Indictment — United States v. Sanda G. Frimpong, Eastern District of North Carolina (Document 1)
Summary
A grand jury Indictment in United States v. Sanda G. Frimpong, Case 5:23-cr-00035-D-RN, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, filed February 7, 2023. It alleges that Frimpong, described as an active-duty E-4/Specialist in the U.S. Army stationed at Fort Bragg, used his bank accounts to receive and move money from romance and gold scams run with co-conspirators, including cashier's checks of $50,000 and $100,000 later wired to the Republic of Ghana. A second part describes an unemployment assistance scheme involving Pandemic Unemployment Assistance under the CARES Act administered by California's EDD. The forfeiture section seeks at least $365,662.00 for the money laundering counts, Counts One through Three, and at least $154,335.00 in gross proceeds for Counts Four through Nineteen. The filing is a redacted version.
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“Indictment — United States v. Sanda G. Frimpong, Eastern District of North Carolina (Document 1).”
Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/indictment-no-5-23-cr-00035-dkt-1-e-d-n-c-d535199de7/
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FILED IN OPEN COURT
ON 1- IJI 1-0i~l(3
Peter A. Moore, Jr., Clerk
US District Court
DGB Eastern District of NC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
V. )
)
SANDA G. FRIMPONG ) INDICTMENT
)
The grand jury charges that:
INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS
1. At all relevant times, Defendant SANDA G. FRIMPONG
("FRIMPONG") was an active-duty E-4/Specialist in the U.S. Army and maintained
a Secret security clearance. FRIMPONG entered the U.S. from the Republic of Ghana
in 2015 on a Kl Fiance Visa. In December 2015, FRIMPONG married the Kl sponsor
and the two later divorced in March 20 18. FRIMPONG naturalized as a U.S. citizen
in November 2018. At all relevant times, FRIMPONG was stationed at Fort Bragg
and resided in Harnett County, both locations being within in the Eastern District of
North Carolina.
I. The Money Laundering Scheme and Artifice to Defraud
2. Beginning no later than on or about December 2019 and continuing until
m or about February 2022, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the
Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, t he Defendant, SANDA G.
Case 5:23-cr-00035-D-RN Document 1 Filed 02/07/23 Page 1 of 29
FRIMPONG, G.F., F.A., and B.S., along with others known and unknown to the grand
jury, engaged in a series of schemes and artifices to defraud to obtain money and
property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises
through the u se of interstate wire communications and interstate mail. To execute
the fraud, conspirators impersonated romantic love interests, diplomats, customs
personnel, military personnel, and assumed other fictitious personas. As set forth in
greater detail below, SANDA G. FRIMPONG knowingly utilized his personal bank
accounts to receive or send money obtained via a variety of frauds , such as the false
promise of a romantic relationship and/or gold.
3. It was the object of the conspiracy that FRIMPONG and his co-
conspirators conducted romance scams targeting victims in the United States and
elsewhere for the purpose of enriching themselves and each other with the unlawful
proceeds of such scams. It was further part of the conspiracy and scheme to defraud
that FRIMPONG and his co-conspirators used false stories and promises to convince
the victims to transfer money on their behalf.
4. FRIMPONG and others used a variety of fraudulent scenarios to
ensnare victims by earning their confidence, including promises of romance, sharing
an inheritance or other riches, or other scenarios intended to fraudulently induce the
victims to provide money or property to the conspirators. FRIMPONG and others
assumed false identities to communicate with victims online.
5. Having established relationships with the victims, the conspirators
ultimately requested money for variou s untrue purposes, including travel expenses
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and customs fees for gold. The conspirators directed the victims to wire transfer or
deposit money into various accounts, including accounts establish ed and maintained
by FRIMPONG. Often, after the victims transferred money into the specified
accounts, conspirators claimed more money was needed for various purposes.
6. It was further part of the conspiracy and scheme to defraud that
FRIMPONG and his co-conspirators used drop accounts to receive, transfer, and
otherwise convert fraudulently obtained funds from victims. It was further part of
the conspiracy a nd scheme to defraud that FRIMPONG and his co-conspirators
caused the victims to use the wires to transfer money to the drop accounts.
Thereafter, the fraudulently obtained funds were disbursed by using wires to transfer
money to other accounts, by initiating account transfers to other accounts at the same
bank, by withdrawing sums of money, and by transferring funds to other individuals
and entities .
7. It was further part of the conspiracy that FRIMPONG maintained
numerous bank accounts and mobile payment services. The victims of these frauds,
following the directions of known and unknown conspirators, mailed, wired, or
deposited money into those accounts identified below and maintained by
FRIMPONG. Upon receipt of the money, FRIMPONG typically utilized some of the
proceeds for his own benefit, and transferred some of the proceeds to other accounts
in the United States or overseas. At no time did FRIMPONG utilize the transferred
funds for the purposes communicated to the victims .
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Financial Institution Account No. Registered
(Last Four) Account Holder
Navy Federal Credit Union *****3467 Sanda G. Frimpong
Navy Federal Credit Union *****9937 Sanda G. Frimpong
JPMorgan Chase *****0680 Sanda G. Frimpong
BB&T *****8845 Sanda G. Frimpong
TD Bank *****5836 Sanda G. Frimoong
Wells Fargo *****6517 Sanda G. Frimpong
Bank of America *****6024 Sanda G. Frimpong
The above banks and credit unions are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and otherwise meet the definition of a financial institution under
United States Code, Chapter 18, Section 20.
8. Funds in the accounts were rapidly transferred to co-conspirators, other
individuals known to law enforcement or between accounts maintained by
FRIMPONG. These transfers served no apparent valid legal business purpose.
FRIMPONG retained a portion of the funds.
9. FRIMPONG regularly communicated with other members of the
conspiracy using WhatsApp Messenger ("WhatsApp"). WhatsApp is a free, cross-
platform communication application available for Apple, Android, and Windows
cellular telephones, as well as Mac and Windows PC computers. WhatsApp enables
users to communicate securely over the Internet with end-to-end encryption using a
variety of formats, including video, voice calls, and SMS (text) messaging. WhatsApp
is owned by Meta Platforms, which houses WhatsApp's servers outside of North
Carolina. The conspirators also communicated using SnapChat, an instant
messagmg application whose principal feature is that pictures and messages are
usually only available for a short time before they become inaccessible to their
recipients.
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A. Representative Money Laundering Example #1
10. In one example, K.W., a widower, residing in North Rose, NY, was
contacted in or around October 2020, by an online alias self-identified as "Catherine
White." K.W. engaged in a virtual relationship with "Catherine White" with the
intent of meeting her in person in the future.
11. After communicating back-and-forth for approximately one month,
"Catherine White" claimed to need money to pay a holding fee to release gold that
was held in Canada and inherited by Catherine White's deceased father. White
further claimed to h ave been detained by a Canadian customs officer named Sanda
Frimpong and requested that K.W. wire money to Frimpong's JPMorgan Chase bank
account ending in -0680 to pay duties on the gold "White" was attempting to bring
into Canada. To further perpetuate the scheme, "Catherine White" sent K.W.
photographs of the purported gold bars, a photograph of a woman in handcuffs, and
a counterfeit Canada Border Services Agency document. "Catherine White"
communicated with KW. by text message and using the email address,
comfortwhite10@gmail.com. Google, LLC houses its servers outside of North
Carolina.
12. K.W. wired $6,500 (in two transactions of $6,100 and $400 each) on or
about November 3, 2020 to FRIMPONG's aforementioned JPMorgan Chase account
ending in -0680. FRIMPONG then transferred $6,000 of that money using the money
transfer service known as "Zelle" into his Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU) account
ending in -3467 in three transactions of $2,000: one each occurring on or about
November 3, 2020; on or about November 4, 2020; and on or about November 5, 2020.
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On or about December 28, 2020, K.W. wired $900 to FRIMPONG's aforementioned
JPMorgan Chase account ending in -0680. On or about the same day, FRIMPONG
then wired $982 .87 from his aforementioned JPMorgan Chase account ending in -
0680 in transactions of $100 and $882.87, using, respectively, the money transfer
services known as "Western Union" and "Moneygram."
B. Representative Money Laundering Example #2
13. In another example, A.H., a resident of Lakewood, IL, met an individual
in early 2021 with the online alias "Tom Tanner" on an online dating website. A.H.
had recently divorced after 25 years of marriage. "Tom Tanner" purported to be from
Illinois but deployed with the Army in Afghanistan. "Tom Tanner" asked A.H. to
marry him, while delaying an in-person meeting.
14. After gaining their trust, "Tom Tanner" claimed he had access to gold
and diamonds but needed A.H.'s financial assistance to transfer the assets.
"Tom Tanner" communicated with A.H. usmg the email address,
tomtanner022@gmail.com or through Google Hangouts. Google LLC houses its
servers outside of North Carolina.
15. On or about September 8, 2021, A.H. received an email from an
individual claiming to be Tanner's attorney, "Shawn Martins.'' "Shawn Martins"
communicated with A.H. using the email address, advocacylawoffice66@mail.com.
16. "Shawn Martins" told A.H. that he recently spoke to Tanner, and
suggested the transaction could be easily accomplished by sending a cashier's check
to Sanda Frimpong. "Shawn Martins" provided a Spring Lake, NC address, which
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was associated with FRIMPONG's co-conspirator, B.S . The aliases "Shawn Martin"
and "Tom Tanner" regularly communicated with A.H. through interstate email
communications.
17. A.H. obliged and mailed a $50,000 cashier's check to "Tom Tanner" via
UPS next-day air to the Spring Lake address. On or about September 9, 2021 ,
FRIMPONG messaged with F.A. acknowledging delivery of the check at the Spring
Lake, NC address.
18. On or about September 9, 2021, "Shawn Martins" emailed A.H.
confirming receipt of the cashier's check, but noting the name on the check was
spelled "Sandra" and thus needed to be corrected. "Shawn Martins" attached a photo
of the check that was also exchanged between FRIMPONG and F.A., who was
communicating with FRIMPONG from the Republic of Ghana.
19. On or about September 10, 2021 , the cashier's check was deposited into
FRIMPONG's NFCU account ending in -9937. On or about September 13, 2021,
FRIMPONG wired $50,000 from his NFCU account ending in -9937 to Freddie Frim
Motors located outside of the United States in the Republic of Ghana.
20. On or about September 20, 2021, "Shawn Martins" sent A.H. an email
stating that it was going to cost $36,000 to change the ownership documents. On or
about September 23, 2021, A.H. responded with concern stating she needed to talk to
their financial advisor because there has been a lot of fraud related to military
personnel.
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21. On or about November 10, 2021 , "Tom Tanner" emailed A.H. two
fraudulent documents relative to reassignment of 100 kilograms of gold bars and
diamonds from Tanner to A.H.
22. On or about December 16, 2021, "Shawn Martins" and "Tom Tanner"
emailed A.H. listing FRIMPONG and B.S.' Spring Lake, NC address. Martins
reminded A.H. to make sure the name was spelled Sanda not Sandra.
23. On or about December 17, 2021, A.H. sent an email to Martins
indicating a cashier's check was on its way to FRIMPONG. FRIMPONG exchanged
messages with F.A. acknowledging receipt of the check, made out for $100,000. On
or about December 20, 2021, the check was deposited into FRIMPONG's NFCU
account ending in -9937.
24. On or about December 21 , 2021 , FRIMPONG wired $100,000 in two
separate transactions of $50,000 each from his NFCU account ending in -9937 to
Freddie Frim Motors and to S.F. (FRIMPONG's sister), both outside of the United
States in the Republic of Ghana.
25. A.H. sent FRIMPONG additional funds around late January 2022 that
were deposited into FRIMPONG's NFCU account ending in -9937 in early February
2022. FRIMPONG repeatedly exchanged messages with F.A. acknowledging the
additional funds.
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II. The Unemployment Assistance Scheme
A. Regulatory and Program Background
26. Since 1935, The U .S. Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance
(UI) program has provided unemployment benefits to eligible workers who become
unemployed through no fault of their own. This program ensures that at least a
significant portion of the necessities of life -- most notably food, shelter, and clothing
-- are met on a weekly basis while the worker seeks employment. UI beneficiaries
who meet the requirements of the applicable state law are eligible for this temporary
financial assistance. Each state administers a separate UI program within the
guidelines established by Federal law. For example, in the State of California, the
Employment Development Department (EDD) administers the UI program for
residents and others physically performing work activities in California.
27. Generally, regular UI claimants must be: 1) unemployed through no
fault of their own; 2) able and available for work; 3) willing to accept suitable work;
and 4) actively seeking work.
28. In Response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act ("CARES Act"), which the
President signed into law on March 27, 2020. The CARES Act provided over $2
trillion in economic relief protections to the American people from the public health
and economic impacts of COVID-19.
29. Prior to the enactment of the CARES Act, to be eligible for UI
administered by EDD, a person must have been employed and worked in California
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and received at least a certain amount of wages from an employer in the 18 months
preceding his/her UI benefits claim. Because of this requirement, self-employed
workers, independent contractors, and employees with insufficient earnings were not
eligible to receive regular UI benefits. The CARES Act established a new program --
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA). Under PUA, states are permitted to
provide PUA to individuals who are self-employed, seeking part-time employment, or
otherwise would not qualify for regular UI compensation.
30. Under the PUA provisions of the CARES Act, a person who was a
business owner, self-employed worker, independent contractor, or gig worker could
qualify for PUA benefits administered by EDD if he/she previously performed such
work in California and was unemployed, partially unemployed, unable to work, or
unavailable to work due to a COVID-19-related reason.
31. EDD began accepting applications for PUA benefits on April 28, 2020.
To make benefits available as quickly as possible, payments were issued in phases.
If a claimant qualified for PUA benefits, the minimum payments depended on the
claim's start date.
32. A UI claimant could usually collect 26 weeks ofregular state UI benefits.
The CARES Act also established the Pandemic Emergency Unemployment
Compensation ("PEUC") program, which provided up to 13 weeks of additional
payments, for a total of 39 weeks of benefits. PEUC was available to persons who
were or are fully or partially unemployed at any time between from March 29 and
December 26, 2020. Persons with a regular UI claim, a PUA claim or a PEUC
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extension filed between March 29 and July 25, 2020, also received Federal Pandemic
Unemployment Compensation ("FPUC"), which was an extra $600 per week.
33. Persons applying for PUA benefits did not need to submit any
supporting documents to the EDD with their applications. Claimants entered their
total income for the 2019 calendar year on the applications.
34. Like regular UI claims, PUA claims could be filed online . When an
individual filed a PUA claim online, EDD automatically maintained certain
information regarding the filing of the claim. This information included the date and
time the claim was submitted, the name of the person for whom the claim was filed,
and the IP address of the computer, or ISP account, that was used to file the claim.
35. A PUA claimant must answer various questions to establish his/her
eligibility for PUA benefits. The claimant must provide his/her name, Social Security
Number, and mailing address. The claimant must also identify a qualifying
occupational status and COVID-19-related reason for being out of work.
36. After it accepts a UI claim, including a claim submitted pursuant to the
PUA program, EDD typically deposited UI funds every two weeks to an electronic
benefits debit card administered by a federally insured financial institution, which
the claimant could use to pay for their expenses. The electronic benefits debit card
was sent via the U.S. Postal Service to the claimant at the address the claimant
provided in their UI claim. Claimants could activate their debit card over the phone
or online.
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37. When receiving UI benefits, including PUA benefits, a claimant must
have completed a Continued Claim Form (DE 4581) and certify every two weeks,
under penalty of perjury, that he/she remained unemployed and eligible to receive UI
benefits. EDD authorized and deposited payment to the electronic benefits debit card
after it received the Continued Claim Form.
B. The Scheme and Artifice to Defraud
38. Beginning as early as April 2020, the Defendant, FRIMPONG, together
with B.S. , and others known and unknown to the grand jury, engaged in a scheme to
defraud the United States Government by submitting false and fraudulent
applications for CARES Act financial assistance relief in the form of unemployment
insurance benefits.
39. FRIMPONG coordinated with B.S. and others in the Republic of Ghana,
to use stolen identities to apply online for federal CARES Act funds and
unemployment benefits from several states, including California as well as Arizona,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Texas, and others. Many state agencies tasked with administering
unemployment assistance disburse benefits through the issuance of physical debit
cards, which were sent to the physical mailing address provided with the application.
The cards were issued by financial institutions insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and mailed by the United States Postal Service.
40. FRIMPONG or others acting on his behalf would complete fraudulent
applications online through the state agencies administering UI benefits, and input
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a physical address, purportedly associated with the beneficiary. After the state
administering the UI benefits mailed the debit card to that address, FRIMPONG or
another member of the conspiracy, would physically retrieve the debit cards from the
address. FRIMPONG often used B.S.'s address of 604 Eva Circle in Spring Lake, NC,
which is located in the Eastern District of North Carolina.
41. C.M. lived in Gilroy, CA. C.M. never met FRIMPONG or applied for UI.
FRIMPONG or others acting on his behalf used C.M.'s name, date of birth, and/or
social security number without C.M.'s knowledge or permission to complete an online
application for UI through the California EDD. Debit cards issued by Bank of
America in C.M.'s name were mailed to 7271 Katella Ave., SPC 2 in Stanton,
California, 90680. FRIMPONG or other members of the conspiracy acting on his
behalf physically retrieved the debit cards, and transferred the funds into
FRIMPONG'S JP Morgan Chase bank account ending in -0680 through interstate
wire.
42. C.S. lived in Cypress, CA. C.S. never met FRIMPONG or applied for UI.
FRIMPONG or others acting on his behalf used C.S.'s name, date of birth, and/or
social security number without C.S.'s knowledge or permission to complete an online
application for UI through the California EDD. Debit cards issued by Bank of
America in C.S.'s name were mailed to 11901 176th St., Apt. 152 in Artesia,
California, 90701. FRIMPONG or other members of the conspiracy acting on his
behalf physically retrieved the debit cards, and transferred the funds into
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FRIMPONG'S JP Morgan Chase bank account ending in -0680 through interstate
wire.
43. J.G., who died in February 2022, lived in Dale City, VA. FRIMPONG or
others acting on his behalf used J.G.'s name, date of birth, and/or social security
number without J.G.'s knowledge or permission to complete an online application for
UI through the California EDD. Debit cards issued by Bank of America in J.G.'s
name were mailed to 7271 Katella Ave., SPC 2 in Stanton, California, 90680.
FRIMPONG or other members of the conspiracy acting on his behalf physically
retrieved the debit cards, and transferred the funds into FRIMPONG'S JP Morgan
Chase bank account ending in -0680 through interstate wire.
44. In each instance, FRIMPONG or others acting on his behalf would
transfer the funds from the debit cards into his J.P. Morgan Chase (JPMC) bank
account ending in -0680.
COUNT ONE
Money Laundering and Aiding & Abetting
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(l)(B) and 2
45. Paragraphs 2 through 25 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
46. Beginning no later than on or about December 2019, and continuing
until at least on or about February 2022, both dates being approximate and inclusive,
in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant, SANDA G.
FRIMPONG, aiding and abetting others, known and unknown to the grand jury, did
knowingly engage and attempt to engage, in financial transactions affecting
interstate and foreign commerce; through a financial institution; knowing the
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property and funds involved in the transactions to be derived from unlawful activity;
such proceeds having been derived from specified unlawful activities, that is Wire
Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 and Mail Fraud in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341; and knowing that the
transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of Wire Fraud and
Mail Fraud.
All in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(B).
COUNT TWO
Money Laundering and Aiding & Abetting
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(B) and 2
4 7. Paragraphs 2 through 25 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
48. Beginning no later than on or about December 2019, and continuing
until at least on or about February 2022, both dates being approximate and inclusive,
in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the defendant, SANDA G.
FRIMPONG, aiding and abetting others, known and unknown to the grand jury, did
knowingly transfer and attempt to transfer monetary instruments and funds from
inside the United States to or through a place outside of the United States, the
Republic of Ghana; knowing that the monetary instruments and funds involved in
the transfer represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing
that such transfer was designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature,
location, the source, the ownership, and the control of the proceeds of unlawful
activity; such proceeds having been derived from various unlawful activities that
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constituted offenses against the United States, violations of North Carolina criminal
law, and violations of other state and federal laws, including, but not limited to Wire
Fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343; Mail Fraud in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341; and Obtaining Property by
False Pretense in violation of North Carolina General Statutes, Section 14-100.
All in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B).
COUNT THREE
Conspiracy to Conimit Money Laundering
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)
49. Paragraphs 2 through 25 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
50. Beginning no later than on or about December 2019, and continuing
until at least on or about February 2022, both dates being approximate and inclusive,
in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant, SANDA G.
FRIMPONG and others, known and unknown to the grand jury, did knowingly
combine, conspire, confederate, agree, and have a tacit understanding with each other
to commit offenses against the United States, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 1956(a)(l) and 1956(a)(2); specifically, to
a. knowingly engage and attempt to engage, in monetary transactions
affecting interstate and foreign commerce; through a financial
institution; knowing that the property and funds involved in the
transactions to be derived from unlawful activity; such proceeds having
been derived from specified unlawful activities, that is Wire Fraud, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 and Mail Fraud
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in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341 ; and knowing
that the transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal and
disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the
control of the proceeds of Wire Fraud and Mail Fraud; and
b. knowingly transfer and attempt to transfer funds from inside the United
States to or through a place outside of the United States, the Republic
of Ghana; knowing that the funds involved in the transfer represented
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such
transfer was designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the
nature, location, the source, the ownership, and the control of the
proceeds of unlawful activity; such proceeds having been derived from
various unlawful activities including but not limited to Wire Fraud, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, Mail Fraud in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, and Obtaining
Property by False Pretense in violation of North Carolina General
Statutes, Section 14-100.
All in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
COUNTS FOUR THROUGH TEN
Wire Fraud & Aiding and Abetting
18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2
51. Paragraphs 26 through 37 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth h erein.
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The Scheme to Defraud
52. From approximately April of 2020 through approximately February of
2022, within the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant,
SANDA G. FRIMPONG, aiding and abetting others, knowingly devised and intended
to device a scheme and artifice to defraud the State of California's unemployment
assistance program, including the extended benefits made available during the
COVID-19 pandemic; the United States; JP Morgan Chase, N.A.; Bank of America,
N.A.; and the victims identified herein; and to obtain money and property by means
of materially false and fraudulent representations and promises.
Manner and Means
53. The Defendant, SANDA G. FRIMPONG, carried out the scheme and
artifice to defraud in the manner and means set forth in paragraphs 38 through 44.
Use of the Wires
54. On or about each of the dates set forth below in the Eastern District of
North Carolina and elsewhere, Defendant, SANDA G. FRIMPONG, for the purpose
of executing and attempting to execute the scheme and artifice to defraud described
above, caused to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate
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commerce the signals and sounds described below for each count, each transmission
constituting a separate count:
Count Date Description
4 9/10/2020 Bank of America fund transfer of $5,000 in the name of
C.M. to JPMC account ending in -0680
5 9/17/2020 Bank of America fund transfer of $5,000 in the name of
C.M. to JPMC account ending in -0680
6 10/06/2020 Bank of America fund transfer of $1,200 in the name of
C.M. to JPMC account ending in -0680
7 9/14/2020 Bank of America fund transfer of $5,000 in the name of
C.S. to JPMC account ending in -0680
8 10/13/2020 Bank of America fund transfer of $1,036 in the name of
C.S. to JPMC account ending in -0680
9 10/16/2020 Bank of America fund transfer of $5,000 in the name of
J.G. to JPMC account ending in -0680
10 10/30/2020 Bank of America fund transfer of $5,000 in the name of
J.G. to JPMC account ending in -0680
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 2.
COUNTS ELEVEN TO THIRTEEN
Mail Fraud & Aiding and Abetting
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2
55. Paragraphs 26 through 37 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
The Scheme to Defraud
56. From approximately April of 2020 through approximately February of
2022, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant,
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SANDA G. FRIMPONG, aiding and abetting others, with the intent to defraud,
devised and willfully participated in, and attempted to do so, with knowledge of its
fraudulent nature, the above-described scheme and artifice to defraud, and obtain
money and property by materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations,
and promises.
Manner and Means
57. The Defendant, SANDA G. FRIMPONG, carried out the scheme and
artifice to defraud in the manner and means set forth in paragraphs 38 through 44.
Use of the Mail
58. From approximately April of 2020 through approximately February of
2022, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant,
SANDA G. FRIMPONG, aiding and abetting others, for the purpose of executing and
attempting to execute the above-described scheme and artifice to defraud and
deprive, knowingly caused to be delivered by mail or private and commercial
interstate carrier, according to the direction thereon at the place at which it was
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it was addressed the following matter:
Count Approximate Date Mailing
11 August - September 2020 Debit card account number ending in -0258
in the name of C.M. mailed to:
7271 Katella Ave., SPC 2
Stanton, California, 90680
12 August - September 2020 Debit card account number ending in -5454
in the name of C.S. mailed to:
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11901 176th St., Apt. 152
Artesia, CA 90701
13 August - September 2020 Debit card account number ending in -6155
in the name of J.G. mailed to:
7271 Katella Ave. , SPC 2
Stanton, California, 90680
Each of the above-referenced entries constituting a separate violation of Title
18, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 2.
COUNT FOURTEEN
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Mail Fraud
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 and 1349
59. Paragraphs 26 through 37 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
60. From approximately April of 2020 through approximately February of
2022, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant SANDA
G. FRIMPONG, G.F., B.S. and others-known and unknown to the grand jury-did
knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, agree , and have a tacit understanding
with each other to commit offenses against the United States, to wit, Wire Fraud in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343; and Mail Fraud in violation
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341.
Objects of the Conspiracy
61. Wire Fraud: It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that
FRIMPONG and others, known and unknown to the grand jury, having devised the
above-described schemes and artifices to defraud, and knowingly executed and
attempted to execute the schemes and artifices to defraud, and to obtain money and
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property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and
promises, and attempting to do so, would and did transmit and cause to be
transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate commerce, any writing,
sign, signal, picture, and sound for purposes of executing said schemes and artifices
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.
62. Mail Fraud: It was a part and an object of the conspiracy that
FRIMPONG and others, known and unknown to the grand jury, having devised the
above-described schemes and artifices to defraud, and knowingly executed and
attempted to execute the schemes and artifices to defraud, and to obtain money and
property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and
promises, and attempting to do so, did knowingly caused to be delivered by mail or
private and commercial interstate carrier, according to the direction thereon at the
place at which it was directed to be delivered by the person to whom it was addressed
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service or private
and commercial interstate carrier.
Manner and Means
63. FRIMPONG and others, known and unknown to the grand jury, carried
out the conspiracy in the manner and means as set forth in paragraphs 38 through
44.
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.
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COUNTS FIFTEEN TO SEVENTEEN
Aggravated Identity Theft
18 US.C. § 1028A(a)(l)
64. Paragraphs 26 through 44 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
65. From approximately April of 2020 through approximately February of
2022, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant,
SANDA G. FRIMPONG, did knowingly transfer, possess, and use, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person, to wit-the name, date of birth,
and/or social security number of said other person-during and in relation to the
crimes set forth in the corresponding count of this Indictment identified in the table
below, which are felony violations enumerated in Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1028A(c), knowing that the means of identification belonged to another actual
person.
Count Victim Initials Corresponding Counts Predicate Offenses
15 C.M. 4, 5, 6, 11 Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343)
Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341)
16 C.S. 7, 8, 12 Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343)
Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341)
17 J.G. 9, 10, 13 Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343)
Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341)
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(l).
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COUNT EIGHTEEN
Access Device Fraud
18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)
66. From on or about January 1, 2022 through on or about February 28,
2022, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant,
SANDA G. FRIMPONG, did knowingly and with intent to defraud possess fifteen or
more devices, identified below-by associated financial institution, account number,
and purported account holder-which were counterfeit and unauthorized access
devices as defined in subsection (e)(2) and (e)(3) of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1029, to wit, banking and credit card account numbers that can be used, alone
or with other access devices, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of
value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds, such access devices being
lost, stolen, cancelled, and obtained with intent to defraud. This possession in the
aggregate substantially affected interstate commerce because the access devices were
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; because numerous purported account-
holders were domiciled outside of North Carolina; and because the associated
financial institutions were headquartered outside of North Carolina.
Access Institution Last Four Digits of Victim
Device No. Account Number
#1 BanCorp -2442 D.T.
#2 BanCorp -2252 P.P.
#3 BanCorp -7960 P.P.
#4 Lincoln Savings Bank -4462 L.S.
#5 Lincoln Savings Bank -4158 R.F.
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#6 Lincoln Savings Bank -6510 A.C.
#7 Lincoln Savings Bank -6077 J.D.
#8 Lincoln Savings Bank -1980 A.B.
#9 Lincoln Savings Bank -4797 D.W.
#10 Lincoln Savings Bank -9959 S.H.
#11 Lincoln Savings Bank -3628 D.S.
#12 CashApp -9157 S.H.
#13 Fidelity Investments -7158 L.S.
#14 Fidelity Investments -7363 A.L.
#15 Fidelity Investments -9070 A.C.
#16 Key Bank -3598 J.L.
#17 U.S. Bank -1430 A.B.
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(a)(3).
COUNT NINETEEN
Access Device Fraud
U.S.C. § 1029(a)(5)
67. Paragraphs 26 through 44 are re-alleged as factual allegations and
incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
68. From on or about September 1, 2020 through on or about October 31,
2020, in the Eastern District of North Carolina and elsewhere, the Defendant,
SANDA G. FRIMPONG, did knowingly and with intent to defraud effect transactions
with one or more unauthorized access devices-debit cards issued by Bank of
America, N.A. for fraudulently obtained UI benefits-issued to other persons (C.M.,
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C.S., and J.G.) to receive United States Currency in excess of $1,000 during the
calendar year of 2020, which did not exceed one year. The access devices were
counterfeit and unauthorized access devices as defined in subsection (e)(2) and (e)(3)
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2019, to wit, banking and credit card account
numbers that can be used, alone or with other access devices, to obtain money, goods,
services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds,
such access devices being lost, stolen, cancelled, and obtained with intent to defraud.
This conduct substantially affected interstate commerce because the access devices
were instrumentalities of interstate commerce; because the associated electronic
transactions involved the transmission of wire communication in interstate
commerce through FIDC-insured financial institutions like Bank of America, N.A.
and JPMorgan Chase, N.A.; because the debit cards were mailed through the United
States Postal Service; and because the victims and the accounts were domiciled in
California or Virginia.
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(a)(5).
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FORFEITURE NOTICE
Notice is hereby given that all right, title and interest in the property described
herein is subject to forfeiture.
Upon conviction of any offense charged herein constituting "specified unlawful
activity" (as defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) and 1961(1)), or a conspiracy to commit
such offense, the defendant shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(l)(C), as made applicable by 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), a ny property, real or
personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the said offense.
Upon conviction of any violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 or 1960 charged
herein, the defendant shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(l), any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property
traceable to such property.
Upon conviction of any violation of, or conspiracy to violate, Section 1029 of
Title 18 of the United States Code, the defendant shall forfeit to the United States,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(B), any property constituting, or derived from,
proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the said violation, or, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1029(c)(l)(C), any personal property used or intended to be used to
commit the said offense.
The forfeitable property includes, but is not limited to, the following:
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Forfeiture Money Judgment:
a) A sum of money representing the value of the property involved in the money
laundering offense(s) charged herein in Counts One through Three, in the
amount of at least $365,662.00.
b) A sum of money representing the gross proceeds of the offense(s) charged
herein in Counts Four through Nineteen, in the amount of at least $154,335.00.
Personal Property:
c) Approximately $47,590.35 m Funds seized from PNC Smart Access Card
Account No. XXXXXXXXXXXX:3560, issued in the name of B.S.
If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or
omission of a defendant: cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; has
been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; has been placed beyond
the jurisdiction of the court; has been substantially diminished in value; or has been
commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty; it is the
intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p),
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to seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendant up to the value of the
forfeitable property described above.
ATR_DE BILL
F6REPERSON
Date: J ~ ~ t)~
MICHAEL F. EASLEY, JR.
Unite_:S~a!~ ~ __
~#~
DAVID G. BERAKA
Assistant United States Attorney
Criminal Division
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