Defendant's Motion for Immediate Release and Opposition to Government's Motion for Revocation of Release Order — United States v. Sniders Jean-Jacques et al. (Dkt. 55)

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Defendant's Motion for Immediate Release and Opposition to Government's Motion for Revocation of Release Order, Document 55, filed April 4, 2026 in United States of America v. Sniders Jean-Jacques, Docket No. 26-cr-10030-RGS and 26-cr-10031-RGS, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The motion argues that the government misinterprets the Bail Reform Act and that, in an economic crimes case, dangerousness is not an available ground for pretrial detention, citing United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988). It describes the February 13, 2026 detention hearing in Miami, after which the magistrate judge ordered release on conditions including a $100,000 unsecured bond and standalone electronic monitoring. It asks the court not to revoke that order. Attorney Jane F. Peachy signs /s/.

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“Defendant's Motion for Immediate Release and Opposition to Government's Motion for Revocation of Release Order — United States v. Sniders Jean-Jacques et al. (Dkt. 55).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/gov-uscourts-mad-295478-55-0-cc6f9e7d2c/, SHA-256 558e4ed53f1766e3c3f5a3b24995a97e9d209878fd246c77abf45e59b0584832.

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
:
:
v. : Docket No.: 26-cr-10030-RGS and
: 26-cr-10031-RGS
:
SNIDERS JEAN-JACQUES :

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND OPPOSITION TO
GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR REVOCATION OF RELEASE ORDER

Mr. Jean-Jacques opposes the government’s motion for revocation of the magistrate

judge’s release order. The government, quite simply, misinterprets the Bail Reform Act in

arguing that Mr. Jean-Jacques must be detained because of the danger he poses to the

community. In an economic crimes case such as this one, dangerousness is not an available

ground for pretrial detention. See United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988). The law

requires that Mr. Jean-Jacques be released pending trial, and it is only if the government proves

by a preponderance of the evidence that 1) Mr. Jean-Jacques poses a serious risk of flight, or

serious risk to obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt

to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror; and 2) that there is no possible

combination of conditions of release that would “reasonably assure the appearance of the person

as required and the safety of any other person and the community,” that Mr. Jean-Jacques can be

jailed pretrial under 18 U.S.C. §3142. For the reasons set forth below, under this proper legal

framework, the magistrate judge was correct to order Mr. Jean-Jacques’ release subject to a

number of conditions. Mr. Jean-Jacques asks this Court to reach the same conclusion and not to

revoke the magistrate judge’s order of release.

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 2 of 12

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Jean-Jacques was arrested on February 9, 2026 in Florida, where he resides. He appeared

in front of a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Florida the next day, at which time the

government moved for his detention, citing only §3142(f)(2)(A). Tr. at 11. 1 Pretrial services

interviewed Mr. Jean-Jacques and prepared a bail report, in which they recommended release

subject to a number of conditions. See Exhibit B (filed under seal).

A detention hearing was held on February 13, 2026. The government called one witness at

the detention hearing in Miami: Special Agent Nelson Muñiz of the Federal Housing Finance

Agency Office of Inspector General. At the hearing, the agent described the allegations in the

indictments, including the potential loss amounts. Tr. at 14-15, 18-19. He described the fact that

Mr. Jean-Jacques had previously been convicted of a fraud offense in the District of

Massachusetts, and that the conspiracy alleged in the instant indictment was alleged to have

begun a few months before the end of his supervised release. Tr. at 15-16. He also testified that

when agents went to a residence to arrest Mr. Jean-Jacques, he was “not cooperative” and

refused to come out for fifteen minutes before presenting himself to the agents. Tr. at 16-17.

In arguing for Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention, the prosecuting attorney in Florida cited the fact

that Mr. Jean-Jacques was a “recidivist” who was still on supervised release at the time the

instant conspiracy began, Tr. at 33, that he faces significant penalties, Tr. at 34, that he refused to

answer questions by pretrial services about his international travel, Tr. at 35, that his brother was

unable to corroborate some of his personal history, Id., that he was born in Haiti (although a

United States citizen), Tr. at 36, that he has a mental health history, Id., and that it took him 15

minutes to surrender himself to agents, Tr. at 37.

1
A copy of the February 13, 2026 detention hearing transcript is attached as Exhibit A. References to the transcript
will appear as “Tr. at __.”

2
Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 3 of 12

At the conclusion of the hearing, after considering the arguments by both the prosecutor and

the defense attorney, the magistrate judge explained the legal standard applicable to the hearing

and its reasoning in ordering release subject to conditions. Tr. at 42-46. After careful

consideration, the court ordered Mr. Jean-Jacques’ release with the following special conditions:

• $100,000 unsecured bond, co-signed by Mr. Jean-Jacques’ mother;
• Report to Pretrial Services as directed;
• Surrender passport and do not apply for any other travel documents;
• Participate in a mental health assessment and treatment, if necessary, or continue
participation in current treatment;
• Do not work in any job with access to credit cards or the personal identification
information of other individuals;
• No contact with co-defendants in either case;
• Refrain from possessing a firearm or any other dangerous weapon;
• Cosigner of bond cannot encumber, mortgage or hypothecate in any way any real
property that they own;
• Travel restricted to Southern District of Florida and to the District of Massachusetts
only court appearances. Notify Pretrial Services officer in advance of any travel to
Massachusetts; and
• Standalone electronic monitoring.
Tr. at 55-58. At the conclusion of the hearing, the government requested a stay of the release

order, which the Court allowed. On February 17, 2026, the prosecuting attorney in this district

filed an Emergency Motion to Stay and Revocation of Release Order. Following Mr. Jean-

Jacques’ arrival in this district, this Court scheduled a hearing on the government’s motion for

April 7, 2026.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

At the detention hearing, the magistrate judge noted that the government only moved for Mr.

Jean-Jacques’ detention under 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2)(A), and did not allow them to argue for

detention on the basis of dangerousness. The court was correct to do so. Even so, the government

now asks this Court to detain Mr. Jean-Jacques on the basis of dangerousness. However, where

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 4 of 12

Mr. Jean-Jacques is charged only with economic crimes, and not one of the crimes specified in

18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(1), dangerousness is not an available ground for pretrial detention. See

United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1988).

In Ploof, the defendant was charged with economic crimes, but also had a history of domestic

violence. The magistrate and district court held, after a hearing, that there was no combination of

conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of the community and ordered the defendant’s

pretrial detention. The First Circuit held that dangerousness was not a proper basis for detention

in an economic crime: “where detention is based on dangerousness grounds, it can be ordered

only in cases involving one of the circumstances set forth in § 3142(f)(1).” Id. at 11. Ploof

remains the law in this Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Oquendo, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 44732 at *5 (D.P.R. March 10, 2025) (holding, in bank fraud case, that “it is well-settled

that where ‘detention is based on dangerousness grounds, it can be ordered only in cases

involving one of the circumstances set forth in § 3142(f)(1).’”); United States v. Salgado, 2020

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147866 at *9 (D.R.I. Aug. 17, 2020).

The government cites several out-of-circuit cases for the contrary position that detention

can be authorized based on economic danger. See D.E. 18, Gov’t Emergency Motion for Stay

and Revocation of Release Order, at 11-12. However, the cases cited by the government do not

support this position, nor do they contradict the holding of Ploof. For example, in United States

v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989), the Court considered dangerousness in the context

of a revocation under §3148, a different standard than §3142. In that case, the Court did note that

dangerousness meant more than “the mere danger of physical violence,” and specifically that

“the risk that a defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking constitutes a danger to the

‘safety of any other person or the community.’” Likewise, in United States v. Carpenter, No. 04-

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 5 of 12

10029-GAO, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71034, at *10 (D. Mass. May 232014), the Court

considered economic danger posed by defendant in his request for bail pending appeal under

§3143(b) – not pretrial release under §3142. The court noted the different standard for bail

pending appeal, specifically that “even when the conviction does not involve a crime of violence

or drug offense, detention (following conviction and sentencing) is mandatory,” unless the

standard for exception is met.

In United States v. Schenberger, 498 F.Supp.2d 738 (D.N.J. 2007), another case cited by

the government, the Court was considering pretrial detention in a child pornography case, i.e. a

case involving an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(1). There, the Court noted that “danger to

the community does not only include physical harm or violent behavior. The concept of ‘safety’

may include non-physical harm.” Id. at 742. However, the Court specifically mentioned that

“[t]he government may move for detention on the basis of danger to the community only for an

offense that is listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) to (E),” consistent with the holding of Ploof.

Id. at 741.

In United States v. Persaud, No. 05-cr-00368, 2007 WL 1074906 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 5 2007),

the Court considered the danger of economic harm in setting appropriate conditions of release; it

did not cite the danger of economic harm as a basis for detention. See also Ploof, 851 F.2d at 11

(“Danger to the community present in the likelihood defendant would continue to commit

offenses involving false identification could be considered only in setting conditions of release”)

(quoting United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986)); United States v. Harris, 920

F.Supp. 132, 133 (D. Nev. 1996) (considering risk of economic harm in fashioning defendant’s

conditions of release).

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 6 of 12

Finally, in United States v. Giordano, 370 F.Supp.2d 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2005), a 35-count

economic crimes case, the court ordered release and adopted the reasoning of Ploof:

notwithstanding the Government's stated concession during the
hearing that it understood it could not seek to detain the defendant
strictly based upon danger to the community, it appears that the
thrust of the Government's case was still based upon that perceived
danger rather than a real serious risk of flight. The evidence of risk
of flight was sparse and conclusory, while the evidence submitted
showing the alleged pattern of fraudulent conduct on the part of
this defendant was more identifiable. The statutory scheme as
currently constructed, however, does not support the stronger part
of the Government's case that the threat of continuing economic
fraud triggers a right to detention.

370 F.Supp. 2d at 1258. The court noted “even in a case involving serious economic crimes that

may have been financially lucrative,” “section 3142 presumes that this defendant is eligible for

bond.” Id.

Accordingly, the only available grounds for Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention are under

§3142(f)(2). There is a presumption of release. The Court must engage in a two-step analysis in

considering release. United States v. Butland, No. 25-mj-03231-JDH, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

174463 at *3 (D.Mass. Sept. 8, 2025) (noting the government’s “dual burden” in seeking pretrial

detention). First, it must determine whether the government has proven that Mr. Jean-Jacques

presents a serious risk of flight or a serious risk of obstructing justice or intimidating witnesses.

If the Court finds that he does pose such a risk, then the Court must consider conditions of

release to mitigate that risk. Mr. Jean-Jacques may only be detained if the government has

proven that there exist no possible combination conditions of release that would reasonably

assure Mr. Jean-Jacques’ appearance. Pretrial detention is a last resort. See United States v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 7 of 12

or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”); United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403,

1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Only in rare circumstances should release be denied…Doubts regarding

the propriety of release should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”).

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Government Has Not Shown That Mr. Jean-Jacques Presents a Serious
Risk of Flight or a Serious Risk of Obstructing Justice or Intimidating
Witnesses.

The government’s first hurdle is proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jean-

Jacques is either a serious risk of flight or a serious risk of obstructing justice or intimidating

witnesses. While the government offers various reasons in support of their position, ultimately

those reasons are either speculative or misconstrued. Mr. Jean-Jacques is not a serious risk under

either 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2)(A) or (B), and should be released.

The government argues that the fact that Mr. Jean-Jacques faces a significant sentence

weighs in favor of detention. In their motion, they assert that his guidelines are 188 to 235

months, while at the detention hearing they asserted they were 121 to 151 months. Tr. at 11. The

government has repeated the allegations in the indictment, and asserted loss amounts without

evidence to support it. In fact, at the detention hearing in Florida, the only loss amount that was

described in any detail are two transactions described in the indictment that were likely less than

$100,000. Tr. 29-30.

The government also cites Mr. Jean-Jacques “foreign ties.” While it is true that Mr. Jean-

Jacques is an immigrant born in Haiti, who continues to care for the people of Haiti as they suffer

through political, economic, and natural disasters, he has lived in the United States since he was

a child and is a naturalized citizen. Most of his close family resides in the United States,

including his mother, siblings, and children. And while on supervised release for three years, he

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 8 of 12

never traveled outside of the jurisdiction without permission. The government also speculates

that Mr. Jean-Jacques could “live underground” in the United States, alleging that he has done so

before, when there is absolutely no evidence that he has lived “underground” at any point in his

life. The government asserts that Mr. Jean-Jacques has no stable residence and no means of

employment, both of which are simply untrue. Mr. Jean-Jacques intends to return to work for

Lyft, as he did during his period of supervised release. See Exhibit C (Memorandum from

Probation). He will live with his mother, who owns her own home in Florida, and is also willing

to co-sign a bond in this case. This is the same residence at which Mr. Jean-Jacques resided

during his period of supervised release. Id. While the government attempts to implicate Mr. Jean-

Jacques’ family in his alleged criminal activity, these accusations again are based on nothing

more than speculation.

The government also points to the circumstances of Mr. Jean-Jacques’ arrest, and claims

that he “barricaded” himself inside his house when police came to arrest him. This issue was

discussed at length at Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention hearing. Ultimately, the judge there concluded:

“This is not a situation as far as the evidence I was presented where he barricaded himself in or

law enforcement had to go in and get him, where he took off from the residence and tried to flee

from law enforcement. So I don't think that a 15-minute delay in coming to the door is

particularly concerning as to whether or not he's going to appear here in court.” Tr. at 45. The

Florida court’s finding about the significance of Mr. Jean-Jacques delay in coming to the door is

correct and properly supported by the evidence.

The government also alleges that Mr. Jean-Jacques was engaged in the criminal acts

alleged in the indictment during his period of supervised release. However, the only support for

this are the dates stated in the indictment and a single sentence, that states, “On or about May 15,

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 9 of 12

2018, Kelly Michel messaged Jean-Jacques a listing of available tradelines and the cost of each.”

Docket No. 26-cr-10030-RGS, D.E. 1 at ¶19a. The fact that Mr. Jean-Jacques received this

message in May 2018 does not mean he was engaged in criminal activity at that time. There is

nothing to indicate he actually did anything illegal during his period of supervised release.

Lastly, the government speculates that Mr. Jean-Jacques has access to an “influx of cash”

without providing any financial records to substantiate this claim. Mr. Jean-Jacques, as the

government also notes, has no current employment, and has now been detained for almost two

months.

In addition, despite not moving for Mr. Jean-Jacques’ detention under §3142(f)(2)(B) at

his initial appearance or at his detention hearing, the government now asserts that Mr. Jean-

Jacques should be detained because he presents a serious risk of intimidating witnesses or

obstructing justice. The government points to several incidents, none of which have resulted in a

criminal conviction, and most of which were unsubstantiated and uncharged. 2 None of them

involve the violation of a court order, and none of them involve interference with a criminal

investigation. Cf. United States v. Courture, No. 21-10172-NMG, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29911,

at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 11, 2022) (detaining defendant under both §3142(f)(2)(B) and §3148 where

he violated condition of release not to contact witnesses and attempted to influence witness

testimony).

In short, Mr. Jean-Jacques is a United States citizen with family support and significant

ties in the community. He has serious medical and mental health needs that keep him tied to his

treatment providers in the community. He has a perfect track record of being able to comply with

conditions of supervised release, see Exhibit C, and no history of fleeing court or not appearing

2
For example, despite claims made by unnamed witnesses that Mr. Jean-Jacques possessed a firearm, no firearm has
ever been found in Mr. Jean-Jacques possession.

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 10 of 12

when required. Serious risk of flight cannot be based on speculation or made-up scenarios.

“Serious risk of flight has been defined by some courts as more than mere ordinary risk and is

certainly different than risk of non-appearance. It requires intentional and active movement

outside the jurisdiction or within the jurisdiction to avoid appearing in court.” Garcia-Oquendo,

supra, at *8-9. It has been described as “a great risk—beyond average—that the defendant will

intentionally and actively move within or outside the jurisdiction to avoid court proceedings or

supervision.” Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Jean-Jacques does not present this sort of “great risk”

warranting pretrial detention, nor does he pose any similar sort of risk of interfering in the

criminal investigation and prosecution against him.

B. Even if the Court Finds That Mr. Jean-Jacques Does Present a Serious Risk of
Flight or of Obstructing Justice, Conditions Can Be Fashioned to Reasonably
Assure His Appearance and the Safety of the Community.

The magistrate judge in Florida found that Mr. Jean-Jacques did pose a serious risk of flight,

but held that there were conditions of release that would mitigate his risk of flight and assure the

safety of the community. Even though a District Court considers detention de novo, the Court

should defer to the Magistrate Judge when that judge issues a careful and considered decision.

See United States v. Simone, 317 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D. Mass. 2004) (“In reviewing the

magistrate judge’s detention orders, the court must undertake an independent review, giving her

decision such deference as the care and consideration manifested by the magistrate judge

warrant.”) (Wolf, D.J.). Magistrate Judge Fulgueira Elgenbein applied thorough care and

consideration here. She held an evidentiary detention hearing, carefully considered the arguments

of counsel and the recommendation of Pretrial Services, and issued an order of release on

conditions with a detailed basis for her order provided orally at the conclusion of the hearing. See

10
Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 11 of 12

Ex. A at 42-58. On this record, the Court should defer to the Magistrate Judge (and Pretrial

Services), affirm her decision, and release Mr. Jean-Jacques.

Where the Court finds there is a serious risk, conditions must be considered “to see if they

will serve as a reasonable guard.” United States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1991). It

is in this context that the court may consider any potential economic danger Mr. Jean-Jacques

poses in fashioning appropriate conditions of release. See, e.g., Persaud, supra at 5. Reasonable

conditions can be fashioned to “reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.”

These conditions include a $100,000 appearance bond, co-signed by Mr. Jean-Jacques’ mother,

with whom he will reside; a requirement that he reside with his mother and not change his

residence without probation’s prior approval; that he surrender his passport and not obtain a new

travel document while the case is pending; that his travel be restricted to the Southern District of

Florida, and to the District of Massachusetts only for the purposes of meeting with his attorney

or attending court; regular reporting to probation; continued engagement with mental health

treatment; and standalone electronic monitoring. Likewise, conditions can be fashioned to

reasonably assure “the safety of any other person and the community,” such as continued

engagement in mental health treatment; a prohibition against possessing any dangerous weapons;

a prohibition against contact with any co-defendants or witnesses in the case, except in the

presence of counsel; and restrictions on employment to ensure Mr. Jean-Jacques is not in a job

where he has access to financial or personal identifying information of any person.

IV. CONCLUSION
Pretrial detention is a last resort and an “interference … with the important and

fundamental right of liberty, despite the presumption of innocence pending trial.” United States v.

Butland, No. 25-mj-03231-JDH, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174463, at *4 (D. Mass. Sep. 8, 2025)

(citing United States v. Powell, 813 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D. Mass. 1992) (cleaned up)). Here, both

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Case 1:26-cr-10030-RGS Document 55 Filed 04/04/26 Page 12 of 12

the magistrate judge and Pretrial Services believe Mr. Jean-Jacques should be released subject to

certain conditions. This Court should reach the same conclusion, where there is a presumption of

release and conditions that can be fashioned to mitigate any risk Mr. Jean-Jacques poses.

Respectfully Submitted,
SNIDERS JEAN-JACQUES,
By His Attorney,

/s/ Jane F. Peachy
Jane F. Peachy, she/her
BBO #661394
Peachy Hackett & Sunderland
88 Broad Street, Suite 101
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 302-8466
jpeachy@phsllp.com

Dated: April 4, 2026

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document filed through the ECF system will be sent electronically
to the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) on April 4,
2026.
/s Jane F. Peachy
Jane F. Peachy

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