Federal Air Marshal Service Should Document Its Response to Cases and Facilitate Access to Testing (GAO-21-595)
Summary
A GAO report to congressional committees, GAO-21-595, dated June 2021, on the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) within the Department of Homeland Security. It reports that FAMS reported 345 cases of COVID-19 among employees as of January 31, 2021. It notes that public health officials have recommended social distancing and other steps to reduce spread, but air marshals often work on planes where they cannot fully adopt these measures. The report was prepared under the CARES Act provision for GAO monitoring and oversight. Its title states that FAMS should document its response to cases and facilitate access to testing.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Full text
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
COVID-19
June 2021
Federal Air Marshal
Service Should
Document Its
Response to Cases
and Facilitate Access
to Testing
GAO-21-595
June 2021
COVID-19
Federal Air Marshal Service Should Document Its
Response to Cases and Facilitate Access to Testing
Highlights of GAO-21-595, a report to
congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
In the U.S. there have been over 29 The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), within the Department of
million cumulative reported cases of Homeland Security (DHS), reported 345 cases of COVID-19 among employees,
COVID-19 and about 524,000 reported as of January 31, 2021.
deaths, as of March 23, 2021. Public
health officials have recommended Federal Air Marshal Service’s Reported Cases of COVID-19, as of January 31, 2021
social distancing and other steps to
reduce the spread of the disease, but
air marshals often work on planes
where they cannot fully adopt these
measures. The CARES Act included a
provision for GAO to conduct
monitoring and oversight of the federal
government’s response to the COVID-
19 pandemic. This report examines (1)
how many air marshals have been
diagnosed with COVID-19; (2) FAMS’s
steps to protect air marshals’ health;
and (3) how FAMS adapted its Note: Cases included in the figure were confirmed with a positive COVID-19 test and reported to the
operations during the pandemic. Federal Air Marshal Service by the employee.
GAO analyzed FAMS data on COVID- To protect air marshals from COVID-19, FAMS provided supplies like N95 masks
19 cases among employees, reviewed and implemented new telework and leave policies. FAMS also created protocols
agency guidance, analyzed FAMS for responding to employees with COVID-19, but has not consistently
flight operations reports, and documented their implementation. By doing so, FAMS could better ensure it is
interviewed FAMS leadership as well taking the required steps to protect employees and the flying public. GAO also
as air marshals at a non-generalizable found FAMS does not routinely facilitate employee access to COVID-19 testing.
sample of three field offices selected FAMS recommends employees seek testing through their medical provider or
for variation in number of COVID-19
local public health officials, but air marshals in all three field offices GAO met with
cases, among other things. This is a
either noted barriers to testing or benefits to improved access to tests. In January
public version of a sensitive report that
2021, FAMS employees became eligible for COVID-19 vaccinations, but Centers
GAO issued in May 2021. Information
that DHS deemed sensitive has been for Disease Control and Prevention guidance says testing continues to be
omitted. important even as vaccinations become available. By facilitating access to
testing, FAMS could better ensure employee health and continued operations.
What GAO Recommends Starting in February 2020, FAMS adjusted the number and types of flights air
GAO recommends that FAMS (1) marshals covered. In April 2020, amidst a decline in U.S. carrier flights, the
consistently document steps taken in number of flights FAMS covered declined by 90 percent compared to average
response to an employee’s diagnosis monthly flights pre-pandemic. By June 2020, FAMS had resumed pre-pandemic
with COVID-19 and (2) routinely flight levels. From April through August 2020, FAMS made operational changes
facilitate employee access to testing to increase its flight coverage that also resulted in FAMS covering different types
for COVID-19. DHS concurred with of flights, compared to those it covered prior to the pandemic. For example, due
both of GAO’s recommendations and to travel restrictions, FAMS stopped covering most international flights but
identified actions it will take to increased coverage of other types of flights. Starting in April 2020, FAMS also
implement them. increased air marshals’ non-flight work, such as providing a security presence at
airports and national events.
View GAO-21-595. For more information,
contact Triana McNeil at (202) 512-6691 or
McNeilT@gao.gov.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Background 6
FAMS Reported 345 Cases of COVID-19 through January 2021 13
FAMS Has Taken Steps to Protect Air Marshals, but Could
Improve Documentation of These Efforts and Access to Testing 16
FAMS Adjusted Flight Coverage and Expanded Ground-Based
Operations 26
Conclusions 34
Recommendations for Executive Action 35
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35
Appendix I Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 39
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 42
Table
Table 1: Categories of Flights the Federal Air Marshal Service
(FAMS) Prioritizes 10
Figures
Figure 1: Location of Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Field
Offices 8
Figure 2: Numbers of Domestic and International Passenger
Flights on U.S. Air Carriers, October 2019 – November
2020 12
Figure 3: Percent of Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
Employees Who Reported Testing Positive for COVID-19
in Each Field Office, as of January 31, 2021 14
Figure 4: Distribution of Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS)
Reported COVID-19 Cases by Employee Role, As of
January 31, 2021 15
Figure 5: Photos of N95 Masks, Hand Sanitizer, and Other
Personal Protective Equipment Available to Federal Air
Marshals 17
Figure 6: Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Protocols for
Responding to a COVID-19 Case 22
Page i GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Figure 7: Federal Air Marshals Support Inauguration Event
Security at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport 33
Abbreviations
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
SAC Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge
TSA Transportation Security Administration
VIPR Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page ii GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Letter
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
June 23, 2021
Congressional Committees
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has resulted in catastrophic
loss of life. In the U.S., as of March 23, 2021, there were about 29.7
million cumulative reported cases and more than 524,000 reported
deaths, according to federal agencies. 1 Public health officials have
recommended social distancing and other measures to reduce
transmission of the disease. However, certain sectors of the U.S.
workforce with critical roles such as in law enforcement and transportation
have remained at risk of catching and spreading the virus because their
jobs require that they come into regular contact with other people. The
U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)—an office within the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA)—is one such workforce. 2
FAMS is tasked with promoting confidence in the nation’s civil aviation
system through the deployment of air marshals to protect U.S. air
carriers, airports, passengers, and crews. To accomplish this mission,
FAMS deploys armed federal law enforcement officers—air marshals—to
provide an onboard security presence on selected flights of U.S. air
carriers travelling within the U.S. and around the world. 3 FAMS’s mission
has continued throughout the COVID-19 pandemic with air marshals
routinely working on airplanes and at airports; flying domestic and
international routes. The Department of State has advised U.S. citizens to
avoid international travel and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) has warned that with regard to COVID-19, high-risk
1Data on COVID-19 cases in the U.S. are based on aggregate case reporting to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and include probable and confirmed
cases as reported by states and jurisdictions. CDC’s National Center for Health Statistics
COVID-19 death counts in the U.S. are based on provisional counts from death certificate
data, which do not distinguish between laboratory-confirmed and probable COVID-19
deaths. Provisional counts are incomplete due to an average delay of 2 weeks (a range of
1–8 weeks or longer) for death certificate processing. The data were accessed on March
23, 2021. Data include deaths occurring from January 2020 through the week ending on
March 20, 2021.
2The formal name of this office is Law Enforcement / Federal Air Marshal Service, but we
refer to it as the Federal Air Marshal Service throughout this report.
3See 49 U.S.C. § 44917.
Page 1 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
settings include workplaces where physical distancing is difficult and
workers are in close contact with coworkers or the public. 4 As such,
COVID-19 presents a particular health concern for flying air marshals and
the public with whom they interact in the course of their work.
The CARES Act—signed in March 2020—includes a provision for us to
conduct monitoring and oversight of the federal government’s efforts to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. 5 In
addition, we were asked to review the steps DHS is taking to protect its
employees from contracting COVID-19, among other things. This report
examines, (1) how many air marshals have been diagnosed with COVID-
19; (2) FAMS’s steps to protect air marshals’ health during the COVID-19
pandemic; and (3) how FAMS has adapted its operations during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we issued
in May 2021. 6 TSA deemed some of the information in our May report to
be sensitive security information, which must be protected from public
disclosure. Therefore, this report omits this information, such as the
number of air marshals as well as data and details associated with
FAMS’s flight operations. Although the information provided in this report
is more limited in scope, it addresses the same objectives as the sensitive
report and uses the same methodology.
To address our first objective, we analyzed FAMS data and reports to
identify the number of cases of COVID-19 among employees, as reported
4CDC “SARS-CoV-2 Testing Strategy: Considerations for Non-Healthcare Workplaces,
Testing in Non-Healthcare Workplaces.” July 22, 2020. Accessed October 14, 2020,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/testing-non-healthca
re-workplaces.html.
5Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010, 134 Stat. 281, 579. We regularly issue government-wide
reports on the federal response to COVID-19. For the latest report, see GAO, COVID-19:
Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year, GAO-21-387
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2021). Our next government-wide report will be issued in July
2021 and will be available on GAO’s website at https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus.
6GAO, COVID-19: Federal Air Marshal Service Should Document Its Response to Cases
and Facilitate Access to Testing, GAO-21-382SU (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2021).
Page 2 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
to FAMS management through January 31, 2021. 7 Specifically, we
analyzed data collected by the FAMS Medical Programs Section—the
office within FAMS tasked with monitoring cases of COVID-19—to track
reported cases of COVID-19 among the workforce. 8 We also analyzed
periodic reports summarizing new cases for FAMS management, as well
as FAMS summary data on the number of cases broken out by employee
location and employee type (i.e., flying air marshals, ground-based air
marshals, etc.). 9 We assessed the reliability of these summary data by
cross-checking totals from each source, matching totals for the breakouts
by field office location and employee type, and resolving discrepancies
with FAMS officials. We also spoke with officials from FAMS management
and FAMS’s Medical Programs Section to understand how they tracked
and reported these data. We determined that these data were sufficiently
reliable for describing the number of reported cases of COVID-19 among
FAMS employees, including the employees’ office locations and roles. 10
To address our second objective, we reviewed TSA and FAMS COVID-
19-specific guidance to identify changes in policy and procedure intended
to protect employees from COVID-19, such as new procedures for
contact tracing, among other steps. Specifically, we reviewed TSA’s
Human Capital Advisory Memos (versions 1 through 8); TSA’s August
2020 Guidance for COVID-19: Return to Workplace and Medical
Documentation; and FAMS’s July 2020 COVID-19 Protocol for Assistant
7FAMS does not have information on whether employees caught COVID-19 through their
work. The Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs has
determined that for the purposes of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, federal
law enforcement officers—such as air marshals—whose employment causes them to
come into direct and frequent in-person and close proximity contact with the public are
assumed to have contracted COVID-19 as a result of their employment.
8In addition to tracking reported cases, the FAMS Medical Programs Section tracked
employees’ reported history of symptoms, the date the employee contacted the Section,
the employee’s field office location, whether the employee had a COVID-19 test, and the
results of the test where known, among other things. This spreadsheet included over 700
employee symptom history records beginning February 16, 2020 through January 31,
2021. FAMS summarized employee reports of COVID-19 symptoms and cases in more
than 50 reports for FAMS management, on a daily or weekly basis, beginning March 11,
2020 through January 31, 2021.
9In addition to conducting flight operations, air marshals may carry out the FAMS mission
by participating in ground-based operational assignments that support security activities in
transportation settings.
10Throughout this report, the numbers of cases of COVID-19 among FAMS employees
refers to confirmed cases where an employee received a COVID-19 test and reported
their positive test result to the FAMS Medical Programs Section.
Page 3 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Administrators, Supervisory Air Marshal In Charge, or Federal Security
Director (FAMS Protocols). 11 We also reviewed FAMS’s, TSA’s, and
DHS’s internal communications to employees during the period January
22, 2020 to August 6, 2020 related to COVID-19, such as email
messages with best practices to avoid contracting COVID-19 during
travel. Lastly, we compared the steps FAMS had taken to protect
employees to CDC and Federal Occupational Safety and Health
Administration guidance for workplaces responding to COVID-19 and
considerations for COVID-19 testing in non-medical workplaces. 12
To obtain FAMS officials’ perspectives on the steps taken to protect
employees from COVID-19 and how FAMS management is monitoring
implementation of these steps, we interviewed senior FAMS management
officials, including the Assistant Administrator for Field Operations and the
Assistant Administrator for Flight Operations. We also interviewed field
office management officials and air marshals in three of the 20 FAMS
field office locations—Newark, New Jersey; Houston, Texas; and Seattle,
Washington. We selected these field offices to capture perspectives from
field offices that had experienced varying numbers of COVID-19 cases,
as well as varied effects on their operations, such as decreased
international flights.
We developed standardized lists of questions that we used in each of the
three field offices to facilitate two separate discussion sessions—one with
field office management officials, including the field office Supervisory Air
11TSA, Human Capital Advisory Memo 2020.30.4 (rev. 8); Appendix A – Return to
Workplace and Medical Documentation; and Appendix B – Assistant Administrator
(AA)/Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge (SAC)/ Federal Security Director (FSD) Protocol
for Employee (or Contractor) with Laboratory-Confirmed or Suspected COVID-19.
December 8, 2020. According to FAMS management officials, the FAMS Protocols have
been revised three times, since the first version issued on April 2, 2020. The Return to
Workplace Documentation guidance was first issued July 2020. TSA has revised the
Human Capital Advisory Memo eight times, to reflect changes in policies. Beginning with
the seventh version (dated September 24, 2020), the Return to Workplace guidance and
FAMS Protocols appear as appendix A and B respectively.
12CDC “Domestic Travel during the COVID-19 Pandemic.” December 2, 2020. Accessed
December 14, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-during-
covid19.html; CDC “Testing Strategy for Coronavirus (COVID-19) in High-Density Critical
Infrastructure Workplaces after a COVID-19 Case is Identified, Testing in High-Density
Critical Infrastructure Workplaces” June 13, 2020. Accessed October 14, 2020,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/worker-safety-support/hd-
testing.html; Occupational Safety and Health Administration “Guidance on Preparing
Workplaces for COVID-19.” March 9, 2020, and Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. “Protecting Workers: Guidance on Mitigating and Preventing the Spread of
COVID-19 in the Workplace”. January 29, 2021.
Page 4 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Marshals in Charge (SAC), and the other with approximately five air
marshals in each office. For the group discussion sessions with air
marshals, we requested that each field office make available
approximately five air marshals including both flying and non-flying air
marshals. Although the information obtained from interviews with these
officials is not generalizable to all 20 FAMS field offices, it provided insight
into the steps FAMS had taken to protect air marshals’ health during the
pandemic and how these steps varied across offices.
We also met with representatives from the three external employee
groups representing air marshals—the Air Marshal Association, the Air
Marshal National Council, and the Federal Law Enforcement Officer
Association—to obtain their perspectives on the steps FAMS had taken to
protect air marshals from COVID-19 and whether additional steps were
needed. We determined that the control activities component of internal
control was significant to this objective, along with the underlying principle
that management should design control activities to achieve objectives
and respond to risks. 13 We assessed how FAMS has designed control
activities to ensure implementation of the FAMS Protocols. We also
compared FAMS’s documentation requirements to DHS Risk
Management Fundamentals—the purpose of which is to establish
organizational practices that DHS components should follow to
incorporate risk management into organizational missions. 14
To address our third objective, we analyzed FAMS monthly flight
operations reports from October 2019 through January 2021 to identify
how FAMS’s flight coverage—that is the number and types of flights
FAMS covered—changed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. 15 We
assessed the reliability of the data presented in these reports by
reviewing documentation and interviewing knowledgeable FAMS officials
about their Aircrews and WebEOC flight tracking systems and how they
ensure the quality of their data. We also compared FAMS’s monthly flight
13GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).
14DHS, Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine,
(Washington, D.C.: April 2011).
15To enable us to compare FAMS flight operations pre- and post-pandemic, we analyzed
data for the period October 2019—the beginning of fiscal year 2020—through January
2021—the most recent month for which data were available at the time of our review.
Throughout our report, we use the term pre-pandemic to refer to flight data we reviewed
for the period October 2019 through February 2020.
Page 5 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
operations reports to record-level flight data for the months of October
2019, April 2020, and January 2021 and resolved discrepancies through
discussion with FAMS officials. 16 We determined that these data were
sufficiently reliable for describing month-to-month changes in FAMS
operations during this period. We also reviewed FAMS documentation of
operational changes in response to COVID-19 and interviewed FAMS
leadership about their decisions to make these changes. Further, we
analyzed FAMS documentation of air marshals’ ground-based (non-flight)
activities from April 2020 through January 2021 and interviewed the
Executive Assistant Administrator/Director of FAMS, the leadership, and
three field office SACs about how FAMS’s ground-based activities
changed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The performance audit upon which this report is based was conducted
from July 2020 to May 2021 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We
subsequently worked with TSA from May through June 2021 to prepare
this unclassified version of the original sensitive report for public release.
This public version was also prepared in accordance with these
standards.
Background
FAMS Management The senior leader of FAMS is the Executive Assistant
Administrator/Director of FAMS. FAMS management is organized into
three divisions:
• Field Operations Division. Led by the Assistant Administrator for
Field Operations, this division manages FAMS’s 20 field offices
located near major airports across the U.S. Each field office is
managed by a SAC, assisted by a Deputy Supervisory Air Marshal in
Charge or Assistant Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge, depending on
16Aircrews is FAMS’s primary system for tracking flights and air marshal deployments.
However, FAMS also captures some types of flights—namely top priority flights—in a
second data system called WebEOC. In both systems, record-level flight data included
details such as the flight departure and destination locations, the flight’s FAMS-designated
priority level, and whether or not air marshals covered the flight, among others.
Page 6 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
the size of the field office. The SACs are responsible for the day-to-
day management of air marshals assigned to their field office.
• Flight Operation Division. Led by the Assistant Administrator for
Flight Operations, this division is responsible for planning and
preparing air marshals’ schedules, monitoring all FAMS flights, and
providing support to air marshals during flight operations.
• Operations Management Division. Led by the Assistant
Administrator for Operations Management, this division is responsible
for the agency-wide human capital and financial management of
FAMS. Within this division, a staff of one part-time doctor and three
occupational health nurses comprise the FAMS Medical Programs
Section, located at FAMS’s facility in Atlantic City, New Jersey. 17 This
unit is responsible for determining air marshals’ medical fitness for
duty, based on the results of required annual physicals completed by
the air marshals’ personal physicians. The doctor and nurses also
respond to medical questions from air marshals, including questions
about new health threats such as COVID-19, among other things.
FAMS Workforce As of January 2021, FAMS had thousands of employees, the majority of
whom are air marshals who conduct flight operations and other law
enforcement work. The remainder of the FAMS workforce consists of
administrative and mission support staff across their headquarters, field
office locations, and training facilities. In addition to conducting flight
operations, air marshals may carry out the FAMS mission by participating
in ground-based operational assignments that support security activities
in transportation settings. For example, FAMS assigns air marshals to
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams in all of its 20
field offices. See figure 1 for the locations of FAMS’s 20 field offices.
17The Medical Programs Section also includes three administrative staff and two
occupational health nurse positions that are vacant as of January 2021.
Page 7 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Figure 1: Location of Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Field Offices
Note: This figure shows the locations of FAMS field offices. FAMS also has employees at its
headquarters in Springfield, Virginia.
VIPR teams consist of air marshals and other TSA security officers
specializing in aviation, surface, and explosives inspections. VIPR teams
deploy to provide a visible law enforcement and security screening
presence at surface and maritime transportation locations, like public
transit stations. In addition to VIPR teams, air marshals may support law
enforcement operations at airports, such as conducting risk assessments
of security threats. FAMS also deploys air marshals to provide support to
other DHS components for a few days or several months, including the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations, and the Secret Service.
Page 8 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
In February 2020, we reported that the FAMS workforce had concerns
about their health but FAMS had not comprehensively assessed the
health of its workforce. We recommended that FAMS develop and
implement a plan to assess the health and fitness of the FAMS workforce
as a whole, including trends over time. DHS agreed with this
recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS
had established a team to develop a plan to do so, but as of January
2021, they had not taken further steps to implement the
recommendation. 18
FAMS’s Concept of The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001,
Operations authorizes TSA to deploy air marshals on every passenger flight of a U.S.
air carrier and requires TSA to deploy air marshals on every such flight
determined by the TSA Administrator to present high security risks. 19
FAMS uses a concept of operations to set forth its methodology for
deploying air marshals on flights. 20 FAMS prioritizes several categories of
flights considered higher risk, including those for which a known or
suspected terrorist is ticketed, called special mission coverage. FAMS
further prioritizes deployment of air marshals on random, unpredictable
flights, and supporting flights used to position air marshals for flights. (See
table 1). 21
18GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken Steps to Address
Workforce Issues, but Additional Actions Needed, GAO-20-125 (Washington, D.C: Feb.
12, 2020). In addition to recommending that FAMS develop and implement a plan to
assess the health and fitness of the FAMS workforce, we made five other
recommendations to improve FAMS’s tracking of employees’ medical status, and
strengthen efforts to prevent discrimination, among other things. DHS concurred with
these recommendations, and as of January 2021, DHS had taken steps to address two of
the six recommendations and had plans to implement the remaining four.
19See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 105(a), 115 Stat. 597, 606; 49 U.S.C. § 44917(a)(1) and (2).
20FAMS may deploy air marshals on U.S. air carriers either operating within the U.S. or
operating internationally if an agreement is in place with a destination country allowing for
the arrival and departure of armed U.S. air marshals. In accordance with its statutory
authorities, however, FAMS may not deploy air marshals on foreign-flagged carriers.
21TSA designated further detail about these categories as sensitive security information
and thus it cannot be included in a public report.
Page 9 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Table 1: Categories of Flights the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Prioritizes
Category description Flight selection rationale
Domestic: Certain flights within the U.S. As resources permit, FAMS deploys air marshals on selected domestic flights.
International: Flights covering international International flights selected based on FAMS’s assessment of the security risk of
routes a flight’s route or last point of departure.
National Special Security Events: Flights Flights associated with certain planned large gatherings that merit special security
traveling into or out of cities during certain high- concern. These gatherings include events such as Presidential inaugurations and
profile events major international summits held in the United States. Transportation Security
Administration is notified of these events and then identifies specific flights for
FAMS coverage, depending on location, aircraft size, and other variables.
Random, Unpredictable: Flights not associated Flights selected to maintain a periodic law enforcement presence on any type of
with other priority categories domestic flight.
Special Mission Coverage: Flights for which a Flights selected based on specific intelligence about higher-risk or potentially
known, suspected, or potentially higher-risk higher-risk individual passengers, such as individuals who are in the federal
traveler is ticketed government’s database of known or suspected terrorists.
Supporting: Flights completed to support the Flights needed to position air marshals to cover a priority flight.
coverage of other priority missions
Source: GAO summary of FAMS operations documents Ɩ GAO-21-595
To cover special mission coverage flights, FAMS typically uses air
marshals scheduled for standby, who report to the airport or office and fly
upon notification. If no air marshals in standby status are available, FAMS
may reassign air marshals from regularly scheduled missions or air
marshals who were not scheduled to fly at that time.
COVID-19 Effects on U.S. air carriers reduced both international and domestic flights in
Flight and Passenger response to a decline in passenger demand following the onset of the
pandemic, and TSA officials have publicly stated that they expect air
Volume
travel to remain below pre-pandemic levels through most of 2021. In
January 2020, the State Department and CDC began issuing a series of
advisories to U.S. citizens discouraging certain domestic and international
travel. 22 According to publicly available U.S. Department of Transportation
flight data, in April 2020, U.S. air carriers decreased international flights to
and from the U.S. by 93 percent and reduced domestic flights by 70
22Specifically, in January 2020, the State Department advised U.S. citizens to avoid travel
to China due to the novel coronavirus first identified in Wuhan, China. This travel advisory
was extended in late February 2020 to include Italy due to evidence of community spread
of the coronavirus. In March 2020, the CDC and State Department issued a Global Level
4 Health Advisory instructing U.S. citizens to avoid all international travel. From January
through April 2020, the CDC issued recommendations for individuals to avoid
discretionary domestic travel.
Page 10 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
percent compared to pre-pandemic monthly averages. 23 U.S. air carrier
flights have increased somewhat since April 2020, but as of November
2020—the most recent month for which Department of Transportation
flight data were available at the time of our review—international flights to
and from the U.S. remained at 34 percent of pre-pandemic levels and
U.S. carrier domestic flights remained at 60 percent of pre-pandemic
levels. 24 See figure 2.
23For the purposes of this report, we define the “pre-pandemic” period as October 2019
through February 2020. Pre-pandemic flight levels are based on the number of average
monthly passenger flights on U.S. carriers from October 2019 through February 2020.
24The U.S. Department of Transportation reports publicly available passenger flight data
on their website with a 3-month lag. Therefore, we analyzed passenger flight data through
November 2020, the most recent month available at the time of our analysis.
Page 11 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Figure 2: Numbers of Domestic and International Passenger Flights on U.S. Air Carriers, October 2019 – November 2020
Page 12 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
FAMS reported 345 cases of COVID-19 among employees, including one
FAMS Reported 345 death because of complications from COVID-19, as of January 31,
Cases of COVID-19 2021. 25 According to FAMS Medical Programs Section officials, this count
captures all cases of COVID-19 confirmed by a positive diagnostic test. 26
through January 2021 FAMS has reported cases of COVID-19 in all 20 field offices and other
FAMS work locations, including their headquarters and training facilities.
The infection rates per office ranged from less than 1 percent of
employees in FAMS headquarters to 19 percent of employees in the Las
Vegas field office. FAMS does not have information on how or where
these employees caught COVID-19 and the TSA Chief Medical Officer
said it would be nearly impossible to determine. 27 See figure 3 for the
percent of employees in each field office who reported testing positive for
COVID-19.
25According to FAMS management officials, employees should communicate any potential
exposure to their immediate supervisor, but FAMS and TSA guidance do not require
employees to do so. The TSA Human Capital Advisory Memo, and a March 12, 2020
email to the FAMS workforce, directed all employees to report any symptoms or possible
exposure to COVID-19 to their local public health officials or healthcare provider.
26Each reported case generally represents a unique individual employee. Two employees
had more than one case of COVID-19, representing four positive test results, as of
January 2021.This case count includes all such cases reported to FAMS management,
but may not include all cases that have occurred among employees. On July 22, 2020, the
CDC estimated that there were 10 times more cases than reported from March through
May 2020.
27The Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs has determined
that for the purposes of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, federal law
enforcement officers—such as air marshals—whose employment causes them to come
into direct and frequent in-person and close proximity contact with the public are assumed
to have contacted COVID-19 as a result of their employment.
Page 13 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Figure 3: Percent of Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Employees Who Reported Testing Positive for COVID-19 in Each
Field Office, as of January 31, 2021
Note: Cases included here are reported confirmed cases of COVID-19 where an employee received a
test and reported their positive test result to FAMS. This figure does not include 12 confirmed cases
among FAMS employees located at the TSA Freedom Center in Herndon, Virginia and two reported
cases of FAMS employees located at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New
Mexico and the FAMS training facility in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Page 14 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
According to our analysis of FAMS case data, the majority of COVID-19
infections occurred among flying air marshals (234 out of 345), while the
remaining 111 cases occurred among employees in ground-based roles.
Of these 111 cases, 50 occurred among field office supervisors and
managers; 48 were among air marshals on ground-based assignments,
such as VIPR; and 13 occurred among FAMS’s administrative support
staff. 28 Figure 4 shows the distribution of FAMS COVID-19 cases across
different employee roles.
Figure 4: Distribution of Federal Air Marshal Service’s (FAMS) Reported COVID-19 Cases by Employee Role, As of January 31,
2021
Note: Cases included here are reported confirmed cases of COVID-19 where an employee received a
test and reported their positive test result to FAMS.
28These data reflect the job air marshals were doing when they reported their illness.
Page 15 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
FAMS Has Taken
Steps to Protect Air
Marshals, but Could
Improve
Documentation of
These Efforts and
Access to Testing
FAMS Has Taken Steps to FAMS has taken various steps to protect air marshals’ health during the
Protect Employees during COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, management has 1) provided Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE), guidance, and adapted some travel
Travel and Ground-Based
procedures; 2) implemented new telework and leave policies; and 3)
Work taken steps to reduce in-office contact.
FAMS Provided PPE, Beginning in January 2020, FAMS managers began to inventory, procure,
Guidance, and Adapted Some and distribute PPE—including N95 masks, disinfectant wipes, and hand
Travel Procedures sanitizer—to air marshals, according to the Assistant Administrator for
Field Operations. In February 2020, FAMS management emailed all air
marshals notifying them that face coverings and other PPE were available
for their use. Figure 5 shows PPE supplies available to air marshals in the
Newark, New Jersey and Orlando, Florida field offices. By April 2020, the
DHS Undersecretary for Management recommended all frontline
workers—which includes FAMS—to wear a mask while on duty. 29 Starting
in May 2020, the TSA Administrator required that all TSA employees—
and specifically air marshals during flight operations—use masks during
their work.
29DHS provided this recommendation to all department employees by email on April 7,
2020.
Page 16 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Figure 5: Photos of N95 Masks, Hand Sanitizer, and Other Personal Protective Equipment Available to Federal Air Marshals
Air marshals we met with in all three field offices said they had sufficient
access to PPE. In one field office, the field office managers told us that in
the midst of widespread shortages of travel-sized hand sanitizer, they
emptied commercial-sized bottles of hand sanitizer into travel-sized
bottles to ensure flying air marshals were able to get it. In another field
office, the SAC told us they procured enough PPE locally to fulfill their
needs and provide supplies to another field office. Air marshals in this
field office told us that as of October 2020 they had various types of
protective masks available for them to choose from, such as N95,
surgical, and cloth reusable masks.
FAMS management officials also provided guidance to employees. In
June 2020, the FAMS Safety Specialist—an official tasked with
supporting air marshals’ occupational safety and health—shared
guidance with employees detailing safety precautions during travel. The
guidance addressed, for example, steps to take to reduce COVID-19 risk
Page 17 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
when taking public transportation, staying at a hotel, and eating at
restaurants. The guidance detailed basic hygiene principles and
encouraged social distancing, among other actions. The Safety Specialist
also provided FAMS employees with links to CDC, World Health
Organization, and other health groups’ COVID-19 resources.
Individual field offices changed aspects of how air marshals work to
encourage social distancing and reduce the risk of spreading COVID-19.
For example, officials we spoke with in two of the three field offices told
us to permit greater social distancing, SACs no longer required air
marshals to be in the airport when assigned to standby, awaiting potential
tasking to fly. Rather, these SACs allowed their air marshals to be outside
of the airport, in their car, or at a nearby location. 30 According to air
marshals and SACs in those two offices, this change improved air
marshals’ ability to socially distance without affecting the offices’ abilities
to complete their missions. In another example, the SAC of one field
office we met with told us they had reduced the size of their VIPR teams,
to decrease the number of coworkers exposed if one became infected
with COVID-19 and to create more teams to ensure VIPR operations
continued.
Beginning in January 2021, TSA and other federal agencies added to the
steps already taken to protect air marshals. On January 5, 2021, TSA
began offering COVID-19 vaccinations to mission critical frontline
personnel, including the FAMS workforce, as part of the 1b vaccination
priority group. 31 The vaccine distribution is part of a program with DHS
and the Veterans Health Administration within the Department of
Veterans Affairs. According to a TSA document, employees were to
select whether they would receive the vaccine, but must notify their
supervisors of their decision and whether they have already received the
30Air marshals staffed to “standby” roles were previously required to be in the airport to
allow FAMS to fulfill missions with a different air marshal if unforeseen circumstances
prevented the planned air marshal from travelling. In the remaining field office, the SAC
did not implement this change, citing security priorities within the airport as the basis for
continuing to require air marshals to be in the airport.
31According to CDC guidance, the allocation for COVID-19 vaccines designates phases
for different groups. Specifically, the phase “1b” group includes individuals deemed
frontline essential workers.
Page 18 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
vaccine from another provider. 32 In addition, a January 21, 2021
Executive Order and subsequent Emergency Amendment by TSA,
required that all individuals wear masks in airports, on planes, and in
other transportation venues. 33
FAMS Implemented New Prior to the pandemic, FAMS generally had not allowed air marshals to
Telework and Leave Options telework, but starting in March 2020, FAMS managers permitted and
encouraged air marshals to telework when they did not need to be in the
office. 34 On March 12, 2020, TSA issued its first Human Capital Advisory
Memo, to guide the use of telework and various leave categories in
response to COVID-19. This guidance encouraged employees—including
FAMS employees—to use telework and other flexibilities to protect
employees’ health and well-being, protect the traveling public, and
prevent the spread of COVID-19.
The March version of the TSA Human Capital Advisory Memo also
provided that employees who had certain conditions (i.e.,
immunocompromised, asthma, etc.) and were therefore at a higher risk
for negative outcomes from COVID-19 could use weather and safety
leave. 35 In total, about 6 percent of the workforce took advantage of this
option for some period of time. According to FAMS officials, FAMS did not
schedule these individuals to fly or conduct in-person work while on
32We did not review FAMS’s data on or monitoring of COVID-19 vaccination among the
workforce. As of March 4, 2021, FAMS officials reported that 1,026 staff had received their
first dose, and 681 of those had received both doses of the vaccine.
33White House. Executive Order on Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and
International Travel. Exec. Order, 13998, 86 Fed. Reg. 7205 (Jan. 21, 2021). This Order
also required a negative COVID-19 test for passengers entering the country from
international travel. On January 27, 2021, the Acting Secretary of DHS determined that a
national emergency existed and directed TSA to take actions consistent with the
authorities in Aviation and Transportation Security Act as codified at 49 U.S.C. sections
106(m) and 114(f), (g), (l), and (m) to implement the Executive Order to promote safety in
and secure the transportation system. The mask order, which was due to expire May 11,
2021, was extended by TSA Emergency Amendment until September 13, 2021. TSA
Emergency Amendment 1546-21-01A (April 30, 2021).
34TSA Management Directive 1100.30-5 Telework Program designated air marshals as
emergency employees and therefore not eligible for routine telework. However, the
Directive also states that under certain circumstances, employees occupying positions
that are normally ineligible for telework may be considered for telework on a situational
basis, limited to functions that are suitable for telework activity.
35According to TSA’s human capital policies, prior to the pandemic, weather and safety
leave was granted for employees when conditions—such as severe weather—made work
or commuting unsafe.
Page 19 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
weather and safety leave. An August 5, 2020 update to the TSA Human
Capital Advisory Memo rescinded the use of weather and safety leave for
high-risk employees. 36 TSA clarified in a subsequent Human Capital
Advisory Memo update that these employees could use sick leave at the
suggestion of their doctor or leave without pay for personal reasons,
including health reasons.
According to air marshals and SACs we met with in three field offices, the
use of telework and other leave had helped protect air marshals’ health
and reduce the spread of COVID-19. For example, air marshals we met
with in one office mentioned that they previously had to go to their office
to complete time sheets and travel vouchers, but they were now able to
do these tasks from home, thereby reducing their possible exposure to
COVID-19.
FAMS Took Steps to Reduce FAMS also took steps intended to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in its
In-Office Contact offices and facilities, such as gyms and shooting ranges. In addition to
reducing occupancy levels in the offices by promoting telework, FAMS
closed all gyms and shooting range facilities in late March through July
2020. FAMS also waived training requirements for employees through
June 2020. 37 On May 11, 2020, FAMS provided field offices with
guidance for the reopening of its offices and gyms, based on the latest
CDC and Occupational Safety and Health Administration guidelines. For
example, FAMS recommended that field offices disinfect high-touch
surfaces in their gyms every 2 hours, close showers and locker rooms,
and follow masking and social distancing requirements, among other
36According to an email from the TSA Administrator to TSA employees, weather and
safety leave was a tool to protect the highest-risk employees at the start of the pandemic;
however, because of the increase in other protective measures, such as access to PPE,
the risk of exposure had been reduced and TSA could revert to standard absence and
leave policies. September 2020 updates to the Human Capital Advisory Memo (version 7)
clarify procedures for the use of sick leave for employees who are at higher risk, at the
suggestion of their doctor. December 2020 updates (version 8) further clarified the use of
leave without pay for personal reasons, including health conditions that place the
employee at higher risk. As of January 8, 2021, 10 air marshals continued to use a
combination of sick leave, leave without pay, or emergency paid sick leave, due to their
risk for severe complications from COVID-19.
37Incumbent air marshals are required to complete 160 hours of recurrent training courses
annually on such topics as use of force, defensive measures, firearms, mission tactics,
and physical fitness. FAMS began reinstating training in August 2020, though employees
were not required to attend training, according to a SAC we spoke to in one field office.
According to the official, their office continued to delay training due to heightened COVID-
19 levels in the community.
Page 20 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
steps. Air marshals and managers in all three field offices we spoke with
said their offices implemented these procedures, and others, such as
sign-in procedures to control capacity limits in their facilities and other
procedures to ensure social distancing.
FAMS Established In April 2020, TSA and FAMS management officials developed protocols
Protocols for Responding to be followed when a FAMS employee reports a confirmed or suspected
case of COVID-19. 38 The FAMS Protocols, a 3-page document, states,
to Cases, but Has Not
for example, that field office SACs must conduct contact tracing within the
Consistently Documented workforce; may contact airport officials in certain circumstances; and must
Implementation contact local public health officials to report the case. 39 The TSA Chief
Medical Officer and FAMS medical officer told us that they defer to local
public health entities to handle or initiate any additional contact tracing.
The protocols also describe circumstances under which the field office
SAC must notify other employees within the office that a coworker has
tested positive for COVID-19.
The FAMS Protocols also instruct SACs to follow the TSA Human Capital
Advisory Memo regarding the use of leave for quarantine when
employees have been potentially exposed to COVID-19, and to follow
TSA Return to Workplace guidance when determining the requirements
for employees to return to work from a period of quarantine. This
guidance explains TSA’s criteria for an employee to return to work
following different exposure situations. For example, an employee with a
confirmed COVID-19 infection who remains asymptomatic may return to
work after 10 days of quarantine from the employees’ first positive test
result. 40 Figure 6 describes the steps SACs and other FAMS employees
are expected to take following a case of confirmed or suspected COVID-
38FAMS defines a “suspected case” of COVID-19 to be cases where an employee (or
contractor) has signs and symptoms clinically compatible with COVID-19, as identified by
a healthcare provider, but the employee was not tested, or was tested and the test result
is pending.
39According to FAMS management officials, there have been three revisions of the FAMS
Protocols, first issued in April 2020. The FAMS Protocols does not provide information on
the conditions under which SACs would have to contact airport officials. One SAC we
spoke with described taking this step in a few cases, when the infected air marshals
reported contact with someone at an airport. The FAMS Protocols also do not specify
when SACs must carry out the steps but FAMS officials told us they expect contact tracing
to be carried out as soon as practicable.
40None of the situations requires an employee to obtain a negative COVID-19 test result in
order to return to work.
Page 21 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
19 among their employees, as set forth in the FAMS Protocols and TSA
guidance.
Figure 6: Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Protocols for Responding to a COVID-19 Case
Page 22 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
a
FAMS defines an “exposed coworker” as any employee who has had close contact with a
symptomatic person or a person who has tested positive for COVID-19 without symptoms. FAMS
defines “close contact” as within 6 feet for 15 minutes or more or being directly coughed on in the
face.
b
If exposed coworkers are mission-critical employees, FAMS leadership may assess whether they
need to continue working, according to FAMS Protocols.
c
FAMS defers to local public health entities to carry out any further contact tracing.
FAMS has developed these protocols, but has not consistently
documented their implementation. FAMS management provided us with
examples of emails notifying field offices of COVID-19 cases—one of the
steps in the protocols—but could not provide documentation showing
implementation of other steps in the protocols. For example, they could
not provide documentation of employees’ consent or refusal to disclose
their name to the workforce, a step that the FAMS protocols require be
documented. Further, FAMS could not provide documentation confirming
that required contact with local public health officials had been completed
or that exposed coworkers had been advised to notify their healthcare
providers. According to the Assistant Administrator for Field Operations,
FAMS management has not seen a need to document the steps taken in
response to cases of COVID-19. Rather, this official noted that they relied
on verbal communication with field office SACs as a means to
communicate about implementation of the protocols, as needed.
However, according to DHS Risk Management Fundamentals, leadership
should require documentation of actions taken to implement a risk
management strategy, specifically citing pandemics, such as COVID-19,
as one source of risk. Further, according to Standards for Internal Control
in the Federal Government, management should design control activities
to achieve objectives and respond to risks. Internal control standards
provide that one means of implementing this is for management to clearly
document all transactions and other significant events in a manner that
allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. Fully
documenting the steps taken would facilitate FAMS management’s
oversight and better position them to assure both employees and the
flying public that FAMS—a federal law enforcement entity tasked with
protecting the public—is consistently taking the steps established in its
protocols.
FAMS Does Not Routinely FAMS recommends that employees who want or need COVID-19 testing
Facilitate Employee seek it through their medical provider or local public health officials. Some
air marshals told us they could be tested through their personal doctor or
Access to Testing
at local testing sites. However, air marshals in all three field offices we
Page 23 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
met with noted either barriers to testing or benefits to improved access to
COVID-19 testing. 41 For example, air marshals we met with spoke of the
time needed to wait in line in some communities and the length of time
between being tested and obtaining results. These scheduling and timing
challenges are particularly impactful for air marshals who may be
scheduled to travel more than 50 percent of their work days and may not
be in a city—even their home city—for more than a few hours before their
next flight.
Further, air marshals we met with expressed concern that they might be a
threat to the public, because they are flying on multiple planes and
through multiple cities every week, without knowing whether they might
be asymptomatic and spreading COVID-19. A group of air marshals we
spoke with in one office noted that this runs counter to their mission to
protect the public. Lastly, representatives of all three employee groups we
met with said that air marshals had persistent concerns about the lack of
testing, which added to their stress given their fear of being at an
increased risk of exposure or exposing family members to COVID-19.
Some FAMS employees and employee groups have shared resources to
assist air marshals seeking COVID-19 testing. Air marshals we met with
in one field office said that law enforcement workers, including air
marshals, could access testing at a nearby location. According to them,
an air marshal had identified this resource and shared it with their SAC;
the SAC had then shared the information with others in the office. In
another example, representatives from one employee group told us they
were aware of a SAC in one field office who had compiled and shared a
document with information about testing locations. FAMS management
and Medical Programs Section officials told us they have in specific
instances, such as when an employee is ill while on travel, helped an air
marshal find a way to get tested, but said they do not routinely do this.
CDC guidance states that mitigation strategies such as social distancing
and wearing masks continue to be important during the period of
vaccination, and testing is one mitigation strategy that can help make
41We reported in September 2020, that national challenges existed with testing supply
availability and recommended the development of plans outlining specific actions the
federal government could take to help mitigate remaining medical supply gaps—including
testing supply shortages. See GAO, COVID-19: Critical Vaccine Distribution, Supply
Chain, Program Integrity, and Other Challenges Require Focused Federal Attention,
GAO-21-265 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2021).
Page 24 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
travel safer, even though it does not eliminate all risk. Importantly, CDC
guidance notes that even when individuals feel well and experience no
symptoms, they may still spread COVID-19 to others in busy travel
settings such as airports. 42 CDC guidance also states that experience
from outbreaks in a variety of settings suggests that when symptomatic
workers with COVID-19 are identified, there are often asymptomatic
workers present in the workplace. According to the guidance, testing is
important to identify such individuals, as they may not know they are
infected and detecting workers earlier and excluding them from the
workplace—that for air marshals includes airplanes and airports—can
help prevent the spread of COVID-19. 43
CDC guidance further states that testing before and after travel is a
critical layer to slow the introduction and spread of COVID-19, particularly
as variants of the virus continue to emerge in other countries. As such, in
December 2020, the CDC recommended testing before and after
domestic travel; and, effective January 26, 2021, began requiring all air
passengers to provide a negative test result when they enter the
country. 44 Guidance from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration also states that employers should provide information to
42CDC “Domestic Travel during the COVID-19 Pandemic.” December 2, 2020. Accessed
December 14, 2020 at
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-during-covid19.html.
43CDC “Testing Strategies for Coronavirus (COVID-19) in High-Density Critical
Infrastructure Workplaces after a COVID-19 Case is Identified, Testing in high-Density
Critical Infrastructure Workplaces.” June 13, 2020. Accessed October 14, 2020 at
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/worker-safety-support/hd-testing.h
tml.
44CDC guidance suggests getting a COVID-19 viral test 1 to 3 days prior to travel and
within 3 to 5 days following a trip. Additionally, the CDC suggests reducing any non-
essential activities for 7 to 10 days after traveling. See CDC “Domestic Travel during the
COVID-19 Pandemic.” December 2, 2020. Accessed December 12, 2020 at
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-during-covid19.html. CDC and
Department of Health and Human Services. “Requirement for Negative Pre-Departure
COVID-19 Test Result of Documentation of Recovery from COVID-19 For All Airline or
Other Aircraft Passengers Arriving into the United Stated from Any Foreign Country”. This
order was issued pursuant to their authority under 42 C.F.R. § 71.20.
Page 25 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
workers about medical care, such as testing, in coordination with health
insurance providers and local health agencies. 45
FAMS management officials stated that they have not facilitated
employee access to testing because they have not identified a need to do
so. They noted that employees should be able to access COVID-19
testing through their private health providers or local health departments.
One senior FAMS official noted that FAMS employees are not among the
highest risk employees (like first responders) so they questioned whether
limited testing resources should be used for air marshals and they further
questioned the value of testing. However, one FAMS Medical Programs
Section official stated that facilitated access to testing would be beneficial
if it improves the timeliness of testing results for their employees. Further,
according to DHS Human Capital officials, the Coast Guard and Secret
Service are providing their employees with access to COVID-19 testing
as part of their efforts to ensure continued operations during the
pandemic, and DHS has provided all components with the opportunity to
access a contract for COVID-19 testing as of January 2021. As of
February 2021, FAMS did not plan to use this contract or otherwise
facilitate employee access to testing. By routinely facilitating employee
access to testing, FAMS would better support its workforce when
employees want or need COVID-19 testing to ensure their health, the
health of others, and continued operations during this exigent
circumstance.
FAMS Adjusted Flight
Coverage and
Expanded Ground-
Based Operations
45Occupational Safety and Health Administration “Guidance on Preparing Workplaces for
COVID-19.” May 11, 2020. In additional guidance in January 2021, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration recommended that employers establish COVID-19
prevention programs and described 16 elements of effective programs, one of which is
“providing guidance on screening and testing.” See Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. “Protecting Workers: Guidance on Mitigating and Preventing the Spread of
COVID-19 in the Workplace”. January 29, 2021.
Page 26 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Amidst Decline in U.S. In April 2020, amidst a 73 percent decline in total monthly domestic and
Flight Volume, the Number international U.S. carrier flights, 46 the number of flights air marshals
of Flights FAMS Covered covered decreased by 90 percent compared to average monthly flights
covered pre-pandemic. 47 With regard to international flights, specifically,
Declined 90 Percent in in April 2020, when publicly available flight data indicate the total number
April 2020 of international flights on U.S. carriers had decreased 93 percent, air
marshals covered no international flights. 48 This decline followed the first
confirmed U.S. case of COVID-19 on January 21, 2020 and subsequent
State Department and CDC travel advisories discouraging certain
international travel starting in late January 2020. 49 (See figure 2) In
response to these advisories, FAMS management made a series of
changes in the coverage of international missions through December
2020. 50
• February 2020: FAMS management decided to stop covering certain
international flights to China and Italy. In January 2020, the State
Department advised U.S. citizens to avoid travel to China and in late
February 2020, extended this advisory to include Italy.
• March and April 2020: According to FAMS officials, FAMS continued
to deploy air marshals on international flights throughout the
pandemic. However, because FAMS identified certain flights based on
the risk associated with a specific passenger or passengers, the
number of these international flights FAMS covered decreased as
overall international passenger volume decreased in March and April
2020. Further, according to FAMS officials, in March 2020 they
46To determine trends in U.S. air carrier flight volume, we analyzed the U.S. Department
of Transportation’s publicly available passenger flight data.
47This decline in the number of flights FAMS covered is in part the result of the decrease
in the total number of U.S. carrier international flights, and other high-priority domestic
flights, as detailed below. For the purposes of this report, we define the “pre-pandemic”
period as October 2019 through February 2020. TSA designated the specific numbers of
flights FAMS covered as sensitive security information and thus they cannot be included in
a public report.
48According to FAMS officials, many of the international flights they had planned to cover
were cancelled during this period.
49Specifically, in January 2020, the State Department advised U.S. citizens to avoid travel
to China due to the novel coronavirus first identified in Wuhan, China. This travel advisory
was extended in late February 2020 to include Italy due to evidence of community spread
of the coronavirus. In March 2020, the CDC and State Department issued a Global Level
4 Health Advisory instructing U.S. citizens to avoid all international travel.
50TSA designated the details of FAMS’s changes to flight operations as sensitive security
information and thus they cannot be included in a public report.
Page 27 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
stopped coverage of certain international flights when the CDC and
State Department issued a Global Level 4 Health Advisory instructing
U.S. citizens to avoid all international travel. In effect, FAMS
management did not have air marshals cover international flights for
approximately 5 weeks.
• May 2020 through January 2021: From May 2020 through January
2021, as U.S. carrier flight volume increased, FAMS began covering
certain international flights although at lower rates. FAMS officials
reported that some of the international flights air marshals covered
from May through January 2021 were in support of flights categorized
as higher risk.
The number of domestic flights air marshals covered in April 2020 was 88
percent lower than average monthly domestic flights covered pre-
pandemic. According to FAMS officials and our analysis of publicly
available flight data, this decrease reflects both the 70 percent reduction
in U.S. carriers’ total domestic flights and the specific reductions in flights
FAMS categorizes as National Special Security Events and Special
Mission Coverage. With regard to National Special Security Events, CDC
guidance on limiting the size of events and public concern about the
pandemic caused many of these events to be cancelled or conducted in
virtual environments. As a result, FAMS conducted no flights related to
National Special Security Events from March through June 2020. With
regard to Special Mission Coverage, with fewer passengers flying, FAMS
saw a corresponding decrease in flights with higher risk travelers.
FAMS Adjusted the Types
of Flights It Covered and
Increased Ground-Based
Activities
FAMS Increased Flights to Beginning in April 2020, FAMS management implemented operational
Pre-Pandemic Levels by June changes to increase the number of monthly covered flights. 51 They did
2020 this in part, by increasing the number of flights they covered that do not fit
FAMS’s defined flight categories. For example, FAMS data indicate that
air marshals covered more random, unpredictable flights in June 2020
51TSA designated the details of FAMS’s operational changes as sensitive security
information and thus they cannot be included in a public report.
Page 28 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
than pre-pandemic. 52 Following these operational changes, by June 2020,
FAMS covered approximately the same number of flights per month as it
did on average in pre-pandemic months; however, the types of flights
covered differed. 53
FAMS Has Continued to Adapt From July 2020 through January 2021, the number and types of flights
Flight Operations FAMS covered continued to fluctuate in response to ongoing changes in
the airline industry and FAMS management’s decisions to end some flight
operations modifications, among other variables.
From July 2020 through January 2021, the number of flights FAMS
covered per month varied from a high in August 2020 to a low in
December 2020. FAMS officials explained that the high number of flights
covered in August was the result of the increase in total U.S. domestic
flights combined with their April and May 2020 decisions to expand the
types of flights FAMS would cover. They explained that due to instability
in the airline industry, it had been difficult for FAMS leadership to predict
how the changes in their flight selection criteria would affect the total
number of covered flights. According to FAMS officials and
documentation, in August 2020, FAMS leadership adopted two changes
they expected would reduce the number of covered flights going forward.
FAMS covered fewer flights in December 2020 in part because of
increased COVID-19 infection rates in certain cities, according to FAMS
management officials. Beginning in July 2020, FAMS tracked the level of
COVID-19 infection by city and restricted operations that would require air
marshals to stay overnight in locations with high rates of infection—which
they referred to as “hotspots.” 54 According to FAMS officials, FAMS’s
52Prior to the pandemic, in addition to their defined flight categories, FAMS scheduled
random, unpredictable flights based on air marshals’ availability. According to FAMS
officials, in March 2020, in response to the pandemic, they discontinued these flights.
Starting in May 2020, FAMS categorized all flights that did not meet the conventional
definitions of their flight categories as random, unpredictable flights.
53TSA designated the specific number of flights air marshals covered as sensitive security
information and thus it cannot be included in a public report.
54According to FAMS officials and documentation, beginning in July 2020, FAMS worked
with TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis Office, and assessed data from the Johns Hopkins
Coronavirus Resource Center to determine the weekly level of COVID-19 infection in the
areas around U.S. airports. FAMS officials explained that FAMS generally discontinued
overnight stays in these areas but in certain circumstances, such as a lengthy operation or
in the event of weather delays, air marshals were asked to stay overnight in a hotel near
the airport.
Page 29 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
coverage of flights in January 2021 increased, in part, due to additional
flight coverage following the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol
and increased coverage associated with the January 20, 2021
Presidential Inauguration, a National Special Security Event. 55
As of February 2021, FAMS officials reported that they were not covering
certain international flights due to CDC travel advisories, but were
otherwise selecting flights for coverage much as they had pre-
pandemic. 56 FAMS officials explained that they did not anticipate FAMS
would be covering flights at pre-pandemic levels given the decrease in
U.S. air travel, but they were not working toward a specific target number
of covered flights per month. As of February 2021, FAMS officials told us
they were not planning any modifications to their flight operations.
FAMS Plans to Permanently FAMS leadership is in the early stages of planning to permanently shift
Increase Ground-Based operations toward more ground-based transportation security activities.
Activities According to the Executive Assistant Administrator/Director of FAMS,
FAMS leadership had been considering an increase in ground-based
operations prior to the COVID-19 pandemic—as far back as 2011—but
the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have caused them to accelerate
this shift.
In April 2020, when FAMS flight operations were at decreased levels,
FAMS leadership increased air marshals’ participation in some ground-
based activities such as expanded VIPR operations and supporting TSA
and DHS activities.
• Expanding VIPR work. According to FAMS officials, FAMS
expanded VIPR operations in at least four field offices by deploying at
least 47 air marshals to enhance transportation security and free up
local law enforcement for other purposes. 57 For example, leadership
55According to FAMS officials, air marshals covered hundreds of flights in January 2021
related to the heightened security following the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol
and the Presidential Inauguration. TSA designated the specific number of flights as
sensitive security information and thus it cannot be included in a public report.
56FAMS continued to track hotspot airports and avoid overnight missions in those areas.
57FAMS management officials explained that they provided field office management with
discretion in how they utilized VIPR operations during this time, so they did not have
comprehensive data on the extent of FAMS’s VIPR operations agency-wide. Rather,
FAMS officials asked field office management retrospectively about their VIPR operations
during this period and identified that at least 47 air marshals in four offices were assigned
to support VIPR operations from inception of the pandemic through October 2020.
Page 30 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
of the Seattle field office told us that during a period when they had
fewer air marshals on flights, they deployed air marshals to aid with
VIPR operations at transportation venues when the Seattle Police
Department was focused on local civil unrest.
• Supporting TSA at airports. Prior to the pandemic, FAMS regularly
supported TSA at airports with duties including overt and covert law
enforcement activities. According to FAMS officials, in April 2020 air
marshals increased their support for TSA operations in some airports.
For example, from April through July 2020, in Newark, New Jersey, air
marshals worked additional shifts at the airport to provide exit lane
security when there was a shortage of Transportation Security
Officers due to COVID-19. FAMS officials told us that at least 134 air
marshals across ten field offices have provided support to TSA at
airports since April 2020. FAMS officials told us that they also
increased their security assistance at small-hub airports. 58 According
to FAMS management officials, prior to COVID-19, FAMS did not
typically assist TSA in this manner. However, starting in April 2020
FAMS officials said that they regularly deployed eight air marshals to
these two airports to provide security assistance. 59 FAMS also
deployed four air marshals from the Boston, Massachusetts field
office to three regional airports from May through December 2020 and
five air marshals from the New York City, New York field office to
three regional airports from June through August 2020 to provide on-
going security assistance.
• Supporting other DHS activities. FAMS officials told us that at least
339 air marshals provided support to other DHS components from
April through December 2020. For example, FAMS officials told us
that in March 2020, they deployed VIPR teams of air marshals from
six field offices to support Federal Emergency Management Agency
by providing security and safe escort for individuals quarantined at
Joint Base Lackland and Travis Air Force Base. 60 FAMS also
deployed 18 air marshals to assist the Federal Protective Service with
58Federal law defines a small-hub airport as an airport with scheduled air carrier service
that receives 0.05 to 0.25 percent of the annual U.S. commercial enplanements.49 U.S.C.
§ 40102(a)(42).
59As of January 2021, FAMS officials stated that one air marshal based out of the
Washington field office was providing ongoing to support to TSA at the Norfolk, Virginia
airport and FAMS was providing support to TSA at the Richmond, Virginia airport upon
request.
60FAMS deployed VIPR teams from Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; New York
City, New York; San Francisco, California; Seattle, Washington; and Washington, D.C. to
assist with quarantine efforts from March 10-26, 2020.
Page 31 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
responsibilities such as protecting federal property at Gettysburg
National Battleground on July 4, 2020. Additionally, FAMS officials
told us that from August through December 2020, approximately, 285
air marshals supported the U.S. Secret Service in a variety of
assignments including providing security at the Democratic National
Convention.
In January 2021, FAMS further expanded its ground-based activities.
Specifically, FAMS officials told us that following the January 6, 2021
attack on the U.S. Capitol, VIPR teams from the Washington and
Baltimore field offices supported TSA by providing an increased visible
law enforcement presence at airport screening checkpoints and provided
protective escorts for congressional members, staff, and others (see
figure 10). Further, for the January 20, 2021 Presidential Inauguration,
eight FAMS VIPR teams supported DHS Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Mobile Detection Deployment Units and 224 air marshals
supported the U.S. Secret Service through assignments including
providing security at inauguration venues. 61
61Within DHS, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office deploys Mobile Detection
Deployment Units—radiological and nuclear detection equipment housed in a mobile
trailer package—as a national surge asset, designed to augment and supplement first
responders’ existing capabilities, especially in support of national and special security
events. According to FAMS officials, the eight VIPR teams conducted 42 operations from
January 17-22, 2021 in support of Amtrak, Maryland Area Regional Commuter,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and the Metropolitan Washington Airport
Authority.
Page 32 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Figure 7: Federal Air Marshals Support Inauguration Event Security at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
The FAMS Director said the purpose of this shift toward more ground-
based activities is to find additional ways for air marshals to contribute to
DHS and TSA security missions in a changing national security
environment. FAMS leadership also intends for the shift toward a greater
variety of law enforcement tasks to benefit employee retention and
morale.
Page 33 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
FAMS leadership has tasked a working group with identifying
opportunities for air marshals to engage in new ground-based initiatives,
such as participating in TSA red-team testing, assisting with behavior
detection activities at airport security checkpoints, working with airport
officials on access control, and assisting with passenger screening at
airport departure gates. 62 The FAMS Director said he anticipated FAMS
would not need any additional authorities to carry out these changes. In
November 2020, the working group reported 12 recommendations for
FAMS leadership and, as of January 2021, FAMS leadership had named
a program manager to lead the development and implementation of the
operational changes. FAMS officials said they expected to begin
implementing the changes on a rolling basis through 2021 and they
planned to update their concept of operations to reflect the changes.
The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in catastrophic loss of life. Public
Conclusions health officials have widely recommended physical distancing to reduce
transmission, but air marshals’ jobs require that they work at airports, on
airplanes, and in other public spaces where they are routinely in close
quarters with colleagues and the public. To mitigate this risk, FAMS has
taken steps intended to help protect employees from infection at work,
such as providing PPE and encouraging employees to telework. Even
with these and other measures, FAMS reports that, as of January 31,
2021, 345 employees had been infected with COVID-19 and one air
marshal had died due to complications of the disease.
FAMS developed and implemented protocols to guide its response when
employees became sick with COVID-19, but has not consistently
documented the steps taken to implement the protocols. Doing so would
facilitate management oversight and better position FAMS to assure both
its employees and the flying public that it is consistently implementing its
protocols.
FAMS recommends that employees seek COVID-19 testing through their
medical provider or local public health officials but air marshals we met
62What TSA commonly calls “red team” tests are covert tests that are designed to assess
TSA’s screening operations. Behavior detection is a technique used by TSA to identify
passengers exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception at airport screening
checkpoints. According to TSA, certain verbal and nonverbal cues and behaviors may
indicate mal-intent and provide a means for identifying passengers who may pose a risk to
aviation security and referring them for additional screening. GAO has issued numerous
reports about TSA’s use of behavior detection, most recently GAO, Aviation Security: TSA
Has Policies that Prohibit Unlawful Profiling But Should Improve Its Oversight of Behavior
Detection Activities, GAO-19-268 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2019).
Page 34 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
with noted barriers to testing and benefits to improved access. In January
2021, FAMS employees became eligible for COVID-19 vaccinations
through the Department of Veterans Affairs, but CDC guidance says
testing continues to be important even as vaccinations become available.
By facilitating employee access to testing, FAMS would better support its
workforce to ensure their health, the health of others, and continued
operations during this exigent circumstance.
We are making the following two recommendations to FAMS:
Recommendations for
Executive Action The Executive Assistant Administrator/Director of FAMS should ensure
that FAMS officials consistently document steps taken to implement
agency protocols following identification of employees with COVID-19.
(Recommendation 1)
The Executive Assistant Administrator/Director of FAMS should routinely
facilitate employee access to COVID-19 testing. (Recommendation 2)
We provided a draft of our report to DHS for comment. In written
Agency Comments comments, which are included in Appendix I, the agency concurred with
and Our Evaluation our two recommendations and described steps they plan to take to
address them. DHS also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated, as appropriate.
With regard to our first recommendation that FAMS consistently
document steps taken to implement agency protocols following
identification of employees with COVID-19, DHS responded that it would
develop and implement a formal reporting process to document the steps
taken at FAMS field offices and headquarters by the end of June 2021. If
implemented effectively, this would address the intent of our
recommendation.
With regard to our second recommendation that FAMS routinely facilitate
employee access to COVID-19 testing, DHS responded that it would
provide information to employees regarding available COVID-19 testing
locations, and ensure that employees deployed away from home have the
necessary assistance to obtain testing by the end of June 2021. If
implemented effectively, this would address the intent of our
recommendation.
Page 35 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested
parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO
website at https://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6691 or McNeilT@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of the report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in Appendix II.
Triana McNeil
Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Page 36 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
List of Committees
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Wyden
Chairman
The Honorable Mike Crapo
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chair
The Honorable Rob Portman
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Chairwoman
The Honorable Kay Granger
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Republican Leader
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Page 37 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
The Honorable John Katko
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Comer
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard Neal
Chair
The Honorable Kevin Brady
Republican Leader
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives
Page 38 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Appendix I: Comments from the Department
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of
Homeland Security
of Homeland Security
Page 39 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of
Homeland Security
Page 40 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of
Homeland Security
Page 41 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Triana McNeil at (202) 512-6691, McNeilT@gao.gov.
GAO contact
In addition to the contact named above, Claudia Becker (Assistant
Staff Director), Amanda Parker (Analyst in Charge), Paul Aussendorf, Karen
Acknowledgments Doran, Clifton Douglas, Elizabeth Dretsch, David Hooper, Susan Irving,
Tyler Kent, Terell Lasane, Diona Martyn, Adam Vogt, and Emilie Weisser
made key contributions to this report.
(105224)
Page 42 GAO-21-595 FAMS Response to Covid-19
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative
GAO’s Mission arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the
federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public
funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed
oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government
is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is
Obtaining Copies of through our website. Each weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly
GAO Reports and released reports, testimony, and correspondence. You can also subscribe to
GAO’s email updates to receive notification of newly posted products.
Testimony
Order by Phone The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and
distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether
the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering
information is posted on GAO’s website, https://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm.
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard,
Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.
Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.
Connect with GAO Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or Email Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at https://www.gao.gov.
Contact FraudNet:
To Report Fraud,
Website: https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/fraudnet
Waste, and Abuse in
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7700
Federal Programs
Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director, WilliamsO@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400,
Congressional U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125,
Relations Washington, DC 20548
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800
Public Affairs U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, DC 20548
Stephen J. Sanford, Acting Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707
Strategic Planning and U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814,
External Liaison Washington, DC 20548
Please Print on Recycled Paper.
File and source
- File
- gao-21-595.pdf
- Size
- 2,843,992 bytes
- SHA-256
- c9f891fd96229ad09b8c4b700de65e87486ac2d0dd033a7857ff7b15d24b5c64
- Our copy
- gao-21-595.pdf
- Original
- www.gao.gov