Government’s Sentencing Memorandum — No. 1:20-cr-00087 (Dkt. 90, S.D. Ohio)

Summary

Government sentencing memorandum filed 05/03/22 against Adesh Alvin Bissoon, who prosecutors say supported himself for nearly seven years through identity theft that caused a loss of at least $3.5 million, including more than $1,000,000 in disaster-relief funds obtained during the COVID-19 pandemic. Co-conspirator Michael Joseph allegedly bought stolen personal information on the dark web and Victor Torres made false identity documents, which the three used to open accounts in victims' names. Prosecutors say Bissoon kept going after being charged, seeking a $150,000 reimbursement for transfers he made himself. They ask for 78 months on Count 1 plus a mandatory consecutive 24 months on Count 4, a $150,000 fine and $3,591.32 in restitution to Barclays Bank DE, with SBA restitution to be set later.

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Cite this document

“Government’s Sentencing Memorandum — No. 1:20-cr-00087 (Dkt. 90, S.D. Ohio).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/government-s-sentencing-memorandum-no-1-20-cr-00087-dkt-90-s-d-ohio-e9180d2ae3/, SHA-256 1364394aecdb4fa45c61d93e0c17dde2b72c7089a156ed688d94c36504c38f92.

Full text

Case: 1:20-cr-00087-DRC Doc #: 90 Filed: 05/03/22 Page: 1 of 20 PAGEID #: 564

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Case No. 1:20-CR-087(1)
Plaintiff,
Judge Cole
v.
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING
ADESH ALVIN BISSOON, MEMORANDUM

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly seven years, Adesh Bissoon supported himself entirely through an identity-

theft scheme, causing a loss of at least $3.5 million dollars—including more than $1,000,000 in

disaster-relief funds he fraudulently obtained during the COVID-19 pandemic. His scheme was

sophisticated, involving hundreds of accounts opened in victims’ names and in the names of

LLCs he had created using their personally identifiable information (PII). And Bissoon was

brazen: Even after being charged in this case, and in violation of his conditions of pretrial

release, he continued to perpetrate the scheme, fraudulently seeking a $150,000 reimbursement

for allegedly unauthorized transfers from his account, when in fact he had made the transfers

himself—using another account he had opened in a victim’s name.

As explained in more detail below, because of the many aggravating circumstances in

this case, and because there are not significant mitigating factors, the government respectfully

requests that the Court impose a Guidelines sentence: 78 months’ imprisonment on Count 1,

followed by the mandatory consecutive 24-month sentence on Count 4; two years of supervised

release; and a $200 special assessment. The government further requests that the Court impose
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a $150,000 fine, that Bissoon be ordered to pay $3,591.32 in restitution to Barclays Bank DE,

and that the Court set another hearing for approximately 30 days from sentencing at which the

amount of restitution due to another victim may be determined.

BACKGROUND

A. Bissoon profited from an identity-theft scheme for years, causing multiple millions
of dollars in loss.

In 2019, the U.S. Inspector General for Tax Administration began investigating

defendant Adesh Bissoon for bank fraud, mail fraud, and identity theft after evidence showed

he was exchanging stolen PII and fraudulent identity documents with coconspirators Victor

Torres and Michael Joseph via email.

Further investigation showed that the conspiracy had been going on since at least

November 2013—almost seven years—and shed light on the three coconspirators’ roles.

Joseph obtained stolen PII—including victims’ names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and

driver’s license information—from the dark web1 and then shared it with Bissoon and Torres.

Torres used the stolen PII to create false identity documentation, including false Social Security

cards, driver’s licenses, paystubs, and checks, which he shared with Bissoon and Joseph. All

three conspirators then used the stolen PII and fraudulent identity documents to open

unauthorized financial accounts in victims’ names. From there, the three coconspirators largely

followed their own paths, with each seeing how much money he could make from the

fraudulent accounts he created.

1
The term “dark web” refers to encrypted online content that is not indexed by conventional search engines like
Google. The dark web cannot be accessed via a standard browser such as Chrome; doing so requires custom
software.

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Of the three coconspirators, Bissoon was the most ambitious. Once he had opened a

financial account in a particular victim’s name, he profited by, among other things, making

charges to credit cards in the victims’ names and requesting convenience checks that allowed

him to obtain cash advances via the victims’ line of credit. For example, in 2019, Bissoon

requested eight convenience checks, totaling $14,000, from an account in one victim’s name.

Bissoon also enriched himself by writing checks in victims’ names, drawn from accounts he

had opened in their names, and made payable to himself. In other words, Bissoon did not hack

into victims’ true bank accounts or make charges to their credit cards; he opened entirely new

accounts in the victims’ names, which the victims did not know about, and used multiple tools

to convince financial institutions to give him money using the victims’ lines of credit.

But it was not just personal accounts that Bissoon opened in the victims’ names; he also

created LLCs in the victims’ names and then opened business credit cards in the names of the

LLCs. The business accounts typically had higher credit limits than individual accounts,

allowing Bissoon to request convenience checks in higher amounts, as well as to make larger

charges on the credit cards. For example, in 2018 Bissoon opened a business credit card in the

name of an LLC he had created using victim V.D.’s identity, and from June 2018 through

March 2019 he made more than $60,000 in charges to the card, which he did not pay off.

Later in 2018, Bissoon deposited several more checks to an account in his name, drawn

from an account he had opened in victim J.K.’s name. These checks totaled more than $50,000

and were drawn from TIAA Bank. Fidelity Investments later identified these checks as

“altered/fictitious” and rejected them; however, by that time Bissoon had already transferred

the money to another account he controlled.

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Bissoon also enriched himself by falsely claiming to be a victim of fraud and requesting

that the banks reimburse him for money he himself had stolen. For example, after Bissoon

caused the above-described checks in J.K.’s name to be written to himself, he then used J.K.’s

identity to file a fraud claim with TIAA Bank, asserting that the checks had not been

authorized. In response, TIAA Bank shut down the account from which the checks had been

withdrawn, opened a new account for “J.K.,” and then refunded “J.K.” the approximately

$50,000 that Bissoon had stolen. Bissoon then transferred those funds to another financial

account he had opened in the name of a different victim.

To help him keep track of the many victims whose PII he was using, as well as the

many financial accounts he had opened in their names, Bissoon created Excel spreadsheets to

stay organized. For example, one spreadsheet listed eight victims and the fraudulently opened

accounts associated with each. Bissoon created approximately a dozen such spreadsheets and

sent them to Joseph from October 2014 through January 2015. As Bissoon admitted in his plea

agreement, he knew that the people whose PII was listed in the spreadsheets were real

individuals.

Bissoon laundered proceeds of the scheme by purchasing and reselling precious metals.

He also laundered proceeds by purchasing money orders from the U.S. Postal Service, which

he then deposited into accounts he controlled. For example, from January 2015 through June

2019, an account in Bissoon’s name received approximately 215 U.S. Postal Service money

orders totaling more than $200,000.

B. Bissoon also fraudulently obtained more than $1,000,000 from programs meant to
assist Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In addition to defrauding financial institutions and his fellow Americans, Bissoon

defrauded the United States government. Specifically, during the COVID-19 pandemic,

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Bissoon enriched himself by applying for Economic Impact Disaster Loans in the names of

LLCs he had created using victims’ PII. Bissoon also applied for an Economic Impact Disaster

Loan and a Paycheck Protection Program loan in the name of an LLC he had opened using his

own PII, but which he used in furtherance of the fraud. As a result, Bissoon was fraudulently

awarded more than $1,000,000 in fraudulent loans. The government later recovered

approximately $980,000 of what was disbursed.2

C. A search of one of Bissoon’s residences revealed evidence of a sophisticated
scheme, and Bissoon admitted in an interview that he had stolen victims’ identities.

When federal agents executed a search warrant at one of Bissoon’s residences in August

2020, they found multiple driver’s licenses in other people’s names, approximately 200 credit

and/or debit cards in other people’s names, and more than 10 checkbooks in other people’s

names. Agents also hundreds of other documents containing victims’ PII; approximately

$70,000 in United States currency; tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of precious metals; and

seven cellphones, each of which was labeled with the name of a victim.

In an interview that same day, Bissoon admitted that he and his coconspirators had

access to “underground information” comprising lists of individuals’ PII and that he used this

information to open accounts without the victims’ authorization. He also explained that he

laundered funds for Joseph, keeping a 20% cut. Bissoon said that, to help him receive mail in

the victims’ names, he made copies of mailbox keys he found in his apartment building’s

mailroom and used those neighbors’ addresses on some of the fraudulent accounts. When he

started missing mail that way, he transitioned to mail-repackaging services like

2
As discussed below, the government requests that the Court set a hearing approximately 30 days after the
sentencing hearing at which the total amount of restitution owed to the Small Business Administration may be
determined.

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PhysicalAddress.com instead, signing up for accounts using driver’s licenses in other people’s

names.

D. After his arrest and release on bond, Bissoon continued to perpetrate the identity-
theft scheme—bringing the total intended loss from the scheme to at least $3.5
million.

Even after his arrest in this case, Bissoon continued to engage in bank fraud. On August

14, 2020, he was released on bond with the condition that he “not commit a Federal, State, or

local crime” (a mandatory condition in every case, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)), as well as the

special condition that he have “no access to credit cards / debit cards [or] PII of others”:

(Doc. 4 at 20 (Minute Order)).

Despite these express orders, on August 16, 2020, the same day Bissoon met with

Pretrial Services and signed paperwork acknowledging that he understood the conditions of

release, he contacted Rising Bank, where he had a checking account that he had not disclosed

to Pretrial Services, and falsely reported that someone had made sixteen unauthorized

transactions transferring more than $150,000 out of his account. Bissoon asked the bank to

“[p]lease look into these unauthorized transactions” and asked, “How and when will I be made

whole again?”

When speaking to a bank representative, Bissoon claimed he did not know J.K.—even

though materials in J.K.’s name had just been found in his house—and maintained that the

transactions were unauthorized. The representative requested that Bissoon complete an ACH

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dispute form for each of the unauthorized transactions and submit a police report substantiating

the fraud. On August 20, 2020, Bissoon filed a false police report with Port St. Lucie Police

Department claiming that he had not authorized the transactions. He later submitted the police

report to the bank in support of his request for reimbursement of the purportedly unauthorized

transactions.

As Bissoon admitted in his plea agreement, and contrary to his representations to the

bank and his assertions in his police report, he himself had made the allegedly unauthorized

debits from the Rising Bank account using an account he had opened in the J.K.’s name.

As Bissoon also admitted in his plea agreement, the total intended loss to his victims,

including the banks and the U.S. government, was at least $3.5 million.

APPLICABLE LAW

The Sentencing Guidelines “should be the starting point and the initial benchmark for

choosing a defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Demma, 948 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, “a district court should begin all sentencing

proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). Then, “the district court must weigh and apply the range of factors

outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 49-50. These include (1) the nature and circumstances

of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant and (2) the need for the

sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and

to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with

needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court should impose a sentence sufficient but

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not greater than necessary to reflect the purposes of sentencing that Congress identified in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

ARGUMENT

A. The PSR correctly calculates the Guidelines.

1. Summary of Guidelines Ranges and Statutory Minimum Sentence

The probation officer correctly calculated the Guidelines in this case, which result in a

Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment on Count 1, plus an additional two-year

mandatory sentence on Count 4, which by statute must run consecutively to the sentence

imposed on Count 1. (PSR ¶¶ 144-46.)

The Guidelines also recommend a term of supervised release of between two and five

years on Count 1, and up to one year on Count 4, with any terms of supervised release to run

concurrently. (Id. ¶ 1449-50.) There is no statutory minimum term of supervised release, and

multiple terms of supervised release will run concurrently. (Id. ¶ 148.)

The Guidelines recommend a fine of between $25,000 and $1,000,000. (PSR ¶ 155.)

And a special assessment of $100 per count is mandatory. (Id. ¶ 154.)

Restitution to victims is also mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. (PSR ¶ 158.)

2. The two-level enhancement in § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) applies to Bissoon’s conduct.

The defense objects to the probation officer’s application of a two-level enhancement

under § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C). As explained below, the probation officer correctly applied the

enhancement.

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(i) Applicable Guideline and Commentary

Section 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f the offense

involved . . . (C) a violation of any prior, specific judicial or administrative order, injunction,

decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines[.]”

The commentary to this provision provides further details about the circumstances in

which the enhancement applies:

(C) Fraud in Contravention of Prior Judicial Order.—Subsection
(b)(9)(C) provides an enhancement if the defendant commits a fraud in
contravention of a prior, official judicial or administrative warning, in
the form of an order, injunction, decree, or process, to take or not to take
a specified action. A defendant who does not comply with such a prior,
official judicial or administrative warning demonstrates aggravated
criminal intent and deserves additional punishment. . . . . This
enhancement does not apply if the same conduct resulted in an
enhancement pursuant to a provision found elsewhere in the guidelines
(e.g., a violation of a condition of release addressed in § 3C1.3
(Commission of Offense While on Release) or a violation of probation
addressed in § 4A1.1 (Criminal History Category)).

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 – Cmt. to § 2B1.1(b)(2) (emphases added).

(ii) Bissoon violated a “prior” court order, because the offense of conviction
continued after the bond order was issued.

Bissoon first argues that an enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) does not apply here

because Bissoon violated a “condition of release” and, according to him, the conditions of

release are not a “prior” order because they “do not predate the commission of the offense in

this case.” (Obj. Ltr. at 1.)

Bissoon is mistaken. Unfortunately, the offense did not stop when Bissoon was

originally arrested, or even when he was released on bond; Bissoon continued committing the

same offense—a fraud scheme involving, among other crimes, identity theft, bank fraud, and

wire fraud—after the Magistrate Judge issued a bond order.

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For purposes of the Guidelines, the “offense” is not determined rigidly according to the

dates in the indictment or the date of a defendant’s arrest, or even the charges to which the

defendant pleads guilty. Rather, where counts would group under § 3D1.2(d), the term

“offense” includes all acts that were part of the same course of conduct or scheme as the

offense of conviction. As explained in § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), “specific offense

characteristics”—such as the applicability of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)—shall be determined on the

basis of,” among other things:

(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant;
....
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which §3D1.2(d) would
require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in
subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction;

The commentary to Subsection (a)(2) further explains, “Application of this provision

does not require the defendant, in fact, to have been convicted of multiple counts.”

The offense Bissoon committed on August 16, 2020, when he falsely represented to the

bank that “J.K.” had defrauded him, was part of the same course of conduct or scheme as the

offenses of conviction, because it followed the same modus operandi and even involved one of

the same victims as the offenses of conviction. See Cmt. to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).

For purposes of determining relevant conduct under the Guidelines, therefore, Bissoon’s

“offense” was committed even after Bissoon was ordered released on conditions, and his

continued commission of that offense was therefore in violation of a “prior” specific court

order.

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(iii) Bissoon’s violations of the bond order are not “addressed elsewhere in the
Guidelines,” because § 3C1.3 is directed only to cases in which a statutory
enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies.

Bissoon next argues that the enhancement should not apply because, in his view,

§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) applies “only when the conduct giving rise to the enhancement is not covered

somewhere else in the Guidelines.” (Obj. Ltr. at 3.) Bissoon argues that, because “a violation of

a condition of release is covered elsewhere in the Guidelines, specifically in § 3C1.3,” a

violation of a condition of release allegedly cannot be the basis of an enhancement under

§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(C). (Id.)

Bisson’s argument lacks merit. Section 3C1.3 is not relevant here, because the

government did not bring a separate charge against Bissoon for the crimes he committed while

on release, nor did the government advocate for an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147.

Therefore, Bissoon’s continued commission of the offense in violation of the bond order is not

“addressed elsewhere in the Guidelines.”

The commentary to § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) supports this interpretation, making clear that the

Commission expected the 2-level enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) to apply where, as here,

the defendant was not already receiving an enhancement based on a violation of the same

order:

This enhancement does not apply if the same conduct resulted in an
enhancement pursuant to a provision found elsewhere in the guidelines (e.g.,
a violation of a condition of release addressed in §3C1.3 (Commission of
Offense While on Release) or a violation of probation addressed in §4A1.1
(Criminal History Category)).

§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) – App. n. 8 (emphases added).

Note that the focus is on whether the same conduct actually “resulted in an

enhancement” under another Guideline and that the Commission specifically gave “a violation

of a condition of release” as something that would warrant a 2-level enhancement under

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§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) assuming that the defendant had not already received a 3-level enhancement

under § 3C1.3.

(iv) The Commission’s commentary is not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with” the Guideline.

Bissoon next argues that the government and the probation officer’s interpretation of the

commentary to § 2B1.1 is “inconsistent with the actual language of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C)” and that,

under United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2019), it therefore cannot stand. (Obj.

Ltr. at 4.)

Bissoon is mistaken. In Havis, the Sixth Circuit held that a court “need not accept an

interpretation [by the Sentencing Commission] that is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

corresponding guideline.” 927 F.3d at 386 (internal quotations omitted). At issue in that case

was Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2, which added attempt crimes to the list of controlled

substance offenses under § 4B1.2(b). Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the Application Note was

not an “interpretation” at all; it was a wholesale addition of an offense that was not listed in the

Guideline. Id. And because the text of § 4B1.2(b) “makes clear that attempt crimes do not

qualify as controlled substance offenses,” the Commission’s decision to add attempt crimes to

the definition of “controlled substance offense” deserved no deference. Id. at 387.

Here, the commentary to § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) is not a “plainly erroneous” interpretation of

the Guideline. The Guideline provides for an enhancement if the offense involved “a violation

of any prior, specific judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or process not

addressed elsewhere in the guidelines[.]” It is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with any

other part of the Guideline for the commentary to interpret this phrase as referring to a

“violation . . . not addressed elsewhere in the Guidelines” (rather than a “topic” not so

addressed)—and, accordingly, to explain that the enhancement does not apply if the same

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conduct “resulted in an enhancement pursuant to a provision found elsewhere in the

guidelines.” § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) – App. n. 8 (emphasis added). Indeed, this interpretation is

consistent with the Guidelines’ general policy of avoiding applying two enhancements for the

same conduct. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 (providing that, as applicable here, if a defendant is

sentenced for Aggravated Identity Theft and another underlying offense, the enhancement

under § 2B1.1(b)(11) for the transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification should not

be applied when calculating the Guidelines range for the underlying offense). And, as

explained above, the particular violations at issue here—Bissoon’s continued commission of

the crime of conviction, including by accessing credit cards and others’ PII, in contravention of

the bond order—are not addressed elsewhere in the Guidelines, because § 3C1.3 only addresses

the circumstance in which a statutory enhancement under § 3147 applies, which it does not

here.

(v) The only case Bissoon cites that supports a contrary interpretation is a
30-year-old, out-of-circuit decision that predates relevant commentary from
the Commission.

Bissoon cites several case law summaries from Westlaw in support of his contention

that the enhancement should not apply. In fact, in almost all of those cases, the court held that

the enhancement did apply; they did not appear to address, even in dicta, any argument that a

violation of a bond order could not be the basis of an enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C).

Only one case, United States v. Scarano, 975 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1992), as

amended (Nov. 24, 1992), supports Bissoon’s argument. But, aside from being an out-of-

circuit, pre-Booker decision that is nearly thirty years old, its reasoning is unpersuasive, it

predates the publication of the Guidelines commentary at issue here, and it is distinguishable on

the facts.

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In Scarano, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it would not be appropriate to add a two-

level enhancement for violating a “general bail order” for two reasons: First, because, in that

court’s view, there was no principled reason for enhancing the offense level of a fraud

defendant but not of defendants subject to other guidelines; and second, because the court

believed that a contrary interpretation would render other guidelines superfluous. 975 F.2d at

583.

Neither of these arguments is persuasive. First, there is a principled reason why

Congress may have chosen this enhancement to apply to only fraud defendants who continue to

offend on release. Fraud crimes necessarily involve dishonesty, so Congress may have believed

that there was a particularly high risk that fraud defendants would think themselves clever

enough (as did Bissoon here) to mislead a Pretrial Service Officer, as well as the Court, and to

go on offending in contravention of a court order—including an order governing their behavior

while on release.

Second, the Scarano court believed that interpreting § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) to encompass

committing crimes in violation of a bond order would render superfluous § 2J1.7, the

predecessor to § 3C1.3—but, as explained above, those provisions apply to separate

circumstances, with § 3C1.3 applying only where a defendant is subject to the statutory

enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147, and § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) applying to violations that are not

subject to § 3147.

The Scarano court also cited § 4A1.3(d), which provides that the court may vary

upward if the defendant was “was pending trial or sentencing on another charge at the time of

the instant offense.” But this provision would not render § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) superfluous, because

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it applies only if the defendant was pending trial on “another charge”—i.e., in a separate case—

at the time of the offense.

Importantly, Scarano predates the commentary to § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) that informs the

correct interpretation. In 1992, when Scarano was decided, the commentary to § 2F1.1 (the

predecessor to § 2B1.1) did not contain the following language:

This enhancement does not apply if the same conduct resulted in an
enhancement pursuant to a provision found elsewhere in the guidelines (e.g.,
a violation of a condition of release addressed in § 3C1.3 (Commission of
Offense While on Release) or a violation of probation addressed in § 4A1.1
(Criminal History Category)).

§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(C) – App. n. 8 (emphases added); cf. U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 (1992) (lacking this

language). Had the Scarano court had the guidance of this language, which cites in particular

“a violation of a condition of release” as something that might trigger the enhancement, it likely

would have come to the opposite conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the probation officer correctly applied an enhancement

under § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C).

B. A consideration of the § 3553(a) factors shows that a low-end Guidelines sentence
of 78 months on Count 1, followed by a mandatory 24-month sentence on Court 4,
is appropriate here.

The nature and circumstances of this offense weigh in favor of a lengthy period of

incarceration and at least two years of supervised release. Bissoon spent nearly seven years

supporting himself through fraud, causing at least $3.5 million dollars in loss. He used stolen

PII to open hundreds of financial accounts in at least dozens of victims’ names, such that agents

found in his home more than 200 unauthorized credit and debit cards and more than 10

checkbooks in other people’s names. The scheme was so sophisticated that Bissoon even

opened LLCs using the victims’ PII and had dedicated cell phones labeled with victims’ names,

apparently to allow him to answer verification calls meant for the victims. To help him stay

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organized, he also had Excel spreadsheets in which he kept track of the numerous accounts he

had opened in victims’ names. The large number of victims in this case, the high loss amount,

and the many years during which Bissoon perpetrated the scheme all show that a lengthy

sentence is necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,

and to provide just punishment for the offense.

But Bissoon did not stop at what might be called “traditional” identity theft. When the

COVID-19 pandemic struck, he saw an opportunity in the global crisis—and America’s

generous response to it. Using the same LLCs he had opened in victims’ names, Bissoon

applied for and received more than $1,000,000 in relief funds meant to help American

businesses survive the pandemic. The fact that more than $1,000,000 that could have helped

struggling Americans keep their businesses open, keep their jobs, and keep their homes instead

went into Bissoon’s pocket as spending money further supports the idea that a significant

prison term is required to provide just punishment for the offense, as well as to send a strong

message of deterrence to others who might be considering taking advantage of disaster-relief

programs.

Also weighing in favor of a substantial term of imprisonment is the fact that Bissoon

continued offending even after being charged in this case. During his interview with Pretrial

Services, Bissoon lied about his financial condition, concealing some of his bank accounts.

Then, after a magistrate judge ordered him released on conditions, he went right back to the

scheme—asking a financial institution to make him “whole” by reimbursing him for $150,000

in allegedly unauthorized transfers that he himself had made. Bissoon’s continued criminal

conduct even after being charged and specifically ordered to refrain from reoffending shows

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that he is at a high risk of recidivism. It also shows “aggravated criminal intent . . . [that]

deserves additional punishment.” Cmt. to § 2B1.1(b)(2).

Bissoon’s history and characteristics do not offer significant mitigating circumstances.

Unlike some defendants who come before the Court for sentencing, Bissoon was not raised by

a single parent addicted to drugs; he did not grow up poor; he was not physically or verbally

abused. Instead, Bissoon and his mother both reported that he was raised in a good home, and

Bissoon even reported that the family “vacationed almost every summer and winter” and

“traveled to England to visit family.” (PSR ¶¶ 119, 127.) Although Bissoon dropped out of high

school in the eleventh grade, a few years later he obtained his high school diploma and went on

to obtain an associate degree in Architectural Engineering. (Id. ¶¶ 122, 135.) And for several

years—from 2007 to 2011—Bissoon worked for British multinational infrastructure group

Balfour Beatty, making $18.00 an hour. (Id. ¶ 139.) All of these facts suggest that Bissoon

could have chosen a law-abiding career; he had the education and the family support to do so.

But instead, Bissoon chose to engage in fraud—not because he was forced to, not because he

had no other options, but apparently because that is what seemed easier. During the time that he

was engaged in this fraud scheme—from at least 2013 through 2020—Bissoon does not appear

to have had any legitimate employment at all; he appears to have supported himself entirely

through the fraud, weighing in favor of a lengthy term of imprisonment. (See PSR ¶¶ 137, 139.)

In light of the foregoing facts, the government does not believe there are any factors

justifying a below-Guidelines sentence. The government respectfully requests that the Court

sentence Bissoon to a low-end sentence of 78 months on Count 1, followed by the mandatory

consecutive 24-month sentence on Count 4. Because of the high risk that Bissoon will reoffend,

the government also requests that the Court sentence him to two years’ supervised release.

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C. The government requests that the Court also impose a substantial fine, order
restitution to Barclays, and set a hearing to determine the restitution owed to the
Small Business Administration.

Restitution is another important component of any sentence for Bissoon—but,

unfortunately, it has proven difficult to calculate the amounts owed to each victim. The

financial institutions at which Bissoon opened accounts collectively lost millions of dollars to

the scheme; however, because of the large number of accounts Bissoon created and the even

larger number of transfers he made between those accounts, it has proven difficult to determine

which banks suffered losses in which amounts. Although the government sent letters to the

banks asking for documentation of losses, in most cases the letters went unanswered. The only

exception was Barclays Bank DE, which provided proof of $3,591.32 that it wrote off from one

of Bissoon’s fraudulent accounts. (PSR ¶ 158.)

The individual victims—that is, those whose PII was stolen—were almost certainly

harmed by Bissoon’s unauthorized use of their credit, because he opened the accounts, made

charges to them or requested advances from them, and then never repaid the money. But the

government has been unable to find the victims to allow them to submit restitution requests,

because Bissoon put fraudulent contact information on the many unauthorized accounts he

opened in their names; this incorrect information is what now appears in relevant databases.

The government does not yet have, but anticipates receiving within the next week,

evidence sufficient to show the amount of restitution owed to the Small Business

Administration (SBA) relating to the COVID-19 disaster-relief loans that the government was

not able to claw back from Bissoon. The government respectfully requests that, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), the Court set a date, no later than 90 days after sentencing, for a final

determination of the amount of restitution owed to the SBA.

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Because of the strong evidence that Bissoon profited greatly from his scheme (he

appears to have earned no income from a legitimate job for approximately seven years), as well

as the high likelihood that the government has not found all of the financial accounts in which

Bissoon has ferreted away money (given that they were created in other people’s names), a

substantial fine would also be appropriate in this case. The Guidelines state that the Court

should “impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to

pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine.” U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). And Bissoon is able

to pay: The PSR’s accounting of Bissoon’s net worth shows that he has $192,800 in equity in a

property on SE Shipping Road in Port St. Lucie, Florida, and that he and his two siblings

jointly have $409,100 in equity in another residence on SE Elmhurst Road, also in Port St.

Lucie. Although the PSR may have overstated Bissoon’s net worth by attributing the total

amount of equity in the SE Elmhurst Road property to Bissoon, even assuming that Bissoon

holds just one-third of the equity in the Elmhurst property, he would have approximately

$328,000 in assets, for a net worth (taking into account his $142,590 in debt) of approximately

$186,000. Additionally, as the PSR notes, Bissoon will be able to participate in the Inmate

Financial Responsibility Program while incarcerated, and a portion of his earnings can go

toward a fine.

The Guidelines state that, in imposing a fine, one of the circumstances the Court should

consider is “any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is obligated to make.”

U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. Because Bissoon caused losses of at least multiple millions of dollars, and

because the difficulty in calculating individual losses means he will not be obligated to pay

restitution to the victim financial institutions (except Barclays) or the individual victims, it

would be appropriate to impose a substantial fine. The government respectfully requests that

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the Court impose a fine of $150,000. This amount is less than Bissoon’s net worth and is

substantially less than the high end of the Guidelines range for a fine, which here is $1,000,000;

but it is still a substantial fine that would send a significant message of deterrence and disgorge

some of Bissoon’s ill-gotten gains.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that the Court sentence

Bissoon to 78 months on Count 1, followed by the mandatory consecutive 24-month sentence

on Count 4; two years of supervised release; and a $200 special assessment. The government

further requests that the Court impose a fine of $150,000, that Bissoon be ordered to pay

$3,591.32 in restitution to Barclays Bank DE, and that the Court set another hearing for

approximately 30 days from sentencing at which the amount of restitution due to the SBA may

be determined.

Respectfully submitted,

KENNETH L. PARKER
United States Attorney

s/Julie D. Garcia_____________
JULIE D. GARCIA (CA 288624)
Assistant United States Attorney
221 East Fourth Street, Suite 400
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Phone: (513) 684-3711

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