ED OIG Semiannual Report to Congress No. 92 (October 1, 2025-March 31, 2026)
Summary
The U.S. Department of Education Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress, No. 92, covering October 1, 2025 through March 31, 2026, dated May 2026, with a message from Mark E. Priebe, Deputy Inspector General Delegated the Duties of Inspector General. The message states that during the period the OIG issued 4 audit, inspection, and other reports identifying $3.9 million in questioned and unsupported costs and closed 14 criminal and civil investigations. It states that the OIG secured more than $7 million in restitution, settlements, fines, savings, recoveries, and forfeitures. The report is organized into sections on Federal student aid programs, elementary and secondary education programs, pandemic relief aid oversight, and Department management and operations, and includes a Fraud Advisory on FAFSA data.
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Semiannual Report
to Congress, No. 92
October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
U.S. Department of Education
Office of Inspector General
Office of Inspector General
May 2026
This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce it in
whole or in part is granted. While permission to reprint this publication
is not necessary, the citation should be: U.S. Department of Education,
Office of Inspector General, Semiannual Report to Congress, No. 92.
Please Note:
The Office of Inspector General’s Semiannual Report to Congress, No.
92 is available on the ED OIG website at https://oig.ed.gov/resources/
congressional-reports.
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Message from the Deputy Inspector General
Delegated the Duties of Inspector General
On behalf of the U.S. Department We also issued a Fraud Advisory
of Education (Department) Office of titled “Potential Fraud Involving
Inspector General (OIG), I present this FAFSA from Dependent Students
Semiannual Report on the activities and with Unusual Parent Data” that
accomplishments of this office from identified a potential loss of almost
October 1, 2025, through March 31, $3.5 million in Federal student aid.
2026. The audits, investigations, and Notable matters include:
related work highlighted in this report are
• Our inspection of the Puerto Rico
products of our mission to identify and stop
Department of Education’s (Puerto
fraud, waste, and abuse and to promote
Rico DOE) use of American Rescue
accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness
Plan (ARP) Elementary and Secondary
through our oversight of the Department’s
School Emergency Relief (ESSER)
programs and operations. For example,
funds to measure student academic
during this reporting period, the OIG:
progress found that the Puerto
• Issued 4 audit, inspection, and other Rico DOE did not ensure that the
reports, identifying $3.9 million services contracted for and paid
in questioned and unsupported with ARP ESSER funds were provided
costs. These reports covered in accordance with the executed
Federal student aid programs, contract. It also did not ensure that
elementary and secondary education teachers used the results of the
programs, pandemic relief aid, and contractor-administered student
our statutory work involving the academic proficiency assessments
Department’s financial statements. as intended to modify individual
We also issued our statutory report students’ instructional plans and
on the most significant management help prevent academic failure.
challenges facing the Department As a result, $3.9 million in ARP
in fiscal year (FY) 2026, and our FY ESSER program funds were
2025 Performance Results report wasted. Those funds could have
that includes statutorily required been used to benefit students and
information on our performance mitigate learning loss caused by the
measures, targets, and results. coronavirus pandemic. We made
• Closed 14 criminal and civil four recommendations, including
investigations involving fraud or one to return the $3.9 million or
corruption and secured more than take other remedial action.
$7 million in restitution, settlements, • Actions were taken against two
fines, savings, recoveries, and members of a fraud ring that targeted
forfeitures. As a result of this some $16 million in Federal student
work, criminal actions were taken aid, one of whom pled guilty.
against numerous people, including The 10-year scheme involved the
current and former school officials submission of fraudulent FAFSAs for
and service providers who more than 1,200 people, involving
cheated students and taxpayers. more than 100 schools in 24 States.
i
• Study Across the Pond (SATP), a included conducting 105 fraud awareness
student recruiting firm and its principal and prevention meetings, trainings, and
agreed to pay $1.3 million to settle discussions with stakeholders and law
allegations that it violated the Federal enforcement partners at the Federal,
ban on incentive-based compensation. State, and local levels. We also updated
SATP was alleged to have convinced and issued new brochures, flyers, and
foreign schools to enter into information sheets to help the public
arrangements that violated the Federal recognize, avoid, and report education-
ban on incentive compensation, which related fraud to the OIG. You will find more
is meant to protect students against on these efforts—our reports, investigations,
aggressive recruitment practices. and new materials—throughout the pages
SATP and its principal also allegedly of this report and on our website.
paid employees to recruit American In closing, the work detailed in this report
students to attend schools in the reflects the skill and commitment of
United Kingdom and then required the OIG workforce and our continued
the schools to pay a commission value to the students, institutions, and
when the recruited students enrolled. taxpayers who depend on the integrity of
Further, as collaboration is essential in Federal education programs. We have a
the fight against fraud, we continued to significant amount of work underway and
participate in task forces and strengthen planned and look forward to presenting
partnerships with our colleagues at the the results in future Semiannual Reports
U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal to Congress. In the meantime, we will
Bureau of Investigation, the Department, continue to work with the 119th Congress,
and across the Federal and State/Territorial the Department, and our Federal law
Inspector General community. Together, enforcement and prosecutive partners
we are identifying new ways to leverage to fulfill our statutory mission on behalf
our collective resources, expertise, and of America’s taxpayers and students.
skillsets to more effectively combat fraud.
In addition, recognizing that the first
steps in preventing education-related
Mark E. Priebe
fraud are knowing how to identify and
Deputy Inspector General Delegated
report it, we continued our efforts to help
the Duties of Inspector General
our stakeholders and the general public
identify and report fraud to the OIG. This
ii
Table of Contents
Federal Student Aid Programs and Operations 1
Reports 1
Investigations and Outreach 4
Elementary and Secondary Education Programs 9
Report 9
Investigations and Outreach 10
Pandemic Relief Aid Oversight 15
Report 15
Investigation 16
Department Management and Operations 18
Report 18
Non-Federal Audit Oversight Activities 20
Desk Reviews and Quality Control Reviews 20
Technical Assistance 20
Additional Efforts 22
Required Reporting Tables 26
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Federal Student Aid Programs and Operations
Federal student aid programs have long been a major focus of our audit and investigative
work. These programs are inherently risky because of their complexity, the amount
of funds involved, the number of program participants, and the characteristics of
student populations. The Department disburses more than $100 billion in Federal
student aid annually and manages or oversees an outstanding loan portfolio valued
at nearly $1.7 trillion. As such, effective oversight and monitoring of Federal student
aid programs, operations, and program participants—be it those administered by the
Department or in partnership with the U.S. Department of Treasury—are critical.
REPORTS
During this reporting period, the OIG issued two reports specific to Federal student aid
programs. Summaries of those reports follow.
Fraud Advisory: In February, we issued a Fraud Advisory on suspicious and
Potential Fraud potentially fraudulent activity on the Free Application for
Involving FAFSA Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) involving dependent students with
from Dependent unusual parent data. Between late 2024 and early 2025, the OIG
Students participated in several meetings with Department staff and officials
with Unusual from three States regarding the identities of high school students
Parent Data that had allegedly been stolen and used to create fraudulent
Federal Student Aid identification (FSA ID) accounts and apply
for student aid. The OIG analyzed related FAFSA data and in
March 2025 conveyed to the Department information about
potentially fraudulent activity involving suspicious activity from
students with unusual parent data reported on the FAFSA.
Specifically, our analysis of a small subset of FAFSA data found
189 parent identities that were used on an unusually high number
of dependent student FAFSAs in award year 2024–2025—instances
where a unique parent’s identity was associated with 10 or more
dependent students. Our analysis found that bad actors may
be exploiting the FAFSA process by using the same parental
information on multiple dependent student FAFSAs in an attempt
to fraudulently obtain Federal student aid. We identified some
$500,000 in Pell grants disbursed in award years 2023 – 2024 and
2024 – 2025 connected to this suspicious activity. Immediately
following our March 2025 communication to the FSA office,
FSA took action to flag these students for identity verification.
In June 2025, we initiated analysis of additional data and ultimately
found that this pattern of activity involving dependent students
with unusual parent data on the FAFSA had continued. Of the
189 parent identities we initially identified as potentially fraudulent
in March 2025, we found that 125 were associated with new FAFSA
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submissions containing potentially fraudulent student
identities. Additionally, we determined that 12,026 dependent
student identities submitted FAFSAs associated with
1,991 parent identities where it is unlikely that the student
and parent are related or associated. As a result, these FAFSA
submissions have a high likelihood of being fraudulent—a potential
loss of almost $3.5 million in Federal student aid associated
with these FAFSA submissions during award year 2024–2025.
To address the issue identified, we recommended that FSA work
with the IRS to implement additional controls to detect and
prevent the misuse of stolen identities on FAFSA submissions,
especially fraud schemes involving the use of potentially
stolen student identities and nonrelated, potentially stolen
parent identities. We also recommended that it conduct risk-
based verification and validation procedures at the time FSA
IDs are created. This can prevent the improper disbursement
of Federal student aid based on fraudulent FAFSA submissions
containing stolen identities. In response to our report, FSA
stated that it had already taken actions to address the issue
identified, and that it had started assessing additional account-
level actions to improve longer-term controls. Read the report
Quality of Data During this reporting period, we issued the fifth in our series of
Reported through reviews involving the quality of data reported by selected schools
the Department’s through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
Integrated (IPEDS). Section 487(a)(17) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as
Postsecondary amended (HEA), requires postsecondary schools participating in
Education Data Title IV programs to annually report data, including data relevant
System Surveys to students’ cost of attendance and financial aid and the schools’
graduation rates, to the Department’s IPEDS to the satisfaction
of the Secretary. IPEDS data are available to the public—including
students, parents, and researchers—and can be used to analyze
trends in postsecondary education. They can also help students
attending postsecondary schools and prospective students, and
their parents, compare postsecondary schools and make informed
school enrollment decisions. The objective of this inspection
series was to determine whether selected schools reported
verifiable data to IPEDS for the time periods reviewed. Below is a
summary of what we found at Southern New Hampshire University
(SNHU), the final school reviewed in the series. Our reports on
the four other schools reviewed can be found on our website.
Southern New Hampshire University
We found that SNHU did not always report verifiable data in
the Student Financial Aid, Graduation Rates, and Institutional
Characteristic Surveys to IPEDS for the 2021–2022 reporting
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period because it did not update and implement procedures
for collecting, consolidating, assessing the reliability of, and
reporting data to IPEDS. Specifically, we found that:
• SNHU overstated the total amount of grant and scholarship
aid received from the Federal, State, or local governments, or
the school. Because SNHU incorrectly reported data through
the Student Financial Aid survey, its net price of $32,043
calculated for the 2021–2022 reporting period was unreliable.
Prospective students and their parents might have made
enrollment decisions based on this unreliable information.
• SNHU incorrectly reported the number of full-time
undergraduate students who were enrolled in fall 2016
and were seeking their first postsecondary degree.
Because SNHU inaccurately reported the number of
such students, its overall graduation rate calculated for
the 2021–2022 reporting period was not reliable. The
unreliable graduation rate might have resulted in prospective
SNHU students and their parents making enrollment
decisions based on unreliable graduation rate data.
• SNHU inaccurately calculated the room and board costs
for off-campus students (those not living with family) and
other expenses for all full-time undergraduate students
on campus and off campus (both living with family and
not with family) who began attending the school during
the 2021–2022 academic year and were seeking their
first postsecondary degree or certificate. This occurred
because SNHU did not use the correct budgets for room
and board and other expenses for the 2021–2022 academic
year when determining certain component costs of
its total cost of attendance. Additionally, SNHU did not
maintain documentation to support the book and supplies
costs that it reported to IPEDS. As a result, the school
reported inaccurate room and board and other expenses,
leading prospective students and their parents to make
enrollment decisions based on unreliable information.
We made five recommendations to FSA and the Department’s
National Center for Education Statistics to address these
issues. This included requiring SNHU to update its policies and
procedures to ensure it reports accurate information, and to
consider taking appropriate action because the school reported
inaccurate and incorrect information to IPEDS. SNHU officials
agreed with three of our recommendations and disagreed with
various conclusions presented in our findings. Read the report.
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INVESTIGATIONS AND OUTREACH
Identifying and investigating fraud in Federal student aid programs has always
been a top OIG priority. The results of our efforts have led to prison sentences
for unscrupulous school officials and others who stole or criminally misused
Federal student aid funds, significant civil fraud actions against entities participating
in Federal student aid programs, and hundreds of millions of dollars returned
to the Federal government in fines, restitutions, and civil settlements. As you
will see below, our efforts continued throughout this reporting period.
Investigations of Schools, School Officials, Other Program Participants
The following are summaries of OIG investigations and links to press
releases involving Federal student aid fraud and other fraud involving
schools, school officials, and other program participants.
Student Recruiting In a recent Semiannual Report, we highlighted a complaint
Firm and Its filed by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Massachusetts,
Principal Agree to under the False Claims Act against Study Across the Pond, LLC
Pay $1.3 Million (SATP) and its principal for allegedly violating the Federal ban
to Settle False on incentive-based compensation for student recruitment.
Claims Allegations The Incentive Compensation Ban protects students against
(Massachusetts) aggressive recruitment practices that serve the financial interest
of the recruiter, rather than the educational needs of the student.
During this reporting period, SATP and its principal agreed to pay
$1.3 million to resolve the claim. According to court documents,
SATP was alleged to have convinced foreign schools to enter
into arrangements that violated the Federal ban on incentive-
based compensation for student recruitment. SATP and its
principal were also alleged to have paid employees to recruit
American students to attend schools in the United Kingdom (UK)
and then required the schools to pay a commission when the
recruited students enrolled. Based on this conduct, SATP and
its principal are alleged to have knowingly caused UK schools
to submit false claims to the Department. SATP and its principal
were also alleged to have created sham records to hide these
arrangements and ultimately caused foreign schools to submit
false claims to the Department. Read the press release.
Investigations of Student Aid Fraud Rings
Below are summaries and links to press releases on actions taken over the last 6 months
against people who participated in Federal student aid fraud rings. Fraud rings are large,
loosely affiliated groups of criminals who seek to exploit distance education programs
to fraudulently obtain Federal student aid. These cases are just a sample of actions taken
against fraud ring participants during this reporting period. You can learn more about our
work involving student aid fraud rings in the “OIG Perspective Report: The Importance
of Strengthening Internal Controls in Federal Student Aid,” available on our website.
4
Actions Taken In our last Semiannual Report, we highlighted our investigation
Against Members involving a student aid fraud ring that fraudulently obtained more
for Roles in than $10 million in student aid. During this reporting period,
$16 Million one ring member pled guilty, and another was indicted for their
Student Aid Fraud roles in the ring. The 10-year scheme involved the submission
Ring (Michigan) of fraudulent FAFSAs for more than 1,200 people, involving
more than 100 schools in 24 States, and targeting more than
$16 million in Federal student aid. Many of these individuals
were enrolled in the same or similar degree programs and were
taking the same or similar online courses. The two assisted
the ring by both recruiting people to provide their personal
identifying information (PII) to the ring, and by acting as “runners,”
making withdrawals of student aid funds from debit cards in
straw students’ names—at times with the “students” themselves
present—and paid kickbacks to cooperating individuals.
Leader of Ring In January, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of
That Targeted North Carolina issued a press release highlighting the leader of
More than a student aid fraud ring that targeted some $5 million in student
$5 Million in aid. The ringleader was sentenced to 5 years in prison and was
Student Aid ordered to pay more than $3.6 million in restitution. Between
Sentenced to 2016 and 2023, the ringleader recruited some 80 people to
Prison (North participate in the ring as “straw students” using their PII to apply
Carolina) for admission to and receive Federal student aid for attending
multiple schools in North Carolina. The ringleader attempted
to make it appear that the straw students were attending
classes, completing coursework, and communicating with
the targeted schools when, in fact, she was impersonating the
straw students for these and other purposes. When the straw
student received their student aid award balance, they kicked a
substantial portion back to the ringleader. Read the press release.
Leader of Ring A woman pled guilty to orchestrating a decade-long fraud ring that
that Targeted targeted Wayne County Community College (WCCC) and more
$3 Million in than $3 million in Federal student aid. From 2015 through 2025,
Student Aid Pled the ringleader submitted fraudulent aid applications for more than
Guilty (Michigan) 80 individuals who were purportedly eligible students seeking to
attend WCCC. In reality, those individuals had no interest in or
intent to pursue a degree. The ringleader obtained the necessary
high school diplomas on their behalf, with many from the same
Florida online “fast-track” school, and completed their WCCC
online coursework for them, often simultaneously, to create the
appearance of academic progress and extend their eligibility for
aid across multiple semesters. When the straw student received
their student aid award balance, they kicked a substantial portion
back to the ringleader. In her guilty plea, the ringleader agreed to
pay more than $2.5 million in restitution. Read the press release.
5
Ringleader Pled The leader of a fraud ring that targeted the University of Phoenix
Guilty to Using and more than $989,000 in Federal student aid pled guilty to
the Identities of identity theft and fraud charges. From 2018 to 2021, the man
Nearly 300 People obtained the PII of nearly 300 people, some of whom were
to Target More incarcerated at the time, and enrolled them for classes at the
than $989,000 in University of Phoenix and for Federal student aid without their
Federal Student knowledge or consent. As the student aid award would often
Aid (Wisconsin) be more than the cost of tuition and fees, the man ensured
that the student aid refunds were directed to a bank account
he controlled, deposited onto debit cards, or mailed to an
address he controlled. As a result of his fraudulent efforts,
the ring obtained nearly $404,000 in Federal student aid.
Former Professor In a previous Semiannual Report to Congress, we highlighted
Pled Guilty for our investigation involving a former college professor who
Leading $600k had been indicted for his role in a fraud ring that targeted
Fraud Ring (Texas) nearly $600,000 in student aid from several Texas colleges and
universities. During this reporting period, the man pled guilty.
For approximately 5 years, the former professor submitted more
than 100 false applications for financial aid for numerous straw
students. He utilized mailing addresses, telephone numbers,
and email accounts he controlled to ensure all communications
and the student aid award balances went directly to him. The
former professor also admitted to the aggravated identity theft
of two victims whose personal identifiers had been repeatedly
used to apply for and obtain Federal student aid over the course
of several years. He also acknowledged he was fraudulently in
possession of false identity documents—temporary driver permits
and identification cards—with the intent to unlawfully use or
transfer those documents in furtherance of the fraud scheme.
Some of the unwitting victims had tens of thousands of dollars
in loans taken out in their name, and the fraudulent applications
significantly impacted their credit. Read the press release.
Leader of a A student aid fraud ringleader was sentenced to serve 12 months
Ring That plus 1 day in prison, 3 years of supervised release, and was ordered
Targeted More to pay more than $461,000 in restitution for fraud. From 2020
than $461,000 to 2023, the leader recruited people to act as straw students,
in Student Aid targeting online courses at Holmes Community College, Columbia
Sentenced College, and the University of Phoenix. The straw students
to Prison provided him with their PII that he then used to prepare and submit
(Mississippi) school admissions and student aid application forms on their
behalf, solely for the purpose of obtaining student aid, and none of
the straw students intended to attend classes. Once the ringleader
obtained the student aid award balance, he paid a portion of
the money to the straw students for the use of their identities.
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Other Student Aid Fraud Investigations
The following are summaries and, where issued, links to press releases on the results
of additional OIG investigations into abuse or misuse of Federal student aid.
Self-Proclaimed A woman who claimed to be the “Student Loan Default Guru”
“Student Loan and operated a business under that name was arrested on
Default Guru” fraud charges. According to the complaint, from 2023 through
Charged in $2 2025, the woman promised to help student loan borrowers
Million Student navigate “the complexities of student loan forgiveness,” for a
Loan Forgiveness fee. Using the borrowers’ information, she allegedly employed
Scam (Florida) misrepresentations, false statements, and fake documents to
deceive the U.S. Department of Education into forgiving about
$2 million in Federal student loans issued to those borrowers.
Woman Pled A woman pled guilty to charges of theft associated with her
Guilty to Theft and fraudulent attempt to discharge her student loans. The woman
Fraud Charges, submitted falsified medical records and other information to
Including the Total the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, seeking a finding of
and Permanent total and permanent disability. Once obtained, the woman
Disability Student submitted the information to the U.S. Department of Education
Loan Discharge in order to discharge more than $242,500 in student loans
Program (West through the Total and Permanent Disability discharge program.
Virginia)
Man Indicted for A Federal grand jury indicted a man for defrauding the United
Fraud Involving States through fraudulent GI Bill educational assistance,
Federal Student Federal student aid, and military loan discharge. According to
Aid, GI Bill (Ohio) the indictment, from 2018 through 2024, the man and others
allegedly enrolled in college courses, applying for and receiving
GI Bill funds and Federal student aid for tuition, monthly housing
allowances, and stipends for books and supplies. Once enrolled,
the man is alleged to have paid an individual in Africa to complete
course assignments for co-conspirators. He also allegedly caused
fraudulent Federal student loan discharges or forgiveness based
on claimed total and permanent disability status for veterans.
Finally, part of the proceeds from the fraudulently obtained
government benefits and student loan discharges was reportedly
paid to the man through money apps by co-conspirators. The
indictment details a series of payments totaling nearly $15,000,
with approximately $6,000 of that amount going to the individual
in Africa completing the coursework. Read the press release.
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Outreach: Student Loan Fraud Awareness and Prevention Materials
During this reporting period, the OIG continued to inform the public about student
loan fraud and scams. Through its fraud awareness materials and information, the
OIG encouraged student loan borrowers to stay alert and avoid falling victim to
student loan forgiveness and debt relief scams and provided actions they can take
to protect themselves. These materials provide helpful tips and proactive steps for
student borrowers to take to avoid falling victim to student loan scams, student loan
forgiveness scams, debt collection and other student loan debt relief scams, and
identity theft. The flyers also list actions to take should students think they have been
caught in a scammer’s trap. These free materials are available on our website.
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Elementary and Secondary Education Programs
The Department—both on its own and in partnership with other Federal agencies—
administers more than 100 programs that involve 56 State and territorial educational
agencies, more than 17,000 public school districts, about 128,000 schools, and
numerous other grantees and subgrantees. Effective oversight of and accountability
in how these entities spend the Federal education funding they receive is vital.
Through our audit work, we identify problems and propose solutions to help
ensure that these programs and operations meet the requirements established by
law and that federally funded education services reach the intended recipients—
America’s students. Through our criminal investigations, we help protect public
education funds for eligible students by identifying those who abuse or misuse
Federal education funds and holding them accountable for their unlawful actions.
REPORT
During this reporting period, we issued the first in our series of reports involving local
educational agencies’ (LEA) internal controls over individualized education programs (IEP).
The Department administers the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which
authorizes formula grants to States under Part B to assist them in meeting the excess
costs of providing special education and related services (services) to children ages
3 through 21 with disabilities. Most of the Federal funds provided to States must be passed
on to LEAs. Federal funds are combined with State and local funds to provide a free
appropriate public education to children with disabilities. Under IDEA, a free appropriate
public education is provided through an IEP based on the individual needs of the child.
In this audit series, we look to determine whether selected LEAs designed and
implemented sufficient processes for overseeing the development of IEPs for children
with disabilities and ensuring that those children receive the services described in their
IEPs. The first report issued in this series involved Omaha Public Schools, the largest LEA
in Nebraska, that was awarded approximately $15.3 million in IDEA Part B funds for school
year 2023–2024. A summary of our findings follows. We will share the findings from the
other reports in this series in future Semiannual Reports to Congress.
Omaha Public We found that Omaha generally designed and implemented
Schools’ Oversight sufficient processes for overseeing the development of IEPs and
of Individualized ensuring that children with disabilities receive the services as
Education described in their IEPs. As such, stakeholders have reasonable
Programs assurance that Omaha is sufficiently overseeing the development
of IEPs and ensuring that children with disabilities receive the
services described in their IEPs. However, there were a small
number of instances where IEPs and related documentation
did not show that all applicable IEP requirements were met
(25 of 769 items tested) or that students received all of the services
described in their IEPs (5 of 22 students included in our review).
When documentation is lacking or does not exist, stakeholders do
not have sufficient assurances that the IEP teams considered all
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required elements when developing the IEPs, the IEPs contained
all required information, or all services described in the IEPs were
provided to children with disabilities. Based on our findings, we
made two recommendations to improve Omaha’s oversight of
IEP development and documentation of IEP services provided.
We recommended that Omaha (1) provide sufficient training and
instruction to employees responsible for developing and reviewing
IEPs, which in part should remind staff to follow applicable
guidance; and (2) develop policies, procedures, or protocols that
describe how and in what level of detail special education staff
and other service providers should document the IEP services they
provide to each student. Nebraska officials agreed with our findings
and recommendations and described the actions that Nebraska
plans to take to address the recommendations. Read the report.
INVESTIGATIONS AND OUTREACH
OIG investigations in the elementary and secondary education areas include
criminal investigations involving bribery, embezzlement, and other unlawful
activity, often involving State and local education officials, educational services
providers, and contractors who abused their positions of trust for personal gain.
Examples of some of these investigations and links to press releases follow.
Investigations of School Officials, Contractors, and Educational
Services Providers
The following are summaries of OIG investigations involving K–12 school officials,
contractors, and educational services providers.
Former Boone In recent Semiannual Reports to Congress, we highlighted our
County Schools investigation involving the former maintenance director of Boone
Maintenance County schools, his parents, and the owner of Rush Enterprises,
Director and a Boone County Schools contractor, for their roles in defrauding
Schools Contractor the school district out of $3.4 million. During this reporting period,
Sentenced for the former official and the contractor were sentenced. The former
Roles in $3.4 director was sentenced to serve more than 2 years in prison,
Million Fraud 3 years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay more than
Scheme (West $3.4 million in restitution while the contractor was sentenced to
Virginia) serve 1 and a half years of home confinement, probation, and
was also ordered to pay more than $3.4 million in restitution. The
former director used his position to conspire with the contractor
to falsify documents showing that the Boone County Board of
Education was receiving large amounts of janitorial and custodial
products including hand soap, trash can liners, and face masks
from the contractor’s company, when the Boone County
Board of Education was only receiving a small amount of those
products or paid for products that were never delivered. When
the contractor received the payments, he wrote checks from his
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business account to himself, cashed those checks at multiple
banks, and paid the former director a share of the proceeds from
the fraudulent scheme with the cash. Approximately 80 percent
of the total payments his company received were for products
never delivered. The former maintenance director’s parents made
11 cash deposits to their bank accounts in amounts ranging from
$8,000 to $9,500 and totaling $97,215—deposits designed to avoid
banking reporting requirements, which they used along with other
funds provided to them by their son, to purchase property. All
involved with the scheme—the former official, his parents, and the
contractor—have now been sentenced. Read the press release.
Another Former In a previous Semiannual Report, we highlighted our case
Executive of involving the former Executive Director of the Center for
Community Community Academic Success (CCAS) who had pled guilty to
Academic Success misappropriating some $1.8 million. During this reporting period,
Partnerships Pled her co-conspirator, another former CCAS executive, pled guilty
Guilty in $1.8 to his role in the scam. CCAS received government grants and
Million Fraud other funds to provide afterschool programs to schools in the
Scheme (Illinois) Chicago area, including 21st Century Community Learning Centers
Program funds that support academic enrichment opportunities.
From 2012 to 2017, the two former executives submitted grant
applications that inflated CCAS’s projected annual expenses and
falsely claimed that the organization would receive services from
five subcontractors. In reality, the former officials knew that the
subcontractors, two of which were other non-profit groups run
by the two conspirators, provided no actual services to CCAS.
The former Executive Director also admitted to a separate fraud
scheme that bilked funds from the AmeriCorps VISTA program.
More Actions The superintendents of the Hollandale School District and Leake
Taken in County School District, along with a contractor pled guilty for their
Bribery, Fraud, roles in a public corruption scheme. The superintendent of the
and Kickback Leake County School District (and prior to that, superintendent of
Scheme Involving the Clarksdale Municipal School District), and the superintendent
Two School of Hollandale School District, used their positions to enter
Superintendents into reciprocal consulting contracts and generate reciprocal
(Mississippi) payments involving some $250,000 in the districts’ funds, for
consulting services at a fraudulently inflated rate of payment
and for consulting services that were not actually provided.
Each superintendent directed payments of their respective
school district funds to companies that they either controlled or
had access to, which they used for their personal benefit. The
superintendent of the Hollandale School District also engaged
in a bribery and kickback scheme with the owner of Erudition
Consulting Company, securing contract awards for services
at fraudulently inflated rates or for services that were never
11
provided. The consultant then kicked back a portion of the
contract awards to the superintendent. Read the press release.
Former Hulbert In a recent Semiannual Report, we highlighted our case involving
Public Schools a former treasurer of Hulbert Public Schools who had been
Encumbrance sentenced, and a former encumbrance clerk who had pled guilty
Clerk Sentenced to stealing more than $372,000 from the school district. During
for Role in this reporting period, the former clerk was sentenced to serve
$372,000 1 year and 1 day in prison, and was ordered to pay more than
Fraud Scheme $178,000 in restitution. From 2019 through 2021, the treasurer
(Oklahoma) and the clerk used their access to the district’s financial systems
to issue themselves excessive payroll payments above and
beyond their district-authorized salaries. The former treasurer was
previously sentenced to serve 1 year and 1 day in prison and was
ordered to pay $372,000 in restitution. Read the press release.
Former The now-former Superintendent of DeKalb County Schools
Superintendent (Georgia) was indicted on charges of bribery, theft, and fraud
of Evanston/ involving some $280,000 in contracts—acts he allegedly
Skokie School committed while serving as Superintendent of Illinois’ Evanston/
District 65 and Skokie School District 65. According to the indictment, the
Others Indicted for former Superintendent allegedly received unauthorized kickback
Roles in Bribery payments from outside consultants in exchange for awarding
and Kickbacks contracts to those consultants. The former Superintendent is
Scheme (Illinois) also alleged to have entered into consulting contracts on his
own behalf with a different public school districts, concealing
his employment and payments from the School District. He also
allegedly misused a School District issued purchase card for his
personal benefit. Also indicted were the former Principal and the
former Athletic Director of Hyde Park Academy High School, and
a business owner, who were friends of the former Superintendent.
President of The president of Exploring Together Therapy, a special education
Therapy Company services provider participating in the Puerto Rico Department of
Providing Special Education’s Provisional Remedy Program, pled guilty to charges of
Education theft. From 2021 through 2024, the president bilked the program
Services Pled out of more than $190,800 by submitting fraudulent invoices
Guilty to $190,800 for services never provided. As part of the plea agreement, the
Fraud Scheme company president agreed to pay $190,820 in restitution.
(Puerto Rico)
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Former A former accountant for the Savannah R-III School District was
Savannah R-III sentenced for embezzlement. The former employee used his
School District position and access to the District’s checks and signature stamps
Accountant to write himself checks totaling $63,000 that he deposited
Sentenced for into his own bank accounts. He also accessed a District’s bank
Embezzlement account from which he directed more than $29,000 to accounts
(Missouri) under his personal control that he used to pay off his credit
cards and those of his wife, Kansas City Chiefs tickets, and travel.
Further, the former accountant, through a tax preparation and
bookkeeping service he operated, willfully withheld more than
$21,000 from his employees’ salaries intended for retirement
funds and unlawfully used the funds for personal and business-
related expenses. The former accountant was sentenced
to serve 1 year and 1 day in prison, and was ordered to pay
more than $122,000 in restitution. Read the press release.
Action Taken In a recent Semiannual Report, we highlighted our investigation
Against Another involving five businessmen who had violated the Sherman
Businessman Antitrust Act—a Federal statute that prohibits activities restricting
for Bid Rigging, interstate commerce and competition in the marketplace. At that
Antitrust time, all five had pled guilty, one of whom had been sentenced
Violations (Florida) for their roles in the scam. During this reporting period, another
participant, the president of a roofing company, was sentenced.
Beginning in at least 2010 through 2022, the businessmen and
others participated in a conspiracy to suppress and eliminate
competition by agreeing to rig bids for commercial roofing
contracts in the State of Florida, including for schools. The
roofing company official was sentenced to serve 2 years of
probation, and was ordered to pay more than $86,000 in fines.
Two Former The former principal of Carolyn Wenz Elementary School
Paris Union and the former principal of Mayo Middle School, two schools
School District 95 in the Paris Union School District 95, were indicted on
Principals Indicted embezzlement charges. According to the indictment, the two
on Embezzlement are alleged to have enriched themselves with Federal program
Charges (Illinois) funds for work involving those programs that exceeded what
they had actually completed. They are also alleged to have
submitted and received mileage reimbursement for official
business in amounts greater than the actual miles driven.
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Investigative Outreach Efforts
During this reporting period, the OIG continued to conduct fraud awareness
outreach activities. This included sharing the OIG’s free brochures, fact sheets,
flyers, and online trainings aimed at helping school officials and the general
public identify and report K–12 and education-related disaster recovery fraud to
the OIG. We also continued to promote our Eye on ED podcast episodes that
include topics involving K–12 and education-related disaster recovery fraud.
These free materials and Eye on ED podcasts are available via our website.
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Pandemic Relief Aid Oversight
Three statutes were enacted into law, providing the Department with more than
$280 billion to support States, K–12 schools, school districts, and institutions of higher
education (IHE) in addressing their needs and those of their students affected by the
coronavirus pandemic. These laws include the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act or CARES Act (March 2020); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which
incorporated the 2021 Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations
Act (CRRSA) (December 2020); and the American Rescue Plan (ARP) (March 2021). Since
2020, the OIG has been conducting audits and reviews of programs, grants, requirements,
and flexibilities established under these laws. This work is available on our website.
REPORT
Since 2021, the OIG has issued a number of reports involving State educational agencies’
(SEA) use of pandemic aid, including Elementary and Secondary School Emergency
Relief (ESSER) funds. During this reporting period, we issued another report involving
ESSER funds, titled “Puerto Rico Department of Education’s Use of ARP ESSER Funds to
Measure Student Academic Progress.” The objective of our inspection was to determine
whether the Puerto Rico Department of Education (Puerto Rico DOE) ensured that
(1) contracted services paid with ARP ESSER funds to measure students’ academic
progress were provided as required and (2) results were used as intended to modify
individual students’ instructional plans and help prevent academic failure. The Puerto Rico
DOE was allocated about $3 billion in ARP ESSER funds to support 860 schools serving
about 261,000 students. As of November 25, 2025, it had drawn down about $2.7 billion
(90 percent) of its $3 billion ARP ESSER allocation. The Puerto Rico DOE used $3.9 million
of its ARP ESSER funds to pay an educational technology services firm (contractor) to
design, administer, tabulate, and analyze the results of interim assessments of Puerto
Rico students’ academic proficiency in five core subjects during school year 2023–2024.
Puerto Rico DOE’s Office of Academic and Programmatic Affairs was responsible for
managing the $3.9 million professional services contract (contract) and monitoring
contractor performance. This contract was the focus of our review. Below you will find a
summary of our findings, and you can find copies of all of our pandemic-related work on
our website.
Puerto Rico We found that the Puerto Rico DOE did not ensure that all
Department of services contracted for and paid with ARP ESSER funds to
Education’s Use measure students’ academic progress were provided by the
of ARP ESSER contractor. It also did not ensure that teachers used the results
Funds to Measure of the contractor-administered student academic proficiency
Student Academic assessments to modify students’ instructional plans and help
Progress prevent academic failure. As a result, the Puerto Rico DOE used
$3.9 million in ARP ESSER funds to pay for services that the
contractor either did not perform or performed late, and that did
not achieve the intended purposes of helping teachers develop
differentiated work plans based on each student’s academic lag,
diagnose students’ immediate learning needs so they could be
15
addressed promptly, and implement targeted re-teaching strategies
effectively. This wasteful spending meant that fewer funds were
available for other allowable activities that could have helped
mitigate the learning loss caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
Based on our finding, we recommended that the Puerto Rico DOE:
1. Return the $3.9 million charged to the ARP ESSER
grant for the student academic proficiency interim
assessments or take other remedial actions as
appropriate, such as making accounting adjustments
to other valid and allowable obligations incurred
during the ARP ESSER grant period of availability;
2. Develop and incorporate into its existing contract monitoring
and oversight policies and procedures, control activities, or
protocols designed to ensure that only qualified personnel
are assigned to manage and oversee contracts and those
charged with that responsibility verify that the contractually
required services are rendered before paying the contractor;
3. Implement its contract amendment procedures, as designed,
to ensure that all future changes to the scope of contracted
work are documented and approved in writing; and
4. Provide sufficient training to its employees, including
teachers, who are responsible for implementing initiatives and
activities under contracts funded with Federal education funds
to help ensure that all contractual obligations and objectives
are met and Federal education funds are used as intended.
The Puerto Rico DOE partially agreed with our finding and
did not state whether it agreed with our recommendations,
but did describe the corrective actions it planned to take to
address three of the four recommendations. Read the report.
INVESTIGATION
Investigation with the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Fraud Task Force
The OIG is a statutory member of the Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee (PRAC), and since its inception, OIG staff have served on PRAC
subcommittees and task forces, including the PRAC’s Fraud Task Force. During
this reporting period, the following action was taken as a result of the PRAC’s
Fraud Task Force. The OIG worked with or assisted in the investigation.
16
Former In a recent Semiannual Report, we highlighted an investigation
Department involving a now-former Department employee who had pled
Employee guilty to fraud and money laundering associated with a $400,000
Sentenced for Role pandemic relief aid fraud scam. During this reporting period, the
in $400,000 Fraud former employee was sentenced to serve 3 years of probation
Scheme (Maryland) and was ordered to pay more than $203,700 in restitution. The
former employee was also the owner of a fitness company and
logistics company. From April 2020 through 2022, the former
employee and business owner along with her conspirators
submitted fraudulent Payment Protection Program (PPP) loans
on behalf of those companies and used the funds received for
non-business purposes, including luxury vehicles, residential
properties, cryptocurrency, jewelry, and private jet travel. The
former staffer and conspirators then submitted forms loaded
with phony information to get those PPP loans forgiven.
17
Department Management and Operations
Effective and efficient business operations are critical to ensure that the Department
effectively manages and safeguards its programs and protects its assets. Our reviews
in this area seek to help the Department accomplish its objectives by ensuring
its compliance with applicable laws, policies, and regulations and the effective,
efficient, and fair use of taxpayer dollars with which it has been entrusted.
REPORT
OIG work completed over the last 6 months in this area includes the OIG’s statutory
report on the Department’s FY 2025 consolidated financial statement. A summary of this
work follows.
Audit of the U.S. During this reporting period, the Independent Auditors’
Department of Report, covering the Department’s consolidated balance
Education’s FY sheet as of September 30, 2025, and the related notes to the
2025 Consolidated consolidated balance sheet (the FY 2025 consolidated financial
Financial statement), was issued. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990
Statement requires the Inspector General to audit the agency’s financial
(Statutory) statements each year, which is intended to help improve an
agency’s financial management and controls over financial
reporting, and to deter fraud, waste, and abuse of government
resources. Specifically for FY 2025, the auditors issued an
unmodified opinion on the Department’s consolidated financial
statement—meaning the auditors found that it was presented
fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles. The auditors also reported:
• One material weakness related to the Department’s
student loan portfolio, finding that the Department did
not design and implement sufficient controls to support
the reliability of the underlying data and code used in
the subsidy re-estimates. This increases the risk that the
financial statements could be materially misstated.
• Three significant deficiencies related to (1) information
technology control (IT), which increases the risks of
unauthorized use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of information housed in the Department’s data
systems; (2) monitoring of its service organizations, which
increases the risks of incomplete or inaccurate loan receivable
information, data, and transactions; and (3) entity level
controls that ensure corrective action plans are implemented
and control deficiencies are remediated timely. Insufficient
entity controls contributed to the previous deficiencies.
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• No instances in which the Department’s financial
management systems did not substantially comply
with required, applicable provisions of the Federal
Financial Management Improvement Act; and
• No reportable noncompliance with provisions
of laws tested or other matters.
Seven recommendations were made to the Department to
address the auditor’s findings. The Department concurred
with the findings and agreed to take action to address the
recommendations. Read the report (pages 84–96).
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Non-Federal Audit Oversight Activities
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as restated (5 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) sections 401–424),
requires that inspectors general take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed
by non-Federal auditors complies with Government auditing standards. To fulfill these
requirements, we perform several activities, including conducting desk reviews and quality
control reviews of non-Federal audits, providing technical assistance, and issuing audit
guides to help independent public accountants or audit organizations performing audits
of participants in the Department’s programs. You can find these audit guidance and other
materials for non-Federal auditors on our website.
DESK REVIEWS AND QUALITY CONTROL REVIEWS
Non-Federal audits, such as entity-wide single audits of governments and nonprofits
or program-specific Title IV audits of for-profit and foreign schools or servicers, assure
the Federal government that recipients of Federal funds comply with laws, regulations,
and other requirements material to Federal awards. To help assess the quality of the
thousands of audits performed each year, we conduct quality control reviews of a
judgmental sample of audits. We also perform desk reviews of a judgmental sample
of audit reporting packages to identify quality issues that may warrant follow-up work,
revisions to the reporting package, or the attention of appropriate management officials.
During this reporting period, we completed three desk reviews. All three reporting
packages contained quality deficiencies that were brought to the attention of the
auditees and auditors for corrective action in future engagements. We also completed
seven quality control reviews. For four of these reviewed audits (57 percent), we
found quality deficiencies that impacted the reliability of the audit results and
required corrective action. In three reviewed audits (43 percent), we identified quality
deficiencies that we communicated to the auditor for correction in future audits.
When a quality control review receives a rating of Fail and the independent public
accountant or audit organization cannot or does not adequately resolve the deficiencies,
we may find the audit report is not reliable and we will recommend the report be rejected.
When we identify significant quality deficiencies or repeated poor performance by non-
Federal auditors, we refer them to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) and their respective State boards of accountancy for possible disciplinary action.
During this reporting period, we made a recommendation to the Department to reject
the reports for two audits performed by the same auditor, and the Department accepted
our recommendation and rejected the audit reports in question. We also referred that
auditor to the AICPA and to the Boards of Accountancy in the auditor’s home State
and in the States where the auditees were located, for possible disciplinary action.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The OIG’s Non-Federal Audit Team is also dedicated to improving the quality
of non-Federal audits through technical assistance and outreach to State and
local government auditors, independent public accountants, audit organizations,
and others, including auditee officials and Department program officials.
20
Technical assistance involves providing advice about standards, audit guides and
guidance, and other criteria and systems pertaining to non-Federal audits.
During this reporting period, the OIG presented audit update sessions at
two conferences, reaching hundreds of financial aid professionals, leaders
in postsecondary career education, auditors from institutions of higher
education, and school district Federal program administrators.
21
Additional Efforts
During this reporting period, the OIG issued other statutory reports and continued
to produce and conduct fraud awareness materials and efforts aimed at helping
State and school officials, students, and the general public understand, identify,
and report fraud to the OIG. We also continued to produce and share information
on education-related fraud schemes and scams, and how the public can protect
themselves against them. Summaries of some of these efforts follow.
FY 2026 During this reporting period, the OIG issued its FY 2026
Management Management Challenges Report, a statutorily required report
Challenges Report that highlights the most serious management challenges the
(Statutory) Department faces and actions the Department needs to take to
address them. To identify these challenges, the OIG routinely
examines past audit, inspection, and investigative work and reports
issued by the Government Accountability Office, including reports
issued to management where corrective actions have yet to be
taken; assesses ongoing audit, inspection, and investigative work
to identify significant vulnerabilities; and analyzes new programs
and activities that could pose significant challenges because
of their breadth and scope. For FY 2026, the OIG identified five
management challenges the Department faces: (1) change
management; (2) oversight and monitoring of grantees,
(3) oversight and monitoring of student financial
assistance programs; (4) data quality and reporting,
and (5) IT security. Read the report.
FY 2025 Small In December, the OIG issued its statutory report on FY 2025
Business OIG investigations involving the Small Business Innovation
Innovation Research program. The National Defense Authorization
Research Report Act for FY 2012 requires the inspector general of a Federal
(Statutory) agency participating in the program to submit an annual
report describing its investigations involving those programs.
The Department participates in the Small Business Innovation
Research program, although it is a relatively small program
within the agency. As reported, for FY 2025, the OIG received
no allegations of possible fraud, waste, or abuse involving the
Small Business Innovation Research program. Read the report.
FY 2025 During this reporting period, the OIG issued its FY 2025
Performance Performance Results Report, in accordance with the Government
Results Report Performance Modernization Act of 2010. The report presents
(Statutory) the results of our work throughout FY 2025 in meeting our
performance goals set forth in our organizational Strategic Plan
for FYs 2023–2028. As highlighted in the FY 2025 Performance
Results Report, the OIG successfully met or exceeded its
targeted measurements for 15 of its 16 performance goals.
22
The Report presents those results and highlights actions
the OIG took throughout the fiscal year that enabled it to
achieve those results. The Report also presents the OIG’s
performance measures for FY 2026. Read the report.
Fraud Awareness The first step in stopping education-related fraud is learning how
Efforts to identify it. The second step is knowing how to report it. That
is why our fraud awareness efforts are so important. During this
reporting period, the OIG issued new and updated brochures,
flyers, and information sheets aimed at helping our stakeholders
and the general public identify, avoid, and report education-related
fraud to the OIG. This included our fifth FraudGram newsletter,
designed to educate and alert the public to education-related
schemes and scams, as well as provide information on free
resources to identify fraud, and the importance of reporting fraud
to the OIG. The OIG also conducted 105 fraud awareness efforts
during this reporting period. This included trainings, discussions,
briefings, panel sessions, one-on-one meetings, and social
media campaigns—to reach school officials at the K–12 and post-
secondary levels, as well as State and local law enforcement and
prosecutive entities. You’ll find these materials, as well as our
online trainings, Eye on ED Podcasts, and other resources aimed
at identifying, reporting, and stopping fraud on our website.
Interview
During this reporting period, OIG Assistant Inspector General
for Investigation Services Jason Williams was featured in an ABC
News story on ghost students and student aid fraud. Assistant
Inspector General Williams shared information on how criminals
operate these schemes and what is being done to stop them.
The story ran on ABC’s Good Morning America, Nightline,
and on ABC stations across the country. ABC News Story
23
PARTICIPATION ON COMMITTEES, WORK
GROUPS, AND TASK FORCES
OIG staff continue to play an active role in CIGIE efforts. OIG staff currently serve
on the following CIGIE committees, subcommittees, and work groups:
• Deputy Inspector General Working Group
• Information Technology Investigations Subcommittee
• Assistant Inspector General for Investigations Subcommittee
• Assistant Inspector General for Investigations Training Subcommittee
• Assistant Inspector General for Investigations Undercover Subcommittee
• Assistant Inspector General for Management Working Group
• Council of Counsels to the Inspectors General
• Data Analytics Working Group of the Information Technology Committee
• CIGIE/OMB Reform Working Group
• Federal Hotline Working Group
• Human Resources Directors’ Roundtable
• Enterprise Risk Management Working Group
• Internal Affairs Working Group
• OIG Communitywide Quality Assurance Working Group
• CIGIE Accessibility Working Group
• CIGIE Professional Development Committee Coaching Subcommittee
• CIGIE Training Courses
» The OIG staff lead or facilitate CIGIE training courses, including the following:
– IG Criminal Investigator Academy (as needed)
– Inspector General Investigator Training Program
– Franklin Covey Leadership Courses
Law Enforcement-Focused
• Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Crime Investigations Task Force. The
OIG is a member of this task force of Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies conducting cybercrime investigations nationwide, with agents physically
located in Washington, D.C., Boston, Massachusetts, and Dallas, Texas.
• Grant Fraud Working Group. The OIG is a member of this working group,
composed of OIGs and other governmental agencies, that meets quarterly to discuss
challenges, opportunities, and best practices involving grant fraud investigations.
• National Center for Disaster Fraud. The OIG is involved in this partnership
between the U.S. Department of Justice and various law enforcement
and regulatory agencies that work to improve and further the detection,
prevention, investigation, and prosecution of fraud related to disasters.
24
• Pandemic/COVID-19 Federal-State Fraud Task Forces. OIG criminal
investigators continued to work with their Federal and State investigative
and prosecutive partners to address pandemic relief aid fraud.
• Puerto Rico Anti-Public Corruption Task Force. The OIG is a member of
a joint task force focused on combatting public corruption in Puerto Rico.
The task force is led by the U.S. Department of Justice and includes the FBI,
Puerto Rico and local law enforcement agencies, and Federal OIG offices.
• Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Group. The OIG’s designated
Whistleblower Protection Coordinator (WPC) and OIG attorneys
participate in a governmentwide group of WPCs to stay abreast of
legislation affecting internal and external whistleblowers.
• DC and Memphis Fraud Task Forces. The OIG is a member and contributes
investigative resources to the D.C. Safe and Beautiful Task Force and the Memphis
Safe Task Force. Our involvement brings together OIG’s from beneficiary granting
agencies to provide investigations related to fraud in our respective programs.
Other Governmentwide Groups
• Federal Audit Executive Council, Financial Statement Audit Committee
Workgroup. OIG staff serve on this interagency workgroup, which consists
of OIG auditors from numerous Federal agencies. The committee addresses
governmentwide financial management and financial statement audit issues
through coordination with GAO, the Department of the Treasury, and OMB. It
also provides technical assistance on audit standards, policies, legislation, and
guidance, and plans the CIGIE/GAO Annual Financial Statement Audit Conference.
• Intergovernmental Audit Forums. OIG staff serve on several
intergovernmental audit forums, which bring together Federal, State, and
local government audit executives who work to improve audit education
and training and exchange information and ideas regarding the full range
of professional activities undertaken by government audit officials.
Department Groups
• Investment Review Board and Planning and Investment Review Working Group.
The OIG participates in an advisory capacity in these groups that review technology
investments and the strategic direction of the information technology portfolio.
• Department Human Capital Policy Working Group. The OIG
participates in this group that meets monthly to discuss issues,
proposals, and plans related to human capital management.
• Department Fraud Task Force and Policy Group. The OIG participates
in this group that meets monthly to discuss policy changes within
ED’s programs that strengthen internal controls and coordination
between the OIG and the Department’s fraud fighting efforts.
25
Required Reporting
The following provides acronyms, definitions, and other
information relevant to the tables that follow.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED
IN THE REQUIRED TABLES
Acronym Definition
Department U.S. Department of Education
FSA Federal Student Aid
IES Institute of Education Sciences
IG Act Inspector General Act of 1978, as restated (5 U.S.C. §§ 401–424)
OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer
ODS Office of the Deputy Secretary
OGC Office of General Counsel
OESE Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
OFO Office of Finance and Operations
OIG Office of Inspector General
OPEPD Office of Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development
OSERS Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services
Recs Recommendations
RMSD Risk Management Services Division
SAR Semiannual Report to Congress
26
DEFINITIONS
Reports
Term Definition
Attestation reports convey the results of attestation engagements performed
within the context of their stated scope and objectives. Attestation
engagements can cover a broad range of financial and nonfinancial subjects
Attestation
and can be part of a financial audit or a performance audit. Attestation
Reports
engagements are conducted in accordance with American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants attestation standards, as well as the related Statements on
Standards for Attestation Engagements.
Audit reports provide objective analysis, findings, and conclusions to assist
management and those charged with governance with improving program
Audit
performance and operations, reducing costs, facilitating decision-making
Reports
by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action, and
contributing to public accountability.
Flash reports are used to rapidly share value-added information related
Flash
to Department programs or operations that focus on user needs while
Reports
maintaining overall quality.
A fraud advisory report is a new report used to inform the Department of
Fraud fraud risks, indicators, trends, and suspicious and potentially fraudulent activity
Advisory involving Federal education funds identified by OIG proactive data analytics
efforts.
Inspection reports provide information or communicate a need for
Inspection action related to the Department’s programs or operations. They have
Reports targeted objectives to systemically and independently assess the design,
implementation, and results of operations, programs, or policies.
Terminology
Term Definition
As defined by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as restated (5 U.S.C. sections
Better Use of 401-424), better use of funds is the monetary amount for a recommendation
Funds made by the OIG that could result in funds being used more efficiently if
management took actions to implement and complete the recommendation.
As defined by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as restated (5 U.S.C. section
405), questioned costs are identified during an audit, inspection, or flash
review because of (1) an alleged violation of a law, regulation, contract,
grant, cooperative agreement, or other agreement or document governing
Questioned the expenditure of funds; (2) such cost not being supported by adequate
Costs documentation; or (3) the expenditure of funds for the intended purpose
being unnecessary or unreasonable. The OIG considers that category (3) of
this definition would include other recommended recoveries of funds, such as
recovery of outstanding funds or revenue earned on Federal funds or interest
due to the Department.
27
Term Definition
As defined by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as restated (5 U.S.C. section
Unsupported 405), unsupported costs are costs that, at the time of the audit, inspection, or
Costs flash review, were not supported by adequate documentation. These amounts
are also included as questioned costs.
OIG Product Website Availability Policy
The OIG’s final issued products are generally considered to be public documents,
accessible on the OIG’s website unless sensitive in nature or otherwise subject
to Freedom of Information Act exemption. Consistent with the Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. Section 552), and to the extent practical, the OIG
redacts exempt information from the product so that nonexempt information
contained in the product may be made available on the OIG website.
28
REQUIRED REPORTING TABLES
The following pages present summary tables and tables containing statistical
and other data as required, including under the Inspector General Act of
1978, as restated (5 U.S.C. §§ 401–424), and other statutes and orders.
Section and Table Page
Requirement
Statute or Order Number Number
Statistical Summary of Audit-Related
- Accomplishments (October 1, 2025, through 1 31
March 31, 2026)
Statistical Summary of Investigation-Related
- Accomplishments (October 1, 2025, through 2 32
March 31, 2026)
Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies
Section405(b) Nothing to
Related to the Administration of Programs and
(1)1) Report
Operations
Recommendations Described in Previous
Semiannual Reports on Which Corrective
Section 405(b)
Action Has Not Been Completed, Including 5 36
(3))
Potential Cost Savings Associated with the
Recommendations
Total Number of Convictions During the
Section 405(b)
Reporting Period Resulting from Investigations 2 32
(4)
(October 1, 2025, through March 31, 2026)
Summary of each report made to the head of
Section 405(b) Nothing to
the establishment under section 406(c)(2) of this
(5) Report
title during the reporting period.
Audit and Other Reports Issued During the
Reporting Period Including Questioned Costs,
Section 405(b) Better Use of Funds, and Whether a Management
3 34
(6), (8) & (9)) Decision Had Been Made by the End of the
Reporting Period (October 1, 2025, through
March 31, 2026)
Management Decisions on Audit or Other
Section 405(b)
Reports and Products Issued Prior to the 4 35
(8) & (9)
Reporting Period (Prior to October 1, 2025)
Unmet Intermediate Target Dates Established
Section 405(b) Nothing to
by the Department Under the Federal Financial
(13) Report
Management Improvement Act of 1996
Section 405(b) Peer Review Results - Reviews of OIG Operations Nothing to
(14) Completed During the Reporting Period Report
29
Section and Table Page
Requirement
Statute or Order Number Number
Peer Review Results - Recommendations from
Section 405(b) Nothing to
Previously Issued Peer Reviews that the OIG Has
(15) Report
Not Yet Implemented
Peer Review Results - Reviews of other Offices of
Section 405(b)
Inspector General Completed by the OIG During 6 39
(16)
the Reporting Period
Investigative Reports Issued
Number of Persons Referred to the U.S.
Department of Justice Number of Persons
Section 405(b) Referred to State and Local Prosecuting
2 32
(17) Authorities
Indictments and Criminal Informations that
Resulted from Prior Referrals to Prosecuting
Authorities
Section 405(b) Description of the Metrics Used for Developing
2 32
(18) the Investigative Data for the Statistical Tables
Summary of Significant Investigations Closed
Section 5(b) of
During the Reporting Period (October 1, 2025, 7 39
P.L. 117-286
through March 31, 2026)
Report on Each Investigation Conducted by the
Section 405(b) OIG Involving a Senior Government Employee Nothing to
(19) (GS-15 or Above) Where the Allegations of Report
Misconduct were Substantiated
Section 405(b) Description of Instances of Whistleblower Nothing to
(20) Retaliation Report
Section 405(b) Description of Attempt by Agency to Interfere Nothing to
(21) with OIG Independence Report
Description of Audits, Inspections, Other Reports
Section 405(b) Nothing to
and Investigations Closed but Not Disclosed to
(22) Report
the Public
Number of suspected violations of the law
Section 122(e)
reported, number of investigations, outcomes of
Trafficking Nothing to
those investigations, and recommended actions
Victims Report
to improve programs and operations related
Protection Act
thereto.
Number of Administrative False Claims Act
Section 5203 reports submitted by investigating officials to
Administrative reviewing officials; actions taken in response Nothing to
False Claims to such reports; and instances in which the Report
Act reviewing official declined to proceed on a case
reported by an investigating official.
30
Table 1. Statistical Summary of Audit and Other Report
Accomplishments (October 1, 2025-March 31, 2026)
Accomplishment SAR 92
Audit Reports Issued 1
Inspection Reports Issued 3
Questioned Costs (including Unsupported Costs) $3,900,000
Value of Recommendations for Better Use of Funds $0
31
Table 2. Statistical Summary of Investigative Accomplishments
(October 1, 2025-March 31, 2026)
Accomplishment Description of the Metric SAR 92
Number of cases that were opened as full
Investigative Cases investigations or converted from a complaint or
10
Opened preliminary inquiry to a full investigation during the
reporting period.
Investigative Cases Number of investigations that were closed during the
14
Closed reporting period.
Cases Active at the
Number of investigations not closed prior to the end
End of the Reporting 102
of the reporting period.
Period
Investigative Reports Number of Reports of Investigation issued during the
16
Issued reporting period.
Other Fraud-Related
Number of other fraud-focused reports issued during 1
Report Issued with
the reporting period and the financial impact. $3,500,000
Financial Impact
Total Number of
Persons Referred Number of individuals and organizations formally
0 Criminal
to State and referred to state or local prosecuting authorities for
0 Civil
Local Prosecuting prosecutorial decisions during the reporting period.
Authorities
Total Number of
Number of individuals and organizations formally
Persons Referred to 9 Criminal
referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for
the U.S. Department 0 Civil
prosecutorial decisions.
of Justice
Indictments and
Criminal Informations
Number of individuals who were indicted or for
that Result from
whom a criminal information was filed during the 14
Prior Referrals
reporting period.
to Prosecuting
Authorities
Number of criminal convictions, pleas of guilty or
Convictions/Pleas nolo contendere, or acceptance of pretrial diversions 13
that occurred during the reporting period.
Fines Ordered Sum of all fines ordered during the reporting period. $86,707
Restitution Payments Sum of all restitution ordered during the reporting
$7,037,432
Ordered period.
Civil Settlements/ Number of civil settlements completed or judgments
$0
Judgments (number) ordered during the reporting period.
32
Accomplishment Description of the Metric SAR 92
Civil Settlements/ Sum of all completed settlements or judgments
0
Judgments (amount) ordered during the reporting period.
Sum of all administrative recoveries ordered by the
Recoveries Department or voluntary repayments made during $0
the reporting period.
Sum of all forfeitures/seizures ordered during the
Forfeitures/Seizures $0
reporting period.
Sum of all administrative savings or cost avoidances
that result in a savings to, or better use of funds for,
a program or victim during the reporting period.
Estimated Savings $0
These are calculated by using the prior 12 month
period of funds obtained or requested and then
projecting that amount 12 months forward.
Suspensions and
Number of suspensions and debarments referred to
Debarments Referred 4
the Department during the reporting period.
to Department
33
Table 3: : Audit and Other Reports Issued During the Reporting
Period Including Questioned Costs, Better Use of Funds, and
Whether a Management Decision Had Been Made by the End of the
Reporting Period (October 1, 2025, through March 31, 2026)
Report Type Report Title, Date Issued, Questioned Unsupported Number
Office BUF
and Number and Status Costs Costs of Recs
Quality of Data
Reported through the
Department’s Integrated
Postsecondary
Education Data System
Inspection Surveys by Southern
FSA $0 $0 $0 5
I24IL0217 New Hampshire
University
Issued: January 16,
2026
Status: Open
Fiscal Year 2025
Consolidated Financial
Statement of the
Audit U.S. Department of
OFO Education $0 $0 $0 7
A25FS0234
Issued: January 22,
2026
Status: Unresolved
Puerto Rico Department
of Education’s Use
of ARP ESSER Funds
Inspection to Measure Student
OESE $3,900,000 $0 $0 4
I25GA0233 Academic Progress
Issued: March 17, 2026
Status: Open
Omaha Public
Schools’ Oversight of
Individualized Education
Inspection Programs
OSERS $0 $0 $0 2
I25CA0218 Issued: December 19,
2025
Status: Open
Total 4 - $3,900,000 $0 $0 18
34
Table 4. Audit and Other Reports Described in Previous Semiannual
Reports and Resolved During this Reporting Period
Table includes the Department office responsible for the report, number
of recommendations, and the value of the potential cost savings.
Value of
Report Type Number
Office Report Title Potential
and Number of Recs
Cost Savings
U.S. Department of Education’s
Inspection Assessment and Recoupment of
FSA 6 $0
I24GA0163 Liabilities from Closed Institutions of
Higher Education
Total 1 - 6 $0
35
Table 5. Recommendations Described in Previous Semiannual Reports
on Which Corrective Action Has Not Been Completed, Including
Potential Cost Savings Associated with the Recommendations
Table includes the Department office responsible for the report, link to the report,
number of open recommendations, and the value of the potential cost savings.
The Department commented on all reports within 60 days of issuance.
Value of
Report Type Number
Office Report Title Potential
and Number of Recs
Cost Savings
Audit FSA Transition Plans for Business
FSA 5 $0
A22DC0105 Process Operations Vendors
Flash Federal Student Aid’s Actions to
FSA Mitigate Risks Associated with the 2 $0
F23IT0138 FSA ID Account Creation Process
FSA’s Implementation of the FUTURE
Audit Act and FAFSA Simplification Act’s
FSA Federal Taxpayer Information 1 $0
A23GA0122 Provisions through the Student Aid
and Borrower Reform Initiative
Inspection Federal Student Aid’s Performance
FSA Measures and Indicators for 3 $0
I23NY0150 Returning Borrowers to Repayment
Audit Final Independent Auditors’ Report
FSA of Federal Student Aid’s Financial 5 $0
A24FS0167 Statements for Fiscal Year 2024
Federal Student Aid’s Oversight of
Audit Contractor’s Acceptability Review
FSA 5 $0
A23NY0143 Process for Proprietary Institution
Annual Audits
Inspection FSA’s Oversight of Section 117
FSA 6 $0
I24DC0166 Reporting Requirements
Inspection FAFSA Simplification Act and
FSA Student Loan Forgiveness Initiatives 3 $0
I24DC0194 Accounting
Special Allowance Payments to
Audit Sallie Mae’s Subsidiary, Nellie Mae,
FSA 3 $22,378,905
A03I0006 for Loans Funded by Tax-Exempt
Obligations
Audit Bais HaMedrash and Mesivta of
FSA Baltimore’s Use of Professional 3 $236,235
A20IL0005 Judgment
36
Value of
Report Type Number
Office Report Title Potential
and Number of Recs
Cost Savings
The U.S. Department of Education’s
Audit Federal Information Security
OCIO 1 $0
A23IT0118 Modernization Act of 2014 Report
For Fiscal Year 2023
The U.S. Department of Education’s
Audit Federal Information Security
OCIO 1 $0
A24IT0153 Modernization Act of 2014 Report
For Fiscal Year 2024
The U.S. Department of Education’s
Audit Federal Information Security
OCIO 2 $0
A25IT0212 Modernization Act of 2014 Report
For Fiscal Year 2025
Inspection Examination of the U.S. Department
OCIO of Education’s Incident Response 1 $0
I23IT0111 Coordination Efforts
The U.S. Department of Education’s
Processes for Reviewing and
Audit Approving State Plans Submitted
OESE 3 $0
A05S0001 Pursuant to the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, as
Amended
Puerto Rico Department of
Flash Education’s Unallowable Use of
OESE Temporary Emergency Impact Aid 2 $0
F19GA0027 for Displaced Students Program
Funds for Payroll Activities
Audit Effectiveness of Charter School
OESE Programs in Increasing the Number 1 $0
A21IL0034 of Charter Schools
Inspection The Department’s Approval of
OESE Alternate Assessment Waivers and 1 $0
I23DC0112 Extensions
Texas Education Agency’s
Audit Administration of the Temporary
OESE 10 $12,366,942
A02T0001 Emergency Impact Aid for Displaced
Students Program
Texas Education Agency’s
Audit Administration of the Immediate
OESE 5 $34,065
A06T0001 Aid to Restart School Operations
Program
37
Value of
Report Type Number
Office Report Title Potential
and Number of Recs
Cost Savings
Audit U.S. Department of Education’s
OFO Compliance with Payment Integrity 1 $0
A24NY0157 Information Reporting Requirements
Final Independent Auditors’ Report of
Audit the U.S. Department of Education’s
OFO 5 $0
A24FS0168 Financial Statements for Fiscal Year
2024
U.S. Department of Education’s
Audit Compliance with Payment Integrity
OFO 1 $0
A25DC0225 Information Reporting Requirements
for Fiscal Year 2024
Inspection The Department’s Compliance
OFO with Whistleblower Protections for 2 $0
I23DC0144 Contractor and Grantee Employees
Audit Office of the Chief Privacy Officer’s
OPEPD Processing of Family Educational 2 $0
A09R0008 Rights and Privacy Act Complaints
Audit The Department’s Compliance with
IES 1 $0
A24DC0187 the Geospatial Data Act
Inspection The Department’s Administration of
ODS the Reasonable Accommodation 8 $0
I24DC0165 Program
University of Illinois at Chicago's
Audit Gaining Early Awareness and
RMSD 4 $1,018,212
A05D0017 Readiness for Undergraduate
Programs Project
Inspection U.S. Department of Education’s
OGC Nondisclosure Policies, Forms, and 2 $0
I24DC0196 Agreements
Total 29 - 89 $36,034,359
38
Table 6. Peer Review Results - Reviews of Other Offices of Inspector
General Completed by the OIG During the Reporting Period
Summary of Peer Review
During this reporting period, the OIG conducted a peer review of the system of quality control
for the inspection and evaluation function of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office
of Inspector General (FDIC OIG) in effect for the year ended September 30, 2025. FDIC OIG
received an external peer review rating of pass. The report was issued on March 26, 2026, and
is available on the FDIC OIG website.
Table 7. Summary of Significant Investigations Closed During the
Reporting Period (October 1, 2025, through March 31, 2026)
The following are significant OIG investigations that were closed during the reporting
period. The OIG defines significant as an investigation that involves one or more
of the following: (1) at least $1 million in Federal funds; (2) resulted in a prison
sentence of at least 10 years; (3) involves a Department employee, contractor, or
subcontractor or (4) involves public corruption involving a school official or employee,
grantee, subgrantee, public official, or other person in a position of public trust.
Case Subject Summary
Former Boone County Schools Maintenance
Director and Schools Contractor Sentenced for K-12 Fraud This SAR, page 10
Roles in $3.4 Million Fraud Scheme (West Virginia)
Former Savannah R-III School District Accountant
K-12 Fraud This SAR, page 13
Sentenced for $121,000 Embezzlement (Missouri)
Former Department Employee Sentenced for Role Pandemic Aid
This SAR, page 17
in $400,000 Fraud Scheme (Maryland) Fraud
Second Person Sentenced in Fraud and Identity
Pandemic Aid
Theft Scheme Involving $150,000 in Pandemic SAR 91, page 3
Fraud
Relief Aid (Florida)
39
2026 Management Challenges
The Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 requires the OIG to identify
and summarize the most significant management challenges facing
the Department each year. Below are the management challenges that
the OIG identified for FY 2026.
1. Change Management
2. Oversight and Monitoring of Grantees
3. Oversight & Monitoring of Student
Financial Assistance Programs
4. Data Quality and Reporting
5. IT Security
Copies of our Management Challenges reports are available on our
website oig.ed.gov.
40
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