Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor — Semiannual Report to Congress, Volume 95
Summary
Semiannual Report to Congress, Volume 95, of the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor, covering October 1, 2025 to March 31, 2026, with a message from Inspector General Anthony P. D'Esposito. It states that the investigative work produced a total of 133 investigations completed, 131 indictments, 191 convictions, and more than $810 million in monetary accomplishments. It states that two alert memos to the Employment and Training Administration found that taxpayers could lose approximately $912 million potentially tied to pandemic unemployment insurance fraud, after analysis of 6.5 million prepaid debit cards. It also states that the Office of Audit issued eight audit reports and an estimated $8,436,366 in questioned costs.
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Volume 95 October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Semiannual Report
to Congress
Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Labor
A Message from the Inspector General
I am pleased to present our Semiannual Report to Congress,
summarizing the activities and accomplishments of the
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), Office of Inspector General
(OIG), for the six-month period ending March 31, 2026.
War on Fraud
In March 2026, I was honored to be appointed to serve
on President Donald J. Trump’s Task Force to Eliminate
Fraud, a government-wide initiative led by Vice President
JD Vance to crush waste, fraud, and abuse across every
corner of the federal government. This Task Force isn’t
about talk—it’s about investigations, arrests, prosecutions,
and the clawing back of stolen taxpayer dollars. We are
declaring total war on fraud. Working together with our
federal partners, including the U.S. Department of Justice,
we will relentlessly hunt down these fraudsters, no matter where they hide or the sophistication
of their scams.
As I’ve previously stated, this is not business as usual. The OIG has gone on the offense
against fraud. We will track it, expose it, and shut it down. Working alongside our federal
partners amplifies our mission to dismantle fraud schemes and deliver real accountability.
In fact, my team has already identified nearly $1 billion in stolen taxpayer dollars, and we are
determined to claw it back and return it to the American people. Fraud is nothing less than a
direct tax on every family—a theft you never voted for and should never have to pay. It is not
victimless, and it burdens every hardworking taxpayer.
The OIG is unleashing investigators to hunt down these criminals. And the war on fraud
means going after every fraudster—no scheme is too small, and no one gets a pass.
My message is simple: if you steal from the American people, we are coming for you.
Much of the following work exemplifies my vision in the OIG’s ongoing battle against those
perpetrators who seek to exploit DOL benefit programs.
OIG Accomplishments
Our investigative work also produced impressive results, with a total of 133 investigations
completed, 131 indictments, 191 convictions, and more than $810 million in monetary
accomplishments.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 1
In February 2026, my office issued a press release announcing the issuance of two alert memos
(December 2025 and February 2026) to DOL’s Employment and Training Administration (ETA)
about our investigative review of prepaid unemployment insurance (UI) card accounts which
found that American taxpayers could lose approximately $912 million potentially tied to pandemic
UI fraud. After analyzing 6.5 million prepaid debit cards, OIG investigators found $720 million still
loaded on unused cards and another $192 million already transferred to state unclaimed property
offices. The alert memos called upon ETA to issue immediate guidance directing the states to
work with financial institutions and unclaimed property administrators to recover the funds.
Notable investigative cases during this reporting period include:
• Three Florida residents were sentenced for their roles in a pandemic-related UI fraud
scheme that defrauded the state of California of more than $4.8 million in COVID-19 UI
benefits through the submission of fraudulent claims.
• Two brothers were sentenced to 36 months supervised release and ordered to pay
approximately $2.9 million in restitution for a scheme in which they obtained the personally
identifiable information of identity theft victims and used this information to file fraudulent
claims for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance benefits.
• A former contractor with the Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) was
sentenced to 3 years of probation and ordered to pay more than $1.6 million in restitution
related to her role in a UI fraud scheme. Additionally, a former Michigan UIA examiner pled
guilty to conspiracy to commit federal program bribery related to the scheme.
• A Texas orthopedic surgeon was sentenced to 102 months in prison and ordered to pay
more than $13 million in restitution for his role in a $145 million scheme to defraud DOL’s
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) through the submission of fraudulent
claims for prescription compound creams.
• A chiropractor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud for his role in a
multimillion-dollar scheme to defraud OWCP. As part of his plea, he agreed that more than
$1.1 million in seized funds and property constituted proceeds of the fraud scheme.
Unfortunately, the statute of limitations for many of our UI investigations have begun to
expire. Unless Congress acts quickly, the opportunity to extend the SOL associated with
pandemic-related fraud will soon be lost. Despite our tireless efforts, a failure to extend
the current statute of limitations means federal law enforcement will have to stop short of
fully investigating and prosecuting some of the most egregious cases of pandemic UI fraud.
On the audit front, the Office of Audit issued eight audit reports, resulting in three
recommendations and an estimated $8,436,366 in questioned costs.
• An audit found that the COVID-19 pandemic minimally affected the overall operations
and effectiveness of the Jobs for Veterans State Grants program in providing training
2 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
and employment services to eligible veterans and spouses with significant barriers to
employment, as well as other eligible persons, as evidenced by the program reportedly
meeting or exceeding its employment rate goals. However, this apparent success may be
misleading due to weaknesses identified in the program’s eligibility validation practices.
These accomplishments would not be possible without my team’s commitment to relentlessly
fight waste, fraud, and abuse in DOL programs and operations. It is an honor to lead my
professional staff in serving as good stewards of taxpayer funds.
I encourage Congress to join the War on Fraud and pass comprehensive legislation that
strengthens oversight and extends tools to prosecute fraud. This includes extending the
statute of limitations for pandemic-related UI fraud, rewarding whistleblowers, and recovering
stolen funds. This is the kind of accountability taxpayers deserve.
The war on fraud is on, and we are not backing down.
Anthony P. D’Esposito
Inspector General
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 3
OIG Fiscal Year 2026–2030 Strategic Plan
OIG Mission
We serve the American people, DOL, and Congress by providing independent and
objective oversight of Departmental programs through audits and investigations,
and by combatting the influence of labor racketeering in the workplace.
Core Values
Excellence
We deliver relevant, quality, timely, high-impact products and services, through a
workforce committed to accountability and the highest professional standards.
Integrity
We adhere to the highest ethical principles and perform our work in an honest and
trustworthy manner.
Independence
We are committed to being free of conflicts of interest through objectivity and impartiality.
Service
We are a unified team, vigilant to duty through dedicated public service.
Transparency
We promote an environment of open communication through information sharing,
accountability, and accurate reporting.
Strategic Goals
Goal 1: Deliver timely, relevant, and high-impact results.
Goal 2: Foster an internal OIG culture that drives high performance and engagement.
Goal 3: Promote responsible stewardship of OIG financial and non-financial resources.
4 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Contents
Selected Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Management Decision Made During this
Reporting Period on Other Reports Issued
during a Previous Reporting Period . . . . . . . 58
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs . . . . . 9
Corrective Actions Taken by
Unemployment Insurance Programs . . . . 10
the Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Office of Workers’ Compensation
Unimplemented Recommendations. . . . . . . 61
Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
High-Priority Unimplemented
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Employment and Training Programs . . . . . 29
Summary of Reports with Unimplemented
Veteran’s Employment and
Recommendations with Cost Savings /
Training Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Funds Put to Better Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Foreign Labor Certification Programs . . . 32
Reports with Unimplemented
Recommendations for Management
Single Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Improvement or Disallowed Costs Owed. . . 69
Investigative Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
OIG Congressional Testimony . . . . . . . . . . 38
Peer Review Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Legislative Recommendations . . . . . . . . . 40 OIG Hotline. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Reporting Requirements Under the
Following Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Funds Recommended for Better Use . . . . . 50
Questioned Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Final Audit Reports Issued . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Other Reports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Unresolved Audit Reports Over
6 Months Old . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Management Decision Made During this
Reporting Period on Final Audit, Inspection,
or Evaluation Reports Issued during a
Previous Reporting Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Audit Statistics
8 3 $8,436,366
Audits and Recommendations for Questioned Costs
Other Reports Issued Corrective Action
OIG Unimplemented Recommendations
OIG recommendations not fully implemented as of September 30, 2025
BLS 2
EBSA 7
ETA 71
MSHA 34
OASAM 18
OCFO 20
OLMS 3
OSEC 1
OSHA 16
WHD 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
6 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Investigative Statistics
Investigative Results Labor Racketeering 71/133
Program Fraud
191
133 131
71
43
34 71 investigative
cases opened and
1 133 cases closed
r r s s ry ts
s d
se ose
s d
se ene fo tion fo tion e nt i on to en
a a d u d c t t u
C Cl C Op rre ec rre l A ict
m
nv
ic a rm
e fe ros e fe ivi d o St eba
R P R /C I n C D
s es ses min
d
Ca Ca A
Monetary Accomplishments
$
Types include: $282,508,387
Recoveries
Cost-Efficiencies
Restitutions
Fines/Penalties
Forfeitures
Civil Monetary Actions
$527,885,918
$810,394,305
Total Labor Racketeering
Program Fraud
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 7
Worker and Retiree
Benefit Programs
Unemployment Insurance Programs
Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Unemployment Insurance Programs
Enacted more than 80 years ago as a federal-state partnership, the unemployment insurance
(UI) program is the Department’s largest income-maintenance program. This multi-billion-dollar
program provides unemployment benefits to eligible workers who become unemployed through
no fault of their own. Within the UI program umbrella are other programs such as State UI,
Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees, and Unemployment Compensation for
Ex-Servicemembers. The UI program is generally administered by states with oversight from
DOL’s Employment and Training Administration.
The UI program has experienced some of the highest improper payment rates across the federal
government, generally exceeding 10 percent for the last two decades.
DOL OIG UNCOVERS NEARLY $1 BILLION IN TAXPAYER MONEY AT
RISK—TIED TO COVID UNEMPLOYMENT FRAUD
As part of its continued commitment to combatting pandemic-era fraud, the Department of Labor, Office
of Inspector General (DOL OIG) conducted a review of prepaid UI card accounts that were managed
by four major financial institutions during the pandemic. After completing its analysis of two of these
financial institutions, the OIG revealed that over $1.3 billion in UI funds are currently associated with
more than 6.5 million prepaid card accounts. Specifically, around $1 billion remains on 5.9 million
accounts, while approximately $267 million has already been escheated, meaning it has been
returned to state unclaimed property administrators. Of these funds, the OIG identified approximately
$912 million that may have been obtained through fraudulent means, tied to nearly 3.9 million accounts.
Considering these findings, DOL OIG assessed a significant risk of potential taxpayer fund losses and
has recommended that the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) provide timely guidance
for state workforce agencies (SWA) to engage with the OIG and relevant financial institutions. This
engagement aims to thoroughly evaluate the implications of the identified fraudulent activities and
develop appropriate measures to protect taxpayer interests. The data also outlines the balances on
prepaid cards, including specifics on the number of cards linked to fraud-related claims, underlining the
gravity of the situation.
For more information, go to Alert Memo: ETA Needs to Ensure SWAs Take Action to Recover Significant
UI Holdings Still Held by Financial Institution 1’s Prepaid Card Program, Alert Memo: ETA Needs to
Ensure SWAs Take Action to Recover Significant UI Holdings Still Held by Financial Institution 2’s
Prepaid Card Program, and Press Release.
10 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Florida Residents Sentenced in $4 .8 Million Pandemic Unemployment Insurance
Fraud Scheme
In November 2025, three defendants were sentenced for their roles in a pandemic-related UI fraud
scheme that defrauded the California Employment Development Department (CA EDD) of more than
$4.8 million in COVID-19 UI benefits through the submission of fraudulent claims.
During this period, the following actions occurred:
• Michael Amparo Suarez was sentenced on November 10, 2025, to 69 months in prison and
ordered to pay restitution of more than $1.3 million to CA EDD.
• Bryan Seda Morales was sentenced on November 12, 2025, to 78 months in prison and ordered to
pay restitution of approximately $1.7 million to CA EDD.
• Abel Bonilla was sentenced on November 13, 2025, to 46 months in prison and ordered to pay
restitution of more than $4.8 million to CA EDD.
From August 2020 through August 2022, Bonilla, Morales, Suarez, and co-conspirators submitted at
least 357 fraudulent UI applications to CA EDD by utilizing personal identifiable information (PII) from
dozens of victims without their authorization. They would then facilitate the submission of CA EDD UI
applications via ID.me by creating counterfeit drivers’ licenses with the identity theft victims’ PII and
the co-conspirators’ faces. They used multiple vehicles to travel and withdraw UI funds from ATMs
throughout the states of Florida and Maryland. The scheme resulted in the subsequent theft of at least
$4.8 million from CA EDD.
This was a joint investigation with the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) as part of the Southern
District of Florida Miami COVID-19 Strike Force. United States v. Perla Bonilla et al. (S.D. Florida)
Four Individuals Sentenced and One Pled Guilty in an Unemployment Insurance
Fraud Scheme
Between November 2025 and February 2026, four defendants were sentenced and one other pled
guilty for their roles in an UI scheme that defrauded the federal government, CA EDD, and a financial
institution of funds that were earmarked for COVID-19 pandemic relief.
During this period, the following actions occurred:
• On November 7, 2025, Khi Simms was sentenced to 102 months in prison and ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, restitution of approximately $2.7 million.
• On November 19, 2025, Quentin Watson was sentenced to 6 months in prison and ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, restitution of approximately $1 million.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 11
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
• On December 2, 2025, Racie Phillips pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud.
• On February 5, 2026, Cornelius Williams was sentenced to 4 months of home detention and
ordered to pay restitution of approximately $32,700.
• On February 25, 2026, Kaylah Banks was sentenced to time served and ordered to pay restitution
of approximately $105,000.
From approximately January 2021 to August 2021, Simms, Watson, Phillips, Banks, Williams, and
others were involved in a conspiracy, whereby they obtained and made withdrawals from UI debit cards
containing fraudulent UI benefits. The benefits were made available by a co-conspirator, who was hired
by a financial institution as a contract employee. The co-conspirator had accessed bank systems without
authorization to reissue UI debit cards, remove fraud blocks, and add provisional credits to UI debit cards
from which Simms, Watson, Phillips, Banks, Williams, and others later withdrew. Simms often recruited
others via social media to participate in the conspiracy and sent messages to co-conspirators, including
Watson, advising how to call a financial institution and pretend to be various customers to have UI debit
cards sent to their addresses. Banks and Williams also obtained fraudulent UI debit cards in order to
withdraw funds made available by co-conspirators. Both Banks’ and Williams’ access and unauthorized
use of these cards resulted in withdrawals of approximately $37,000 and $33,000, respectively.
This is a joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). United States v. Clark et al.
(E.D. Arkansas)
California Brothers Sentenced in CARES Act Fraud Scheme
Tyrone Boyle and Timothy Boyle were sentenced on January 21 and February 2, 2026, respectively,
to 36 months supervised release and ordered to pay approximately $2.9 million in joint and several
restitution for their roles in a Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act fraud
scheme. Tyrone and Timothy Boyle, twin brothers residing in Los Angeles, California, were the last of
eight defendants prosecuted in a pandemic fraud scheme that targeted numerous state UI programs
and the Small Business Administration (SBA).
From approximately February 2020 to May 2021, Tyrone, Timothy, and co-conspirators obtained the PII
of identity theft victims without their knowledge or consent, and used this information to file fraudulent
claims for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) benefits. As part of the fraud scheme, Tyrone
and Timothy also assisted in the filing of fraudulent applications for Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
loans and Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) funds in the names of various businesses.
In total, this pandemic fraud scheme involved more than $7.7 million in PUA benefits, PPP loans, and
EIDL funds.
This is a joint investigation with the FBI and SBA OIG. United States v. Deangelo Jackson-Portwood et
al. (E.D. Michigan)
12 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Former State of Michigan Employee and Contractor Prosecuted for Roles in
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme
On January 26, 2026, Jennae Reed, a former contractor with the state of Michigan Unemployment
Insurance Agency (UIA), was sentenced to 3 years of probation and was ordered to pay more than
$1.6 million in restitution related to her role in a UI fraud scheme.
On February 25, 2026, Terri Ramsey, a former Michigan UIA examiner, pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to commit federal program bribery related to the scheme.
As part of the UI fraud scheme, Ramsey, Reed, and two additional state employees accessed the
Michigan UIA claims system without proper authorization. The defendants subsequently removed
fraud protection triggers and altered information to falsely make the UI claims appear legitimate. In
furtherance of the scheme, both Ramsey and Reed also accepted and offered bribes in exchange for
their unauthorized actions related to UI claims. Ramsey received tens of thousands of dollars in bribes
while Reed obtained at least $34,000.
As a result of the conspiracy, more than $2.8 million of fraudulent UI benefits were distributed to
third-party claimants.
This is a joint investigation with the FBI, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG, Michigan UIA,
and U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). United States v. Timeka Johnson et al. (E.D. Michigan)
Pennsylvania Man Sentenced to 78 Months in Prison for Federal COVID-Relief
Fraud and International Money Laundering
On March 3, 2026, Adepoju Babatunde Salako was sentenced to 78 months in prison and ordered to
pay more than $2.5 million in restitution. He previously pled guilty to wire fraud conspiracy and money
laundering conspiracy for his role in a scheme to steal more than $5 million from 30 UI programs, the
PPP, and the EIDL program.
In 2021, Salako was part of a conspiracy that stole more than $5 million in funds from the PPP, EIDL
program, and state UI programs through several complex schemes. In one scheme, he and two
co-conspirators used information of identity theft victims to fraudulently obtain UI benefits and PPP
loans and submit false EIDL applications. The co-conspirators also used stolen identities and enlisted
romance-scam victims to obtain government money. Salako’s role was then to receive the funds and
launder the proceeds.
This is a joint investigation with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) OIG, Internal Revenue Service-Criminal
Investigation (IRS CI), and SBA OIG. United States v. Adepoju Babatunde Salako (D. Colorado)
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 13
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Cameroonian National Sentenced to Prison for Role in $1 .7 Million Pandemic
Unemployment Insurance Benefits Fraud Conspiracy Executed from the
United Kingdom
On February 20, 2026, Anais Thalia Ossele Massaba was sentenced to 54 months in prison and
ordered to pay restitution of more than $1.7 million in connection with an UI fraud conspiracy executed
from the United Kingdom (UK).
Beginning in June 2020, Massaba, as part of an organized group of individuals operating in the United
States and the UK, engaged in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain UI benefits from multiple SWAs during
the COVID-19 pandemic. She used a computer located in the UK to file fraudulent UI claims with the
Maryland Department of Labor (MD DOL) and other SWAs. Massaba worked closely with other members
of the conspiracy to obtain and use the PII of identity theft victims to submit fraudulent UI claims.
Massaba and her co-conspirators also used proxy servers and virtual private networks to conceal
their identities and location. In addition, she used encrypted messaging platforms to communicate
with co-conspirators to exchange PII of identity theft victims. In total, Massaba submitted nearly 200
fraudulent UI claims to the MD DOL by using anonymous email addresses, which resulted in the loss
of more than $1.7 million in UI benefits.
This was a joint investigation with the IRS CI and HSI as part of the Maryland COVID-19 Fraud
Enforcement Strike Force. United States v. Anais Thalia Ossele Massaba et al. (D. Maryland)
Nigerian Man Sentenced to 70 months in Prison for $10 Million Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance Fraud Scheme
On Oct 10, 2025, Yomi Jones Olayeye was sentenced to 70 months in prison in connection with a
conspiracy to fraudulently obtain at least $10 million in pandemic UI benefits. He was also ordered to pay
more than $1.6 million in restitution to 15 state SWAs, a $75,000 fine, and approximately $415,000 in
forfeiture.
Between March 2020 and July 2020, Olayeye and his co-conspirators used PII that they purchased
over criminal internet forums to apply for UI benefits. They falsely represented themselves to be eligible
residents of states affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. He and his co-conspirators also used the
stolen PII to open U.S. bank accounts and UI debit cards to receive the UI payments. They also
recruited bank account holders in the United States to receive and transfer the fraud proceeds,
which Olayeye and others then converted to Bitcoin. Through his scheme, they attempted to receive
approximately $10 million in UI benefits and were successful in receiving more than $1.5 million.
This is a joint investigation with the United States Secret Service (USSS) and the FBI. United States v.
Kazeem et al. (D. Massachusetts)
14 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Michigan Man Sentenced in Pandemic Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme
On October 23, 2025, Terrance Calhoun Jr. was sentenced to 52 months in prison and ordered to pay
restitution in excess of $1.6 million for his involvement in a large-scale, multi-state UI fraud scheme.
The investigation revealed that Calhoun and his co-conspirators used stolen PII to file hundreds of
fraudulent UI claims with multiple SWAs, including Michigan, Maryland, and Arizona. As part of the
scheme, Calhoun and a co-conspirator created email accounts to link with UI claims, submitted and
re-certified fraudulent UI claims, collected mail for the fraudulent claims, including UI debit cards, and
shared information in furtherance of the scheme. As a result, Calhoun and his accomplices received UI
debit cards in the names of other individuals loaded with over $4 million in PUA funds.
This is a joint investigation with IRS CI, USSS, the FBI, HSI, and Michigan UIA. United States v.
Terrance Calhoun Jr. (E.D. Michigan)
Illinois Woman Sentenced for Involvement in Fraudulent Unemployment
Insurance Fraud and Pandemic Benefits Schemes
On October 6, 2025, Yoshimi Henry was sentenced to 18 months in prison and ordered to pay
restitution of more than $860,000 for her involvement in UI and pandemic benefits fraud schemes.
She was the last individual sentenced in the multi-defendant fraud schemes.
From 2013 to 2015, the investigation revealed that Henry and her co-defendants filed and caused to be
filed over 890 fraudulent UI claims in the names of other individuals. This resulted in an attempted loss
of about $8.8 million in benefits and an actual loss of approximately $1.5 million in benefits.
In June 2020 and February 2021, while under indictment for UI fraud, Henry submitted fraudulent
applications in her name to the SBA for EIDL and PPP loans. The loan applications falsely stated
that she was the owner of a limited liability company for an entertainment business and a sole
proprietor of a printing and graphic design business. Henry, in exchange for fees, knowingly submitted,
and caused to be submitted, approximately 37 fraudulent PPP loan applications and supporting
documents for approximately 25 individuals. The applications contained materially false statements
and misrepresentations regarding the applicant’s purported business, business income, gross revenue,
and expenses. Henry was paid between $1,000 and $5,000 per loan that she submitted for these
individuals.
While still under indictment, Henry also fraudulently filed claims for pandemic-related UI benefits. In her
UI certifications, she falsely certified that she was unemployed and entitled to UI benefits.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 15
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
In total, Henry caused approximately $864,000 in pandemic-related benefit losses, including more than
$722,000 in fraudulently obtained PPP funds disbursed to her customers, almost $20,000 in PPP funds
she received, more than $42,000 in UI benefits she received, and more than $79,900 in UI benefits from
the 2013 to 2015 fraud scheme.
The is a joint investigation with the FBI and USPIS. U.S. v. Pitts et al. (N.D. Illinois)
Pennsylvania Woman Sentenced for $1 Million COVID-19 Fraud Scheme
On February 4, 2026, Wylene Johnson was sentenced to 18 months in prison and was ordered to pay
restitution of more than $1 million for her role in a PUA fraud scheme. She was also ordered to forfeit
more than $1 million.
Between May 2020 and October 2020, Johnson obtained PII from individuals, including friends and
relatives, for the purpose of using the PII to file or cause to be filed fraudulent PUA applications. She
filed or caused to be filed at least 90 different fraudulent claims from her address in Philadelphia, PA.
As a result of these fraudulent applications, the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry
dispersed at least $950,000 via checks and/or debit cards to addresses controlled by Johnson.
Johnson also filed fraudulent EIDL applications using fictitious businesses. As a result, the SBA
deposited approximately $52,000 into her personal bank account. She did not spend this money on
authorized purchases, but instead used it for personal expenditures, including a shopping spree.
This is a joint investigation with the FBI and HSI. United States v. Wylene Johnson (E.D. Pennsylvania)
Nevada Man Sentenced to Prison and Ordered to Pay More Than $1 Million for
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme
On October 8, 2025, Corey Marcus Valrey was sentenced to 12 months and 1 day in federal prison and
ordered to pay more than $1 million in restitution for his involvement in a fraudulent UI fraud scheme.
Beginning in early 2020 and continuing through about January 2021, Valrey and co-conspirators
devised a scheme to fraudulently obtain UI benefits from the Nevada Department of Employment,
Training, and Rehabilitation. As part of the scheme, his co-conspirators filed fraudulent applications
for UI benefits by using the PII of individuals without their authorization, knowledge, and consent. As a
result, UI debit cards, which were loaded with UI funds, were issued in the names of individuals whose
PII had been wrongfully used. The UI debit cards were mailed to addresses controlled by Valrey and
co-conspirators, including two private mailboxes that Valrey rented for this purpose.
16 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Through the course of the scheme, Valrey and co-conspirators received at least 140 fraudulent UI debit
cards and caused losses of at least $1 million in disbursed UI benefits.
This was a joint investigation with USSS. United States v. Corey Marcus Valrey (D. Nevada)
Maryland Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Pandemic Unemployment
Insurance Fraud, Firearms, and Drug Trafficking Crimes
On January 16, 2026, Lawrence Harris was sentenced to 180 months in prison and ordered to pay
more than $950,000 in restitution in connection with his convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud
and aggravated identity theft for his role in a pandemic-related UI fraud scheme, as well as possession
of a machine gun, possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, and possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.
Between approximately January 2021 and September 2023, Harris conspired with other co-defendants,
including former contractors who provided services directly to MD DOL. The contractors were issued
laptop computers that allowed remote access to MD DOL systems, such as the UI claims system. Harris
and his co-conspirators used the laptops to access non-public UI data and databases maintained by
MD DOL to change information on existing UI claims, including contact email addresses, online account
passwords, and payment methods. Using the PII of identity theft victims, they also made numerous
false statements and misrepresentations on UI applications, so the highest amount of available UI
benefits would be paid. Harris and his other co-conspirators uploaded and approved documents
required by MD DOL to support UI claims, removed fraud holds on UI claims, and certified weeks of
unemployment for payment in the MD DOL system.
On November 16, 2022, while law enforcement executed a search warrant at his home, Harris threw a
firearm and a bag of marijuana from his room. Law enforcement then searched an attic in the residence
that Harris had access to and discovered three additional firearms, including one that functioned
as a machine gun, stored in the attic. In addition to the firearms, law enforcement also recovered
approximately 37 pounds of marijuana that Harris intended to distribute.
This is a joint investigation with the FBI as part of the Maryland COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Strike
Force. United States v. Lawrence Nathaniel Harris et al. (D. Maryland)
State of Arizona Employee Sentenced for Receiving Bribes to Approve
Jobless Benefits
On November 24, 2025, Jacqueline Espino was sentenced to 2 years of home confinement and ordered
to pay more than $740,000 in criminal restitution.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 17
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Espino was employed by the Arizona Department of Economic Security (DES) as an adjudicator who
evaluated claims and determined eligibility for the UI and PUA programs. Between 2020 and 2022, she
accepted bribes in exchange for approving UI and PUA claims for individuals who were not entitled to
receive such benefits. Espino processed approximately nine different UI and PUA claims, resulting in
DES paying more than $140,000 in claims that were not properly adjudicated.
During the same period, in addition to accepting bribes to process claims, Espino embezzled and
misapplied DES funds for the benefit of herself and for others. In total, Espino embezzled or misapplied
more than $600,000 in DES UI and PUA claims.
This is a joint investigation with DHS OIG and Arizona DES. United States v. Jacqueline Espino
(D. Arizona)
Oregon Woman Convicted of Stealing Jobless Benefits
On November 4, 2025, Tamara Fulmer pled guilty to stealing more than $567,000 in pandemic
unemployment benefits from the Oregon Employment Department (OED).
Between May 2020 and October 2021, Fulmer used the PII of approximately 27 individuals to
fraudulently apply for pandemic UI benefits. Based on Fulmer’s misrepresentations, OED paid more
than $567,000 in UI benefits. Fulmer deposited at least 236 UI checks totaling more than $68,000 into
her personal account and cashed many UI checks at an Oregon gas station without the applicants’
knowledge or permission.
Additionally, OED paid Fulmer more than $13,000 after she submitted her fraudulent UI application
that falsely claimed she had not applied for or received disability benefits despite receiving disability
payments since 2004.
This is a joint investigation with DHS OIG and OED. United States v. Tamara Fulmer (D. Oregon)
Virginia Woman Sentenced to More Than 6 Years in Prison for Pandemic
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Conspiracy
On October 9, 2025, Lynette Morse was sentenced to 78 months in prison and ordered to pay more
than $495,000 in restitution to the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC) for her role in a scheme to
fraudulently obtain pandemic-related UI benefits, including through the use of PII belonging to Virginia
Department of Corrections (VA DOC) inmates.
From approximately April 2020 through February 2021, Morse and her co-conspirators used the
PII, which included the names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers belonging to herself and
18 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
others to file fraudulent UI claims with VEC during the COVID-19 pandemic. She submitted fraudulent
UI claims and completed false weekly claim certifications using PII of either VA DOC inmates, other
individuals, and herself—all of whom were not entitled to receive UI benefits.
Morse elected for most of UI benefits to be paid through UI debit cards. She directed the UI debit cards
to be mailed to addresses within her control, including her residence, her post office box, a relatives’
residence, and other residences selected to avoid suspicion due to multiple debit cards being mailed to
one address.
The fraudulent UI claims, which Morse filed for 22 inmates, 9 non-inmates, and herself, resulted in the
approval of more than $322,000 in fraudulent benefits. In total, the VEC approved more than $495,000
in UI benefits on behalf of individuals who were not entitled to receive such benefits.
This was a joint investigation with DHS OIG and USPIS. United States v. Lynette Ebony Morse
(E.D. Virginia)
Connecticut Man Sentenced to 57 Months in Prison for Fraudulently Collecting
Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Food Stamp Benefits
On March 9, 2026, Ricardo Santiago was sentenced to 57 months in prison and ordered to pay more
than $370,000 in restitution for fraudulently obtaining Social Security, UI, and food stamp benefits.
Between 2002 and 2024, Santiago held jobs with more than 20 employers and earned income totaling
more than $580,000. He concealed his income from federal and state government agencies by
providing employers false identification, including a Social Security number (SSN) and card belonging
to another individual, and, in at least one instance, a fraudulent Social Security card.
In 2002, Santiago applied for Retirement Survivors Disability Insurance (RSDI) benefits, representing
that he was unable to work due to disability. In February 2017, Santiago applied for Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, representing that he did not earn income from
employment. As a result, he began receiving RSDI payments and SNAP benefits to which he was
not entitled.
In April 2020, Santiago applied to the Connecticut Department of Labor for UI benefits. On the
application, he used a SSN belonging to another individual, and represented that he was unemployed
but available for work and physically able to work. He subsequently completed weekly certifications
and made the same representations. From April 2020 through February 2021, Santiago received UI
payments to which he was not entitled.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 19
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
In September 2025, while released on bond and awaiting sentencing, Santiago staged his and his
daughter’s drowning in the Connecticut River and attempted to flee. Hartford Police located Santiago
and his daughter in Hartford on September 20, 2025. He has been detained since that date.
This is a joint investigation with the Social Security Administration (SSA) OIG, U.S. Department of
Agriculture OIG, and U.S. Department of Transportation OIG. United States v. Ricardo Santiago
(D. Connecticut)
Former California College Football Player Sentenced in Jobless Benefits Scam
On January 20, 2026, Abdul-Malik McClain was sentenced to 24 months’ probation and ordered to pay
restitution of more than $228,000 to the California EDD in a UI fraud scheme.
While a member of his university’s football team, McClain filed fraudulent claims for UI benefits with
CA EDD and also assisted football players in filing fraudulent claims, including under the PUA
program. The claims contained false information about the claimants’ supposed prior employment,
pandemic-related job loss, and job-seeking efforts.
The false statements in the UI applications led CA EDD to authorize a financial institution to mail
debit cards addressed to the named claimants—often to addresses that McClain controlled. Those
debit cards were loaded with fraudulently obtained benefits, ranging from a few hundred dollars to
thousands of dollars. The recipients of the debit cards, including McClain, used the debit cards to make
cash withdrawals at ATMs and to fund personal expenses. In some cases, he obtained a cut of the
fraudulently obtained benefits for helping others file fraudulent UI applications.
McClain’s and his co-schemers’ fraudulent applications sought at least $1 million in UI benefits from
CA EDD and led to more than $280,000 in fraudulently obtained benefits.
This was a joint investigation with the FBI, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG, U.S. Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration, SSA OIG, USPIS, and CA EDD Investigations Division.
United States v. McClain (C.D. California)
Business Owner Convicted and Former Massachusetts State Senator
Sentenced for Obstruction of Justice Related to Unemployment Insurance and
Tax Fraud Schemes
On January 23, 2026, Tuyet Martin pled guilty to attempting to obstruct and interfere in a grand jury
investigation. On January 30, 2026, former Massachusetts state senator Dean Tran was sentenced for
obstruction of justice during an investigation into Tran’s fraudulent pandemic UI claims and tax fraud.
Tran was sentenced to one year in prison to run concurrent to an 18-month sentence for his convictions
related to UI and tax fraud.
20 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
During the investigation, federal law enforcement interviewed Tran at his residence while executing
a federal search warrant. He was asked about a reinstatement letter that he provided to UI agency
officials when his benefits were briefly suspended. Tran made material misrepresentations to the law
enforcement agents, including that Martin had authored and signed the letter. However, Martin was not
the sole author of the letter as Tran revised and signed it before submitting it to the UI agency. Martin
then provided false testimony regarding the letter to a federal grand jury.
This is a joint investigation with the FBI and IRS CI. United States v. Dean Tran; United States v. Tuyet
Martin (D. Massachusetts)
Florida Resident Pled Guilty for Role in $5 .6 Million Pandemic Unemployment
Insurance Fraud Scheme
On January 15, 2026, Tiffany Gonsalves pled guilty to conspiracy to commit access device fraud, aiding
and abetting access device fraud, and aiding and abetting aggravated identify theft.
From February 2021 through November 2021, Gonsalves and her co-conspirators accessed the
database of a contractor that was responsible for ensuring beneficiaries of the UI program were able
to receive their benefits through pre-loaded debit cards. They used this access to obtain the PII of UI
recipients and then re-issue the debit cards to themselves instead of the lawful beneficiaries. Gonsalves
and her co-conspirators changed the mailing addresses to their own, so they received the debit cards.
In total, 904 debit cards were transferred via this scheme with 133 cards going to Gonsalves’ address.
Co-conspirators, including Gonsalves, withdrew funds from these debit cards at ATMs across the
country. The total amount of these unlawful transactions was more than $5.6 million.
This is a joint investigation with the FBI and USSS. United States v. Tiffany Gonsalves (M.D. Florida)
Maryland Man Pled Guilty for Role in $1 .5 Million Pandemic-Related
Unemployment Insurance Fraud Scheme
On January 8, 2026, Sayquan Leon Bridges, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud,
and aggravated identity theft for his role in a pandemic-related UI fraud and aggravated identity theft
conspiracy that defrauded multiple SWAs through the submission of fraudulent UI claims that resulted in
the payment of at least $1.5 million in UI benefits from SWAs.
From March 2020 to October 2021, Bridges and his co-conspirators impersonated identity theft victims
to submit fraudulent claims for UI benefits in multiple states, including Maryland and California. As part
of the scheme, he and his co-conspirators used electronic messages, phone calls, electronic mail, and
other means to collect and exchange PII of identity theft victims. They also created false email addresses
and phone numbers for the victims and used the fake emails and phone numbers on the fraudulent UI
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 21
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
applications. Once Bridges and his co-conspirators received the fraudulently obtained UI benefits on debit
cards, they made cash withdrawals and other transactions for their own financial benefit.
This is a joint investigation with USPIS, HSI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
Maryland State Police, and Anne Arundel County (Maryland) Police Department. United States v.
Sayquan Leon Bridges et al. (D. Maryland)
Pennsylvania Residents Convicted of Federal Racketeering and Related Charges
Between October 2025 and February 2026, three defendants pled guilty for their roles in a federal
racketeering conspiracy that included fraud against pandemic UI benefits, counterfeiting, assault,
and murder.
During this period, the following actions occurred:
• On October 21, 2025, Rakeim Savage pled guilty to participating in a racketeering enterprise
(“RICO”), conspiracy to commit counterfeiting, and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud.
• On December 17, 2025, Rakiem King pled guilty to conspiracy to participate in the affairs of a
racketeering enterprise, conspiracy to commit counterfeiting, and conspiracy to commit mail and
wire fraud.
• On February 10, 2026, Ward Roberts pled guilty to conspiracy to participate in the affairs of a
racketeering enterprise, conspiracy to commit counterfeiting, and conspiracy to commit mail and
wire fraud. Harry Draper pled guilty to conspiracy to participate in the affairs of a racketeering
enterprise and conspiracy to commit counterfeiting.
Savage, King, Roberts, and Draper conspired with others to conduct and participate in an enterprise,
which was known as Omerta, through racketeering activity. This activity involved counterfeiting, mail and
wire fraud, fraudulently obtaining COVID-19 benefits, robbery, and other violent crimes. Omerta used
social media, music, and music videos to enrich its members and promote their identity and image.
To fund Omerta, conspiracy members committed more than $1.2 million of counterfeiting by visiting
stores throughout the East Coast to illegally exchange counterfeit currency for U.S. currency. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, Savage, Roberts, and others filed for fraudulent UI benefits, falsely stating they
were unemployed and seeking employment. Through this fraud, Omerta received more than $443,000
in UI benefits to fund their illegal enterprise.
This investigation is joint with the FBI and USSS. United States v. Rakeim Savage (E.D. Pennsylvania)
22 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Pennsylvania Man Pled Guilty to Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Fraud and
Defrauding Local Car Dealerships
On February 26, 2026, Justin Heimbach pled guilty to mail fraud and wire fraud, arising from his
schemes to defraud the PUA program and multiple local car dealerships.
Heimbach, who operated a construction company called TeamKJ Construction, engaged in a scheme
that caused fraudulent PUA applications to be filed in the names of individuals allegedly no longer
employed by TeamKJ as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. He filed more than 30 PUA applications
in the names of various friends and associates. The applications contained a number of materially
false statements. Heimbach falsely inflated the wages reported to the Pennsylvania Department of
Labor and Industry (PADLI), as well as the total number of TeamKJ employees in order to support
the fraudulent PUA applications later filed. Heimbach also demanded that he be paid a portion of the
PUA funds received by individuals who listed unemployment from TeamKJ. He also enlisted others
to assist with collecting payment. Due to the fraudulent applications, PADLI disbursed more than
$550,000 in PUA funds.
In addition, Heimbach successfully defrauded multiple Lehigh Valley car dealerships. He purchased
vehicles in the names of other companies registered to or associated with him, and wrote checks for
those vehicles on bank accounts with insufficient balances to cover the transactions.
This investigation is joint with the FBI. United States v. Justin Heimbach (E.D. Pennsylvania)
Former Georgia State Representatives Pled Guilty to Unemployment
Insurance Fraud
On January 21, 2026, Karen Bennett, who resigned from her position as an elected member of the
Georgia House of Representatives, pled guilty to making false statements to fraudulently obtain
pandemic UI benefits.
On March 11, 2026, Dexter L. Sharper, as a current member of the Georgia House of Representatives,
pled guilty to false statements related to a claim for UI benefits. He later resigned from office.
Bennett, while serving in 2020 as a Georgia House Representative, applied for and submitted weekly
certifications to claim pandemic UI benefits for weeks in March through August 2020. On these forms,
she claimed her only earnings were $300 per week from the Georgia General Assembly. She stated
that her other employer, Metro Therapy Providers, Inc., would not allow her to work and that she was
actively seeking other employment. However, Bennett was the sole owner of Metro Therapy Providers,
Inc., and she performed administrative work from her home office—allowing the business to function
and generate revenues. Bennett also concealed her employment at a church.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 23
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Sharper, while serving as a Georgia State Representative, applied for benefits from April 2020 through
May 2021. On the weekly certifications, Sharper stated he had not worked or earned any wages, was
actively looking for work, and had not refused any work. However, Sharper was allegedly working and
earning money from 2–3 jobs each week.
This is a joint investigation with the FBI, Georgia Office of State Inspector General, and DeKalb
County District Attorney’s Office. United States v. Karen L. Bennett (N.D. Georgia), United States v.
Sharper – Dexter L. Sharper (N.D. Georgia)
24 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) administers four major workers’
compensation programs: Federal Employees’ Compensation, Energy Employees Occupational
Illness Compensation (Energy), Coal Mine Workers’ Compensation (Black Lung Benefits), and
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation.
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) program is the largest of the programs and
provides workers’ compensation coverage to millions of federal, postal, and other employees
for work-related injuries and illnesses. Benefits include wage replacement, payment for medical
care, vocational rehabilitation, and survivor benefits.
Special Report Relating to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act Special
Benefit Fund
The OIG contracted with KPMG LLP (KPMG) to audit the FECA Special Benefit Fund’s Schedule of
Actuarial Liability, Net Intra-Governmental Accounts Receivable, and Benefit Expense Fund as of, and
for the year ended, September 30, 2025. KPMG issued an unmodified opinion, meaning the schedule
was presented fairly in all material respects and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles. KPMG also performed certain tests of controls and compliance with laws and regulations
related to the fund. Its testing of controls found no deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting
that it considered to be significant deficiencies and/or material weaknesses. Its testing of compliance
found no instances of noncompliance or reportable conditions. Further, KPMG performed agreed-upon
procedures and identified certain differences as a result of performing the procedures over the actuarial
liability, net intra-governmental accounts receivable, and the benefit expense.
For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2026/22-26-001-04-431.pdf,
Report No. 22-26-001-04-431 (December 18, 2025).
Texas Doctor Sentenced to 8 .5 Years in Prison for $145 Million Health Care
Fraud Scheme
On February 24, 2026, orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Michael Taba, was sentenced to 102 months in prison
and ordered to pay more than $13 million in restitution for his role in a $145 million scheme to defraud
DOL’s OWCP through the submission of fraudulent claims for prescription compound creams.
Taba accepted bribes paid by pharmacy owners to prescribe medically unnecessary compound
creams to injured federal workers. During the multiyear scheme, pharmacy owners paid him millions
of dollars in illegal bribes and kickbacks for prescribing expensive compound medications. According
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 25
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
to trial evidence, medications were mixed in the pharmacies by untrained teenagers for about $15
per prescription. OWCP was then billed as much as $16,000 per prescription. Patients advised these
medications were ineffective and, in some instances, would cause pain and irritation to the skin.
Between May 2014 and March 2017, the pharmacies billed OWCP and the insurance company more
than $145 million and were paid more than $90 million for unnecessary prescriptions referred by Taba
and other medical providers.
This is a joint investigation with USPS OIG, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) OIG, and IRS
CI. United States v. Dehshid Nourian aka David Nourian (N.D. Texas)
Texas Chiropractor Pleads Guilty in Million-Dollar Health Care Fraud Conspiracy
Involving Federal Workers’ Compensation
On October 16, 2025, Demitrious Gilmore, a chiropractor licensed in the state of Texas, pled guilty to
conspiracy to commit health care fraud for his role in a multi-million dollar scheme to defraud a health
care benefit program administered by DOL’s OWCP. As part of his plea, he agreed that more than
$1.1 million in seized funds and a Texas property constituted proceeds of the fraud scheme.
From approximately January 2017 until about April 2023, Gilmore and at least two co-conspirators
submitted OWCP documents to become enrolled providers that were assigned provider billing
numbers. They opened various bank accounts in the names of clinics in which OWCP payments were
deposited, and recruited patients to the clinics. Through the clinics, Gilmore and his co-conspirators
submitted false and fraudulent claims to OWCP. In several instances, they billed OWCP for expensive
knee braces that claimants did not need or receive and for physical therapy that was never provided.
Gilmore and his co-conspirators also submitted claims for intravenous infusions and ultrasonic
devices that were medically unnecessary.
As part of the scheme, Gilmore and his co-conspirators each received a percentage of the funds paid
by OWCP for the false and fraudulent claims. In total, they billed OWCP more than $19 million and
were paid at least $17 million.
This is a joint investigation with USPS OIG. United States v. Demitrious Gilmore (N.D. Texas)
Virginia Firefighter Sentenced to 12 Months of Home Confinement for
Fraudulently Obtaining Federal Workers' Compensation Benefits
On October 22, 2025, Richard Hyland was sentenced to 12 months of home confinement and
ordered to pay restitution of more than $479,000 to the federal government. He previously pled guilty
to making false statements to obtain federal workers’ compensation benefits.
26 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Worker and Retiree Benefit Programs
In 2014, while employed as a firefighter by the VA, Hyland suffered a back injury and began receiving
workers’ compensation benefits. To continue receiving benefits, Hyland falsely certified annually to
DOL that he was not working or serving as a volunteer. However, as early as March 2017, he worked
as a tow-truck driver, a long-haul truck driver, and a volunteer firefighter. Between March 2017 and
December 2024, Hyland received almost $480,000 in federal workers’ compensation benefits while
failing to report his employment.
This was a joint investigation with VA OIG. United States v. Richard Hyland (D. New Jersey)
Three United States Postal Employees Pled Guilty in a Conspiracy to Obtain
OWCP Mileage Reimbursement
On February 4, 2026, Coretta Turner pled guilty to one count of making false statements to obtain
federal employee’s compensation benefits. On February 9 and 26, 2026, respectively, Tameka
Bourne and Tammy Briggs both pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud. They conspired to submit travel
vouchers to DOL’s OWCP in order to fraudulently obtain benefits.
Turner, Bourne, and Briggs were each employed by the USPS and filed on-the-job injury claims with
OWCP for purported injuries sustained while employed. They conspired to submit false and fraudulent
travel vouchers to OWCP, claiming reimbursement for land-based and aquatic therapy sessions that
they did not actually attend.
As a result of the scheme, OWCP paid more than $90,000 in reimbursements.
This is a joint investigation with USPS OIG and the FBI. United States v. Briggs et al. (S.D. Texas)
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 27
Employment and
Training Programs
Veteran’s Employment and
Training Service
Foreign Labor Certification Programs
Employment and Training Programs
Veteran’s Employment and Training Service
The mission of the Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) is to prepare
America’s service members, veterans, and military spouses for meaningful careers, provide
them with employment resources and expertise, protect their employment rights, and promote
their employment opportunities.
COVID-19 MINIMALLY AFFECTED THE JOBS FOR VETERANS STATE
GRANTS PROGRAM AMID WEAKNESSES IN ELIGIBILITY VALIDATION
PRACTICES
Why OIG Conducted the Audit
The Jobs for Veterans State Grants (JVSG) program allocates federal funds to 54 state workforce
agencies (states), which consist of all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, to support various positions, including Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program
(DVOP) specialists, who provide career and training services to eligible veterans and spouses with
significant barriers to employment (SBE). These services are also offered to other eligible persons,
such as transitioning service members and caregivers of eligible veterans.
To evaluate program effectiveness, the ETA establishes performance metrics to assess program
outcomes and overall success. VETS provides states with technical assistance and oversight to
support effective program implementation.
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic was declared a national emergency. To assess the
pandemic’s impact, we conducted a performance audit to answer the following question:
How did the COVID-19 pandemic affect the JVSG program’s operations and effectiveness
in providing training and employment services to eligible veterans and spouses with
significant barriers to employment, as well as other eligible persons?
What OIG Found
We found the COVID-19 pandemic minimally affected the overall operations and effectiveness of the
JVSG program in providing training and employment services to eligible veterans and spouses with
SBE, as well as other eligible persons, as evidenced by the program reportedly meeting or exceeding
its employment rate goals. However, this apparent success may be misleading due to weaknesses
30 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Employment and Training Programs
identified in the program’s eligibility validation practices. Specifically, while VETS’ policy, developed
in collaboration with ETA and issued in April 2014, allows individuals to self-attest their SBE eligibility
without documentation to receive DVOP services, it does not include procedures for subsequent
validation, calling into question the accuracy of the reported outcomes.
In June 2020 and October 2022, ETA issued guidance specifying documentation needed to validate
eligibility, such as signed forms or electronic signatures for self-attestation. However, VETS did not
update its policy to align with ETA’s guidance, resulting in conflicting requirements that may have
hindered validation efforts. Our review of case files for 180 JVSG program participants who received
DVOP services from Program Year (PY) 2020 to PY 2022, covering periods before, during, and after the
pandemic, across 45 states, found the files for 54 participants, or 30 percent, were incomplete, meaning
they lacked documentation or contained inadequate documentation to validate their eligibility. These
findings raise questions about the eligibility of those served and the accuracy of reported program
outcomes for assessing program performance during the pandemic.
Additionally, among the reviewed case files for 12 participants from one state, files for 11 individuals
indicated they did not meet the participant eligibility criteria for DVOP services. VETS’ program staff
later clarified that errors in the state’s management information system had incorrectly recorded these
individuals as participants. Because VETS’ policy limits DVOP services to eligible veterans and spouses
with SBE, as well as other eligible persons, these system errors raise questions about the eligibility of
all participants who received DVOP services in this state from PY 2020 to PY 2022. Consequently, up
to $8.4 million in JVSG funds spent by the state to support DVOP specialists during that period may
represent unsupported costs, indicating a potential waste of federal funds.
What OIG Recommended
We made three recommendations to VETS to revise its current program policies to strengthen
eligibility validation procedures and conduct a comprehensive assessment to determine the full extent
of unsupported costs caused by ineligible individuals recorded as program participants. After report
issuance, VETS updated its position and agreed with our recommendations.
Read the Full Report
For more information, go to: https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2026/06-26-001-02-203.pdf,
Report No. 06-26-001-02-203 (January 22, 2026).
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 31
Employment and Training Programs
Foreign Labor Certification Programs
ETA administers a number of foreign labor certification (FLC) programs that allow U.S. employers
to employ foreign workers to meet domestic worker shortages, including: PERM, CW-1, H-1B,
H-2A, and H-2B. The PERM program allows an employer to hire foreign nationals to work in
the United States on a permanent basis while the CW-1, H-1B, H-2A, and H-2B programs are
for temporary employment in the United States. ETA ensures the admission of foreign workers
into the United States on a PERM, CW-1, H-2A, or H-2B visa will not adversely affect job
opportunities, wages, and working conditions of U.S. workers. The Department’s Wage and Hour
Division (WHD) has been delegated as the enforcement authority to ensure employers in H-1B,
H-2A, and H-2B programs are in compliance with labor certification requirements. The OIG also
investigates labor trafficking cases that involve fraud against FLC programs.
Illinois Woman Pled Guilty to Conspiring to Commit Immigration Fraud
On February 10, 2026, Felicitas Cordero pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit immigration
fraud for her involvement in a scheme to bring foreign nationals to the United States and unlawfully
obtain H-1B and EB-2 visas.
From approximately June 2011 until at least May 2015, Cordero conspired with a co-defendant and
others to encourage and induce foreign nationals to reside and work in the United States in violation
of the law. She received approximately $500 for each nurse that she helped unlawfully obtain an H-1B
or EB-2 visa. Between approximately 2011 and 2015, she and her co-defendant unlawfully assisted at
least 148 foreign-national nurses come to, enter, and/or reside in the United States.
More specifically, Cordero and her co-defendant instructed nurses from the Philippines to take
fraudulent employment documents to consular interviews and to provide consular officials with false
information. To unlawfully obtain the visas, Cordero, her co-defendant, and a third individual falsely
certified and caused others to falsely certify that foreign nationals would be employed by a company
in managerial, supervisory, or other higher-level positions, when they knew that was not true. The
falsely certified documents were then submitted to DOL and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services.
This is a joint investigation with HSI and U.S. Department of State Diplomatic Security Service.
United States v. Felicitas Cordero (N.D. Illinois)
32 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Single Audits
Single Audits
Single Audits
A single audit provides an organization-wide examination of an entity expending federal
assistance funds received for its operations. The audit is typically conducted annually by an
independent certified public accountant, and its objective is to provide assurance to the U.S.
government regarding the management and use of funds by recipients such as states, schools,
universities, and nonprofits.
Quality Control Review of Single Audits
Under the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Uniform Guidance,1 cognizant and oversight
federal agencies ensure the implementation of single audit requirements. A nonfederal entity
expending more than $50 million in a year in federal awards has a cognizant agency for audit while a
nonfederal entity expending $50 million or less in federal awards annually has an oversight agency.2
DOL is currently cognizant for 12 entities and oversees another 95 entities.
The OIG periodically performs Quality Control Reviews (QCRs) of the cognizant and oversight entities’
single audits. During this reporting period, we conducted three QCRs: (1) as the cognizant agency for
the Single Audit of the Chicago Cook Workforce Partnership for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024,
and (2) for the Single Audit of the State of Hawaii Department of Accounting and General Services for
the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024, and (3) as the oversight agency for the Single Audit of Easter
Seals, Inc. and the Easter Seals Foundation for the Year Ended December 31, 2024.
Quality Control Review of the Single Audit of the Chicago Cook Workforce
Partnership for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024
We performed a QCR of the independent certified public accounting firm Evolve Financial I’s
single audit of the Chicago Cook Workforce Partnership for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024.
Our QCR covered the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) cluster and the WIOA
national dislocated worker/Workforce Investment Act national emergency grants, which totaled
about $61 million of DOL major program funds reported as expended.
1 Uniform Guidance refers to 2 C.F.R. Part 200, OMB’s “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and
Audit Requirements for Federal Awards.”
2 Per 2 CFR 200.513(a)(1): A nonfederal entity expending more than $50 million a year in federal awards must
have a cognizant agency for audit. The cognizant agency for audit must be the federal agency that provides the
largest amount of direct funding (as listed on the nonfederal entity's Schedule of expenditures of federal awards,
see § 200.510(b)) unless OMB designates a specific cognizant agency for audit. When the direct funding represents
less than 25 percent of the total expenditures (as direct and subawards) by the nonfederal entity, then the federal
agency with the predominant amount of total funding is the designated cognizant agency for audit.
34 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Single Audits
We determined the single audit report and audit work performed generally met the requirements
of OMB uniform guidance, generally accepted government auditing standards, and generally
accepted auditing standards. However, we found Evolve Financial I needed to strengthen its quality
management policies and procedures to prevent self-review of audit documentation. Evolve Financial
I agreed with the matter noted and took the corrective actions necessary to properly address it. Our
report did not contain any recommendations.
For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2026/24-26-001-50-598.pdf,
Report No. 24-26-001-50-598 (January 13, 2026).
Quality Control Review for the Single Audit of the State of Hawaii Department of
Accounting and General Services for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024
We performed a QCR of the independent certified public accounting firm Accuity LLP’s single audit
of the State of Hawaii Department of Accounting and General Services for the fiscal year ended June
30, 2024. Our QCR covered unemployment insurance, COVID-19 unemployment insurance, WIOA
cluster, and the WIOA national dislocated worker/Workforce Investment Act national emergency
grants, which totaled about $291 million of DOL major program funds reported as expended.
We determined Accuity LLP’s audit work on the single audit was acceptable and met the requirements
of OMB uniform guidance, generally accepted government auditing standards, and generally
accepted auditing standards. Our report did not contain any recommendations.
For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2026/24-26-003-50-598.pdf,
Report No. 24-26-003-50-598 (March 12, 2026).
Quality Control Review of the Single Audit of Easter Seals, Inc . and the
Easter Seals Foundation for the Year Ended December 31, 2024
We performed a QCR of the independent certified public accounting firm Plante & Moran, PLLC’s single
audit of Easter Seals, Inc. and the Easter Seals Foundation for the year ended December 31, 2024.
Our QCR covered the Senior Community Service Employment Program, which totaled about $23 million
of DOL major program funds reported as expended.
We determined the single audit report and the audit work performed generally met the requirements
of OMB uniform guidance, generally accepted government auditing standards, and generally
accepted auditing standards. However, we found Plante & Moran, PLLC needed to correctly report
the Type A/B threshold. Plante & Moran, PLLC agreed with the matter identified and took the
corrective actions necessary to properly address it. Our report did not contain any recommendations.
For more information, go to https://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2026/24-26-002-50-598.pdf,
Report No. 24-26-002-50-598 (January 13, 2026).
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 35
OIG Congressional
Testimony
OIG Congressional Testimony
OIG Congressional Testimony
During this semiannual reporting period, the OIG provided a statement for the record for one
congressional hearing. The full text of our testimony is available on our website at https://www.
oig.dol.gov/testimony.htm.
March 5, 2026—House Committee on Ways and Means: Subcommittee on Work
and Welfare
The OIG provided a statement for the record on “Reclaiming 'Forgotten' Fraudulent Pandemic
Unemployment Funds Frozen by Banks.”
38 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Legislative
Recommendations
Legislative Recommendations
Legislative Recommendations
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires the OIG to review existing or
proposed legislation and regulations and to make recommendations in the Semiannual
Report to Congress concerning their impact both on the economy and efficiency of the DOL’s
programs and operations and on the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse. The OIG continues
to propose the following legislative actions to increase efficiency and protect the Department’s
programs and operations.
The OIG, in congressional testimonies and through other means, has highlighted four high-priority
recommendations for congressional consideration:
1. Immediately extend the statute of limitations for fraud involving pandemic-related UI programs;
2. Ensure DOL and the OIG have permanent ongoing, timely, and complete access to UI claimant
data and wage records;
3. Grant the OIG statutory authority to participate in asset forfeiture funds to combat UI fraud and
other crimes; and
4. Ensure effective payment integrity controls to reduce improper payments in all UI programs,
including temporary ones, such as through broader requirements for mandatory cross-matching.
Details on these and other legislative recommendations follow.
Immediately Extend the Statute of Limitations Associated with Pandemic-Related
UI Fraud
The statute of limitations for many of the OIG’s pandemic-related UI fraud investigations continues to
expire. Unless Congress acts quickly, the opportunity to extend the statute of limitations associated
with pandemic-related UI fraud will soon be lost entirely. Given that the statutes often used to
prosecute UI fraud have a 5-year limitation, and the pandemic-related UI programs were initiated
by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act on March 27, 2020—and largely ended
on September 6, 2021—many groups and individuals that have defrauded the UI program may now
escape justice.
Even with the OIG’s tireless efforts, a failure to extend the current statute of limitations associated
with UI fraud means federal law enforcement will have to stop short of fully investigating and
prosecuting some of the most egregious cases of pandemic UI fraud. This is particularly the case
given the volume and complexity of UI fraud matters we investigate. Due to the incredible volume
of pandemic-related UI matters, the OIG was simply unable to investigate the millions of potentially
fraudulent claims within the 5-year window, despite devoting over 90 percent of our investigative
40 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Legislative Recommendations
resources to the effort. The SBA faced a similar issue regarding the statute of limitations for
pandemic-related fraud in the PPP and EIDL programs. To address those concerns, Congress passed
legislation to extend associated statutes of limitations.
Congress could likewise extend the statute of limitations for fraud associated with pandemic-related
UI programs. This would help ensure both investigators and prosecutors have time to effectively
pursue and hold accountable those who defrauded UI programs during the pandemic. With an
extension of the statute of limitations, and a corresponding increase in resources, the OIG could
continue to vigorously pursue those who defrauded pandemic UI programs, particularly by means of
large-scale identity theft schemes.
Ensure DOL and OIG Access to UI Claimant Data and Wage Records
In addition to the authority provided by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, legislative
action by Congress that permanently authorizes DOL and the OIG to have ongoing, timely, and
complete access to UI claimant data and wage records of SWAs and UI-administering agencies in
U.S. territories3 is crucial to effectively carry out our respective oversight responsibilities, strengthen
the integrity of the UI program, and safeguard federal and state funds.
On August 29, 2025, DOL announced a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to require the disclosure and
sharing of state-level UI data with federal officials, including the OIG. This rulemaking aligns with the
President’s Executive Order 14243, Stopping Waste, Fraud, and Abuse by Eliminating Information
Silos, which underscores the Administration’s commitment to eliminating barriers that hinder federal
oversight efforts. DOL stated the change is designed to improve coordination in detecting fraud,
closing system vulnerabilities, and preventing improper payments. ETA is currently reviewing public
comments received on the proposed rule.
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Congressional Budget Justification emphasized the importance of
improving UI program integrity and reducing fraud in the UI system. DOL stated that it has a strong
interest in working with Congress to combat fraud and reduce improper payments and noted that OIG
access to states’ UI data would support audits and investigations to identify fraud, waste, abuse, and
inefficiencies.
While DOL has initiated the rulemaking process to improve the OIG’s access to UI claimant and wage
records, this approach is inherently limited by the time required to finalize rules and the vulnerability of
3 Fifty states, as well as the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia,
administer UI through a SWA. In addition, U.S. Territories that administered pandemic-UI programs included
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Guam,
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 41
Legislative Recommendations
regulatory solutions to reversal. Ongoing, timely, and complete permanent access to the UI claimant
data and wage records of SWAs and UI-administering agencies in U.S. territories is essential to
preventing fraud, safeguarding program integrity, and strengthening oversight of UI program funds.
Authorize OIG Participation in Asset Forfeiture Funds
Legislative authority in the area of asset forfeiture would increase the OIG’s ability to effectively and
efficiently investigate UI fraud and other crimes. Allowing the OIG to recover fraudulently obtained
funds would deprive criminals of their ill-gotten proceeds.4 Asset forfeiture is a critical legal tool that
serves a number of compelling law enforcement purposes. It is designed to deprive criminals of the
proceeds of their crimes, to break the financial backbone of organized criminal syndicates, and to
recover property that may be used to compensate victims and deter criminal activity.
While the OIG could make significant use of asset forfeiture in our UI fraud investigations, we could
also use that authority in other areas of our investigative jurisdiction, including labor trafficking
involving the Department’s foreign labor certification programs; the OWCP provider fraud matters;
and labor racketeering matters involving labor unions and their affiliated employee benefit plans.
Currently, the OIG is not a participant in the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) Forfeiture
Fund or the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Assets Forfeiture Fund. This lack of authority to
participate limits the OIG’s ability to effectively recover proceeds of UI fraud and other crimes under
the OIG’s jurisdiction. Allowing the OIG to participate in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund or the DOJ
Assets Forfeiture Fund would allow the OIG to better combat UI fraud and other crimes in the future.
Enact the UI Integrity Legislative Proposals
The OIG encourages Congress to consider and adopt key DOL proposals to aid the Department’s
efforts to combat improper payments in the UI program. In its FY 2025 Congressional Budget
Justification, the Department proposed provisions designed to provide new and expanded tools
and controls for states to help ensure workers are properly paid and to prevent improper payments,
including fraud, in the UI system.
The Department stated the proposals collectively would result in savings of more than $3 billion
over the 10-year budget window. These are similar to DOL proposals included in prior DOL budget
requests that would help address UI program integrity and the high improper payment rates in the UI
program. These proposals include the following:
4 According to the FBI’s law enforcement bulletin titled Asset Seizure and Forfeiture: A Basic Guide, “Asset
forfeiture entails a legal process whereby the ownership of an asset is removed from individuals because they used
it illegally, received or derived it from illicit activity, or employed it to facilitate a crime. The vesting of title with the
government follows a civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.”
42 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Legislative Recommendations
• require SWAs to cross-match UI claims against the National Directory of New Hires;
• require SWAs to cross-match UI claims with a system(s)…that contains information on individuals
who are incarcerated;
• require states to disclose information to the OIG;
• allow SWAs to retain up to 5 percent of recovered fraudulent UI overpayments for program
integrity use;
• require SWAs to use [UI] penalty and interest collections solely for UI administration; and
• permit the Department to collect and store states’ UI claimant data.
The Department did not include these legislative proposals in its FY 2026 Congressional Budget
Justification. However, the proposals are consistent with previous OIG reporting to improve the UI
program. To maintain UI program integrity, the OIG has recommended establishing legislation that
requires SWAs to cross-match high risk areas, such as UI benefits paid to individuals with Social
Security numbers filed in multiple states and belonging to deceased persons.
Lack of Fiscal Year Limitations Hinders DOL’s Ability to Properly Manage
Temporary Emergency Program Funds
The OIG encourages Congress to implement a time limit for states’ acceptance of UI emergency
program benefit claims after the expiration of the eligibility periods for current and future temporary
emergency benefit programs.
During our audit of the Mixed Earners Unemployment Compensation (MEUC) program, we found
that, under the enacting law and agreements between the Department and SWAs, SWAs are entitled
to the reimbursement of 100 percent of the cost of eligible benefits paid under the MEUC program no
matter when the claim is processed. Funds for this program, like most pandemic-related UI programs,
were appropriated by Congress without fiscal year limitation. Because of this, ETA continues to set
aside pandemic funds to reimburse SWAs for eligible MEUC claims. ETA must reimburse states until
all eligible claims from the program period have been administered—even if this requires the agency
to do so years after the conclusion of the program period in September 2021.
If the enacting law and subsequent agreements between DOL and the SWAs contained a termination
date by which all claims must be administered or returned to Treasury, remaining pandemic funds
could be returned to Treasury sooner and reprogrammed for more urgent needs of the American
taxpayer. The pandemic assistance funds, such as MEUC, were authorized to quickly meet the urgent
financial needs of American taxpayers during the pandemic. However, paying pandemic-related
claims long after the pandemic has ended and the U.S. economy has recovered is counterproductive
to the original intent of the funds—even if claimants are eligible under the program period.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 43
Legislative Recommendations
Provide Authority to Ensure the Integrity of the H-1B Program
If DOL is to have a meaningful role in the foreign labor certification process for H-1B specialty
occupation visas, it must have the statutory authority to ensure the integrity of that process. This
authority should include the ability to verify the accuracy of information provided on labor condition
applications and to initiate its own H-1B investigations more broadly.
Currently, unlike H-2A and H-2B investigations, DOL’s authority to investigate H-1B employers is
limited and typically requires a complaint by an aggrieved party or a credible source. In the absence
of such a complaint, with limited exceptions, DOL may only initiate its own H-1B investigations if the
Secretary personally certifies there is reasonable cause to believe the employer is not in compliance.5
Even assuming such personal certification is obtained, the scope of Secretary-certified investigations
is limited. These investigations are restricted to willful, pattern-or-practice, or substantial violations
of the Labor Condition Application requirements regarding prevailing wage and benefits, working
conditions, labor disputes, recruitment of U.S. workers, and notification of applications.
Additionally, such an investigation must be conducted under specific procedures and may only be
initiated for reasons other than completeness and obvious inaccuracies by the employer in complying
with H-1B requirements. In most circumstances, a notice also must be provided to the employer to
allow a rebuttal of the allegations before the investigation begins.
Our concern with the Department’s limited ability to ensure the integrity of the certification process
is heightened by the results of OIG audits and investigations showing the program is susceptible to
significant fraud and abuse, including by certain employers and attorneys. For example, some staffing
companies utilize the H-1B program without having scheduled jobs already lined up. Some employers
and attorneys misrepresent their need for workers to DOL, then reassign the extra workers to other
companies or require foreign workers to find their own work. There have also been instances when
companies illegally generated profits by requiring foreign workers to pay fees and recurring payments
to secure H-1B visas.
Without statutory authority, the Department generally cannot verify employers’ attestations to H-1B
certifications except in limited circumstances, including when an aggrieved party or a credible source
files a complaint. As some foreign workers may be reluctant to file complaints for fear of retaliation
and losing their jobs, the Department’s process is unlikely to result in verification action being taken.
5 On September 19, 2025, the Secretary announced DOL will be using Secretary-certified investigations.
44 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Legislative Recommendations
Amend Pension Protection Laws
Legislative changes to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and criminal
penalties for ERISA violations would enhance the protection of assets in pension plans. To this end,
the OIG continues to recommend the following legislative actions:
• Repeal ERISA’s limited-scope audit exemption. This exemption excludes pension plan
assets invested in financial institutions, such as banks and savings and loan firms, from audits of
employee benefit plans. Notwithstanding recent changes to auditing standards that strengthen
limited-scope audits, these audits prevent independent public accountants who are auditing
pension plans from rendering an opinion on the plans’ financial statements in accordance with
professional auditing standards. These “no opinion” audits offer weak assurance of asset integrity
either to plan participants or to the Department.
• Expand the authority of the Employee Benefits Security Administration to correct
substandard benefit plan audits and ensure that auditors with poor records do not perform
additional audits . Changes should include providing the Employee Benefits Security Administration
with greater enforcement authority over registration, suspension, and debarment as well as the ability
to levy civil penalties against employee benefit plan auditors. The ability to correct substandard audits
and take action against auditors is essential because benefit plan audits help protect participants and
beneficiaries by ensuring the proper valuation of plan assets and computation of benefits.
• Require direct reporting of ERISA violations to DOL . Under current law, a pension plan auditor
who finds a potential ERISA violation is responsible for reporting it to the plan administrator but
not directly to DOL. To ensure improprieties are addressed, we recommend plan administrators or
auditors be required to report potential ERISA violations directly to DOL. This change would ensure
the timely reporting of violations and would more actively involve auditors in safeguarding pension
assets as a first line of defense against the abuse of workers’ pension plans.
Improve the Integrity of the FECA Program
Legislative reforms should be considered in the following areas to improve the effectiveness and
integrity of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) program:
• Provide statutory access to the National Directory of New Hires and Social Security wage
records . Currently, the Department has no direct access to the National Directory of New Hires
data and can access Social Security wage information only if a claimant gives it permission.
Granting the Department and the OIG routine access to these databases would aid in detecting
fraud committed by individuals receiving FECA wage loss compensation but failing to report
income they have earned.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 45
Legislative Recommendations
• Establish a 3-day waiting period at the beginning of the claims process for all federal
employees . FECA legislation provides for a 3-day waiting period before receiving FECA
compensation. This waiting period is intended to discourage the filing of frivolous claims. However,
the legislation places the waiting period for federal non-postal employees at the end of the 45-day
continuation-of-pay period, thereby negating its purpose. Legislation that passed in 2006 placed
the waiting period for postal employees immediately after an employment-related injury. To ensure
a true waiting period before an employee applies for benefits, the law should place the period
immediately after an employment-related injury for all federal employees, not exclusively postal
employees.
• Allow the temporary suspension of medical providers pending the outcome of criminal
investigations . While FECA regulations allow OWCP to automatically exclude a provider who
has been convicted of fraud from participating in the FECA program, OWCP cannot suspend
payments to a provider who has been criminally indicted for alleged fraudulent billing practices.
The Department can pursue a government-wide non-procurement suspension in such
circumstances. However, this process and the various procedures involved can be lengthy and
rely on the Department’s Suspension and Debarment Official, delaying OWCP’s ability to protect
the FECA program from medical providers alleged to have engaged in fraudulent practices.
Legislative changes are necessary to enable DOL to suspend a medical provider who has
been indicted for alleged fraudulent billing practices from providing further medical services and
receiving payments from the program until the indictment is resolved.
46 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Appendices
Reporting Requirements Under
the Following Acts
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as Amended
REPORTING REQUIREMENT PAGE
Recommendations on existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to the None to
Section 4(a)(2)
programs and operations of DOL report
Description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration
Section 5(a)(1) of programs and operations of the establishment and associated reports and All
recommendations for corrective action made by the Office
Identification of each recommendation made before the reporting period, for which
Section 5(a)(2) corrective action has not been completed, including the potential costs savings associated All
with the recommendation
Section 5(a)(3) Summary of significant investigations closed during the reporting period 10-32
Identification of the total number of convictions during the reporting period resulting from
Section 5(a)(4) 74
investigations
Information regarding each audit, inspection, or evaluation report issued during the
reporting period, including—
(A) a listing of each audit, inspection, or evaluation;
Section 5(a)(5) (B) if applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for 52
the dollar value of unsupported costs) and the dollar value of recommendations that funds
be put to better use, including whether a management decision had been made by the end
of the reporting period
Information regarding any management decision made during the reporting period with
Section 5(a)(6) 56
respect to any audit, inspection, or evaluation issued during a previous reporting period
Information from the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act Section 804(b) —
None to
Section 5(a) (7) instances in which an agency has not met intermediate target dates in a remediation plan,
report
and the reasons
Peer review reporting:
Section 5(a)(8) (A) results of any peer review conducted by another OIG, or 76
(B) a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted
None to
Section 5(a)(9) Outstanding peer review recommendations
report
48 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Section 5(a) Peer reviews conducted by the OIG and recommendations outstanding or not fully None to
(10) implemented report
Statistical tables on investigative findings showing total number of:
(A) reports issued;
Section 5(a) (B) persons referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for prosecution;
74
(11) (C) persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities; and
(D) indictments and criminal informations that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting
authorities
Section 5(a)
Metrics used for developing the data for the statistical tables 74
(12)
Summary of investigations of senior government employees where allegations of
Section 5(a) None to
misconduct were substantiated, including the facts, circumstances, status, and disposition
(13) report
of the matter
Description of whistleblower retaliation cases including information about the official found
Section 5(a) None to
to have engaged in retaliation and what, if any, consequences that establishment imposed
(14) report
to hold that official accountable
Information related to interference by the establishment, including—
(A) a detailed description of any attempt by the establishment to interfere with the
independence of the Office, including—
Section 5(a) (i) with budget constraints designed to limit the capabilities of the Office; and
None to
(15) and (ii) incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the
report
Section 6(c)(2) Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information,
including the justification of the establishment for such action; and
(B) a summary of each report made to the head of the establishment under section 6(c)(2)
during the reporting period
(A) Descriptions of inspections, evaluations, audits, and investigations that are closed and
Section 5(a) were not disclosed to the public; and None to
(16) (B) Descriptions of investigations conducted by the office involving a senior government report
employee that are closed and were not disclosed to the public
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
REPORTING REQUIREMENT PAGE
Section
Peer review reporting 76
989(C)
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 49
Appendices
Funds Recommended for Better Use
Number Dollar Value
Funds Put to a Better Use Agreed to by DOL6
of Reports ($ millions)
For which no management decision had been made as of the commencement of the
2 $1,313
reporting period
Issued during the reporting period 0 $0
Subtotal 2 $1,313
For which a management decision was made during the reporting period:
• Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to by management 1 $21
• Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to by management
For which no management decision had been made as of the end of the reporting period 1 $1,292
Number Dollar Value
Funds Put to a Better Use Implemented by DOL
of Reports ($ millions)
For which final action had not been taken as of the commencement of the reporting period 5 $73,786
For which management or appeal decisions were made during the reporting period 1 $21
Subtotal 6 $73,807
For which management decision was made during the reporting period:
• Dollar value of recommendations that were actually completed 1 $21
• Dollar value of recommendations that management has subsequently concluded should not or
could not be implemented or completed
For which no final action had been taken by the end of the reporting period 5 $73,786
6 The term “recommendation that funds be put to better use” means a recommendation by the OIG that funds
could be used more efficiently or achieve greater program effectiveness if management took actions to implement
and complete the recommendation. This term is defined by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and
includes, among other things, reductions in future outlays; deobligation of funds from programs or operations;
costs not incurred in the future by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the
establishment, a contractor, or a grantee; and any other savings specifically identified, including reverting funds to
Treasury to be used for other purposes.
50 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Questioned Costs
Questioned
Number
Resolution Activity: Questioned Costs7 Costs
of Reports
($ millions)
For which no management decision had been made as of the commencement of the reporting
4 $374
period (as adjusted)
Issued during the reporting period 1 $8
Subtotal 5 $382
For which a management decision was made during the reporting period:
• Dollar value of disallowed costs 2 $28
• Dollar value of costs not disallowed 0 $0
For which no management decision had been made as of the end of the reporting period 3 $354
For which no management decision had been made within six months of issuance 2 $346
Disallowed
Number
Closure Activity: Disallowed Costs8 Costs
of Reports
($ millions)
For which final action had not been taken as of the commencement of the reporting period
3 $295
(as adjusted)
For which management or appeal decisions were made during the reporting period 2 $28
Subtotal 5 $323
For which final action was taken during the reporting period:
• Dollar value of disallowed costs that were recovered 0 $0
• Dollar value of disallowed costs that were written off 0 $0
• Dollar value of disallowed costs that entered appeal status 0 $0
For which no final action had been taken by the end of the reporting period 5 $323
7 As defined by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, questioned costs include alleged violations of law,
regulations, contracts, grants, or agreements; costs not supported by adequate documentation; or the expenditure of
funds for an intended purpose that was unnecessary or unreasonable.
8 Disallowed costs are costs that the OIG questioned during an audit as unsupported or unallowable and that the
grant/contracting officer has determined the auditee should repay. The Department is responsible for collecting the
debts established. The amount collected may be less than the amount disallowed, and monies recovered usually
cannot be used to fund other program operations and are returned to Treasury.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 51
Appendices
Final Audit Reports Issued
Management Decision Made by
Number of Recommendations Funds Put To Better Use ($)
Questioned Costs ($)
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued
End of Reporting Period9
Employment and Training Administration
COVID-19 Minimally Affected the Jobs for Veteran State
Grants Program Amid Weaknesses in Eligibility Validation
3 $8,436,366 $0 Yes
Practices;
Report No. 06-26-001-02-203; 01/22/26
Total (1 Report)
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
Special Report Relating to the Federal Employees’ No
Compensation Act Special Benefit Fund September 30, 2025; 0 $0 $0 Response
Report No. 22-26-001-04-431; 12/18/25 Required
Total (1 Report)
Final Audit Total (2 Reports) 3 $8,436,366 $0
9 The management decisions documented in this table refer to decisions made from April 1, 2025, to September
30, 2025. Management decisions noted in the Funds Put to a Better Use and Questioned Cost tables include
information from both current and prior semiannual reporting periods.
52 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Other Reports
Management Decision
Number of
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Made by End of
Recommendations
Reporting Period
Congressional Testimony
Testimony before the U .S . House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means
Reclaiming ‘Forgotten’ Fraudulent Pandemic Unemployment Funds
0 No Response Required
Frozen by Banks; Report No. 19-26-001-03-315; 03/05/26
Total (1 Report)
Employment and Training Programs
Quality Control Review of the Single Audit of the Chicago Cook Workforce
Partnership for the Year Ended June 30, 2024; 0 No Response Required
Report No. 24-26-001-50-598; 01/13/26
Quality Control Review of the Single Audit of Easter Seals, Inc. and the
Easter Seals Foundation for the Year Ended December 31, 2024; 0 No Response Required
Report No. 24-26-002-50-598; 01/13/26
Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration Needs
to Ensure State Workforce Agencies Take Action to Recover Significant
0 No Response Required
Unemployment Insurance Holdings Still Held by Financial Institution 1’s
Prepaid Card Program; Report No. 50-26-001-03-315; 01/30/26
Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration Needs
to Ensure State Workforce Agencies Take Action to Recover Significant
0 No Response Required
Unemployment Insurance Holdings Still Held by Financial Institution 2’s
Prepaid Card Program; Report No. 50-26-002-03-315; 02/10/26
Quality Control Review for the Single Audit of the State of Hawaii,
Department of Accounting and General Services, for the Fiscal Year 0 No Response Required
Ended June 30, 2024; Report No. 24-26-003-50-598; 03/12/26
Total (5 Reports)
Other Reports Total (6 Reports) 0
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 53
Appendices
Unresolved Audit Reports Over 6 Months Old
Number of Unresolved
Questioned
Agency Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued
Recommendations
Costs ($)
Agency Management Decision or Grant/Contracting Officer’s Final Determination Did Not Resolve;
OIG Negotiating with Agency
EBSA Faced Challenges Enforcing Compliance with Mental Health Parity
EBSA 5 $0
Laws and Requirements; Report No. 09-25-001-12-001; 02/19/25
Unemployment Insurance Overpayments Related to Work Search
ETA Underscore the Need for More Consistent State Requirements; 1 $0
Report No. 04-21-001-03-315; 09/29/21
Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to
ETA Improve Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program; 2 $0
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23
COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile and Return to the U.S. Treasury
ETA Nearly $5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary Unemployment 1 $105,100,000
Insurance Program; Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23
ETA Did Not Ensure States Sufficiently Implemented the Mixed Earners
ETA Unemployment Compensation Program; 1 $0
Report No. 19-24-005-03-315; 09/11/24
COVID-19: ETA Could Have Done More to Ensure States Had Sufficient
ETA Staffing to Deliver Timely Pandemic Unemployment Benefits; 1 $0
Report No. 19-25-002-03-315; 11/22/24
ETA and State Workforce Agencies Need to Do More to Recover Pandemic
ETA 4 $0
UI Program Improper Payments; Report No. 19-25-003-03-315; 04/01/25
COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States’ Efforts to Identify
ETA 1 $0
Multistate UI Fraud; Report No. 19-25-004-03-315; 08/04/25
ETA Did Not Ensure ARPA Grants Demonstrated Improvements in Access to
ETA 1 $0
Unemployment Benefits; Report No. 19-25-006-03-315; 08/28/25
COVID-19: Recovery of Millions in Pandemic-Related UI Overpayments
ETA 1 $240,973,884
Improperly Waived, Including Fraud; Report No. 19-25-009-03-315; 09/25/25
MSHA Needs to Provide Better Oversight of Emergency Response Plans;
MSHA 2 $0
Report No. 05-17-002-06-001; 03/31/17
COVID-19: MSHA Did Not Complete or Accurately Report Mandatory
MSHA 7 $0
Inspections; Report No. 19-24-001-06-001; 10/17/23
Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Miner Safety and Health in At Least
Three U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mandatory Inspections
MSHA 1 $0
and Conducted Inappropriate Oversight of Mines in the Pacific Territories;
Report No. 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24
54 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Without an IT Modernization Framework, DOL Is Vulnerable to Inadequate
OASAM Resource Prioritization for Ensuring Security and Availability of DOL 2 $0
Systems; Report No. 23-24-002-07-725; 11/17/23
DOL Implemented Its Wireless Network Securely, Though Security Gaps
OASAM Exist in Testing, Updating, Patching, and Continuous Review; 2 $0
Report No. 23-24-003-07-720; 09/11/2410
FY 2024 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: Continued Improvement of
OASAM Information System Security Program; 2 $0
Report No. 23-25-002-07-725; 12/10/24
The U.S. Department of Labor Did Not Meet the Requirements for
OCFO Compliance With the Payment Integrity Information Act for FY 2024; 1 $0
Report No. 22-25-007-13-001; 05/27/25
DOL’s IT Governance Lacked the Framework Necessary to Support the
OSEC 1 $0
Overall Mission; Report No. 23-21-002-01-001; 09/30/21
COVID-19: OSHA Needs to Do More to Address High Injury Rates of
OSHA 3 $0
Warehouse Workers; Report No. 19-23-013-10-105; 09/27/23
Total Nonmonetary Recommendations and Questioned Costs 39 $346,073,884
Number of Funds Recommended for
Agency Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued
Better Use ($)
Recommendations
Agency Management Decision or Grant/Contracting Officer’s Final Determination Did Not Resolve;
OIG Negotiating with Agency
Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to
ETA Improve Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program; 1 $1,292,205,723
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23
Total Funds Recommended for Better Use 1 $1,292,205,723
Total Audit Exceptions and Questioned Costs 39 $346,073,884
Total Funds Recommended for Better Use 1 $1,292,205,723
Total Audit Exceptions, Questioned Costs, and Funds Recommended for Better Use 40 $1,638,279,607
10 This report contains sensitive information and content was not posted for public viewing.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 55
Appendices
Management Decision Made During this
Reporting Period on Final Audit, Inspection,
or Evaluation Reports Issued During a
Previous Reporting Period
Number of Recommendations
Management Decision Made
Questioned Costs ($) Funds Put to Better Use ($)
Impacted by Management Impacted by Management Impacted by Management
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued
by End of Reporting Period Decision Decision
Decision
Employment and Training Administration
ETA and State Workforce Agencies Need to Do More to Recover
Pandemic UI Program Improper Payments; Yes 0 of 4 $0 $0
Report No. 19-25-003-03-315; 04/01/25
COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States’ Efforts to
Yes 2 of 3 $0 $0
Identify Multistate UI Fraud; Report No.19-25-004-03-315; 08/04/25
COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States’ Efforts to No
Identify UI Fraud Using Deceased Persons’ Social Security Numbers; Response 0 $0 $0
Report No. 19-25-005-03-315; 08/15/25 Required
ETA Did Not Ensure ARPA Grants Demonstrated Improvements in
Access to Unemployment Benefits; Yes 3 of 4 $2,827,736 $20,772,490
Report No. 19-25-006-03-315; 08/28/25
COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States’ Efforts to No
Identify UI Fraud Using Suspicious Email Accounts; Response 0 $0 $0
Report No. 19-25-007-03-315; 09/16/25 Required
COVID-19: Recovery of Millions in Pandemic-Related Unemployment
Insurance Overpayments Improperly Waived, Including Fraud; Yes 4 of 5 $0 $0
Report No. 19-25-009-03-315; 09/25/25
56 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to
Improve Oversight of Grants Awarded in New York; Yes 6 of 6 $25,391,220 $0
Report No. 19-25-008-03-391; 09/26/25
Total (7 Reports)
Office of the Chief Financial Officer
The U.S. Department of Labor Did Not Meet the Requirements for
Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for FY 2024; Yes 2 of 3 $0 $0
Report No. 22-25-007-13-001; 5/27/25
Total (1 Report)
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Special Fund No
Financial Statements and Independent Auditors’ Report September 30, Response 0 $0 $0
2024 and 2023; Report No. 22-25-005-04-432; 04/28/25 Required
District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act Special Fund No
Financial Statements and Independent Auditor’s Report September 30, Response 0 $0 $0
2024 and 2023; Report No. 22-25-006-04-432; 04/28/25 Required
No
OWCP Has Taken Steps to Address the Backlog of War Hazards
Response 0 $0 $0
Claims; Report No. 23-25-003-04-432; 05/12/25
Required
Service Auditors’ Report on the Integrated Federal Employees’
Compensation System; Service Auditors’ Report on Optum Workers’
No
Compensation and Auto No-Fault’s Retail Pharmacy Network Services
Response 0 $0 $0
System; and Service Auditors’ Report on the Acentra Health LLC’s U.S.
Required
Department of Labor Workers’ Compensation Medical Billing Program
System; Report No. 22-25-008-04-431; 09/12/25
Total (4 Reports)
Wage and Hour Division
No
Advisory Report: Review of WHD Efforts to Address Child Labor Law
Response $0 $0 $0
Violation Challenges; Report No. 17-25-001-15-001; 09/30/25
Required
Total (1 Report)
Final Audit Total (13 Reports) 17 of 25 $28,218,956 $20,772,490
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 57
Appendices
Management Decision Made During this
Reporting Period on Other Reports Issued
during a Previous Reporting Period
Number of
Management Decision
Recommendations
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Made by End of
Impacted by
Reporting Period
Management Decision
Employment and Training Programs
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act
Quality Control Review for the Single Audit of the State of New Mexico
No Response
Department of Workforce Solutions for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 0
Required
2024; Report No. 24-25-002-50-598; 04/02/25
Quality Control Review for the Single Audit of Eckerd Connects for the
No Response
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2024; 0
Required
Report No. 24-25-003-50-598; 06/03/25
Total (2 Reports)
Other Reports Total (2 Reports) 0
58 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Corrective Actions Taken by the Department
During this reporting period, we took final action to close recommendations within reports
based on corrective action taken by the Department. The following is a summary of the most
significant actions.
ETA Did Not Ensure ARPA Grants Demonstrated Improvements in Access to
Unemployment Benefits; Report No . 19-25-006-03-315; 08/28/25
The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 provided DOL $1 billion in funding to prevent and detect fraud,
promote equitable access, and ensure timely payment of UI benefits. Our audit found ETA did not
ensure states provided evidence of UI access issues in their grant applications. ETA required states to
provide an assessment within their grant applications of specific issues or problems that grant projects
would address; however, ETA did not ensure these assessments included evidence that these issues or
problems existed in their states. Consequently, more than $20.7 million in funding may have been spent
on projects that did not address actual issues or improve access for underserved claimant populations.
In response to our audit, ETA updated its template language for issuing funding opportunity
announcements to include a request for quantitative and qualitative descriptions of the need for
assistance in the proposed service area. The descriptions are to include the nature and scope of the
problem and the consequences of not addressing the need. The updated template asks applicants
to incorporate demographic data and participant/beneficiary information whenever possible and to
cite related research, as appropriate. In addition, ETA revised its standard operating procedure for
discretionary competitive awards to ensure review panelists receive specific guidance on evaluating
evidence requirements prior to performing their application reviews.
Job Corps Needs to Revise How it Measures and Reports on its Activities
Supporting the President’s National Drug Control Strategy;
Report No . 03-25-001-03-370; 11/22/24
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for implementing the President’s
National Drug Control Strategy to address addiction and the overdose epidemic in the United States.
Each year, ONDCP is required to publish the National Drug Control Assessment, an update on 19
federal agencies’ progress in achieving the goals and objectives of the President’s Strategy. Our audit
found Job Corps did not effectively measure and report the performance of its drug control activities,
as required by ONDCP.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 59
Appendices
In response to our audit, Job Corps identified existing data and performance measures that satisfied
ONDCP’s reporting requirements. For the 2026 National Drug Control Assessment, Job Corps:
(1) began reporting one new measure on the percentage of students who received a follow-up
drug test and were retained in the program; (2) eliminated reporting on two measures that caused
significant reporting delays; and (3) established targets for all measures reported. In addition, Job
Corps developed a standard operating procedure to improve coordination with DOL and ONDCP on
any requests related to its drug control activities.
COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States’ Efforts to Identify
Multistate UI Fraud; Report No . 19-25-004-03-315; 08/04/25
As of September 2022, the OIG reported a cumulative $45.6 billion paid in four high-risk areas
of UI fraud identified by the OIG. Of these high-risk areas, multistate claimants—individuals
filing UI claims in multiple states—was the largest with $29 billion paid in potentially fraudulent
benefits. The OIG shared its data and methodology for identifying those claimants with ETA, the
agency responsible for providing states with UI program direction and oversight. Concurrently,
the states are responsible for ensuring UI payments go only to eligible claimants and for making
determinations of fraud. Our audit found that ETA did not ensure states consistently established
and reported fraudulent overpayments distributed to imposter claimants. Without complete
overpayment reporting, ETA cannot sufficiently perform its oversight role and effectively direct its
resources to address identity fraud.
In response to our audit, ETA issued guidance which included additional information and
clarification for reporting overpayment activities involving identity fraud: (1) establish an
overpayment for the improperly paid and/or fraudulently obtained benefits, (2) issue a written
determination denying benefits, and (3) report the established overpayment, including fraudulent
overpayments, on the appropriate UI-required report, whether the perpetrator of the fraud is known
or unknown. Additionally, the guidance reminded states of their obligation to protect victims of
identity fraud and to ensure the victim is not held responsible for overpayments resulting from fraud.
Further, the guidance clarified that the states’ obligation to protect an identity fraud victim does not
preclude the state from the requirement to establish and report the overpayment on the
UI-required report.
60 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Unimplemented Recommendations
During this reporting period, we encountered four instances of audits or evaluations provided to
the Department for comment that were not responded to within 60 days. However, agencies have
since provided management decisions in response to all audits or evaluations issued before the
commencement of this reporting period.
From October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2025, the OIG made 1,234 audit recommendations,
of which 173 have not been fully implemented. These 173 recommendations include 155
recommendations resulting from audits issued since FY 2021, and, in many cases, the corrective
action plans are in place.
RECOMMENDATIONS MADE PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 2025,
NOT YET IMPLEMENTED
Unimplemented Recommendations
Total Number of
Fiscal Year
Recommendations Made
Total Number Monetary Impact ($)
2014 128 1 $0
2015 163 0 $0
2016 100 0 $0
2017 112 6 $0
2018 98 1 $0
2019 84 6 $0
2020 105 4 $0
2021 133 19 $39,155,643,774
2022 67 7 $29,581,490,253
2023 93 34 $6,611,643,281
2024 60 27 $129,565,581
2025 91 68 $269,192,840
Total 1,234 173 $75,747,535,729
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 61
Appendices
High-Priority Unimplemented Recommendations
The following table summarizes the unimplemented recommendations the OIG considers to be
the highest priorities for the Department.
Report Title; Report Number;
Unimplemented Recommendation(s)
Date Issued
Employment and Training Programs
COVID-19: More Can Be Done to Mitigate Risk Issue guidance directing states to provide routine access to state UI claimant
to Unemployment Compensation Under the data in order to prevent and detect fraud.
CARES Act;
Report No. 19-20-008-03-315; 08/07/20
Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Establish effective controls, in collaboration with SWAs, to mitigate fraud and
Training Administration (ETA) Needs to Ensure other improper payments to ineligible claimants, including the areas identified
State Workforce Agencies (SWA) Implement in the memorandum: UI benefits paid to multistate claimants, claimants who
Effective Unemployment Insurance Program used the Social Security numbers of deceased individuals, potentially ineligible
Fraud Controls for High Risk Areas; federal inmates, and claimants with suspicious email accounts. Effective
Report No. 19-21-002-03-315; 02/22/21 controls will help prevent similar or greater amounts of fraud and allow those
funds to be put to better use;
Work with Congress to establish legislation requiring SWAs to cross-match
high-risk areas, including the four areas identified in the memorandum.
COVID-19: States Struggled to Implement Continue to work with states to develop, operate, and maintain a modular
CARES Act Unemployment Insurance Programs; set of technological capabilities to modernize the delivery of UI benefits that
Report No. 19-21-004-03-315; 05/28/21 is sufficient to manage and process sudden spikes in claims volume during
emergencies or high unemployment.
Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Amend 20 C.F.R. § 603.5 and 20 C.F.R. § 603.6(a) through the rulemaking
Training Administration Needs to Issue Guidance process to reinforce that UI information must be provided to DOL OIG for all IG
to Ensure State Workforce Agencies Provide engagements authorized under the IG Act, including audits, evaluations, and
Requested Unemployment Insurance Data to the investigations.
Office of Inspector General;
Report No. 19-21-005-03-315; 06/16/21
Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Implement immediate measures to ensure SWAs are required to provide
Unemployment Insurance Payments in High-Risk ongoing access to the OIG by amending its current guidance to require
Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion; disclosures to the OIG for audits and investigations as necessary, mandatory,
Report No. 19-22-005-03-315; 09/21/22 and without time limitation for the proper oversight of the UI program;
Expedite OIG-related amendments to 20 C.F.R. § 603.6(a) to make ongoing
disclosures of UI information to DOL OIG mandatory by expressly adding the
U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General (including its agents and
contractors) to the list of required disclosures that are necessary for the proper
oversight of the UI program without distinction as to purpose (e.g., audits
versus investigations);
Expedite OIG-related amendments to 20 C.F.R. § 603.5(i) to expressly make
disclosures of UI information to federal officials for oversight, audits, and
investigations of federal programs mandatory.
62 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
COVID-19: ETA and States Did Not Protect Use data collected from monitoring and Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM)
Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper reports to identify the areas of highest improper payments including fraud and
Payments Including Fraud or from Payment create a plan to prevent similar issues in future temporary UI benefit programs;
Delays; Work with NASWA to update the IDH Participant Agreement to require states
Report No. 19-22-006-03-315; 09/30/22 to submit the results of their UI fraud investigations;
Work with NASWA to ensure the IDH crossmatches are effective at preventing
the types of fraud that were detected during the pandemic and regularly update
using the results of state fraud investigations.
ETA Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Specify within its policy the information states must include in their
Emergency Administrative Grants; documentation to support compliance with the requirements to receive grant
Report No. 19-23-006-03-315; 07/27/23 funds prior to disbursement of the funds;
Remedy the $136,353,567.50 in questioned costs.
COVID-19: Unemployment Relief for Obtain evidence from the states that ensures all Emergency Unemployment
Governmental Entities and Nonprofit Relief for Governmental Entities and Nonprofit Organizations (EURGENO)
Organizations Should Have Been Better refunds and credits to which reimbursing employers are entitled have been
Managed; provided;
Report No. 19-23-010-03-315; 09/21/23 Work with states to reconcile remaining balances; Determine the proper
disposition of excess funds and take necessary actions, including the recovery
of questioned costs.
Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Obtain direct access to unemployment insurance claims data from all state
Data Analytics Capability to Improve Oversight of workforce agencies;
the Unemployment Insurance Program; Create an integrity program that incorporates a data analytics capability and
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23 regularly monitors state unemployment insurance claims data to detect and
prevent improper payments, including fraudulent payments, and to identify
trends and emerging issues that could negatively impact the unemployment
insurance program.
COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile Work with Oregon, Louisiana, Delaware, and Mississippi to ensure the appropriate
and Return to the U.S. Treasury Nearly return of approximately $105.1 million in Temporary Full Federal Funding (TFFF)
$5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary reimbursements for firstweek regular UI compensation paid that were associated
Unemployment Insurance Program; with ineligible weeks;
Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23 Establish a deadline by which states are required to perform a timely review of
past drawdowns and provide evidence that drawdowns were for reimbursement of
eligible first-week regular UI compensation paid by the state for claim weeks that
fell within the TFFF program period;
Ensure that any state drawdowns of the remaining almost $5 billion in TFFF
funds are only for the reimbursement of first-week regular UI compensation paid
by the state that fall within the TFFF program period (March 27, 2020, through
September 6, 2021);
Establish written procedures and deadlines for the timely return of funding for
TFFF and future similar programs and consult with OMB and Treasury officials to
execute the proper return of unused funds that remain within states’ accounts.
COVID-19: The Employment and Training Develop and implement risk tolerance for the amount of participants being
Administration Needs to Improve Oversight of served under the WIOA Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Workers program;
Grants Awarded in New Jersey; Establish and implement a plan to improve monitoring activities to ensure
Report No. 19-23-016-03-391; 09/28/23 grantees and sub-recipients are properly documenting eligibility.
continued on next page
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 63
Appendices
COVID-19: ETA’s Oversight of Short-Time Establish policies and procedures for monitoring, using lessons learned from
Compensation Did Not Detect $129.6 Million the Short-Time Compensation (STC) program during the pandemic, that ensure
in Questioned Costs; states meet requirements for similar future temporary unemployment insurance
Report No. 19-24-003-03-315; 06/26/24 programs that provide federal reimbursements to states;
Review states’ compliance with STC eligibility requirements and require all
states with STC agreements to return federal funds used for reimbursements of
STC benefit payments for weeks of unemployment beginning before March 27,
2020, and ending after September 6, 2021, as well as for reimbursements that
exceeded benefits paid;
Monitor states administering unemployment insurance programs subsidized with
federal funds, including temporary programs such as STC, to ensure compliance
with the 3-year records retention requirements established in the Code of
Federal Regulations (2 C.F.R. § 200.334).
ETA Did Not Ensure States Sufficiently Perform an assessment of previous emergency UI programs and the pandemic-
Implemented the Mixed Earners related UI programs to determine an appropriate historically-based time limit for
Unemployment Compensation Program; states’ acceptance of emergency program benefit claims after the expiration of
Report No. 19-24-005-03-315; 09/11/24 the UI programs’ eligibility periods and consider making a legislative proposal to
Congress to use the determined time limit on future emergency programs.
COVID-19: ETA Could Have Done More Capture lessons learned from the pandemic and use the information to
to Ensure States Had Sufficient Staffing to develop performance standards for prompt payment of UI benefits under
Deliver Timely Pandemic Unemployment temporary UI programs;
Benefits; Establish policy that requires officials to issue guidance timely for ETA regional
Report No. 19-25-002-03-315; 11/22/24 offices to monitor and measure the effectiveness of states’ use of staffing to
support the implementation of temporary UI programs;
Establish policy that requires states to develop corrective action plans to
address staffing related concerns negatively impacting permanent and
temporary UI programs, as identified by regional offices during monitoring
reviews;
Establish policy that requires ETA officials to develop a business case analysis
and supporting justification before suspending UI program integrity functions
for states to manage workload surges during emergency events.
COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Evaluate fraud risk mitigation strategies and actions on a quarterly basis
Oversight of States’ Efforts to Identify to determine their effectiveness and document the results accordingly, in
Multistate UI Fraud; compliance with the processes set forth in ETA’s UI Integrity Strategic Plan;
Report No. 19-25-004-03-315; 08/04/25 Identify the states that have not complied with ETA 227 reporting requirements
for FPUC and PEUC and ETA 902P reporting requirements for PUA and work
with the states to ensure fraudulent overpayments for the CARES Act UI
programs are reported before the commencement of DOL’s Fiscal Year 2025
financial statement audit.
ETA Did Not Ensure ARPA Grants Develop additional guidance and staff training to improve monitoring of grant
Demonstrated Improvements in Access to recipients, including a focus on reviewing progress reports to ensure reporting
Unemployment Benefits; complies with requirements and grant recipients are on target to achieve grant
Report No. 19-25-006-03-315; 08/28/25 goals as identified in the grant agreement.
64 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
COVID-19: The Employment and Training Establish and implement data verification checks to ensure participants
Administration Needs to Improve Oversight of reported are unique individuals who obtained services through Workforce
Grants Awarded in New York; Innovation and Opportunity Act programs while strengthening controls to
Report No. 19-25-008-03-391; 09/26/25 properly exit participants after 90 days without services;
Establish and implement a plan to improve monitoring activities to ensure
grant recipients and sub-recipients are properly documenting eligibility and
ensuring participant-level services are delivered by each program in which the
participant is co-enrolled;
Remedy the $19,639,718 in questioned costs associated with the contractual
service contracts awarded in non-compliance with federal requirements;
Remedy the $5,751,502 in questioned costs associated with payroll and non-
payroll costs; Establish and implement a plan to increase the level of technical
assistance and monitoring for grant recipients and sub-recipients to ensure
they comply with the general procurement standards;
Develop and implement a formal comprehensive Conflict of Interest Policy to
ensure staff are actively monitoring, identifying and resolving conflict of interest
issues.
Worker Safety
MSHA Needs to Provide Better Oversight of Clarify mine operators’ responsibilities for local coordination under the
Emergency Response Plans; Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act, including
Report No. 05-17-002-06-001; 03/31/17 coordination and communication between the operator, mine rescue teams, and
local emergency response personnel, and familiarizing local rescue personnel
with surface functions that may be required in the course of mine rescue work.
MSHA Needs to Improve Efforts to Protect Coal Enhance its sampling program to increase the frequency of inspector samples
Miners from Respirable Crystalline Silica; where needed (e.g., by implementing a risk-based approach).
Report No. 05-21-001-06-001; 11/12/20
Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Revise MSHA’s implementation plan for when it will begin inspecting mines
Miner Safety and Health in At Least Three within American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mariana Islands and begin implementing the plan. The revised plan should
Mandatory Inspections and Conducted address: (1) when enforcement of the Mine Act and MSHA regulations will
Inappropriate Oversight of Mines in the Pacific begin; (2) how inspections will occur in future years (e.g., travel from a specific
Territories; MSHA district or setting up a field office nearby); (3) whether additional training
Report No. 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24 will occur and how (e.g., in-person, virtual, hybrid, via grants, et cetera); and (4)
how funding will be obtained to conduct required MSHA activities in FY 2025.
COVID-19: OSHA’s Enforcement Activities Did As part of OSHA’s rulemaking on infectious diseases, require employers to
Not Sufficiently Protect Workers from Pandemic notify all employees of all known positive cases of infectious diseases at the
Health Hazards; worksite;
Report No. 19-23-001-10-105; 10/31/22 Develop and implement a tracking tool to ensure OSHA receives and reviews
all items Compliance Safety and Health Officers (CSHO) request during
inspections to ensure alleged hazards have been mitigated.
OSHA Needs to Better Address Complaints and Modify the Field Operations Manual to include a policy for mandatory
Referrals for Increased Worker Safety; interviews of complainants and witnesses or document the rationale for lack
Report No. 02-23-001-10-105; 03/06/23 thereof and provide training to CSHOs on the updated requirements.
continued on next page
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 65
Appendices
COVID-19: OSHA Needs to Do More to Address Develop specific, measurable inspection goals for the Site-Specific Targeting
High Injury Rates of Warehouse Workers; program, including a baseline for the number of inspections in each SiteSpecific
Report No. 19-23-013-10-105; 09/27/23 Targeting category, and periodically monitor progress toward those goals;
Develop a more effective enforcement strategy to improve employer Form 300A
compliance;
Assess Form 300A data categories and gather more specific supporting
information about injuries to better identify the count and type of injuries reported,
such as musculoskeletal disorders;
Develop specific measurable inspection goals for the warehousing National
Emphasis Program, including a baseline for the number of inspections to
complete and periodically monitor progress toward those goals. Ensure the goals
contain metrics that demonstrate the outcomes of the program.
Employee Benefits
EBSA Did Not Have the Ability to Protect the Reduce or eliminate exemption thresholds for small plans.
Estimated 79 Million Plan Participants in Self-
Insured Health Plans from Improper Denials of
Health Claims;
Report No. 05-17-001-12-121; 11/18/16
OLMS Can Do More to Protect Workers’ Rights Outline requirements needed to strengthen enforcement authority to align
to Unionize Through Enforcing Persuader Activity with the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959’s intentions
Disclosure; to protect workers’ rights and interests to unionize by recommending
Report No. 09-24-002-16-001; 05/03/24 rule changes or legislative changes to increase employer and consultant
compliance.
Departmental Management
DOL Needs to Do More to Secure Employees’ Establish and implement procedures to ensure E2 Solutions (E2) account
Personally Identifiable Information in the Travel management practices enforce DOL’s security policies;
Management System; Establish and I mplement procedures to ensure E2 is managed in compliance
Report No. 23-20-003-13-001; 09/10/20 with contractual security requirements and DOL computer security policies for
contracted information systems.
DOL’s IT Governance Lacked the Framework Ensure the Chief Information Officer is a lead member with voting rights of
Necessary to Support the Overall Mission; DOL’s executive strategy and management boards and committees, including
Report No. 23-21-002-01-001; 09/30/21 but not limited to the Management Review Board, Enterprise Shared Services
Governance Board, COVID-19 Coordination team, and Enterprise Risk
Management Council.
FY 2022 FISMA DOL Information Security Update DOL entity-wide and system-level security policies, procedures, and
Report: DOL’s Information Security Program Not plans to comply with National Institute of Standards and Technology Special
Remaining Current with Security Requirements; Publication 800-53, Revision 5;
Report No. 23-23-001-07-725; 02/10/23 Implement data loss prevention tools and alerts based on the results of
agencies’ data exfiltration tests.
Management Alert Memorandum: The Majority of Send an updated memorandum to all DOL Agency Heads reminding them of
DOL Nondisclosure Agreements Do Not Include the requirement to include the anti-gag provision in all nondisclosure forms,
Required Anti-Gag Language; agreements, and related documents;
Report No. 09-25-0001-MA-01; 01/14/25 Revise all existing nondisclosure agreement forms or templates to include the
required anti-gag language.
66 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Summary of Reports with Unimplemented
Recommendations with Cost Savings /
Funds Put to Better Use
Funds Put to Better Use
Number of
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Unimplemented
Recommendations ($)
Employment and Training Administration
Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) Needs to Ensure
State Workforce Agencies (SWA) Implement Effective Unemployment Insurance Program
Fraud Controls for High-Risk Areas; Report No. 19-21-002-03-315; 02/22/21
Establish effective controls, in collaboration with SWAs, to mitigate fraud and other
1 $5,409,966,198
improper payments to ineligible claimants, including the areas identified in the
memorandum: UI benefits paid to multistate claimants, claimants who used the Social
Security numbers of deceased individuals, potentially ineligible federal inmates, and
claimants with suspicious email accounts. Effective controls will help prevent similar or
greater amounts of fraud and allow those funds to be put to better use.
COVID-19: States Struggled to Implement CARES Act Unemployment Insurance
Programs; Report No. 19-21-004-03-315; 05/28/21
Continue to work with states to develop, operate, and maintain a modular set of 1 $33,745,677,576
technological capabilities to modernize the delivery of UI benefits that is sufficient to
manage and process sudden spikes in claims volume during emergencies or high
unemployment.
Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments in
High-Risk Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion; Report No. 19-22-005-03-315; 09/21/22
Expedite OIG-related amendments to 20 C.F.R. § 603.6(a) to make ongoing disclosures
1 $29,581,490,253
of UI information to DOL-OIG mandatory by expressly adding the U.S. Department
of Labor, Office of Inspector General (including its agents and contractors) to the list
of required disclosures that are necessary for the proper oversight of the UI program
without distinction as to purpose (e.g., audits versus investigations).
Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to Improve
Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program;
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23
1 $1,292,205,723
Establish effective controls, in collaboration with State Workforce Agencies, to mitigate
fraud and other improper payments to ineligible claimants in high-risk age categories.
continued on next page
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 67
Appendices
COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile and Return to the U.S. Treasury Nearly
$5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary Unemployment Insurance Program;
Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23
1 $4,948,811,006
Establish written procedures and deadlines for the timely return of funding for TFFF and
future similar programs and consult with OMB and Treasury officials to execute the proper
return of unused funds that remain within states’ accounts.11
COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to Improve Oversight of
Grants Awarded in New Jersey; Report No. 19-23-016-03-391; 09/28/23
1 $100,098,923
Develop and implement risk tolerance for the amount of participants being served under the
WIOA Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Workers program.
Total 6 $75,078,249,679
11 To date, ETA has completed the reconciliation process in accordance with Unemployment Insurance Program
Letter No. 20-20, Change 1, for 52 states and territories, and facilitated the return of $4,475,268,389. ETA has
reserved $265 million in the Uninvested Federal Unemployment Account for states’ unpaid TFFF expenditures.
We will close this recommendation once ETA provides documentation to support that the $265 million reserved for
states’ unpaid TFFF expenditures has been reconciled and unused funds that remained within states’ accounts have
been properly returned.
68 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Reports with Unimplemented
Recommendations for Management
Improvement or Disallowed Costs Owed
The following table lists all OIG reports issued prior to this semiannual reporting period with
recommendations that have not yet been fully implemented (as of March 31, 2026). For identification
of each recommendation made before March 31, 2026, visit our online Recommendation Dashboard.
Number of Unimplemented or
Report Title; Report Number; Date Issued Unimplemented Disallowed Costs
Recommendations Owed
Bureau of Labor Statistics
BLS Could Do More to Identify Data Limitations and Increase Transparency;
2 $0
Report No. 17-24-001-11-001;10/26/23
Employee Benefits Security Administration
Limited-Scope Audits Provide Inadequate Protections to Retirement
Plan Participants; 1 $0
Report No. 05-14-005-12-121; 09/30/14
EBSA Did Not Have the Ability to Protect the Estimated 79 Million Plan
Participants in Self-Insured Health Plans from Improper Denials of
1 $0
Health Claims;
Report No. 05-17-001-12-121; 11/18/16
EBSA Faced Challenges Enforcing Compliance with Mental Health Parity Laws
and Requirements; 5 $0
Report No. 09-25-001-12-001; 02/19/25
Employment and Training Administration
COVID-19: More Can Be Done to Mitigate Risk to Unemployment
Compensation Under the CARES Act; 1 $0
Report No. 19-20-008-03-315; 08/07/20
Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) Needs
to Ensure State Workforce Agencies (SWA) Implement Effective Unemployment
1 $0
Insurance Program Fraud Controls for High-Risk Areas;
Report No. 19-21-002-03-315; 02/22/21
continued on next page
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 69
Appendices
COVID-19: States Struggled to Implement CARES Act Unemployment
Insurance Programs; 1 $0
Report No. 19-21-004-03-315; 05/28/21
Alert Memorandum: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to
Issue Guidance to Ensure State Workforce Agencies Provide Requested
3 $0
Unemployment Insurance Data to the Office of Inspector General;
Report No. 19-21-005-03-315; 06/16/21
Unemployment Insurance Overpayments Related to Work Search Underscore
the Need for More Consistent State Requirements; 3 $0
Report No. 04-21-001-03-315; 09/29/21
Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent Unemployment Insurance Payments
in High-Risk Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion; 2 $0
Report No. 19-22-005-03-315; 09/21/22
COVID-19: ETA and States Did Not Protect Pandemic Related UI Funds from
Improper Payments, Including Fraud or from Payment Delays; 3 $0
Report No. 19-22-006-03-315; 09/30/22
ETA Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Emergency Administrative Grants;
2 $136,353,568
Report No. 19-23-006-03-315; 07/27/23
COVID-19: Unemployment Relief for Governmental Entities and Nonprofit
Organizations Should Have Been Better Managed; 3 $29,074,061
Report No. 19-23-010-03-315; 09/21/23
COVID-19: ETA Can Improve Its Oversight to Ensure Integrity over
CARES Act UI Programs; 1 $0
Report No. 19-23-011-03-315; 09/22/23
Alert Memorandum: ETA Needs to Incorporate Data Analytics Capability to
Improve Oversight of the Unemployment Insurance Program; 2 $0
Report No. 19-23-012-03-315; 09/25/23
COVID-19: Pandemic Unemployment Assistance for Non-Traditional Claimants
Weakened by Billions in Overpayments, Including Fraud; 1 $0
Report No. 19-23-014-03-315; 09/27/23
COVID-19: ETA Needs a Plan to Reconcile and Return to the U.S. Treasury
Nearly $5 Billion Unused by States for a Temporary Unemployment Insurance
6 $105,100,000
Program;
Report No. 19-23-015-03-315; 09/28/23
COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to Improve
Oversight of Grants Awarded in New Jersey; 1 $0
Report No. 19-23-016-03-391; 09/28/23
COVID-19: ETA’s Oversight of Short-Time Compensation Did Not Detect
$129.6 Million in Questioned Costs; 3 $129,565,581
Report No. 19-24-003-03-315; 06/26/24
ETA Did Not Ensure States Sufficiently Implemented the Mixed Earners
Unemployment Compensation Program; 4 $0
Report No. 19-24-005-03-315; 09/11/24
70 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
COVID-19: ETA Could Have Done More to Ensure States Had Sufficient Staffing
to Delivery Timely Pandemic Unemployment Benefits; 4 $0
Report No. 19-25-002-03-315; 11/22/24
COVID-19: Data Sharing Project Finds Billions Paid to Same Likely
Fraudsters Under Both the Unemployment Insurance and Economic Injury
1 $0
Disaster Loan Programs;
Report No. 19-25-001-03-315; 12/05/24
ETA Can Improve Its Management of the H-2A Program;
3 $0
Report No. 06-25-001-03-321; 02/25/25
ETA and State Workforce Agencies Need to Do More to Recover Pandemic UI
Program Improper Payments; 4 $0
Report No. 19-25-003-03-315; 04/01/25
COVID-19: ETA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of States’ Efforts to Identify
Multistate UI Fraud; 2 $0
Report No. 19-25-004-03-315; 08/04/25
ETA Did Not Ensure ARPA Grants Demonstrated Improvements in Access to
Unemployment Benefits; 3 $2,827,736
Report No. 19-25-006-03-315; 08/28/25
COVID-19: Recovery of Millions in Pandemic-Related Unemployment Insurance
Overpayments Improperly Waived, Including Fraud; 5 $240,973,884
Report No. 19-25-009-03-315; 09/25/25
COVID-19: The Employment and Training Administration Needs to Improve
Oversight of Grants Awarded in New York; 6 $25,391,220
Report No. 19-25-008-03-391; 09/26/25
Mine Safety and Health Administration
MSHA Needs to Provide Better Oversight of Emergency Response Plans;
5 $0
Report No. 05-17-002-06-001; 03/31/17
MSHA Can Improve Its Pre-Assessment Conferencing Program;
6 $0
Report No. 05-19-001-06-001; 09/23/19
MSHA Needs to Improve Efforts to Protect Coal Miners from Respirable
Crystalline Silica; 1 $0
Report No. 05-21-001-06-001; 11/12/20
MSHA Can Improve How Violations Are Issued, Terminated, Modified,
and Vacated; 5 $0
Report No. 05-21-002-06-001; 03/31/21
COVID-19: MSHA Did Not Complete or Accurately Report Mandatory
Inspections; 9 $0
Report No. 19-24-001-06-001; 10/17/23
continued on next page
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 71
Appendices
Alert Memorandum: Urgent Concerns for Miner Safety and Health in At Least
Three U.S. Territories: MSHA Has Never Conducted Mandatory Inspections and
8 $0
Conducted Inappropriate Oversight of Mines in the Pacific Territories;
Report No: 05-25-002-06-001; 11/12/24
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Management
FY 2021 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: Information Security
Continuous Monitoring Controls Remain Deficient; 1 $0
Report No. 23-22-001-07-725; 01/28/22
FY 2022 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: DOL’s Information Security
Program Not Remaining Current with Security Requirements; 2 $0
Report No. 23-23-001-07-725; 02/10/23
Without an IT Modernization Framework, DOL Is Vulnerable to Inadequate
Resource Prioritization for Ensuring Security and Availability of DOL Systems; 2 $0
Report No. 23-24-002-07-725; 11/17/23
DOL Implemented Its Wireless Network Securely, Though Security Gaps Exist in
Testing, Updating, Patching, and Continuous Review; 4 $0
Report No. 23-24-003-07-720; 09/11/24
DOL Continues to Make Progress Toward Compliance with the
Geospatial Data Act of 2018; 3 $0
Report No. 23-25-001-01-001; 10/03/24
FY 2024 FISMA DOL Information Security Report: Continued Improvement of
Information System Security Program; 4 $0
Report No. 23-25-002-07-725; 12/10/24
Management Alert Memorandum: The Majority of DOL Nondisclosure
Agreements Do Not Include Required Anti-Gag Language; 2 $0
Report No. 09-25-0001-MA-01-001; 01/14/25
Office of the Chief Financial Officer
DOL Needs to Do More to Secure Employees’ Personally Identifiable Information
in the Travel Management System; 2 $0
Report No. 23-20-003-13-001; 09/10/20
FY 2024 Independent Auditors' Report on DOL's Consolidated Financial
Statements; 3 $0
Report No. 22-25-002-13-001; 11/14/24
Management Advisory Comments Identified in an Audit of the Consolidated
Financial Statements, for the Year Ended September 30, 2024; 12 $0
Report No. 22-25-003-13-001; 12/18/24
The U.S. Department of Labor Did Not Meet the Requirements for Compliance
with the Payment Integrity Information Act for FY 2024; 3 $0
Report No. 22-25-007-13-001; 05/27/25
72 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Office of Labor-Management Standards
OLMS Can Do More to Protect Workers’ Rights to Unionize Through Enforcing
Persuader Activity Disclosure; 3 $0
Report No. 09-24-002-16-001; 05/03/24
Office of the Secretary
DOL’s IT Governance Lacked the Framework Necessary to Support the
Overall Mission; 1 $0
Report No. 23-21-002-01-001; 09/30/21
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSHA Needs to Improve the Guidance for Its Fatality and Severe Injury
Reporting Program to Better Protect Workers; 1 $0
Report No. 02-18-203-10-105; 09/13/18
Review of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Referral to and
Reclamation of Debt from the U.S. Department of the Treasury; 1 $0
Report No. 22-20-006-10-001; 03/16/20
OSHA’s Diminished Enforcement Left More Workers at Risk for Exposure to
Silica; 1 $0
Report No. 02-21-003-10-105; 09/29/21
COVID-19: OSHA’s Enforcement Activities Did Not Sufficiently Protect Workers
from Pandemic Health Hazards; 4 $0
Report No. 19-23-001-10-105; 10/31/22
OSHA Needs to Better Address Complaints and Referrals for Increased Worker
Safety; 3 $0
Report No. 02-23-001-10-105; 03/06/23
COVID-19: OSHA Needs to Do More to Address High Injury Rates of Warehouse
Workers; 6 $0
Report No. 19-23-013-10-105; 09/27/23
Wage and Hour Division
COVID-19: The Pandemic Highlighted the Need to Strengthen Wage and Hour
Division’s Enforcement Controls; 1 $0
Report No. 19-21-008-15-001; 09/30/21
Totals 167 $669,286,050
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 73
Appendices
Investigative Statistics
Division
Total
Totals
Investigative Reports Issued / Cases Closed (includes investigative reports issued, case closing
133
reports, and matters referred for possible civil and/or administrative action):
Program Fraud 118
Labor Racketeering 15
Cases Opened: 71
Program Fraud 65
Labor Racketeering 6
Cases Referred for Prosecution (each case is measured as a singular statistic and may include more
43
than one person or business entity):
Program Fraud 39
Labor Racketeering 4
Cases Referred for Administrative/Civil Action (each case is measured as a singular statistic and
34
may include more than one person or business entity):
Program Fraud 30
Labor Racketeering 4
Persons Referred to the Department of Justice for Criminal Prosecution (includes the number of
38
individuals and business entities referred for prosecution):
Program Fraud 34
Labor Racketeering 4
Persons Referred to State and Local Prosecuting Authorities for Criminal Prosecution (includes
3
the number of individuals and business entities referred for prosecution):
Program Fraud 3
Labor Racketeering 0
Indictments and Criminal Informations That Resulted from Any Prior Referral to Prosecuting
131
Authorities (includes sealed and unsealed indictments):
Program Fraud 121
Labor Racketeering 10
Indictments (includes sealed and unsealed indictments): 131
Program Fraud 121
Labor Racketeering 10
Convictions: 191
Program Fraud 173
Labor Racketeering 18
Statutory Debarments: 1
Program Fraud 0
Labor Racketeering 1
74 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Recoveries, Cost-Efficiencies, Restitutions, Fines/Penalties,
$810,394,305
Forfeitures, and Civil Monetary Actions:
Program Fraud $527,885,918
Labor Racketeering $282,508,387
Recoveries (the dollar amount/value of an agency’s action to recover or to reprogram
$290,154,548
funds or to make other adjustments in response to OIG investigations):
Cost-Efficiencies (the one-time or per annum dollar amount/value of management’s
commitment, in response to OIG investigations, to utilize the government’s resources $440,176,217
more efficiently):
Restitutions/Forfeitures (the dollar amount/value of restitutions and forfeitures
$73,512,811
resulting from OIG criminal investigations):
Fines/Penalties (the dollar amount/value of fines, assessments, seizures, investigative/
$0
court costs, and other penalties resulting from OIG criminal investigations):
Civil Monetary Actions (the dollar amount/value of forfeitures, settlements, damages,
$6,550,729
judgments, court costs, and other penalties resulting from OIG criminal investigations):
Total $810,394,305
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 75
Appendices
Peer Review Reporting
The following meets the requirement of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended that the
Inspectors General include their peer review results as an appendix to each semiannual report.
Peer Review of the Office of Personnel Management OIG Audit Organization
DOL OIG conducted a peer review of the Office of Personnel Management OIG audit
organization’s system of quality control for the period ending March 31, 2024. The peer review
report issued on September 4, 2024, resulted in an opinion that the system of quality control
was suitably designed and complied with to provide DOL OIG with reasonable assurance of
performing and reporting conformity with applicable professional standards and applicable legal
and regulatory requirements in all material respects.
Peer Review of DOL OIG Inspection and Evaluation Function
The Securities and Exchange Commission OIG conducted an external peer review to assess
the system of quality control for DOL OIG’s inspections and evaluations function for the
3-year period ending September 30, 2025. The peer review report, issued on March 18, 2026,
concluded that DOL OIG’s system of quality control was suitably designed and provided
reasonable assurance of DOL OIG’s reviews conforming with the Council of Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency’s (CIGIE) Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, published
in December 2020. DOL OIG received an external peer review rating of “pass.”
Peer Review of DOL OIG Audit Function
SBA OIG conducted a peer review of the system of quality control for DOL OIG’s audit function
for the 3-year period ending September 30, 2024. The peer review report, which was issued on
June 18, 2025, resulted in an opinion that the system of quality control for the DOL OIG audit
organization was suitably designed and provided reasonable assurance of DOL OIG’s audits
conforming to professional standards. The peer review did not find any reportable findings, and
DOL OIG received an external peer review rating of “pass.”
Peer Review of DOL OIG Investigative Function
The U.S. Department of Defense OIG conducted a peer review of internal safeguards and
management procedures for DOL OIG’s investigative operations for the period ending December
31, 2024. The peer review report, which was issued on July 18, 2025, resulted in an opinion that
76 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
the system of internal safeguards and management procedures for the investigative function of
DOL OIG in effect for the period ending December 31, 2024, complies with the quality standards
established by CIGIE and the applicable Attorney General Guidelines.
Peer Review of DHS OIG Investigative Function
DOL OIG conducted a peer review of internal safeguards and management procedures for DHS
OIG’s investigative operations for the period ending March 2025. The peer review report, which
was issued on July 3, 2025, resulted in an opinion that the system of internal safeguards and
management procedures for the investigative function of DHS OIG were in compliance with the
quality standards established by CIGIE and the applicable Attorney General Guidelines.
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 77
Appendices
OIG Hotline
The OIG Hotline provides a communication link between the OIG and persons who want to
report alleged violations of laws, rules, and regulations; mismanagement; waste of funds; abuse
of authority; or danger to public health and safety. During the reporting period October 1, 2025,
through March 31, 2026, a total of 1,614 complaints were opened in the OIG Hotline’s complaint
management system.
Complaints Received (complaints opened by method reported): Totals
Telephone 1
E-mail/Internet 1,485
Mail 126
Fax 1
Walk-In 1
Total 1,614
Contacts Received (complaints opened by source): Totals
Complaints from Individuals or Non-Governmental Organizations 1,040
Complaints/Inquiries from Congress 1
Referrals from GAO 6
Complaints from Other DOL Agencies 3
Complaints from Other (non-DOL) Government Agencies 564
Total 1,614
Disposition of Complaints Reviewed and Processed: Totals
Referred to OIG Components for Further Review and/or Action 84
Referred to DOL Program Management for Further Review and/or Action 267
Referred to Non-DOL Agencies/Organizations 54
No Referral Required/Informational Contact 767
Total 1,172
78 Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026
Appendices
Acronyms and Abbreviations
CARES Act H-2B visa program for non- SBE significant barriers to
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and agricultural workers employment
Economic Security Act
HSI Homeland Security SNAP Supplemental Nutrition
CIGIE Council of the Inspectors Investigations Assistance Program
General on Integrity and
Efficiency IRS Internal Revenue Service SSA Social Security
Administration
Department or DOL JVSG Jobs for Veterans State
U.S. Department of Labor Grants SSN Social Security number
DES Department of Economic KPMG KPMG LLP SWA State Workforce Agency
Security
MEUC Mixed Earners Treasury
DHS U.S. Department of Unemployment U.S. Department of the
Homeland Security Compensation Treasury
DOJ U.S. Department of Justice OED Oregon Employment UI unemployment insurance
Department
DOT U.S. Department of UIA Unemployment Insurance
Transportation OIG Office of Inspector General Agency
DVOP Disabled Veterans’ OMB Office of Management and UK United Kingdom
Outreach Program Budget
USDA U.S. Department of
EDD Employment Development ONDCP Office of National Drug Agriculture
Department Control Policy
USPIS United States Postal
EIDL Economic Injury Disaster OWCP Office of Workers’ Inspection Service
Loan Compensation Programs
USPS United States Postal
ERISA Employee Retirement PADLI Pennsylvania Department Service
Income Security Act of 1974 of Labor and Industry
USSS United States Secret
ETA Employment and Training PII personally identifiable Service
Administration information
VA U.S. Department of
FBI Federal Bureau of PUA Pandemic Unemployment Veterans Affairs
Investigation Assistance
VA DOC
FECA Federal Employees’ PPP Paycheck Protection Virginia Department of
Compensation Act Program Corrections
FLC Foreign Labor Certification PY Program Year VEC Virginia Employment
Commission
FY Fiscal Year/fiscal year QCR Quality Control Reviews
WHD Wage and Hour Division
H-1B visa program for workers in RSDI Retirement Survivors
specialty occupations Disability Insurance WIOA Workforce Innovation and
Opportunity Act
H-2A visa program for agricultural SBA Small Business
workers Administration
Semiannual Report to Congress | October 1, 2025–March 31, 2026 79
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor
200 Constitution Avenue, NW
Room S-5506
Washington, DC 20210
To learn more about the Office of Inspector General’s current and planned work,
please visit www.oig.dol.gov.
Office of Inspector General
United States Department of Labor
Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Contact the Hotline
202.693.6999 or 800.347.3756
Fax: 202.693.7020
www.oig.dol.gov
The OIG Hotline is open to the public and to federal employees
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to receive allegations of fraud, waste,
and abuse concerning Department of Labor programs and operations.
OIG Hotline
U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Inspector General
200 Constitution Avenue, NW
Room S-5506
Washington, DC 20210
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