Indictment — No. 1:23-cr-00300 (Dkt. 1, D. Colo.)

Summary

Indictment filed June 20, 2023 in the District of Colorado, case 1:23-cr-00300, against Ikponmwosa Pero Erhinmwinrose, Victor Henshaw Tobore, also known as David Badru, Nyerhovwo Presley Agbure and Oreoluwa Abdul-Jabbar Elegba. The grand jury charges that from about March 2020 to June 2021 a Fraud Ring registered sham companies in states including Indiana and Kentucky, obtained employer tax numbers with stolen identities and faked payroll, tax and bank records. It says the ring obtained more than $7,700,000 in CARES Act relief: over $5.2 million in PPP loans and over $2.5 million in EIDLs and EIDL grants. Count 1 is conspiracy to commit wire fraud. These are charges.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“Indictment — No. 1:23-cr-00300 (Dkt. 1, D. Colo.).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/indictment-no-1-23-cr-00300-dkt-1-d-colo-dbac682e26/, SHA-256 a9492f25b199adc3061381266c0b0a43d56ebe05b0e27cd28854659ef9e02fab.

Full text

Case No. 1:23-cr-00300-CNS Document 1 filed 06/20/23 USDC Colorado pg 1
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Criminal Case No. 23-cr-0300-CNS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

1. IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE,
2. VICTOR HENSHAW TOBORE a/k/a DAVID BADRU,
3. NYERHOVWO PRESLEY AGBURE, and
4. OREOLUWA ABDUL-JABBAR ELEGBA,

Defendants.

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT 1
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349

THE CONSPIRACY AND SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

1. Beginning in or about March 2020 and continuing through in or about June

2021, within the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, defendant

IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE knowingly combined, conspired, and agreed

with CONSPIRATOR 1 and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury (together, the

“Fraud Ring”), to commit the offense of wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States

Code, Section 1343.

OVERVIEW OF THE CONSPIRACY

2. The conspiracy involved ERHINMWINROSE and other Fraud Ring

participants—using the names and identifying information of others—registering
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fraudulent corporate entities with state governments, obtaining fraudulent employer tax

identification numbers from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), creating fraudulent

bank accounts at financial institutions, falsifying payroll and employment data, and

fabricating tax and bank documents. These actions were taken to mislead lenders so

that Fraud Ring participants could then fraudulently obtain loans and grants while hiding

their own involvement in the conspiracy and scheme to defraud.

3. The Fraud Ring Participants fraudulently obtained more than $7,700,000

in loans and grants from programs authorized by Congress in the Coronavirus Aid,

Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act intended to provide emergency financial

assistance for millions of American small businesses suffering economic harm caused

by the COVID-19 pandemic. These programs included the Paycheck Protection

Program (PPP) and the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program.

a. The United States Small Business Administration (SBA) directly

paid EIDLs and grants (EIDGs) to eligible small businesses

experiencing substantial financial disruptions from the COVID-19

pandemic.

b. PPP loan applications were processed by participating lenders.

Lenders funded PPP loans using their own funds, which were

guaranteed by the SBA. The SBA approved numerous lenders to

participate in the PPP.

4. Between March 2020 and April 2021, Fraud Ring participants including

ERHINMWINROSE and CONSPIRATOR 1 fraudulently obtained PPP loans totaling

more than $5.2 million and EIDLs and EIDGs totaling more than $2.5 million.

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MANNER AND MEANS OF CONSPIRACY

Acting interdependently, ERHINMWINROSE and other Fraud Ring participants

used the following manner and means, among others:

5. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE fraudulently

obtained registrations for new business entities in various states including Indiana and

Kentucky.

6. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE used existing or

defunct corporate entities registered to real individuals for the purpose of applying for

COVID-related benefits, such as PPP loans and EIDLs.

7. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE submitted fraudulent

applications to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for Employer Identification Numbers

(EINs) on behalf of these companies. The IRS required businesses that have

employees to register for an EIN, which is a unique nine-digit number to identify to the

IRS an employer’s tax account. Businesses created EINs using a system managed by

the IRS called the Modernized Internet Employer Identification Number system. To

create fraudulent EINs, Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE used

personally identifiable information (PII) of real individuals (“Identity Victims”) without

authorization. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE used PII of real

individuals who owned the businesses, including Identity Victims #1-24.

8. It was part of the conspiracy and scheme to defraud that, when Fraud

Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE created EINs, they caused interstate

wires communications, including to an IRS server in Colorado from other states

including Georgia.

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9. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE used fraudulent

EINs and fraudulent corporate registration documents to open fraudulent bank accounts

and to submit fraudulent applications for PPP loans and EIDLs.

10. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE created and used

email accounts in other names to perpetrate their fraud. These email accounts were

listed on applications for PPP loans and EIDLs and allowed the Fraud Ring participants

to send and receive emails pretending they were the business owner.

11. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE stored PII and other

identifying information about individuals, fraudulent bank accounts, fraudulent EINs, and

fraudulent loan applications in email accounts and in cloud-based storage folders.

12. It was part of the conspiracy and scheme to defraud that, for each funded

PPP loan and EIDL, Fraud Ring participants caused interstate wire communications

from the SBA’s Denver Finance Center in Colorado to other states.

Paycheck Protection Program Loans

13. To obtain a PPP loan, a business’s authorized representative was

required to sign and submit a PPP loan application to a private lender participating in

the PPP. The PPP loan application required the business’s representative to include

information about average monthly payroll expenses and number of employees and to

provide contact information, including phone number and email address. The payroll

expenses were used to calculate the amount of money the small business was eligible

to receive under the PPP. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE

submitted fraudulent PPP loan applications that, among other false representations,

fabricated the number of employees and average monthly payroll, falsely represented

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that the purpose of the loan was to cover payroll costs, and falsely represented that the

applicant was not engaged in any illegal activity.

14. For PPP loan requests above a certain amount, businesses were required

to submit documentation verifying their payroll expenses and bank account information,

such as a voided check in the name of the business, bank statements, and tax returns.

It was part of the conspiracy that Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE

submitted to lenders fabricated tax documents, bank statements, and bank checks to

make it appear that the person submitting the PPP loan application owned the entity

listed on the application and had a legitimate corporate bank account in the name of the

company listed on the PPP loan application. In fact, the Fraud Ring participants had no

legitimate relationship to the business listed on the application and listed fraudulent

bank accounts controlled by Fraud Ring participants.

15. Lenders also required verification of identity through driver’s licenses or

other identity documents. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE

knowingly presented fabricated driver’s licenses that appeared to be issued by states

including Georgia to apply for loans.

16. Before processing PPP loans, lenders and online loan marketplaces

sometimes called and texted the phone numbers and emailed the email addresses

listed on the PPP applications to obtain additional tax and financial records of the

businesses. It was part of the conspiracy that Fraud Ring participants including

ERHINMWINROSE used different phone numbers and email accounts on each

application and pretended they were the real business owner when contacted by the

lender or online loan marketplace.

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17. Fraud Ring participants applied for more than $14,200,000 in PPP loans.

As a result of fraudulent PPP applications submitted by the Fraud Ring participants,

lenders funded more than $5,200,000 in PPP loans.

Economic Injury Disaster Loans

18. Under the EIDL program, a small business could receive a loan from the

SBA in an amount of up to six months of working capital. From in or about March 2020

until in or about April 2021, the maximum amount any business could obtain was

$150,000. The CARES Act also authorized the SBA to issue advances, or EIDGs, of up

to $10,000 to small businesses. EIDL funds were permitted to be used for payroll

expenses, sick leave, production costs, and business obligations, such as debts, rents,

and mortgage payments.

19. The EIDL application required the business’s representative to provide

truthful information about gross revenues, costs of goods sold, and number of

employees. The revenue and cost figures were used to calculate the amount of the

EIDL and the number of employees to calculate the amount of the EIDG. Fraud Ring

participants including ERHINMWINROSE and CONSPIRATOR 1 submitted EIDL

applications that, among other false statements, included fabricated gross revenues,

costs of goods sold, and number of employees and provided false information about

who had completed the application.

20. Before the SBA disbursed EIDL funds, an applicant generally had to

digitally sign a contract, referred to as a Loan Authorization and Agreement. Fraud Ring

participants including ERHINMWINROSE and CONSPIRATOR 1 signed these

contracts and falsely certified that they intended to use the EIDL funds for working

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capital, had disclosed to the SBA all other COVID-related compensation, and were

authorized to apply for an EIDL on behalf of the company listed on the application.

21. ERHINMWINROSE shared information with other Fraud Ring participants,

including CONSPIRATOR 1, to further the conspiracy and to fraudulently obtain

additional EIDL funding, including the following:

a. On July 7, 2020, ERHINMWINROSE messaged bank accounts and

routing numbers associated with Identity Victims #25 and 26 to

another Fraud Ring participant for use on SBA applications.

Following this message, the bank accounts listed on two EIDL

applications were updated to the accounts in the names of Identity

Victims #25 and #26. On July 8, 2020, the SBA disbursed $24,400

to these same bank accounts.

b. On August 15, 2020, ERHINMWINROSE messaged a Fraud Ring

participant about the status of recent EIDL applications and getting

a bank to release funds. Email accounts connected to this other

Fraud Ring Participant were responsible for submitting at least 108

EIDL applications, at least 6 of which were funded for a total

amount of at least $225,400.

22. As a result of fraudulent EIDL applications submitted by Fraud Ring

participants including ERHINMWINROSE and CONSPIRATOR 1, the SBA funded at

least 60 applications for a total of at least $2,526,100 and denied hundreds of other loan

applications.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.

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COUNT 2
Money Laundering Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)

23. Beginning in or about March 2020, and continuing thereafter until in or

about May 2021, in the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, defendants

IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE, VICTOR HENSHAW TOBORE a/k/a

DAVID BADRU, NYERHOVWO PRESLEY AGBURE, and OREOLUWA ABDUL-

JABBAR ELEGBA knowingly combined, conspired, and agreed with each other and

with CONSPIRATOR 1, CONSPIRATOR 2, and others known and unknown to the

Grand Jury (“the Fraud Ring”) to:

a. knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct a financial transaction

affecting interstate and foreign commerce, which involved the

proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, that is wire fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, with the intent to promote the

carrying on of specified unlawful activity, and that while conducting

and attempting to conduct such financial transaction knew that the

property involved in the financial transaction represented the

proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).

b. knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct financial transactions

affecting interstate commerce that involved the proceeds of

specified unlawful activity, that is, wire fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1343, knowing that the transaction was designed in whole

or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source,

ownership, and control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity

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and that while conducting and attempting to conduct such financial

transactions knew that the property involved in the financial

transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful

activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY

Acting interdependently, IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE, VICTOR

HENSHAW TOBORE a/k/a DAVID BADRU, NYERHOVWO PRESLEY AGBURE,

OREOLUWA ABDUL-JABBAR ELEGBA, CONSPIRATOR 1, CONSPIRATOR 2, and

other Fraud Ring participants known and unknown to the grand jury carried out the

conspiracy using the following manner and means:

24. Fraud Ring participants provided to financial institutions fabricated

identification documents and false information about their identity to open bank

accounts using names other than their own. To open business bank accounts in the

names of companies they did not own or operate and that did no actual business, Fraud

Ring participants further presented to financial institutions fraudulently obtained

corporate registrations and EINs.

25. After PPP and EIDL funds—as well as fraudulently obtained federal tax

refunds from the IRS and benefits from unemployment programs run by states including

Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio—were deposited into these

fraudulently obtained bank accounts, Fraud Ring participants including

ERHINMWINROSE, TOBORE, AGBURE, ELEGBA, CONSPIRATOR 1, and

CONSPIRATOR 2 would, over a short time period, spend, transfer, and withdraw these

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illegally obtained proceeds (“Wire Fraud Proceeds”), including by using the following

manner and means:

a. Fraud Ring participants regularly accessed the bank accounts

online from their own electronic devices and from IP addresses

associated with their own identities, including 24.30.107.247

associated with AGBURE and 99.97.136.159 associated with

TOBORE, to confirm the receipt of Wire Fraud Proceeds, check

available balances, and access other online banking features.

b. Fraud Ring participants including AGBURE, ELEGBA

ERHINMWINROSE, and TOBORE used instant messaging

services including WhatsApp to exchange bank account

information, request money, confirm the deposit of Wire Fraud

Proceeds, and provide instructions for the withdrawal of Wire Fraud

Proceeds.

c. Multiple Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE and

CONSPIRATOR 1 shared in common bank accounts to receive

Wire Fraud Proceeds, physical mailing addresses to receive bank

communications and checks, and money runners including

TOBORE to manage bank accounts and coordinate the transfer of

money to other members of the Fraud Ring.

d. Fraud Ring participants endorsed checks drawn on fraudulent bank

accounts that received Wire Fraud Proceeds and deposited those

checks into other fraudulent bank accounts controlled by other

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Fraud Ring participants in the names of other individuals or

corporate entities.

e. After depositing Wire Fraud Proceeds, Fraud Ring participants

including ERHINMWINROSE, TOBORE, AGBURE, and ELEGBA

messaged each other and exchanged screenshots and bank

statements to confirm the deposits.

f. Multiple Fraud Ring participants used physical mailing addresses

monitored by ELEGBA and TOBORE to receive correspondence

related to, among other things, identity victims, fraudulent bank

accounts, and Wire Fraud Proceeds. Fraud Ring participants set up

delivery notifications and received text messages from other Fraud

Ring participants to track the delivery of checks and

correspondence related to identity victims, fraudulent bank

accounts, and Wire Fraud proceeds.

g. Fraud Ring participants deposited checks into accounts they

controlled, including accounts under names other than their own

using the following initials: W.C., M.H., B.M., M.N., and A.R.

h. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE paid a fee to

third-party money clerks to transfer Wire Fraud proceeds to

fraudulent bank accounts controlled by Fraud Ring participants.

i. Fraud Ring participants including ERHINMWINROSE and

CONSPIRATOR 1 opened bank accounts under various names

and loaded debit cards tied to these accounts with Wire Fraud

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Proceeds from the EIDL program, state unemployment benefit

programs, and federal tax refunds.

j. After obtaining Wire Fraud Proceeds in fraudulent bank accounts,

Fraud Ring participants including TOBORE used debit cards tied to

these bank accounts at retail stores, including to purchase money

orders and request cash back in large amounts.

k. Fraud Ring participants including TOBORE purchased United

States Postal Service and Western Union money orders using Wire

Fraud Proceeds. To conceal and disguise the source of the Wire

Fraud Proceeds used to purchase money orders and to avoid

transaction reporting requirements, Fraud Ring participants would

make multiple purchases of money orders in small amounts on the

same day and in the same geographic area.

l. Fraud Ring participants including ELEGBA and TOBORE visited

ATMs and bank branches in a short time frame and in the same

geographic area to make cash withdrawals of Wire Fraud

Proceeds. The multiple transactions ensured that the withdrawals

did not exceed transaction reporting thresholds or daily withdrawal

limits, with multiple withdrawals often occurring on the same day

from nearby ATMs and retail stores.

m. Fraud Ring participants including AGBURE and TOBORE made

bulk deposits of money orders purchased at various times from

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Wire Fraud Proceeds in bank accounts under the control of other

Fraud Ring participants including ELEGBA and TOBORE.

n. Fraud Ring participants including ELEGBA and TOBORE—after

laundering the Wire Fraud Proceeds through numerous

intermediary accounts—converted money to cash through cash

withdrawals from fraudulent bank accounts.

o. Fraud Ring participants including CONSPIRATOR 2—after

laundering the Wire Fraud Proceeds through numerous

intermediary accounts—transferred money overseas via

international wire transfers.

p. Fraud Ring participants including TOBORE provided bank accounts

and routing numbers for foreign bank accounts in the names of

third parties to ERHINMWINROSE and AGBURE, who would then

ensure that Wire Fraud Proceeds were successfully deposited in

these foreign bank accounts.

q. Fraud Ring participants used Wire Fraud Proceeds to pay for

physical items and monetary costs that promoted their wire fraud

operations, including by sending Wire Fraud proceeds from outside

Colorado to a bank account in Colorado. Such costs included, but

were not limited to, purchases of cellular telephones and cellular

service, virtual private network (“VPN”) subscriptions, custom

website domains, mobile hotspot subscriptions, and identity-service

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subscriptions used to obtain information about additional fraud

victims.

26. Fraud Ring participants caused acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to be

committed in Colorado. As an example, on August 11, 2020, Fraud Ring participants

created an EIN using an IRS server in Colorado. This EIN was needed to open a

fraudulent corporate bank account used to launder Wire Fraud Proceeds.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h).

COUNTS 3-4
Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343

THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

27. From in or around May 2020, until in or around July 2020, within the State

and District of Colorado and elsewhere, defendant IKPONMWOSA PERO

ERHINMWINROSE devised, intended to devise, and participated in a scheme and

artifice to defraud the Small Business Administration and to obtain money and property

by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.

MANNER AND MEANS OF THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

The fraudulent scheme operated and was carried out, in substance, as follows:

28. Paragraph 18 is re-alleged and incorporated here by reference.

29. ERHINMWINROSE submitted and caused to be submitted fraudulent

information to the SBA in applying for four EIDLs and EIDGs, two of which were funded

for a total of $192,500.

a. On or about May 8, 2020, ERHINMWINROSE applied for an EIDL

from the SBA on behalf of IGI Autos LLC. The SBA awarded a

$37,500 EIDL to IGI Autos, plus a $5,000 EIDG.

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b. On or about July 8, 2020, ERHINMWINROSE applied for an EIDL

from the SBA on behalf of IGI Logistics LLC. The SBA awarded a

$150,000 EIDL to IGI Logistics.

c. In June and July 2020, ERHINMWINROSE applied for two other

EIDLs, for Ikponmwosa Auto Parts and for IGI Rentals LLC. The

SBA declined to fund the EIDL applications of IGI Rentals and

Ikponmwosa Auto Parts.

30. He checked a box on each EIDL application falsely certifying under

penalty of perjury that the information provided in the application was true and accurate

and that he was not engaged in any illegal activity. He subsequently submitted each

application to the SBA.

31. Prior to the disbursement of the two EIDLs that the SBA funded,

ERHINMWINROSE digitally signed a loan authorization and agreement, wherein he

again certified that all representations in the loan application were true, correct, and

complete.

32. In truth, ERHINMWINROSE inflated revenues and number of employees

for each entity. The information on the EIDL applications for IGI Autos, IGI Logistics, IGI

Rentals or Ikponmwosa Auto Parts did not match the revenues or number of employees

reported to the Georgia Department of Revenue.

EXECUTION OF THE SCHEME

33. On or about the dates set forth below, for purposes of executing the

scheme described in Paragraphs 27 through 32, defendant IKPONMWOSA PERO

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ERHINMWINROSE caused to be transmitted, by means of wire communication in

interstate commerce, as set forth below:

Count Date Description of Wire
Payment file for $37,400 EIDL designated for IGI Autos as payee
June 24, created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado and
3
2020 transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.
Payment file for $149,900 EIDL designated with IGI Logistics as
July 19, payee created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado and
4
2020 transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

COUNTS 5-11
Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343

THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

34. From in or around March 2020, until in or around September 2020, within

the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, defendant NYERHOVWO PRESLEY

AGBURE devised, intended to devise, and participated in a scheme and artifice to

defraud the Small Business Administration and to obtain money and property by means

of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.

MANNER AND MEANS OF THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

The fraudulent scheme operated and was carried out, in substance, as follows:

35. Paragraph 18 is re-alleged and incorporated here by reference.

36. Between March 31, 2020 and July 27, 2020, AGBURE submitted eight

fraudulent EIDL applications for eight different entities using his own name. On each

application, AGBURE inflated the number of employees and gross revenues. In reality,

AGBURE never reported to tax authorities that his businesses had any employees or

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revenues in 2019. He also checked a box certifying under penalty of perjury that the

information provided in the application was true and accurate, despite knowing that it

was not. He subsequently submitted each application to the SBA.

37. The SBA funded six EIDLs to AGBURE’s companies totaling $628,300

and five EIDGs totaling $16,000. Prior to disbursement of these six EIDLs, AGBURE

digitally signed a loan authorization and agreement, wherein he again certified that all

representations in the loan application were true, correct, and complete. He falsely

certified that he would use loan proceeds solely as working capital to alleviate economic

injury caused by the COVID-19 pandemic when, in fact, he used the majority of funds

for non-eligible expenses, including transferring money to ERHINMWINROSE that was

used to purchase automobiles, wiring money to other bank accounts controlled by

AGBURE, laundering money through the bank accounts of other companies, and

funding personal cryptocurrency and investment accounts.

38. During the same period, two other EIDL applications were submitted from

AGBURE’s IP Address (24.30.107.247) under other names.

EXECUTION OF THE SCHEME

39. On or about the dates set forth below, for purposes of executing the

scheme described in Paragraphs 34 through 38, defendant NYERHOVWO

PRESLEY AGBURE, caused to be transmitted, by means of wire communication in

interstate commerce, as set forth below:

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Count Date Description of Wire
Payment file for $69,400 EIDL designated for Nyerhos Systems as
June 9, payee created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado and
5
2020 transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.
Payment file for $116,900 EIDL designated with Nyerhos Mobile as
June 18, payee created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado and
6
2020 transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.
Payment file for $3,000 EIDG designated with Nyerhos Mobile as
June 18, payee created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado and
7
2020 transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.
Payment file for $80,400 EIDL designated with PhoneDial as payee
June 19, created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado and
8
2020 transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.
Payment file for $146,900 EIDL designated with Nyerhos Group as
June 20, payee created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado and
9
2020 transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.
Payment file for $86,400 EIDL designated with Sohreyn Assets
June 27, Holdings as payee created and certified at SBA finance center in
10
2020 Colorado and transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury
disbursing office outside of Colorado.
Payment file for $127,700 EIDL designated with Nyerhos Trucklines
August 28, as payee created and certified at SBA finance center in Colorado
11
2020 and transmitted via interstate wire to U.S. Treasury disbursing office
outside of Colorado.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

COUNT 12-15
Wire Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343

THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

40. Beginning at least by April 2020 and continuing at least through April

2022, within the State and District of Colorado and elsewhere, defendant

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IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE devised, intended to devise, and

participated in a scheme and artifice to defraud the United States and to obtain money

and property from the IRS by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses,

representations, and promises.

MANNER AND MEANS OF THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

41. The scheme involved using the identities of elderly victims (“Identity

Victims”) without their permission to apply for and obtain tax refunds and Economic

Impact Payments that ERHINMWINROSE was not entitled to obtain.

42. Specifically, between at least April 2020 and April 2022,

ERHINMWINROSE filed or assisted with the filing of false federal income tax returns

with the IRS in the names of Identity Victims for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining

tax refunds. He used victim PII of at least nineteen Identity Victims (Identity Victims #27-

45) over the age of 65.

43. ERHINMWINROSE knew that the PII belonged to real people and

maintained files in his email accounts that contained real names, addresses, Social

Security numbers, and other information about the Identity Victims.

44. The filed returns falsely represented, among other things, the amount of

income and the amount of itemized deductions including medical and dental expenses,

state tax payments, and charitable contributions. By falsifying deduction information,

ERHINMWINROSE claimed itemized deductions in excess of the standard deduction

available to all taxpayers and increased the amount of tax refunds he received.

45. Based on the false information about income and itemized deductions,

ERHINMWINROSE received refunds for tax years 2020, 2021, and 2022 in the names

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of elderly victims, including Identity Victims #27 and 28, each of whom was over 65

years old.

46. As a result of the false returns being filed, the IRS issued tax refunds in

the form of ACH wire payments to the purported taxpayers and electronically deposited

the funds into bank accounts designated by ERHINMWINROSE.

47. To carry out the scheme, ERHINMWINROSE configured a custom

internet domain, fansmexx.com, and created emails in the names of each of his victims

using the @fansmexx.com domain.

48. ERHINMWINROSE used Comcast and Verizon hotspots he was not

legally authorized to use and corporate VPNs—thereby concealing his involvement—to

submit fraudulent tax returns and to fraudulently check the status of tax refund

payments.

49. ERHINMWINROSE checked the status of refund payments using an

online feature available on the IRS’s website that allows tax filers to check on refund

status by entering a real Social Security number, filing status, and the exact refund

amount on the taxpayer’s return.

50. The CARES Act provided Economic Impact Payments of up to $1,200 per

adult taxpayer for direct relief during the COVID-19 pandemic. In or about December

2020, the COVID-Related Tax Relief Act of 2020 authorized additional Economic Impact

Payments of up to $600 per taxpayer. In or about March 2021, the American Rescue

Plan Act authorized additional Economic Impact Payments of up to $1,400 per taxpayer.

The United States Treasury Department and IRS calculated a taxpayer’s amount of

Economic Impact Payment based on information provided on tax returns from previous

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years and deposited the payments to the same bank account that received previous

refunds. It was part of the scheme that ERHINMWINROSE obtained Economic Impact

Payments intended for elderly victims, including Identity Victims #27 and 28. For

example, because ERHINMWINROSE filed false tax returns in the names of elderly

victims for earlier tax years, he received the Economic Impact Payments in 2021 that

should have been paid to these elderly victims, including Identity Victims #27 and 28.

EXECUTION OF THE SCHEME

51. On or about the dates set forth below, for purposes of executing the

scheme described in Paragraphs 40 through 50, defendant IKPONMWOSA PERO

ERHINMWINROSE caused to be transmitted, by means of wire communication in

interstate commerce, as set forth below:

Count Date Description of Wire

Logged on to IRS server located in Colorado to inquire about status
12 05/05/2020 of Identity Victim #27’s 2019 tax refund from location outside of
Colorado

Logged on to IRS server located in Colorado to inquire about status
13 05/16/2020 of Identity Victim #28’s 2019 tax refund from location outside of
Colorado

Logged on to IRS server located in Colorado to inquire about status
14 02/28/2021 of Identity Victim #28’s 2020 tax refund from location outside of
Colorado

Logged on to IRS server located in Colorado to inquire about status
15 07/13/2022 of Identity Victim #27’s 2021 tax refund from location outside of
Colorado

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.

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COUNTS 16-18
Aggravated Identity Theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A

52. On or about the dates listed below, in the District of Colorado and

elsewhere, defendant IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE knowingly

transferred, possessed, and used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of

the below persons during and in relation to a felony violation enumerated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028A(c), to wit, wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349, knowing that the means of identification belonged to another

actual person.

COUNT DATE PERSON
16 01/25/2021 Identity Victim #1, a Georgia resident
17 05/05/2020 Identity Victim #27, a Mississippi
resident
18 02/28/2021 Identity Victim #28, a Mississippi
resident

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1).

FORFEITURE

53. Upon conviction of any of the violations alleged in Counts 1 and 3-15 of

this Indictment involving the commission of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 or 1349,

defendants IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE and NYERHOVWO PRESLEY

AGBURE shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28

U.S.C. § 2461(c), any and all rights, title, and interest in all property constituting and

derived from any proceeds obtained directly and indirectly as a result of such offense or

offenses, including, but not limited to a money judgment in the amount of the proceeds

obtained by the defendant’s scheme.

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54. Upon conviction of the violations alleged in Count 2 of this Indictment, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), defendants IKPONMWOSA PERO

ERHINMWINROSE, VICTOR HENSHAW TOBORE a/k/a DAVID BADRU,

NYERHOVWO PRESLEY AGBURE, and OREOLUWA ABDUL-JABBAR ELEGBA shall

forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), any and all rights, title,

and interest in all property involved in the offense and any property traceable to such

property, including, but not limited to a money judgment in the amount of value of the

property involved in the offense.

55. If any of the property described above, as a result of any act or omission

of defendants IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE, VICTOR HENSHAW

TOBORE a/k/a DAVID BADRU, NYERHOVWO AGBURE, and OREOLUWA

ABDUL-JABBAR ELEGBA cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; has

been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; has been substantially

diminished in value; or has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided

without difficulty, it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c),

incorporating 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of defendants

IKPONMWOSA PERO ERHINMWINROSE, VICTOR HENSHAW TOBORE a/k/a

DAVID BADRU, NYERHOVWO AGBURE, and OREOLUWA ABDUL-JABBAR

ELEGBA up to the value of the forfeitable property described above.

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A TRUE BILL: Ink signature on file in Clerk’s Office
FOREPERSON

COLE FINEGAN
United States Attorney

By: s/Craig G. Fansler
Craig G. Fansler
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office
1801 California St., Ste. 1600
Denver, CO 80202
Telephone: 303-454-0100
Fax: 303-454-0401
E-mail: Craig.Fansler2@usdoj.gov
Attorney for the United States

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