Order — United States v. Emmet Bowens (Dkt. 244)

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Document 244, filed March 30, 2026 in Case No. 6:21-cr-141-RBD-NWH in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, is an Order in United States of America v. Emmet Bowens. It addresses the pro se defendant's motions to withdraw and vacate his guilty plea, to terminate standby counsel and for an evidentiary hearing (Docs. 226-29). The Court states that his plea colloquy statements are strongly presumed true, that his conclusory allegations do not rebut them, and that the government would be prejudiced by rescheduling a new trial. It states the defendant has not shown good cause to replace standby counsel. It orders the motions (Docs. 226-29) DENIED, dated March 27, 2026.

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Case 6:21-cr-00141-RBD-NWH           Document 244        Filed 03/30/26      Page 1 of 3 PageID 906




                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
                                ORLANDO DIVISION

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

  v.                                                         Case No. 6:21-cr-141-RBD-NWH

  EMMET BOWENS


                                              ORDER

         Before the Court are the pro se Defendant’s motions to withdraw and vacate

  his guilty plea, to terminate standby counsel, and for an evidentiary hearing.

  (Docs. 226–29; see Doc. 236.)

         Defendant makes conclusory assertions that the plea, which he entered on

  the first day of trial after jury selection was conducted, was not “knowingly,

  intelligently, or voluntarily made” and that he was “coerced by counsel.”

  (Doc. 226, p. 1; see Docs. 222, 227–29.) He filed a declaration sworn under penalty

  of perjury in support. 1 (Doc. 230.)

         As to the motion to withdraw a guilty plea, courts consider “(1) whether

  close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and

  voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the




         1 Though Bowens is incarcerated in Florida, the motions and declaration were mailed from

  Mississippi, and the signature is distinctly dissimilar from Bowens’ signature filed on documents
  earlier in the case. (See Docs. 226-1, 227-1, 228-1, 229-1, 230-1. Compare Doc. 29, with Doc. 230.)
Case 6:21-cr-00141-RBD-NWH       Document 244     Filed 03/30/26    Page 2 of 3 PageID 907




  government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his

  plea.” United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).

  A defendant’s statements during a plea colloquy are strongly presumed to be true.

  See United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 800 n.8 (11th Cir. 1987).

        Here, Defendant stated under oath that he committed the underlying

  offenses, that he had no complaints about his standby counsel, and that he

  understood the consequences of pleading guilty. (Doc. 235, Tr. 28:12, 32:19, 33:14.)

  The Court observed Defendant during the colloquy and found his statements to

  be credible. Defendant’s later conclusory allegations fail to rebut the strong

  presumption of veracity of his statements during the colloquy. See Gonzalez-

  Mercado, 808 F.2d at 800 n.8. So Defendant has not shown that he lacked close

  assistance of competent counsel—a conclusory assertion that standby counsel

  “coerced” him with nothing more does not suffice—or that his plea was not

  knowing and voluntary. See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472. And the Government would

  be prejudiced by having to reschedule a new trial after already dismissing its

  witnesses and expending considerable resources in preparing for the aborted first

  trial—not to mention the judicial resources wasted. (See Doc. 236, pp. 13–14.) So

  Defendant’s motions to withdraw and vacate his guilty plea are due to be denied.

        As to the motion to terminate standby counsel, an indigent defendant has

  no right to substitute counsel in the absence of good cause. United States v. Garey,


                                            2
Case 6:21-cr-00141-RBD-NWH           Document 244        Filed 03/30/26      Page 3 of 3 PageID 908




  540 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008). And when a “defendant rejects his court-

  appointed counsel or otherwise engages in behavior that creates tension between

  his right to counsel and his right to self-representation,” the court may deny the

  defendant’s request for substitute counsel and require him to proceed pro se or

  with the current counsel. See id. at 1265–66.

          Here, Defendant has not shown good cause because his assertion that

  standby counsel coerced him is unsupported by any facts. See Garey, 540 F.3d at

  1263. The Court will not indulge Defendant’s repeated misbehavior by granting

  him a seventh lawyer. (See Docs. 22, 34, 110, 148, 149, 171.) If Defendant dislikes

  standby counsel, he can either ignore him or proceed pro se. 2 See Garey, 540 F.3d

  at 1265–66. The Defendant’s motions are meritless.

          Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s motions

  (Docs. 226–29) are DENIED.

          DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on March 27,

  2026.




          2 If standby counsel believes there is an actual conflict, he should move to withdraw.



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