Government’s Notice and Motion to Admit Evidence as Intrinsic Evidence Or, in the Alternative, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B) — No. 1:21-cr-00625 (Dkt. 189, D.D.C.)

Summary

Government notice and motion, filed 11/06/25, to admit evidence as intrinsic or under Rule 404(b) at the retrial of Roberto Adams on Counts Two and Three, which concern a second Paycheck Protection Program loan application for his company SuperKlean. Prosecutors plan to show Adams' receipt and depletion of the first loan's proceeds, inconsistencies in ownership percentages between his EIDL and tax submissions and the loan application, and his later application to the Seattle Police Department and creation of a fake SuperKlean invoice. The motion says Adams registered SuperKlean in Maryland on June 12, 2020, and that his EIDL application reported no gross revenues for the prior 12 months. It argues he used the same loan preparer and process for both PPP applications.

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Cite this document

“Government’s Notice and Motion to Admit Evidence as Intrinsic Evidence Or, in the Alternative, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B) — No. 1:21-cr-00625 (Dkt. 189, D.D.C.).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/government-s-notice-and-motion-to-admit-evidence-as-intrinsic-evidence-0379bf78da/, SHA-256 71288016cd40c0bcaeb619638395f1f43873c7a08685063d2b833eab75d8e2fb.

Full text

Case 1:21-cr-00625-APM Document 189 Filed 11/06/25 Page 1 of 29

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CRIMINAL NO. 21-CR-625 (APM)
:
v. :
:
ROBERTO ADAMS, :
:
Defendant. :

GOVERNMENT’S NOTICE AND MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE AS INTRINSIC
EVIDENCE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B)

The United States of America hereby provides notice of its intent to introduce evidence

described herein as intrinsic evidence relevant to the charges in the Second Superseding Indictment

and moves in limine for a ruling on the admissibility of such evidence as intrinsic evidence. In the

alternative, the Government also hereby provides notice of its intent to introduce evidence pursuant

to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The Government makes this disclosure out of an abundance of caution so

that the Government will have complied with the notice requirement of Rule 404(b) if the Court

determines that such evidence is not intrinsic. Indeed, the evidence disclosed in this notice would

still be admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) because it would be offered to show Defendant Roberto

Adams’ motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or

lack of accident in his scheme to submit a second fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)

loan application for his company, SuperKlean, to obtain funds that he used for personal gain. See

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). As set forth below, there are three principal areas of evidence that the

government will seek to introduce at trial: (1) Adams’ receipt of the first loan proceeds and

depletion of the proceeds as reflected in his bank account balance; (2) the inconsistencies between

the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) and tax submissions with the loan application,
Case 1:21-cr-00625-APM Document 189 Filed 11/06/25 Page 2 of 29

particularly regarding ownership percentages; and (3) Adams’ actions following the depletion of

the loan funds in applying to the Seattle Police Department and in making a fake SuperKlean

invoice and identifying fraudulent business expenses.

In support of its motion, the United States relies on the following points and authorities,

and such other points and authorities as may be cited at a hearing on this motion.

I. Factual Background 1

On June 12, 2020, Adams registered SuperKlean LLC (“SuperKlean”) with the State of

Maryland, as a limited Liability Company. The registered address for the business was the same

street and apartment as Adams’ residence in Hyattsville, Maryland. On June 25, 2020, Adams

filed for Federal Tax ID, also known as an Employer Identification Number (EIN), for SuperKlean,

obtaining EIN Number 85-XXXX504.

On July 25, 2020, Adams had a balance in his Bank of America (BOA) checking account

(-4188) of approximately $222.46 and approximately $18.13 in his BOA savings account (-4191).

1. SuperKlean’s EIDL Loan Application

On or about July 8, 2020 – less than one month before applying for SuperKlean’s first PPP

loan – Adams applied for an Economic Injury Disaster Loan for SuperKlean, including a $10,000

advance. In Adams’ EIDL application, he personally submitted the following information:

o SuperKlean was formed on June 12, 2020;

o SuperKlean’s gross revenues for the previous 12 months prior to the date of disaster

(January 30, 2020) was $0; and

1
The recitation of facts in the instant brief largely tracks the government’s submission in its first
Motion regarding intrinsic evidence and evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). ECF 57. The
instant brief, however, highlights facts salient to Counts Two and Three which are the subject of
the upcoming retrial. The government hereby incorporates by reference ECF 57 with respect to
its background discussion on the EIDL and PPP Programs.
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o SuperKlean’s gross costs for goods sold for the previous 12 months prior to the date of

disaster (January 30, 2020) was $0.

However, Adams also claimed that:

o SuperKlean had five (5) employees as of January 31, 2020;

o Adams only owned 50% of SuperKlean; and

o Each of his then 11-year-old children owned 25% of SuperKlean.

Adams certified under penalty of perjury that the information he provided was true and

correct. On July 13, 2020, the SBA denied Adams’ EIDL loan application. The loan application

was rejected because, as set forth in a July 13, 2020 letter to Adams from the SBA, the “Economic

Injury is not substantiated.” The letter stated that “[y]our economic injury is less than the amount

you received from the EIDL advance. As a result, we are unable to substantiate any additional

eligibility at this time,” and “the information you submitted does not indicate an economic injury.”

There are no documents demonstrating that Adams’ pre-teen children were actually 25%

owners of SuperKlean, and there is no evidence that SuperKlean had any employees, much less

five employees. Indeed, as discussed further below, in response to a grand jury subpoena,

SuperKlean failed to identify a single employee, a single client, or any revenue earned by

SuperKlean prior to September 2021 – more than 18 months after the PPP loan eligibility deadline

of February 15, 2020. In addition, Adams’ claim in the EIDL application that he owned 50% of

SuperKlean is materially inconsistent from his claim, as detailed below, in tax filings that he owned

90% of SuperKlean. Critically, it is also inconsistent with his second loan application in which he

claimed that SuperKlean had one employee, was established in 2019, and that he had 100% equity

in the business. The Government is aware of no evidence that Adams filed or maintained any

documents showing a change in the percentage of ownership between the time he filed his first

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loan application and when he caused the filing of a fraudulent application for a second PPP loan.

2. SuperKlean’s First PPP Loan Application (July 2020)

Approximately three weeks after being denied an EIDL loan, on July 31, 2020, at

approximately 9:07 AM, Individual 1 (“G.B.”) emailed Adams (at

“robertoadams326@gmail.com”) with the subject “PPP Loan Information,” stating:

Thank you for inquiring on additional information regarding the current programs available
from the SBA… Loan amounts are about $20k-$60K and forgivable ( The forgivable part
is 100% up to you, more info HERE)... Incorporated or not, I can mostly likely get you
funded…Due to the time and research required I do charge a 5% success fee once funded…
During the process it is important that you forward me any and all emails you receive
related to funding from the lender in a timely manner.

The email asked for, among other things, the applicant’s name, social security number, date of

birth, address, phone number, email, bank account information, a driver’s license photo and bank

statements from February 2020. The email also offered a referral fee of $500 for any applicants

who are approved for a PPP loan. The email also contained a link to a Forbes article titled “Loan

Forgiveness and SBA EIDL Programs: 10 Things Small Businesses Need to Know.” The article

set forth that the specific purpose of the PPP loans were to give small businesses funding for

payroll. The article stated, in part

“The intent of Congress and the Trump Administration when passing the PPP loans was
twofold: First, give small business the funding necessary to survive the Coronavirus
shutdown, which the federal government estimated would last two months. That is why
the loan amount was based on your average 2019 monthly payroll multiplied by 2.5% and
forgiveness is largely based on two months of payroll. Second, to keep workers employed
and on payrolls instead of sending them to the unemployment line.”

At that time, SuperKlean had no payroll to multiply or workers to keep employed.

That morning, at approximately 9:13 AM, Adams, while on duty as an MPD officer in the

District of Columbia, sent an email to G.B. containing his date of birth, address, email, bank

account information and bank routing number. Soon after, at approximately 9:49 AM, Adams

emailed G.B. a copy of his BOA accounts statement for January 25, 2020 through February 21,
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2020. Five minutes later, at approximately 9:54 AM, Adams emailed G.B. a photograph of the

front and back of his driver’s license.

At approximately 9:58 AM that morning, Adams received an email from BlueVine, a

financial technology company that assists in the processing of PPP loans. The email contained a

link to “Activate your account.” One minute later, Adams forwarded the email to G.B. Records

obtained from BlueVine also indicate that the IP Address 75.191.14.220, repeatedly accessed the

BlueVine Account associated with Adams on July 31, 2020. Subscriber records indicate that that

the IP Address 75.191.14.220 is associated with G.B.

Records from BlueVine indicate an application was submitted for a loan for SuperKlean

through the SBA’s PPP. The application claimed that Adams was an eligible self-employed

individual with a monthly payroll of $7,338 and sought a forgivable loan of $18,345 to cover

payroll expenses. The application contained a certification that represented that the business was

in operation on February 15, 2020, and “had employees for whom it paid salaries and payroll taxes

or paid independent contractors, as reported on Form(s) 1099-MISC.” The application also

contained a certification that all “SBA loan proceeds” would be “used only for business-related

purposes as specified in the loan application.” As part of the application materials, statements

from Adams’ personal savings and checking accounts with BOA were provided. The application

also contained a purported 2019 Form 1040 Schedule C reporting $94,250 in gross income, $6,460

in expenses, and $88,060 in profits from a business called SUPERKLEAN. The Schedule C form

indicated that Adams was the proprietor, that the business provided janitorial services, and that

Adams started or acquired the business in 2019. Adams’ residence was listed as the business

address.

On July 31, 2020, Adams received an email from BlueVine attaching his completed and

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signed PPP loan documents. These documents included, among other things: (1) Paycheck

Protection Program Borrower Application Form; (2) Loan Note; (3) Resolution to Borrow; and (4)

SBA Form 1050 Settlement Sheet.

On July 31, 2020, Adams’ application was granted, and he secured the $18,345 loan from

Cross River Bank, an FDIC-insured financial institution. On July 31, 2020, at approximately 8:40

PM, Adams paid, via the Square App, $917.25 to G.B. This amount represented 5% of the PPP

loan that Adams had obtained from Cross River Bank. Approximately one minute later, at 8:41

PM, G.B. placed a call to Adams and they spoke for 32 seconds. Five minutes later, at 8:46 PM,

Adams called G.B. and they spoke for approximately three minutes.

On August 3, 2020, Adams’ balance in his personal BOA checking account (-4188) was

approximately $379.34 and approximately $9.81 in his BOA savings account (-4191). On or about

August 4, 2020, $18,345, representing the PPP loans funds, were deposited into Adams’ personal

accounts with BOA. According to bank records, Adams did not use the PPP funds as required.

Instead, he used the PPP loan funds primarily for his personal use, including gambling, restaurants,

hotels, airfare, and a luxury car payment.

In total, between August 4, 2020, the date of the deposit of the PPP loan funds, and August

30, 2020, the Adams spent at least $25,417.84 on expenses that had no relation to SuperKlean or

any outside employment. 2 In short, rather than use the taxpayer funds as required, Adams spent

2
The only other significant deposits into the checking account were on August 26, 2020 in the
amount of $8,224.88 and $1,949.48 (totaling $10,174.36). These funds appear to be unrelated to
any business of SuperKlean and more than half of these funds were used for a cashier’s check in
the amount of $5,724.55 to pay Century Summerfield, an apartment complex in Landover,
Maryland. This cashier’s check along with Adams’ expenditures in Las Vegas ($6,706.28) could
not have been paid for by the non-PPP loan related funds in the account. Indeed, between August
25, 2020 and August 31, 2020, Adams’ transferred $5,200 from his BOA savings account, in which
he previously deposited $10,000 of PPP loan funds, to his BOA checking account.
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the funds frivolously for his personal gain and enjoyment. By September 23, 2020, Adams’

balance in his personal BOA checking account (-4188) was approximately -$150.39 and

approximately -$20.77 in his BOA savings account (-4191) – indicating that he had spent down

the entirety of the PPP loan proceeds in less than two months.

Additionally, the government’s evidence, financial and other documents, including those

obtained from SuperKlean, showed an absence of any income from a janitorial business or regular

payroll transactions, and the Government has been unable to find any other indication that Adams

ra ns such a business from his residence. For example, on October 26, 2020, an Ex Parte Order

for the Disclosure of Tax Returns and Return Information for Adams’ 2019 tax records was issued

by the Court. Those tax records do not reflect any evidence of income from SuperKlean or a

monthly payroll of $7,338; nor do they include the purported 2019 Form 1040 Schedule C

reporting $94,250 in gross income, $6,460 in expenses, and $88,060 in profits from a business

called SuperKlean submitted with Adams’ first PPP application. Similarly, records from the State

of Maryland, Department of Labor do not show any income claimed for SuperKlean from the first

quarter of 2015 through the present for Adams or his children. MPD records also do not indicate

that Adams requested or received permission to procure outside with respect to a cleaning or

janitorial service, as he had in the past for other outside employment.

3. SuperKlean’s Second Fraudulent PPP Loan Application (January 2021)

On December 30, 2020, Adams texted G.B. and said “Question, are we able to do a second

ppp forgivable loan with the new stimulus package.” G.B. responded, “Morninggg!!! Yes you

are.” Adams then responded “LOL let’s do it.”

On December 30, 2020, Adams received an email from BlueVine stating “We will be

taking applications soon… we will happily help you apply for your first PPP Loan (Initial Draw)

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or Second Draw.” The email goes on to instruct the borrower, “You’ll also want to start collecting

records of payroll level and revenues in 2019 and 2020 which will likely be requested for PPP

Loan Eligibility. Such records can include: For Initial Draw applicants, payroll tax filings such as

941, 940/944 Schedule C, or payroll process records, as well as bank statements or bank

connections, and/or other documents pending SBA Guidance; For Second Draw applicants we’re

still awaiting SBA guidance.” The email also states “if the business applies for a Second Draw

after 1/1/21. Q4 may be included in the reduction calculation.” To be clear, Adams and

SuperKlean did not have any such records described in this email.

On January 20, 2021, Adams’ balance in his personal BOA checking account (-4188) was

approximately $135.86 and approximately $13.48 in his BOA savings account (-4191).

On January 20, 2021, Adams received an email from BlueVine stating “Get Fast Funds

with the SBA Paycheck Protection Program. You may be eligible to get fast relief for your

business with a Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Second Draw loan… Existing PPP customers:

… To qualify for a Second Draw loan, you must show at least a 25% reduction in gross receipts.

For most borrowers, this will be based on the first, second, or third quarter of 2020 compared to

the same quarter in 2019.”

On January 21, 2021, Adams sent G.B. a text stating “What’s up shordddddd? Blue vibe

just sent me a email.” G.B. responded, “Lmao I got you… Shit… What was your email addy?”

Adams then provided the email address Robertoadams326@gmail.com.

Records from BlueVine indicate that, on or about January 21, 2021, at 6:40 PM, Adams

caused the submission of a second borrower application for a loan through the Small Business

Administration’s Paycheck Protection Program. Records obtained from BlueVine also indicate

that an IP Address associated with G.B. accessed the Adams’ BlueVine Account. Adams’

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application again claimed he was an eligible self-employed individual with a monthly payroll of

$7,338 and sought a forgivable loan of $18,345 to cover payroll expenses. Adams caused the

certification that the business was in operation on February 15, 2020, and “had employees for

whom it paid salaries and payroll taxes or paid independent contractors, as reported on Form(s)

1099-MISC.” He also caused the certification that all “SBA loan proceeds” would be “used only

for business-related purposes as specified in the loan application.”

On or about January 25, 2021, at 11:38 AM, Adams called G.B. and spoke with her for

over 11 minutes.

On January 25, 2021, at 9:54 PM, Adams received an email from BlueVine which stated

“The SBA has finished reviewing your application and you’ve been approved for your Paycheck

Protection Program loan. Accept your offer and access more information, including the next

steps.” There is button below the text that says “Accept Offer.”

On January 25, 2021, at 9:57 PM, Adams received an email from BlueVine containing his

completed and signed PPP loan documents for a second draw. These documents included, among

other things: (1) Paycheck Protection Program Second Draw Borrower Application Form; (2) Loan

Note; and (3) Certification Note. These documents contained false and fraudulent information and

certifications to include that as of February 20, 2020, SuperKlean “had employees for whom it

paid salaries and payroll taxes or paid independent contractors, as reported on Form(s) 1099-

MISC,” and specifically with respect to the first PPP loan application:

The Applicant received a First Draw Paycheck Protection Program Loan and,
before the Second Draw Paycheck Protection Program Loan is disbursed, will have
used the full loan amount (including any increase) of the First Draw Paycheck
Protection Program Loan only for eligible expenses.

(emphasis added).

As previously discussed, Adams used the first disbursement from August 2020 for

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ineligible expenses, to include a personal trip to Las Vegas. By January 25, 2025, the date of

Adams’ certifications for the second PPP loan, he had spent the funds from the first disbursement

for items wholly unrelated to SuperKlean.

The Government is not aware of any records which indicate that Adams notified BlueVine,

Cross River Bank (which funded the loan), G.B., or the United States Government that the

documents contained false and fraudulent certifications.

On or about January 25, 2021, Adams’ application was granted and he secured a second

draw of the PPP loan, in the amount of $18,345, from Cross River Bank.

On January 28, 2021, Adams received an email from BlueVine stating “Thank you for

accepting your offer for the Paycheck Protection Program. We’ve initiated an ACH deposit into

the bank account you provided in your application. You should receive your funds within 10

business days.” On or about January 29, 2021, $18,345, representing the second draw of the PPP

loan funds, was deposited into Adams’ BOA checking account. On or about February 1, 2021,

Adams made a payment of $12,110.91 to Property Payment Rent using proceeds from his illicit

conduct. 3

By February 20, 2021, Adams’ balance in his personal BOA checking account (-4188) was

approximately $644.20 and approximately -$10.43 in his BOA savings account (-4191). In other

words, approximately 23 days after he received $18,345 in PPP loan funds, the money was gone.

It was not spent on SuperKlean’s expenses, an entity with no clients or employees. Adams spent

taxpayer funds frivolously for the Adams’ personal gain and enjoyment.

3
On February 1, 2021, Adams also received two deposits totaling $7,047.36 ($3,696.45 and
$3,350.91), in what appears to be legitimate income. However, these funds would be insufficient
to cover the approximately $21,373.20 in expenditures on February 1, 2021, only $500 of which
appear to be related to a purported business expenditure of SuperKlean. To cover these remaining
expenditures alone required $14,325.84 in PPP loan proceeds.
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On March 31, 2021, Adams sent G.B. a text containing a link to a CNBC article, titled

“How just a few days cost some small businesses thousands on their PPP forgivable loans,”

regarding the PPP loan program and changes in the loan formula that would have meant larger

loans for small businesses. (https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2021/03/15/few-days-cost-some-small-

businesses-thousands-on-ppp-forgivable-loans.html). Immediately after sending the article,

Adams sent another text asking “How much more???”

5. Adams’ PPP Loan Forgiveness

On July 28, 2021, Adams texted G.B. and asked, “I got an email from scratch about the

forgiveness.” This appears to be a reference to the forgiveness of his first PPP loan from July of

2020. G.B. responded, “Heyyyyy! Forward it to me and I’ll check it out.”

In or around August 2021, Adams requested that Cross River Bank forgive the PPP loan

he received on July 31, 2020.

On August 4, 2021, Adams texted G.B. and stated, “I just got another email and I forwarded

it to you.” This appears to be another email about the loan forgiveness.

On August 9, 2021, Adams texted G.B. and asked “Hey shordddddd, can you log in and

do my second one please?” This appears to be a reference to the forgiveness of his second PPP

loan from January 2021. Again, the majority of the funds dispensed for the first PPP loan that

Adams received were not used for SuperKlean.

On or about August 19, 2021, Adams’ PPP loan with Cross River Bank was forgiven.

II. Planned Evidence

The Government intends to introduce three categories of intrinsic evidence at trial: (1) the

first PPP loan application and Adams’ use of the funds for ineligible expenses which contradict

his January 2021 certification on the second PPP loan application; (2) the EIDL and tax filings,

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for Tax Years 2019 and 2020, relevant to SuperKlean and are inconsistent with the second PPP

loan application; and (3) Adams actions after receiving the second PPP loan, including his failure

to disclose and false statement regarding SuperKlean in connection with a background

investigation by the Seattle Police Department, and his creation of a false invoice and business

expenditures for SuperKlean after he was alerted to the investigation.

A. Adams’ Submission of and Disbursement of Funds from the First PPP Loan
in July and August 2020

As set forth above, prior to Adams’ submission of the second PPP loan in January 2021, Adams

applied for, received, and then spent funds in connection with a first PPP loan in July 2020.

Though Adams was acquitted of the counts related to the July 2020 application, Count Two,

pertaining to the second application specifically references the use of the funds in the first loan

and Adams’ January 2021 certification that he “used the full loan amount (including any increase)

of the First Draw Paycheck Protection Program Loan only for eligible expenses.” ECF 70 at 7.

Adams’ first PPP loan is therefore intrinsic to Count Two of the Second Superseding Indictment

in that the falsity of his certifications second application turns, in part, on how Adams used the

funds from the first disbursement.

B. Adams’ Inconsistent EIDL Loan Application Tax Filings

The Government expects to elicit testimony regarding the EIDL loan application,

specifically the listed ownership percentage, creation date, and number of employees. The

Government expects to admit evidence and elicit testimony that Adams’ tax filings for Tax Year

2019 (filed on or about February 23, 2020, approximately five months before the first PPP loan)

and Tax Year 2020 (filed on or about April 1, 2021, approximately two months after Adams caused

the fraudulent submission of his second PPP loan and four months before he caused the submission

of a request for loan forgiveness for his first PPP loan), were inconsistent with Adams operating

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SuperKlean or any cleaning service prior to January 31, 2020 and are inconsistent with the 2019

Schedule C submitted in connection with his first PPP loan. Critically, the second PPP loan

application was largely based on the first and did not require the submission of new Schedule C.

Further, as with his EIDL and PPP loan applications, Adams caused the submission of inconsistent

tax filings to the federal government and State of Maryland regarding business expenses. In

addition, the documents also reveal material inconsistencies such as Adams (1) claiming a higher

ownership percentage than claimed in his EIDL loan in order to obtain a larger tax deduction and

higher refund; (2) claiming expenses inconsistent with those identified by SuperKlean in response

to the grand jury subpoena. At its core, this information demonstrates the falsity of information

Adams knowingly provided in the second loan application.

With respect to his 2019 and 2020 tax filings, George Buckmon, Jr., of Buckmon’s Tax

Services, is expected to testify that he prepared Adams’ federal and Maryland state tax returns

using information Adams provided to him. In addition, Buckmon is expected to testify that

Adams: (1) did not provide Buckmon with documentary support (i.e., receipts) for any of the costs

or economic losses reported for SuperKlean; and (2) that Adams reviewed the tax returns before

filing and never flagged that any of the information contained in the filings was incorrect.

There is no reference in this tax return to any work or expenses for SuperKlean, specifically

there is no Schedule C related to SuperKlean. Further, Adams’ 2019 federal tax returns

demonstrate his knowledge, intent, and lack of mistake in declaring that SuperKlean did not have

any work or expenses.

On Adams’ 2020 federal income tax return, he reported an income loss of $15,012 for his

business SuperKlean, which reduced his reportable income to $67,875. In addition, Adams caused

Buckmon to complete and file on Adams’ behalf a Form 1065 U.S. Return of Partnership Income

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for 2020. Importantly, the form states that Adams started SuperKlean on June 25, 2020 – well

after the February 15, 2020, PPP loan eligibility deadline. It also claims a total business income

loss of $16,680 – $15,012 for Adams and $834 for each of his two children – based on business

expenses Adams claimed without documentary support, including automobile expenses, legal fees,

supplies, and telephone expenses. Finally, Adams caused Buckmon to complete and file three

Schedule K-1’s – Partner’s Share of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc. – for Adams and each of

his two children who were 11-years-old at the time. The K-1’s claimed that Adams owned 90%

of SuperKlean, and each of his two children owned 5% of SuperKlean. The 90% ownership is

materially inconsistent with the 50% ownership Adams claimed in his EIDL loan application that

the SBA denied.

On Adams’ 2020 Maryland state tax return, he again reported the same income amount –

$67,875. Adams also caused Buckmon to complete and file on Adams’ behalf a Maryland Form

510 Pass-Through Entity Income Tax Return for SuperKlean, in which Adams again claimed a

total business income loss of $16,680, with Adams claiming 90% ownership of SuperKlean, and

each of his children owning 5% of the shell company.

C. Creation of Fake SuperKlean Invoice, False Expenditures, and Statements to
the Seattle Police Department

The Government expects to admit evidence and elicit testimony that, after being arrested

on a complaint by law enforcement for bank and wire fraud related to his first PPP loan in August

2021, Adams attempted to “legitimize” SuperKlean by creating a fake invoice for an individual

who was never a client of SuperKlean. The evidence demonstrates that SuperKlean was an entity

without clients or business prior to August 2021, and that Adams attempted to obstruct justice by

manufacturing evidence in response to a criminal investigation. Specifically, on October 1, 2021

– nearly two months after Adams was arrested for the instant criminal activity and while the

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Government’s investigation remained ongoing – law enforcement executed a search warrant at

SuperKlean’s listed place of business, the same address as Adams’ personal residence. Law

enforcement seized a document marked “Office Cleaning Invoice,” dated September 20, 2021.

Handwritten onto the document was the company name “SuperKlean LLC,” “Roberto Adams,”

and Adams’ phone number. Also handwritten onto the document was the “client / customer name”

of “Tom Jones,” with an address of “7259 Hanover Parkway” in “Greenbelt, MD.” Services

rendered were described as “Bathroom x 2 . . . open area room x 7 . . . All area surface.” The

invoice did not state a total cost or contain any indication that the services had been paid. Dr.

Ricardo Thomas Jones indeed exists and practices dentistry at the address notated on the invoice.

Dr. Jones is expected to testify, however, that he does not know Adams, is not aware of a business

called SuperKlean, and has no records of hiring SuperKlean for cleaning services. Tellingly,

SuperKlean did not provide any documents in response to the grand jury subpoena that relate to

Dr. Jones, including any communications with or prior invoices to Dr. Jones.

The Government also expects to admit evidence that in response to a subpoena requesting

all of SuperKlean’s expenses, Adams submitted bank statements for April 2020 – August 2021

that identified nearly $13,000 in business expenditures, 4 when in fact, further investigation

confirmed that many, if not most, of the expenditures were actually for Adams’ personal use. The

evidence demonstrates that SuperKlean was an entity without proper business expenses prior to

4
The Government will only seek to introduce fraudulent expenses identified from April 13, 2020
through February 6, 2021, consistent with the Government’s anticipated motion in limine which
will seek to preclude the introduction of any purported business expenses after on or about
February 6, 2021, when the funds from the second PPP loan were expended. Any purported
expenses after the PPP loan proceeds were expended is irrelevant to the Adams’ knowledge, intent
or motive at the time he fraudulently obtained the first and second PPP loans. It is the
Government’s understanding that at the Pretrial Conference of August 11, 2023, this issue was
addressed consistent with the Government’s stated position.
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the PPP loan February 15, 2020 eligibility date or even at the time that Adams applied for the

fraudulent PPP loans in July 2020 and January 2021, that Adams did not use taxpayer funds for

legitimate business expenses, and that Adams attempted to obstruct justice by falsifying records

in an effort to mislead a grand jury investigation. Examples of expenditures falsely identified as

purported “business expenditures,” which the Government seeks to admit include the following:

o August 3, 2020, a purported “business expenditure” of $38.44 at UPrinting. See
SuperKlean_0000398. The Government’s subpoena to UPrinting for the
underlying receipt revealed that the expense was for a 30 x 17 “large format
poster” of MPD officers in riot gear.

o September 11, 2020, a purported “business expenditure” of $180.20 at Foot
Action. See SuperKlean_0000410. The Government’s subpoena to Foot Action
for the underlying receipt revealed that the expense was for a pair of Nike Air Max
270s, Nike Air Max 90, and two pairs of men’s Ethika boxer briefs.

o September 11, 2020, a purported “business expenditure” of $136.36 at Old Navy.
See SuperKlean_0000410. The Government’s subpoena to Old Navy for the
underlying receipt revealed that the expense was for women’s flip-flops, girls’
jeggings, girls’ sweatpants, women’s socks, girls’ tees, women’s polo, women’s
jogger pants, and women’s jeans.

o October 19, 2020, a purported “business expenditure” of $12.99 at Family Dollar.
See SuperKlean_0000422. The Government’s subpoena to Family Dollar for the
underlying receipt revealed that the expense was for plastic red cups, printed paper
plates, and plastic forks.

o February 6, 2021, a purported “business expenditure” of $39.49 at Dollar General.
See SuperKlean_0000476. The Government’s subpoena to Dollar General for the
underlying receipt revealed that the expense was for four numeral balloons, four
numeral glitter candles, cutlery, plates, a roll of paper towels and toilet paper.

o $330.80 in purported “business expenditures” at Walmart. See
SuperKlean_0000359, SuperKlean_0000360, SuperKlean_0000377,
SuperKlean_0000378, SuperKlean_0000460, SuperKlean_0000466. The
Government’s subpoena to Walmart for the underlying receipts revealed that the
expenses were for items such as Easter candy, plastic cups, produce, bread,
Cheetos, a birthday card, tissue paper, and ankle weights.

o $360.79 in purported “business expenditures at EZ Storage. See
SuperKlean_0000359, SuperKlean_0000378, SuperKlean_0000388,
SuperKlean_0000397, SuperKlean_0000409, SuperKlean_0000420,

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SuperKlean_0000440. Per SuperKlean’s representations, these charges began on
or about April 13, 2020, two months before the business was incorporated – when
it had no clients or supplies or equipment.

o $1,863.90 in purported “business expenditures” at Fleetcor Funding. See
SuperKlean_0000467, SuperKlean_0000482, SuperKlean_0000496,
SuperKlean_0000498, SuperKlean_0000533, SuperKlean_0000535,
SuperKlean_0000535. The Government’s subpoena to Fleetcor for the underlying
receipts revealed that the expenses were for fuel – despite the fact that the
Government’s subpoena to SuperKlean revealed no clients for which commuting
costs could legitimately be claimed as a business expense.

In April 2021, Adams applied for a position with the Seattle Police Department. In the

course of his background check, a Seattle Police Department detective noticed that Adams had

obtained a PPP loan, but Adams had failed to disclose it in his written application or during an

interview with the detective, as required. On June 1, 2021, the detective sent Adams an email

reminding him that he was required to disclose all employment and businesses and stating,

“provide the name and type of business by which you were able to obtain a Federal PPP Loan and

the purpose for the funds. What is the amount of your loan and the terms? This information was

not listed in your PHI and you did not discuss it in your interview when we covered the financial

issues of your background.” On June 2, 2021, in an email, Adams falsely responded, “My kids

and I have a cleaning company called SuperKleanllc. It’s a janitorial cleaning business. The

amount of the loan was $18,345 and the terms were 60 months at 1.0% interest. The purpose of

the loan was to provide relief and assistance for my small business during the pandemic.”

(emphasis added).

III. Legal Discussion

A. Evidence of Adams’ First PPP Loan and Repeated, Contemporaneous
Submission of Inconsistent Information to the Government Regarding
SuperKlean Is Admissible as Intrinsic and Inextricably Intertwined Evidence

Adams’ first loan application as well as inconsistent submissions in 2019 and 2020 of

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federal and state tax filings, statements to a state law enforcement agency, creation of false

evidence, and identification of false “business expenses” are all part of a single and intertwined

story. These facts and this evidence cannot be excised from Adams’ fraudulent submission of the

second loan application, for which he was indicted and stands trial.

As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “Generally intrinsic evidence includes ‘act[s] that [are]

part of the charged offense’ or ‘some uncharged acts performed contemporaneously with the

charged crime … if they facilitate the commission of the charged crime.’” United States v. Bell,

795 F.3d 88, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir.

2000)); see also United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (approvingly quoting

Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929); United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (approvingly

quoting Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929); United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(“[I]f evidence is offered as direct evidence of a fact in issue, not as circumstantial evidence

requiring an inference regarding the character of the accused, it is properly considered intrinsic.”)

(internal quotations omitted); United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A]cts are

intrinsic when they are inextricably intertwined or [the] acts are part of a single criminal episode

or the other acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Intrinsic evidence is part of the chain of events completing the story of the crime, United States v.

Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 721 (11th Cir. 1992), evidence that is “linked together in time and

circumstances” with the crime charged, United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912 (5th Cir.

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1976), and evidence that is part of a “continuing pattern of criminal activity,” United States v.

Toney, 161 F.3d 404, 413 (6th Cir. 1998). 5

With respect to the 2019 and 2020 tax filings, these documents are inextricably intertwined

with the fraudulent scheme, as the information contained within these documents, which were

contemporaneously filed, is inconsistent with other information submitted in Adams EIDL and

PPP loan applications. For instance, Adams’ 2019 tax filing does not contain a Schedule C form

or any information relevant to SuperKlean. This document is inconsistent with the information

contained in the 2019 Schedule C that Adams caused to be submitted in connection with his first

PPP loan. Similarly, the information contained within Adams’ 2020 federal and state tax filing is

inconsistent with the information he submitted in his EIDL loan application. As set forth in the

Second Superseding Indictment, Adams falsely claimed in his EIDL loan application to have five

employees and that his 11-year-old children were each 25% owners in the company. This

information is inconsistent with the ownership percentages and businesses expenditures declared

in Adams stated and federal returns for Tax Year 2020, where he claimed to be a 90% owner of

the company and did not indicate that he had expenses consistent with five employees. This is

further inconsistent with Adams’ second loan application in which he claimed 100% ownership of

SuperKlean. Put simply, two things cannot be true at once. This inconsistency makes a fact at

issue, whether Adams’ second PPP application was fraudulent, more probable. Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Similarly, the facts surrounding the first loan application, its receipt and use go to the

knowing falsity of the certifications for his second loan application in January 2021. The

5
Should the Court deem the aforementioned proffered evidence as intrinsic, it need not move to
the Rule 404(b) inquiry. Evidence of other crimes or “uncharged conduct is not considered other
crimes” for Rule 404(b) purposes “if it arose out of the same . . . series of transactions as the
charged offense, . . . or if it is necessary to complete the story of the crime [on] trial.” United
States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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certification regarding the use of the funds from the first PPP loan is intrinsic to Count Two as it

is set forth in the indictment. ECF 70 at 7. “‘Evidence that constitutes the very crime being

prosecuted is not prior bad act evidence.’” United States v. Wilkins, 538 F. Supp. 3d 49, 70 (D.D.C.

2021) (quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The first loan

application in this case “facilitated” the second. Bell, 795 F.3d at 100. The first loan application,

its disbursement and use of funds by Adams is also intrinsic to the remaining charges because this

was part of one ongoing scheme. It provides the context and “setting” for the charged conduct

here. United States v. Weinstock, 153 F.3d 272, 277 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he jury is entitled to

know the ‘setting’ of a case. It cannot be expected to make its decision in a void-without knowledge

of the time, place and circumstances of the acts which form the basis of the charge.”). It shows

context that is intrinsic to this matter. United States v. Daniels, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1040 n.1

(D. Kan. 2000) (holding that defendant dentist’s uncharged false statements regarding

tonsillectomies was intrinsic to the charged fraud regarding the dentist’s statements on a loss-of-

taste complication). 6

The government has the burden to prove the falsity of Adams’ statements in the January

2021 application and to prove the falsehood set forth in the indictment, the government must

discuss (a) that Adams applied for and received a first PPP loan and (2) that he did not use the

funds for “eligible expenses.”

With respect to his April 2021 application to the Seattle Police Department, Adams did not

mention any information regarding SuperKlean or the loans he fraudulently obtained — because

6
Also worth considering is the D.C. Circuit’s acknowledgement in United States v. Abou-Khatwa,
40 F.4th 666, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2022), that “the government may ‘rely on proof of scheme activity in
an otherwise time-barred period’” to prove up charges of mail and wire fraud that were indicted.

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he knew it was not a real, operating business and thus that he had nothing to disclose, or because

he feared disclosing his fraudulently-obtained loans would expose criminal conduct. When

confronted, Adams lied, claiming that he had only received $18,345, when he had actually received

approximately $36,690, and falsely claiming that the “purpose of the loan was to provide relief

and assistance for my small business during the pandemic.” In truth and in fact, there was no

business to provide relief or assistance to. Adams false representations were just an effort to

conceal his fraudulent conduct. This false statement occurred approximately two months after he

received his second PPP loan and three months before he applied for loan forgiveness for his first

PPP loan. Adams’ acts of concealment are intrinsic to the offense charged and “forms an integral

and natural part of the account of crimes and is necessary to complete the story of the crimes for

the jury.” United States v. Horner, 2015 WL13357652, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2015).

Finally, after Adams became aware of the nature and scope of the Government’s

investigation in the fall of 2021, Adams created a fake invoice for SuperKlean and falsely

identified business expenditures in response to a grand jury subpoena, all in an effort by Adams to

conceal the fraudulent nature of the PPP loans he obtained and obstruct justice.

B. The Evidence is Alternatively Admissible to Prove Motive, Opportunity,
Intent, Preparation, Plan, Knowledge, Identity, Absence of Mistake, or Lack
of Accident

Evidence of Adams’ repeated, contemporaneous submission of fraudulent information to

the Government regarding SuperKlean alternatively should properly be admitted under Rule

404(b), which governs the admission of other crimes, wrongs, and acts of a defendant. Under the

rule, “other acts” evidence is admissible if offered for a permissible purpose, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident. See United States v. Pindell, 336 F.3d 1049, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540

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U.S. 1200 (2004); United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 825 (1990).

In determining whether “other act” evidence is admissible, the Court applies a two-part

analysis. First, the Court examines whether the evidence is “probative of some material issue

other than character.” United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also United

States v. Douglas, 482 F.3d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“A proper analysis under Rule 404(b)

begins with the question of relevance: is the other crime or act relevant and, if so, relevant to

something other than the defendant’s character or propensity [to commit crime]? If yes, the

evidence is admissible unless excluded under other rules of evidence such as Rule 403.”). The

rule is one of inclusion, not exclusion, and evidence can properly be offered for any purpose other

than solely to prove character. See Douglas, 482 F.3d at 596; United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d

735, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 660-61 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Bowie,

232 F.3d at 929-30; United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc);

Miller, 895 F.2d at 1436.

Second, if the Court deems evidence to have met the first part of this analysis, the Court

should exclude it only if its probative value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1978);

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988); see also United States v. Johnson, 802

F.2d 1459, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“the balance should generally be struck in favor of admission

when the evidence indicates a close relationship to the event charged”) (quoting Day, 591 F.2d at

878). The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence is not

appropriate if the evidence is merely prejudicial; the prejudice must be “unfair.” See United States

v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn’t

22
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material. The prejudice must be unfair.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, the Government is entitled to introduce evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) in its

case-in-chief to anticipate a defendant’s likely defense of lack of intent or knowledge. See, e.g.,

United States v. Brown, 597 F.3d 399, 404 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (extrinsic evidence of defendant’s

“knowledge, motive, and the absence of mistake or accident” was admissible under Rule 404(b)

“to show his specific intent to defraud”); see also United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.

1994) (“[Rule 404(b) other crimes evidence] is admissible during the Government’s case-in-chief

if it is apparent that the defendant will dispute that issue.”); United States v. Harrod, 856 F.2d 996,

1000 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Government may introduce evidence of other acts to establish intent

in its case-in-chief.”); United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 289 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[W]here it

is made clear at the outset of the trial that the defendant’s principal defense is a lack of knowledge

or intent, and thus the issue is unarguably in dispute, the government may take the defendant at his

word and introduce the evidence in its case-in-chief”); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1349

n. 14 (8th Cir. 1985) (“It was not necessary for the government to await defendant’s denial of

intent or knowledge before introducing [Rule 404(b) other crimes] evidence; instead the

government may anticipate the defense and introduce it in its case-in-chief”); United States v.

Hooton, 662 F.2d 628, 635 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted) (“[E]ven in general intent crimes, the

government can offer evidence of other acts as part of its case-in-chief when it is obvious that the

defense will raise lack of intent as a defense.”).

The Government’s evidence regarding Adams’ uncharged acts meets the first part of the

analysis—whether the proposed evidence is probative of a material issue other than character—

because it is probative of Adams’ motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and

absence of mistake or accident, and is therefore admissible for multiple purposes pursuant to Rule

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404(b). See Crowder, 141 F.3d at 1208 (Rule 404(b) evidence “will often have . . . multiple utility,

showing at once intent, knowledge, motive, preparation and the like”).

Here, pretrial briefing and during oral arguments during the leadup to the first trial the

defense made clear the theory Adams believed that he and his “business” were entitled to loans

under the EIDL and PPP programs, that he was unaware that the loan processor had submitted

fraudulent PPP loan applications on his behalf for SuperKlean, and that Adams had not intended

to cause the submission of fraudulent PPP loans. Accordingly, evidence of Adams’ initial

submission of an EIDL loan, as set forth in the Second Superseding Indictment, and tax filings

regarding SuperKlean – specifically the contradictory information across all the government

submissions – establish his personal knowledge and intent of the charged PPP fraud scheme. See

Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 685 (“Extrinsic acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of the

truth as to a disputed issue, especially when that issue involves the actor’s state of mind and the

only means of ascertaining that mental state is by drawing inferences from conduct.”); id. (“the act

in question was ‘similar’ to the one with which he was charged”). Adams’ subsequent efforts to

conceal the charged fraud scheme – through the creation of a fake invoice for SuperKlean, the

false identification of business expenditures, and the false statement to the Seattle Police

Department regarding SuperKlean – also underscore that Adams knew that his loan application

was fraudulent and that he was not legally entitled to the PPP loan. See, e.g., United States v. Han,

962 F.3d 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1736 (2021) (evidence of defendant’s

other fraudulent misrepresentations were probative of intent); United States v. Watson, 894 F.2d

1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding that subsequent extrinsic act was admissible as relevant to

defendant’s intent and knowledge).

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Similarly, all three categories of evidence –the submission of false information, the

improper use of the first loan funds, and his ensuing steps to conceal – also are probative of that

fact that the submission of the second fraudulent PPP loan application on Adams’ behalf was not

a mistake or accident. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 155, 169–70 (3d Cir. 2016)

(evidence that defendant had accepted other bribes was properly admitted as evidence of intent,

knowledge, and absence of mistake). Adams’ repeated submission of false information in the tax

filings – consistent with the information in the PPP loan applications – demonstrates the

preparation and planning Adams undertook to obtain government funds fraudulently. See United

States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1535 (7th Cir. 1985) (evidence of other bad acts – that a judge

had been accepting suspicious envelopes of cash – admissible to show a common plan and combat

defense of mistake). Adams’ contemporaneous submission of inconsistent tax filings regarding

SuperKlean constituted a common plan, not mere accident or mistake, to obtain government funds.

Finally, evidence that Adams falsely identified expenditures for SuperKlean also establish that he

was motivated to obtain government funds for his personal – and not business – use. See United

States v. Bradshaw, 690 F.2d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 1982) (Evidence of motive “is far from irrelevant.

Motive is evidence of the commission of any crime,” even where such motive evidence could show

other criminal conduct.). This is all the more true with respect to admission of evidence on the

first loan. As set forth above, this money was spent on personal expenses, including a trip to Las

Vegas, providing Adams with a strong motive to submit a second fraudulent loan application. The

fact that funds were depleted at the time Adams sought the second loan also shows strong motive

to obtain more funds via a fraudulent loan application.

The Government is not planning to introduce evidence of Adams’ uncharged acts for the

purpose of establishing his character, but to establish his motive, intent, preparation, plan,

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knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident. United States v. Loza, 764 F. Supp. 2d

55, 57 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[A]ny purpose for which evidence is introduced is a proper purpose so

long as the evidence is not offered solely to prove character or criminal propensity.”). The next

step in the analysis, then, is whether the evidence should nevertheless be excluded because its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, the probative

value of evidence of Adams’ submission of fraudulent information to the Government regarding

SuperKlean in various forms – contemporaneous with the PPP fraud scheme in the instant case –

far outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. It is not unfairly prejudicial for the jury to learn that

Adams made similarly false misrepresentations regarding SuperKlean in his initial and

unsuccessful EIDL application and in tax filings, or that he attempted to conceal his fraudulent

procurement of PPP loans by creating a fake SuperKlean invoice and falsely identifying business

expenditures. It similarly is not prejudicial for the jury to hear that Adams submitted a first loan

application and misused those funds as it goes to his knowledge, planning, preparation, and lack

of mistake at the time he made false statements in the January 2021 loan application. Specifically,

his first PPP loan application goes directly to his understanding of the PPP loan process. And his

second PPP loan application is directly related to his experience with his initial application. For

example, he initiated contact G.B., the same loan preparer, referenced that this would be his second

application, and certified in that application that he received and used the original PPP funds for

eligible expenses. In addition, the probative value of this evidence is significant: it goes directly

to the central issue in the case, Adams’s mental state and intent when he submitted and caused to

be submitted the false and fraudulent claims about SuperKlean. Moreover, the Rule 404(b)

evidence will be presented in limited form through testimony and documents as described above,

and will not prolong the Government’s presentation. In addition, in order to avoid any potential

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prejudice, the Court can provide the jury with a limiting instruction to consider the evidence only

for its intended, proper purposes. See U.S. v. Brown, 597 F.3d 399, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The

district court’s limiting instructions guarded against the jury’s reliance on impermissible inferences

that might have been drawn from the Rule 404(b) evidence.”).

C. The Fact that Adams Was Acquitted of Count One is of No Moment in this
Analysis

Courts have consistently acknowledged that previously acquitted conduct may properly be

introduced pursuant to Rule 404(b). This Circuit has acknowledged that previously acquitted

conduct may be introduced in a subsequent case. United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 661 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (“The other activity need not have resulted in a charge or conviction; indeed, the

defendant may even have been acquitted of the conduct, or the conduct may have been entirely

lawful.”) (abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Mohammed, 89 F.4th 158 (D.C. Cir.

2023)); see also United States v. Hite, 916 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123 n.8 (D.D.C. 2013). “The Supreme

Court has recognized that evidence on acquitted conduct may be admissible under Rule 404(b)

because the Rule has a lower standard of proof than that required for a conviction.” United States

v. Rosario, 931 F. Supp. 2d 75, 77 n.2 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.

342, 349, 110 S. Ct. 668, 672, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1990) (“Our decision is consistent with other

cases where we have held that an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government

from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard

of proof.”)). Here, there is a preponderance of evidence, in the form of receipts, text messages,

and emails, that Adams applied for the first PPP loan and used the funds for ineligible expenses.

While the government does not intend to relitigate the merits of the acquitted conduct, the

government should be permitted to admit information from the first PPP loan to establish the falsity

of the information in the second PPP loan application and to establish the Adams knowledge of

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the PPP loan process. 7

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully requests permission to introduce

the above-described evidence as intrinsic evidence or other crimes evidence pursuant to Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b).

Respectfully Submitted,

Jeanine Ferris Pirro
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Caelainn Carney
Caelainn Carney (N.Y. Bar No. 5751672)
Sarah C. Santiago (GA Bar No. 724304)
Assistant United States Attorneys
United States Attorney’s Office
601 D Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Email: caelainn.carney@usdoj.gov
Telephone: 202-714-6433

7
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Vega, 676 F.3d 708, 719 (8th Cir. 2012), considered the
admission of acquitted conduct in the retrial of a drug trafficking case. The District Court allowed
the facts of a prior acquitted drug transaction into evidence where the defendant was being tried
for trafficking methamphetamine in connection with the execution of a search warrant ten days
after the first incident. Notably, based on the recitation of facts by the Eighth Circuit, the
government was not limited in its account of the first transaction. Id. at 713. In affirming the
District Court, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the offenses were close in time and of the
same type, particularly with respect to the fact that the defendant used the same distinctive drug
packaging across the two incidents. Id. at 719. And the court acknowledged that any prejudice to
the defendant was properly managed via a limiting instruction regarding the evidence. Id. at 720.
Similarly, here, Adams used the same modus operandi, that is the same loan preparer, information,
and application process for both his first and second PPP loan applications.

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