Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Provide a Speedy Trial and Prosecutorial Misconduct — No. 1:21-cr-20242 (Dkt. 110, S.D. Fla.)

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The Government's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Provide a Speedy Trial and Prosecutorial Misconduct, Document 110, entered September 9, 2022 in United States v. Mark Scott Grenon, Jonathan David Grenon, Jordan Paul Grenon and Joseph Timothy Grenon, Case No. 21-20242-CR-ALTONAGA/TORRES (1:21-cr-20242-CMA), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The government states that the pro se defendants filed motions on August 26, 2022 (ECF Nos. 104, 105, and 106), that the court ordered the competency evaluations sua sponte, and that zero non-excludable days have elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act. It cites the Chief Judge's administrative orders In Re: Coronavirus Public Emergency and asks the court to deny the motions.

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Case 1:21-cr-20242-CMA Document 110 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/09/2022 Page 1 of 5




                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

                        CASE NO. 21-20242-CR-ALTONAGA/TORRES

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

  v.

  MARK SCOTT GRENON,
  JONATHAN DAVID GRENON,
  JORDAN PAUL GRENON, and
  JOSEPH TIMOTHY GRENON,

              Defendants.
  __________________________________/

     GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
   FAILURE TO PROVIDE A SPEEDY TRIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

         On August 26, 2022, pro se Defendants Mark Scott Grenon, Jonathan David Grenon, and

  Joseph Timothy Grenon (the “Defendants”) each submitted substantively identical motions asking

  the Court to dismiss all criminal charges against them due to the alleged failure to provide the

  Defendants a speedy trial and prosecutorial misconduct. 1       (ECF Nos. 104, 105, and 106.)

  Specifically, the Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed because “[t]he Prosecutor,

  after all the time [the Defendants] have been incarcerated, just moved for a psychiatric evaluation

  without good cause and without proper notice, and certainly for the purpose of extending [the

  Defendants’] incarceration and with the specific purpose of depriving [the Defendants] of [their]

  rights to a speedy trial.” (Id. at ¶ 2.) The Court should deny the Defendant’s motions because the




         1
            The government notes that each of the Defendants filed these motions to dismiss pro se
  after requesting the Court appoint each of them counsel. (ECF Nos. 90, 91, and 93.) Should the
  Court adjudicate these motions to dismiss on the merits, and the Defendants subsequently obtain
  counsel, the Court should prohibit the Defendants from filing additional motions to dismiss
  seeking to relitigate these same issues.
Case 1:21-cr-20242-CMA Document 110 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/09/2022 Page 2 of 5




  government did not request that the Defendants undergo psychiatric evaluations, and because the

  Speedy Trial clock has not yet begun to run for any of the Defendants.

         First, the government did not move for psychiatric evaluations of the Defendants. Rather,

  the Court ordered that the Defendants undergo competency evaluations on the Court’s own

  initiative. (See ECF No. 85 (Order for Competency Evaluation) (“THIS CAUSE came before the

  Court sua sponte.”) Accordingly, the Defendants’ allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are

  baseless and should be rejected.

         Second, the Defendants’ speedy trial rights have not been violated. In fact, zero non-

  excludable days have elapsed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. 2 Defendant Jonathan David

  Grenon made his initial appearance in the Southern District of Florida on September 4, 2020. (ECF

  No. 9.) At that time, the Chief Judge of the United States District Court of the Southern District

  of Florida had issued Administrative Orders 2020-18, 2020-21, 2020-24, 2020-33, 2020-41, and

  2020-53 In Re: Coronavirus Public Emergency.            These Administrative Orders sua sponte

  suspended all jury trials during the pandemic and found that the time of continuances was

  excludable under the Speedy Trial Act, as the ends of justice outweighed the interests of the parties

  and public in a speedy trial due to the severe risks of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Chief Judge

  subsequently entered several additional Administrative Orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic,

  ultimately finding all time from March 30, 2020, through September 6, 2021, to be excludable

  under the Speedy Trial Act “based on a finding that the ends of justice outweigh the interests of

  the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” See Administrative Order 2021-65 Coronavirus

  Public Emergency.



         2
           The following analysis illustrates why, contrary to the Defendants’ assertions, the
  Defendants’ rights under the Speedy Trial Act have not been violated. But, to be clear, the
  Defendants’ constitutional speedy trial rights similarly have not been violated.
                                                   2
Case 1:21-cr-20242-CMA Document 110 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/09/2022 Page 3 of 5




         During this excludable period of delay, on July 14, 2021, the Court issued an Order

  continuing trial until March 14, 2022. (ECF No. 44.) For reasons stated on the record in open

  court, and as further detailed in the Order Continuing Trial, the Court found that the interests of

  justice served by a continuance outweighed any interest of the public or the Defendants in a speedy

  trial. (Id.) As a result, the Court excluded all time under the Speedy Trial Act through the date

  trial was set to commence on March 14, 2022. (Id.)

         During this excludable period of delay, on December 29, 2021, Defendant Joseph Timothy

  Grenon made his initial appearance in the Southern District of Florida. (ECF No. 47.) Several

  days later, on January 5, 2022, the Court issued an Order continuing trial until September 6, 2022.

  (ECF No. 56.) Again, for reasons stated on the record in open court, the Court found that the

  interests of justice served by a continuance outweighed any interest of the public or the Defendants

  in a speedy trial. (Id.) As a result, the Court excluded all time under the Speedy Trial Act through

  the date trial was set to commence on September 6, 2022. 3 (Id.)

         During this excludable period of delay, on July 28, 2022, Defendant Mark Scott Grenon

  made his initial appearance in the Southern District of Florida. (ECF No. 75.) Several days later,

  on August 8, 2022, the Court sua sponte issued an Order that the Defendants undergo competency

  evaluations. (ECF No. 85.) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A), the Court ordered that the

  “period of delay resulting from the examination of the Defendants and any subsequent judicial




         3
            As outlined in the Government’s Motion to Continue Trial filed on July 6, 2021 (ECF
  No. 41 at 9-12), and the Government’s Motion to Continue Trial filed on January 3, 2022 (ECF
  No. 52 at 9-11), these periods of delay were also automatically excludable under the Speedy Trial
  Act due to Defendant Mark Scott Grenon not yet having appeared in the Southern District of
  Florida, as he contested his extradition from Colombia to the United States. See, e.g., United States
  v. Tobin, 840 F.2d 867, 869 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6), “delay
  caused by an unapprehended codefendant stops the clock for the defendant before the court”).
                                                   3
Case 1:21-cr-20242-CMA Document 110 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/09/2022 Page 4 of 5




  proceedings to determine the Defendants’ competency shall be deemed excluded for speedy trial

  calculations.” (Id.)

         Finally, on August 11, 2022, the Court issued an Order continuing trial until January 3,

  2023. (ECF No. 89.) For the reasons outlined in the Government’s Motion to Continue Trial (ECF

  No. 88), the Court found that the interests of justice served by a continuance outweighed any

  interest of the public or the Defendants in a speedy trial. As a result, the Court excluded all time

  under the Speedy Trial Act through the date trial was set to commence on January 3, 2023. 4 (Id.)

         In short, zero non-excludable Speedy Trial days have elapsed, the Defendants’ speedy trial

  rights have not been violated, and the Defendants’ motions to dismiss should be denied.

                                                Respectfully submitted,

                                                JUAN ANTONIO GONZALEZ
                                                UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

                                        BY:     /s/ Michael B. Homer
                                                MICHAEL B. HOMER
                                                Assistant United States Attorney
                                                Court ID No. A5502497
                                                99 Northeast 4th Street
                                                Miami, Florida 33132-2111
                                                Telephone: 305-961-9289
                                                Michael.Homer@usdoj.gov

                                                JOHN C. SHIPLEY
                                                Assistant United States Attorney
                                                FL Bar No. 0069670
                                                99 Northeast 4th Street
                                                Miami, Florida 33132-2111
                                                Telephone: 305-961-9111
                                                John.Shipley@usdoj.gov

         4
            The Defendants have also filed numerous motions in this case, including the instant
  motions to dismiss and motions for appointment of counsel. The filing of these pretrial motions
  also stopped the Speedy Trial clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); United States v. Tinklenberg,
  131 S. Ct. 2007 (2011) (holding that §3161(h)(1)(D) stops the Speedy Trial clock from running
  automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion irrespective of whether the motion has any impact
  on when the trial begins).
                                                   4
Case 1:21-cr-20242-CMA Document 110 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/09/2022 Page 5 of 5




                                CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

         I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 9, 2022, I caused a true and correct copy of the

  foregoing to be delivered via Certified Mail to pro se Defendants Mark Scott Grenon and Joseph

  Timothy Grenon at the Federal Medical Center Fort Worth, Inmate Mail/Parcels, P.O. Box 15330,

  Fort Worth, Texas 76119, and to pro se Defendant Jonathan David Grenon at the Miami Federal

  Detention Center, Inmate Mail/Parcels, P.O. Box 019120, Miami, Florida 33101.



                                                    /s/ Michael B. Homer
                                                    MICHAEL B. HOMER
                                                    Assistant United States Attorney




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