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How Effective Were Job-Retention Schemes During COVID-19?

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An International Monetary Fund working paper, WP/23/3, from the Fiscal Affairs Department, dated January 2023 and prepared by W. Raphael Lam and Alexandra Solovyeva. It uses the EUROMOD microsimulation model and household data to assess how well job-retention schemes stabilized household income across European countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. The abstract reports that these schemes, with other measures, absorbed nearly 80 percent of market income shocks and helped mitigate the rise in the unemployment rate by about 3 percentage points. The paper contrasts EU labor markets, where hours per worker fell by almost 12 percent in the second quarter of 2020, with the United States, and mentions the Paycheck Protection Program as a limited US job-retention scheme. It closes with a list of references.

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How Effective were Job-Retention
Schemes during the COVID-19
Pandemic? A Microsimulation
Approach for European Countries
W. Raphael Lam and Alexandra Solovyeva




IMF Working Papers describe research in
progress by the author(s) and are published to
elicit comments and to encourage debate.
The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board,
or IMF management.




2023
JAN
  © 2023 International Monetary Fund                                                                             WP/23/3

                                                    IMF Working Paper
                                                 Fiscal Affairs Department

     How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                  Approach for European Countries
                        Prepared by W. Raphael Lam and Alexandra Solovyeva 1

                                       Authorized for distribution by Paulo Medas
                                                     January 2023


  IMF Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit
  comments and to encourage debate. The views expressed in IMF Working Papers are those of the
  author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.


ABSTRACT: The COVID-19 pandemic had posed a dramatic impact on labor markets across Europe. Forceful fiscal
responses have prevented an otherwise sharper contraction. Many countries introduced or expanded job-retention
schemes to preserve jobs and support households. This paper uses a microsimulation approach (EUROMOD) and
household data to assess the effectiveness of those schemes in stabilizing household income during the pandemic
across European countries. Empirical evidence shows that job-retention schemes were effective in stabilizing income
and, along with other measures, absorbed nearly 80 percent of market income shocks—almost doubling the extent of
the automatic stabilization of the pre-p andemic tax and benefit systems. The large effects are related to the
widespread use and scaling up of those schemes and a deep but short-lived disruption to labor markets during the
pandemic. Along with other fiscal support measures, job-retention schemes helped mitigate the rise in the
unemployment rate, by about 3 percentage points, and income inequality during the pandemic. Our results show that
job-retention schemes were largely targeted, in which households more vulnerable to income losses, such as lower-
income families, youth, and low-skilled workers, are able to stabilize their income.


RECOMMENDED CITATION: Lam, W. Raphael and Solovyeva, Alexandra. 2023. How Effective were Job-Retention
Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation Approach for European Countries. IMF Working Paper
23/3, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.


  JEL Classification Numbers:                D1, D12, D31, D61; E2, E21, E24, E64, E65; H3, H31; J3, J6

                                             Job-retention schemes; COVID-19 pandemic; short-time work;
  Keywords:
                                             inequality; income stabilization; Okun’s Law

  Author’s E-Mail Address:                   WLam@imf.org; ASolovyeva@imf.org


1
  The authors would like to thank Vitor Gaspar, Paolo Mauro, Paulo Medas, Ricardo Reis, Camille Landais, Alberto Tumino, and
participants in IMF-FAD seminar and July 2022 Fiscal Monitor Workshop for their constructive comments and suggestions. Andrew
Womer and Andre Vasquez provided excellent research assistance and editorial support. The paper is based on data from Eurostat,
2019 European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (2018 reference year). The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from
the data lies entirely with the authors. The results presented in the paper are based on EUROMOD version I4.0+. Originally
maintained, developed and managed by the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), since 2021 EUROMOD is
maintained, developed and managed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, in collaboration with
EUROSTAT and national teams from the EU countries. We are indebted to the many people who have contributed to the
development of EUROMOD. The report is based on data from Eurostat 2018-20.
WORKING PAPERS




How Effective were Job-Retention
Schemes During the COVID-19
Pandemic? A Microsimulation
Approach for European Countries


Prepared by W. Raphael Lam and Alexandra Solovyeva
IMF WORKING PAPERS            How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                       Approach for European Countries




Contents
I.               INTRODUCTION_________________________________________________________________________3

II.              IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON EU LABOR MARKETS ___________________________4

III.             DATA AND METHODOLOGY __________________________________________________________8

IV.              SIMULATION RESULTS _________________________________________________________________9
A.               Income stabilization before the pandemic_____________________________________________9
B.               Income stabilization during the pandemic___________________________________________ 11
C.               Regression analysis ____________________________________________________________________ 16

V.               POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCL USIONS_____________________________________ 17

ANNEX I. SIMULATIONS OF SHOCKS IN EUROMOD ______________________________________________ 19

REFERENCES _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 20


FIGURES
1. Labor Market Developments in the European Union During the COVID-19 _______________________________ 5
2. Relationship between Output Fluctuations and Labor Market Dynamics __________________________________ 7
3. EU-27: Changes in Unemployment ________________________________________________________________________ 7
4 Income Stabilization in EU before the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2019________________________________________ 10
5. Simulated Changes in Market and Disposable Incomes During the Pandemic___________________________ 11
6. Income Stabilization after the COVID Shock, by Country and Income Level _____________________________ 12
7. Correlation of Simulated Income ________________________________________________________________________ 13
8. Income Stabilization During the Pandemic across Households __________________________________________ 13
9. Redistribution Effects of Fiscal Measures During the Pandemic__________________________________________ 14
10. Simulated Income Stabilization Coefficients by Worker Groups and Sectors ___________________________ 15


TABLES
1. Features of Job-Retention Schemes in Selected European Countries During the COVID-19 Pandemic ____ 6
2. Regression Results on Differences of Income Stabilization across EU Households_______________________ 17




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IMF WORKING PAPERS                 How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                            Approach for European Countries




I.        Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic generated widespread economic disruptions and consequently led to a sharp
deterioration in labor markets across Europe. Despite a dramatic economic contraction, the impact on
employment appeared to be muted, with employment rate remaining at 0.7 percentage points below the pre-
crisis levels, far above projections based on the pre-pandemic relationship between output growth and
unemployment (Okun’s relationship). Most of the adjustment in the labor markets was through a sharp
reduction in working hours per worker, by 12 percent in the second quarter of 2020. These observations were
in contrast with the experience of the United States, where the unemployment rate surged by 11 percentage
points in the first two months of the pandemic, while working hours per worker fell moderately.

Swift and forceful fiscal support has cushioned the adverse impact of the pandemic. Yet the diverse experience
in EU and US labor markets was likely driven by specific fiscal measures. Many EU countries introduced new
or expanded the existing job-retention schemes which prevented a surge in unemployment, while the United
States expanded the federal unemployment income support despite that many states had some form of job-
retention schemes in place. 2 This is usually seen as a key contributing factor for different developments in the
labor markets (Ando and others 2022; Giupponi, Landais, and Lapeyre 2022). Within the European Union, the
design and coverage of job-retention schemes varied significantly across countries. Given that job-retention
schemes can become a prominent tool for future shocks, it is therefore important to assess whether job-
retention schemes are effective in terms of stabilizing household income and to what extent those schemes
target well to workers vulnerable to job losses.

The paper uses a microsimulation approach (EUROMOD) and household data to assess the effectiveness of
those schemes in stabilizing household income during the pandemic across EU countries. Our paper is related
to Christl and others (2022) that analyzes the aggregate stabilization of tax and benefit systems during the
pandemic. Our paper extends their analysis and quantifies not only the aggregate effects of pandemic-related
fiscal support, including job-retention schemes, in stabilizing household income, but also focuses on the impact
on different socio-economic groups, including age, gender, occupations, and level of educational attainment.

The paper is also related to other strands in the literature. First, it contributes to the literature on the size of
automatic stabilizers—the built-in components in the budget that adjust automatically to cyclical changes in the
economy. The paper uses a micro-simulation approach that relies on household data and detailed policies in
the tax and benefit systems (Auerbach and Feenberg 2000; Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl 2012). It allows an
analysis of the direct effects of specific tax or expenditure policies on household income during an adverse
shock by household characteristics. Although the microsimulation approach does not account for feedback
effects, other approaches using cyclical budget balances or semi-elasticities are likely less applicable in an
environment of sharp adjustments and high uncertainty such as during the pandemic. The relationship between
fiscal variables and output inherent in those approaches could change dramatically (for example, due to
lockdown restrictions). 3
Second, our microsimulation results provide an estimate on the degree of income stabilization of tax and
benefit systems during the pandemic. This updates the previous estimates in the literature that focus on the



2
  The widespread use of job-retention schemes was in part mobilizing the EU funds under the temporary Support to mitigate
    Unemployment Risks in Emergency (SURE) instrument.
3
  Other approaches include the conventional statistical method that uses the cyclical component of the government budget balance
    or makes use of the semi-elasticities of revenue and expenditures (IMF 2015) or general equilibrium models. The general
    equilibrium modeling approach can estimate both direct and indirect effects of behavioral responses and their feedback (Krusell,
    Mukoyama, and Sahin 2010; McKay and Reis 2016).

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IMF WORKING PAPERS                      How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                 Approach for European Countries



pre-pandemic period, including (Coady and others 2023; Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl 2012; European Commission
2017; Mohl Mourre, and Stovicek 2019).

Third, the paper contributes to the research that examines the role of pandemic-related fiscal support in
European labor markets. For example, Ando and others (2022) find that job-retention schemes across the euro
area were crucial in mitigating the adverse impact of the pandemic, otherwise, unemployment rates could have
risen further by another 2½ percentage points in 2020. Aiyar and Dao (2021) uses data on state-level
Kurzarbeit, short-time work program in Germany, and finds that the unemployment rate would have increased
by 3 percentage points without the job-retention schemes and consumption would have contracted even
further. Giupponi, Landais, and Lapeyre (2022) compares the experience between EU and US policy
responses and concludes that cyclical job-retention schemes can be an efficient and expedient way to
complement unemployment insurance. Our paper supports these findings and provides further analyses across
different household groups. The paper does not examine the effects of prolonged use of job-retention schemes
on labor market allocations partly because those schemes were quickly phased out when labor markets
recovered during the pandmeic, although some studies suggest the potential drawback on disincentives to
work from such schemes if not withdrawn timely (Basso and others 2020).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the impact of the pandemic on the EU
labor markets and provides an overview of policies to protect workers against job and income losses. Section
III describes the data and methodology of the microsimulations of the tax and benefit systems and the design of
various scenarios. Section IV presents simulation results for the pre-pandemic automatic stabilizers and
analyzes the extent of income stabilization in EU countries from job-retention schemes and other tax and
benefit components during the pandemic. Section V concludes with some takeaways and policy implications.


II. Impact of the Pandemic on EU Labor Markets
During the COVID-19 pandemic, labor markets in the European Union adjusted mostly through reduction of
hours worked per employee (‘intensive margin’) rather than employment levels (Figure 1). Average hours
worked per worker dropped by almost 12 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2020, while
employment fell by just under 3 percent over the same period. There was some variation across EU countries,
depending on the differences in the severity of the pandemic and the sectoral structure.

The developments in EU labor markets are very different from those in the United States, where employment
plunged by 12 percent at the onset of the pandemic but working hours per workers remained steady (Figure 1).
The adverse impact of large decline in working hours but muted employment loss was in contrast to the global
financial crisis. During the onset of the global financial crisis, the decline in employment was broadly similar to
the drop in working hours per worker, and the decline was more protracted over several years.
The widespread use of job-retention schemes in EU countries has contributed to the muted loss of employment
during the pandemic. Job-retention schemes encompass policies that subsidize workers’ wages in firms that
have reduced working hours but preserved workers’ jobs, which broadly include short-time work schemes and
wage subsidies. Before the pandemic, many EU countries had already some forms of job-retention schemes in
place. Some schemes have always been active 4, such as Kurzarbeit in Germany and Activité Partielle in
France, while other governments took action to introduce or expand those schemes to protect workers. During
the pandemic, countries introduced new or expanded existing job-retention schemes by simplifying access,




4
    A firm can always apply but needs to prove that all the eligibility criteria are met.

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IMF WORKING PAPERS                                                                                How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                                                                           Approach for European Countries



relaxing eligibility criteria, and raising the benefit levels (Table 1). Some schemes gave more generous support
for workers in contact-intensive sectors that were affected the most, such as in Austria and Luxembourg.

At the beginning of the pandemic, an average of 14 percent of working-age population were under some job-
retention schemes in the four largest EU economies (compared to 2 percent during the global financial crisis).
More than half of EU countries had the take-up rate higher than 12 percent of working-age population. This
dwarfed the increase of people receiving unemployment income support, which increased only modestly, by
about 2 percentage points, given the muted impact on employment (Figure 1). The rise in unemployment rates
in the EU during the pandemic was lower than predicted by the estimates based on the Okun’s Law, partly
reflecting the widespread use of job-retention schemes, as well as a drop in the labor force participation when
workers did not actively search for a new job at the onset of the pandemic (Ando and others 2022). The
average fiscal cost was about 2 percent of GDP in advanced EU economies (1.4 percent in emerging market
economies in EU), about one-third of total fiscal support during the pandemic (Ando and others 2022).

On the other hand, the US has also introduced a limited job-retention scheme to firms—the Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP)—that provided small firms with loans to cover labor costs, forgivable if the payroll
level was maintained. Some estimates suggest that PPP saved about 3.6 million jobs, equivalent to 2.2 percent
of total employment (Autor and others 2022). In many cases, however, workers were temporarily laid off and
received unemployment income support at the onset of the pandemic. The US scaled up its federal
unemployment support by about 3 percent of GDP to provide weekly supplements to standard unemployment
insurance, expand the eligibility to include independent workers, and extend the duration of the federal benefits.

 Figure 1. Labor Market Developments in the European Union During the COVID-19 Pandemic
 1.                     Employment Growth                                                                                                                           2.         Growth in Average Hours per Worker
 (Percent, year-on-year)                                                                                                                                           (Percent, year-on-year)
              10                                                                                                                                                     15


                                                                                                                                                                     10
                    5

                                                                                                                                                                         5

                    0
                                                                                                                                                                         0


                -5                                                                                          United States                                            -5
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            United States
                                                                                                            EU-27
          -10                                                                                                                                                       -10                                                                                                     EU-27


                                                                                                                                                                    -15
          -15
                                                                                                                                                                             2007Q2   2008Q2   2009Q2        2010Q2    2011Q2    2012Q2    2013Q2    2014Q2   2015Q2       2016Q2   2017Q2     2018Q2    2019Q2     2020Q2       2021Q2
                        2007Q2   2008Q2   2009Q2   2010Q2   2011Q2   2012Q2   2013Q2   2014Q2   2015Q2   2016Q2   2017Q2   2018Q2   2019Q2   2020Q2   2021Q2

 Sources: Eurostat, B ureau of Labor Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
 Note: Shaded areas refer to CEPR-based recessions for the EU countries and NBER recessions for the United States.
    3. Changes in Employment and Working Hours,                                                                                                                     4.         Take-up of Job-Retention Schemes and
       2019-20                                                                                                                                                                 Unemployment Income Support
 (Percentage change)                                                                                                                                               (Percent of working-age population)
                        2

                                                    USA                                           ROU                                                               14                Global financial crisis, 2008-09                                     14                                          COVID-19, 2020-21
                        0                                                                      HRV
                                                                                          FIN                                                                       12                                                                                     12
                                                                                                    POL
                                                                                            SWE
                                                                                                DNK                                                                 10                                                                                     10
                     -2




 Hours per worker
                                                                                        BGR      NLD                                                                 8                                                                                        8
                                                                                        LVA    HUN
                     -4                                                           EST LTU                                                                            6                                                                                        6
                                                                                     CZE     DEU SVN                                                                 4                                                                                        4
                     -6
                                                                                               EU-27                                         LUX
                                                                                                                  CYP                                                2                                                                                        2
                                                                         ESP                 SVKAUT
                                                                                       IRL                  FRA                                                      0                                                                                        0
                     -8                                                                           PRT                                                 MLT
                                                                                                                       BEL                                               Dec-07   Mar-08   Jun-08   Sep-08    Dec-08   Mar-09   Jun-09   Sep-09   Dec-09          Jan-20   Mar-20   May-20   Jul-20   Sep-20   Nov-20   Jan-21   Mar-21   May-21
                                                                                                  ITA
                    -10                                                                                   GRC
                            -8                     -6                 -4                     -2                    0                    2                      4
                                                                              Employment

 Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Eurostat, and authors’                                                                                                       Sources: Giupponi, Landais, and Lapeyre 2022; and
 calculations. The figure uses International Organization for                                                                                                      authors’ calculations.
 Standardization (ISO) country codes.                                                                                                                              Note: Data for EU-4 is a weighted average of Germany,
                                                                                                                                                                   France, Spain, and Italy.


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IMF WORKING PAPERS                          How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                     Approach for European Countries




                       Table 1. Features of Job-Retention Schemes in Selected European Countries During the COVID-19 Pandemic
                   Pre-existing job-   Increased access and   Increased    New job-retention         Take-up rate
                                                                                                                                                                              Remarks
                   retention scheme          coverage         generosity       scheme          Maximum          Average

  Austria                 x                     x                 x                              17.7             7.9     Longer duration, more flexible rules for extension of duration and administrative simplification. Up to 100
                                                                                                                          precent working time reduction in the hospitality sector.
  Belgium                 x                     x                 x                              16.9             7.6
  Bulgaria                                                                        x
  Croatia                                                                         x
  Czech Republic          x                     x                 x                               8.6             4.5
  Cyprus                                                                          x
  Denmark                 x                     x                                 x               7.3             3.5     Introduced temporararily with no membership in unemployment scheme required.
  Estonia                                                                         x              14.4             3.3
  Finland                 x                     x                 x                               4.8             2.6
  France                  x                     x                 x                              20.6             8.8     No condition on type of contract, part or full time, seniority. The maximum duration is extended from 6 to 12
                                                                                                                          months. The subsidy is 70 percent of gross wage. Most employers do not bear any cost of hours no worked.

  Germany                 x                     x                 x                              11.2             6.4     Firms can apply if 10 percent of their workforce is subject to reduction of hours (30 percent before).
                                                                                                                          Replacement rate for lost earnings is raised to 70 and 80 percent (from 4th month and 7th month, respectively).

  Greece                                                                          x              11.0             4.8     Available for employers with at least a 20 percent revenue loss. Only full-time dependent employees are
                                                                                                                          eligible. Replacement rate for lost earnings is 60 percent of net wages.
  Hungary                                                                         x               3.2            2.3      Job-retention scheme with 30-50 percent working time reduction.
  Ireland                 x                                                       x              14.8            11.8     The existing short-time work was replaced by a temporary wage subsidy.
  Italy                   x                     x                 x                              14.7            7.3      Firms of any size and from all sectors can apply. Evidence of economic need is no longer required. Employers
                                                                                                                          do not bear any cost for hours not worked.
  Latvia                                                                          x              5.0              3.2     Short-time work with full- and part-time reduction.
  Lithuania                                                                       x              9.4              3.8     Short-time work with full- and part-time reduction.
  Luxembourg              x                     x                 x                              22.2             6.4     Up to 100 percent working time reduction; temporary workers and apprentices eligible.
                                                                                                                          Wage Supplement scheme provided eligible employees with a basic wage (March 2020-May 2022). Funds were
  Malta                                                                           x                                       forwarded via the employer.
  Netherlands             x                                                       x              23.8            14.2     The existing short-time work program was replaced by a temporary wage subsidy; employees received 100
                                                                                                                          percent of their wage.
  Poland                                                                          x              6.3              2.4
  Portugal                x                     x                 x                              12.0             4.5
  Romania                                                                         x                                       Short-time work program with up to 80 percent of reduced work time.
  Slovakia                x                     x                 x                              12.6            8.0
  Slovenia                                                                        x              13.4             5.6
  Spain                   x                     x                 x                              11.5             4.9
  Sweden                  x                     x                 x                               7.6             4.3     Larger working time reduction of 80 percent between May and July 2020.
  United Kingdom                                                                  x              21.2            12.8     Replacement rate for unworked hours is 80 percent of gross salary. The cost of unworked hours faced by
                                                                                                                          firms set at zero. All workers who were on payroll on March 19 are eligible.

 Sources: Ando and others (2022), Drahokoupil and Müller (2021), Giupponi, Landais, and Lapeyre (2022), and OECD (2020).
 Note: The take-up rates of job-retention schemes refer to the maximum and the average of share of workers enrolled in job-retention schemes during March to December
 2020. The indicators are expressed in percent of working-age population in the country.




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IMF WORKING PAPERS                          How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                     Approach for European Countries




The COVID-19 pandemic had a disproportionate impact on certain groups of workers. For example, young
workers experienced the largest decline in employment and the largest rise in the unemployment rate between
2019 and 2020 (Figure 3). Workers with low-level of education also saw a large decline in employment rate, 5
percentage points on average at the EU level. In contrast, elderly and high-skilled workers were less affected,
with their employment rates rising slightly by 1.7 and 2.4 percent, respectively. The findings that young and
low-skilled workers were more sensitive to economic fluctuations coincided with empirical estimates before the
pandemic. For example, pre-pandemic Okun’s Law estimates suggest that unemployment rates of these
groups are more responsive to output fluctuations (Figure 2), consistent with Ando and others (2022).

 Figure 2. Relationship between Output Fluctuations and Labor Market Dynamics across Worker
 Groups
 1. Estimated Okun’s Law Coefficients, 1995-2019                      2. Actual Unemployment Rates Rose Less than
                                                                         Predicted Levels based on Okun’s Law
                                                                         Estimates, 2020
 (Coefficients, average across EU countries)                          (Percentage points, average)
     0                                                                  2
                                                                                                               2020Q1                 2020Q2       2020Q3                2020 average
  -0.05
                                                                        0
   -0.1

  -0.15
                                                                       -2
   -0.2

  -0.25
                                                                       -4
   -0.3

  -0.35                                                                -6
   -0.4

  -0.45                                                                -8
                  15-24   25-54   55-64   Men Women Low Medium High                      15-24           25-54         55-64          Men    Women             Low      Medium High

          Total           Age              Gender       Education           Total                        Age                             Gender                        Education

 Sources: Eurostat and authors’ calculations.
 Notes: Okun’s Law coefficient measures the impact of GDP growth on changes in the unemployment rate. The estimation
 sample includes 15 EU countries and covers the period during 1995Q1-2019Q4 (or earliest available). Coefficients for
 individual countries not statistically significantly at the 5 percent level are set to zero. Panel 2 shows the average prediction
 errors (the difference between the actual and predicted unemployment rates based on Okun’s Law coefficients). Low
 education corresponds to less than primary and lower secondary. High education corresponds to tertiary education.


While job-retention schemes have contributed to                             Figure 3. EU-27: Changes in Unemployment
preventing a surge in unemployment in EU countries,                         Rates and Employment Growth, 2019-20
questions arise whether those schemes are effective to                      (Percentage points for changes in unemployment
stabilize household incomes and target well to workers                      rate; percent for employment growth)
                                                                             3                                                                                                                             3
that are more vulnerable to job losses. The following                        2                                                                                                                             2
section analyzes these by conducting micro-                                  1                                                                                                                             1

simulations.                                                                 0                                                                                                                             0

                                                                            -1                                                                                                                             -1

                                                                            -2                                                                                                                             -2

                                                                            -3                                                                                                                             -3

                                                                            -4                                                                                                                             -4

                                                                            -5                                                                                                                             -5

                                                                            -6                                                                                                                             -6

                                                                            -7                                                                                                                             -7

                                                                                                                             Medium                                                        Medium
                                                                                                         Men                          High                             Men                          High
                                                                                                               Women                                                         Women
                                                                                                                       Low                                                           Low
                                                                                 15-24   25-54   55-64                                         15-24   25-54   55-64


                                                                                         Age              Gender         Education                     Age             Gender          Education

                                                                                            Unemployment rate change                                           Employment growth


                                                                            Sources: Eurostat and authors’ calculations.




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IMF WORKING PAPERS                How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                           Approach for European Countries




III. Data and Methodology
The analysis uses a microsimulation approach that quantifies how well existing tax and benefit systems or new
policy measures buffer shocks to household market income (income before taxes and transfers). This approach
allows a detailed analysis based on household characteristics, although it does not account for the feedback
effects on aggregate income when policies change.
The analysis uses a static microsimulation model EUROMOD (version I4.0+) and microdata from the 2019
European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 26 EU countries. 5 The EUROMOD is a
tax-benefit microsimulation model developed by the Joint Research Center (JRC) of the European Commission
in collaboration with Eurostat and national teams from the EU countries. The model simulates country-specific
direct tax liabilities and in-cash benefit entitlements for samples of representative households in EU countries
(Sutherland and Figari 2013). The model allows us to calculate, in a comparable manner, the effects of tax and
benefit policies on the income of individual households (see Annex I).

The paper conducts two sets of simulations to analyze how a change in taxes and benefits would stabilize
income during an adverse shock.
1.   The first set of simulations aims to assess to what extent income was stabilized in an adverse shock before
     the pandemic. The adverse shock is assumed to be a uniform 5-percent decline in market incomes of all
     households under the 2019 tax and benefit system (see Annex I). This help assess the size of automatic
     stabilizers—the built-in components in the budget that adjust automatically to cyclical changes in the
     economy—prior to the pandemic. The analyses simulate and compare two scenarios—the baseline and
     the income shock scenario. The baseline scenario is based on the tax-benefit system of individual EU
     countries in 2019 and the 2019 EU-SILC household-level microdata (assuming no major discretionary
     fiscal measures in 2019), while the income shock scenario is based on the 2019 tax-benefit system with a
     5-percent decline in market incomes of all individuals in the 2019 EU-SILC microdata.

2.   The second set of simulations assesses to what extent the announced fiscal support during the pandemic
     has stabilized household incomes. The analyses simulate and compare two scenarios—a “COVID-19”
     scenario and a counterfactual “no COVID-19” scenario. The COVID-19 scenario is based on the 2020 tax-
     benefit system and the 2019 EU-SILC microdata, adjusted to match the actual labor market conditions
     observed in 2020. The adjustment follows Christl and others (2022) and employs the Labor Market
     Adjustment (LMA) Add-on that simulates transitions between employment, unemployment and job-
     retention schemes based on the data from the European Labor Force Survey and other detailed
     administrative sources. 6 This scenario essentially captures how household incomes would change under a
     COVID-19 shock, taking into account the announced fiscal support measures. In the “no COVID-19”
     scenario, the analysis assumes that there were no pandemic-related labor market transitions (i.e., no rise
     in unemployment or decline in working hours as observed during the pandemic). The simulation uses the
     2020 tax-benefit system and the latest available 2019 EU-SILC microdata.

In cases where the reference year of the microdata is different from that of the tax and benefit systems, the
EUROMOD adjusts monetary variables in the microdata. The adjustment through uprating factors follows the



5
  The EUROMOD version I4.0+ is developed by the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex; Joint Research
    Centre, European Commission, 2022. The EUROMOD input files are based on 2019 EU-SILC microdata, which are made
    available by Eurostat for all EU countries except Germany.
6
  See the EUROMOD LMA Add-on documentation for further information.

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IMF WORKING PAPERS                   How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                              Approach for European Countries




EUROMOD modeling conventions. For example, an uprated adjustment is made to align the differences in
reference years for household income (2018) and the tax and benefit system (2019).

The paper quantifies the extent of income stabilization by the tax and benefit system during an adverse income
shock using an income stabilization coefficient, in line with the literature (Dolls and others 2012; Mohl, Mourre,
and Stovicek 2019). The coefficient measures the average share of the market income shock that is absorbed
by the tax and benefit system. It is defined as follows:
                                  ∑ 𝑁𝑁
                                     ℎ=1 ∆𝑌𝑌ℎ             ∑ 𝑁𝑁
                                                             ℎ=1 ∆𝑇𝑇ℎ   ∑ 𝑁𝑁
                                                                           ℎ=1 ∆𝑆𝑆ℎ   ∑ 𝑁𝑁
                                                                                        ℎ=1 ∆𝐵𝐵ℎ
                  𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = �1 −     𝑁𝑁
                                              � × 100 = �   𝑁𝑁
                                                                      +   𝑁𝑁
                                                                                    −  𝑁𝑁
                                                                                                 � × 100                   (1)
                                  ∑ ℎ=1 ∆𝑀𝑀ℎ              ∑ ℎ=1 ∆𝑀𝑀ℎ    ∑ ℎ=1 ∆𝑀𝑀ℎ ∑ ℎ=1 ∆𝑀𝑀ℎ

where ∆𝑀𝑀ℎ (∆𝑌𝑌ℎ ) is the change in market (disposable) income of household h following the shock. Variables
∆𝑇𝑇ℎ , ∆𝑆𝑆ℎ , and ∆𝐵𝐵ℎ refer to the changes in personal income taxes, social insurance contributions, and social
benefits, respectively. Social benefits include unemployment benefits, social assistance and housing benefits,
family and education benefits, health and disability benefits. In the simulations of the COVID-19 shock, social
benefits also include the monetary compensation received by workers on short-time work programs, wage
subsidies, as well as similar schemes for self-employed, which the paper refers to broadly as job-retention
schemes. 7 The income stabilization coefficient is equal to 100 percent when the market income shock is fully
absorbed by the tax and benefit system. A zero coefficient means that the tax and benefit system does not
compensate for income losses such that the change in disposable income (after taxes and transfers) is the
same as the change in market income (before taxes and transfers).


IV. Simulation Results
A. Income stabilization before the pandemic
The first set of simulations suggests that the tax and benefit system in the EU countries, on average, can
absorb 37 percent of an adverse income shock (5 percent decline in market income), reflecting the size of
automatic stabilizers in the tax and benefit systems before the pandemic (Figure 4, panel 1). The estimates of
income stabilization are in line with other estimates such as Mohl, Mourre, and Stovicek (2019) and Coady and
others (2023), in which the latter finds that the size of automatic stabilizers had been stable during 2011-19 for
the EU countries on average. 8
Within the tax and benefit system, personal income tax has been the largest contributor to the income
stabilization during an adverse income shock. It absorbs 24 percent of the adverse income shock on average,
accounting for more than half of the total income stabilization in most countries. However, there is considerable
variation across countries in the EU, with coefficients ranging from 14 percent in Bulgaria to 57 percent in
Belgium. The large variation reflects differences in the progressivity of the tax systems. Countries with more


7
  The complete list of monetary compensation schemes and other pandemic-related policies in the LMA Add-On is available in
  Christl and others (2022).
8
  Using the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD for 19 countries, Dolls and others (2012) assess the effectiveness of tax-
  benefit systems to provide income insurance through automatic stabilizers during the global financial crisis and find that automatic
  stabilizers absorbed 38 percent of a proportional market income shock in the EU, compared to 32 percent in the United States.
  European Commission (2017) analyzes the direct and total effects of automatic stabilizers on income in the 28 Member States for
  2014 using the microsimulation model EUROMOD and the macrosimulation model QUEST, respectively. They estimate that the
  direct automatic income stabilization is about 33 percent on average, slightly higher than the total macro-based stabilization (29
  percent) due to behavioral responses and macroeconomic feedback effects. Coady and others (2023) quantify the extent of
  automatic income and consumption stabilization in the EU prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, and find that, in 2019, tax-benefit
  policies absorbed 41 percent of the proportional market income shock on average, while only 15 percent of the market income
  shock was transmitted to household consumption.

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IMF WORKING PAPERS                             How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                        Approach for European Countries




progressive personal income taxes, such as Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland, tend to have higher stabilization
from taxes, with personal income taxes absorbing at least 40 percent of the adverse income shock. This means
that the applicable personal income tax would fall when households face an adverse hit in their income. Social
insurance contributions and benefits are another key component of the automatic stabilizes in protecting
households against income losses. Together they absorb a total of 12 percent of the income shock, amid large
country variations. 9 In countries with limited progressivity of income taxes, such as Bulgaria and Romania,
social protection systems contribute over 70 percent of income stabilization during adverse shocks.

    Figure 4 Income Stabilization in EU before the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2019
    (Percent, share of the shock absorbed by the tax and benefit system)
                               1. By country                                               2. By household income quintile
    70                                                                70   70                                                                                  70
                  Personal income taxes                                                          Personal income taxes
    60            Social insurance contributions                      60   60                                                                                  60
                                                                                                 Social insurance contributions
                  Social benefits                                                                Social benefits
    50                                                                50   50                                                                                  50

                                                                           40                                                                                  40
    40                                                                40

                                                                           30                                                                                  30
    30                                                                30
                                                                           20                                                                                  20
    20                                                                20
                                                                           10                                                                                  10
    10                                                                10
                                                                           0                                                                                   0
                                                                                First quintile    Second       Third quintile Fourth quintile Fifth quintile
     0                                                                0
         BGR                                                                        (lowest       quintile                                       (highest
                                                                 EU
          EST
          CYP
         MLT
                                                                                   income)                                                       income)
          POL
          LVA
          CZE
         GRC
          ESP
          SVK
         HUN
          FRA
          PRT
          LTU
           ITA
         SWE
         ROU
         SVN
         NLD
          LUX
           FIN
           IRL
         DNK
         AUT
          BEL

    Source: Authors’ calculations.
    Note: Estimates are based on the EUROMOD I.40+ and microdata from the 2019 EU-SILC (excluding Germany) under the
    under the 2019 tax-benefit system and an illustrative 5-percent negative shock to market incomes for all households. For
    EU and each income quintile, the chart reports the average stabilization coefficients across countries. Income quintiles are
    calculated at the country level based on the household’s market income in the baseline scenario. The difference between
    stabilization coefficients for top income quintile and the first income quintile is positive and statistically significant for 18 out
    of 26 EU countries. Social benefits include unemployment benefits, social assistance and housing benefits, family and
    education benefits, health and disability benefits. Pensions are excluded. Data labels in the figure use International
    Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes. EU=European Union.

The size of income stabilization varies across household income distribution within a country, reflecting the
progressivity of the tax system and the strength of the social protection system. Across the EU countries,
household income tends to be stabilized more for higher-income households, with income stabilization
coefficients ranging from 32 percent for the poorest income quintile to 39 percent at the top income quintile
(Figure 4, panel 2). Nonetheless, social insurance and benefits play a more important role for lower-income
households, contributing about two-thirds to the overall stabilization (20 percent out of 32 percent) relative to
about one-quarter (10 out of 39 percent) for the households in the top income quintile. As for the social
protection system, the social insurance contributions stabilize income by about 11 percent, broadly at the same
degree across the household income distribution. In countries with stronger social safety nets, such as Ireland,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, social benefits contribute more to the income stabilization at the lower end



9
    As the scenario considers a uniform 5-percent decline in household income without a change in unemployment, the income
    stabilization from unemployment insurance and assistance is muted. We have conducted alternative scenarios in which
    households face higher likelihood of unemployment in the event of an adverse income shock. The overall stabilization coefficient is
    similar to the baseline scenario, but unemployment income support would play a more important role, particularly in countries with
    strong unemployment income support systems. While the income stabilization coefficients are not entirely linear in the size of
    income shocks, alternative scenarios show that the income stabilization coefficients in individual countries are broadly unchanged
    if income shocks are between 0 and 10 percent.

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IMF WORKING PAPERS                 How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                            Approach for European Countries




of the income distribution. In contrast, income taxes absorb a larger share of adverse income shocks for the
high-income groups.

B. Income stabilization during the pandemic
Households suffered from a large decline in incomes during the pandemic, although the magnitudes vary
across countries reflecting differences in labor market dynamics, severity of the pandemic, and policy
responses. Simulations show that market incomes for households fell by 5.3 percent on average, with the
largest drop of more than 10 percent in Malta, Ireland, Italy, and Slovakia (Figure 5). In contrast, some
economies faced a smaller decline in market income, less than 2 percent (Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands). Fiscal support measures mitigated part of the income shock, resulting in a milder drop of the
disposable income (after taxes and transfers), by 1.6 percent in 2020. In a few countries, disposable income
actually rose slightly because of large fiscal support measures at the onset of the pandemic (Croatia, Denmark,
and Luxembourg).

Across the household income distribution, lower-income households tend to experience a larger decline in
market incomes before accounting for fiscal support. For example, market incomes fell by a median of 4.6
percent for households in the lowest income quintile, while only by 3.7 percent for households in the top income
quintile (Figure 5). Once accounting for the stabilization role of tax and benefit systems, the disproportionate
impact on lower-income households was more than offset by pre-existing automatic stabilizers and fiscal
support measures implemented during the pandemic. The disposable income after taxes and transfers
remained broadly unchanged for lower-income households (implying fiscal measures were able to absorb the
income shock), while it declined by about 2 percent for households at the top income quintile. These suggest
that fiscal policy was impactful and progressive, mitigating largely the income shocks across the board,
particularly for low-income households.

 Figure 5. Simulated Changes in Market and Disposable Incomes During the Pandemic
 (Percent)
                       1. By country                                         2. By household income quintile
   4                                                              4                                                                   4

   2                                                              2        Median   Average                                           2

   0                                                              0                                                                   0

   -2                                                            -2                                                                   -2

   -4                                                            -4                                                                   -4

   -6                                                            -6                                                                   -6

                                                                 -8                                                                   -8
   -8
                                                                -10                                                                   -10
  -10
                              Disposable income                 -12                                                                   -12
  -12
                              Market income                     -14                                                                   -14
  -14
                                                                -16                                                                   -16
  -16   MLT                                                           Q1    Q2      Q3        Q4   Q5   Q1   Q2     Q3     Q4    Q5
                                                        EU
          IRL
         SVK
          ITA
        GRC
        AUT
         FRA
         CYP
         BEL
         ESP
         LTU
        SVN
        HRV
                                                                              Market income                  Disposable income
         PRT
         EST
        ROU
         CZE
        HUN
         POL
         LVA
          FIN
        BGR
        SWE
        DNK
        NLD
         LUX

 Source: Authors’ calculations.
 Note: Estimates are based on the EUROMOD I.40+ and microdata from the 2019 EU-SILC (excluding Germany). Labor
 market shock is simulated to replicate the 2020 labor market conditions using Labor Market Adjustment (LMA) Add-On. For
 EU and each income quintile, the average percentage change in market and disposable incomes across countries are
 reported. The box-whisker shows the variation across EU countries, with the interquartile range (box), and 5 th and 95 th
 percentiles (whiskers). Income quintiles are calculated at the country level based on the household’s market income in the
 baseline “no COVID-19” scenario. Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country
 codes. EU=European Union.




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IMF WORKING PAPERS                        How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                   Approach for European Countries




Fiscal support was impactful in stabilizing household incomes during the pandemic in the EU. Together with
pre-existing automatic stabilizers, fiscal support had absorbed 78 percent of the decline in market incomes
across countries (Figure 6), almost double the stabilization observed before the pandemic. 10 The income
stabilization varied across countries, ranging from 55 percent in Malta and Poland to almost 100 percent in
Belgium and Denmark. These explain large differences between changes in market and disposable incomes
during the pandemic, as well as a relatively muted impact on the disposable income even in countries that
faced a severe pandemic shock.

Among various components in the tax and benefit systems, job-retention schemes (including short-time work,
wage subsidies, and other similar schemes for self-employed) had contributed significantly to stabilizing
incomes. Such schemes preserved jobs and compensated workers for the reduction of working hours. They
stabilized 47 percent of the income shock on average (or about 60 percent the overall income stabilization, i.e.,
47 out of 78 percent), far exceeding other components such as personal income taxes or social insurance
contributions (Figure 6). Job-retention schemes are more impactful in countries where workers receive a higher
compensation rate for hours not worked, such as in Czech Republic, Denmark, and Slovak Republic
(OECD 2021). As the EU countries only experienced a modest rise in unemployment rates during the
pandemic, income stabilization from unemployment income support compensated for a mere 9 percent of the
adverse shocks.

     Figure 6. Income Stabilization after the COVID Shock, by Country and Income Level
     (Percent, share of the shock absorbed by the tax-benefit system)
                                 1. By country                                                    2. By household income quintile
     110                                                                          100                              Personal income taxes         Social insurance contributions
               Personal income taxes        Social insurance contributions
                                                                                                                   Job retention schemes         Unemployment benefits
     100       Job retention schemes        Unemployment benefits                 90
                                                                                                                   Other benefits
      90       Other benefits
                                                                                  80
      80
                                                                                  70
      70
                                                                                  60
      60
                                                                                  50
      50
                                                                                  40
      40
      30                                                                          30

      20                                                                          20
      10                                                                          10
       0                                                                           0
     -10                                                                                  First quintile Second quintile   Third quintile   Fourth quintile     Fifth quintile
                                                                                        (lowest income)                                                       (highest income)
           MLT
                                                                             EU
            POL
             FIN
             ITA
           GRC
            CYP
            ESP
           SWE
             IRL
            PRT
            CZE
            LVA
            EST
           HUN
            FRA
           AUT
           ROU
            SVK
           BGR
           SVN
           HRV
            LUX
           NLD
            LTU
            BEL
           DNK
     Source: IMF staff calculations.
     Note: Estimates are based on the EUROMOD I.40+ and microdata from the 2019 EU-SILC (excluding Germany). Labor
     market shock is simulated to replicate the 2020 labor market conditions using Labor Market Adjustment (LMA) Add-On. The
     chart reports the average stabilization coefficients for EU countries and each household income quintile. Income quintiles
     are calculated at the country level based on the household’s market income in the “no COVID-19” scenario. Job-retention
     schemes include compensation received by employees on short-time work schemes, wage subsidies, as well as similar
     schemes for self-employed. Other benefits include social assistance and housing benefits, family and education benefits,
     health and disability benefits. Pensions are excluded.




10
  Christl and others (2022) find that the European tax-benefit systems absorbed about 75 percent of the market income shock at
 the EU level during the pandemic in 2020, of which the monetary compensation (job-retention) schemes played a major role. They
 also estimated that consumption was largely stable (at 90 percent of the shocks) based on the marginal propensity to consume
 proxied by the likelihood of liquidity constraints before the pandemic. However, during the pandemic, consumption was restricted
 not just because of liquidity constraints or income deterioration but also because of lockdown restrictions and social distancing
 requirements. This suggests the stabilization of consumption cannot be easily estimated based on the pre-pandemic parameters.

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                                                                                                                Approach for European Countries




Our estimates of the income stabilization coefficients
                                                                                                          Figure 7. Correlation of Simulated Income
have a strong correlation with the actual data.
                                                                                                          Stabilization Coefficients and Actual Change in
Countries with a strong income stabilization during the                                                   Per-Capita Consumption, 2019-20
pandemic tend to experience a smaller decline in per-                                                     (Percentage points)
capita real disposable income and real per-capita                                                                                                  0

private consumption expenditure at the aggregate                                                                                                   -2
                                                                                                                                                                                                        DNK
                                                                                                                                                                                                              SVK

                                                                                                                                                                                         SWE                   LTU




                                                                                                           Real per capita consumption % change
level. It suggests some evidence of correlation, not                                                                                                                                                                       EST
                                                                                                                                                   -4            FIN
necessarily a causation (Figure 7).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    y = 0.1163x - 11.605
                                                                                                                                                   -6                                             CYP
                                                                                                                                                                                  POL        PRT    LVA                  R² = 0.1687
Simulations also allow an assessment on how job-                                                                                                                                                ROU NLD
                                                                                                                                                                                                     FRA
                                                                                                                                                                                         GRC          SVN
                                                                                                                                                   -8
retention schemes can stabilize income across income                                                                                                                                          BEL LUX
                                                                                                                                                                                             AUT   HUN

groups. For each country, we calculate the income                                                                                                 -10
                                                                                                                                                                            ITA                         CZE
                                                                                                                                                                                   IRL
stabilization coefficients for five income groups                                                                                                 -12                                          ESP
(quintiles) according to the household market income in                                                                                                                             MLT
                                                                                                                                                  -14
the “no-COVID19” scenario. Results show that the tax                                                                                                    0   10         20           30         40        50         60         70          80
                                                                                                                                                                        Change in income stabilization coefficient
and benefit systems, together with the pandemic-
                                                                                                          Source: Eurostat and authors’ estimates.
related support measures, stabilized household            Note: Consumption growth corresponds to the percentage
incomes more strongly for lower-income households.        change in real final consumption expenditure of households
                                                          and non-profit institutions serving households in per capita
They absorbed 88 percent of the income shock during       terms between 2019 and 2020. The change in income
the pandemic for lower-income households, more than       stabilization coefficient is the difference between coefficients
                                                          simulated during the pandemic and pre-pandemic levels.
for households at the top quintile (72 percent of the
income shock) (Figure 6, panel 2). 11 Job-retention schemes account for the bulk of the overall stabilization

     Figure 8. Income Stabilization During the Pandemic across Households
     (Percent, share of the shock absorbed by the tax-benefit system)
                    1. Income stabilization coefficient                                                                              2. Contribution of job-retention schemes
                                                                                                    120
     120

                                                                                                    100
     100

                                                                                                    80
     80

                                                                                                    60
     60

                                                                                                    40
     40

                                                                                                    20
     20

                                                                                                     0
      0
                                                                                                            First quintile Second quintile                                        Third quintile     Fourth quintile     Fifth quintile
             First quintile Second quintile   Third quintile   Fourth quintile     Fifth quintile
                                                                                                          (lowest income)                                                                                              (highest income)
           (lowest income)                                                       (highest income)

     Source: Authors’ calculations.
     Note: Estimates are based on the EUROMOD I.40+ and microdata from the 2019 EU-SILC (excluding Germany). Labor
     market shock is simulated to replicate the 2020 labor market conditions using Labor Market Adjustment (LMA) Add-On. The
     box-whisker shows the variation across EU countries, with the median level (marker), interquartile range (box), and 5 th and
     95 th percentiles (whiskers). Income quintiles are calculated at the country level based on the household’s market income in
     the “no COVID-19” scenario. Job-retention schemes include compensation received by employees on short-time work
     schemes, wage subsidies, as well as similar schemes for self-employed.




11
  Similarly, the temporary expansion of unemployment income support in the United States was more progressive with most
 benefits accruing to low-income workers (Ganong and others 2022).

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IMF WORKING PAPERS                          How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                     Approach for European Countries




across the board for all income groups, particularly for lower-income households compensating 64 percent of
their income shocks. They contributed to the overall income stabilization much more than other components in
the tax and benefit system. These results are robust across countries and household income groups,
suggesting that job-retention schemes were impactful to protect household income and well targeted as they
stabilized income more strongly for lower-income households (Figure 8). 12

Fiscal measures during the pandemic helped protect households against large income losses. They also
played a redistributive role by mitigating the rise in income inequality and protecting people’s livelihoods.
Simulations suggest that the pandemic could have led to a rise in the market income inequality—measured by
Gini coefficients—by 0.65 percentage points as lower-income households were more disproportionately
affected during the pandemic. Without job-retention schemes, the disposable income inequality could have
risen by 0.38 percentage points compared to the “no COVID-19” scenario (Figure 9). 13 But once accounting for
the pandemic-related fiscal support, the tax and benefit systems were able to protect household incomes,
especially of lower-income groups. Inequality in disposable income during the pandemic had decreased by
0.24 percentage points on average. The impact of job-retention schemes on disposable income inequality
varies across countries, reflecting differences in the design of job-retention schemes, the differences of the
pandemic impact, and the heterogeneity of labor markets.

     Figure 9. Redistribution Effects of Fiscal Measures During the Pandemic
     (Change in Gini coefficients, percentage points)
     1. Impact of the COVID Shock on Inequality            2. Impact of Job-Retention Schemes on
                                                               Disposable Income Inequality
     3.0                                                              2.5
             Disposable income inequality
             Market income inequality
                                                                       2
     2.0


                                                                      1.5

     1.0

                                                                       1


     0.0
                                                                      0.5



     -1.0                                                              0    NLD
                                                                                                                       EU
            HUN                                                             BGR
                                                               EU
            HRV
            NLD
             POL
            ROU
             CYP
            DNK                                                               FIN
                                                                            HUN
                                                                             POL
                                                                            SWE
                                                                             LVA
                                                                            DNK
                                                                              IRL
            SWE
            BGR
             BEL
             CZE
             PRT
             FRA
              FIN                                                             ITA
                                                                             CYP
                                                                             EST
                                                                             CZE
                                                                             PRT
                                                                            SVN
             LVA
            SVN
             EST
            GRC
             LTU
             ESP                                                             FRA
                                                                            ROU
                                                                             ESP
                                                                            HRV
                                                                             LTU
                                                                            GRC
                                                                             BEL
             LUX
              ITA
             SVK
            MLT
              IRL
            AUT                                                             MLT
                                                                            AUT
                                                                             SVK
                                                                             LUX

     Source: Authors’ calculations.
     Note: Estimates are based on the EUROMOD I.40+ and microdata from the 2019 EU-SILC (excluding Germany). Labor
     market shock is simulated to replicate the 2020 labor market conditions using Labor Market Adjustment (LMA) Add-On.
     Panel 1 shows changes in Gini coefficients of market (disposable) income following the COVID shock (between “no
     COVID-19” scenario and the pandemic scenario). Panel 2 shows the change in Gini coefficients of disposable income
     under the pandemic scenario with and without job-retention schemes.


Certain workers were more vulnerable to adverse shocks. For example, workers in the contact-intensive
sectors were exposed to greater job losses during the pandemic. A strong and effective job-retention scheme
should have stabilized income for workers who are more vulnerable. Our simulation results compare the impact
of job-retention schemes across different worker groups and assess if the stabilization effects are greater for


12
 In a few countries, the job-retention schemes stabilized more than 100 percent of the income shocks for the lowest income
 quintile because some schemes provided a lump sum support and may have more than compensated for the income losses for
 households earning very little income.
13
 The rise in disposable income inequality would also be affected by progressive income taxes and other means-tested benefits,
 which partly compensate for the decline in income even without the job-retention schemes.

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IMF WORKING PAPERS                                                                How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                                                                           Approach for European Countries




vulnerable workers, such as young workers and those with low skills. We classify workers according to their
age (18-24 years old, 24-55 years old, and 55-64 years old), gender, and education attainment (low-skilled and
high skilled). Income stabilization coefficients are calculated for all individuals of the working age (aged 15-64)
from the corresponding group j:
                                                                                                     𝑗𝑗                   𝑗𝑗
                                                           𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝑗𝑗 = �1 − ∑ 𝑁𝑁
                                                                              𝑖𝑖=1 ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
                                                                                             𝑖𝑖=1 ∆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 × 100                                                                                                          (2)


 Figure 10. Simulated Income Stabilization Coefficients by Worker Groups and Sectors
 (Percent, share of the shock absorbed by the tax-benefit system)
                                       1. Average, by age group                                                                                                2. Differences across countries
   90
                       Personal income taxes                              Social insurance contributions                                20
   80                  Unemployment benefits                              Job retention schemes
                       Other benefits                                                                                                   15
   70
                                                                                                                                        10
   60

   50                                                                                                                                    5

   40                                                                                                                                    0

   30
                                                                                                                                        -5
   20
                                                                                                                                       -10
   10
                                                                                                                                       -15
       0
                                                                                                                                              Women relative to 15-24 relative to                           55-64 relative to                 Low relative to
                Women                  Men            15-24           25-54            55-64              Low            High                     Men                25-54                                       25-54                            High
                           Gender                                       Age                                    Education                               Gender                                          Age                                      Education


                                        3.            Average, by sector                                                                                      4.         Country variation, by sector
  90                                                                                                                                   120
                              Personal income taxes                                   Social insurance contributions
                              Unemployment benefits                                   Job retention schemes
  80
                              Other benefits
                                                                                                                                       100
  70

  60                                                                                                                                    80

  50
                                                                                                                                        60
  40

  30                                                                                                                                    40

  20
                                                                                                                                        20
  10

   0                                                                                                                                     0
           Trade,Transp.    Industry     Prof. serv   Inf. & Comm. Public serv.   Real estate   Construction   Finance   Agriculture          Trade,Transp.   Industry    Prof. serv   Inf. & Comm. Public serv.   Real estate Construction    Finance   Agriculture
              Food &                    Arts & Ent.                                                                                          Food & Accom.               Arts & Ent.
              Accom.



 Source: Authors’ calculations.
 Note: Estimates are based on the EUROMOD I.40+ and microdata from the 2019 EU-SILC (excluding Germany). Labor
 market shock is simulated to replicate the 2020 labor market conditions using EUROMOD Labor Market Adjustment (LMA)
 Add-on. Panel 1 shows average stabilization coefficients across countries for each group. Job-retention schemes include
 compensation received by employees on short-time work schemes, wage subsidies, as well as similar schemes for self-
 employed. Other benefits include social assistance and housing benefits, family and education benefits, health and disability
 benefits. Pensions are excluded. Low level of education corresponds to upper secondary or below. High level of education
 corresponds to post-secondary and tertiary education. Panel 2 shows the variation across countries for each worker group.
 Panel 3 shows the average coefficients for each sector across countries. The boxes in panels 2 and 4 correspond to the
 interquartile range, the marker to the median, and whiskers to 5 th and 95 th percentiles.


Simulation results show that the income stabilization coefficients are on average stronger for workers aged
18-24 years old and those with lower educational attainment (Figure 10, panel 1). The tax and benefit systems,
including the job-retention schemes, absorbed about 75 percent of the income losses for the young workers
during the pandemic, compared to 70 percent of those aged 25 and older. Income stabilization was also
stronger for workers with lower education (absorbing over 72 percent of the income shock) and females (72
percent). Job-retention schemes played an important role across all worker groups, absorbing almost half of
the income shock for young workers and about 40 percent of the shock in other groups. Unemployment income

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                                                                                           Approach for European Countries




support also helped stabilize income during the pandemic, particularly for low-skilled workers. There is no
major difference in the stabilization effects of social insurance contributions across worker groups.

Differences across worker groups were observed in many countries (Figure 10, panel 2). Income stabilization
for females is stronger in over 80 percent of EU countries (by as much as 6 percentage points on average).
Similarly, majority of countries have their tax and benefit systems stabilizing income more for young workers
and those with lower levels of education.

The job-retention schemes also stabilized income more for workers in contact-intensive sectors that were
affected the most by lockdown restrictions and social distancing (Figure 10, panel 3). Income stabilization was
the strongest in trade, transport, food and accommodation sectors (absorbing 75 percent of income losses),
while the stabilization is lower for less contact-intensive sectors such as finance and agriculture. Country
variations remain large (Figure 10, panel 4).

C. Regression analysis
While the simulation results point to some differences across household income groups and worker
characteristics in terms of the effectiveness of the job-retention schemes, a regression analysis would help
assess whether those differences are statistically significant or not, controlling for other factors such as the size
of pandemic-related support, and pre-existing social protection systems. The regression specification follows:

                                     𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
                                           𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐      = α + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐β + 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐γ + 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐δ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐   (3)
where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
            𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐      is the income stabilization coefficient for an individual i from country c folllwing the pandemic
shock. The income stabilization coefficient for an individual i is calculated as 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = (1 − ∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖⁄∆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 ) × 100. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐 is
a vector of individuals’ characteristics, such as age, gender, the level of education, contact intensity of the
sector that individual works, and the market income quintile the individual belongs to; 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐 is a vector of county-
specific macro-fiscal variables, including allowance of the job-retention scheme (i.e. percent of lost income that
a worker receives for hours not worked), the change in cyclically adjusted primary deficit between 2019 and
2020 in percent of potential GDP, a net replacement rate in unemployment, and a percentage change in the
average number of hours worked per worker between 2019 and 2020. The specification includes a vector of
country dummy variables 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐.

Estimation results provide evidence that the tax and benefit systems, alongside with the pandemic-related
support, have stabilized income more strongly for female workers, workers employed in contact-intensive
industries and those with lower level of education. The corresponding coefficients are positive and statistically
significant (Table 2). The coefficients for those households in the lower-income quintiles tend to be higher,
suggesting the tax and benefit systems are able to stabilize their income more in face of an adverse shock.

At the same time, empirical results show that countries with higher allowance rates of the job-retention
schemes or more generous unemployment benefits tend to exhibit a stronger income stabilization. But the
income stabilization effects are weaker in countries that experienced a larger decline in working hours for
workers. Countries that have stronger counter-cyclical fiscal responses, as measured by the change in
cyclically adjusted primary balance, have greater income stabilization, suggesting discretionary fiscal support
can help stabilize income for individual households.




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                                                                                           Approach for European Countries




 Table 2. Regression Results on Differences of Income Stabilization across EU Households
                                                                       Dependent variable: Income Stabilization Coefficient
                                                                         (1)       (2)         (3)         (4)       (5)
   Age between 15-24                                                     1.953     1.602    1.594     -1.653   -0.772
   Age between 55-64                                                   -2.307*** -2.164** -2.164** -1.651** -1.769**
   Female                                                              4.447*** 4.027*** 4.087*** 1.740*** 1.918***
   Education level, low                                                4.937*** 4.441*** 5.064***      0.906    1.308
   Contact-intensive                                                             3.876*** 5.593*** 2.896*** 2.607***
   Contact-intensive × Education level, low                                               -2.383**   -0.597    -1.462
   Market income, the lowest quintile                                                                  3.713    3.939
   Market income, 20th to 40th percentile                                                            3.813** 3.867*
   Market income, 60th to 80th percentile                                                           -3.605** -3.253*
   Market income, the top quintile                                                                 -11.40*** -11.13***
   Job retention scheme allowance, percent of lost income                                                    0.495***
   Change in cyclically adjusted primary deficit 2020                                                        2.378***
   Net replacement rate in unemployment, percent of previous income                                          0.407***
   Hours per worker, percentage change in 2020                                                               0.372***


   Numer of country dummies                                               25       25       25       25       16
   Constant                                                            80.70*** 80.17*** 79.76*** 85.26*** 14.67***

   Observations                                                         48,945     48,945     48,945     48,945    41,365
   Number of countries                                                    26         26         26         26        21
 Source: Authors’ estimates.
 The table reports results of the pooled ordinary least squares estimation. The dependent variable is the individual’s income
 stabilization coefficient estimated based on simulations in the EUROMOD I.40+ and microdata from the 2019 EU-SILC
 (excluding Germany). Labor market shock is simulated to replicate the 2020 labor market conditions using EUROMOD
 Labor Market Adjustment (LMA) Add-on. Income quintiles used to construct dummy variables are calculated at the country
 level based on the individual’s market income in the “no COVID-19” scenario. Low level of education corresponds to upper
 secondary or below. Contact intensive sectors include trade, transport, food and accommodation, professional services, arts
 and entertainment. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05. *p<0.1




V. Policy Implications and Conclusions
Diverse and forceful fiscal responses during the pandemic opened new grounds to support households against
large income or job losses. The preceding analyses on job-retention schemes provide some takeaways that
can inform the policy design.

The use of job-retention schemes across the EU helped prevent widespread job losses and stabilized
household incomes when people suffered from a severe shock. Such schemes have proved to be timely,
effective, and well-targeted—providing significant income stabilization in general and particularly to those
workers that are vulnerable to job and income losses. Our microsimulation approach points to the evidence that
job-retention schemes during the pandemic absorbed nearly 80 percent of market income shocks—almost
doubling the extent of the automatic stabilization of the pre-pandemic tax and benefit systems. In the absence
of those schemes, unemployment rates in the EU could have risen by additional 3 percentage points and
income inequality could have deteriorated further. Empirical results also show strong evidence that job-
retention schemes were well-targeted, with stronger income stabilization of vulnerable households, such as
lower-income families, youth, and low-skilled workers, after controlling for other factors.

Job-retention schemes are complementary to the unemployment income support because they work on
different margins (working hours versus unemployment) and tend to insure different types of workers
(Giupponi, Landais, and Lapeyre 2022). Both policies can provide a timely buffer and cushion the loss of labor

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IMF WORKING PAPERS             How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                        Approach for European Countries




income. In case of a severe shock, governments are wary of the risks of massive layoffs, which could
undermine the valuable employer-employee relationships, especially in countries with more rigid labor markets
that are less capable to absorb unemployed workers quickly or in countries where social safety nets are
inadequate. Job-retention schemes could help limit productivity losses from unemployment (IMF 2022).

Job-retention schemes can become a more prominent part of the resilience toolkit in response to adverse
shocks. Once the job-retention schemes are in place, they can be expanded or broadened depending on the
severity of the shocks, particularly to those who are not qualified or fall outside the regular unemployment
income support, such as workers who have not worked long enough for the unemployment assistance.
Experience during the pandemic shows that many governments can unwind the support through those
schemes once economic conditions improve, as the take-up rates of those schemes have quickly returned to
the pre-pandemic low levels. Nonetheless, it is crucial to link the generosity of those schemes to economic
activity and incentivize workers and firms to return to normal working hours (Ando and others 2022). Job-
retention schemes are best used in situations when the adverse shocks are deep but pose short-lived
disruptions to labor markets. If the adverse shock turns out to be more persistent, preserving jobs through job-
retention schemes would hinder necessary reallocation, and policies should gradually transition from protecting
jobs to supporting workers and facilitating job-to-job transitions.




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IMF WORKING PAPERS                How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                           Approach for European Countries




Annex I. Simulations of Shocks in EUROMOD
The annex describes how the simulations are conducted based on the household level data and the tax-benefit
systems for EU countries. The simulations are done in EUROMOD version I4.0+ for all EU countries except
Germany and United Kingdom.
The EUROMOD is a tax and benefit microsimulation model that simulates individual and household tax
liabilities and benefit entitlements according to the policy rules in place in each country. It calculates, in a
comparable manner and based on representative micro-data on individuals and households drawn from
national household income surveys, the static effects of the tax and benefit system on household incomes for
each country. EUROMOD aims to simulate as much as possible of the tax and benefit components of
household disposable income, includng income taxes, social contributions, family benefits, housing benefits,
social assistance and other income-related benefits. Some instruments, such as contributory benefits and
pensions, are not simulated due to lack of information on previous employment and contribution history in the
cross-sectional surveys and are taken directly from the data. Please see Sutherland and Figari (2013) for the
detailed description of the EUROMOD model.

Two scenarios are simulated to assess the size of income stabilization prior to the pandemic. The baseline
scenario uses the 2019 EU-SILC household-level microdata and the 2019 tax and benefit policies. In the
scenario of a uniform market income shock, the simulation uses a negative 5-percent reduction of market
income across all households with nonnegative income. We then compute changes in market and disposable
incomes between the baseline and the uniform market income shock scenario for each household and
calculate the income stabilization coefficients for each country. To estimate income stabilization across
households’ income distribution, income stabilization coefficients are calculated for every income quintile of
each country.

 Annex Table I.1. Uniform Market Income Shock
                                                                                                   Input microdata
                                     Input microdata                                               2019 SILC & 5%
   2019 tax-benefit                                               2019 tax-benefit
                                        2019 SILC                                                   negative market
     policy rules                                                   policy rules
                                                                                                     income shock

                          Baseline                                                     Income shock

 Note: M stands for market income; T(M) includes direct income taxes and social insurance contributions payable by
 households, and B(M) is the benefits accrued to households. Y is the disposable income, which is market income net of
 taxes and transfers (Y=M-(T(M)-B(M)). Variables with an apostrophe denote the shock scenario.

We simulate two hypothetical scenarios to gauge the size of income stabilization during the pandemic. The “no
COVID-19” scenario uses the 2019 EU-SILC household-level microdata and the 2020 tax-benefit policies. The
“COVID-19” scenario is based on the 2020 tax-benefit policies and the 2019 EU-SILC microdata adjusted to
match the 2020 labor market conditions. The Labor Market Adjustment (LMA) Add-on is used to adjust and
simulate transitions between employment, unemployment and job-retention schemes based on the data from
the European Labor Force Survey and other detailed administrative data. We then compute changes in market
and disposable incomes between the “no COVID-19” and “COVID-19” scenarios and calculate the income
stabilization coefficients for each country. To estimate income stabilization across households’ income
distribution and worker groups, income stabilization coefficients are calculated for every income quintile and
worker group of each country, respectively.




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IMF WORKING PAPERS                How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation
                                                                                           Approach for European Countries




 Annex Table I.2. COVID-19 Shock

   2020 tax-benefit                  Input microdata             2020 tax-benefit                  Input microdata
     policy rules                       2019 SILC                  policy rules                       2019 SILC


                                                                                                   LMA add-on
                       No COVID-19                                                              Adjust microdata to
                                                                                               account for 2020 labor
                                                                                                 market conditions

                                                                                      COVID-19

 Note: M stands for market income; T(M) includes direct income taxes and social insurance contributions payable by
 households, and B(M) is the benefits accrued to households. Y is the disposable income, which is market income net of
 taxes and transfers (Y=M-(T(M)-B(M)). Variables with an apostrophe denote the shock scenario.



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How Effective were Job-Retention Schemes during the COVID-19 Pandemic? A Microsimulation Approach for
European Countries
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