Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Motion to Suppress — United States v. Ryan Dales (D. Md., 10/16/24)

Summary

A defense motion filed 10/16/24 as Document 76 in United States v. Ryan Dales, Cr. No. GLR-23-026, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. It asks the Court to reconsider the denial, from the bench at a May 3, 2024 hearing, of the motion to suppress evidence seized in the January 20, 2023 search, arguing the Court treated subsequent identity fraud allegations as if they were part of the search warrant affidavit. The motion states that the affidavit alleged only Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) tied to COVID loan applications, with the last activity by September, 2021, sixteen months before the search. A second argument states that the affidavit gives no source for the assertion that the IP address used for the applications resolved to Volunteers of America, and that Leon does not apply. It is signed /s/ by Richard Bardos.

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“Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Motion to Suppress — United States v. Ryan Dales (D. Md., 10/16/24).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/gov-uscourts-mdd-529188-76-0-2dd714ee8f/, SHA-256 2e1ea510afef827cdd8dcd1f53b122a894c8c0af38eab53c8b290dbe69cb741c.

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Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *

V. * Cr. No. GLR-23-026

RYAN DALES *

Defendant *

For: RYAN DALES *

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DENIAL OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

RYAN DALES, by his undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this motion to

reconsider the Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized on January 20,

2023, and to grant that motion and as grounds states:

INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2023, law enforcement from several sectors executed a search

warrant on the premises at 900 East Fort Avenue in Baltimore. On October 10, 2023,

defendant filed a motion to suppress the various items seized in the search, asserting that

the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked probable cause with regard to

timeliness and any nexus between the crimes alleged and the placed searched.

The affidavit in support of the search warrant alleged crimes related to fraudulent

COVID loans, such applications occurring on December 15 and 29, 2020 and March 24,

2021 (the “COVID loans” or “COVID applications”).1 The last payment for any of

1
There were actually two searches of 900 East Fort Avenue on January 20, 2023.
After entry for the COVID loan fraud warrant, officers assert that drugs and guns were in
plain view during the search. They stopped the fraud search and proceeded to obtain a
second warrant to search for guns and drugs. The motion to suppress concerns only the
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 2 of 11

these loans, per the affidavit, was made by September, 2021. It is undisputed that no

activity related to these alleged offenses occurred after September, 2021, sixteen months

before the search in January, 2023. No other crimes are alleged in the search warrant

affidavit.2 The search warrant sought information related to the PPP and EIDL frauds.

The fraudulent COVID loan applications are alleged in count one of the superseding

indictment filed in May, 2023. ECF 35.

Many incriminating items were discovered in the search, including drugs, guns and,

relevant here, driver’s licenses with Mr. Dales’ photo but another person’s name.

Using these newly found documents, investigation after the search disclosed the alleged

us of these records to commit other, commercial fraud against various private companies.

These allegations are contained in counts five through eight of the second superseding

indictment and are alleged to have occurred in August and September, 2022, a year after

the COVID loan activity ended. Because these items were discovered in the January

20, 2023, search, allegations about these offenses were not included in the search warrant

affidavit for the January search.

On May 3, 2024, this Court held a hearing on the motion. After hearing from the

parties, the Court denied the motion from the bench.

THE HEARING ON MAY 3, 2024

At the beginning, and then at the end, of the hearing, instead of the single

Government fraud allegation in the search warrant affidavit, the Court included the

absence of probable cause in affidavit for the first search; of course if the first search is
suppressed, any subsequent search relying on the first would also be suppressed.
2
The affidavit does reference iCloud photos of false identification documents but does
not provide the dates of those images. More importantly, the affidavit does not allege
that the documents were ever used in any offense.
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 3 of 11

subsequent identity fraud allegations as if they were part of the January, 2023, affidavit.

The Court began: “A warrant was executed on January 20, 2023. The warrant actually

was applied for and issued two days earlier. Inside the warranted affidavit it alleges

through the agent that there was reason to believe that evidence of a criminal fraud would

be present at the individual location. There were two investigations of fraud.” Tr.at 4.3

(emphasis added). The Court, still referring to the contents of the January, 2023,

affidavit, listed the two investigations: “One related to a -- an identity sort of fraud, an

insurance fraud, and a pandemic fraud scheme. In one of the fraud schemes the Defendant

identified himself through identification -- don't worry about -- I'm not worried about the

furrowed brows, if I make a mistake you guys are going to tell me. And then in the

second -- one of the other frauds there were other individuals' identities that were

assumed for the purposes of obtaining Government monies. In addition, there was a

second fraud that was related to actually defrauding other institutions that were not

Government controlled.” Id., at 4-5. (emphasis added). While the “second fraud” is

alleged in the second superseding indictment, it is not, in fact, alleged as a crime in the

January, 2023, affidavit.

At the end of the hearing, the Court continued to refer to the “second fraud” as part

of the support for probable cause in the affidavit at issue. While rendering its ruling, the

Court stated “[t]here's sufficient evidence within the affidavit itself that the cell phone

was used by this Defendant at the location, although there is some time that did pass

between the two alleged fraudulent acts. It's noteworthy that the Defendant was indeed on

3
The full transcript is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 4 of 11

supervised release for a fraud-related crime and committed this act while -- at least one of

these acts while he was on supervised release.” Id., at 55. (Emphasis added). This

statement by the Court contributed to the Court’s finding of an “ongoing” fraud, well past

September, 2021: “[t]here was an assertion within the affidavit that the crime, if not direct

and express, was ongoing. The Defendant was on supervised release for a fraud. He

committed one fraud while in VOA and then within a relatively -- what this Court

considers a relatively short period of time, connected in another fraud. Id., at 56.

(Emphasis added).

As a result, the Court found a sufficient nexus in time between the “ongoing” frauds

and the January 20, 2023, search.

ARGUMENT

I. The affidavit does not allege probable cause for crimes committed in 20224

The search warrant affidavit makes clear both the crimes it alleges and the details of

those crimes. In paragraph 15, it states “Based on your Affiant’s investigation, and the

facts set forth in this affidavit, I submit probable cause exists to believe that violations of

Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) (the TARGET OFFENSE)…” ECF 58-1, p. 5. The

affidavit then details the investigation into the target offenses:

29. Based on my investigation to date, I have identified various UI, EIDL,
and PPP applications submitted in the name of DALES and purported
businesses that he allegedly operated or controlled beginning in or about
December 2020 when he began residing at the halfway house and continuing

4
The point of this motion for reconsideration is to ask the Court to reconsider its
ruling in light of statements made by the Court regarding multiple areas of fraud alleged
in the affidavit when only one was actually alleged. Therefore, all of the defendant’s
prior arguments regarding staleness and nexus are not repeated herein, but although not
listed herein, the defendant incorporates in this memorandum all prior arguments made
with regard to this motion.
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 5 of 11

thereafter. These UI, EIDL, and PPP applications contained false statements
and misrepresentations regarding DALES, his employment, and purported
businesses. At times, the applications included fabricated documents,
including fake and fraudulent Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax records.

30. All loan applications and supporting documents were submitted by
DALES to MD DOL or the SBA (or through SBA authorized lenders)
electronically via the internet, causing interstate wire communications to be
sent in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. They are discussed in turn below.

ECF 58-1, pp. 29-30. The only crimes investigated, alleged, or “discussed below”

in the affidavit, i.e., the specific target offenses, involve the COVID loans and not

any other offenses, such as identity theft.

The critical aspect of the defendant’s motion with regard to staleness was that the last

criminal act alleged in the affidavit occurred in September, 2021, when payment was

made due to one of the fraudulent COVID applications. No criminal acts are alleged

after that date with regard to the crimes identified in support of the search warrant.

Obviously, the timing argument is vastly different had the affidavit alleged offenses

that occurred a year later, in September, 2022. That date would put the most recent

criminal allegation only about four months before the search. By importing the

subsequently charged counts into the January, 2023, affidavit, the Court materially and

critically changed the specific timing of the stale evidence.

Without this “second” investigation being part of the January, 2023, affidavit, the

affidavit fails, both on staleness and nexus grounds. As for staleness, when only the

COVID loan applications are considered, the latest act regarding these offenses occurred,

per the affidavit itself, in September 2021, sixteen months before the search, with no

illegal activity in the interim. And, because the COVID applications were claimed to be

filed from the VOA, search of a different address, with no evidence of any illegal activity
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 6 of 11

whatsoever occurring there cannot meet the nexus requirement for search warrants that

the affidavit must show that “ there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a

crime will be found in a particular place. ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

Thus, “[i]n determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, the

crucial element is not whether the target of the search is suspected of a crime, but whether

it is reasonable to believe that the items to be seized will be found in the place to be

searched.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 & n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1976-77

& n. 6, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978).” United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582 (4th Cir.

1993). “In this and other circuits, residential searches have been upheld only where

some information links the criminal activity to the defendant's residence.” Lalor, at

1583. Without the critical allegation seeking to connect the IP address to VOA, the

affidavit fails to even suggest that electronic evidence could be in Mr. Dales’ phone 16

months later.

II. The affidavit fails to provide any source or validity to its conclusion that the IP
address used in the COVID loans was associated with the Volunteers of America nad
therefore fails the requirements of the Spenelli-Aquilar analysis5

Although the COVID loans were filed using Dales’ name and personal information,

those facts alone do not support a finding that Dales filed the claim; particularly in a

case that otherwise alleges identity theft; it is patent that someone other than Dales

could have used his information. What connects Dales to the filings, and the only

evidence that connects him to the filings, according to the affidavit, is the alleged

5
This second argument was not presented in the defendant’s prior arguments on this
motion. Nevertheless, the Court is asked to address this issue because if the Court
agrees that the affidavit failed to meet the requirements of Aquliar-Spenelli, in the
interests of justice, the affidvat is insufficient and the motion must be granted.
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 7 of 11

relationship between the IP address associated with the filings and Dales’ residence at

the time of the filings.6

To support its claim of probable cause, the affidavit simply states that “[t]he IP

address used for the application was 165.117.248.240, which resolved Volunteers of

America, 5000 East Monument Street in Baltimore the halfway house where DALES

was residing at the time.” ECF 58-1, para. 31, p. 9. The affidavit provides no basis

for this assertion, no indication as to the origin of the information or whether it was

even obtained from a legitimate source.7 Cases in which law enforcement tries to

attach an IP address to a location involve the issuance of a subpoena to the relevant

phone carrier that serves the IP address. See, e.g., United States v. Axelrod, Case No.

WDQ-10-279 (D.Md. 2011, ECF 48 at p. 2; United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735 (5th

Cir. 2007) and United States v. Stanley, Cr. No. 11-272 (W.D. Pa. 2012), ECF 42 at p.

4. The instant affidavit contains no information that a subpoena was ever issued.

If this unsupported allegation is removed from the affidavit as unsubstantiated,

nothing left connects the filings of these applications to the VOA, or Mr. Dales. As a

result, this fully critical, and only, connection between Dales residence in 2020 and the

6
“An IP address is a number assigned to a modem when it connects to the internet.
Every modem that connects to the internet has a unique IP address.” United States v.
Stanley, Crim. No. 11-272 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 11, 2012), at p. 2.
7
Discovery in this case, by undersigned counsel’ careful review, does not provide any
source for the affiant’s allegation that the IP address “resolved” to the VOA.. There is
but one document that lists Mr. Dales and any IP address, titled “Ryan Dales IP
address.pdf” with no identifying source of the document and, more importantly, it simply
lists the IP address and nothing connecting that IP address to the VOA, nor any
identification as to where this single document came from. Regardless, the suppression
motion depends only on the four corners of the affidavit, even if the affiant had other
information not provied to the Magistrate Judge.
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 8 of 11

location from which the loan applications were filed must be examined like any other

unsuipported anonymous tip information under the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis.8

Saying that the IP address belongs to the VOA without any confirming information

as to its validity or source is the functional equivalent of an anonymous tip in which

someone says “Mr. Jones is selling drugs from his house.” Failure to validate in any

way an anonymous tip renders the search warrant invalid. Spinelli. And, in such

circumstances, Leon does not apply to permit introduction of the evidence seized from

any resultant search. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 59 F.4th 232, 238 (6th Cir.

2023), United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 822 (6th Cir. 2003). This failure is

particularly troubling here because law enforcement had access to Dales’ phone

records prior to the search; if those records showed Dales’ phone accessing the IP

address, (or even using his phone at the time the applications were filed) that

information would undoubtedly been included in the affidavit. That the affidavit not

only does not include such information, but is vague deliberately about the source of

the IP address identification make Leon even more inapplicable here.

Aguilar set forth the requirement for evaluating a search warrant affidavit that

contains an unsupported allegation of “fact”:

Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not
reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be
informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of
the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the
informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, was "credible" or his
information "reliable."5 Otherwise, "the inferences from the facts which lead
to the complaint" will be drawn not "by a neutral and detached magistrate," as
the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer "engaged in the often

8
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 9 of 11

competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," or, as in this case, by an
unidentified informant.”

Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-115 (citations omitted). Thus, with regard to the

affidavit's statement that the IP address “resolved” to the VOA, the Supreme Court

requires that “the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying

circumstances from which” the affiant concluded that the IP address in fact

connected to VOA, and that the information “was ‘credible’ or his information

‘reliable.’" Without such information, the quality of the information cannot be

assessed by a “neutral and detached magistrate”, but only by the police officer

engaged in the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”

As a result, the instant affidavit fails to meet Supreme Court standards. In

Spinelli, the Court set out the legal consequences of failing to give a detached Judge

sufficient information as to the credibility, or source, of the affiant’s statements:

In Aguilar, a search warrant had issued upon an affidavit of police officers
who swore only that they had "received reliable information from a credible
person and do believe" that narcotics were being illegally stored on the
described premises. While recognizing that the constitutional requirement of
probable cause can be satisfied by hearsay information, this Court held
the affidavit inadequate… [in part because] the application failed to set forth
any of the "underlying circumstances" necessary to enable the magistrate
independently to judge of the validity of the informant's conclusion that the
narcotics were where he said they were.

Spinelli, at 412-413. The instant affidavit contains no information that the affiiant had

received reliable and credible information regarding the IP address. Because the

affidavit failed to set forth any of the underlying circumstances “necessary to enable the

Magistrate independently to judge the validity” of the IP location information, the

affidavit was therefore “inadequate.”
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 10 of 11

Even if the affiant had offered his own personal opinion that the IP information was

reliable, there is nothing in the affidavit “in support of this conclusion.” Aguilar, at 416.

Like the rejected affidavit in Aguilar, the instant affidavit “does not contain a sufficient

statement of the underlying circumstances from which the [affiant] concluded that the IP

address “resolved” to VOA. The Magistrate Judge was “not told how the [affiant’s]

received his information—it is not alleged that the informant personally observed” any

phone records. “Moreover, if the [affiant] came by the information indirectly, he did not

explain why his sources were reliable.” Id., at 416. Like the failed affidavit in Aguilar,

the affiant “offered the magistrate no reason in support of this conclusion” that the IP

address resolved to VOA.9 Id.

The next step in the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis is to assess whether the affidavit

provides probable cause without the unsubstantiated IP address allegation. Here, the

affidavit fails completely. Without connecting the IP address to VOA, the affidavit also

fails to connect the COVID applications to anywhere that Mr. Dales lived at the time of

the applications. Without connecting the IP address to VOA, the affidavit does not even

offer a suggestion that Dales’ cell phone was involved in the applications.

Without an legitimate, identified source of the allleged connections between the IP

address used and the VOA, the affidavit fails to provide a Magistrate Judge with sufficent

information to evaluate that assertion. When this alleged connection is removed, the

affidavit becomes merely a statement that Mr. Dales lived at the VOA in December, 2020,

and then lived at 900 East Fort Avenue over two years later. Such an affidavit cannot

9
In other cases, police officers obtain IP addreses direct;ly from the phone company
via subpoena. See, e.g., Stanley, infra, where a subpoena was issued to Comcast and
that information was provided directly in the affidavit. Stanley, at 2.
Case 1:23-cr-00026-GLR Document 76 Filed 10/16/24 Page 11 of 11

provide probable cause for the search and cannot “reasonably” be relied on by a law

enforcement officer such that Leon does not apply to resurrect the invalid searc because

“no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer

manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in

indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely

unreasonable.’” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (POWELL, J., concurring in

part); see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 263-264 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment).”

Leon, at 923.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, RYAN DALES moves this Honorable Court to reconsider it denial

of his motion to suppress and grant his motion.

Respectfully submitted,

_______/s/__________________
Richard Bardos
Schulman, Hershfield & Gilden, P.A.
1 East Pratt Street, 9th Floor
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
(410) 332 0850

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th of October, 2024, a copy of the foregoing
was served electronically by ECF to: Office of the United States Attorney, 36 South
Charles Street, Fourth Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 and all defense counsel.

_____/s/______________________
Richard Bardos

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