Order (Unopposed Motion for a Briefing Schedule) — In re January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litigation (Dkt. 665, S.D. Fla.)
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An Order in In re: January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litigation, Case 1:21-md-02989-CMA (Case No. 21-02989-MDL-ALTONAGA/Reid, Document 665, 12 pages), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, done and ordered in Miami, Florida on April 18, 2024 under the name of Chief U.S. District Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga and entered April 19, 2024. The Court construes Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for a Briefing Schedule [ECF No. 624] as a motion to extend the passed deadline to seek class certification and for leave to file a second class certification motion, applying the good cause standard of Rule 16(b)(4). Because the November 13, 2023 Order denying class certification did not amend the Scheduling Order's deadline and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated good cause, the motion is DENIED and Plaintiffs may not file a renewed class certification motion.
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“Order (Unopposed Motion for a Briefing Schedule) (Dkt. 665).”
Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/gov-uscourts-flsd-590042-665-0/
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Case 1:21-md-02989-CMA Document 665 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/19/2024 Page 1 of 12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 21-02989-MDL-ALTONAGA/Reid
In re:
JANUARY 2021 SHORT SQUEEZE
TRADING LITIGATION
_________________________________/
This Document Relates to the Actions in the Federal Securities Tranche
ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Lead Plaintiff, Blue Laine-Beveridge; Named
Plaintiffs, Abraham Huacuja, Ava Bernard, Brendan Clarke, Brian Harbison, Cecilia Rivas, Doi
Nguyen, Joseph Gurney, Marcel Poirier, Sandy Ng, Santiago Gil Bohórquez, and Thomas Cash’s
Unopposed Motion for a Briefing Schedule [ECF No. 624], filed on December 13, 2023. Plaintiffs
seek leave to file a renewed motion for class certification, even though the deadline to do so has
passed (see generally Mot.); thus, the Court construes the Motion as one to extend the deadline to
seek class certification and for leave to file a second, class certification motion. Defendants,
Robinhood Markets, Inc., Robinhood Financial LLC, and Robinhood Securities, LLC (together,
“Robinhood”) filed a Response [ECF No. 631]; to which Plaintiffs filed a Reply [ECF No. 636].
Given the matters raised in the Reply (and with leave of Court), Robinhood filed a Sur-Reply [ECF
No. 651].
The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the record, and applicable law. For the
following reasons, the Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 7, 2022, the Court entered an Order Setting Trial and Pre-Trial Schedule,
Requiring Mediation, and Referring Certain Matters to Magistrate Judge (“Scheduling Order”)
[ECF No. 517], which set a deadline of April 28, 2023 for Plaintiffs to file a motion for class
Case 1:21-md-02989-CMA Document 665 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/19/2024 Page 2 of 12
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certification. (See id. 2). On April 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification
[ECF No. 559], which the Court denied, explaining that Plaintiffs had failed to identify a
presumption of reliance sufficient to demonstrate that individualized issues of reliance would not
predominate over common issues. (See Nov. 13, 2023 Order [ECF No. 622] 36–72).
In rejecting Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court acknowledged certain academic discourse
suggesting the possibility that a modified fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption may apply in
a case like this one. (See id. 62 (citing Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 945 n.1
(9th Cir. 2009) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring); Charles R. Korsmo, Mismatch: The Misuse of
Market Efficiency in Market Manipulation Class Actions, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1111, 1174
(2011)); see also id. 57 (citing Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., 716 F.3d 18, 21 n.2 (2d Cir.
2013)). The Court explained, however, that it was “tak[ing] no position on whether such a
presumption is viable, and the parties have not briefed this issue.” (Id. 62 (alteration added)).
Although the deadline to pursue class certification passed in April 2023, Plaintiffs now
request a second opportunity to pursue class certification based on a modified fraud-on-the-market
presumption. (See generally Mot.; Reply). Unsurprisingly, Robinhood opposes Plaintiffs’
request. (See generally Resp.; Sur-Reply).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Plaintiffs’ requested relief requires both the extension of an expired pre-trial deadline and
leave to file a renewed class certification motion. (See generally Mot.; Reply). There are legal
standards that guide the Court’s decision.
Scheduling order extensions. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), a
scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” This good
cause standard precludes modification unless the schedule cannot be met despite the diligence of
the parties seeking the extension. See, e.g., Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d
2
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1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (“We have recognized that Rule 16[b]’s good cause standard
‘precludes modification of the scheduling order unless the schedule cannot be met despite the
diligence of the party seeking the extension.” (alteration added; other alteration adopted; citations
omitted)); Roberson v. BancorpSouth Bank, Inc., No. 12-0669, 2013 WL 4870839, at *2 (S.D.
Ala. Sept. 12, 2013) (“Diligence, not lack of prejudice, is the touchstone of the Rule 16(b)(4)
inquiry.” (citations omitted)).
Renewed motion for class certification. The determination to certify a class should be
made “[a]t an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative[.]” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (alterations added). Rule 23(c)(1)(C) permits a court to “alter[] or amend[]”
its class certification order “before final judgment.” Id. (alterations added). Thus, after denying
class certification, the trial court retains discretion over the decision of whether to “revisit the
issue[,]” provided plaintiffs can “clarify and better support the need for class certification[.]”
Hudson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 458 (11th Cir. 1996) (alterations added; footnote call
number omitted). “The Eleventh Circuit has not established an exact standard for determining
when to allow parties to revisit the issue of class certification after an initial denial thereof.” Terrill
v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 274 F.R.D. 698, 700 (S.D. Ga. 2011). 1
Generally, however, district courts interpreting Rule 23(c)(1) revisit class certification only
if “subsequent developments so require, upon a showing of new evidence or some other
appropriate ground, or a demonstration of changed circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks omitted;
1
Other circuits have highlighted district courts’ broad discretion to consider renewed class
certification motions. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 483 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“District courts have ample discretion to consider (or to decline to consider) a revised class
certification motion after an initial denial.” (collecting cases). But see Hargrove v. Sleepy’s LLC,
974 F.3d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding the district court could not require “a change in
controlling law, new evidence, or a clear error” in addition to the Rule 23 requirements when
reviewing a renewed motion for class certification).
3
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collecting cases). This is so because “[c]ourts are generally reluctant to allow parties to have a
second bite at the apple by relitigating issues that have already been decided, thereby incentivizing
parties to put their best foot forward at the outset to avoid costly delays to the proceedings.” Rensel
v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-Civ, 2019 WL 6170221, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2019)
(alteration added; other alteration adopted; citation and quotation marks omitted).
Conversely, “‘late amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when the
facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the
cause of action.’” Cabrera v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 12-61390-Civ, 2015 WL 464237, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2015) (quoting Mogel v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 677 F. Supp, 2d 362, 365
(D. Mass. 2009). In such cases, the proponent must demonstrate “‘some justification’” for filing
another motion “‘and not simply a desire to have a second or third run at the same issues.’” Id.
(quoting Hartman v. United Bank Card, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 591, 596–97 (W.D. Wash. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION
Since the deadline to seek class certification has passed, and Plaintiffs have already
requested and been denied class certification, they must demonstrate both good cause to extend
the Scheduling Order deadline under Rule 16(b) and that the circumstances are such that a renewed
class certification motion is appropriate under Rule 23(c)(1). See, e.g., Stockinger v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. 17-cv-00035, 2020 WL 7314794, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020)
(collecting cases); see also O’Neill v. The Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 469, 482–83 (S.D.
Fla. 2006) (applying Rule 16(b)’s good cause standard to a plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
of an order denying class certification where further amendments to the complaint would have
required extension of deadlines in the scheduling order).
Remarkably, the Motion makes no mention of Rule 23(c), the standards governing a
renewed motion for class certification, Rule 16(b), or the standards governing the extension of
4
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scheduling order deadlines. (See generally Mot.). Instead, Plaintiffs merely ask for a briefing
schedule and appear to assume their entitlement to presenting a renewed class certification motion.
(See generally id.).
After reviewing the Motion and observing these deficiencies, the Court advised the parties
that “[i]mplicitly, the Motion seeks leave of Court to file a renewed motion for class certification,
since the deadline to seek class certification passed long ago.” (Dec. 28, 2023 Order [ECF No.
626] (alteration added; citing Scheduling Order 1–2)). Following the Court’s directive,
Robinhood’s Response discusses both the standard for renewed class certification and the Rule
16(b) standard, insisting that Plaintiffs satisfy neither. (See generally Resp.). To the Court’s
surprise, despite Robinhood’s arguments and the Court’s overt statement that the deadline to seek
class certification had passed, Plaintiffs’ Reply makes only passing reference to the Rule 16(b)
standard. (See generally Reply). Rather than address this salient issue, the Reply states only that
Robinhood’s Rule 16(b) arguments “lack[] merit” because Robinhood would not be prejudiced by
an extension and Robinhood’s untimely document production “provides good cause”; no further
explanation or citation to any authority is provided. (Id. 13 (alteration added)). 2
“The [] Scheduling Order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be
cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.” Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D.
138, 141 (D. Me. 1985) (alteration added). Plaintiffs’ failure to adequately brief this issue provides
sufficient justification to deny the Motion. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. CP Transp. LLC, No. 12-
21258-Civ, 2012 WL 4795766, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2012) (“The onus is upon the parties to
formulate arguments.” (alteration adopted; quotation marks and footnote call number omitted;
2
The Court uses the pagination generated by the electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the headers
of all court filings.
5
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quoting Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995); other citation
omitted)); McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that it is “not
sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to
put flesh on its bones” (alteration adopted; quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Nonetheless, the Court considers, under both Rules 16(b) and 23(c)(1), Plaintiffs’
arguments as to why they should get a second shot at securing class certification. Plaintiffs appear
to cite three justifications for being allowed to file a renewed motion: (1) Robinhood’s untimely
discovery responses; (2) the novel issues in the case; and (3) the Court’s denial of class certification
without prejudice. (See generally Reply).
Untimely Discovery Responses. Plaintiffs first assert that, to lodge the modified fraud-on-
the-market presumption argument, they require certain trading data — including purchase
cancellation data Plaintiffs say will demonstrate price impact. (See id. 12–13). Plaintiffs explain
they requested such data on September 30, 2022, but Robinhood did not even attempt to provide
it until June 30, 2023, the day class certification briefing closed. (See id. 12; see also id., Ex. 1,
Decl. Laurence M. Rosen [ECF No. 636-1] ¶¶ 3, 5). Even then, Plaintiffs state, they were forced
to move to compel better responses to Plaintiffs’ requests, and Robinhood only produced the
purchase cancellation data on January 5, 2024. (See Reply 12).
According to Robinhood, Plaintiffs’ arguments are pretextual and should be denied, for
several reasons: (1) Plaintiffs never before linked the purchase cancellation data to class
certification in any conferrals or correspondence with Robinhood following the Court’s denial of
class certification; (2) despite saying other data (specifically, data from the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)) separate from the cancellation data is also necessary to their
expert’s opinions in support of the renewed motion, Plaintiffs only subpoenaed the data after they
submitted their expert report on class certification; (3) Plaintiffs did not ask other brokers for
6
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internal cancellation data; (4) cancellation data is irrelevant to the analysis at issue; (5) Plaintiffs
have failed to explain how the cancellation data is material to their proposed new argument; and
(6) Plaintiffs do not explain why they could not have obtained the necessary data prior to the class
certification deadline. (See Resp. 18 n.5; Sur-Reply 3–5).
At bottom, Robinhood urges that Plaintiffs either made the tactical decision to not assert a
modified fraud-on-the-market presumption argument or failed to exercise diligence in presenting
the argument; either way, Robinhood argues, Plaintiffs’ references now to “new data” are mere
subterfuge. (See Resp. 16–19; Sur-Reply 4–6). The Court agrees.
Admittedly, when new evidence becomes available to plaintiffs seeking class certification,
it does not appear that all courts applying Rule 23(c)(1) impose the sort of diligence requirement
that Robinhood urges. For example, in Terrill, the court permitted the filing of a renewed class
certification motion based on “new evidence” that was “belatedly obtained because [the defendant]
did not produce the evidence until after the close of class certification discovery and after Plaintiffs
had filed their original motion for class certification.” 274 F.R.D. at 701 (alteration added; citation
omitted). Other courts have concluded differently, with one court holding evidence was not truly
“new” where the plaintiff knew of the existence of the evidence well before filing the initial class
certification motion — even though the evidence itself was produced only hours before the
plaintiff filed the motion. See Karhu v. Vital Pharms., Inc., No. 13-60768-Civ, 2014 WL 3540811,
at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2014).
In any event, Plaintiffs’ argument does not pass muster under Rule 16(b). While
Robinhood’s production of this purportedly necessary evidence was late, if this evidence was
indeed “necessary” to their initial class certification briefing, Plaintiffs should have — but did
not — move to compel production of it using the Court-ordered discovery dispute process. (See
Scheduling Order 3–4). “In light of [Plaintiffs’] lack of diligence in protecting [their] rights, [their]
7
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attempt to [seek class certification] outside the time frame prescribed by the [S]cheduling [O]rder
[is] not supported by good cause.” Sosa v. Airprint Sys., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998)
(alterations added).
Further, the data is not evidence that “would not have been discovered in the exercise of
reasonable diligence until after the [class certification] deadline had passed.” Donahay v. Palm
Beach Tours & Transp., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (alteration added; citation
omitted). Quite the opposite. By their own admission, Plaintiffs knew of this evidence long before
the class certification deadline and simply deemed it unimportant — until their class certification
motion was denied. (See Resp. 7–13). Consequently, the Court is not persuaded that the late
production of the purchase cancellation data provides good cause to extend the deadline to seek
class certification.
Novel Issues. Plaintiffs also assert that the novelty of the issues in this case justifies a
second shot at class certification. (See Resp. 13–15). Plaintiffs provide no authority, however, to
support the proposition that novelty alone justifies the filing of a second motion for class
certification, and the Court can locate none. Further, Robinhood correctly points out that Plaintiffs
fail to explain why they did not timely raise the modified fraud-on-the-market presumption. (See
Sur-Reply 6). The Court agrees with Robinhood that Plaintiffs’ “novelty” arguments are
unavailing under Rules 16(b) and 23(c)(1).
To start, under Rule 16(b), Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate diligence. The modified fraud-
on-the-market theory mentioned by the Court in the November 13, 2023 Order derives from cases
Plaintiffs cited throughout their class certification briefing. (See, e.g., Mot. Class Certification 22
(citing Fezzani, 716 F.3d at 22–23); Reply in Support of Mot. Class Certification [ECF No. 585]
21 (discussing Desai, 573 F.3d at 940)). Indeed, the law review article the Court cited, and which
is now referenced by Plaintiffs, was mentioned in a footnote that Plaintiffs included in their original
8
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briefing. (See Reply in Support of Mot. Class Certification 20 (quoting Fezzani, 716 F.3d at 21
n.2 (citing Korsmo, supra, at 1171))).
Given that Plaintiffs plainly had access to the building blocks of the modified fraud-on-
the-market presumption when they filed their Motion for Class Certification, it cannot be said that
their failure to pursue that argument was “diligent.” Cf. Donley v. City of Morrow, 601 F. App’x
805, 811 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A plaintiff lacks diligence when, prior to the scheduling order deadline,
he either (1) had full knowledge of the information with which he later sought to amend his
complaint, or (2) failed to seek the information he needed to determine whether to amend the
complaint.” (citation omitted)); In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d
716, 737 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The good cause standard typically will not be met where the party
seeking to modify the scheduling order has been aware of the facts and theories supporting
amendment since the inception of the action.” (quotation marks omitted)). The novelty of the
theory does not excuse this lack of diligence.
Similarly, under Rule 23(c)(1), Plaintiffs’ decision not to pursue a novel and untested
theory is not justification for Plaintiffs to change course now. Holding as much would depart from
the well-established policy of disallowing renewed motions when the circumstances remain
unchanged. See Rensel, 2019 WL 6170221, at *2. As Robinhood aptly puts it, the issues were
just as novel then as they are now. (See Sur-Reply 5–6).
Plaintiffs either made a strategic decision to not assert the theory or neglected to raise it.
Either way, Rule 23(c)(1) does not permit a “second bite at the apple” to assert an argument
previously available to Plaintiffs. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether the theory
is novel or not, the Court will not allow “a second . . . run at the same issues” because Plaintiffs
made an unsuccessful tactical decision. Cabrera, 2015 WL 464237, at *5 (alteration added;
quotation marks and citation omitted).
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In sum, there is a dearth of authority supporting Plaintiffs’ argument that the novelty of the
issues justifies a renewed class certification motion, while there is substantial authority suggesting
Plaintiffs’ failure to pursue an argument they knew or should have known of precludes an untimely
renewed class certification motion under Rules 16(b) and 23(c)(1). Consequently, the Court rejects
Plaintiffs’ argument that the novelty of the issues in this case justifies granting them leave to file
a renewed class certification motion.
Denial without prejudice. Plaintiffs’ last, half-hearted argument is that a renewed motion
is appropriate simply because Plaintiffs’ initial Motion was denied without prejudice. (See Reply
15). Robinhood insists that Plaintiffs must still overcome the strictures of Rules 16(b) and
23(c)(1). (See Sur-Reply 6 n.5). Here again, the Court agrees with Robinhood.
In support of their argument, Plaintiffs cite two cases. (See Reply 15 (citing Dunbar v.
Google, Inc., No. 12-cv-003305, 2012 WL 6202797, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2012); Kanawi
v. Bechtel Corp., 254 F.R.D. 102, 106 (N.D. Cal. 2008))). Both fail to persuade.
Dunbar involved a district court judge interpreting the prior assigned judge’s ruling on
plaintiff’s motion to amend his pleading and bring a new motion for class certification, which the
prior judge denied without prejudice. See 2012 WL 6202797, at *5, *11–12. The court determined
that the former judge intended for the plaintiff to have another chance at class certification and
found that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff demonstrated that leave to amend his class
definition was warranted. See id. at *12–22. Notably, this analysis supports Robinhood’s position,
not Plaintiffs’. While the court in Dunbar found the prior judge’s denial without prejudice implied
he intended for plaintiff to have another chance at class certification, the court conducted a
thorough analysis under Rule 15(a) to determine whether amendment was appropriate. See
generally id. In other words, the denial without prejudice was insufficient to justify granting the
10
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plaintiff’s motion, which also needed to satisfy Rule 15(a). Likewise, Plaintiffs must satisfy Rules
16(b) and 23(c)(1).
Kanawi is even less convincing. There, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification without prejudice so they could take additional discovery necessary to support a
renewed motion. See Kanawi, 254 F.R.D. at 106. There was no indication that, as here, the
defendant opposed the plaintiffs’ request to file a renewed motion, or that the filing of a renewed
motion was past a court-ordered deadline. See generally id. Moreover, here, the undersigned’s
denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion was not premised on a finding that Plaintiffs were entitled to further
discovery. (See generally Nov. 13, 2023 Order).
In short, the Court’s denial of class certification without prejudice does not relieve
Plaintiffs of the obligation to comply with the Scheduling Order, Rule 16(b), and Rule 23(c)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
A scheduling order “control[s] the subsequent course of the action” absent court
modification. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e) (alteration added). In this case, nothing in the Court’s
November 13, 2023 Order amended the Scheduling Order’s deadline for seeking class
certification. (See generally Nov. 13, 2023 Order). Since Plaintiffs have not demonstrated good
cause to extend the deadlines in the Scheduling Order, they may not file a renewed class
certification motion. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Lead Plaintiff, Blue Laine-Beveridge; Named
Plaintiffs, Abraham Huacuja, Ava Bernard, Brendan Clarke, Brian Harbison, Cecilia Rivas, Doi
Nguyen, Joseph Gurney, Marcel Poirier, Sandy Ng, Santiago Gil Bohórquez, and Thomas Cash’s
Unopposed Motion for a Briefing Schedule [ECF No. 624] is DENIED.
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DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 18th day of April, 2024.
________________________________________
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: counsel of record
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