Government's Response to Defendant's Omnibus Request for Relief — United States v. Emmet Bowens (Dkt. 215)

Summary

The Government's Response to Defendant's Omnibus Request for Relief, filed January 9, 2026 in United States v. Emmet Bowens, Case No. 6:21-cr-141-RBD-NWH, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division (Document 215). The United States opposes the defendant's requests in Doc. 209 to suppress evidence, to dismiss the indictment and to be released on bond, and argues that they are due to be denied. The response sets out a procedural background, a Speedy Trial Act computation under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 that states 27 days expired on the speedy trial clock, and a statement of the case that describes a PPP loan application. It concludes by asking that the omnibus motion, Doc. 209, be denied without a hearing; the signature block names Special Assistant United States Attorney Rachel S. Lyons.

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“Government's Response to Defendant's Omnibus Request for Relief — United States v. Emmet Bowens (Dkt. 215).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/gov-uscourts-flmd-396523-215-0-c14a421ef6/, SHA-256 e8626eff81f7c2c79fa51f44998e3c1912d9a77f2066f0edb5cd0dab38c423be.

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Case 6:21-cr-00141-RBD-NWH Document 215 Filed 01/09/26 Page 1 of 20 PageID 656

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASE NO. 6:21-cr-141-RBD-NWH

EMMET BOWENS

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S OMINBUS
REQUEST FOR RELIEF

The United States of America, by Gregory W. Kehoe, United States Attorney

for the Middle District of Florida, opposes Defendant’s omnibus request for relief.

Doc. 209. In a one and one-half page document, Defendant includes multiple

motions asking this Court to (1) suppress “all evidence obtained in violation of the

Fourth and Fifth Amendments”, (2) dismiss the Indictment based on the same

violations, (3) dismiss the Indictment under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth

Amendment, and (4) order Defendant’s release on bond. Id. Setting aside the

procedural errors and lack of compliance with the Local Rules, Defendant’s requests

are due to be denied as meritless and not supported by law or fact.

Procedural Background

1. On November 10, 2021, a federal grand jury returned an indictment

charging Defendant with two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343

(Counts One and Two), and four counts of money laundering, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1957 (Counts Three through Six). Doc. 1. On December 2, 2021, Defendant

was arrested in the Northern District of Georgia. His initial appearance and
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detention hearing occurred the following day. Docs. 6–8. The United States did not

move for detention, and Defendant was released on bond conditions. Id.

2. On December 16, 2021, Defendant was arraigned in the Middle District

of Florida. Doc. 10. Afterwards, pretrial discovery and preparation took place over

the next few months, with Defendant seeking unopposed continuances. See Docs. 25,

27, 28, 38, 39, and 50. By May 5, 2022, Defendant began to file pretrial motions,

including a motion to suppress statements, a motion to suppress pretrial and in-court

identifications, a motion to dismiss Count Two of the Indictment for lack of venue,

and most significantly, a motion for competency examination. Docs. 44–47. The

United States responded in opposition to the motions to suppress and the motion to

dismiss. Docs. 59–61. A hearing on those motions never occurred due to

Defendant’s competency proceedings. On October 17, 2025, this Court denied the

motions to suppress and dismiss given the significant gap in time since their filing,

leaving open the opportunity for the defendant to re-raise those issues. Doc. 157.

3. Meanwhile, back on July 13, 2022, Defendant was found incompetent

to proceed with trial and ordered into the custody of the Attorney General for

competency restoration. Doc. 78. However, Defendant was left at liberty and

ordered to report to the designated facility on the date set forth by the Bureau of

Prisons. Id. at 3. He did not.

4. On March 21, 2023, the date Defendant was supposed to report for

competency restoration, he cut off his ankle monitor and fled. Docs. 100–102. He

was not arrested until December 10, 2024, in the Northern District of Mississippi.

2
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Doc. 111. After his transfer back to the Middle District of Florida, Defendant was

ordered back into the custody of the Attorney General to await competency

restoration proceedings. Doc. 116. The parties were directed to file monthly status

reports documenting the progress of those efforts. Id.

5. On March 13, 2025, both of Defendant’s appointed counsel moved to

withdraw. Docs. 121 and 122. By March 31, 2025, Defendant had been designated a

space at FMC Butner, to arrive in May 2025. Doc. 131. He was transferred on or

about May 12, 2025. Doc. 133. Defendant generally declined to participate in the

restoration programs and refused to take medications. Docs. 135, 137, and 139. On

September 9, 2025, his evaluation was completed, and a certificate of competency

was entered on September 15, 2025. Doc. 141.

6. Defendant was released from the custody of the Attorney General on

September 24, 2025. Doc. 142. After several delays caused by the withdrawal of

Defendant’s various defense counsel, he was determined to be competent on October

10, 2025. Docs. 144–155.

7. Similarly, it took some time to progress through defendant’s bond

revocation hearing, due to the withdrawal of yet another court-appointed counsel.

See Docs. 162–178. There was one brief continuance requested by the government

due to the illness of a critical witness; however, at the time, Defendant had elected to

proceed pro se, a decision which he ultimately reversed after the brief continuance.

Docs. 163 and 171.

8. Meanwhile, at the status conference on November 13, 2025,

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Defendant’s then-defense counsel requested a one-month continuance due to his

recent appointment to the case and the need for time to adequately prepare. Doc.

176. The government did not oppose what seemed a very reasonable request, which

this Court granted, contingent on Defendant signing a waiver of speedy trial. Doc.

175. Defendant refused to sign the waiver of speedy trial. Doc. 184. This was the first

time Defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. 1 The Court initially docketed the

case for trial in December, but then granted the government’s motion to continue

based on the unavailability of its case agent, inability to confirm the availability of

other witnesses, and other scheduling concerns. Docs. 186, 190, and 193. The ruling

excluded the time between December 3, 2025, and January 31, 2026. Doc. 193. On

December 11, 2025, this case was set for trial date certain starting January 26, 2026.

Doc. 197. On December 12, 2025, Defendant then requested to proceed pro se, and

on December 16, 2025, Defendant’s seventh attorney was redesignated as stand-by

counsel. Doc. 208. On December 19, 2025, defendant filed his requests for relief.

Doc. 209.

Speedy Trial Act Computation

9. Because Defendant was initially arrested in the Northern District of

Georgia, he must be brought to trial within 70 days from the date he appeared before

a judicial officer in the Middle District of Florida where the charges are pending. 18

U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Defendant was arraigned on December 16, 2021, triggering the

1
In fact, the record shows several instances where Defendant waived his right to speedy
trial. Docs. 29 and 36.

4
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speedy trial clock. Doc. 10.

10. The Speedy Trial Act includes the potential for “excludable delay,”

providing a non-exhaustive list of potential bases. 18 U.S.C. § 3161. Those include

any period of delay resulting from proceedings concerning the defendant, examples

of which are listed in subsection (h). Id.

11. The United States calculates 27 days expired on Defendant’s speedy

trial clock, as follows 2:

Dates Case Status Number of Basis for
Days Against Exclusion
Speedy Trial
Clock
December 2-3, 2021 Defendant’s arrest in 0 18 U.S.C. §
NDGA and initial 3161(c)(1)
appearance
December 4-15, (period between 0 18 U.S.C. §
2021 Defendant’s initial 3161(c)(1)
appearance in NDGA
and his arraignment in
MDFL)
December 16, 2021 Defendant’s 0 18 U.S.C. §
arraignment 3161(h)(1)
December 17, 2021 (period between 27 None
– January 12, 2022 Defendant’s
arraignment and the
first status conference)
January 13, 2022- Continuance by 0 18 U.S.C. §
April 20, 2022 Defendant; 3161(h)(1)(D)
Waiver of speedy trial and (h)(7)(A)
March 10, 2022 – Continuance by 0 18 U.S.C. §
June 30, 2022 Defendant 3161(h)(1)(D)
and (h)(7)(A)
2
Some of the relevant dates for exclusion of time overlap. Additionally, there were other
motions filed between May 5, 2022, and November 19, 2025. These additional motions
would also toll the speedy trial clock, but to simplify the government’s calculations those
additional filings are excluded from the chart.

5
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May 5, 2022 – Defendant’s motions for 0 18 U.S.C.
October 10, 2025 relief, including §3161(h)(1)(A)
competency and (D), and
determination

Defendant’s fugitive (h)(3)(B)
status
March 21, 2023 – Bond revocation petition 0 18 U.S.C. §
November 19, 2025 pending 3161(h)(1)(H)
October 28, 2025 – Motion to withdraw by 0 18 U.S.C. §
November 5, 2025 Roger Weeden 3161(h)(1)(D)
November 5, 2025 Defense motion to 0 18 U.S.C. §
– November 19, continue bond 3161(h)(1)(D)
2025 revocation hearing and (H)
November 13, 2025 Status conference 0 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)
November 14, 2025 (period under which 0 18 U.S.C. §
– November 25, defense counsel’s 3161(h)(1)(D)
2025 motion to continue was and (H)
under advisement)
November 26, 2025 (Period under which 0 18 U.S.C. §
– December 2, 2025 government counsel’s 3161(h)(1)(D)
motion to continue was and (H)
under advisement)
December 3, 2025 – Time excluded by the 0 18 U.S.C. §
January 31, 2026 Court 3161(h)

Statement of the Case

12. On May 5, 2020, Defendant took advantage of the Paycheck Protection

Program (PPP) by applying for a PPP loan using fraudulent information. As the

basis for the loan application, Defendant provided information for an IT company

named Buccaneer Technologies LLC (Buccaneer). On the PPP loan application

Defendant listed himself as the CEO of Buccaneer. On the application Defendant

provided a variation of the proper spelling of his name, “Emmit Bowens” but listed

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19. The application was approved, and a loan in the amount of $739,582.00

was funded by Harvest Small Business Finance, LLC, on May 20, 2020. The funds

were wired from Harvest’s account at East West bank to Defendant’s personal

Trustco bank account ending in 4982. After the funds were deposited into his

Trustco account, Defendant split the money between six other bank accounts, one of

which was opened after the loan application was submitted and two more of which

were opened after he received the loan funds.

20. The information Defendant submitted with his PPP loan application

was false. Buccaneer is a fake business that never employed anyone and was only

created to take advantage of the PPP. The facts that support this include:

(a) Per Florida SunBiz Buccaneer Articles of Organization were not filed until

May 11, 2020—six days after Defendant filed his application for the PPP loan;

(b) Facts of filing information provided by the IRS demonstrates that no taxes

were ever filed by the Buccaneer nor any other business bearing the EIN listed

during 2019;

or for Defendant;

(d) Defendant’s bank records do not reflect that he ever employed anyone or

made other payments in connection with this business, such as payments to a

payroll company, regular payments, or checks for services or supplies;

(e) The business address in the application is an address for “pivot desk,” a

company that provides virtual or physical workspace for businesses. Per the

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665

company’s website, the cost for space ranges between $400–$10,500.

Defendant’s financial records do not show any payments to this company that

would indicate that he was renting physical or virtual space from them;

(f) A check of open-source data revealed that there was no internet presence for

Buccaneer; and

(g) Defendant listed the business phone number on the application as 407-428-

744. This is similar to a number associated with a person named “Matheus

Bowens” per Accurint. 3

21. Defendant’s financial records also reveal he did not use the PPP funds

as permitted under the PPP. First, Defendant did not use this money to cover

legitimate approved costs such as payroll, utilities, rent, etc. Rather, Defendant’s

financial records show transfers of loan proceeds consistent with money laundering.

Prior to the dispensation of the loan funds, financial records reflect that Defendant

had $5,559.89 in his Trustco account. After receiving the PPP loan funds, Defendant

split the money between six different bank accounts, at four different banks, over the

course of only nine days.

22. In addition to the movement of funds, Defendant’s financial records

reveal that he used this money at restaurants, for retail purchases, and to fund a

cross-country vacation. For example, Defendant’s Wells Fargo account ending in

0135 shows charges indicating a cross-country trip starting around May 29, 2020,

3
The full number in Accurint is 407-428-7744

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24. Notably absent from all of the financial records are any payments

resembling payroll, rent, utilities, or any other approved expense as required for PPP

funds.

25. At trial, the United States intends to prove its case through documents

and surveillance footage evidence obtained from subpoenas and other administrative

actions. There were no searches or seizures, and the United States does not seek to

introduce any custodial statements of Defendant.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Defendant’s omnibus motion is due to be summarily denied. The motion fails

on its face to assert the articulable and precise relief requested. The motion is devoid

of substantive facts supporting its conclusory assertions. Defendant cites to no case

law supporting his requested relief. Finally, the motion does not comply with the

Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Local Rules of the Middle District of Florida, or

this Court’s scheduling order. The United States takes up the various requests in

turn.

A. Motion to Suppress Evidence under Fourth and Fifth Amendments

Defendant first seeks to suppress “all evidence” obtained in violation of the

Fourth and Fifth Amendments, contending evidence was obtained through

unconstitutional searches, seizures, interrogations, and compelled disclosures. Doc.

209 at 2.

As an initial matter, the Motion is facially insufficient in that it makes

conclusory assertions with no specific factual support. “A motion to suppress must in

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every critical respect be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to

enable the court to collude that a substantial claim is presented.” United States v.

Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). “In short, the

motion must allege facts which, if proven, would provide a basis for relief.” Id. “A

court need not act upon general or conclusory assertions founded on mere suspicion

or conjecture, and the court has discretion in determining the need for a hearing.” Id.

(citation omitted).

As to evidence other than Defendant’s statements, Defendant first fails to

identify what “searches” or “seizures” took place and then fails to explain how any

purported searches or seizures were violative of the Constitution. This may be

because, as discussed above, no searches or seizures took place in this investigation.

Rather, the evidence was obtained lawfully using grand jury subpoenas from the

SBA, various financial institutions, Google, Charter Communications, and other

entities—which Defendant had no grounds to challenge at the time and has

identified no problems with even now. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.

632, 642–43 (1950) (noting a grand jury “can investigate merely on suspicion that the

law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.”); United

States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (noting that as a necessary

consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury “paints with a broad

brush.”). Because Defendant has not identified any search or seizure that took place

in this investigation, nor could he, and thus no violation of his Fourth Amendment

rights. The Motion fails in every respect to be “definite, specific, detailed, and

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669

nonconjectural”; to the contrary, it contains nothing more than “general or

conclusory assertions,” and as such it is due to be denied without a hearing. See

Richardson, 764 F.2d at 1527 (finding a trial court properly denied a motion to

suppress without an evidentiary hearing where the defendants “relied on a flawed

legal theory and on a conclusory statement that the arrest was carried out without

probable cause” and “failed to make factual allegations which could form the basis

for exclusion of evidence.”).

As to any statements by Defendant, Defendant likewise fails to identify what

custodial interrogation or compelled financial certifications occurred and then fails to

explain how any such purported interrogations or certifications were violative of the

Constitution. This may be because—as with the “searches” and “seizures”—no

custodial interrogation or compelled certifications occurred. Rather, law enforcement

attempted to meet with Defendant to discuss his case but no meeting ever occurred.

So not only does the motion lack specificity as to the statements and certifications

Defendant seeks to suppress, his motion lacks a sufficient basis to suppress any such

evidence even if it existed. As a result, his request to suppress this evidence likewise

should be denied.

B. Motion to Dismiss based on Fourth and Fifth Amendment Violations

Defendant also seeks dismissal of the Indictment based on violations of the

Fourth and Fifth Amendments as it relates to “unlawfully obtained evidence.” Doc.

209 at 2–3. But because Defendant has failed to establish that his Fourth or Fifth

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Amendment rights were violated or that any evidence was obtained unlawfully, his

request for dismissal on these grounds should likewise fail.

C. Motion to Dismiss based on Speedy Trial Act Violations

Next, Defendant seeks dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth

Amendment. Doc. 209 at 2–3. But Defendant has not explained how his right to a

Speedy Trial has been violated. For starters, he does not explain how much time he

believes has lapsed on the speedy trial clock or when he believes the 70-day time

period expired under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 in light of the procedure of this case, the

waivers of speedy trial, and the excludable time periods throughout the pendency of

this case. As discussed above, the United States respectfully submits that only 27

days have expired, the remaining time until trial has been excluded, and thus

Defendant will be brought to trial within 70 days.

In determining whether a Sixth Amendment violation of Defendant’s right to

a speedy trial has occurred, the Court must make a case-by-case determination,

assessing factors such as: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3)

the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice to the

defendant. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

Factor one is a threshold inquiry, as some presumptively unreasonable period

of time must have expired to justify the Court’s attention to the other factors. Id.;

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992). “If, after the threshold inquiry is

satisfied and the second and third factor are considered, all three of these factors

weigh heavily against the Government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice

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(the fourth factor) to succeed in showing a violation of his right to a speedy

trial.” United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (2006). The government concedes

that the delay between Indictment and trial, in this case approximately 50 months,

warrants the Court’s assessment of the remaining factors. None of those factors

weigh heavily against the government, or even in Defendant’s favor.

Turning to the second factor, the reasons for the significant delays in this case

are attributable to Defendant. For example, between December 2021 and May 2022,

Defendant, through his attorneys, requested several continuances prior to filing

pretrial motions. Given the complex nature of this fraud case, and the volume of

discovery, such pretrial continuances were reasonable and unopposed. Defendant

even filed accompanying waivers of speedy trial.

Then, in May 2022, Defendant began filing motions for pretrial relief. The

government responded to those motions within a reasonable period (within a

month). However, Defendant’s request for a competency determination caused a

much longer delay (from May 2022, when the motion was filed, to October 2025,

when he was determined to be competent). Notably, much of that same period

lapsed due to the fact Defendant fled prior to participating in competency restoration

as ordered by the Court (from March 2023 to December 2024). Also contributing to

the delays were Defendant’s quarrels with his court-appointed attorneys (which

included the physical destruction of one attorney’s files).

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The third prong similarly does not weigh in Defendant’s favor. It was not until

December 2025, three years after his arraignment and less than one month prior to

the scheduled trial date, that Defendant asserted his right to speedy trial.

Finally, as to the fourth factor, Defendant has provided no specific facts or

evidence to demonstrate prejudice. Certainly, the experience of being incarcerated is

likely unpleasant. Yet, the fact of his incarceration is of his own making, as the

United States did not move for detention until after Defendant cut off his ankle

monitor and fled prosecution. Further, he does not articulate details that make him

different from any other pre-trial detainee. Similarly, Defendant makes no mention

of the most serious aspect of this prong—the inability to prepare his defense. He

points to no evidence that is no longer available, no witness whose memory has

atrophied, and no potential defense that has been foreclosed.

Ultimately, Defendant has failed to show how the Speedy Trial Act or his

Sixth Amendment rights have been violated during these proceedings, and his

request for dismissal on these grounds should be denied.

D. Motion for Release on Bond

Finally, Defendant requests release on bond under the Bail Reform Act

claiming he is not a flight risk, poses no danger to the community, and has complied

with court orders. Doc. 209 at 3. But again, Defendant has offered no legal or factual

support warranting his release.

Putting aside the fact Defendant has offered no legal basis for his release at

this stage of the proceedings, Defendant’s request is wholly unsupported by the facts

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of this case. Defendant claims he is not a flight risk, yet he has proven the exact

opposite by being a fugitive from justice for 21 months. He claims to have “complied

with all court orders,” but the record is rife with evidence to the contrary. For

example, he failed to comply with GPS monitoring, he did not communicate with

his pretrial services officer as directed, and he left the jurisdiction within which he

was ordered to remain. Further, when he was placed in the court-ordered

competency restoration program, he refused to participate in the program or take

recommended medication. As a final and more recent example, during the hearing in

which Defendant requested to be allowed to proceed pro se, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Hill ordered him to stand and be placed under oath. Defendant refused, stating

words to the effect that he did not recognize the Court’s authority to require him to

swear to the statements he made in court. On these facts, no condition or

combination of conditions could reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance as

required or the safety of the community as necessary for release on conditions, and

his request for release is due to be denied.

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CONCLUSION

Therefore, the United States respectfully requests the omnibus motion, Doc.

209, be denied without a hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

GREGORY W. KEHOE
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Rachel S. Lyons
Rachel S. Lyons
Special Assistant United States Attorney
USA No. 215
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
Facsimile: (407) 648-7643
E-mail: Rachel.Lyons@usdoj.gov

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U.S. v. Emmet Bowens Case No. 6:21-cr-141-RBD-NWH

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 9, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing

with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of

electronic filing to the following:

Michael Nielsen
Stand-by counsel for the defendant

I hereby certify that on January 9, 2026, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing document and the notice of electronic filing were sent by United States

Mail to the following non-CM/ECF participant(s):

Emmet Bowens
Defendant

/s/ Rachel S. Lyons
Rachel S. Lyons
Special Assistant United States Attorney
USA No. 215
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
Facsimile: (407) 648-7643
E-mail: Rachel.Lyons@usdoj.gov

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