Third-Party Claimant Sandra Will's Opposition to Government's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment — United States v. Cassie Will-Darnall (Dkt. 83)

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Third Party Claimant Sandra Will’s Opposition to the Government’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, filed August 22, 2025 as Document 83 in United States of America v. Cassie Will-Darnall, Case 5:24-cr-00292-PCP, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division; the hearing date is October 15, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. Sandra Will argues that her petition states a plausible claim as to the Belwood home and that the Court should deny the government’s motions and amend the preliminary order of forfeiture to remove both the Belwood and Almaden properties. She also argues that she has standing to raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to the forfeiture. The filing carries an s/ signature for Hanni M. Fakhoury of Moeel Lah Fakhoury LLP, attorney for the third party claimant.

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“Third-Party Claimant Sandra Will's Opposition to Government's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment — United States v. Cassie Will-Darnall (Dkt. 83).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/gov-uscourts-cand-430212-83-0-a103ac9f2c/, SHA-256 f05ef6a852d53f3188dc8b405518eaafbe7bcae7a7bc3efcf587f9445c8da2b7.

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Case 5:24-cr-00292-PCP Document 83 Filed 08/22/25 Page 1 of 16

1 MOEEL LAH FAKHOURY LLP
Hanni M. Fakhoury (State Bar No. 252629)
2 2006 Kala Bagai Way, Suite 16
Berkeley, CA 94704
3 Telephone: (510) 500-9994
Email: hanni@mlf-llp.com
4

5 Attorneys for Third Party Claimaint Sandra Will

7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
SAN JOSE DIVISION
10

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No.: 5:24-CR-00292-PCP
12 Plaintiff, THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA
WILL’S OPPOSITION TO
13 v. GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY
14 CASSIE WILL-DARNALL, JUDGMENT
15 Defendant. Court: Courtroom 8, 4th Floor
16 Hearing Date: October 15, 2025
Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m.
17 SANDRA WILL,
18 Third Party Claimant.
19

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
United States v. Will-Darnall, 5:24-CR-00292-PCP
Case 5:24-cr-00292-PCP Document 83 Filed 08/22/25 Page 2 of 16

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................ i
3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................................. ii
4 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1
5 ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................................... 2
6 A. The ancillary petition states a plausible claim for relief as to the Bellwood home. ......... 2
7 B. Should the Court construe the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment,
it should reject the government’s motion and grant Ms. Will summary judgment. ......... 4
8
1. In an ancillary proceeding, a motion for summary judgment is only
9 appropriate after a Court has ruled on a motion to dismiss. ................................. 4
10 2. The Court should deem the government’s request for summary judgment
waived because it provides no argument or case law to support its
11 request. .................................................................................................................. 5
12 3. If the Court considers the merits, Ms. Will had a superior interest at the
time of the fraud and so summary judgment should be granted to Ms.
13 Will. ...................................................................................................................... 6
14 C. The Court should decline the government’s invitation to issue an advisory opinion on
whether Ms. Will is a “bona fide purchaser for value” under § 853(n)(6)(B). ................. 7
15
D. Ms. Will has standing to raise a constitutional challenge to the forfeiture. ...................... 9
16

17 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 12
18

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Cases
3 Bailey v. Citibank, N.A., 66 Cal. App. 5th 335 (2021) ........................................................................... 7
4 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)........................................................................ 3, 4
5 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) .............................................................................................. 1
6 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................. 6
7 FDIC v. Garner, 126 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................... 6
8 Hellon & Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 958 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1992) .................................... 5
9 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) ......................................................................................... 9
10 Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) ......................................................................................................... 5
11 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) ............................................. 6
12 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2000) ..................... 6
13 Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)................................................. 3
14 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) ......................................................... 3
15 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000)........................................... 8
16 United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2004) .................................... 9
17 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).................................................................................. 9
18 United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991) .................................................................... 5
19 United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1990) ........................................................................... 6
20 United States v. Coffman, 612 Fed. Appx. 278 (6th Cir. 2015) ..................................................... 10, 11
21 United States v. Egan, 811 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ............................................................... 3
22 United States v. Espada, 128 F. Supp. 3d 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) .................................................... 10, 11
23 United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157 (9th Cir. 2022) ...................................................... 5
24 United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2000).......................................................................... 8
25 United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2007) ..................................................................... 8
26 United States v. Lester, 85 F.3d 1409 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................ 1
27 United States v. Newman, 659 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................... 11
28 United States v. Porchay, 533 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................... 10

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 United States v. Tarraf, 725 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Mich. 2010)......................................................... 10
2 United States v. Timley, 507 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 7
3 United States v. Totaro, 345 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2003) ......................................................................... 10
4 United States v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2015) .......................................................................... 7, 8
5 Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2011) .................................... 2, 4
6 Constitutional Provisions
7 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII ..................................................................................................... 9, 10, 11, 12
8 Statutes
9 18 U.S.C. § 3571 .................................................................................................................................. 11
10 21 U.S.C. § 853 .......................................................................................................................... 1, 2, 7, 8
11 Federal Rules
12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 ................................................................................................ 2, 4, 5
13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ............................................................................................ 2, 4, 5, 6
14 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 ................................................................................... 1, 2, 4, 5
15

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 INTRODUCTION
2 Third Party Claimant Sandra Will petitioned the Court to conduct an ancillary proceeding
3 under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) after the government gave
4 her notice that it intended to forfeit two homes—306 Los Gatos Almaden Way and 111 Belwood
5 Gateway—in Los Gatos as a result of criminal conduct by her daughter, defendant Cassie Will-
6 Darnall. Dkt. 65, Third Party Claimant Sandra Will’s Petition For Ancillary Proceeding (“Anc. Pet.”).
7 Most pressing to Ms. Will was the property at 306 Los Gatos Almaden Way, the home she has
8 owned since 1991 and lived in since 1995. Despite acknowledging “since the start that Will owns the
9 Almaden property,” the government nonetheless sought to forfeit the home. Dkt. 77, Government’s
10 Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (“Gov. Motion”) at 2. It was only
11 after significant stress and the quick filing of the ancillary petition at considerable expense did the
12 government backtrack from its intent to forfeit the Almaden home, explaining to the Court it “now
13 relinquishes the forfeiture of the Almaden Property in this case,” and asking this Court to “remove
14 the Almaden Property” from the final order of forfeiture. Gov. Motion at 2, 20.
15 But the government continues to seek forfeiture of the Belwood home, moving this Court to
16 either dismiss Ms. Will’s petition or grant it summary judgment. But as set forth in the Ancillary
17 Petition and below, Ms. Will had a superior right to the property at the time of Ms. Will-Darnall’s
18 fraud in 2020 and so the preliminary order of forfeiture must be amended to remove both the
19 Almaden and Bellwood homes.
20 Ultimately, this Court must “‘heed[ ] the Supreme Court’s…admonition that ‘[i]mproperly
21 used, forfeiture could become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenues from innocent
22 but hapless owners ..., or a tool wielded to punish those who associate with criminals, [rather] than a
23 component of a system of justice.’” United States v. Lester, 85 F.3d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1996)
24 (quoting Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 456 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)). The government’s
25 efforts to forfeit the properties are precisely that: an effort to punish Ms. Will for the criminal deeds
26 of her daughter by taking away a home that has no nexus whatsoever to criminal conduct.
27 This Court should deny the government’s motions and amend the preliminary order of
28 forfeiture to remove both the Belwood and Almaden properties.

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 ARGUMENT
2 To prevail at an ancillary proceeding, a petitioner must show by a preponderance of the
3 evidence that she either (1) has a “legal right, title, or interest in the property” that was “vested in the
4 petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at
5 the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property,” or (2) is “a
6 bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of
7 purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture.” 21 U.S.C. §
8 853(n)(6)(A), (B). If that standard is met, the district court should “amend the order of forfeiture” to
9 accommodate those interests. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6).
10 In her petition, Ms. Will raised a claim under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) as to both the Almaden
11 and Bellwood homes, asserting that her interests in the properties were superior to Ms. Will-Darnall’s
12 interests at the time of the fraud in May 2020. Ms. Will thus asked the Court to amend the forfeiture
13 order to remove the properties. Anc. Pet. at 10-12. She also explained why forfeiting the homes
14 would constitute an unconstitutionally excessive fine. Anc. Pet. at 12-15.
15 The government asserts that Ms. Will’s petition should be dismissed as to the Belwood home
16 and, without citing or discussing the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 at all, seeks
17 summary judgment. Finally, it argues that Ms. Will lacks standing to assert a constitutional challenge
18 to the forfeiture of the properties. Gov. Motion at 19. As set forth below, the government’s arguments
19 should be rejected.
20 A. The ancillary petition states a plausible claim for relief as to the Bellwood home.
21 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1)(A) permits a court to “dismiss the [ancillary]
22 petition “for lack of standing, for failure to state a claim, or for any other lawful reason.” A motion to
23 dismiss “a third-party petition in a forfeiture proceeding prior to discovery or a hearing should be
24 treated like a motion to dismiss a civil complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b).” Willis
25 Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 241–42 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotations and
26 citations omitted). Rule 12(b), in turn, permits a district court to dismiss a claim for a variety of
27 reasons including, as raised by the government here, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
28 can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal…is the complaint.” Schneider v. California Dep’t of
2 Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998). This Court must treat “all allegations of material
3 fact…as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sprewell v. Golden
4 State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). That means a Court must consider “the allegations
5 in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
6 555 (2007); see also United States v. Egan, 811 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (when
7 considering government motion to dismiss ancillary petition, court “accepts as true all factual
8 allegations in the petitions and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the Claimants”). “A
9 complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
10 of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988. A
11 complaint need only allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
12 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
13 The ancillary petition meets this standard. It explains that Ms. Will’s interests in the Belwood
14 home were “superior” to any interests belonging to Ms. Will-Darnall at the time of the bank fraud in
15 2020. Anc. Pet. at 11-12. More specifically, the petition explains that in April 2012, Ms. Will’s
16 daughter married Sheri Darnall. Anc. Pet. at 2. The couple purchased the home, and it was placed in
17 their names in 2013. Anc. Pet. at 2. When the couple filed for divorce in January 2016, Ms. Will-
18 Darnall bought out her ex-wife’s share of the home. Anc. Pet. at 2. Ms. Will took out a home equity
19 line of credit (“HELOC”) of approximately $500,000 from Bank of America, and gave much of that
20 money, as well as other cash, to her daughter to enable her to purchase Ms. Darnall’s share of the
21 home. Anc. Pet. at 2-3. In 2018, Ms. Will took out a $1 million loan from Bank of America, the
22 proceeds of which were used to repay the HELOC and then repay the mortgage on the Belwood
23 home. Anc. Pet. at 3. To document the nearly $1 million Ms. Will had lent her daughter, a promissory
24 note was signed on February 7, 2018; in 2019, a deed of trust was placed on the Belwood home in
25 favor of Ms. Will to secure that promissory note. Anc. Pet. at 3. At the time of the bank fraud in
26 2020, Ms. Will was the mortgagee of the Belwood home as Ms. Will had taken out debt to purchase
27 the Belwood home, and was contractually responsible to Bank of America to make payments on the
28 loan used to buy the property. Anc. Pet. at 4.

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1 The petition thus alleged enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
2 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. That is all that is needed to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
3 Thus, the government’s motion to dismiss should be denied.
4 B. Should the Court construe the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, it
should reject the government’s motion and grant Ms. Will summary judgment.
5

6 As an alternative to dismissing the petition, the government seeks summary judgment, but it
7 does not seriously grapple with the legal standard, contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
8 that applies to such motions; indeed, it does not even cite the Rule or apply it to this case. Given the
9 clear conflict between Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10 12 on the issue of the timing of a summary judgment motion during an ancillary proceeding, this
11 Court should deny the government’s motion for summary judgment. However, should the Court
12 apply the standards for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56, it should reject the government’s
13 motion and instead grant summary judgment in favor of Ms. Will.
14 1. In an ancillary proceeding, a motion for summary judgment is only appropriate
after a Court has ruled on a motion to dismiss.
15

16 As noted earlier, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1)(A) permits a court to “dismiss
17 the [ancillary] petition “for lack of standing, for failure to state a claim, or for any other lawful
18 reason.” A motion to dismiss an ancillary petition is treated like a motion to dismiss a civil complaint
19 for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Willis, 652 F.3d at 241–42.
20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) states that a motion raised under Rule 12(b)(6) that includes
21 “matters outside the pleadings…must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.
22 R. Civ. P. 12(d). The government relies on that provision when it suggests—without any argument—
23 that the Court should grant it summary judgment as to the Belwood property. Gov. Motion at 11.
24 But that suggestion contradicts the plain language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
25 32.2(c)(1)(B), which explains that only “After disposing of any motion filed under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A)
26 and before conducting a hearing on the petition, the court may permit the parties to conduct discovery
27 in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the court determines that discovery is
28 necessary or desirable to resolve factual issues. When discovery ends, a party may move for summary

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B) (emphasis
2 added). In other words, in an ancillary petition, a summary judgment motion can only be considered
3 after a motion to dismiss is ruled upon and, in some instances, after discovery has been taken, all of
4 which must occur before any hearing on the petition.
5 The Court should reject the government’s efforts to graft Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d)
6 onto Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c), and convert the government’s motion to dismiss
7 into a motion for summary judgment. As a matter of statutory interpretation, “to the extent that
8 statutes can be harmonized, they should be, but in case of an irreconcilable inconsistency between
9 them the later and more specific statute usually controls the earlier and more general one.” Hellon &
10 Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 958 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
11 Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2022) (“the later and more specific statute usually
12 controls if two statutes conflict.”) (quotations and citations omitted). Nor does a court “lightly assume
13 that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply.”
14 Jama v. ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005).
15 Here, the more specific statute that governs ancillary proceedings—Federal Rule of Criminal
16 Procedure 32.2—should control over the more general one, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, that
17 covers all civil cases. Because Rule 32.2 makes no reference to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
18 12(d), this Court should deny the government’s request to convert its motion to dismiss into a motion
19 for summary judgment.
20 2. The Court should deem the government’s request for summary judgment waived
because it provides no argument or case law to support its request.
21

22 Even if the Court wanted to consider whether or not to grant summary judgment, the
23 government has failed to equip the Court with any law or analysis by which to make a ruling.
24 Although the government captions its brief as a “motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,”
25 nowhere does it brief cite Rule 56, the applicable standards to such motions, or one of the myriad
26 cases discussing summary judgment. “A party urging” a court to provide legal relief “has an
27 obligation to argue why” it should, “and to cite appropriate authority to support that argument.”
28 United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991). “It is not the obligation of this court

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1 to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are represented by
2 counsel.” United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has made
3 clear that when a party “present[s] no case law or argument in support” of a legal claim, a court may
4 “deem the argument waived.” FDIC v. Garner, 126 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 1997).
5 Because the government fails to cite case law or argument in support of its request for summary
6 judgment as to the forfeiture of the Belwood property, the Court should deem the claim waived.
7 3. If the Court considers the merits, Ms. Will had a superior interest at the time of
the fraud and so summary judgment should be granted to Ms. Will.
8

9 Should the Court decide to address the merits of the petition as to the Belwood property, it
10 should grant summary judgment to Ms. Will because she has demonstrated there is “no genuine
11 dispute as to any material fact” concerning her superior interest in the home at the time of the bank
12 fraud in May 2020.
13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “The court shall grant summary judgment if the
14 movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
15 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The party moving for summary judgment bears
16 the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Devereaux v.
17 Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). They “must either produce evidence negating an
18 essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does
19 not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.”
20 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). The
21 “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts…must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
22 party opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
23 (1986) (quotations and citations omitted).
24 As explained in the petition, Ms. Will explained that her interest in the Belwood property was
25 superior to Ms. Will-Darnall at the time of the bank fraud on May 20, 2020. Anc. Pet. at 11-12. The
26 government disagrees, arguing that “Under California law, a beneficiary to a deed of trust (a secured
27 lender) does not have a superior interest to the trustor or settlor (the homeowner).” Gov. Motion at
28 12. Ms. Will acknowledges that a “deed of trust carries none of the incidents of ownership of the

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 property, other than the trustee’s right to convey upon default, and in the absence of a special
2 agreement conveys no right of possession to the trustee or beneficiary.” Bailey v. Citibank, N.A., 66
3 Cal. App. 5th 335, 353 (2021). But the government’s focus on the existence of the deed of trust fails
4 to account for the fact that Ms. Will’s interest in the home predated the deed. Ms. Will’s interest in
5 the home stemmed from the money she put into the house to buy out Ms. Will-Darnall’s ex-wife’s
6 share of the home, and then from the money used to pay off the mortgage on the home, all of which
7 took place before the fraud occurred in May 2020, and before the deed was recorded in 2019. See
8 Anc. Pet. at 2-4, 11-12.
9 Timing is crucial. “Because forfeitable property vests in the government immediately upon the
10 commission of a criminal act, a third party may prevail under § 853(n)(6)(A) only by establishing that
11 he ‘had a legal interest in the forfeited property before the underlying crime was committed’—that is,
12 ‘before the government’s interest vested.’” United States v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2015)
13 (quoting United States v. Timley, 507 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 2007)). At the time of the fraud, Ms.
14 Will had an interest—worth approximately $1 million—in the Bellwood home, secured by a deed of
15 trust. That means Ms. Will has carried her burden under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) and is entitled to
16 judgment as a matter of law. The forfeiture order thus must be amended to remove the Belwood
17 home.
18 C. The Court should decline the government’s invitation to issue an advisory opinion on
whether Ms. Will is a “bona fide purchaser for value” under § 853(n)(6)(B).
19

20 The government spends a significant number of pages in its brief arguing that Ms. Will is not a
21 bona fide purchaser for value of the Belwood property, and thus cannot meet the standard in §
22 853(n)(6)(B). Gov. Motion at 13-18. Of course, as the government itself recognizes, Ms. Will has
23 never claimed that she is a bona fide purchaser, nor sought relief under § 853(n)(6)(B). Gov. Motion
24 at 14; see also Anc. Pet. at 11-12.
25 It is clear why the government is nonetheless refuting a claim not raised by Ms. Will: it wants
26 to focus on the 2020 quitclaim deed—a transaction that occurred after Ms. Will-Darnall’s criminal
27 conduct—which it asserts was a “fraudulent transfer” made with Ms. Will’s knowledge that her
28 daughter was attempting “to hide the Belwood Property from a creditor, namely the government.”

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1 Gov. Motion at 14, 18. With that accusation, the government introduces into the record numerous
2 documents and records concerning an unrelated, out of state criminal case from a decade ago having
3 nothing to do with Ms. Will or the relevant legal issues. This Court should reject the government’s
4 request for an advisory opinion on a claim not raised in Ms. Will’s petition.
5 A federal court’s “role is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical
6 cases.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the
7 government seeks an advisory opinion that Ms. Will is not entitled to relief under § 853(n)(6)(B), on
8 the basis of the 2020 quitclaim deed, despite the fact she has never asserted such a claim or relied on
9 the 2020 quitclaim deed at all. That is due to the simple fact that “to qualify for relief under §
10 853(n)(6)(A), Claimants’ legal interest, if any, must have been vested in Claimants at the time” of the
11 crime. United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 2000). “Forfeiture relates back to the
12 time of the criminal acts giving rise to the forfeiture,” and the government’s “interest in the property
13 vests at the time the defendant commits the crime.” United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 647
14 (9th Cir. 2007). Anything occurring after the criminal act is effectively irrelevant for purposes of
15 analyzing a claim brought under § 853(n)(6)(A), the sole ground for relief alleged by Ms. Will in her
16 petition. See Watts, 786 F.3d at 166 (when “the petitioner obtains his interest in the property after the
17 commission of the crime giving rise to forfeiture, he may defend his right to the property only under §
18 853(n)(6)(B)”) (emphasis added). Because § 853(n)(6)(B) and the 2020 quitclaim deed are irrelevant,
19 this Court should decline to consider the government’s arguments on the point. 1
20 The Court should also reject the government’s arguments on this issue—and in particular, its
21 claim that Ms. Will “should have known” the transfer of the Belwood Property was an effort to shield
22 the property from the government—for another reason: they are based entirely on speculation. Gov.
23 Motion at 18. The government presents not a single shred of evidence that Ms. Will was aware in
24 2020 that her daughter engaged in bank fraud, would have to forfeit money to the government, or was
25
1
26 Similarly, the government argues that Ms. Will “could (but does not) argue that she had an interest
in the Belwood Property that had vested before Will-Darnall’s crimes based on the 2019 Deed of
27 Trust” and that this “argument (if made) would fail” because Ms. Will’s vested interest in the home
was extinguished after Ms. Will-Darnall repaid her mother the value of the 2019 promissory note.
28 Gov. Motion at 13. Since, as the government concedes, Ms. Will has never made that claim or
argument, there is no need for the Court to consider the issue.
THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 trying to shield her assets. The government’s claim that “Will-Darnall consulted individuals,
2 including likely her parents, in strategies to hide property from the government” is not based on any
3 actual evidence of Will-Darnall engaging in such conduct, let alone her mother’s knowledge of any
4 such activity. Gov. Motion at 18.
5 The government’s efforts to slander an 88 year old woman accused of no criminal
6 wrongdoing—after it tried to forfeit her house of more than 30 years only to abandon that request
7 when challenged in court after considerable stress and expense to Ms. Will—should be rejected.
8 D. Ms. Will has standing to raise a constitutional challenge to the forfeiture.
9 Ms. Will’s petition also asserted that forfeiting the properties would amount to an
10 unconstitutional fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “excessive fines.” U.S.
11 CONST. AMEND. VIII; see Anc. Pet. at 12-15. The government, however, claims that Ms. Will lacks
12 standing to assert a constitutional violation. Gov. Motion at 19. To the extent the government claims
13 Ms. Will has no standing as a third party claimant to assert an Eighth Amendment claim, it is clearly
14 wrong.
15 Forfeitures are “fines” under the Eighth Amendment when they “constitute punishment for an
16 offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998). A “punitive forfeiture violates the
17 Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Id. at
18 334. Both “owners” and “claimants who assert possessory interests in the forfeited property” have
19 standing to challenge a forfeiture order under the Eighth Amendment even if they are not a criminal
20 defendant. United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004). A
21 claimant may even raise an Eighth Amendment challenge in a civil forfeiture proceeding “as a party
22 ‘punished’ by the forfeiture,” notwithstanding the nonexistence of a criminal case. Id. at 1121; see
23 also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (“The Eighth Amendment protects against
24 excessive civil fines, including forfeitures.”). Because Ms. Will is both an “owner” and a “claimant”
25 of the properties, she has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the forfeitures under the
26 Eighth Amendment.
27 The cases cited by the government for the proposition that Ms. Will cannot assert a
28 constitutional challenge to the forfeiture of the Bellwood property do not withstand scrutiny upon

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 closer inspection, as none of them deal with the Eighth Amendment claim raised by Ms. Will here.
2 See Gov. Motion at 19 (citing cases).
3 For example, in United States v. Espada, 128 F. Supp. 3d 555 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), the claimant
4 asserted the constitutional rights of her husband, arguing that a preliminary order of forfeiture was
5 entered in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 128 F. Supp. 3d at 557. The district court rejected
6 that argument, noting the wife could not “vicariously assert constitutional claims” on her husband’s
7 behalf. Id. But it clarified the wife “could raise constitutional challenges on her own behalf.” Id. at
8 557 n. 1 (emphasis in original). And it quoted an Eighth Circuit case noting that if a court forfeited an
9 “entire estate despite a valid claim of partial ownership by a third party,” the result “would also
10 punish the third party, against whom no jury has returned a verdict of guilt, and may therefore raise
11 constitutional questions.” Id. (quoting United States v. Totaro, 345 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2003)
12 (quotations omitted)).
13 Similarly, in United States v. Tarraf, 725 F. Supp. 2d 625 (E.D. Mich. 2010) the district court
14 rejected the efforts of third party claimants to “assert the Defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights,”
15 noting “had [the defendant] wished to assert an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines defense, he
16 should have argued as much during his criminal proceeding.” Tarraf, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 635
17 (emphasis added).
18 In United States v. Porchay, 533 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2008) the Eighth Circuit found a third party
19 could not raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to how the government seized property it later
20 forfeited, noting that “a third party to the forfeiture has no standing to challenge the legality of the
21 seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Porchay, 533 F.3d at 710 (emphasis added).
22 In United States v. Coffman, 612 Fed. Appx. 278 (6th Cir. 2015), the third party claimant raised
23 an Eighth Amendment challenge to the final order of forfeiture, issued after an ancillary proceeding,
24 seemingly for the first time on appeal. There, the claimant had been charged criminally with her
25 husband; the husband was convicted but the claimant acquitted by jury. She then sought an ancillary
26 petition to contest the forfeiture of certain property on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of certain
27 entities with legal rights in the forfeited properties. The district court issued a final order of forfeiture.
28 Coffman, 612 Fed. Appx. at 281-82. On appeal, she asserted the forfeiture proceeding violated her

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 right against double jeopardy, given her acquittal on the criminal charges, and separately constituted
2 an excessive punishment. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument by noting the claimants could not
3 “now, after having intervened in the proceedings, claim that the order of forfeiture operates as a fine,
4 even if they eventually lose what they believe are their assets.” Coffman, 612 Fed. Appx. at 289. The
5 briefs submitted by the parties do not indicate that any challenge under the Eighth Amendment was
6 raised by the claimants before the district court, and the appellate arguments focused on whether the
7 Eighth Amendment was violated given the fact the claimant was acquitted. See 2014 WL 1512661
8 (Appellant’s Opening Brief); 2014 WL 3556188 (Government’s Answering Brief); 2014 WL
9 3795363 (Appellant’s Reply Brief).
10 Here, Ms. Will is asserting her rights under the Eighth Amendment to be free from excessive
11 fines; she is not vicariously asserting the rights of Ms. Will-Darnall. See Espada, 128 F. Supp. 3d at
12 557 n. 1. Thus, this Court can consider her Eighth Amendment claim. As explained in Ms. Will’s
13 petition, forfeiting the Bellwood home would be an unconstitutionally excessive fine given the fact
14 she has not been charged with a crime or accused of any wrongdoing. Anc. Pet. at 13. Because the
15 government has other remedies to recoup the money taken by Ms. Will-Darnall, including restitution
16 with interest which can be enforced through liens and wage garnishment, forfeiting the Bellwood
17 home is disproportionate and unconstitutional. See Anc. Pet. at 13-15.
18 The government responds that “courts routinely hold that imposition of restitution and
19 forfeiture together in a single judgment does not constitute an excessive fine because requiring a
20 defendant to disgorge no more than twice the proceeds of her crimes cannot be disproportionate to
21 the harm inflicted on the defendant’s victims.” Gov. Motion at 19. 2 It cites a Ninth Circuit case,
22 United States v. Newman, 659 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) which it asserts found “forcing defendant to
23

24 2
The government faults Ms. Will for “mistakenly claiming that the fines for Counts One and Two are
25 $1,000,000, and $250,000, respectively. In fact, Congress authorized for both Counts fines twice the
amount sought by the government in forfeiture, here. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d).” Gov. Motion at 20. But
26 Ms. Will-Darnall was told personally in the Information (prepared by the government), the guilty
plea application form (prepared by her attorney), and at her change of plea hearing (by the Court) that
27 the maximum punishments were $1 million and $250,000 specifically; no one mentioned to her
specifically that the law allowed a fine up to the greater of twice the gross gain or loss. See Dkt. 1 at
28 10 (Information); Dkt. 34 at 2-3 (Amended Submission in Advance of Change of Plea Hearing); Dkt.
40 at 14 (change of plea hearing transcript).
THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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1 pay both forfeiture and restitution ‘at worst’ forces him to disgorge twice the value of the proceeds of
2 his crime, which ‘is in no way disproportionate to the harm inflicted on government and society.’”
3 Gov. Motion at 19 (quoting Newman, 659 F.3d at 1241). But as Ms. Will explained in her petition,
4 Newman noted the “constitutional limits” to forfeiture—including “the constitutional limit defined by
5 the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment”—were “not at issue here” as “neither
6 Defendant asserts that the district court’s forfeiture orders implicate constitutional considerations.”
7 Newman, 659 F.3d at 1241, n. 4; see also Anc. Pet. at 15. In other words, the Ninth Circuit’s decision
8 in Newman does not foreclose the constitutional challenge raised by Ms. Will in her petition.
9 Thus, Ms. Will can assert her Eighth Amendment rights to challenge to the forfeiture. Because
10 forfeiting the Bellwood home is disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, in part because of the
11 availability of other government remedies to collect money illegally obtained by Ms. Will-Darnall,
12 forfeiture of the Belwood home would be unconstitutional.
13 CONCLUSION
14 Ms. Will respectfully requests this Court conduct an ancillary proceeding and amend the
15 forfeiture order to remove both 306 Los Gatos Almaden and 111 Belwood Gateway.
16

17
Dated: August 22, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
18
MOEEL LAH FAKHOURY LLP
19

20 s/ Hanni M. Fakhoury
Hanni M. Fakhoury
21 Attorneys for Third Party Claimant Sandra Will
22

THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT SANDRA WILL’S OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
United States v. Will-Darnall, 5:24-CR-00292-PCP
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