Declaration of Matthew Bernhard — Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann (W.D. Wis.)

Summary

A Declaration of Matthew Bernhard (Document 371, 17 pages) in Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, No. 20-cv-249-wmc, and related cases in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. Bernhard states that he is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan in Computer Science with a focus on computer security and that he has studied cyber-security in voting systems since 2012. He states that he has served as an expert witness in voting related cases and testified before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. He states that the relief proposed by the Gear Plaintiffs is secure and that they asked him to review their proposed relief.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Date: 2020-07-08

Cite this document

“Declaration of Matthew Bernhard — Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann (W.D. Wis.).” Original at archive.org, dated 2020-07-08. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/gov-uscourts-wiwd-45522-371-0-5b82b047a4/, SHA-256 e74bfc6740f1c31cefbdbf952d932c21edf61ffce6c5f72fa4329ca348d1be7f.

Full text

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 1 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
and DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WISCONSIN,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 20-cv-249-wmc

MARGE BOSTELMANN, JULIE M. GLANCEY, ANN S.
JACOBS, DEAN KNUDSON, ROBERT F. SPINDELL, JR.
and MARK L. THOMSEN,

Defendants,

and

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
and REPUBLICAN PARTY OF WISCONSIN,

Intervening Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

SYLVIA GEAR, CLAIRE WHELAN, WISCONSIN
ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS, LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS OF WISCONSIN, KATHERINE
KOHLBECK, DIANE FERGOT, GARY FERGOT,
BONIBET BAHR OLSAN, SHEILA JOZWIK, and
GREGG JOZWIK,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 20-cv-278-wmc

MARGE BOSTELMANN, JULIE M. GLANCEY, ANN S.
JACOBS, DEAN KNUDSON, ROBERT F. SPINDELL, JR.,
MARK L. THOMSEN, and MEAGAN WOLFE,

Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________

CHRYSTAL EDWARDS, TERRON EDWARDS, JOHN
JACOBSON, CATHERINE COOPER, KILEIGH HANNAH,

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 2 of 17

KRISTOPHER ROWE, KATIE ROWE, CHARLES DENNERT,
JEAN ACKERMAN, WILLIAM LASKE, JAN GRAVELINE,
TODD GRAVELINE, ANGELA WEST, DOUGLAS WEST,
and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 20-cv-340-wmc

ROBIN VOS, SCOTT FITZGERALD, WISCONSIN STATE
ASSEMBLY, WISCONSIN STATE SENATE, WISCONSIN
ELECTIONS COMMISSION, MARGE BOSTELMANN,
JULIE M. GLANCEY, ANN S. JACOBS, DEAN KNUDSON,
ROBERT F. SPINDELL, JR., MARK L. THOMSEN, and
MEAGAN WOLFE,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

JILL SWENSON, MELODY McCURTIS, MARIA NELSON,
BLACK LEADERS ORGANIZING FOR COMMUNITIES,
DISABILITY RIGHTS WISCONSIN

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 20-cv-459-wmc

MARGE BOSTELMANN, JULIE M. GLANCEY, ANN S.
JACOBS, DEAN KNUDSON, ROBERT F. SPINDELL, JR.,
MARK L. THOMSEN, and MEAGAN WOLFE,

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF MATTHEW BERNHARD

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 3 of 17

1. I am a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan in Computer Science with a focus on

computer security. I received my Bachelor’s degree from Rice University, and my Master’s

in Computer Science from the University of Michigan.

2. I have focused my study in the field of computer science, including cyber-security in voting

systems since 2012, including specific work on new, secure voting technology (the STAR-

Vote system from Austin, Texas). I have worked with the Verified Voting Foundation on

gathering data about currently deployed voting systems. I consulted with a political

candidate’s campaign in 2016 to assess threat models and incident reports in Michigan,

Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. I have worked with other experts in the field to provide a

theoretical survey of properties of election security and served as an expert witness in

voting related cases in the state of Georgia (Coalition for Good Governance, et al. v.

Crittenden et al., 2018CV31348) and federal court (Curling, et al. v. Raffensperger, et al.

1:17-cv-2989-AT, Shelby Advocates for Valid Elections, et al., v. Hargett, et al. No. 2:18-

cv-02706). I have produced award-winning research about election systems and their

security.

3. I have published and spoken extensively about cybersecurity and other risks of electronic

voting systems and have assisted in preparation of other experts for Congressional

testimony concerning these topics. I have testified before the U.S. Commission on Civil

Rights about the security realities of voting in the United States.

4. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Exhibit A.

The relief proposed by the Gear Plaintiffs is secure.

5. The Gear Plaintiffs have asked me to review their proposed relief for their claims

challenging the failure to deliver absentee ballots and to evaluate the security implications

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 4 of 17

of enabling domestic Wisconsin voters to request replacement ballots via the online portal

myvote.wi.gov (hereinafter “MyVote”).

6. I have reviewed the plaintiff’s proposal in their First Amended Complaint and their

preliminary injunction motion, and it is my opinion that said proposal does not pose a

security risk to voters in Wisconsin. The scope of the relief is narrow and will only affect

voters who do not receive their absentee ballot in time to cast it in the election.

7. I have reviewed the Wisconsin Election Commission (“WEC”) report on the absentee

voting delivery issues for the April 7th election,1 as well as portions of the deposition

transcript from Meagan Wolfe’s July 3, 2020 deposition, the declarations submitted by

current and former municipal clerks Tara Coolidge, Maribeth Witzel-Behl, and Debra

Salas, as well as the MyVote manual.2

8. Based on the testimony of clerks in Wisconsin, my understanding of the MyVote process

for downloading an absentee ballot, and my expertise in the field of cybersecurity and

election security, it is my opinion that Plaintiffs’ proposed remediation does not pose any

additional security risk to Wisconsin elections.

9. This opinion is based on four facts: (1) the subset of voters who will have access to the

proposed relief is limited; (2) the voters who can use the proposed relief will have been

authenticated already and will also have to authenticate to MyVote using additional

credentials; (3) the WEC has robust, defense-in-depth procedures for preventing fraud in

1
Wisconsin Elections Commission, April 7, 2020 Absentee Voting Report (“Post-Election
Absentee Voting Report”) (May 15, 2020),
https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/2020-
05/April%202020%20Absentee%20Voting%20Report.pdf.
2
Wisconsin Elections Commission, MyVote Wisconsin: A Guide to the MyVote Wisconsin
Website for Voters and Clerks, at 20-21,
https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/publication/65/myvote_manual_sept_2016_p
df_21316.pdf.

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 5 of 17

absentee ballots; and (4) fraud in elections in the United States and in Wisconsin in

particular is so rare as to be functionally non-existent.

Access to MyVote ballot downloads will be highly restricted.

10. Voters who gain the ability to download a ballot through MyVote will only be able to do

so if they have previously requested and not received an absentee ballot via mail, and only

if they do so within a specified window of time. Limiting the use of MyVote’s mail-in

absentee ballot portal in this way is a well-established security practice in election security

literature.3,4

11. While there is no evidence that voter ID requirements have an impact on the prevention of

voter fraud,5 voters who will use MyVote to access a replacement absentee ballot will have

already met the voter ID requirements in Wisconsin. These voters will thus have reached a

higher bar of authentication than military and overseas voters, who are exempt from the

photo identification verification requirement.

12. The MyVote portal already uses standard identity authentication information by requiring

the voter input their name, date of birth, and the last four digits of their Social Security

Numbers6 (which have been established as the most secure part of SSNs by Acquisti and

Gross).7

3
Bernhard, Matthew, Allison McDonald, Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Nakul Bajaj, Kevin Chang,
and J. Alex Halderman. "Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking
Devices?." In 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 2020.
4
Appel, Andrew W., Richard A. DeMillo, and Philip B. Stark. "Ballot-Marking Devices Cannot
Ensure the Will of the Voters." Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy (2020).
5
Cantoni, Enrico, and Vincent Pons. Strict ID Laws Don't Stop Voters: Evidence from a US Nationwide
Panel, 2008–2016. No. w25522. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2019.
6
Wolfe Tr. at 156:16-157:2
7
Acquisti, Alessandro, and Ralph Gross. "Predicting social security numbers from public data."
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 27 (2009): 10975-10980.

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 6 of 17

13. Plaintiffs’ proposed relief would not consist of substantive changes to the existing

workflow of the MyVote ballot retrieval process. As voters’ photo IDs will have already

been verified by their clerk and input in MyVote, the MyVote page only needs to make one

transaction with personally identifiable information (PII), in which voters request a

replacement ballot through the MyVote page in the same way that military and overseas

voters currently do. The MyVote page would then have to confirm that a photo ID

verification had already taken place, which it can do in the same check it performs on the

voter’s name, date of birth, and the last 4 digits of their SSN, and then build and send a

ballot back to the voter. This should only require one transaction of PII, not two as indicated

by Administrator Meagan Wolfe in her deposition. 20-cv-249, dkt. 247, Wolfe Tr. 155:18-

21.

14. Since the proposed relief would require only one transaction with personally identifiable

information (PII), it will be functionally the same as the existing workflow, which is

acknowledged by the WEC Administrator as secure: “[T]here’s only, you know, one point

of that data exchange, right, for them because there isn't that intermediary step but, yes, we

– we consider it to be very secure89

15. The MyVote portal prohibits the ability to download the ballot more than three times.10

While this does not preclude the ability to copy the ballot once downloaded, it is a robust

safeguard that balances the voter’s right to ballot access against the risk of any security

breach, however remote or unlikely to affect the election.

9
Wolfe Tr. 157:6-9.
10
MyVote Manual, page 21.

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 7 of 17

16. Voters’ requests to use the portal will also result in their clerk cancelling their existing mail

ballot request, eliminating the possibility that a voter can have multiple live ballots issued

at once, and therefore eliminating any opportunity for double voting.

17. That access to the portal for replacement ballots could be further limited in time restricts

the access to the system even more. It is unlikely that actors seeking to commit fraud would

be able to take advantage of the MyVote portal, for the aforementioned reasons, but also

because a week is not enough time to fraudulently access and submit a substantial number

of fraudulent ballots.

Voter fraud in the United States is practically non-existent.

18. Voter fraud is exceedingly rare. Existing literature has found fewer than 100 fraudulently

cast votes (where a voter has submitted a ballot that was not theirs) over the past twenty

years of elections in the United States. Over that time, billions of ballots were cast, making

the rate of fraud vanishingly small.11,12

19. I have reviewed the deposition of Administrator Meagan Wolfe, in which she indicated

that she has no knowledge of anyone committing fraud using the MyVote portal in its

capacity to facilitate online ballot delivery.13

Wisconsin’s absentee balloting process has defense in depth.

20. Another significant mitigation to the risk of fraud against this system is that it still

ultimately relies on paper ballots sent through physical mail, to date one of the most secure

and verifiable election schemes as noted by the National Academies of Science,

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Briefing_Memo_Debunking_Voter_Fr
aud_Myth.pdf
12
Schultz, David. "Less than fundamental: The myth of voter fraud and the coming of the second
great disenfranchisement." Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 34 (2007): 483.
13
Wolfe Tr. at 160:17-161:4.

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 8 of 17

Engineering, and Medicine.14 This elides potential security issues with online ballot

marking, as reported by Specter et al.15 and Specter and Halderman.16 That voters can print

out and hand-mark their ballots also mitigates issues with ballot marking, as noted in

Bernhard et al.,17 Appel et al.,18 and Kortum et al.19

21. An attacker seeking to commit fraud using the proposed relief would have to ascertain that

the voter has requested an absentee ballot, hope that the voter does not receive or mail their

actual ballot in time, correctly guess the voter’s login credentials, send the ballot from an

unsuspicious address, and provide a voter signature that does not arouse suspicion.

22. An attacker who could overcome those significant burdens of fraudulently requesting

online ballot delivery would still not be able to scale an attack to more than a small number

of voters, because of the difficulty of pulling off the attack for even one voter and the

limited amount of time available with which to mount such an attack.

23. Moreover, the more votes an attacker tries to cast fraudulently, the more likely it is they

will be detected. Acquisti demonstrated that it would require at least 20 attempts for an

attacker to correctly guess the last four digits of just one SSN, with the median requiring

thousands of attempts.20 If the attacker was making these attempts on the MyVote page,

14
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Securing the Vote: Protecting
American Democracy. National Academies Press, 2018.
15
Specter, Michael A., James Koppel, and D. Weitnzer. "The Ballot is Busted Before the
Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in US
Federal Elections." Preprint available at: https://internetpolicy. mit. edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/SecurityAnalysisOfVoatz_Public. pdf (2020).
16
Specter, Michael A., and J. Alex Halderman. "Security Analysis of the Democracy Live
Online Voting System." (2020).
17
See footnote 3.
18
See footnote 4.
19
Kortum, Philip, Michael D. Byrne, and Julie Whitmore. "Voter Verification of BMD Ballots Is
a Two-Part Question: Can They? Mostly, They Can. Do They? Mostly, They Don't." arXiv
preprint arXiv:2003.04997 (2020).
20
See footnote 6.

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 9 of 17

their web traffic would be easily identifiable as fraud. Moreover, as absentee ballots for the

voters we are discussing will be sent largely to addresses within Wisconsin, an attacker

will find it difficult to send ballots from enough addresses the not arouse suspicion.

Moreover, the voters the attacker is trying to cast votes in place of are also likely to notice

that they have not received their ballots. Of note, it is for exactly this reason that one of the

largest and most recent cases of voter fraud was detected and prevented: voters notifying

their clerk that they did not receive their ballot, or that someone attempted to cast it for

them.21

24. Because of the many layered defenses the WEC already has in place on absentee voting

and online ballot delivery, a concept known as defense in depth, the already vanishingly

small likelihood of fraud is all but completely eliminated. To quote from the Department

of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA):

Layering security defenses in an application can reduce the chance of a successful
attack. Incorporating redundant security mechanisms requires an attacker to
circumvent each mechanism to gain access to a digital asset. For example, a
software system with authentication checks may prevent an attacker that has
subverted a firewall. Defending an application with multiple layers can prevent a
single point of failure that compromises the security of the application.22

25. To summarize, because the pool of voters who will be eligible to receive their ballots

through MyVote will be limited, said pool of voters will have already had their identities

verified by their clerk, the window of time in which voters can access MyVote to request

a replacement ballot is short, because fraud is known to be practically non-existent, and

because Wisconsin has significant defense-in-depth measures to prevent fraud and other

21
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/30/746800630/north-carolina-gop-operative-faces-new-felony-
charges-that-allege-ballot-fraud
22
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/bsi/articles/knowledge/principles/defense-in-depth

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 10 of 17

attacks, extending the usage of the MyVote portal to domestic civilian voters who do not

receive their mail-in ballot in time to cast it in the November election does not pose a risk

to the integrity of that election.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this 8th day of July, 2020.
s/Matthew Bernhard

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 11 of 17

EXHIBIT A

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 12 of 17

Matthew Bernhard
Ph.D. Candidate,
2260 Hayward Street
Computer Science and Engineering Ann Arbor, mi 48109 usa
University of Michigan matber@umich.edu

July 8, 2020 mbernhard.com

Research Overview
My research focuses on areas where the security and privacy implications of sophisticated
systems impacts users in the real world. My interests include election security, usability,
human-computer interaction, censorship measurement and resistance, Internet measurement,
cryptography, statistics, and systems security. I’m also interested in the intersection of computer
science, psychology, politics, and policy.

Education
– Ph.D in Computer Science, University of Michigan, Expected July 2020
Election Security is Harder Than You Think
Advisor: J. Alex Halderman
Committee: Nikola Banovic, Peter Honeyman, Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Ronald L. Rivest
– M.S. in Computer Science, University of Michigan, Summer 2018
– B.A. in Computer Science, Rice University, Spring 2015
Advisor: Dan S. Wallach

Refereed Conference Publications
[1] Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices?
Matthew Bernhard, Allison McDonald, Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Nakul Bajaj, Kevin Chang,
and J. Alex Halderman
In Proceedings of the 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(Oakland’20) , May 2020.
Best Student Paper Award
[2] Decentralized Control: A Case Study of Russia
Reethika Ramesh, Ram Sundara Raman, Matthew Bernhard, Victor Ongkowijaya, Leonid
Evdokimov, Anne Edmundson, Steven Sprecher, Muhammad Ikram, and Roya Ensafi
In Proceedings of the 27th Network and Distributed Systems Symposium
(NDSS’20) , February 2020.
[3] UnclearBallot: Automated Ballot Image Manipulation
Matthew Bernhard, Kartikeya Kandula, Jeremy Wink, and J. Alex Halderman
In Proceedings of the 4th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting
(E-Vote-ID’19) , October 2019.

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[4] On the Usability of HTTPS Deployment
Matthew Bernhard, Jonathan Sharman, Claudia Ziegler Acemyan, Philip Kortum, Dan S.
Wallach, and J. Alex Halderman
In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Human Factors on Computing Systems
(CHI’19) , May 2019.
[5] 403 Forbidden: A Global View of CDN Geoblocking
Allison McDonald, Matthew Bernhard, Luke Valenta, Benjamin VanderSloot, Will Scott, Nick
Sullivan, J. Alex Halderman, Roya Ensafi
In Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC’18) , November 2018.
[6] Public Evidence from Secret Ballots
Matthew Bernhard, Josh Benaloh, J. Alex Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Philip
B. Stark, Vanessa Teague, Poorvi L. Vora, and Dan S. Wallach
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting
(E-Vote-ID’17) , October 2017.
[7] Understanding the Mirai Botnet
Manos Antonakakis, Tim April, Michael Bailey, Matthew Bernhard, Elie Bursztein, Jaime
Cochran, Zakir Durumeric, J. Alex Halderman, Luca Invernizzi, Michalis Kallitsis, Deepak
Kumar, Chaz Lever, Zane Ma, Joshua Mason, Damian Menscher, Chad Seaman, Nick Sullivan,
Kurt Thomas, and Yi Zhou
In Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX’17) , August 2017.
[8] Implementing Attestable Kiosks
Matthew Bernhard, J. Alex Halderman, and Gabe Stocco
In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE Conference on Privacy, Security, and Trust
(PST’16) , December 2016.
[9] Towards a Complete View of the Certificate Ecosystem
Benjamin VanderSloot, Johanna Amann, Matthew Bernhard, Zakir Durumeric, Michael Bailey,
and J. Alex Halderman
In Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference
(IMC’16) , November 2016.

Refereed Workshop Publications
[10] Bernoulli Ballot-Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits
Kellie Ottoboni, Matthew Bernhard, J. Alex Halderman, Ronald L. Rivest, and Philip B. Stark
In Proceedings of the 4th Annual Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting
(Voting’19) , February 2019.

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[11] Voting Technologies, Recount Methods and Votes in Wisconsin and Michigan in 2016
Walter R. Mebane, Jr. and Matthew Bernhard
In Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting
(Voting’18) , February 2019.

Selected Other Publications
[12] The Security Challenges of Online Voting Have Not Gone Away
Robert Cunningham, Matthew Bernhard, and J. Alex Halderman
In IEEE Spectrum, November 2016.

Speaking
Major Invited Talks and Keynotes
– Recount 2016 and Student Voter Engagement
University of Pennsylvania Voter Engagement Week, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September
2019.
– U.S. Civil Rights Commission testimony on voter registration security
Michigan Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Detroit, Michigan, April
2019.
– Panel: Next Generation Voting Systems (moderator)
Election Verification Network Conference, Washington, D.C., March 2019.
– Panel: Usability and Voter Verification (moderator)
Election Verification Network Conference, Washington, D.C., March 2019.
– A Crash Course on Election Security
2018 DEF CON Voting Village, Las Vegas, Nevada, August 2018.
– Panel: Do We Want a Recount or Not?
Election Verification Network Conference, Washington, D.C., March 2017.
– Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election
2017 RoadSec, São Paulo, Brazil, November 2017.
– Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election
33rd Chaos Communications Congress, Hamburg, Germany, December 2016.

Selected Talks
– Cybersecurity and U.S. Elections
Invited speaker, RoadSec Pro, São Paulo, Brazil, November 2017; Invited speaker, Workshop on
Electoral Technologies, Brasilia, Brazil, June 2017;
– Internet Pinball: The Security and Privacy Impact of Redirects
Mozilla Security Research Summit, San Francisco, California, May 2019.

Case: 3:20-cv-00249-wmc Document #: 371 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 15 of 17

– Election Security and You
Midwest Security Workshop, Chicago, Illinois, April 2019.
– Coercion-resistant, Receipt-free, and Paperless Voting
Rump session at Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2019, St. Kitts, February 2019.
– 403 Forbidden: A Global View of Geoblocking
Rump session, 9th USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet
(FOCI’18), Baltimore, Maryland, August 2018.
– A Constitutional Argument Against Burr-Feinstein
Rump session, 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX’16), Austin, Texas, August 2017.

Advising and Mentoring
Undergraduate Independent Work
– 2019: Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Thea Lau, Chand Rajendra-Nicolucci, Antonio Atkinson,
Jeremy Wink, Kartikey Kandula
– 2020: Henry Meng, Jensen Hwa, Nakul Bajaj, Atreya Tata, Ryan Feng

Teaching
– Graduate Student Instructor, Election Cybersecurity (Fall 2018)
EECS 498, University of Michigan
Assisted with design and teaching of an undergraduate research course into election security. Lectured,
wrote homework assignments, and oversaw ten undergraduate independent research projects.
– Graduate Student Instructor, Introduction to Computer Security (Winter 2018)
EECS 388, University of Michigan
Led discussion section, wrote and graded assignments, and lectured.
– Course Operations Liaison, Securing Digital Democracy (2014–2018)
Coursera (MOOC), University of Michigan
Assisted with content maintenance and day-to-day course operations for a massive, open online course
about electronic voting and Internet voting technologies.
– Teaching Assistant, Fundamentals of Parallel Programming (Spring 2015)
COMP 322, Rice University
Shaped curriculum and led lab discussions for a introductory course on parallel programming featuring
Java parallelism and Apache Spark
– Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Program Design (Fall 2014)
COMP 215, Rice University
Led lab discussions and wrote and reviewed assignments and exams for an introductory course on Java
and Object Oriented Programming

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Professional Service
Program Committee

– 30th USENIX Security Symposium (Sec’21)
– Program co-chair, 6th Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting (Voting’21)
– Fifth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID’20)
– Program co-chair, 5th Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting (Voting’20)

External Reviewer
– Election Law Journal
– ACM Conferences on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI’20)
– USENIX Security Symposium (Sec’19)
– ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC’18)
– ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’18)
– International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses (RAID’18)
– ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’17)
– Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS’17)
– IEEE Conference on Privacy, Security, and Trust (PST’16)

Broader Impact of Selected Projects
– Implementing Better Election Security (2018–present)
Currently working with the State of Michigan and municipalities across the state to pilot risk-limiting
audits to help secure Michigan’s elections. Developed software that interfaces with voting technology to
enable ballot comparison audits.
– Fighting Weak IoT Security (2017)
Applied machine learning techniques to Internet measurement data to identify make and model
of consumer devices that were infected by the Mirai botnet. Data has been used in ongoing legal
proceedings by the Federal Trade Commission to encourage U.S. manufacturers to improve the default
security of their devices.
– 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Recounts (2016)
Supported efforts to detect vote manipulation in the 2016 election in Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Pennsylvania. While progress was hindered and in places entirely halted due to political and legal
reasons, what little evidence htat was generated did not show that the 2016 Presidential election was
fraudulent.

Professional Experience
– Expert Witness (2018–present)
Served as an expert witness in several lawsuits opposing the use of direct-recording electronic voting
machines. Curling et al. v. Raffensperger, CGG v. Crittenden, Shelby Advocates for Valid Elections et al. v.
Hargett et al.

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– Software Engineering Consultant for VotingWorks (June 2019–present)
Implemented risk-limiting audit math for VotingWorks’ open source risk-limiting audit tool Arlo.
– Data Science Consultant for Verified Voting (June 2018–September 2019)
Collected and interpreted data on currently certified voting equipment in the United States to empower
municipalities to make intelligent purchasing decisions. Focus on the cyber security impacts of voting
technology.
– Cryptography Intern, Cloudflare (2017)
Developed Certificate Transparency monitoring features. Also built an SSL detector to determine what
SSL settings customer sites can support, under the advising of Nick Sullivan.
– Microsoft Research Intern (2015)
Explored applications of trusted platform modules (TPMs) in voting through interfaces provided by
Windows 10 under the advising of Josh Benaloh.

File and source

File: gov.uscourts.wiwd.45522.371.0.pdf
Size: 316,330 bytes
SHA-256: e74bfc6740f1c31cefbdbf952d932c21edf61ffce6c5f72fa4329ca348d1be7f
Our copy: gov.uscourts.wiwd.45522.371.0.pdf
Original: archive.org