery between Spring 2022 and 2023 testing, (iv)
ESSER III spending for other purposes between Spring 2022 and Spring 2023 and (v) dollars still
unspent as of June 2023. In math, the only two categories of spending with statistically significant
coefficients involved ESSER III spending for academic and non-academic purposes between
Spring 2022 and Spring 2023. Moreover, the coefficient on ESSER III academic recovery spending
(.0517) was four times larger than the coefficient on other spending (.0135).
Columns (5) through (8) report similar results for reading. In column (8), the only category
of spending related to student achievement was that attributed to academic recovery, with a
coefficient of .0438 standard deviations per $1000 spent.
VII Comparison to Prior Literature
In Figure 7, we plot the confidence intervals for each of our point estimates relative to the
meta-analytic mean of .0079 in Jackson and Mackevicius (2024). In most cases, we can reject the
hypothesis that the federal pandemic relief dollars had no impact on achievement (zero is not
included in the confidence interval). The only two exceptions are the estimates of impact on
reading achievement from the instrumental variable estimates and the synthetic control groups.
But, in all cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of federal pandemic relief had the
same impact per student as the mean impact identified by Jackson and Mackevicius’ literature
review.
In their meta-analysis, Jackson and Mackevicius include studies involving capital
spending, finding an effect similar to current spending when amortized over the life of the project.
However, they assumed zero impact of capital spending during the first two years to allow for
construction delays. In their analysis of district spending plans for the American Rescue Plan
dollars, Brooks and Springer (2024) estimated that districts were planning to spend 27 percent on
facilities improvements (including HVAC). If we were to adjust our point estimates for the 27
percent capital spending (by dividing by .73), our estimated impacts would be even higher: the
.0086 per $1000 estimate in math would become .0117, and the .0048 in reading would become
.0066. It could be that the capital spending during 2022-23 and earlier will have follow-on effects
on district achievement in 2024 and 2025. Thus, future analyses of the effect of pandemic relief in
later years should account for prior capital spending.
VIII Conclusion
Over the past three years, multiple press reports of districts have highlighted federal dollars
being used for seemingly unintended purposes such as athletic fields 13 (e.g. Associated Press
11F
2021). Some of us have co-authored papers describing implementation challenges and
disappointing results from individual catchup programs. (e.g. Carbonari et al. 2022). Thus, many
are likely wondering whether the ESSER aid truly helped students recover. Our results suggest the
spending did have a positive impact on achievement. Indeed, the estimated impact is in line with
the prior research on the effect of increased education spending.
However, that finding begs three related questions: How much of the recovery between
2022 and 2023 could be explained by the ESSER spending? And, at current rates of impact per
13
For instance, the organization, Parents Defending Education, posted the top 10 most wasteful ESSER expenditures
on its website: https://defendinged.org/investigations/wasteful-esser-expenditures/
dollar spent, how much would a full recovery cost? And, finally, if additional federal or state
spending is needed to complete the recovery, how might it be structured to increase impact per
dollar spent?
The average U.S. student lost .149 standard deviations in math achievement between 2019
and 2022. Based on the Jackson and Mackevicius estimated effect of funding, returning to 2019
levels on the basis of federal pandemic relief alone would require $18,800 per student (dividing
the .149 standard deviation loss by .0079 SD per $1000 ). When aggregated across the 48 million
students who were enrolled in public schools in the U.S., a fully federally funded recovery at that
rate would have costed $904 billion—about 5 times more than the $190 billion provided. 14 12F
But our results imply that would be an overestimate. The average recovery by 2023 is larger
than that implied by our estimate of the effect of ESSER spending. There must be other factors—
such as parental investments at home, teacher or student effort, perhaps even increases in local
spending—which are contributing to the recovery. In Figure 8, we portray the average
improvement between 2022 to 2023 for districts in each of ten bins, organized by the percentage
of students receiving federally subsidized lunches. With the green dashed line, we report the
increase we would have expected based on the federal dollars spent during 2022-23 (multiplying
the average ESSER spending per student during 2022-23 by .0086 standard deviations per $1000
spent, the coefficient on ESSER spending in column 8 of Table 2). While the federal relief can
explain between one-third to one-half of the improvement in districts with more than 70 percent
of students receiving federal lunch subsidies, it explains little to none of improvement in higher
income districts, because they did not receive substantial amounts of federal relief. The additional
improvement that occurred over and above the estimated effect of spending is portrayed by the
gray shaded area in Figure 8. When averaged across all the groups, the additional growth from
sources other than federal spending was .03 standard deviations.
Does a .0086 standard deviation improvement in achievement per $1000 expenditure a
worthwhile investment for society? Research on the relationship between test scores and earnings
suggests that it is. For instance, Neal and Johnson (1996) find that a standard deviation in the
AFQT test was associated with roughly a 20 percent difference in earnings at age 26-29 for both
men and women. Murnane et al. (2000) find that a standard deviation in 10th grade math scores
was associated with a 12 percentage point difference in earnings at age 31. More recently, Watts
(2020) finds that a 1 standard deviation in achievement is associated with a 12 percent difference
in earnings for mean and women between the ages of 33 and 50. Discounting future earnings back
to their current age, Doty et al. (2022) estimated an average present value of lifetime earnings for
K-12 students of $1.2 million. Assuming a 12 percent boost in lifetime earnings per standard
deviation in achievement, a .0086 standard deviation increase in achievement would be worth
$1,238—somewhat more than $1000, although not dramatically so. Other benefits of increased
achievement—such as lower arrests, lower teen motherhood (as reported by Doty et al. 2022)—
would enhance the social return.
14
Shores and Steinberg (2022) also used the Jackson and Mackevicius (2023) meta-analysis to predict that the
recovery would cost $930 billion.
Looking forward, what do our estimates imply about the magnitude of recovery during the
2023-24 school year? A provisional answer to that question requires several assumptions. We start
by assuming that districts will have spent their remaining federal funds between spring 2023 and
spring 2024 (they are required to obligate it all or return the remainder by September 2024, just a
few months later). Moreover, we assume that the effect of spending during the 2023-2024 school
year is equal to our estimate for the 2022-23 school year. Under these assumptions, the orange line
in Figure 8 portrays the expected additional impact of the 2023-24 spending. When added to prior
recovery, our prediction would imply that the federal relief aid will have had larger impacts on
higher poverty districts and will have helped to narrow the gap which opened up during the
pandemic. However, the highest poverty districts, those with 80 percent or more students eligible
for free/reduced price lunch, are forecast to remain 0.1 SD (approximately a third of a grade
equivalent) behind their own 2019 levels of achievement. Of course, these projections are based
on relatively strong assumptions. We do not know how districts spent their remaining ESSER
funds in 2023-2024 or if they followed the same strategies they used during the 2022-23 year. The
full effect of the ESSER spending will not be clear until we have data on 2023-24 spending patterns
and student achievement in Spring 2024.
Like Jackson and Mackevicius (2024), we conclude that many districts spent federal
pandemic relief dollars in ways which boosted student achievement. But that is different from
saying that the dollars had as much impact as they could have had. As noted above, researchers
such as Harris (2009) and Guryan et al. (2023) have found higher effectiveness-cost ratios for
interventions such as K-3 class size, summer learning and high-dosage tutoring programs. While
districts did invest in all three, they also spent the funds on other activities (including worthwhile
efforts such as masks and ventilation). Rather than provide general use funds, as with ESSER,
future state or federal aid might boost achievement even more by incentivizing districts to invest
specifically in evidence-based academic catch-up efforts with higher cost effectiveness, such as
extending the school year or summer learning (as Texas has done) or expanding tutoring programs
(as Maryland and Virginia have done.)
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TABLE 1
Sample Means and Standard Deviations for Analysis Sample vs. Full Sample
Final Analysis Sample Full Sample
(29 States) (42 States)
Mean SD Mean SD
Achievement Outcomes:
2019-22 Change in Math -0.149 0.114 -0.154 0.119
2019-22 Change in Reading -0.095 0.091 -0.092 0.088
2022-23 Change in Math 0.046 0.052 0.046 0.052
2022-23 Change in Reading 0.019 0.061 0.019 0.061
Demographics:
% Black (2022) 14.9% 18.9% 15.2% 17.7%
% Hispanic (2022) 25.0% 23.8% 28.2% 24.8%
% Free Lunch (2022) 47.9% 21.8% 48.3% 21.0%
Log Total Enrollment (2022) 9.270 1.484 9.475 1.602
Percent of Population Aged 5-17
16.6% 9.4% 16.9% 9.2%
Who Met Title I Formula (2020)
Percent Remote/Hybrid:
Percent of 2020-21 SY in Remote
30.2% 29.4% 24.4% 28.4%
Instruction
Percent of 2020-21 SY in Hybrid
43.4% 27.4% 37.1% 28.3%
Instruction
ESSER II/ARP:
ESSER II/ARP Dollars Allocated
$3,167 $2,655 $3,129 $2,578
Per Student
ESSER II/ARP Dollars Spent Per
$1,961 $1,660 $1,961 $1,613
Student
Totals
Number of Districts 5,812 9,424
Number of Students 26,107,534 39,345,566
TABLE 2
Estimating Effect of ESSER Allocation/Spending on District Changes in Math Achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
ESSER II+III Allocation per 0.0045***
Student ($1,000s) (0.0008)
ESSER II+III Spent per Student 0.0059*** 0.0058*** 0.0051*** 0.0054*** 0.0069*** 0.0069*** 0.0086*** 0.0106*** 0.0168*** -0.0155
($1,000s) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0045) (0.0228)
ESSER II+III Unspent per Student 0.0026 0.0009 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0014 0.0014 0.0027
($1,000s) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0021)
% Remote in 2020-21 School Year 0.0326*** 0.0306*** 0.0307*** 0.0300*** 0.0304*** 0.0300*** 0.0322***
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0096)
% Hybrid in 2020-21 School Year 0.0228*** 0.0216*** 0.0217*** 0.0212*** 0.0209*** 0.0205*** 0.0230***
(0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0066)
State Fixed-Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2022 Demographics and Change
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2022-23
% Remote/Hybrid No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Formula Percent - Every 2% (2020) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EB Trend 2016 to 2019 No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ESSER II+III Allocation Per
None None None None None None None $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000
Student Limit
Title I Per
Pop 5-17 Title I
ESSER
Instrument None None None None None None None None
Allocation
Using Residual
2020 Elig (2020)
(No HH)
N 5507 5507 5507 5507 5507 5507 5507 5498 5498 5498 5498
R2 0.032 0.033 0.194 0.223 0.229 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.241 0.234 0.187
Notes: The dependent variable is change in mean achievement between 2022 and 2023 in standard deviations. ESSER allocation and spending variables are in thousands of dollars
per student enrolled in grades K-12. Observations are weighted by enrollment in grades 3-8 in 2022. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Demographics include
controls for log enrollment, % Black, % Hispanic, indicators for each decile of free or reduced price lunch, % rural, % suburb, % town and changes in log enrollment, % Black, %
Hispanic, and % free or reduced price lunch.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
TABLE 3
Estimating Effect of ESSER Allocation/Spending on District Changes in Reading Achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
ESSER II+III Allocation per 0.0024
Student ($1,000s) (0.0017)
ESSER II+III Spent per Student 0.0101** 0.0034** 0.0049*** 0.0050*** 0.0051*** 0.0051*** 0.0049*** 0.0045* 0.0049 -0.0053
($1,000s) (0.0042) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0046) (0.0288)
ESSER II+III Unspent per Student -0.0082** -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007
($1,000s) (0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018)
% Remote in 2020-21 School Year 0.0141* 0.0116 0.0117 0.0126* 0.0125* 0.0124* 0.0132*
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0079)
% Hybrid in 2020-21 School Year -0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0010
(0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0059)
State Fixed-Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2022 Demographics and Change
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2022 to 2023
% Remote/Hybrid No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Formula Percent - Every 2% (2020) No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EB Trend 2016 to 2019 No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ESSER II+III Allocation Per
None None None None None None None $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000
Student Limit
Title I Per
Pop 5-17 Title I
ESSER
Instrument None None None None None None None None
Allocation
Using Residual
2020 Elig (2020)
(No HH)
N 5127 5127 5127 5127 5127 5127 5127 5117 5117 5117 5117
R2 0.008 0.031 0.439 0.458 0.459 0.467 0.467 0.466 0.466 0.466 0.457
Notes: The dependent variable is change in mean achievement between 2022 and 2023 in standard deviations. ESSER allocation and spending variables are in thousands of dollars
per student enrolled in grades K-12. Observations are weighted by enrollment in grades 3-8 in 2022. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Demographics include
controls for log enrollment, % Black, % Hispanic, indicators for each decile of free or reduced price lunch, % rural, % suburb, % town and changes in log enrollment, % Black, %
Hispanic, and % free or reduced price lunch.
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
TABLE 4
Math Treatment vs. Synthetic Control Comparisons
Treatment Control Control (Weighted)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Primary Outcomes:
2019 Achievement in Math -0.531 0.214 -0.350 0.253 -0.523 0.328
2019-22 Change in Math -0.146 0.099 -0.162 0.108 -0.140 0.109
2016-19 Change in Math 0.006 0.034 0.000 0.033 0.011 0.040
Secondary Outcomes:
2019 Achievement in Reading -0.449 0.208 -0.269 0.225 -0.416 0.299
2019-22 Change in Reading -0.057 0.089 -0.108 0.101 -0.096 0.102
2016-19 Change in Reading -0.008 0.037 -0.006 0.035 0.001 0.044
Other District Characteristics:
Log Total Enrollment (2022) 10.97 1.98 9.10 1.01 8.97 1.42
% Black (2022) 32.9% 28.0% 10.7% 16.9% 22.0% 31.2%
% Hispanic (2022) 45.8% 29.7% 62.8% 28.1% 56.9% 33.8%
% Free Lunch (2022) 78.6% 6.4% 76.6% 6.4% 76.3% 6.4%
Percent of Population Aged 5-17
31.8% 7.8% 21.3% 4.7% 24.0% 6.6%
Who Met Title I Formula (2020)
Percent of 2020-21 SY in
61.1% 25.9% 54.4% 31.8% 52.1% 33.4%
Remote Instruction
Percent of 2020-21 SY in Hybrid
29.7% 17.3% 30.6% 22.8% 25.6% 17.1%
Instruction
ESSER II/ARP Dollars
$9,834 $1,911 $3,487 $670 $3,747 $648
Allocated Per Student
ESSER II/ARP Dollars Spent
$5,248 $1,521 $2,114 $679 $2,461 $810
Per Student
Number of Districts 130 213
Number of Students 1,153,079 1,045,320
Notes: The sample was limited to districts with more than 70 percent of students receiving federally subsidized lunches. The
treatment districts received ESSER II+ARP allocations per student in the top quartile (more than $8188 per student); the
synthetic controls were weighted averages of those with ESSER II+ARP allocations in the bottom quartile (less than $4563 per
student). The weights were chosen to match the pre-2023 achievement for each treated district.
TABLE 5
Reading Synthetic Control Group Comparisons
Treatment Control Control (Weighted)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Primary Outcomes
2019 Achievement in Reading -0.436 0.212 -0.263 0.221 -0.428 0.312
2019-22 Change in Reading -0.071 0.101 -0.117 0.105 -0.070 0.121
2016-19 Change in Reading -0.008 0.039 -0.009 0.035 -0.008 0.050
Secondary Outcomes
2019 Achievement in Math -0.513 0.216 -0.334 0.264 -0.499 0.328
2019-22 Change in Math -0.150 0.108 -0.169 0.120 -0.117 0.100
2016-19 Change in Math 0.004 0.036 -0.002 0.035 0.006 0.041
Other District Characteristics:
Log Total Enrollment (2022) 10.93 2.02 9.14 0.94 9.02 1.19
% Black (2022) 31.2% 28.5% 12.3% 18.2% 20.2% 31.1%
% Hispanic (2022) 48.1% 30.2% 62.4% 28.7% 58.7% 31.4%
% Free Lunch (2022) 78.2% 6.3% 77.3% 6.8% 78.8% 6.7%
Percent of Population Aged 5-17
31.1% 7.8% 21.3% 4.5% 22.5% 7.7%
Who Met Title I Formula (2020)
Percent of 2020-21 SY in
60.0% 25.8% 57.1% 29.2% 54.0% 29.1%
Remote Instruction
Percent of 2020-21 SY in Hybrid
30.8% 18.0% 32.6% 23.2% 35.5% 24.4%
Instruction
ESSER II/ARP Dollars
$9,341 $1,386 $3,531 $672 $3,692 $561
Allocated Per Student
ESSER II/ARP Dollars Spent
$5,026 $1,502 $2,091 $656 $2,506 $606
Per Student
Number of Districts 116 181
Number of Students 1,044,928 1,040,845
Note: The sample was limited to districts with more than 70 percent of students receiving federally subsidized lunches. The
treatment districts received ESSER II+ARP allocations per student in the top quartile (more than $8188 per student); the
synthetic controls were weighted averages of those with ESSER II+ARP allocations in the bottom quartile (less than $4563
per student). The weights were chosen to match the pre-2023 achievement for each treated district.
TABLE 6
Treated vs. Synthetic Comparison Districts
Math Reading
Impact on 2023 Achievement 0.0549*** 0.0480*
(0.0179) (0.0259)
Spending per Student $2787*** $2520***
($384) ($254)
Implied Impact per $1000 0.0197*** 0.0190*
(0.0057) (0.0113)
N 343 297
Note: The above are differences between treated and synthetic comparison districts, matched on achievement in 2019, and
changes in mean achievement between 2016-19 and 2019-22. All sample districts had more than 70 percent of students
receiving federal subsidized lunches. The treated districts were in the top quartile of federal ESSER II+ ARP allocations per
student (more than $8188) and the comparisons were in the bottom quartile (receiving less than $4563 per student). The
estimates were bias corrected based on district size and share of the 2020-21 year that districts were remote (Abadie and L’Hour
2021).
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
TABLE 7
California-only OLS regression results
Math Achievement Reading Achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
National CA CA CA National CA CA CA
ESSER II+III Spent (as-of June 2023) ($1,000s per student) 0.0086*** 0.0080*** 0.0049*** 0.0001
(0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0031)
ESSER II+III Unspent ($1,000s per student) 0.0027 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0026 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0034)
ESSER II+III Spent (Between Spring 2022 and Spring 0.0162*** 0.0049
2023) ($1,000s per student)
(0.0048) (0.0053)
ESSER II+III Spent (Before Spring 2022) ($1,000s per -0.0015 -0.0053 -0.0074* -0.0070
student)
(0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0050)
ESSER II Spent (Between Spring 2022 and Spring 2023) 0.0052 0.0064
($1,000s per student)
(0.0108) (0.0132)
ESSER III for Academic Recovery (Between Spring 2022 0.0517*** 0.0438**
and Spring 2023) ($1,000s per student)
(0.0157) (0.0174)
ESSER III Other (Between Spring 2022 and Spring 2023) 0.0135** -0.0001
($1,000s per student)
(0.0052) (0.0062)
State Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2022 Demographics and Change 2022 to 2023 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
% Remote/Hybrid Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Formula Percent - Every 2% (2020) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
EB Trend 2016 to 2019 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ESSER II+III Allocation Per Student Limit $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000
N 5498 588 588 588 5117 561 561 561
R2 0.242 0.236 0.248 0.257 0.466 0.146 0.156 0.167
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in mean achievement between 2022 and 2023. Observations are weighted by enrollment in grades 3-8 in 2022. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. Each of the specifications include log enrollment, percent of students Black and Hispanic in school year 2021-22, 9 indicators for the percent of students
eligible for federally subsidized lunch, urbanicity indicators (rural, town, suburb), changes in log enrollment, percent Black and percent Hispanic from SY2021-22 to SY2022-23,
percent of the 2020-21 school year students were remote or hybrid and indicators for every 2 percentages of students eligible for Title I (in bins of 2 percentage points).
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1
FIGURE 1
Single-year Changes in Percent of 5-17 Year Olds Title I Eligible by District Size, FY 2013-2023
Notes: We exclude from this figure districts with more than 200,000 5–17-year-olds and districts with greater than a 50
percentage point change in the proportion of children meeting the Title I eligibility definition.
FIGURE 2
Trend in Percent Formula Children in Gary Indiana 2013-2023
Note: The red line above is the smoothed trend in Title I eligibility for 5-17 year olds in Gary, Indiana, using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with lambda set to 6.25. The dashed line portrays the Census’ estimate of local poverty rates in Gary. We use
the fluctuation in spending produced by deviations from the trend as instruments for federal pandemic relief spending.
Because ESSER II and III dollars were based on FY 2020 Title I eligibility, the positive fluctuation yielded a large increase in
federal pandemic relief for the district.
FIGURE 3
Variation in Title I Allocations due to Fluctuations in District Eligibility Rates
Notes: For each district, we estimated a smoothed trend in the percent of students meeting the Title I eligibility criteria between
2013 and 2023, using the Hodrick-Prescott time series filter with a lambda of 6.25. We then simulated what each district would
have received in Title I in each year had their percent eligible children followed the trend. The above is the difference between
the Title I allocation based on the trend and actual Title I per student in FY 2020.
FIGURE 4
Title I Allocations Per Population Aged 5-17 by State
Notes: These figures were based on actual Title I allocations in FY 2020, fitted with a linear spline function, with knots at 2
percent, 5 percent and 15 percent eligible children. Although not a perfect fit (for instance, large districts can qualify for a
concentrated grant even if they have fewer than 15 percent poor children, as long as they have more than 6500 eligible children),
the splines are a good summary, explaining 98 percent of the variance in Title I grants per population for districts not subject
to hold harmless provisions.
FIGURE 5
ESSER Allocations Per Student by Percent of Students Receiving Subsidized Lunches
Notes: We divide ESSER II and ARP allocations by district total enrollment in 2022 from the Common Core of Data. The
percentages of students receiving federal subsidized lunches are from Reardon et al. (2024). The estimates are weighted by
district size.
FIGURE 6
High Poverty/High ESSER Districts vs. High Poverty/Low ESSER Synthetic Controls
A. Math
B. Reading
Notes: The analysis consists of districts with more than 70% of their student population qualifying for federal reduced price
lunch. Among this set of districts, the treatment group is composed of the top quartile of ESSER allocations while the donor
group is composed of districts in the bottom quartile of ESSER allocations. Synthetic weights are constructed using average
performance in 2016, 2019, and 2022, as well as the log of total enrollment and percent remote in the 2020-2021 school year.
Averages are weighted by district enrollment in grades 3 through 8.
FIGURE 7
Comparing Estimates to Jackson and Mackevicius
Notes: Implied effect from research is derived from 0.0316 standard deviations increase in achievement per $1,000 per student
over 4 years per the findings in Jackson and Mackevicius (2024).
FIGURE 8
Estimated Effect of Federal Aid on Academic Recovery in Math 2022-23
Note: The grey lines above portray our estimates of the actual loss between 2019 and 2022 and the loss remaining as of Spring
2023. The green line is derived by multiplying dollars spent per student between 2022 and 2023 by .0086, our estimated effect
of ESSER spending on recovery, and adding this amount to the loss as of Spring 2022—the difference between the green and
light grey line is the portion of the academic recovery attributable to federal aid. The orange line is a forecast, based on the
assumption that districts spent all their remaining aid between Spring 2023 and Spring 2024 and spent it in ways that were
equally effective to our estimates of earlier spending. The shaded area is the improvement between 2022 and 2023 in excess of
that predicted by federal spending alone.
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