Indictment — United States v. Elliott Sterling, Middle District of Louisiana (Document 1)

Summary

An indictment for wire fraud, financial aid fraud, engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity and notice of forfeiture, United States of America v. Elliott Sterling, Criminal No. 20-52-BAJ-RLB, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Document 1 dated 08/03/20. The criminal cover sheet lists wire fraud under 18:1343 in Counts 1-9, financial aid fraud under 20:1097(a) in Counts 10-13 and a monetary transaction count under 18:1957 as Count 14. The grand jury alleges that from no later than September 2017 through November 2019 Sterling, through Sterling Educational Consulting, LLC, caused Federal Student Aid funds to be disbursed through Baton Rouge Community College for individuals who lacked a high school diploma or GED or were incarcerated. The cover sheet names AUSA Jessica Jarreau.

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Case 3:20-cr-00052-BAJ-RLB Document1 08/03/20 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
INDICTMENT FOR WIRE FRAUD, FINANCIAL AID FRAUD, ENGAGING

IN MONETARY TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING PROPERTY DERIVED
FROM SPECIFIED UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY AND NOTICE OF FORFEITURE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CRIMINAL NO. 20- 52-BAJ-RLB
versus : 18 U.S.C. § 1343
: 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a)
ELLIOTT STERLING 18 U.S.C. § 1957
: 18 U.S.C. § 981
18 U.S.C. § 982

28 U.S.C. § 2461

THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:

At All Relevant Times Herein:

Introduction to the Federal Student Aid Program

1. The United States Department of Education (“DOE”), a cabinet agency of the
United States Government, was established to ensure equal access to education and to
promote education throughout the United States. The DOE provided oversight and
administration of the Federal Student Aid (“FSA”) Program authorized by Title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, which assisted qualified students in obtaining post-secondary
education.

2. One of the functions of the DOE was to operate, administer, and regulate
various FSA programs, including the federal Pell Grant Program and the Federal Direct Loan

Program.

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3. The Pell Grant Program provided federal funding to eligible students in need
of financial assistance in order to pursue post-secondary education at participating
institutions. Eligibility was based primarily on financial need and, unlike guaranteed student
loan programs, Pell Grants did not need to be repaid.

4, Since June 2010, the Federal Direct Loan Program has become the primary
source of student loans to college students. The Federal Direct Loan Program provided low-
interest loans to eligible students to help cover the cost of higher education at participating
schools. Higher education loans obtained through the Federal Direct Loan Program were
made directly from the DOE to students and were administered by the DOE.

5. The DOE promulgated regulations that specified the eligibility requirements
and application procedures for students applying for federal aid under the FSA programs.
Among other requirements, each applicant had to be enrolled at a DOE-approved institution,
and each applicant must have earned a high school diploma or its equivalent; incarcerated
students were ineligible to receive Federal Direct Loans while incarcerated.

6. FSA funds could only be used for educational purposes and could be used to
satisfy tuition and fees charged by the institution and other expenses incurred by the student
to pursue an educational purpose, such as books, supplies, transportation, and living
expenses.

The FSA Application Process

7. To apply for FSA funds, applicants were required to truthfully complete an
application for federal student aid called the “Free Application for Federal Student Aid”
(“FAFSA”), which could be completed on a DOE website and submitted electronically via

the Internet.
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8. The FAFSA website contained an instructional section titled “Financial Aid
Eligibility” that set forth the basic eligibility criteria, which included “having a high school
diploma or a recognized equivalent such as a General Educational Development (GED)
certificate.”

9, An additional link was available on the FAFSA website titled “Eligibility for
Students with Criminal Convictions,” which advised that “[i]f you are [incarcerated] in a
federal or state institution, you can’t get a Federal Pell Grant or federal student loans,” and
that “[i]f you are [incarcerated] in an institution other than a federal or state institution, you
can’t get federal student loans.”

10. Inorder to obtain FSA funds, the FAFSA required an applicant to truthfully
disclose certain personal identifying information (“PII”), including, but not limited to, the
applicant’s name, date of birth, and Social Security number. The FAFSA also required the
applicant to truthfully report the applicant’s education level, income, family status, number
of dependents, and whether the applicant received benefits from other federal programs, such
as Medicaid, supplemental security income (“SSI”), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (“SNAP”) benefits, and/or Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants, and Children (“WIC”) funds.

11. Each applicant was assigned an FSA ID, which consisted of a unique user-
created name and password. The FSA ID could be used to access the DOE’s FAFSA
website to complete a FAFSA, electronically sign a FAFSA, access a FAFSA, correct a
FAFSA, review financial aid history, access Federal Direct Loan information and tools, and

electronically sign Master Promissory Notes.
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12. The FAFSA website cautioned applicants that applicants and parents/other
preparers should create and use their own FSA IDs because “the FSA ID acts as a legal
signature that should not be shared” and letting someone else create the applicant’s FSA ID
was not allowed.

13. If the FAFSA was prepared by someone other than the applicant, or ifa fee
was paid to someone for advice or assistance for completing the FAFSA, then the non-
applicant preparer was required to complete a section of the FAFSA identifying the
preparer’s name, firm, address, Social Security number, employer ID number, and signature.

14. | If any documents related to the federal student aid programs were signed using
an FSA ID, then the applicant and/or preparer assumed responsibility of the accuracy of the
contents and certified that (a) they were the person identified by that FSA ID; (b) they had
not disclosed that FSA ID to anyone else; (c) the federal financial aid would only be used to
pay the cost of attending an institution of higher education; and (d) all of the information
contained on the FAFSA was true and complete to the best of the applicant and/or preparer’s
knowledge.

Process for Determination of FSA Award

15. Electronically submitted FAFSAs were received and processed by the DOE’s
Central Processing System (“CPS”). The information provided by an applicant on the
FAFSA was used to calculate an applicant’s Expected Family Contribution (“EFC”), which
was the amount the applicant, or the applicant’s family, was expected to contribute towards

the applicant’s post-secondary education costs.
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16. Between 2008 and August 2, 2018, the CPS servers that received FAFSA
submissions were located in Plano, Texas. Since August 5, 2018, the CPS servers that
received FAFSA submissions have been located in Clarksville, Virginia.

17. The EFC and other information calculated by CPS were included in a Student
Aid Report that was sent to the applicant. This same information was also included in an
Institutional Student Information Record (“ISIR”) that was sent to the applicant’s school of
choice, where Financial Aid Administrators determined the applicant’s need for federal
student aid from the DOE by subtracting the EFC from the applicant’s cost of attendance.

18. The DOE and post-secondary educational institutions relied upon, most
importantly, the truthfulness and accuracy of the information provided on the FAFSA to
determine whether the student was eligible to receive student financial aid and to determine
the amount of any student loan or Pell Grant to be awarded. Factors that could affect the
amount of FSA awarded included whether the applicant was married, had children, or other
dependents, the applicant’s income, whether the applicant had certain criminal convictions,
and whether the applicant had obtained a high school diploma, GED, or other high school
equivalency (“HSE”) degree.

19. ‘To receive financial aid from the DOE in the form of a student loan, an
applicant was required to execute a Master Promissory Note, which included a promise to
pay to the DOE all loan amounts disbursed under the terms of the Master Promissory Note.
The applicant was required to identify two personal references and electronically sign the

Master Promissory Note acknowledging the terms of the loan.
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Baton Rouge Community College and FSA Funding

20. Baton Rouge Community College (“BRCC”) was an approved post-secondary
institution located within the Middle District of Louisiana. BRCC participated in FSA
programs and was authorized to award FSA funds to eligible students. Students applied for
admission to BRCC by submitting an application online through BRCC’s website. Students
enrolled at BRCC could obtain financial aid, including Federal Direct Loans and Pell Grants,
from the federal government through the FAFSA application process.

21. Once a student was admitted into BRCC, the student received, through the
email address designated on the BRCC application, instructions on how to create a unique
Log On Louisiana (“LoLA”) account through which they could register for classes, review
their course schedule, check on the status of financial aid requests and disbursements, check
grades, and review registration and contact information.

22. Toensure that FSA funds were awarded to approved institutions of higher
education, FSA funds were disbursed through the DOE’s G5 payment system. In this case,
after BRCC requested FSA funds from the DOE on behalf of students who requested FSA
assistance, the GS payment system deposited the funds into BRCC’s designated bank
account(s). Upon receipt of those FSA funds, BRCC credited the funds to the student’s
financial aid account and applied the funds to cover the student’s tuition, fees, and other
educationally-related charges incurred by the student at BRCC.

23. Before disbursing FSA funds, BRCC would occasionally select applications
for additional verification, and through the LoLA account, BRCC would notify the students

of what additional information and/or documentation was needed to verify the student’s
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eligibility for financial aid, such as proof of high school diploma or GED/HSE, tax returns,
and documentation relating to income, dependents, and expenses.

24. Ifthe amount of federal financial aid received by BRCC exceeded the cost of
attendance for a particular student, BRCC paid the credit balance, sometimes referred to as a
“refund check,” “credit refund,” or “Title IV refund,” to the student through BRCC’s student
loan servicer.

25. Federal regulations required that students earn their financial aid funds by
attending and actively participating in courses. Disbursements were made once attendance
had been confirmed by instructors, typically after the 14th day of classes. Ifa student failed
to earn their FSA funds through participation in classes, their financial aid enrollment level
and eligibility could be reduced.

FSA Loan Servicing

26. BRCC used student loan servicer BankMobile to process student credit
refunds. BankMobile, a Connecticut company, was a division of Customer’s Bank, which
was a Pennsylvania company.

27. | Each FSA applicant received a BankMobile account with a unique bank
account number for receipt of credit refunds; the account was accessed by a user-created
login, password, and security questions. Once created, the student applicants could designate
whether the funds would be deposited into their BankMobile account or into another
specified bank account. Funds deposited into the student’s BankMobile account were
accessible through a debit card that was mailed to the student and also through the online
bank account. BankMobile debit cards could be activated on the Internet, and account

information could be accessed through the Internet.

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The Defendant and His Entity

28. ELLIOTT STERLING (“STERLING”) was a resident of Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. Between January 1, 2017, and April 21, 2020, STERLING had no reported
wages with the Louisiana Department of Labor. Additionally, STERLING did not file
federal income tax returns for tax years 2016, 2017, and 2018. During the dates referenced
in this Indictment, STERLING opened and/or controlled two personal checking accounts,
including a JP Morgan Chase Bank account ending in 1905 (“Chase Acct. #1905”) and a
Pelican State Credit Union account ending in 007 (“Pelican Acct. #007).

29. STERLING EDUCATIONAL CONSULTING, LLC (“SEC”) was a Louisiana
limited liability company that was created in March 2019 with its registered address in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. SEC was owned, operated, and controlled by STERLING; he was its
registered agent. SEC purportedly operated as an educational consulting business, wherein
individuals allegedly engaged SEC for assistance enrolling in classes at BRCC and applying
for federal grants and student loans through the FAFSA application process. During the
dates referenced in this Indictment, STERLING opened and/or controlled business accounts
in the name of SEC, including JP Morgan Chase Bank account ending in 5588 (“SEC’s
Chase Acct. #5588”) and accounts at Woodforest Bank and Business First Bank.

Other Relevant Individuals and Entities Used by STERLING

30. Individuals A, B, C, and D, were residents of the Middle District of Louisiana.
In 2018, STERLING knowingly facilitated and caused them to be enrolled in BRCC, and
thereafter, STERLING caused DOE to disburse FSA funds on each’s behalf, even though

Individuals A, B, C, and D had not earned a high school diploma or GED.
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31. Individual E was incarcerated in the Louisiana Department of Corrections in
2018 when STERLING, while knowing this fact, facilitated and caused FSA funds in the
name of Individual E to be deposited into Chase Acct. #1905.

32. Individual F was incarcerated in East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (““EBRPP”)
in 2019 when STERLING, while knowing this fact, facilitated and caused FSA funds in the
name of Individual F to be deposited into Chase Acct. #1905.

33. Individual G was a resident of the Middle District of Louisiana. In 2018 and
2019, STERLING knowingly facilitated and caused him/her to be enrolled in BRCC, and
thereafter, STERLING caused DOE to disburse FSA funds on Individual G’s behalf, even
though Individual G had not earned a high school diploma or GED. Additionally, Individual
G was incarcerated in EBRPP in 2019 when STERLING, while knowing this fact,
facilitated and caused FSA funds in the name of Individual G to be deposited into Chase
Acct. #1905.

34. Individual H was the principal and owner of High School 1, a Louisiana non-
profit corporation that was created in 2011, with its principal place of business in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana. High School | was reportedly was a high school that offered courses that
enabled students to earn either a high school diploma or GED.

COUNTS ONE THROUGH NINE
(Wire Fraud)

Scheme to Defraud

35. Paragraphs 1 through 34 of this Indictment are incorporated herein by

reference as factual allegations.
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36. Beginning on or about a date unknown, but no later than in or about
September 2017, and continuing through in or about November 2019, in the Middle District
of Louisiana, and elsewhere, ELLIOTT STERLING, defendant herein, and others known
and unknown to the Grand Jury, devised and intended to devise a scheme to defraud the
United States and to obtain money and property from the United States, by means of
materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and for the purpose
of executing the scheme and attempting to do so, did knowingly transmit certain wire
communications in interstate commerce.

Purpose of the Scheme to Defraud

37. | The purpose of STERLING’s scheme was to defraud and obtain money from
the United States and for STERLING to unlawfully enrich himself and others.

Manner and Means of the Scheme to Defraud

38. The manner and means by which STERLING sought to accomplish the
purpose of the scheme to defraud included, among other things, the following:

39. Beginning no later than September 2017, STERLING solicited potential
students to enroll in classes at BRCC; he also encouraged the potential students to refer other
individuals to him. STERLING told many of the potential students that he could assist them
for a fee and promised some that they could receive free federal financial aid.

40. STERLING obtained the PII for each potential student, which he used to
electronically submit applications for admission to BRCC on their behalf and enroll them in
classes at BRCC. In order to accomplish this, STERLING created email addresses and
LoLA accounts on behalf of each potential student, many times without the student’s

knowledge, which he used to log into the accounts he established in their names.

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41, STERLIN G obtained a unique FSA ID in the name of each potential student,
and STERLING used each student’s PIT and FSA ID to apply for federal financial aid funds
on their behalf; STERLING electronically submitted FAFSAs on behalf of each student
through the DOE website. At times, STERLING assisted potential students on how to
electronically submit a FAFSA on their own.

42. Typically, the potential students did not have access to the email addresses or
login information that STERLING created on their behalf and did not have access to their
own BRCC, LoLA, or FAFSA accounts.

43. | Unbeknownst to many of the potential students, STERLING electronically
signed Master Promissory Notes obligating each student to repay federal financial aid loans
STERLING had obtained in their names. STERLING frequently used false personal
references on the Master Promissory Notes he signed for potential students and often used
the same personal references for multiple students, even though the students did not know
the personal references STERLING utilized.

44. The FAFSAs that STERLING personally created and electronically submitted
on behalf of the potential students contained material false information and false
representations.

45. Inmost cases, STERLING falsely reported on required forms that the student
had earned a high school diploma or GED/HSE, when they had not. For instance,
STERLING submitted FAFSAs and obtained FSA funds on behalf of over 250 individuals;
however, only approximately 32 had earned the requisite high school diploma or GED/HSE

that would make them eligible for FSA funding.
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46. Insome cases, STERLING falsely reported the student’s income or the
student’s receipt of other federal benefits, such as Medicaid, SSI, SNAP benefits, and/or
WIC funds.

47. Occasionally, STERLING incorrectly reported the number of the student’s
dependents. For example, in order to obtain FSA funds, STERLING falsely certified that
Individual B had children and/or dependents when he submitted Individual B’s FAFSA to
the DOE and further directed Individual B to list a fictitious dependent on BRCC verification
paperwork, even though STERLING knew that Individual B did not have children or
dependents.

48. STERLING made false representations regarding whether some students had
been convicted of drug offenses, which would have required additional forms to be
completed by the student before eligibility could be determined.

49. — Inevery case, STERLING concealed from the DOE his identity as the
preparer, or person who received a fee for assistance, on the FAFSAs he submitted on behalf
of potential students and further failed to disclose his name, address, Social Security number,
employer ID number, or to sign the FAFSAs. Instead, STERLING electronically signed the
FAFSAs with the potential students’ FSA IDs instead of a FSA ID that identified himself.
By failing to identify himself as the preparer and submitter of the FAFSAs, STERLING
attempted to avoid responsibility for the contents of the false FAFSAs.

50. | When students inquired about needing a high school diploma or GED/HSE,
STERLING told some students that they could earn a GED while taking courses at BRCC;
however, STERLING concealed the fact that students could not receive financial aid while

taking GED courses.
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51. Because STERLING electronically signed the FAFSAs and Master
Promissory Notes on behalf of the students, most students were not aware of the
certifications being made by STERLING.

52. STERLING was able to conceal from most students that they were obligated
to repay loans that he had obtained under false pretenses; STERLING misled some potential
students by mischaracterizing FSA loans as Pell Grants that did not need to be repaid.

53. Insome instances, STERLING told students who had not earned a high
school diploma or GED/HSE that he would provide fake diplomas. For example,
STERLING informed Individual D that he would create a high school diploma or GED if
needed when Individual D informed STERLING that he/she never had a valid diploma or
transcript.

54. To further his scheme, STERLING paid for and obtained fake High School |
diplomas on behalf of approximately 42 students who never attended High School 1. For
approximately 17 of those students, STERLING falsely represented to Individual H that
they had earned a GED from Jefferson Online and Technical High School (“Jefferson”) and
provided Individual H with fake Jefferson transcripts.

55. In response to requests for additional verification by the BRCC Financial Aid
Office, STERLING provided BRCC with false information, or directed the students to do
so, using the same information for multiple students’ forms.

56. Inmany cases, STERLING accompanied the student to BRCC’s campus and
instructed the student on how to complete, sign, and turn in the documentation. In some
instances, STERLING falsely presented himself as a student and even solicited, and offered

to pay, individuals to impersonate students at the BRCC Financial Aid Office.
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57. STERLING created BankMobile accounts for each student for the purpose of
receiving federal financial aid refunds, but in most cases, STERLING did not provide
students with access to these accounts, or the email addresses or login information used to
create, access, and operate these bank accounts.

58. Inthe majority of cases, STERLING set the BankMobile refund preferences
so that the refunds would be deposited into STERLING’s Chase Acct. #1905 or SEC’s
Chase Acct. #5588.

59. In other cases, STERLING set the refund preferences for funds to remain in
the students’ BankMobile accounts, which caused debit cards to be issued to the students.

60. Onsome occasions, STERLING electronically transferred or attempted to
transfer, for his personal enrichment, FSA funds from the students’ BankMobile accounts to
his personal Chase account or personal Square (also known as CashApp) account without the
students’ knowledge.

61. After receiving federal financial aid refunds into his personal or business
accounts, STERLING typically directed students to meet him at a local Chase bank branch,
where he caused cashier’s checks, for a portion of the refund amount and in the names of the
students, to be issued from his personal or business accounts. Regularly, STERLING kept a
portion of funds intended as refunds for the students in his personal or business accounts
without the students’ knowledge.

62. Despite having retained a portion of the refunds in his bank accounts, upon
issuance and cashing of the students’ cashier’s checks, STERLING required the students to

give him a portion of the cashed check as a fee for his assistance.

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63. For instance, on behalf of Individual C, STERLING’s scheme caused
approximately $6,895.55 in FSA funds to be deposited into STERLING’s Chase Acct.
#1905. STERLING then issued a cashier’s check to Individual C in the amount of $3,500
and retained the remaining balance of the FSA funds for his personal enrichment. Upon
cashing the cashier’s check, STERLING gave only $1,000 to Individual C, and STERLING
kept an additional $2,500 for his personal enrichment.

64. STERLING retained FSA funds for his personal enrichment while aware that
some students (a) never intended to attend schoo! after receiving financial aid funds; (b) were
not using the funds for educational purposes; or (c) were incarcerated and therefore ineligible
to receive federal financial aid loans.

65. For example, STERLING, knowing that at least five students were
incarcerated at the time that their FSA loan funds were deposited into STERLING’s Chase
Acct. #1905, arranged for FSA funds to be used for non-educational purposes, such as to be
given to the incarcerated students’ family members or used to post bonds for their release
from incarceration.

66. In furtherance of his scheme to defraud, STERLING did the following: (a)
concealed from the DOE, BRCC, BankMobile, and the students, his sole control of the
FAFSA, BRCC, and BankMobile accounts and the fact that he directed the bank accounts to
which refunds would be disbursed; (b) failed to disclose the full amount of financial aid.
disbursed on behalf of the students; (c) retained a large portion of the funds for himself,
sometimes without the students’ knowledge; and (d) enrolled some students in subsequent
semesters without their knowledge in order to receive additional FSA funds for his and

others’ personal enrichment.

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Wire Transmissions

67. Onor about the following dates, in the Middle District of Louisiana and
elsewhere, ELLIOTT STERLING, defendant herein, for the purpose of executing the
above-described scheme, and attempting to do so, did knowingly transmit and cause to be
transmitted by means of the following wire communications in interstate commerce, certain

writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, with each wiring constituting a separate count:

Count Date Description

1 December 4, 2017 | STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Texas, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual A.

2 December 22, 2017 | STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Texas, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual B.

3 January 24,2018 | STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Texas, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual C.

4 May 24, 2018 STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Texas, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual D.

5 July 26, 2018 STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Texas, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual A.

6 July 26, 2018 STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Texas, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual B.

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7 July 26, 2018 STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Texas, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual C.

8 September 24, STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
2018 be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Virginia, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual C.

9 September 24, STERLING caused an interstate wire communication to
2018 be transmitted from the Middle District of Louisiana,
through servers located in Virginia, in connection with the
submission of a FAFSA, which contained false material
information, on behalf of Individual D.

Each of the above is a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

COUNTS TEN THROUGH THIRTHEEN
(Financial Aid Fraud)

68. Paragraphs | through 67 of this Indictment are incorporated herein by
reference as factual allegations.

69. From on or about a date unknown, but no later than in or about September
2017, and continuing through in or about November 2019, within the Middle District of
Louisiana, and elsewhere, ELLIOTT STERLING, defendant herein, did knowingly and
willfully misapply, steal, and obtain by fraud and false statement, federal student financial
aid funds in excess of $200, which funds were provided and insured under Subchapter IV of
Chapter 28 of Title 20 of Part C of Subchapter 1 of Chapter 34 of Title 42, United States
Code; that is, federal Pell Grants and Federal Direct Loans as below described, each of which

constitute a separate count:

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Count Date Description of Financial Aid Fraud
10 November 13, STERLING received a direct deposit of FSA funds into
2018 Chase Acct. #1905 in the amount of $1,732 in the name
of Individual E, who was incarcerated at the time of the
deposit.

11 January 9,2019 | STERLING received and deposited a BankMobile
issued check into Chase Acct. #1905 in the amount of
$4,194.46 in the name of Individual F, who was
incarcerated at the time of the deposit.

12 February 5, 2019 | STERLING received a direct deposit of FSA funds into
Chase Acct. #1905 in the amount of $846.32 in the
name of Individual G, who was incarcerated at the time
of the deposit.

13 February 8, 2019 | STERLING received a direct deposit of FSA funds into

Chase Acct. #1905 in the amount of $4,701 in the name
of Individual G, who was incarcerated at the time of the
deposit.

Each of the above is a violation of Title 20, United States Code, Section 1097(a).

70.
reference as factual allegations.

71.

COUNT FOURTEEN

(Engaging in Monetary Transactions in
Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity)

Paragraphs | through 69 of this Indictment are incorporated herein by

On or about March 19, 2019, in the Middle District of Louisiana, ELLIOTT

STERLING, defendant herein, knowingly engaged and attempted to engage in monetary

transactions involving criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, which

property was derived from a specified unlawful activity, that is, wire fraud, in violation of

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, which transaction affected interstate commerce,

that is, STERLING caused the withdrawal of $256,000 from STERLING’s Chase bank

account ending in 1905 for conversion of funds to official bank check number xxxxxx5745.

The above is a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957.

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NOTICE OF FORFEITURE

72. Upon conviction of an offense in Counts One through Nine and Count
Fourteen of this Indictment, ELLIOTT STERLING, defendant herein, shall forfeit to the
United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1){A) and (a)(2){A) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c),
the following:

a. any and all property that constitutes or is derived from proceeds the defendant

obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the wire fraud scheme (Counts
One through Nine) and
b. any and all property, real and personal, involved in the money laundering
offense (Count Fourteen) or any property traceable to such property,
including but not limited to the following:
a. The funds formerly held in Pelican State Credit Union account number ending
in 007 in the name of Elliott Sterling, which funds were seized on or about
May 5, 2020, from Pelican State Credit Union, and which are currently being
held by the United States Marshals Service; and
b. $130,000 formerly held by JP Morgan Chase Bank in connection with
cashier’s check number xxxxxx6348, issued on July 24, 2019, and made
payable to Elliott Sterling, which funds were seized on or about May 5, 2020,
from JP Morgan Chase Bank, and which are currently being held by the
United States Marshals Service.

73. Upon conviction of the offense in Count Fourteen of this Indictment,

ELLIOTT STERLING, defendant herein, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to 18

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U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), any and all property, real and personal, involved in such offense, and all

property traceable to such property, including but not limited to the following,

a.

74.

The funds formerly held in Pelican State Credit Union account number ending
in 007 in the name of Elliott Sterling, which funds were seized on or about
May 5, 2020, from Pelican State Credit Union, and which are currently being
held by the United States Marshals Service; and

$130,000 formerly held by JP Morgan Chase Bank in connection with
cashier’s check number xxxxxx6348 issued on July 24, 2019, and made
payable to Elliott Sterling, which funds were seized on or about May 5, 2020,
from JP Morgan Chase Bank, and which are currently being held by the
United States Marshals Service.

If any of the above-described forfeitable property, because of any act or

omission of the defendant:

a.

cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court;

has been substantially diminished in value; or

has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without

difficulty;

it is the intent of the United States to seek a forfeiture money judgment against the

defendant, and it is also the intent of the United States, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) as

incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 982(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), to seek forfeiture of any other |

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Case 3:20-cr-00052-BAJ-RLB Document1 08/03/20 Page 21 of 22

property of the defendant as substitute property up to the value of the forfeitable property

described above.

UNITED ST F AMERICA, BY A TRUE BILL
. REDACTED
YAW) PER PRIVACY ACT
‘GRAND JURY FOREPERSON

MIDDLE DISTNCTL@F LOUISIANA

SICA JARREAU DATE
ASSISTANT STATES ATTORNEY

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Criminal Cover Sheet US. District Court

Place of Offense: Matter to be sealed: No_X__ Yes
City Baton Rouge Related Case Information:
County/Parish East Baton Rouge Superseding Indictment Docket Number

Same Defendant New Defendant x

Magistrate Case Number

Search Warrant Case No.

R 20/ R 40 from District of

Any Other Related Cases:

Defendant Information:

Defendant Name: Elliott Sterling

U.S. Attorney Information:

AUSA Jessica Jarreau Bar # LABN 31204
Interpreter; KINo UI Yes List language and/or dialect:

Location Status:

Arrest Date

Already in Federal Custody as of
Already in State Custody
On Pretrial Release

U.S.C. Citations:

Total # of Counts: 14
Petty/
Index Key/Code Description of Offense Charged Count(s) Misdemeanor/
Felony
18:1343 Wire fraud 1-9 FE
20:1097(a) Financial aid fraud 10—13 FE
18:1957 Engaging in monetary transactions involving property 14 F

derived from specified unlawful activity
Date: % ie | 2020 Signature of avsac fed CH faedeows

District Court Case Number (To be filled in by deputy clerk):


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