Information — United States v. Shakeena Hamilton, Southern District of Georgia (Document 1)

Summary

A criminal information in United States of America v. Shakeena Hamilton, No. 3:22-cr-00005, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Dublin Division, filed March 30, 2022 as Document 1. It charges one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371, running from no later than February 2021 through at least April 2021. The information alleges that Hamilton prepared fraudulent PPP applications through Company 1, a lender service provider, using coconspirators' information, and that coconspirators paid kickbacks as high as $5,000 per application. It alleges more than 120 fraudulent applications, more than approximately $2,300,000 disbursed and more than $300,000 in kickbacks to Hamilton, and cites a March 22, 2021 overt act involving a $20,547 deposit. The signature block names United States Attorney David H. Estes.

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Case 3:22-cr-00005-DHB-BKE Document1_ Filed 03/30/22 Page1of7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WS i |
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
DUBLIN DIVISION 20227 MAR 30 P &: yy
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) INFORMATION NO.) - _ x
v. ) 18 U.S.C. § 371
) Conspiracy to Commit an Offense
SHAKEENA HAMILTON ) Against the United States

CR322-005

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY CHARGES THAT:

COUNT ONE
Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States
18 U.S.C. § 371

1. Beginning no later than February 2021 and continuing through at least
April 2021, in Telfair County, within the Southern District of Georgia, and elsewhere,
the defendant, SHAKEENA HAMILTON, aided and abetted by others, did
knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with at least one
other person to commit wire fraud, that is to devise and intend to devise a scheme
and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property, by means of materially
false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and for the purpose of
executing the scheme and artifice and to obtain money and property, caused to be
transmitted wires and signals in interstate and foreign commerce, namely interstate
communications to be made over the internet, in furtherance of the scheme and
artifice to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13438. All of this was done in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
Case 3:22-cr-O0005-DHB-BKE Document1 Filed 03/30/22 Page 2of7

Background

2. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act was
a federal law enacted in or about March 2020 designed to provide emergency financial
assistance to the millions who are suffering the economic effects caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic.

3. Among other relief efforts, the United States sought to provide financial
support to eligible businesses that could be used to offset certain business expenses.

4. The Small Business Administration (“SBA”) is an executive branch
agency of the United States government that provides support to entrepreneurs and
small businesses. The SBA is headquartered in Washington, DC and maintains its
computer servers outside of the State of Georgia. The SBA’s mission is to maintain
and strengthen the nation’s economy by enabling the establishment and viability of
small businesses and by assisting in the economic recovery of communities after
disasters.

5. As part of this effort, the SBA enables and provides for loans through
banks, credit unions, and other lenders. These loans have government-backed
guarantees. In addition, the SBA provides loans that come directly from the U.S.
Government.

6. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization
of up to $349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and
certain other expenses, through a program referred to as the Paycheck Protection

Program (“PPP”). In or around April 2020, Congress authorized over $300 billion in
Case 3:22-cr-00005-DHB-BKE Document1_ Filed 03/30/22 Page 3of7

additional PPP funding.

7. To obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business had to submit a PPP loan
application signed by an authorized representative of the business. The PPP loan
application required the business (through its authorized representative) to
acknowledge the program rules and make certain affirmative certifications to be
eligible to obtain the PPP loan. In the PPP loan application, the small business
(through its authorized representative) had to state, among other things, its: (a)
average monthly payroll expenses; and (b) number of employees. These figures were
then used to calculate the amount of money the small business was eligible to receive
under the PPP. In addition, a business applying for a PPP loan had to provide
documentation showing its payroll expenses.

8. A PPP loan application must be processed by a participating lender,
such as a financial institution. If a PPP loan is approved, the participating lender
funds the PPP loan using its own monies, which are 100% guaranteed by the SBA.
Data from the application, including the information about the borrower, the total
amount of the loan, and the listed number of employees, is transmitted by the lender
to the SBA in the course of processing the loan.

9; The PPP loan proceeds must be used by the business on certain
permissible expenses—payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent, and utilities. The
PPP allows the interest and principal of the PPP loan to be entirely forgiven if the
business spends the loan proceeds on these expense items within a designated period

of time and uses a certain percentage of the PPP loan proceeds on payroll expenses.
The Scheme

10. The object of the conspiracy was for Defendant and her coconspirators
to unjustly enrich themselves by making false PPP applications to the SBA and to
financial institutions, to unlawfully induce the SBA and PPP lenders to dispense
money and funds to coconspirators to which they were not entitled, and who, in turn,
would pay a portion of the ill-gotten funds to Defendant as a kickback.

11. In furtherance of this scheme, and to effect the objects thereof, the
following acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy:

a. It was part of the conspiracy that between February 2021 and
April 2021, Defendant and her coconspirators utilized cellular devices, email, and the
internet to create fraudulent PPP applications. Coconspirators would send their
personal identifying information and banking information to Defendant. Defendant,
in turn, would use the internet to access Company 1, which is a lender service
provider that partners with banks to apply for and secure PPP loans.

b. For each PPP loan, Defendant would use a coconspirator’s
information with his/her knowledge and consent to create fraudulent PPP
applications falsely reporting the existence of businesses that did not exist, falsely
reporting the number of employees, and falsely reporting revenue. Next, a
coconspirator would login to Company 1 and verify his/her identity by taking a self-
photograph. Once an application was prepared, a coconspirator would electronically
verify his/her identity with Company 1, then Defendant would complete and submit

the fraudulent PPP application through interstate wires. After a PPP application
Case 3:22-cr-00005-DHB-BKE Document1_ Filed 03/30/22 Page 5of7

was approved by a lender, a coconspirator would electronically receive, sign, and
submit loan documents to the lender.

C. In reliance on false representations made in PPP applications
created by Defendant in conjunction with her coconspirators, banks headquartered
outside the State of Georgia, by means of wire communication, deposited millions of
dollars into coconspirators’ bank accounts resulting from this scheme.

d. In exchange for Defendant completing a fraudulent PPP
application, Defendant’s coconspirators agreed to pay Defendant in amounts as high
as $5,000 per PPP application. Coconspirators transmitted the kickback to
Defendant via CashApp, Zelle, or by cash transactions.

12. Between in or around February 2021 through in or around April 2021,
Defendant, while in the Southern District of Georgia, caused to be submitted more
than 120 fraudulent PPP applications on behalf of herself and conspirators, which
resulted in more than approximately $2,300,000 being disbursed from banks to
members of the conspiracy. Of that, Defendant obtained more than $300,000 in
unlawful kickbacks disbursed from coconspirators to her as payment for submitting
the fraudulent PPP applications. Defendant used proceeds of the conspiracy to
purchase a Mercedes vehicle and other items unrelated to the purpose of the PPP’s
creation.

Overt Act in Execution of the Scheme

13. On or about March 22, 2021, in the Southern District of Georgia, and

elsewhere, SHAKEENA HAMILTON, aided and abetted by others, for the purpose
Case 3:22-cr-O0005-DHB-BKE Document1_ Filed 03/30/22 Page6of7

of executing the scheme and artifice described above, and attempting to do so, caused
to be transmitted in interstate commerce, by means of a wire communication, certain
signs, signals, and sounds: that is, Defendant and Coconspirator 1 caused to be
transmitted an electronic PPP application from the Southern District of Georgia to
Bank 1 in Texas, which caused Bank 1 to deposit $20,547 into Coconspirator 1’s
account at Bank 2 on or about April 7, 2021, and in exchange, Coconspirator 1 paid
Defendant $4,500, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

All done in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.
Case 3:22-cr-00005-DHB-BKE Document1 Filed 03/30/22 Page7 of7

David H. Estes Chris Hdward
United States Attorney Assistant United States Attorney
*Lead Counsel

Patricia G. Rhodes
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division


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