Testimony of Dr. Wendy Edelberg, Director, The Hamilton Project — House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Summary
Testimony of Wendy Edelberg, Director, The Hamilton Project, before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, July 29, 2021, on the economic outlook as the Committee and Congress consider infrastructure legislation. The testimony states that real GDP will grow at 7 percent in 2021 and that growth is expected to slow to just above 1 percent in 2023. It says an increase in payroll employment of 850,000 in June 2021 helped reduce a shortfall of roughly 10 million jobs relative to the pre-pandemic trend. Further sections cover the labor market, wages and prices, and federal investment in infrastructure, and the document closes with a list of references.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Cite this document
“Testimony of Dr. Wendy Edelberg, Director, The Hamilton Project — House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.”
Original at docs.house.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/hhrg-117-pw00-wstate-edelbergw-20210729-5245f7c36a71-206e2a0590/
, SHA-256 5245f7c36a713cbcd553530185e8fc4956547e3977f2354dc718aad0d4fd11e4.Full text
Testimony of Dr. Wendy Edelberg
Director, The Hamilton Project
Before The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
July 29, 2021
Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the economic outlook as this Committee and the
US Congress consider enacting significant infrastructure legislation this year.
A founding principle of The Hamilton Project’s economic strategy is that long-term
prosperity is best achieved by promoting economic security, economic growth, and broad
participation in that growth. Through our research, policy papers, and public events we examine
ways to realize those goals based on sound economic theory and evidence. For more than 15
years, The Hamilton Project has focused on policies to increase investment in public
infrastructure—highlighting strategies, financing mechanisms, the economic returns on
infrastructure investment, and the role of such investment in creating prosperity in local and state
economies.
Summary of the Short-term Economic Outlook and the Role of Federal Investment in
Generating Longer-term Growth
Since the economy hit bottom in the second quarter of 2020, real Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) has recovered to its pre-pandemic level, and economic growth has surpassed
consensus expectations formed at the beginning of the pandemic. With economic growth boosted
by the ongoing effects of the fiscal support enacted by Congress in 2020 and 2021, pent-up
demand from consumers for face-to-face services, and the strength in labor markets and asset
prices, I project that, consistent with projections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
real GDP will grow at the rapid pace of 7 percent in 2021 (CBO 2021c). As the factors boosting
growth in the short-term wane, I expect real GDP growth to slow significantly, and to be just
above 1 percent in 2023. Although my baseline projection is for a soft landing, with GDP merely
moving sideways for a couple of quarters, the slowdown could be more abrupt and painful than
my projections suggest.
The current increase in economic activity is being powered in part by an increase in
employment. In June 2021 an increase in payroll employment of 850,000 helped to put a dent in
the shortfall of roughly 10 million jobs relative to the level of employment if it had continued
growing at its pre-pandemic five-year trend. Given that shortfall, the labor market recovery still
has far to go. At this point, the persistence in the overall employment shortfall appears more due
to constraints in labor supply rather than weakness in labor demand.
Several factors are holding down job-matching and employment gains. The share of the
working-age population that is quitting a job each month is at the highest level since the data
began to be reported in 2000. Relatedly, the composition of labor demand is changing, with some
workers moving on from temporary jobs they took during the pandemic. More worrying is that
the labor force participation rate is still quite depressed. The number of people reporting that they
were in the labor force shrank by 8 million in the spring of 2020. After recovering partially in
May and June of last year, that number has stubbornly remained roughly 6 million below trend.
To the degree that vigorous job searching is being held back by temporarily generous
Unemployment Insurance benefits (which many reporting they are out of the labor force may be
receiving), that effect will dissipate quickly when these programs end nationally in early
September, and even earlier in many states.
Because the demand for workers has grown faster than the supply of active job seekers,
we have seen upward pressure on wages for some groups and in some industries; for example,
wages for those in the bottom quartile of the wage distribution are roughly 6 percent above their
pre-pandemic level.
Significant shifts in the composition of demand for goods and services along with the
recent surge in economic activity have created bottlenecks and price pressures for a variety of
goods; for example, demand for automobiles recovered quickly at the beginning of the pandemic
to high levels even as production was curtailed. The result has been a sharp increase in prices for
new and used vehicles.
With greater inflation, workers’ purchasing power is rising much more slowly than
nominal wages. Real wages for the bottom quartile are up 2 percent from before the recession.
As production increases and growth in demand abates, I expect inflation to slow overall.
Nonetheless, certain factors will continue to create inflationary pressure.
The rise in nominal wages means that despite a continued shortfall in employment,
employee compensation returned to its trend at the beginning of the year. Moreover, government
benefits have remained well above trend since April 2020. Overall, disposable personal income
(DPI, or total after-tax income) has so far been higher than its recent trend by a cumulative
$1.4 trillion since March 2020. Those gains in income, along with substantial gains in housing
and equity wealth, are supporting strong consumer demand.
Much of the increase in demand for consumer goods since the start of the pandemic has
been met by drawdowns of inventory. This is particularly true for the automotive sector, where
shortages of semiconductors have constrained production. Generally, capacity utilization and
business investment are poised to increase, which will boost goods production.
Thinking beyond the next couple of years, we need to look at ways that fiscal policy
influences long-run economic growth; one such channel is federal investment in infrastructure.
The consensus of the economic literature strongly supports the principle that increases in public
infrastructure investment lead to greater productivity and greater economic growth. The trend in
recent decades has gone in the wrong direction: outside of a temporary increase in investment
owing to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, federal investment in
infrastructure as a share of GDP has remained notably depressed since 1980. Indeed, in 2019,
before rebounding somewhat in 2020, that share was at its lowest level since President
Eisenhower signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act into law in 1956.
Overview of Real Output through 2023
The economy is recovering. Since the pandemic began, economic growth has generally
surpassed consensus expectations as households and businesses maintained a surprising amount
of activity and spending while social distancing. In addition, successive rounds of substantial
fiscal support have boosted economic activity since March 2020 and are projected to continue to
do so through 2023. Indeed, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) will likely report on July
29 that in the second quarter of 2021 real GDP exceeded its pre-pandemic level.
The surprising strength in GDP and the improvements in expectations are evident from
CBO’s upward revisions to its projections (shown in figure 1). In the third quarter of 2020 the
level of GDP was 4.8 percent above the projection that CBO published at the beginning of that
quarter. Moreover, since July 2020 CBO has revised up projected GDP for 2023 by nearly
7 percent, where the projected level of GDP at the end of 2023 is now 2 percent above CBO’s
pre-pandemic forecast. Nonetheless, through 2023 the cumulative shortfall in real output relative
to a pre-pandemic projection is expected to total about $400 billion in 2012 dollars (CBO 2020a,
2021c).
The surprising strength in economic output was, in part, a result of the enormous
legislative response to the pandemic and the human hardship it caused, including laws passed
this year and last by Congress: the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES
Act), the Consolidated Appropriations Act, and the American Rescue Plan Act. To give a sense
of the potential impact of federal action on the economy, my Brookings colleague Louise
Sheiner and I estimated that a package of similar magnitude to the American Rescue Plan would
boost economic output by 4 percent in 2021 and 2 percent in 2022 (Edelberg and Sheiner
2020).(Edelberg and Sheiner 2020).
With the ongoing effects of that fiscal support, pent-up demand from consumers for face-
to-face services, and the strength in labor markets and asset prices, economic growth is poised to
be very strong for the remainder of 2021. Indeed, CBO projects that real GDP will grow
7.4 percent from the fourth quarter of 2020 to the fourth quarter of 2021 (CBO 2021c).
Moreover, by the middle of next year real GDP would exceed its sustainable level by
2.5 percent. The sustainable level of GDP, also known as potential output, is not a ceiling.
Instead, it is the estimated level of output, given current laws and underlying structural factors,
that we can achieve without putting upward pressure on inflation.
As the factors boosting growth in the short term begin to wane, I expect real GDP growth
to slow significantly, to just above 1 percent in 2023. That projection is subject to a great deal of
uncertainty. Although my baseline projection is for a soft landing, including a couple of quarters
with GDP roughly moving sideways, the slowdown could be more abrupt and painful than my
projections suggest.
There are actions that Congress could take to help avoid a painful slowdown in activity—
both by fine-tuning the timing of spending and by focusing resources on policies that boost
potential output. For example, changes in policy that repurpose fiscal support from boosting
current aggregate demand to policies that would boost the economy’s potential (such as federal
investment in infrastructure that would increase labor supply and human capital) would increase
the chances of a soft landing, in part by raising the landing area to a higher level.
Labor Market
The recent strong gains in economic activity are being powered to some extent by an
ongoing recovery in the labor market. An increase in payroll employment of 850,000 in June
helped to put a dent in the still significant shortfall in employment relative to its pre-pandemic
trend, which stood at roughly 10 million jobs last month.
Despite job openings being their highest since the end of 2000 (the earliest available
data), several factors are holding down employment gains. One factor, shown in figure 2, is
that—according to the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics—the share of the working-age population that is quitting a job each month is also at a
series high. As the figure shows, the “quit rate” generally moves with the job opening rate, as
workers are more likely to switch jobs in a strong labor market. Moreover, in the current
environment the composition of labor demand is changing, and workers may be taking time to
move from temporary jobs taken during the pandemic. Another factor is that job-matching rates
have been historically low for those unemployed for a long time: as of last month, almost 4
million people had been unemployed for more than 27 weeks.
More worrying than the depressed job matching among those saying they are actively
looking for work is the lack of recovery in the labor force participation rate, which is the share of
the population working or actively seeking work. The number of people reporting that they were
in the labor force shrank by 8 million in the spring of 2020. After recovering partially in May
and June 2020, it has stubbornly remained roughly 6 million below trend.
Fiscal support is helping people prioritize their health over labor market income, which
was certainly one of the goals when the support was put in place. That said, even putting health
risks aside, support in the form of Unemployment Insurance benefits and other increases in
transfers (which generally have bolstered household finances) is probably holding some people
back from vigorously job hunting.
To the degree that vigorous job searching among those collecting Unemployment
Insurance benefits is being held back because those benefits are temporarily generous, that effect
will dissipate quickly as the benefits end nationally in early September, and before then in many
states. However, it is worth noting that we haven’t seen clear evidence that job matching has
intensified in states that have scaled back Unemployed Insurance benefits (Dube 2021). In
addition, the intensity of job searching should recover as we make progress in vaccinating the
working-age population and their children.
Other factors unique to the pandemic are having acute effects on specific groups. For
example, among mothers of elementary school–aged children (Bauer et al. 2021)—the
demographic likely bearing the brunt of school closures (Amuedo-Dorantes et al.)—the share
that is employed fell more than that of mothers who did not have children in elementary school,
and their employment rates continue to lag behind others through the beginning of 2021 (Bauer
et al. 2021) Moreover, we find that those declines were larger in states with higher rates of
school closures. To be sure, the portion of the pre-pandemic labor force comprised of mothers
with elementary school–aged children is small enough (at only 9 percent) that these relatively
large declines do not account for much of the weakness in labor force participation and
employment in aggregate (Furman, Kearney, and Powell 2021).
Consequently, addressing the child-care crisis, as important as that is, will not, on its
own, make up ground we have lost in aggregate labor force participation. Nonetheless, the
challenges for parents of elementary school–aged children are both acutely felt and solvable
(Bauer 2021).
Wages and Prices
Upward pressure on wages has been good news, particularly for low-income workers and
workers in certain industries. As shown in figure 3, wages for those in the bottom quartile of the
wage distribution are up 5.9 percent from their pre-pandemic level, or 4.4 percent at an annual
rate. That is close to the rate of growth for that group seen in 2019, when the consensus held that
the labor market was relatively tight. Some sectors have seen particularly strong wage gains. For
example, over the past 12 months average hourly earnings in the leisure and hospitality sector
have grown nearly twice as fast as the overall private industry average. Other sectors seeing
strong gains in hourly earnings include retail trade, transportation and warehousing, and financial
activities.
Because of recent increases in the rate of inflation, workers’ purchasing power is not
rising as fast as nominal wages. As figure 3 shows, price increases in recent months have led to
declines in real wages. Those declines partly offset increases in real wages earlier in the
pandemic for wage-earners in the bottom quartile, when inflation was soft while nominal wages
rose. Real wages for that group have risen 1.7 percent since before the recession, or 1.3 percent
at an annual rate. That is considerably below the rate we saw in 2019 when real wage growth
was 2.4 percent for the bottom quartile. Moreover, real wages are roughly unchanged for those in
the highest quartile, in contrast to a gain of 0.8 percent in 2019.
The aforementioned increase in inflation is largely attributable to the burst in consumer
demand, which has outpaced supply and also to various disruptions in supply chains.
Policymakers are rightfully paying attention. Because prices fell in 2020, one-year changes from
June 2020 to June 2021 overstate the increase in inflation since the pandemic began. Instead, I
recommend focusing on the annualized rate of inflation since February 2020. Using that
approach, inflation through June measured by the core consumer price index was 3.1 percent,
substantially lower than the one-year trend but still higher than any annual increase since the
early 1990s.
However, there are two primary reasons why the rise in inflation is unlikely to persist.
First, the shifts in demand and bottlenecks that have contributed to inflation are a function of the
recent, temporary pace of economic activity. For example, demand for automobiles recovered
quickly during the pandemic to high levels even as production was curtailed, in part due to
disruptions in the supply chain for critical semiconductors. The result has been a sharp increase
in prices for new and used vehicles.
Second, as production is increased (with normalization of global supply chains) and
growth in demand abates, I expect inflation to slow overall. Nonetheless, certain factors will
continue to create inflationary pressure: Even with the slowdown, economic activity will
continue to exceed the sustainable level. We might also see price spikes in certain services as
demand shifts. For example, from March 2021 through June, sales at restaurants were up
12 percent while sales at building materials and garden stores were down 10 percent. Such
changes could lead to price surges at restaurants that more than offset softer prices at stores
selling building materials and garden supplies. In addition, the rapid rise we have seen in home
prices will likely translate into significantly higher rental costs across the country.
Household Sector
As a result of social insurance policies, disposable personal income (DPI, or total after-
tax income) in 2020 and so far in 2021 has been higher than if DPI had simply grown at its trend
rate of the previous five years. As shown in figure 4, in 2020 weak aggregate compensation of
employees was more than offset by a sharp increase in government benefits, leaving total DPI a
cumulative $600 billion above its trend level. So far in 2021, compensation of employees has
recovered back to the levels we would see if compensation had simply grown at its trend rate
from the five years before the pandemic. And, government social benefits have remained well
above trend. As a result, DPI has been higher, on average, by about $165 billion each month than
if it had grown at its trend pace since the beginning of 2020. In aggregate, DPI has so far been
higher than trend by a total of $1.4 trillion since the start of the pandemic.
Congress enacted significant increases in social insurance through policies that included
increased and expanded Unemployment Insurance benefits, assistance to business owners,
increases in food benefits, and refundable tax credits. To a smaller degree, automatic
stabilizers—structural mechanisms built into government spending and revenue that
automatically offset economic fluctuations—have also augmented income. These include
Unemployment Insurance benefits through regular state and federal programs, an increase in
nutrition benefits for some participants in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and
for households with minor children who qualify for free or reduced-price school meals, and a
reduction in taxes.
As a result, government social benefits have been above trend—significantly so early in
the pandemic as well as in 2021, including a spike in March 2021 when a $1,400 rebate per
person check was paid to qualifying households. Since March of this year those benefits have
come down sharply but remain elevated. Under current law, the boost to DPI should fully wane
by early next year. (See Alcala Kovalski et al. 2021 for related information about the waning
fiscal support.)
The recent strength in income helped to finance a surge in spending on durable goods
during the pandemic. In a dramatic departure from behavior in more-typical recessions, durables
as a share of household spending rose from about 10 percent in the first quarter of 2020 to about
13 percent in the first quarter of this year. In contrast, spending on services—many of those
being face-to-face transactions such as live entertainment and dining in sit-down restaurants—
was steeply curtailed during the pandemic. From early 2020 to early 2021, services spending fell
from 69 percent as a share of total spending to 65 percent. Overall, total household spending has
rebounded significantly since mid-2020, but is still 2.4 percent below trend.
As a result of the significant boosts to DPI and restrained services spending during the
pandemic, aggregate household saving has skyrocketed. In every month of the pandemic the rate
of saving has been higher than in the past four decades; in some months it has been roughly
double the previous post–World War II peak. In total, households have roughly $2.6 trillion
more in savings than if DPI and spending had grown in line with trend rates in the five years
prior to the pandemic. Moreover, home prices and stock market prices have surged, leading to
large increases in household wealth. Those resources will help to finance the pent-up demand for
forgone spending and then some. Indeed, household spending will likely be quite strong for the
next few quarters. Beyond that time, with pent-up demand for services sated, my projection is
that households will view the increase in savings and wealth financial resources to support long-
term, relatively steady consumer spending.
Business Sector
Let me turn now to the business sector. So far, much of the consumer demand for goods
has been met by drawdowns of inventory. As shown in figure 5, the retail inventory-to-sales ratio
spiked at the beginning of the pandemic when spending plummeted. But, since then, the ratio has
fallen precipitously.
This is particularly true for the automotive sector, where shortages of semiconductors
have constrained production. Even outside of that sector, production has been insufficient to
keep up with demand. On one hand, capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector has
recovered close to its pre-pandemic level. On the other hand, historical patterns suggest that
manufacturers will increase utilization well beyond that level to replenish inventories as demand
recovers.
In addition, survey data suggest that investment by firms is poised to increase, which will
boost capacity and productivity. Private investment in equipment and structures has partially
rebounded since the second quarter of 2020 but has more to go. As of the first quarter of 2021,
investment in business equipment had rebounded as a share of potential output, but additional
investment is required to make up for lost investment during the pandemic. A rebound in
investment in structures is more than accounted for by investment in residential structures; in
fact, investment in residential structures as a share of output is back to levels not seen since
2007. Nonresidential structure investment, however, is still down as a share of potential output.
Newly created businesses appear to be another source of production of the goods and
services that households are demanding. Since the summer of 2020, we have seen the highest
level—by far—of new business applications of firms that the Census Bureau characterizes as
having a high propensity to employ workers since the agency began to track the series in 2004.
Applications temporarily dipped at the end of last year, but, perhaps in response to the pickup in
household spending and new business opportunities in the wake of the pandemic, applications
have strongly rebounded in recent months.
Federal Investment
One way that fiscal policy can boost potential output is through increases in federal
investment. Both the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and CBO define “federal
investment” as federal outlays on physical infrastructure, research and development, and
education and training. The economic literature tightly ties spending in those areas to future
economic growth. To be sure, other types of spending may deliver that result as well—such as
spending that improves health-care outcomes and nutrition. However, in contrast to the three
categories we define as federal investment, those types of services also have significant effects at
the same time as when the spending takes place—and the more narrow working definition of
federal investment is a good starting point.
Investments in physical infrastructure, research and development, and education and
training produce social benefits beyond those that could be captured by a private investor. For
example, it is generally difficult for a private entity to capture the economic rewards from
investment in basic research and development—which often adds to the overall body of
knowledge in a field. As a result, firms may be reluctant to undertake this type of work. When
the federal government supports such research, it can create enormous social benefits and
improve economywide productivity for decades to come. Federal investment in high-quality
childcare increases the earning potential for affected children long into the future and it lowers
the cost of working for parents of young children and thus increases the potential supply of labor.
Those positive economic effects are recognized in several legislative proposals currently before
Congress.
As figure 6 shows, as a share of GDP the federal government’s investment (limited to
such spending that is not for national defense) has been notably lower since 1980 than it was in
prior years—even during years after enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009, which boosted federal investment in large part through an increase in federal grants to
state and local governments. That shortfall has been driven by a reduction in federal investment
in physical infrastructure as a share of GDP. In fact, in 2019 federal investment in physical
infrastructure as a share of GDP was at its lowest level since the mid-1950s, when President
Eisenhower increased such spending by signing the Federal-Aid Highway Act into law.
The reduction in federal investment as a share of GDP is important for productivity over
the long term. In 2016, CBO published a brief summary of the literature describing the economic
effects of federal investment. The best evidence of those effects is found in the link between
physical public capital and real GDP growth. Using that evidence, “CBO estimates that an
increase in public investment that increases public capital by 1 percent boosts private-sector
output by about 0.06 percent in the long term, on average” (CBO 2016).1
That 0.06 elasticity implies that a $100 increase in public capital boosts GDP in the long run by
$8 every year, using the size of the public capital stock relative to output to translate the
elasticity to a per-dollar effect.
1. The relationship between the increase in output and investment implies an elasticity of 0.06. CBO puts that
estimate in context of its literature, finding, “Research that estimates the effect on output of a particular kind of
investment in physical capital, highway spending, similarly suggests that the elasticity ranges from 0.04 to 0.09”
(CBO 2016).
Unequivocally, that evidence suggests that an increase in federal investment—all else
equal—leads to higher economic output in the long term. The corollary is that the lack of
investment in infrastructure in recent years has reduced the economy’s potential.
However, this does not mean that a $100 increase in federal investment leads
immediately to an $8 increase in output from higher productivity. First, public infrastructure
takes time to put into place. CBO estimated that, for an illustrative policy that would boost
federal investment by $500 billion, roughly one-third of the money would be outlaid within the
first five years, roughly another half in the next five years, and the remaining amounts in future
years (CBO 2016). Moreover, for large-scale physical infrastructure projects requiring extensive
designing, permitting, and construction, the timing can be longer.
Second, once the federal investment is put in place, it takes time for the economy to
respond fully. This is clearly true in the case of research and development and early childhood
education. But even physical infrastructure—a new airport, for example—does not achieve its
full benefits to society immediately.
Finally, public capital, just like private capital, depreciates and requires service and
maintenance to continue to be productive. Without such upkeep, the increase in GDP from the
initial $100 in public investment is smaller over time.
Given the current economic projection, the slowness in outlays that is inherent to federal
investment is a benefit. The level of economic activity is on track to be quite strong—and to
exceed its sustainable level—over the next couple of years. That activity will include a high level
of demand for private sector resources—such as building supplies and construction workers.
Since federal investment competes for those resources, the slower pace of federal infrastructure
spending will be less likely to cause shortages, bottlenecks, and unwanted inflation.
In addition, there are actions that Congress could take to help avoid a painful slowdown
in activity—both by fine-tuning the timing of spending and focusing resources on policies that
boost potential output. For example, changes in fiscal policy that repurpose fiscal support from
boosting current aggregate demand to those that would boost the economy’s potential (such as
federal investment in infrastructure as well as education and training that would increase labor
supply and human capital) would increase the chances of a soft landing, in part by raising the
landing area to a higher level.
Conclusion
This testimony has highlighted three critical points. First, the rapid economic recovery
and expected slowing creates risks to which policymakers should be attentive. Second, fiscal
support has been essential to accelerating the recovery. Third, greater federal investment in
infrastructure is key to improving our longer-term economic prospects. This is the right time to
be enacting an ambitious federal investment package to order to put in place public infrastructure
that is once again a vital factor in improving productivity and economic growth.
References
Alcala Kovalski, Manuel, Sophia Campbell, Tyler Powell, and Louise Sheiner. 2021. “Federal,
State and Local Fiscal Policy and the Economy in 2021.” Hutchins Center Fiscal Impact
Measure, Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC. June 25, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/hutchins-center-
fiscal-impact-measure/
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) Pub.L. 111–5 (2009).
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (COVID-19 Stimulus Package), Pub L. No. 117-2 (2021).
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, Miriam Marcén, Marina Morales, and Almudena Sevilla. 2020.
“COVID-19 School Closures and Parental Labor Supply in the United States.” Institute
of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn, Germany. http://ftp.iza.org/dp13827.pdf
Bauer, Lauren, Eliana Buckner, Sara Estep, Emily Moss, and Morgan Welch. 2021. “10
Economic Facts on How Mothers Spend Their Time.” The Hamilton Project, Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC.
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/10_economic_facts_on_how_mothers_spend_th
eir_time
Bauer, Lauren. 2021. “Mothers Are Being Left Behind in the Economic Recovery from COVID-
19.” Up Front (blog), Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. May 6, 2021.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/05/06/mothers-are-being-left-behind-in-
the-economic-recovery-from-covid-19/
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub.L. 116–136 (2020).
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2016. “The Macroeconomic and Budgetary Effects of
Federal Investment.” Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51628-
Federal_Investment.pdf
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2019. “Federal Investment, 1962 to 2018.” Congressional
Budget Office, Washington, DC. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55375
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2020a. “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to
2030.” Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56020
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2020b. “An Update to the Economic Outlook: 2020 to
2030.” Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56442
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2020c. “The Effects of Pandemic-Related Legislation on
Output.” Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56537
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2021a. “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2021 to
2031.” Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56970
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2021b. “Budgeting for Federal Investment.” Congressional
Budget Office, Washington, DC. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56900
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2021c. “An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook:
2021 to 2031.” Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC.
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57218
Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021, Pub.L. 116–260 (2020).
Dube, Arindrajit. 2021. “Early Impacts of the Expiration of Pandemic Unemployment Insurance
Programs.” Blog. July 18, 2021. https://arindube.com/2021/07/18/early-impacts-of-the-
expiration-of-pandemic-unemployment-insurance-programs/
Edelberg, Wendy, and Louise Sheiner. 2020. “What Could Additional Fiscal Policy Do for the
Economy in the Next Three Years?” Up Front (blog), Brookings Institution, Washington,
DC. October 9, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-could-additional-fiscal-
policy-do-for-the-economy-in-the-next-three-years/
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. (1956).
Furman, Jason, Melissa Kearney, and Wilson Powell III. 2021. “How Much Have Childcare
Challenges Slowed the US Jobs Market Recovery?” Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Washington, DC. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-
watch/how-much-have-childcare-challenges-slowed-us-jobs-market
File and source
- File
- hhrg-117-pw00-wstate-edelbergw-20210729-5245f7c36a71.pdf
- Size
- 968,178 bytes
- SHA-256
- 5245f7c36a713cbcd553530185e8fc4956547e3977f2354dc718aad0d4fd11e4
- Original
- docs.house.gov