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Questions from Chairman Connolly to Parker Gilkesson, Center for Law and Social Policy (March 31, 2022)

Summary

Questions from Chairman Gerald E. Connolly, Subcommittee on Government Operations, to Parker Gilkesson, Senior Policy Analyst at the Center for Law and Social Policy, for the March 31, 2022 hearing "Follow the Money: Tackling Improper Payments," with written answers. The first question asks whether states prioritize preventing fraud and improper payments, and the answer says states are looking for fraud in the wrong places. A question on Medicare and Medicaid improper payments draws an answer citing a 2020 Estimated Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) rate of 21.36 percent. The answer on SNAP states that in FY 2019 only 0.1 percent of SNAP issuances were overpayments based on IPVs, and the answer on TANF cites approximately 800,000 total families in fiscal year 2021.

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“Questions from Chairman Connolly to Parker Gilkesson, Center for Law and Social Policy (March 31, 2022).” Original at docs.house.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/hhrg-117-go24-20220331-qfr004-fc51cfd982ee-8970b85566/, SHA-256 fc51cfd982ee874f6662b108db2e0bc5e52cde1c254707c1ee39e502296791c4.

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                          Questions from Chairman Gerald E. Connolly
                            Subcommittee on Government Operations

                               Parker Gilkesson, Senior Policy Analyst
                                  Center for Law and Social Policy

           March 31, 2022, Hearing: “Follow the Money: Tackling Improper Payments”
1.
     The decentralization of certain federally-funded, state-administered programs can
     make it difficult for federal agencies to prevent improper payments. Do states
     prioritize the prevention of fraud and improper payments in these federally funded programs? In
     your experience as a caseworker in North Carolina, were you more incentivized to distribute
     benefits quickly or to prevent fraud and
     improper payments?
         a. I would like to strongly reject the suggestion from the hearing that states do not care
              about preventing improper payments or fraud. As a previous caseworker for the state of
              North Carolina, I know all too well how “program integrity” and fraud allegations affect
              the lives of recipients and caseworkers. Eligibility workers are often better trained to
              look for fraud than they are to provide trauma-informed care or to refer families to other
              assistance to address the many challenges of living in poverty. It was clear that, based
              on mandates coming from the federal government prioritizing fraud prevention and
              program integrity, the state cared far more about catching people getting more than they
              were supposed to than about caseworkers’ ability to care for people and meet their
              needs. While empathetic care takes more time and effort, workers were rewarded only
              for their timeliness and accuracy. Failure to recognize an overpayment, even if only
              once, could cost someone their job.

            Despite the rarity of fraud, legislators and state agencies DO prioritize fraud prevention–so
            much so that there are millions of dollars in grants and targeted funding for fraud
            prevention and “program integrity.” It isn’t that fraud prevention and program integrity
            aren’t prioritized, it’s that states are looking for fraud in the wrong places. As the hearing
            made clear, the biggest sources of improper payments are international crime rings and
            unscrupulous providers, but states and counties focus on people experiencing poverty.
            State fraud units are notorious for privacy invasion and over-policing of public benefits
            recipients. People have reported home raids, threats to take their children away without
            cooperation, and even threats with the presence of guns.. These instances are so pervasive
            that people receiving public benefits often live under a cloud of fear.

             Federal and state government have to recognize that calling for “more fraud provisions”
            without specifying the types of measures that are needed and highlighting the need to
            ensure that measures do not act as barriers to access for those in need perpetuates

             1310 L St. NW, Suite 900 • Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 906-8000 • clasp.org
           stereotypes and invites abuses.

2. Though the federal government must prioritize program integrity, it also needs to
   deliver services to the public in an equitable fashion. What populations should
   policymakers consider when designing online applications or implementing antifraud controls like
   identity verification? How can the federal government ensure
   that individuals with limited access to technology can still access public benefits?
       a. During the pandemic there have been multiple populations of folks who have struggled to
           access life necessities based on their limited access to technology. Multiple state advocates
           have also reported that folks who struggle to access online applications were having
           difficult times getting through on the busy phone lines to apply—causing some states to
           begin seeing declines in public benefits applications throughout different times of the
           pandemic. When I was a caseworker for the state of NC, there were multiple clients that I
           had, who liked to come into the office to apply because they could hand in their
           verifications, application information, and other documents directly to a caseworker
           without fear of their information being lost in the mail or at the front desk. When offices
           were closed, I am sure that folks similar to my old clients suffered because they couldn’t
           have the direct contact with caseworkers. From my experience, different populations that
           the federal government should consider when designing online applications are:
                i. People with disabilities
               ii. The aging population
              iii. People experiencing extreme poverty and homelessness (particularly ones who did
                    not have an address or phone to be contacted at)
              iv. Youth (particularly opportunity youth or those who have aged out of the foster care
                    system)
               v. People in rural areas that don’t have access to internet services
       b. Online applications should be mobile friendly as individuals with low incomes are more
           likely to have internet access on a phone than on a computer. They should also be
           available in multiple languages, and tested by actual users (both customers and
           caseworkers) prior to launch. Online applications should also never be the only way to
           access benefits; customers should also be able to apply in person, by phone or mail,
           whatever meets their needs. Congress should also explore ways to reduce duplication of
           effort, such as by allowing people eligible for SNAP benefits to be deemed eligible for
           Medicaid or other benefits.

3. In fiscal year 2021, Medicare made over $40 billion in improper payments that
   resulted in monetary loss to the federal government. For Medicaid, that figure
   topped $98 billion. What are the primary root causes of overpayments in
   Medicare and Medicaid? Are overpayments in these programs more often
   attributable to beneficiaries or to health care providers?

       a. Medicaid and Medicare provide access to critical health services for about 136 million
          people—more than 4 in 10 people in the US. While steps should be taken to reduce
          improper payments, impeding access should be off the table. Beneficiaries of these
          programs are not responsible for the vast majority of improper payments, and limiting their

            1310 L St. NW, Suite 900 • Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 906-8000 • clasp.org
           access to the health care they need would do nothing to solve the problem but instead
           cause them harm. Most improper payments in Medicaid are due to lack of documentation
           or mistakes made by the state agency, providers, or reporting systems. Provider fraud,
           such as billing for services that are never delivered, describing services as more complex
           than the ones actually provided, and therefore billing them at a higher rate than earned, and
           knowingly ordering medically unnecessary items or services, is less common. Beneficiary
           fraud is extremely rare.

           According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Centers for Medicare &
           Medicaid Services (CMS) released its 2020 Estimated Payment Error Rate Measurement
           (PERM) rate — which measures “improper” payments in Medicaid and the Children’s
           Health Insurance Program (CHIP). The overall PERM rate reported was 21.36 percent.
           While it’s higher than last year’s 14.9 percent, that’s mostly because CMS measured
           eligibility payment errors for more states, not because errors increased.


           Therefore, it is imperative that policymakers don’t use numbers reported from 2020 to
           justify increased fraud provisions and unnecessary administrative burden on recipients and
           caseworkers by imposing more required verifications or paperwork. imposing additional,
           burdensome verification and paperwork requirements or to distract from the
           larger problem of eligible people losing coverage and access to care. Also, finding an
           improper payment doesn’t mean the payment was made to an ineligible person or for a
           service that shouldn’t have been provided. Often, providers don’t follow the proper federal
           and state procedures when billing for services, which can also cause an improper payment.
           People need healthcare and preventative and early treatment are essential. Finding new
           ways to deny people access to essential benefits is not going to lessen the number of
           improper payments. Finding ways to simplify the application process would lessen
           administrative burden which in turn would lessen mistakes or errors that cause improper
           payments.

4. In March, 2022, you published a paper on program integrity in the Supplemental
   Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), which emphasizes that “SNAP fraud is
   quite rare.” You are also an expert in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
   and Medicaid. To what extent has your research identified fraud in the federal
   programs it examines?
       a. Yes, SNAP fraud is quite rare. Political and media discussions frequently lump all forms of
           SNAP errors or violations as “fraud,” but this is inaccurate and misleading. The SNAP
           error rate calculated by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), the federal agency within
           the U.S. Department of Agriculture that administers SNAP, includes both overpayments,
           which is when people receive more SNAP benefits than they should have received, and
           underpayments, which is when people receive less than they should have
           received. Overpayments may be caused by agency errors, unintentional mistakes by
           recipients, or by intentional reporting of false information by recipients. Only the last of
           these—which is the least common—can be considered fraud. In FY 2019, only 0.1 percent
           of SNAP issuances were overpayments based on IPVs—just a dime for every $100 of
           SNAP benefits. And just 0.9 percent were overpayments of any sort, including household
           and agency errors. According to testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Oversight

            1310 L St. NW, Suite 900 • Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 906-8000 • clasp.org
   and Government Reform, "the overwhelming majority of SNAP errors that do occur result
   from mistakes by recipients, eligibility workers, data entry clerks, or computer
   programmers, not dishonesty or fraud by recipients.”
b. TANF cash assistance is a relatively small program, serving approximately 800,000 total
   families in fiscal year 2021. The maximum benefit for a family of 3 in the median state is
   $492 a month. In order to receive this money, applicants must typically attend multiple
   interviews or orientations, and must document their hours of work or participation in
   another required activity. There simply is no opportunity for large scale fraud in the TANF
   program; in fact the federal government estimates that less than a quarter of the families
   with low-incomes who are eligible for TANF actually receive any cash assistance.




    1310 L St. NW, Suite 900 • Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 906-8000 • clasp.org


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