Superseding Indictment — United States v. Brian R. Cleland et al., Middle District of Pennsylvania
Summary
A superseding indictment in United States v. Brian R. Cleland and Carlos A. Grijalva, Cr. No. 1:23-CR-209, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, filed April 2, 2025 as Document 125. Count 1 charges conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 from on or about 2020 until on or about 2022. The indictment alleges that fraudsters, including some believed to be in or around China, opened bank accounts with other people's identifying information and generated unemployment compensation claims, including records inserted into the Pennsylvania UC system on or about September 17, 2021. It alleges that the defendants controlled companies such as MexUS Service Inc, CCB Group and GC Accounting whose accounts were used in the conspiracy. Forfeiture allegations list real property, and the indictment is marked a true bill.
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“Superseding Indictment — United States v. Brian R. Cleland et al., Middle District of Pennsylvania.”
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Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125_ Filed 04/02/25 Page 1of61
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CR. NO. 1:23-CR-209
v.
(Judge Wilson)
BRIAN R. CLELAND,
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, FILED
HARRISBURG, PA
Defendants. APR 0,2 295
FIRST DEFUTY CLERK
SUPERSEDING
INDICTMENT
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:
At times material to this Indictment:
COUNT 1
18 U.S.C. § 1349
(Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Bank Fraud)
INTRODUCTION
1. Defendant, BRIAN R. CLELAND, was a resident of
Los Angeles County, California, in the Central District of California.
2. Defendant, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, was a resident of
Los Angeles County, California and Ventura County, California, in the
Central District of California.
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3. BRUCE JIN was a resident of Los Angeles County, California,
in the Central District of California.
4. BRUCE JIN controlled and operated multiple companies,
including Jin Commerce LLC, Ample International Inc, Yu Pacific
Logistics LLC, Pacific Goods Supply Inc, KB Supply Inc, and Cathy
Group Inc.
5. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA controlled
and operated multiple companies, including MexUS Service Inc, CCB
Group 1, CCB Group 2, CCB Group 3, GC Accounting Inc 1, GC
Accounting Ine 2, GC Accounting Inc 3, and Group Mex USA Inc, d/b/a/
Masgind (a.k.a., MASQ Industries, Inc.).
6. In addition to the companies listed above, BRIAN R. CLELAND
was also associated with other companies, including another company
that he controlled and operated by the name of CLECO Inc.
7. COCONSPIRATOR 1 was a citizen of Saint Kitts and Nevis and
a resident of Orange County, California, in the Central District of
California.
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8. COMPANY 1 was incorporated in the State of California on or
about May 2019. COMPANY 1 was associated with addresses in or
around Los Angeles County, California and Orange County, California.
9. COCONSPIRATOR 1 incorporated and was the CEO of
COMPANY 1, which was described in official filings as an importer and
exporter of cable and steel products. BRUCE JIN acted asa
representative of COMPANY 1.
10. COCONSPIRATOR 2 was associated with an address in China
and maintained one or more accounts at banks located in China.
11. COMPANY 2 was associated with an address in China and
maintained accounts at banks located in China. COCONSPIRATOR 2
was associated with COMPANY 2. BRUCE JIN acted as a
representative of COMPANY 2.
12. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 1 was a resident of Etters, PA, in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
13. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 2 was a resident of York, PA, in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
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14. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 3 was a resident of Lebanon, PA,
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
15. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 4 was a resident of Biglerville,
PA, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
16. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 5 was a resident of Ortanna, PA,
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
17. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 6 was a resident of
Chambersburg, PA, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
18. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 7 was a resident of Middlesex
County, NJ, in the District of New Jersey.
19. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 8 was a resident of Clearfield
County, PA, in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
20. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 9 was a resident of Cranberry
Township, PA, in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
21. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 10 was a resident of New
Holland, PA, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125_ Filed 04/02/25 Page5of61
Unemployment Compensation
22. The federal-state unemployment compensation program was
created by the Social Security Act of 1935. The unemployment
compensation program, also known as the unemployment insurance
program, provides unemployment benefits to eligible workers who are
unemployed through no “fault” of their own (as determined under State
law) and meet other eligibility requirements of applicable state law.
Unemployment insurance payments are intended to provide temporary
financial assistance to unemployed workers who meet the requirements
of state law. Each state administers a separate unemployment
insurance program within guidelines established by federal law.
Eligibility for unemployment insurance, including benefit amounts and
the length of time benefits are available, is determined by the state law
under which unemployment insurance claims are established.
23. The federal-state unemployment compensation (“UC”)
program is funded by a federal tax levied on employers and a state tax
also levied on employers. The federal tax is used to fund a number of
different unemployment compensation-related expenditures, including
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125_ Filed 04/02/25 Page 6of61
all federal and state administrative costs associated with
unemployment compensation programs and the federal share of
benefits paid under the Federal-State Extended Unemployment
Compensation Act of 1970. The state tax is used to fund the benefit
payments for eligible recipients.
24. The Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry
(“PADOL”) administers Pennsylvania’s unemployment compensation
program on behalf of the federal government. PADOL is located in
Harrisburg, PA, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
25. A person may not receive UC in Pennsylvania unless the
person is unemployed or under-employed through no fault of his or her
own and meets certain financial eligibility requirements. UC is not
available to self-employed individuals, individuals who are not able and
available to work, or individuals who are not eligible to work in the
United States. In order to receive UC in Pennsylvania, a person must
submit a claim for UC and have that claim approved by PADOL. The
claimant must provide his or her name, mailing address, social security
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125_ Filed 04/02/25 Page 7 of61
number, date of birth, last employer’s name and address, and reason for
separation. A claimant must apply for UC over the Internet.
26. Once the initial Pennsylvania application is approved,
claimants must submit biweekly claims to PADOL over the telephone or
the Internet in which they certify the following: (1) they are still
unemployed or under-employed; (2) if they are working, the amount of
income earned; and (8) if they are able and available to work. PADOL
pays UC benefits via a debit card, hard-copy check mailed to the
claimant’s mailing address, or direct deposit into the bank account of
the claimant’s choice. Because legitimate UC claimants may not have
bank accounts, they may, for example, elect to have their UC funds
deposited into the account of a third party with whom they have a
relationship.
27. The biweekly claims submission process in Pennsylvania may
also be conducted entirely over the Internet. The claims process does
not require any additional supporting documentation or verification of
identity.
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28. Once a claimant is approved as eligible for UC benefits,
PADOL directs the Pennsylvania Treasury Department, located in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, to
disburse UC funds to the claimant.
29. Other states operate their own federal-state unemployment
compensation systems in a similar manner. Claimants must meet the
criteria to receive UC as determined by the state from which the
benefits are being claimed. As in Pennsylvania, claimants in other
states are generally required to provide a range of information,
including personal identifier information (“PII”) and their basis for
receiving UC, and they must make additional claims on a periodic basis
to continue receiving additional UC.
Economic Impact Payments
30. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, starting in March
2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES
Act) provided Economic Impact Payments (“stimulus payments”) of up
to $1,200 per adult for eligible individuals and $500 per qualifying child
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125_ Filed 04/02/25 Page 9of61
under age 17. For a family of four, these Economic Impact Payments
provided up to $3,400 of direct financial relief.
31. The COVID-19-related Tax Relief Act of 2020, enacted in late
December 2020, authorized additional Economic Impact Payments of up
to $600 per adult for eligible individuals and up to $600 for each
qualifying child under age 17.
32. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, enacted in early March
2021, provided Economic Impact Payments of up to $1,400 for eligible
individuals or $2,800 for married couples filing jointly, plus $1,400 for
each qualifying dependent, including adult dependents.
33. In 2022, the Internal Revenue Service credited U.S. taxpayers
up to $1,400 for tax year 2021 if they were due but had not previously
received the full amount of the third Economic Impact Payment. These
credits were regularly made through ACH deposits into taxpayers’ bank
accounts along with the transaction code “IRS TREAS 310” anda
description of “TAX REF” or “TAXEIP3.”
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 10 of 61
THE CONSPIRACY TO OBTAIN PUBLIC FUNDS AND ITS OBJECTS
34. Paragraphs 1 through 33 are incorporated here.
35. From on or about 2020 until on or about 2022, in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendants,
BRIAN R. CLELAND, and
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA,
did knowingly conspire, confederate, and agree, together and with other
persons both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit
offenses against the United States and to defraud the United States,
that is:
to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and
property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations,
and promises, and to willfully participate in such a scheme and artifice
with knowledge of its fraudulent nature, with the intent to defraud, and
for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, to cause to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, and television communication in
interstate and foreign commerce, any writing, sign, signal, picture and
sound, in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud); and
to execute and attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a
10
financial institution, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 20, and to obtain any of
the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, and other property owned
by, and under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means
of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, in
violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 1844 (Bank Fraud).
MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY
It was part of the conspiracy that:
36. BRIAN R. CLELAND, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, BRUCE JIN,
and COCONSPIRATOR 1 established and acquired control of various
companies. For instance, BRUCE JIN registered Jin Commerce LLC
with the State of California on or about November 6, 2019 and filed a
statement of information on or about June 3, 2021 listing himself as the
CEO and Secretary of Ample International, Inc. and describing its type
of business as “gen merchandise distributor.”
37. BRIAN R. CLELAND formed MASQ Industries, Inc. in the
State of Colorado on or about April 15, 2020 and CCB Group Inc. in the
State of Colorado on or about October 27, 2021. BRIAN R. CLELAND
also incorporated CLECO, Inc. in the State of California on or about
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September 27, 2018. On or about October 30, 2018, BRIAN R.
CLELAND filed a statement of information with the State of California
listing himself as the CEO, Secretary, and CFO of CLECO, Inc. and
describing the type of business as “hotel management.”
38. COCONSPIRATOR 1 filed articles of incorporation for
COMPANY 1 with the State of California on or about May 21, 2019. On
or about September 27, 2021, COCONSPIRATOR 1 filed a statement of
information with the State of California listing COCONSPIRATOR 1 as
the CEO of COMPANY 1 and describing the type of business as “cable
and steel products” and “import/export.”
39. BRIAN R. CLELAND, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, BRUCE JIN,
and COCONSPIRATOR 1 opened and controlled a number of bank
accounts associated with their businesses. For instance, BRUCE JIN
used multiple accounts for Ample International Inc. and Jin Commerce
LLC, including accounts at Kast West Bank, Bank of the West, Bank of
America, and Chase Bank. BRUCE JIN also used a number of different
Bank of America accounts for Yu Pacific Logistics LLC, Pacific Goods
Supply Inc, KB Supply Inc, Cathy Group Inc, and other companies.
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40. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA used
accounts at Bank of America, including an account for MexUS Service
Inc, an account for Group Mex USA Inc, approximately three accounts
for CCB Group, and approximately three accounts for GC Accounting.
BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA also utilized
accounts at other banks, including an Avidia Bank account in the name
of Group Mex USA Ine, d/b/a Masgind (“Group Mex”) and one or more
Chase Bank accounts in the name of Group Mex USA Inc. BRIAN R.
CLELAND also used an account at Bank of America for CLECO, Inc.
41. A cell phone number for CARLOS A. GRIJALVA was
associated not only with accounts in the names of CARLOS A.
GRIJALVA and BRIAN R. CLELAND but was also utilized in
connection with payments to Ample International Inc and Jin
Commerce LLC, companies run by BRUCE JIN.
42. Fraudsters, including some believed to be located in or around
China, established thousands of accounts at banks across the United
States without the knowledge or lawful authorization of the individuals
whose PII was being used to create the accounts.
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43. Fraudsters, including some believed to be located in or around
China, were also responsible for generating fraudulent claims for UC
payments from Pennsylvania and a number of other states.
44. On or about September 17, 2021, thousands of records were
inserted into a database table in the server supporting the
Pennsylvania UC system. These records were inserted without lawful
authorization over a period of several hours, and they contained names
and associated PII sufficient to make a claim for unemployment
compensation.
45. After these records were inserted into the database table,
numerous claims were submitted to the Pennsylvania UC system and
certified using fraudulent means. The Pennsylvania Treasury
Department then issued payments to apparent UC claimants; however,
rather than payments being made to accounts controlled by the
claimants themselves, the funds were instead deposited into the various
bank accounts that had been fraudulently created using third-party PII.
46. Millions of dollars of fraudulent UC payments were issued to
accounts by the Pennsylvania Treasury Department and other state
14
treasuries around the United States. These UC payments were, at
times, issued in the names of individuals who were legitimately entitled
to such payments and, at other times, were issued in the names of
individuals who were not entitled to such payments. In either case, the
UC payments were issued to claimants whose names differed from the
names on the bank accounts into which the funds were deposited.
47. These UC payments were issued to bank accounts in the
names of third parties without the knowledge of the purported
claimants and without the knowledge of the purported accountholders.
48. BRUCE JIN, through bank accounts at East West Bank in the
names of Ample International, Inc. and Jin Commerce LLC, received
over $12 million in funds from on or about March 2021 until on or about
October 2021. The memos associated with these transactions in bank
records often stated “N95,” “KN95,” and “mask” to make it appear as if
payments were linked to COVID-19-related personal protective
equipment (“PPE”).
49. One of these accounts was an East West Bank account ending
in -4023 in the name of Jin Commerce, LLC. BRUCE JIN opened the
15
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account on or about December 2019 but used the account very little
until on or about May 2021, when the account received a $65,000 credit
from Ample International Inc. for what was described in the transaction
record as “PPE.” On or about the same day, an outgoing wire transfer
for approximately $64,000 was made to COCONSPIRATOR 2 with an
account at a bank based in China. Starting on or about September 16,
2021, the account received hundreds of deposits in rapid succession
totaling nearly $700,000, with all of the transfers occurring on a small
number of dates, until they suddenly stopped on or about October 29,
2021. The memo associated with every deposit stated, “mask.” The
funds were quickly depleted from this account in a series of large-dollar,
round-number debits and outgoing international wire transfers.
50. The funds flowing to Jin Commerce LLC and Ample
International Inc. were, in reality, derived from UC payments. For
instance, on or about August 11, 2021, an account ending in -0852 was
opened at Chase Bank in the name of A.S. From on or about August 20,
2021 until on or about September 29, 2021, the account received a
series of UC payments—not in the name of A.S.— from Pennsylvania
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for amounts ranging from approximately $344 to approximately $3,476.
On or about September 21, 2021, approximately $7,989 was debited
from the account to Ample International Inc., and on or about October
1, 2021, approximately $2,916 was debited from the account to Jin
Commerce LLC.
51. Ample International Inc. also received transfers totaling
approximately $4,325.64 from a Chase Bank account ending in -4478
from on or about April 22, 2021 until or on or about May 24, 2021. On or
about June 10, 2021, Masgqind, a.k.a., MASQ Industries, operated by
BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, received
approximately $1,101.00 from this same Chase Bank account. This
account was opened on or about March 18, 2021 in the name of J.H.,
who was associated with an address in Bradenton, Florida. The account
initially received approximately $4,408 in UC payments from the State
of Florida, followed by approximately $15,263 in UC payments from
Pennsylvania.
52. On or about August 25, 2021, Ample International received an
ACH transfer—an electronic, bank-to-bank money transfer processed
17
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through the Automated Clearing House (ACH) Network—of
approximately $4,700.22 from a TD Bank account ending in -1660. The
account was opened on or about August 3, 2021 in the name of B.K. On
or about August 16, 2021, the account received an ACH deposit from the
Virginia UC system of approximately $4,017.60, and on or about August
18, 2021, the account received an ACH deposit from the Pennsylvania
UC system of approximately $722.
538. CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, BRUCE JIN, and BRIAN R.
CLELAND entered into a series of agreements with one another to
make it appear as if their business relationship was related to the
processing of payments for COVID-19-related PPE purchased by retail
customers.
54. For instance, on or about July 21, 2021, CARLOS A.
GRIJALVA sent BRUCE JIN an “operating agreement” dated February
9, 2021, according to which MexUS would “transmit money from Ample
Int. clients to MexUS who in turn within 48 hours’ would “transmit the
money collected to Ample Int. less a 7% transaction fee.”
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55. On or about July 21, 2021, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA also sent
BRUCE JIN an email referring to a “BILLING AGREEMENT.” The
email, which had been prepared for CARLOS A. GRIJALVA by BRIAN
R. CLELAND, stated that Group Mex USA Inc., owned by CARLOS A.
GRIJALVA, had entered into an agreement with Ample International,
which was operated and managed by BRUCE JIN. According to the
agreement, dated April 2, 2021, Ample International was supposed to
forward to Group Mex USA Inc a “file of customers who have ordered
Masks and or Gloves,” Group Mex USA Inc was then supposed to “ACH
these customers from the information given to them by Ample
International,” Group Mex USA Inc was then supposed to “deposit the
net proceeds from the ACH to Ample International five days later,” and
Ample International was then supposed to ship “gloves” to the
customer.
56. On or about August 13, 2021, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA sent
BRUCE JIN an almost identical email referring to a “BILLING
AGREEMENT,” except this time it was for “COMPANY 1 operated by
BRUCE JIN.” This email had likewise been prepared for CARLOS A.
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GRIJALVA by BRIAN R. CLELAND on or about the previous day. This
agreement was dated July 21, 2021.
57. On or about August 18, 2021, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA sent an
“operating agreement” for COMPANY 1 to BRUCE JIN and copied
BRIAN R. CLELAND. CARLOS A. GRIJALVA requested that BRUCE
JIN sign and return the agreement. The agreement stated that effective
July 19, 2021, “MexUS will transmit money from COMPANY 1 clients
to MexUS who in turn within 48 hours will transmit the money
collected to COMPANY 1 less a 10% transaction fee.” BRUCE JIN was
listed as the expected signatory on behalf of COMPANY 1, CARLOS A.
GRIJALVA was listed as the expected signatory on behalf of MexUS
Inc., and BRIAN R. CLELAND was listed as the witness.
58. On or about the same day, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA sent a
second “operating agreement” for COMPANY 1 to BRUCE JIN, again
copying BRIAN R. CLELAND. This agreement was identical to the one
between COMPANY 1 and MexUS, except that it was between
COMPANY 1 and GroupMex. With each operating agreement for
COMPANY 1, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA wrote, “Hola Bruce, Please sign
20
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the agreement and send it back, gracias..... Saludos, Carlos.”
59. BRUCE JIN maintained a warehouse containing COVID-19-
related PPE at or around a location in Baldwin Park, CA, which made it
appear as if he was operating a company actually selling COVID-19-
related PPE.
60. CARLOS A. GRIJALVA and BRIAN R. CLELAND then
entered into agreements with payment processing companies who were
responsible for taking the bank account information provided by
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA and BRIAN R. CLELAND and processing ACH
payments from those accounts to companies controlled by CARLOS A.
GRIJALVA and BRIAN R. CLELAND. The payment processing
companies had the ability to take banking information for a large
number of accounts and facilitate the transfer of funds to companies
controlled by CARLOS A. GRIJALVA and BRIAN R. CLELAND in
large batch transfers.
61. The information that CARLOS A. GRIJALVA and BRIAN R.
CLELAND provided to payment processing companies contained the
bank account information of identity theft victims whose accounts had
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been used to receive fraudulent UC payments from Pennsylvania and
other states.
62. CARLOS A. GRIJALVA and BRIAN R. CLELAND falsely led
payment processing companies to believe that the banking account
information for these victims was being provided, and that funds should
be debited from their accounts, because they were customers
purchasing COVID-19-related PPE. Payment processing companies
then used this banking information to deduct specific amounts of money
from the victims’ accounts, based on the information provided to them.
63. From on or about August 2021 until on or about February
2022, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA regularly emailed to BRIAN R.
CLELAND “weekly reports” containing daily totals, including overall
amounts wired, the amount of profit to “B,” the amount of profit to the
relevant processing company, and the amount of profit remaining for
Group Mex USA/MexUS—in other words, the amount of profit to
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA and BRIAN R. CLELAND themselves.
64. CARLOS A. GRIJALVA also emailed to BRIAN R. CLELAND
summary spreadsheets listing account information of purported
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customers of companies operated by BRUCE JIN. For instance, on or
about August 1, 2021, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA sent an email with the
subject “Ample International ACH.” The attached spreadsheet listed
approximately 120 separate checking accounts at BMO Harris Bank. A
number of the purported accountholders had names similar to one
another, including eleven individuals with the name “Lee,” four with
the name “Leroy,” eight with the name “Dolores,” and eight with the
name “Shannon.” In addition, all of the listed account numbers were
close to one another. The total amount of funds associated with these
accounts was, according to the spreadsheet, over $155,000.
65. CARLOS A. GRIJALVA also emailed to both BRIAN R.
CLELAND and BRUCE JIN summary spreadsheets regarding their
shared financial activity. For instance, on or about October 25, 2021,
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA sent an email with the subject “Large ACH”
and a spreadsheet titled “LRG ACH Tickets.xlsx.” The spreadsheet
contained just under 40 names, all of whom had checking accounts at
Wells Fargo Bank. According to the spreadsheet, the total “original
amount’ associated with these individuals was over $560,000, the total
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“amount taken” was over $317,000, and the total amount “left over” was
over $243,000. In other words, these individuals, on average, were
purported to have purchased over $14,372 in PPE, with several of them
having apparently purchased about $40,000 in PPE.
66. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA coordinated
with one another on how to respond when concerns were raised about
unauthorized transactions on victims’ accounts. Likewise, BRIAN R.
CLELAND rehearsed with others what to say if the processing company
raised concerns.
67. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA exchanged
information about the number of unemployment claims being made in
the United States. For instance, on or about November 9, 2011, BRIAN
R. CLELAND sent CARLOS A. GRIJALVA an email with the subject
“Unemployment claims.” The body of the email contained a report
stating that “initial unemployment claims” for the week ending
November 5, 2021 were expected to be around 260,000 and the
continuing claims for the week ending October 30, 2021 were expected
to be over two million.
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68. Like CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, BRIAN R. CLELAND also
emailed spreadsheets containing banking information to payment
processing companies in order to receive payments. For instance, on or
about March 28, 2022, BRIAN R. CLELAND sent an email to a
payment processing company stating, “This goes under Cleco as Carlos
and I won’t start until Wednesday. These are fresh, Bruce thought it
would be easier to send us just the B of A transactions.” BRIAN R.
CLELAND attached a spreadsheet containing information for nearly
200 Bank of America accounts with bank account numbers that were
highly similar to one another.
69. In 2021, Group Mex USA Inc., run by CARLOS A. GRIJALVA
and BRIAN R. CLELAND, received nearly $1.5 million in ACH
transfers from one payment processing company.
70. During 2021 and 2022, various companies associated with
BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA—including MexUS
Service Inc, Group Mex USA Inc, CCB Group Inc, GC Accounting Inc,
and CLECO, Inc—received over $44 million in ACH transfers from a
second processing company. In addition, the same processing company
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transferred over $500,000 to COMPANY 1 in 2021 and over $134,000 to
Jin Commerce LLC in 2022.
71. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 1 (“V1”) had an account at Chase
Bank that was open from on or about July 28, 2021 until on or about
October 25, 2021. V1 did not open this account or authorize anyone to
open the account on V1’s behalf. V1 became aware of the account after
receiving bank statements in the mail, which were sent to V1’s home in
Etters, PA, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
72. The account fraudulently opened in V1’s name received a
series of UC payments from Pennsylvania from on or about August 18,
2021 until on or about September 29, 2021. V1 never applied for or
received UC benefits from Pennsylvania.
73. Once deposits were made into the account, the funds were
rapidly depleted. Transfers were made to Ample International in
August 2021 and September 2021. The bank statements for this account
listed a telephone number for CARLOS A. GRIJALVA next to the name
of Ample International in transactional details.
74. V1 had no relationship with Ample International and did not
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order masks or anything else from that company.
75. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 2 (“V2”) had an account at Bank
of America that was open from on or about January 31, 2022 until on or
about July 19, 2022. V2 did not open this account or authorize anyone
to open the account on V2’s behalf. V2 became aware of the account
after receiving bank statements in the mail, which were sent to V2’s
home in York, PA, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
76. The account fraudulently opened in V2’s name received a
series of UC payments from Pennsylvania from on or about March 9,
2022 until on or about June 15, 2022. These payments were issued in
the names of at least three different individuals. Once deposits were
made into the account, the funds were rapidly depleted. Transfers were
made to Jin Commerce LLC in March 2022, CLECO, Inc. in April 2022,
and Jin Commerce LLC again in June 2022. In addition, transfers were
made to pay balances on a number of different Visa cards.
77. V2 had no relationship with Jin Commerce LLC or CLECO,
Inc. and did not order masks or anything else from those companies.
78. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 8 (“V3”) had an account at Bank
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of America that was open from on or about March 10, 2022 until on or
about July 27, 2022. V3 did not open this account or authorize anyone
to open the account on V3’s behalf. V3 became aware of the account
after receiving bank statements in the mail, which were sent to V3’s
home in Lebanon, PA, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
79. The account fraudulently opened in V3’s name received a
series of UC payments from Pennsylvania from on or about April 20,
2022 until on or about June 22, 2022. These payments were issued in
the names of at least two different individuals. Once deposits were
made into the account, the funds were rapidly depleted. Transfers were
made to CLECO, Inc. in April 2022. In addition, transfers were made to
pay balances on a number of different Visa cards, including cards
associated with the same names to which funds were debited from V2’s
Bank of America account.
80. V3 had no relationship with CLECO, Inc. and did not order
masks or anything else from that company.
81. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 4 (“V4”) had an account at Bank
of America that was open from on or about February 17, 2022 until on
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or about July 19, 2022. V4 did not open this account or authorize
anyone to open the account on V4’s behalf.
82. The account fraudulently opened in V4’s name received a
series of UC payments from Pennsylvania from on or about March 30,
2022 until on or about June 22, 2022. These payments were issued in
the names of at least three different individuals. Once deposits were
made into the account, the funds were rapidly depleted. Transfers were
made to CLECO, Inc. in April 2022 and Jin Commerce LLC in June
2022. In addition, transfers were made to pay balances on a number of
different Visa cards, including cards associated with the same names to
which funds were debited from V2 and V3’s Bank of America accounts.
83. V4 had no relationship with Jin Commerce LLC or CLECO,
Inc. and did not order masks or anything else from those companies.
84. On or about April 20, 2022 and April 27, 2022, BRUCE JIN
forwarded to BRIAN R. CLELAND spreadsheets that BRUCE JIN
received from a contact with a 163.com email address. 163.com is an
email service provider located in China.
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85. These spreadsheets contained banking information for
hundreds of individuals with either Citizens Bank, Bank of America,
Susquehanna Bank, and Branch Banking accounts. The spreadsheets
included V2, V3, and V4, along with amounts to be charged to them.
Email addresses purportedly associated with these individuals were
also included, but none of them bore any relationship to the names
listed. For instance, on or about April 20, 2022, V2, whose initials are
“T.A.,” was the first individual on the spreadsheet and was supposedly
associated with the email address peppermint.patty69@hotmail.com.
86. BRIAN R. CLELAND then forwarded these spreadsheets to
the processing company in order to receive payments.
87. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 5 (“V5”) had an account at Truist
Bank that was open from on or about the middle of 2022 until on or
about the first half of 2023. V5 did not open this account or authorize
anyone to open the account on V5’s behalf.
88. The account fraudulently opened in V5’s name received a
refund from the IRS in the amount of $1,400, and paid to an individual
named J.B., on or about September 8, 2022. The very same day, a
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payment was made to Jin Commerce, LLC in the amount of $1,360. On
or about December 2022 and January 2023, a series of payments from
the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, paid to an individual
named D.R., were deposited into the account of V5. Transfers were then
made to pay balances on a couple different Visa cards.
89. V5 had no relationship with Jin Commerce, LLC and did not
order anything from that company.
90. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 6 (“V6”) had an account at Truist
Bank that was open from on or about the middle of 2022 until on or
about the first half of 2023. V6 did not open this account or authorize
anyone to open the account on V6’s behalf.
91. The account fraudulently opened in V6’s name received a
refund from the IRS in the amount of $1,400, and paid to an individual
named M.D., on or about September 8, 2022. The very same day, a
payment was made to Jin Commerce, LLC in the amount of $1,360. The
account had no other activity.
92. V6 had no relationship with Jin Commerce, LLC and did not
order anything from that company.
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93. BRUCE JIN received a number of notifications from banks
about requests for funds to be returned due to unauthorized ACH
transactions. BRUCE JIN sometimes forwarded these messages to the
same 163.com email address from whom he received spreadsheets
containing banking information.
94. On or about August 26, 2021, an East West Bank
representative asked BRUCE JIN to explain the reason for “171 ACH
Returns totaling $446,739.50 from various individuals at various
financial institutions since 3/22/2021” and asked to know how Ample
International Inc. identified its customers. BRUCE JIN falsely claimed,
among other things, that the company “senIt] targeted advertisements
through sales representatives to acquire customers.”
95. On or about September 28, 2021, BRUCE JIN received a
notification from East West Bank about an unauthorized ACH
transaction that took place on or about June 21, 2021 in the
approximate amount of $8,436.66. BRUCE JIN was asked either to
agree to accept the late return or instead provide proof of authorization.
In response, BRUCE JIN authorized the “customer” to receive a
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“refund” for the full amount, stating, “We don’t really care about
whether to return or not.”
96. BRUCE JIN, BRIAN R. CLELAND, and CARLOS A.
GRIJALVA communicated about these unauthorized transactions. For
instance, when a representative of East West Bank sent an email to
BRUCE JIN on or about September 2021 asking for proof of
authorization for an ACH payment, BRUCE JIN forwarded subsequent
correspondence on this subject to CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, who
forwarded the same to BRIAN R. CLELAND.
97. On various occasions, BRIAN R. CLELAND and BRUCE JIN
were also informed either by victims or members of law enforcement
that funds had been transferred to them without the authorization of
the payor or that accountholders from whom funds had been
transferred were the victims of identity theft. When receiving these
communications, BRIAN R. CLELAND and BRUCE JIN sometimes
took steps to placate the concerned parties in order to prevent the
discovery of the fraud scheme.
98. For instance, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 7 (“V7”) contacted
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BRIAN R. CLELAND through LinkedIn on or about September 18,
2021. V7 wrote to BRIAN R. CLELAND that he had “discovered
someone opened a fictitious checking account using my name” and was
“depositing unemployment checks” into that account. V7 wrote, “My
9?
bank statement shows, ‘state of nj - to la unemployment.” V7 explained
that on the account statement BRIAN R. CLELAND’s number was
“listed next to a corporation called MASQ Industries,” and the
statement showed a debit MASQ Industries for $616.00 on July 7, 2021.
V7 explained that he had left a voicemail for BRIAN R. CLELAND
using the telephone number in the statement, and V7 requested a
response.
99. On or about the same day, BRIAN R. CLELAND responded,
“This surprises me and I need to look into this when I return! How was
your info acquired? I will call you Thursday upon my return.” BRIAN R.
CLELAND never responded to V7 following that exchange.
100. On or about July 6, 2021, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA emailed
BRIAN R. CLELAND the banking information for ten different
individuals, including the TD Bank checking account information for
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V7.
101. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 8 (“V8”) discovered that she had
an account at Truist Bank on or about April 2022. V8 did not open this
account or authorize anyone to open the account on V8’s behalf.
102. A bank statement for the account contained a telephone
number in the transactional details associated with a withdrawal. V8
attempted to contact this number, which belonged to BRIAN R.
CLELAND. V8 then received a response from BRIAN R. CLELAND
asking, “Can I call you later?” V8 responded, “Asap. I need to know who
you are because I just got a bank statement from this phone number in
my name and I’m getting ready to go to the police station about it and it
was opened up into my name.” BRIAN R. CLELAND did not respond to
V8 after that text message.
103. IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 9 (“V9”) had an account at Bank
of America that was open from on or about March 10, 2022 until on or
about November 4, 2022. V9 did not open this account or authorize
anyone to open the account on V9’s behalf. V9 became aware of the
account after receiving bank statements in the mail, which were sent to
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V9’s home.
104. On or about April 2022, V9 called the telephone number that
V9 found in transactional details in the bank statement. V9 spoke to
BRIAN R. CLELAND.
105. On or about April 21, 2022, V9 sent to BRIAN R. CLELAND
a picture of a document listing various UC payments that had been
deposited into the account fraudulently opened in V9’s name. BRIAN R.
CLELAND responded, “Received.” On or about the same day, BRIAN R.
CLELAND transferred approximately $325,400.45 to KB Supply Inc.,
one of BRUCE JIN’s companies.
106. Over the next several weeks, V9 continued to contact BRIAN
R. CLELAND in an effort to resolve the situation. On or about May 14,
2022, BRIAN R. CLELAND told V9, “I’ve been told you're deleted from
the data base. I don’t have written confirmation. A deposit was
mistakenly made to your account and withdrawn when it was
discovered with No harm to you. Again everything was deleted and it
won't happen again!” V9 then informed BRIAN R. CLELAND that the
problem continued, and BRIAN R. CLELAND pledged to “follow up” but
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never responded further.
107. On or about April 2, 2022, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIM 10
(“V10”) received a bank statement in the mail from Bank of America.
The statement was for an account in V10’s maiden name. It showed a
series of Pennsylvania UC payments between on or about March 14,
2022 and March 23, 2022, payable to an individual with the name
J.V.F. On or about March 22, 2022, the statement showed a transfer to
Jin Commerce LLC in the amount of $699.89. V10 did not open this
account or authorize anyone to open the account on V10’s behalf.
108. In response, an officer from a local police department emailed
BRUCE JIN at a Gmail address that the officer had located. The subject
of the email was “fraud regarding Jin Commerce.” The officer wrote,
“Sir, I am currently investigating lan] identity theft where a bank
account was opened fraudulently. Your business [of] Jin Commerce LLC
was found to have a withdrawlall] from the account on 3/22/22 for
$699.89.” In response, BRUCE JIN claimed, falsely, that V10, whom he
described as a “customer,” had been found by a “part-time salesman”
who had “resigned” from “the company.” BRUCE JIN claimed that his
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company sold “anti-epidemic materials, including masks, gloves and
protective clothing.”
109. On or about June 4, 2022, BRIAN R. CLELAND sent to
BRUCE JIN a proposed “cooperation agreement” between CLECOQ, Inc.
and COMPANY 2, located in China, on behalf of which BRUCE JIN
acted as a representative. According to the proposed terms, CLECO,
Inc. was responsible for “completing the collection function from the
customer’s account using financial collection platforms and tools such as
ACH.” In exchange, COMPANY 2 was supposed to pay CLECO, Inc. 7%
of its proceeds as commission. On or about the following day, BRUCE
JIN forwarded to BRIAN R. CLELAND an agreement that appeared to
be signed by COCONSPIRATOR 2 as a representative of COMPANY 2.
This email was forwarded from the same 163.com email address with
which BRUCE JIN had contact on other occasions.
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.
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COUNT 2
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)
(Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments)
110. Paragraphs 1 through 33 and 35 through 109 are
incorporated here.
111. From on or about 2020 until on or about 2022, in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the defendants,
BRIAN R. CLELAND, and
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA,
did knowingly conspire, confederate, and agree, together and with other
persons both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit
offenses against the United States in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1956, to wit:
a. To knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct a financial
transaction affecting interstate and foreign commerce, which
involved the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, that is, wire
fraud and bank fraud, with the intent to promote the carrying on
of specified unlawful activity, that is, wire fraud and bank fraud,
and knowing that the property involved in the financial
transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful
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activity in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
1956(a)(1)(A)@); and
b. To knowingly conduct and attempt to conduct financial
transactions affecting interstate commerce and foreign commerce,
which transactions involved the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity, that is, wire fraud and bank fraud, knowing that the
transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal and
disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and knowing that the
property involved in the financial transactions represented the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1)(B)@; and
To transport, transmit and transfer and attempt to transport,
transmit and transfer a monetary instrument and funds from a
place in the United States to and through a place outside the
United States with the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity, that is, wire fraud and bank fraud, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(2){A):
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and
d. To transport, transmit, and transfer, and attempt to transport,
transmit, and transfer a monetary instrument or funds involving
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, that is, wire fraud and
bank fraud, from a place in the United States to or through a
place outside the United States, knowing that the funds involved
in the transportation, transmission, and transfer represented the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such
transportation, transmission, and transfer was designed in whole
or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source,
ownership, and control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section
MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY
111. During 2021 and 2022, BRIAN R. CLELAND, CARLOS A.
GRIJALVA, BRUCE JIN, and COCONSPIRATOR 1 collectively
received approximately $59 million in funds derived from fraud, mainly
comprised of fraudulent state UC payments. Of that total amount,
4]
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BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA handled
approximately $46 million in funds derived from fraud.
112. During 2021 and 2022, BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS
A. GRIJALVA, and in some cases a relative of CARLOS A. GRIJALVA,
used approximately nine different accounts at Bank of America to make
over $30 million in transfers from their companies to various companies
controlled by BRUCE JIN. These transfers were made primarily to
accounts that BRUCE JIN opened at Bank of America, including a Yu
Pacific Logistics LLC account and a Jin Commerce LLC account, both of
which were opened on or about September 2021.
113. From on or about August 10, 2021 until on or about
November 9, 2021, BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA,
and in some cases the relative of CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, used the
same accounts at Bank of America to make approximately
$6,363,612.92 in transfers from their companies to a Bank of America
account belonging to COMPANY 1. COCONSPIRATOR 1 was the
signatory on the COMPANY 1 Bank of America account.
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114. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, and in
some cases the relative of CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, conducted these
transfers by visiting Bank of America branch locations and conducting
teller transactions in person (i.e., “teller transfers”). BRIAN R.
CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, and in some cases the relative
of CARLOS A. GRIJALVA, regularly made teller transfers to companies
affiliated with BRUCE JIN totaling over $1.5 million per week.
115. From on or about June 1, 2021 until on or about February 2,
2022, BRUCE JIN used approximately six different bank accounts
associated with Ample International, Jin Commerce LLC, Yu Pacific
Logistics LLC, and Pacific Goods Supply Inc to transfer, primarily
through international wire transfers, over $35 million to a bank account
in China associated with COMPANY 2. The vast majority of these
transfers were derived from funds received from BRIAN R. CLELAND
and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA. In addition, from on or about May 17,
2021 until on or about May 12, 2022, BRUCE JIN used approximately
four different bank accounts associated with Ample International,
Cathy Group Inc, and KB Supply Inc to transfer, primarily through
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international wire transfers, over $2 million to other bank accounts in
China associated with COCONSPIRATOR 2 and COMPANY 2.
116. On or about November 2021, CARLOS A. GRIJALVA and the
aforementioned relative of CARLOS A. GRIJALVA used approximately
$1,070,653.38 of the proceeds of this scheme to purchase a single-family
home located in or around Simi Valley, California.
117. On or about November 16, 2022, COCONSPIRATOR 1
negotiated a $6,000,000 check from the Bank of America account
associated with COMPANY 1 to a CTBC Bank account. On or about
January 13, 2023, nearly $1,000,000 of the funds in the CTBC account
were used to purchase a luxury vacation property in or around
Honolulu, Hawaii.
118. On or about July 31, 2023, $963,449.52 of the funds in the
CTBC account were used to purchase a condominium property in Irvine,
California.
119. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA retained
several million dollars of the fraudulently obtained UC funds as
personal profit.
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All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h).
COUNTS 3 THROUGH 8
18 U.S.C. § 138438
(Wire Fraud)
120. Paragraphs 1 through 33, 35 through 109, and 111 through
119 are incorporated here.
121. From on or about April 21, 2022 until on or about April 28,
2022, on the dates specified below, in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendant,
BRIAN R. CLELAND,
aiding and abetting other persons both known and unknown to the
Grand Jury, and with the intent to defraud, did devise and willfully
participate in, with knowledge of its fraudulent nature, a scheme and
artifice to defraud and obtain money by materially false and fraudulent
pretenses, representations, and promises, and for the purpose of
executing the above-described scheme and artifice to defraud and
deprive, did knowingly transmit and cause to be transmitted by means
of wire, radio, and television communication in interstate and foreign
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commerce, any writing, sign, signal, picture and sound, as described
below:
Count On or Bank / Accountholder | Wire: Approximate
About Account Amount and Payee
Number
3 4/21/2022 Bank of V2 (a.k.a., $291.87 transfer to
America TA.) CLECO
-1862
4 4/21/2022 Bank of V3 (a.k.a., $351.87 transfer to
America A.B.) CLECO
-1806
5 A/21/2022 Bank of V4 (a.k.a., $696.87 transfer to
America D.M.) CLECO
-7763
6 4/28/2022 Bank of V2 (a.k.a., $286.89 transfer to
America T.A.) CLECO
-1862
7 4/28/2022 Bank of V3 (a.k.a. $763.89 transfer to
America A.B.) CLECO
-1806
8 4/28/2022 Bank of V4 (a.k.a., $350.89 transfer to
America D.M.) CLECO
-7763
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and
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COUNTS 9 THROUGH 14
18 U.S.C. § 1344
(Bank Fraud)
122. Paragraphs 1 through 33, 35 through 109, and 111 through 119
are incorporated here.
123. From on or about April 21, 2022 until on or about April 28,
2022, on the dates specified below, in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendant,
BRIAN R. CLELAND,
aiding and abetting other persons both known and unknown to the Grand
Jury, knowingly executed and attempted to execute a scheme and artifice
to defraud a financial institution, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 20, and to
obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, and other
property owned by, and under the custody or control of, a financial
institution, by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations,
and promises, as described below:
Count On or Bank / Accountholder Approximate
About Account Amount and Payee
Number
9 4/21/2022 Bank of V2 (a.k.a., $291.87 transfer to
America T.A.) CLECO
-1862
AT
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10 | 4/21/2022 Bank of V3 (a.k.a, $351.87 transfer to
America A.B.) CLECO
-1806
11 4/21/2022 Bank of V4 (a.k.a., $696.87 transfer to
America D.M.) CLECO
-7763
12 | 4/28/2022 Bank of V2 (a.k.a., $286.89 transfer to
America T.A.) CLECO
-1862
13 4/28/2022 Bank of V8 (a.k.a., $763.89 transfer to
America A.B.) CLECO
-1806
14 | 4/28/2022 Bank of V4 (a.k.a, $350.89 transfer to
America D.M.) CLECO
-7763
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1344(1)—
(2) and 2.
COUNT 15
18 U.S.C. § 371
(Conspiracy)
124. Paragraphs 1 through 33, 35 through 109, and 111 through 119
are incorporated here.
125. From on or about 2021 until on or about 2022, in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, the defendants,
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BRIAN R.CLELAND, and
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA
did knowingly conspire, confederate, and agree, together and with other
persons both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to commit
offenses against the United States and to defraud the United States,
that is: to knowingly conduct, control, manage, supervise, direct, and
own all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, in
violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 1960 (Prohibition of unlicensed money
transmitting businesses).
OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY
126. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA assisted in
the transfer of money from bank accounts belonging to third persons to
companies associated with BRUCE JIN and COCONSPIRATOR 1 in
exchange for transaction fees.
127. BRIAN R. CLELAND and CARLOS A. GRIJALVA controlled a
money transmitting business but did not register that business with the
Secretary of the Treasury.
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COUNT 16
18 U.S.C. § 1960
(Unlicensed money transmitting business)
128. Paragraphs 1 through 33, 35 through 109, 111 through 119, and
126 through 127 are incorporated here.
129. From on or about 2021 until on or about 2022, on the dates
specified below, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere,
the defendants,
BRIAN R.CLELAND, and
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA
aiding and abetting one another, did knowingly conduct, control,
manage, supervise, direct, and own all or part of a money transmitting
business, which affected interstate or foreign commerce, while failing to
comply with the money transmitting business registration requirements
under 31 U.S.C. § 5330, or regulations prescribed under that section.
All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1960 and
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FORFEITURE ALLEGATIONS
130. The allegations contained in Counts 1 through 16 of this
Indictment are incorporated here for the purpose of alleging forfeitures
pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1), Title 28,
United States Code, Section 2461(0), and Title 18, United States Code,
Section 982.
131. Upon conviction of an offense set forth in Counts 1 through 16 of
this Superseding Indictment, as relevant to each defendant, the
defendants,
BRIAN R.CLELAND, and
CARLOS A. GRIJALVA
shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States
Code, Section 981(a)(1), Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c),
and Title 18, United States Code, Section 982, any property, real or
personal, that constitutes, is derived from, or is traceable to the
proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from the commission of the
offense of which the person is convicted: or that is used to commit,
facilitate, or promote, or is intended to be used to commit, facilitate, or
promote, the commission of the offense of which the person is convicted:
ol
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 52 of 61
or that is involved in such offenses. The property to be forfeited
includes, but is not limited to, the following:
a.
b.
approximately $46,401,749.18 in US currency;
the contents of CTBC bank account #3800628016 in
the name of COMPANY 1,
the contents of Bank of America bank accounts
#325110322269 and #325159948439 in the name of
COMPANY 1, and
a single-family home located at 84-811 Maiola Street
Unit 91 Waianae HI 96792, identified at Parcel
Number 840291500091, more fully described as:
“FIRST
Unit No. 91 of the Condominium Project known as
‘COTTAGES AT MAUNA ‘OLU (the ‘Project’) ,
established by Declaration of Condominium
Property Regime dated March 8, 2019, filed in the
Office of the Assistant Registrar of the Land Court
of the State of Hawaii as Land Court Document No.
T-10661092, recorded in the Bureau of Conveyances
of the State of Hawaii as Document as Doc. No. A-
70090398, as the same may be amended from time
to time (the ‘Declaration’) and as shown on
Condominium Map No. 2434 filed in said Office of
the Assistant Registrar, and Condominium Map No.
52
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 53 of 61
5910 recorded in said Bureau, as the same may be
amended from time to time.
Together with those easements appurtenant to the
Unit as set forth in the Declaration, which may
include the following:
(A)
(B)
Exclusive easements for the use of Limited
Common Elements of the Project which are
described in the Declaration as being
appurtenant to the Unit.
Nonexclusive easements in the common
elements designed for such purposes for
ingress to, egress from, utility services for
and support of said Unit, in the other
common elements for use according to their
respective purposes, subject always to the
exclusive or limited use of the limited
common elements as provided in the
Declaration, and in all other units and
common elements of the building in which
said Unit is located or any adjacent
buildings for support.
SECOND:
An undivided 1/120 fractional interest
appurtenant to the Unit in all common elements
of the Project, as established for said Unit by the
Declaration, as tenant in common with all other
owners from time to time of undivided interests
in and to said common elements.
The land upon which said Condominium Project
‘COTTAGES AT MAUNA ‘OLU’ is located is
described as follows:
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 54 of 61
PARCELS FIRST
All of those certain parcels of land situate at
Makaha, District of Waianae, City and County of
Honolulu, State of Hawaii, described as follows:
LOT: 1465, area 53,799 square feet, more or less,
1466, area 57,959 square feet, more or less,
1467, area 57,461 square feet, more or less,
1468, area 49,973 square feet, more or less,
1469, area 50,261 square feet, more or less,
1470, area 49,965 square feet, more or less,
1471, area 49,572 square feet, more or less,
1472, area 61,559 square feet, more or less,
1473, area 61,131 square feet, more or less,
1474, area 56,783 square feet, more or less,
1475, area 55,932 square feet, more or less,
1476, area 54,373 square feet, more or less,
1477, area 53,279 square feet, more or less,
1478, area 88,449 square feet, more or less,
1480, area 53,193 square feet, more or less,
1481, area 53,356 square feet, more or less,
1482, area 53,425 square feet, more or less,
and 1590, area 63,831 square feet, more or less,
as shown on Map 187, filed in the Office of the
Assistant Registrar of the Land Court of the
State of Hawaii with Land Court Application No.
1052 (amended) of Waianae Company.
Together with a right of way over Lot 632, as
shown on Map 15, Lot 649, as shown on Map 17,
Lots 1430-A, 1430-B, 1429-B and 1429-C as
shown on Map 185.
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 55 of 61
Together also with a right of way across Lots 975
and 1005, as shown on Maps 58 and 75, and
Easement ‘62’ over and across Lots 1248 and
1241, as shown on Map 168 and 131, as set forth
by Land Court Order No. 29882, filed on April 18,
1969.
Together also with a right of way across
Easement ‘158’, across Lot 1025-B and Easement
‘159’, across Lot 1025-C, and across Kasement
‘160’ across Lot 1430-A as shown on said Map
156.
As to Lots 1465 through 1478 and 1480, together
with a right of way over Roadway Lot Nos. 1589
and 1590 as shown on said Map 187.
As to Lots 1481 and 1482, together also with a
right of way over Roadway Lot No. 1589 as shown
on said Map 187 and as set forth by Land Court
Order No. 68505, filed on January 16, 1984.
Together also with a nonexclusive easement to
use on Lot 1589 for access, utility, and entry gate
purposes, as granted by CONFIRMATION OF
GRANT OF EASEMENT FOR ACCESS,
UTILITY PURPOSES AND ENTRY GATE dated
April 2, 1987, filed as Land Court Document No.
1480401 and subject to the terms and conditions
contained therein.
Being land(s) described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1,172,748 issued to MAKATI VISTAS AT
MAKATIA LLC, a Hawaii limited liability
company.
55
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 56 of 61
PARCEL SECOND
All of that certain parcel of land (being all of the
land(s) described in and covered by Royal Patent
Number 2339, Land Commission Award Number
9862 to Kanehaku) situate, lying and being at
Kekio, Makaha, District of Waianae, City and
County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, being all of
Exclusion 3 of Land Court Application No. 1052,
and thus bounded and described:
Beginning at the south corner of this parcel of
land, the coordinates of said point of beginning
referred to Government Survey Triangulation
Station “MAKAHA” being 5495.20 feet north and
1502.00 feet west, thence running by azimuths
measured clockwise from true South:
1. 156° 46 30” 514.20 feet along Lot 1031
as shown on Map 107 of Land Court
Application 1052:
2. 244° 02’ 65.70 feet along Lot 1031 as
shown on Map 107 of Land Court Application
1052;
3. 152° 52’ 29.90 feet along Lot 1031 as
shown on Map 107 of Land Court Application
1052;
4. 245° 50 65.99 feet along Lot 1031 as
shown on Map 107 of Land Court Application
1052;
5. 885° 21’ 117.60 feet along Lot 1031 as
shown on Map 107 of Land Court Application
1052;
6. 241° 39 92.70 feet along Lot 1031 as
shown on Map 107 of Land Court Application
1052;
56
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 57 of 61
7. 338° 46; 389.40 feet along Lot 1031 as
shown on Map 107 of Land Court Application
1052;
8. 538° 31’ 217.00 feet along Lot 1031 as
shown on Map 107 of Land Court Application
1052 to the point of beginning and containing
an area of 2339 acres, more or less.
PARCEL THIRD
All of that certain parcel of land situated at Makaha,
District of Waianae, City and County of Honolulu,
State of Hawaii, described as follows:
LOT 1479-B, area 7,489 square feet, more or less, as
shown on Map 217, filed in the Office of the Assistant
Registrar of the Land Court of the State of Hawaii with
Land Court Application No. 1052 (amended) of
Waianae Company;
Together with a right of way over Lots 672 as shown on
Map 46, Lot 649, as shown on Map 19, Lots 1430-A,
1430-B, 1429-B and 1429-C as shown on Map 185.
Together also with a right of way across Lots 975 and
1005, as shown on Maps 58 and 75, and Easement ‘62’
over and across Lots 1248 and 1241, as shown on Map
168 and 131, as set forth by Land Court Order No.
29882, filed on April 18, 1969.
Together also with a right of way across Kasement
‘158’, across Lot 1025-B and Easement ‘159’, across Lot
1025-C, and across Easement ‘160’ across Lot 14380-A
as shown on said Map 156.
57
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 58 of 61
Together also with a right of way over Roadway Lot
No. 1589 as shown on said Map 187 and as set forth by
Land Court Order No. 68505, filed on January 16,
1984.
Together also with a nonexclusive easement to use Lot
1589 for access, utility and entry gate purposes, as
granted by CONFIRMATION OF GRANT OF
EASEMENT FOR ACCESS, UTILITY PURPOSES,
AND ENTRY GATE dated April 2, 1987, filed as Land
Court Document No. 148041 and subject to the terms
and conditions contained therein.
Being land(s) described in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1,172,743 issued to MAKATI VISTAS AT MAKAHA,
LLC, a Hawaii limited liability company.
AS TO PARCELS FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD
Said parcel(s) of land being more fully described in
Declaration of Condominium Property Regime dated
March 8, 2019, filed in the Office of the Assistant
Registrar of the Land Court of the State of Hawaii as
Land Court Document No. T-10661092, recorded in the
Bureau of Conveyances of the State of Hawaii as
Document No. A-70090398, as the same may be
amended from time to time.
BEING THE PREMISES ACQUIRED BY LIMITED
WARRANTY DEED.”
e. the real property located at 7 Iceberg Rose, Irvine,
California, 92620-2896 identified at Parcel Number
935-45-697, more fully described as:
58
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 59 of 61
“,..A CONDOMINIUM COMPRISED OF:
PARCEL 1: AN UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN
COMMON AREA:
A ONE/TWELFTH (1/12) UNDIVIDED
FRACTIONAL FEE INTEREST AS A TENANT-
IN-COMMON IN AND TO THE PHASE I
COMMON AREA AS SHOWN AND
DESCRIBED ON THAT CERTAIN
CONDOMINIUM PLAN RECORDED ON
SEPTEMBER 28, 2005, AS INSTRUMENT NO.
2005-765033 IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA (THE
"PHASE I CONDOMINIUM PLAN"). SAID
PHASE I COMMON AREA CONSISTS SOLELY
OF AIRSPACE LOCATED ABOVE LOT 7 OF
TRACT 16676, WHICH TRACT IS SHOWN ON
A MAP RECORDED IN BOOK 866, PAGES 22
THROUGH 33, INCLUSIVE, OF
MISCELLANEOUS MAPS IN THE OFFICE OF
THE COUNTY RECORDER FOR ORANGE
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA.
PARCEL 2: THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT:
UNIT 90, AS SHOWN AND DESCRIBED ON
THE PHASE I CONDOMINIUM PLAN AND AS
DEFINED IN THAT CERTAIN
‘SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF
COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND
59
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125 _ Filed 04/02/25 Page 60 of 61
RESTRICTIONS, RESERVATION OF
EASEMENTS, AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES FOR BOWEN
COURT RECORDED ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2005
AS INSTRUMENT NO. 2005-767447, IN THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF ORANGE
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, AS SAME MAY BE
RESTATED AND/OR AMENDED FROM TIME TO
TIME (THE "DECLARATION")
f. a single-family home located at 3161 Omega Ave
Simi Valley CA 93068, identified at Parcel Number
616-0-182-085, more fully described as:
“the real property in the City of Simi Valley, County
of Ventura, State of California, described as: Lot 8 of
Tract No. 2648 as per Map recorded in Book 87,
Page 64 of Maps, in the Office of the County
Recorder of Ventura County, California. Also Known
as: 3161 Omega Avenue, Simi Valley, CA 93063”
132. If any of the property described above, as a result of any act or
omission of the defendants:
a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence:
60
Case 1:23-cr-00209-JPW Document125_ Filed 04/02/25 Page 61 of 61
b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a
third party;
c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
d. has been substantially diminished in value; or
e. has been commingled with other property which
cannot be divided without difficulty,
the United States of America shall be entitled to forfeiture of
substitute property pursuant to Title 21, United States Code,
Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 28, United States Code,
Section 2461(c).
All pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) and 982(b); Title 21, United
States Code, Section 853(p); and Title 28, United States Code, Section
2461(c).
A TRUE BILL
JOHN C. GURGANUS
Acting United States Attorney FOREPERSON
RAVI ROMEL SHARMA Date |
Assistant United States Attorney
61
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