Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2021 and the Future Years Defense Program, Senate hearing transcript (January 30, 2020), GovInfo CHRG-116shrg56187, PDF

Summary

S. Hrg. 116–148, Pt. 1 collects the Senate Committee on Armed Services hearings on S. 4049, the fiscal year 2021 defense authorization, dated January 30; February 13, 25; March 3, 4, 5, 12, 26, 2020. The hearings cover U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Southern Command, Northern and Strategic Command, European and Transportation Command, Central Command, the Air Force, Navy and Army posture, and the Department of Defense budget posture. Chairman Inhofe presided. At the hearing with General Townsend of AFRICOM, Senator Cotton called the Wuhan coronavirus the biggest and the most important story in the world and said China had quarantined 60 million people.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

S. HRG. 116–148, PT. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON

S. 4049
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY
CONSTRUCTION, TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 1
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
AIR FORCE POSTURE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
NAVY POSTURE
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
ARMY POSTURE

JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 3, 4, 5, 12, 26, 2020

(
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM—Part 1
U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND ● U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND ● U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND ● AIR FORCE POSTURE ● DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE ● NAVY POSTURE ● U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND ● ARMY POSTURE
S. HRG. 116–148, PT. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021 AND
THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 30; FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 3, 4, 5, 12, 26, 2020

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(
Available via: http:// www.govinfo.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
56–187 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JACK REED, Rhode Island
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina TIM KAINE, Virginia
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RICK SCOTT, Florida JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri DOUG JONES, Alabama

JOHN BONSELL, Staff Director
ELIZABETH L. KING, Minority Staff Director

(II)
CONTENTS

JANUARY 30, 2020
Page
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND ... 1

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe ................................................................. 1
Statement of Senator Jack Reed ............................................................................ 3

WITNESS STATEMENTS
Townsend, General Stephen J., USA, Commander, United States Africa
Command .............................................................................................................. 4
Faller, Admiral Craig S., USN, Commander, United States Southern
Command .............................................................................................................. 13
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 53

FEBRUARY 13, 2020
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES STRATEGIC
COMMAND .............................................................................................................. 65

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe ................................................................. 65

WITNESS STATEMENTS
O’Shaughnessy, General Terrence J., USAF, Commander, United States
Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command ....... 65
Richard, Admiral Charles A., USN, Commander, United States Strategic
Command .............................................................................................................. 95
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 146

FEBRUARY 25, 2020
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND .............................................................................................................. 163

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe ................................................................. 163
Statement of Senator Jack Reed ............................................................................ 164

WITNESS STATEMENTS
Wolters, General Tod D., USAF, Commander, United States European
Command/
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander
Europe ................................................................................................................... 166
Lyons, General Stephen R., USA, Commander, United States Transportation
Command .............................................................................................................. 175
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 211

(III)
MARCH 3, 2020
Page
AIR FORCE POSTURE ................................................................................................. 231

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator Roger F. Wicker .................................................................. 231
Statement of Senator Jack Reed ............................................................................ 232

WITNESS STATEMENTS
Barrett, Honorable Barbara M., Secretary of the Air Force ................................ 234
Goldfein, General David L., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force ..................... 235
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 280

MARCH 4, 2018
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE ........................................................ 297

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe ................................................................. 297
Statement of Senator Jack Reed ............................................................................ 298

WITNESS STATEMENTS
Esper, Hon. Mark T., Secretary of Defense ........................................................... 300
Milley, General Mark A., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ............... 310
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 361

MARCH 5, 2020
NAVY POSTURE ......................................................................................................... 399

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe ................................................................. 399
Statement of Senator Jack Reed ............................................................................ 400

WITNESS STATEMENTS
Gilday, Admiral Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations ........................... 402
Modly, Hon. Thomas B., Acting Secretary of the Navy ........................................ 417
Berger, General David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps .............. 418
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 451

(IV)
MARCH 12, 2020
Page
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND ...................................................................... 467

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe ................................................................. 467
Statement of Senator Jack Reed ............................................................................ 468

WITNESS STATEMENTS
McKenzie, General Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, United States Cen-
tral Command ....................................................................................................... 470
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 499

MARCH 26, 2020
Page
ARMY POSTURE ......................................................................................................... 513

MEMBERS STATEMENTS
Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe ................................................................. 513
Statement of Senator Jack Reed ............................................................................ 514

WITNESS STATEMENTS
McCarthy, Honorable Ryan D., Secretary of the Army and McConville, Gen-
eral James C., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army ................................................ 517
Paper Hearing Questions for the Record ............................................................... 532
Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 567

(V)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND UNITED
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:59 a.m. in room
SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally, Blackburn,
Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King,
Peters, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Rounds says it is time we start, and
so we are going to start.
Good morning. The committee today has received testimony from
SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command] and AFRICOM
[United States Africa Command]. This is a very significant meeting
because in my narrow view we have the two comms that never
were adequately resourced—I really believe that—compared to the
threat that we are facing.
We have two great heroes here. We have General Steve Town-
send, Commander of AFRICOM and Admiral Craig Faller, Com-
mander of SOUTHCOM.
This committee’s top priority is to ensure the effective implemen-
tation of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). That is this. We
have been adhering to this to the letter in a very bipartisan way.
We identified the competition with China and Russia. That is
where the problem is. That is something that people were not real-
ly sensitive to until we came out with this document. China’s and
Russia’s growing influence is not limited to Europe and the Indo-
Pacific, and both countries clearly view Africa and Latin America
as critical battlefields to fulfill their global ambitions and challenge
the United States.
This is particularly evident in Africa. Over the last 20 years, I
have conducted over about 160 African country visits working with
(1)
2

that continent. I can tell you that it is no coincidence that China
established the first overseas military base in Djibouti. You know,
that is the first time. They have always done it in their own city
limits before, but now it is Djibouti. Now they are as far south in
Africa as Tanzania and all over the country. I visited Djibouti last
February and saw firsthand what they are doing there, and they
are active there.
Elsewhere China is using cash and debt to trap the countries and
to force them to put their infrastructure and potentially their sov-
ereignty on sale.
At the same time, Russia is using its military, mercenaries, and
weapons sales to buy influence, exploit Africa’s natural resources,
and prop up leaders sympathetic to Russian interests and hostile
to the United States.
While the NDS states that competition with Russia and China
should be DOD’s [U.S. Department of Defense] top priority, it
makes clear that we must maintain pressure on radical terrorist
groups like al Qaeda and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].
Today, more than a dozen terrorist groups with ties to al Qaeda
and ISIS are operating across Africa. Many of these groups have
ambition to attack Americans and our partners. Without sustained
pressure, the threat posed by these groups will grow.
In SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), China and Russia
are pursuing a similar strategy by using economic and military
means to expand their access and influence right here in our own
hemisphere.
China has increased its naval deployments to the region by 70
percent over the last 5 years, and Chinese companies currently
have over 50 active port projects in this region and there are more
on the planning board.
Russia props up oppressive regimes in places like Cuba, Ven-
ezuela, and Nicaragua that are hostile to the United States. They
are also deploying advanced military assets to the region, including
strategic bombers and warships.
At the same time, many of the drugs that are poisoning the
American cities are coming from Latin America. These drugs are
trafficked by illicit networks.
I would say in my opening statement that in both of these
comms, I have been pretty outspoken as a conservative but one
who has really been concerned because they do not seem to get the
attention that some of the other comms do. I mean, you know, if
you look at Africa, you have a total of 6,000 people there, but how
much are you going to get accomplished with 6,000 people? You
look at CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. What is that? Sev-
enty-five thousand, INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] is
even bigger than that.
So if the object here and people are talking about on the subject
that is taking place is to reduce and to reposition people, you are
talking about the two areas where there are not enough people to
reposition. That is a narrow view, but that is mine.
Senator Reed?
3
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I wel-
come our witnesses.
But first let me extend my condolences to the families of the
brave Americans who were killed in action in the attack on the
Kenyan airbase earlier this month, as well as those who are recov-
ering from those wounds, and also extend my condolences to the
families of the two airmen who were recently killed in Afghanistan.
Again, thank you to the witnesses for appearing here today. Both
of you are leading commands during challenging times, and we
thank you for your continued service. Please also extend our grati-
tude to the service men and women who, under your command,
continue their outstanding service to the Nation.
There is currently an effort underway to review U.S. Force pos-
ture around the globe in an effort to ensure the Department of De-
fense funding and forces are allocated in line with the National De-
fense Strategy. We understand that AFRICOM is the first combat-
ant command to go through the review process and that
SOUTHCOM will shortly follow.
While it is wise and in fact necessary to take a hard look and
methodological look at our investments in military activities
around the globe, it would be strategically unwise to disengage
from either Africa or Latin America in an effort to generate small,
near-term budgetary gains. Given the relatively small number of
forces under consideration, such a move would not generate the
type of savings necessary for meaningful NDS investments and
would likely come at a much higher cost in terms of increased long-
term security risks.
Our competitors recognize that investing in Africa and Latin
America is in their long-term interests, as evidenced by Chinese
and Russian military and economic activity that continues to grow
across these continents year by year. General Townsend and Admi-
ral Faller, I look forward to hearing your assessments regarding
where and how United States interests are best served in the
AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM areas of operation (AO, including
where we may be able to gain efficiencies without undue risk to the
U.S. interests, and where you believe it would be strategically re-
sponsible to do so.
As you both note in your testimony, Latin America and Africa
are beset by a vicious cycle of challenges that our competitors are
seeking to leverage to their advantage. Countries with weak demo-
cratic institutions and rampant corruption are being overtly wooed
by Chinese and Russian investments and covertly manipulated
through information operations and a flood of disinformation. We
are not only competing globally for influence and access, we must
also work to ensure that new forms of military and economic colo-
nialism do not take root in those regions. I am especially concerned
about Chinese economic intentions and whether our partner coun-
tries are positioned to defend themselves against China’s predatory
lending practices.
As you well know, the problems we face and the security solu-
tions required are multidimensional. They do not lend themselves
to geographic or bureaucratic boundaries and require well-
resourced and well-integrated whole-of-government solutions. Con-
4

tinuing to restrict development aid, rebuff partners and allies, and
constrain multilateral efforts, as the administration has repeatedly
endeavored to do, all but ensures that present challenges in places
like Latin America and Africa will continue to expand and travel
to America’s doorstep. I will be interested in your views on the im-
portance of investing in diplomacy and development to foster long-
term stability in these regions, as well as your assessment of the
impact of significant force reductions on the interagency and inter-
national partners we coordinate with and depend upon to advance
our objectives.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service and thank you for your
testimony.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We will go ahead and start with opening statements, and we will
start with you, General Townsend. Your statement will be made a
part of the record. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
General TOWNSEND. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
and distinguished members of the committee, good morning and
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
It is a privilege to be a part of and to lead America’s finest men
and women at United States Africa Command, an exceptional team
dedicated to protecting America and advancing her interests on the
African continent.
I would like to take a moment to honor the memories of three
exceptional Americans, United States Army Specialist Henry
Mayfield, Jr.; Mr. Bruce Triplet; and Mr. Dustin Harrison who lost
their lives in the service of our nation on January 5th in Manda
Bay, Kenya. To their families, our thoughts and prayers are with
you. Your loved ones died while protecting the American people
from the very real threat of al Qaeda and al Shabaab terrorist
groups.
I am here this morning with my battle buddy, shipmate, and
friend, Admiral Craig Faller, to discuss shared challenges and op-
portunities in both our areas of responsibility while we further
readiness of the joint force and our ability to fight across the globe.
AFRICOM is critical to maintaining this ability as Africa over-
watches a global crossroads with strategic chokepoints and sea
lines of communication that are essential to global commerce and
critical to United States operations in the world. Our future secu-
rity and prosperity rest on this strategic access in times of crisis
and ensuring these waters remain free, open, and secure.
AFRICOM is engaged in an ongoing blank slate review. In con-
cert with the Department of Defense, we have developed a
prioritized list of objectives and actions to protect the Homeland
and secure our strategic interests in Africa while ensuring the
American taxpayers’ investments are in the right areas.
Africa is key terrain for competition with China and Russia who
are aggressively using economic and military means to expand
their access and influence. I believe Africa offers America a com-
petitive edge over China and Russia, and we should take advan-
tage of it.
5

We will grow more efficient to contribute to higher defense prior-
ities and refocus resources to global power competition, but we can-
not take pressure off major terrorist groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
These groups and many others remain an inconvenient reality in
Africa. While we should not try to confront each one, we should re-
main resolute in confronting those who threaten Americans and
the American Homeland like al Shabaab, the largest and most vio-
lent of al Qaeda’s branches. Today AFRICOM does that with a
light and relatively low cost footprint by supporting African and
international partners who are leading these efforts.
In my first 6 months of command, I learned that small invest-
ments, a few troops, and a few bucks can go a long way and make
a real difference in Africa. Our whole-of-government and partner-
centric approach acts as a force multiplier to address Africa’s many
complex challenges. What AFRICOM accomplishes with a few peo-
ple and a few dollars on a continent three and a half times the size
of the continental United States is a bargain for the American tax-
payer and low cost insurance for America in that region.
A secure and stable Africa remains an enduring American inter-
est. AFRICOM stands ready to protect and advance American in-
terests and respond to crises in Africa.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
for your continued support to our armed forces. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Townsend follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND
INTRODUCTION

A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the Com-
mittee:
I am honored and privileged to represent the members of United States Africa
Command, an exceptional team dedicated to protecting our nation and advancing
our interests. United States Africa Command has been engaged in a ‘‘blank slate
review’’ since I took command in July last year, an effort which has accelerated
since I provided my initial assessment to the Secretary of Defense in October. In
concert with the Department of Defense, we have developed a prioritized list of ob-
jectives and actions to protect the Homeland, secure our strategic interests in Africa,
and focus the American taxpayer’s investment in the right areas. We are further
refocusing United States Africa Command’s approach on the objectives of the Na-
tional Security, Defense, and Military Strategies. These foundational documents ac-
knowledge the strategic importance of Africa and guide our mission: United States
Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational threats and malign actors,
strengthens security forces and responds to crises in order to advance United States
national interests and promote regional security and stability.
Africa is home to the fastest growing economies and populations in the world, sits
at crossroads of international commerce and trade, and watches over the world’s
most important sea lines of communication. The U.S. plays a unique role in ensur-
ing these strategic routes remain open to all. The international order we have
helped create gives people everywhere the best hope for safe, secure, and prosperous
lives. Africans recognize this and continue to look to the United States for leader-
ship. Our future security, prosperity, and strategic access in times of crisis rest on
free, open, and secure sea and air lines of communication around Africa. Simply put,
a secure and stable Africa is essential for America’s security.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A Vast Continent. The land mass of Africa is larger than the United States,
China, India, Japan, and all of Europe combined. This vast continent of opportunity
and promise also includes strategic challenges from malign competitors and violent
6
extremist organizations (VEOs). Of the 1.3 billion people who live in Africa, over
two-thirds live in conditions of astonishing poverty. 1 Poverty and food insecurity are
exacerbated by natural resource degradation, shifting weather patterns, climate im-
pact, infectious disease outbreaks, and conflict. Lack of economic opportunities and
a search for a better life leads to internal displacement and refugees, which creates
new challenges and conflicts over increasingly scarce resources. These factors and
others have led to an uptick in migration to Europe in recent years, under dan-
gerous conditions in many cases, and feed a lucrative market for VEOs and criminal
networks.
These challenges will be amplified as Africa’s population continues to grow. By
2050, Africa’s population is projected to double, and more than a quarter of the
world’s inhabitants will reside on the continent. By 2100, Africa’s population is pro-
jected to almost double again. 2 At that point, almost 1 in 3 people on the planet
will live in Africa. This massive population growth will further strain resources, re-
quire job creation, potentially lead to surges in migration to Europe and beyond, and
will increase political instability, communal conflict, trans-regional terrorism, and
further marginalization of already vulnerable populations.
Nonetheless, Africa is also a land of opportunity. Over half of the world’s farming
land is in Africa, and when effectively managed, Africa’s population growth and rich
natural resources drive progress. Of note, 26 African nations hold reserves of min-
erals determined to be critical to the United States economy and national security. 3
For 2020, the World Bank projects six of the world’s fastest growing economies to
be in Africa, with Rwanda identified as the second fastest growing economy in the
world (after Guyana) with 8.1 percent GDP growth. In conditions that promote a
healthy business climate, these burgeoning markets present opportunities for U.S.
trade and investment.
Africa and National Security. Located at the crossroads of the world, Africa
watches over strategic choke points and sea lines of communication, including the
Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar on NATO’s southern flank, the Red
Sea and the Bab al Mandeb strait, and the Mozambique Channel. These strategic
pathways are essential to global commerce and critical to the operations of most of
our Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands. These corridors facilitate
one-third of the world’s shipping, and are key to the movement of Africa’s vast nat-
ural resources including energy and strategic mineral. African, United States, and
global prosperity depend on unhindered access to these waters.
Global Power Competition. 4 China and Russia have long recognized the strategic
and economic importance of Africa, and continue to seize opportunities to expand
their influence across the continent. The National Defense Strategy directs us to
prioritize great power competition with China and Russia due to the ‘‘magnitude of
the threats they post to United States security and prosperity today and the poten-
tial for those threats to increase in the future.’’ The United States encourages con-
structive partners helping to develop Africa’s economic, infrastructure, humani-
tarian, and security sectors to the benefit of all Africans. However, malign actors,
unencumbered by international norms and professional military standards, leverage
speed of action and access to economic and security arenas in many parts of the con-
tinent. Their coercive and exploitative activities undermine and threaten many Afri-
can countries’ stability. China is outpacing all of its competitors in Africa, where,
with the construction of a military port and helicopter landing pads, it is converting
its first overseas military base in Djibouti into a power projection platform. We
know they seek to open more bases and their unprofitable seaport investments in
East Africa and Southern Africa track closely with involvement by Chinese military
forces. These Chinese seaports are not genuine commercial ports; these investments
are geo-economic tools to increase the PRC’s geopolitical influence throughout the
continent. China continues to invest heavily in African infrastructure and currently
maintains 52 embassies in Africa—three more than the United States and a 24 per-
cent increase since 2012. China also leads its G20 partners in head of state and sen-
ior leadership visits to the continent over the last decade. In the last seven years,
China has sold over two billion USD in arms to African partners. During the same
period, Russia increased access agreements by 200 percent and remains the top

1 85 percent of Africans live off less than 5.50 USD per day, World Bank October 2019
2 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division World Popu-
lation Prospects: The 2019 Revision
3 Executive Order 13817, A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Crit-
ical Minerals, December 20, 2017
4 I use ‘‘global’’ rather than ‘‘great’’ because China and Russia are ‘‘global powers’’ but they
are not ‘‘great powers’’ in the way the United States is. Further, calling Russia ‘‘great’’ plays
right into the Russian’s hands as their dream is for Russia to be considered great like the
United States and they are far from it.
7
arms dealer for the entire continent, selling nearly nine billion USD in arms to Afri-
can partners. Russian private military companies (PMCs) have a highly desta-
bilizing influence in Africa, as they are frequently employed to secure Russian in-
vestments at the expense of Africans, to prop up corrupt regimes and establish a
broader Russian military footprint globally. In Libya, Russian PMCs almost cer-
tainly downed a United States unarmed, unmanned aircraft in November using a
sophisticated Russian air defense system. From the 7th Forum On China-Africa Co-
operation (FOCAC) in Beijing in September 2018 where China pledged over 60 bil-
lion USD in investments, to the October 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi where
all 54 African countries attended with over 43 Heads of State, it is clear that China
prioritizes Africa and Russia sees an opportunity to gain a strong position on
NATO’s southern flank. China and Russia’s corrupt and exploitative investment and
security assistance often prioritizes their own gains rather than building long-term
African security capacity, and their activities often undermine transparency, ac-
countability, and respect for human rights. Importantly, they erode United States
influence and access over time.
VEOs Remain a Reality. Violent extremist networks are expanding in Africa at
a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and disenfranchised populations
while employing violence to exacerbate despair and hopelessness. They undermine
public trust in local governments and militaries, eventually filling—via illegitimate
means—security and public service voids while expanding their radical ideology. In
general, African governments view VEOs as near-term threats to their capacity to
govern effectively, protect their populations, and improve their economies. They also
pose threats to U.S. interests. Most VEOs in Africa seek to strike at the United
States in the region, and some aspire to strike the United States Homeland. United
States Africa Command prioritizes efforts on the most capable VEOs today. In East
Africa, we focus on al Qaeda’s al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is the largest and most
kinetically active al Qaeda network in the world. After a series of complex attacks
targeting Somali and United States bases last year, in November al Shabaab’s lead-
ership publicly identified Americans and United States interests worldwide as pri-
ority targets—mirroring Usama bin Laden’s declaration of war on the United States
in 1996. The latest manifestation of this threat was the 5 January 2020 attack by
al Shabaab on United States Forces at the Kenyan Naval Base at Manda Bay,
which killed three Americans and clearly demonstrated al Shabaab’s willingness
and capability to attack the United States outside of Somalia.
While al Shabaab is most dangerous to United States interests today, ISIS is rap-
idly franchising VEOs in all corners of Africa and may become a pre-eminent threat
to United States interests, as it did until western intervention in Iraq and Syria.
In West Africa, the primary VEO threats are al Qaeda’s Jama’at Nusrat al Islam
wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS networks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Unlike
we have seen elsewhere, in this region, both al Qaeda and ISIS networks are work-
ing together to exploit under-governed regions, disenfranchised populations, and po-
rous borders and threaten the security and stability of our African partners, our al-
lies, United States commercial and security interests, and U.S. citizens. Kidnapping
for ransom remains a pervasive threat throughout Africa where Americans and
other Western partners are often targeted by VEOs to raise revenue or exact other
concessions from Western countries. Left unchecked, this threat will continue to ex-
pand across Africa.
Africa is a complex continent with a unique environment. There are numerous big
challenges, but its potential is enormous. Today our African partners are under
siege from new agents coming to strip them of their natural resources, trap them
in unpayable debt, and undermine the international order. Chinese investment has
brought some benefit to the continent through infrastructure projects that have im-
proved roads and connected markets to transportation hubs. However, the United
States offers a unique partnership, as we believe in investing in and fortifying our
African partners to enable ‘‘African solutions to African problems’’—the bedrock of
long-term self-sufficiency, security, and development.
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND STRATEGIC APPROACH

United States Africa Command’s operations are a bargain for America . . .an ‘‘ounce
of prevention’’ that is just pennies on the defense dollar.
The United States must continue to advance our national interests in Africa with-
in the international order that underwrites global security and prosperity. Following
our national strategic guidance to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals, United States
Africa Command applies a partner-centric, interagency-based approach dating back
to the inception of the command in 2007. In an era of global power competition, the
combined efforts of the Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Agency
8
for International Development (USAID), the broader interagency, American busi-
nesses, and the charitable generosity of the American people are critical to achiev-
ing our objectives in the National Defense Strategy. This whole-of-government
model defines United States Africa Command’s strategic approach across three
themes: we partner for success, compete to win, and maintain pressure on malign
networks.
First, we understand Africa’s challenges cannot be resolved solely through the use
of United States military power. United States Africa Command must Partner for
Success with a diverse network that includes African nations, strategic allies,
United States Government agencies and departments, and multinational coalitions
to prevent, address and mitigate conflict in Africa. We emphasize military support
to diplomacy and development as our security activities directly complement Depart-
ment of State and USAID efforts to reduce the spread of harmful ideologies,
strengthen governments to protect their citizens, and promote stability and security,
good governance, and economic successes. Security is a key enabler of U.S. whole-
of-government and whole-of-society efforts—a minimum security threshold must be
met for diplomacy to work, economies to flourish, and development efforts to take
root. On the other side, development and diplomatic engagement are necessary to
consolidate military and other security gains. United States Africa Command helps
African partners create this operational space in Africa to build the governance and
economic growth necessary for them to repel malign actors and VEO influences.
Second, we Compete to Win. We conduct our security activities to safeguard U.S.
interests. We seek areas where our interests align with those of our allies and part-
ners as we work together to achieve shared objectives. This is particularly true
where we see unhelpful activities and pressure exerted by malign actors. Chinese,
Russian and VEO activities on the continent are destabilizing and promote a dis-
regard for human rights and inclusive economic growth that will upend the progress
the continent has seen in the last ten years. United States Africa Command must
continue to find ways to expand the competitive space and outpace Chinese and
Russian influence to maintain our strategic access in Africa. America’s values, our
high standards of professionalism, our direct focus and commitment to addressing
partner security needs, and our high-quality equipment and niche capabilities give
us a qualitative advantage over these competitors in Africa . . . which our African
partners actively seek.
Most importantly, in order to counter potential threats to the U.S. and our core
interests, we work closely with allies and partners to apply persistent Pressure on
the Malign Networks of global and regional competitors, VEOs, and transnational
criminal organizations. Our principal means for applying pressure is working with
our African and international partners, increasing African security capabilities, in-
formation operations, and, only when necessary, using military force. Ultimately, in
countries like Somalia that have seen progress over the course of a decade of invest-
ment, our use of force in Africa directly supports host government, African, and
international partner efforts to provide the security required for development activi-
ties to bring about long-term stability and prosperity.
This strategic approach allows us to protect our citizens and interests at home
and abroad, advance American prosperity and values, and support allies and part-
ners overseas so they become more self-reliant and less dependent on U.S. security
assistance.
PRIORITIES, PARTNERS, AND COMPETITORS

United States Africa Command advances United States strategic objectives by fo-
cusing on global power competition to maintain strategic access, by prioritizing ef-
forts that protect the Homeland and U.S. personnel on the continent, and by re-
sponding to regional crises across our area of responsibility. United States security
cooperation with African partners builds professional, capable militaries that can
provide security which sets the conditions for economic growth and development. We
achieve and maintain influence with our African partners through security coopera-
tion, exercises, engagements, operations, and ‘‘setting the theater’’ or maturing in-
frastructure on the continent.
Protecting United States personnel and facilities remains United States Africa
Command’s number one responsibility. Our mission to protect United States embas-
sies and forces in Africa is central to our force posture. The Department of State
has designated 32 diplomatic facilities worldwide as High Threat, High Risk posts—
15 are in our area of responsibility, spread across an area 3.5 times the size of the
United States. This critical mission requires heightened readiness and vigilance. Ad-
ditionally, on any given day there are approximately 6,000 Department of Defense
personnel across the continent supporting U.S. interests, addressing global security
9
challenges, and maintaining strategic access and influence. Even if the numbers of
at-risk diplomatic posts and military personnel are reduced, the remainder will still
require the backing and protection of the Department of Defense. Al-Shabaab’s ca-
pability to reach outside the borders of Somalia to strike Americans in locations we
once considered beyond their reach highlights the growing threat to our interests.
After the 5 January attack in Kenya, we have taken swift measures to increase our
force protection posture and harden our location at Manda Bay, while pursuing the
attackers and their network. We are also taking a hard look at all our locations
across the continent in light of this expanded threat.
We benefit greatly from close coordination with a variety of U.S. and international
partners. There are currently 28 representatives from 13 different U.S. Government
departments holding key positions on my staff. All United States Africa Command
activities are closely coordinated with Defense Attachés and Chiefs of Security Co-
operation in our embassies across Africa. In addition, United States Africa Com-
mand collaborates with the United States National Guard’s State Partnership Pro-
gram (SPP), where 15 African countries are paired with United States National
Guard units. The SPP creates enduring bonds between Americans and Africans, and
we are encouraged as more African countries apply to the program every year. Fur-
thermore, foreign liaison officers representing 18 countries and multinational orga-
nizations are assigned to United States Africa Command headquarters providing
key reach back capability within their Ministries of Defense and General Staffs.
Outside the command, we regularly work with the African Union, European Union,
NATO, United Nations, and the Regional Economic Communities in Africa on oper-
ations, exercises, engagements, security cooperation, and maturing the theater ac-
tivities.
In Africa, Counter-VEO is Global Power Competition. United States Africa Com-
mand prioritizes global power competition, even while we remain engaged in
counter-VEO (C–VEO) operations. At AFRICOM, we recognize the strategic environ-
ment is changing and the Joint Force must orient the bulk of our efforts against
China and Russia even as we counter VEOs that threaten America. In Africa, the
C–VEO fight is a key component of global power competition as these efforts are
not mutually exclusive. Our experience, training, equipment, advice, and other
unique capabilities to support C–VEO efforts led by our allies and partners address-
es immediate partner needs, builds relationships for the future, and is a distinct
U.S. advantage that our competitors cannot match. Al Qaeda and ISIS influence is
growing in Africa and al Shabaab’s capability to threaten American interests in
East Africa and the Homeland is on a dangerous trajectory. The international com-
munity is not making durable progress to contain priority VEOs in Africa, mainly
because military activities remain insufficiently coordinated and lack a ‘‘whole of co-
alition’’ balance between military and non-military investments. Outside of arms
sales that they leverage to their own benefit, China and Russia do little to counter
violent extremist groups seeking to destabilize Africa. However, as one African lead-
er recently shared, ‘‘a drowning man will accept any hand.’’ In the absence of even
limited United States C–VEO assistance, African partners are turning to our com-
petitors to fill the void, including by accepting training and other military engage-
ment opportunities overseas. In our highest priority countries, where U.S. interests
are greatest, C–VEO assistance is a key tool in our global power competition toolkit.
In Africa, Building Partner Capability is Global Power Competition. Building
partner capability is also an important tool in global power competition, reinforcing
the U.S. role as the world’s elite professional fighting force and furthering American
values, respect for human rights, and adherence to obligations and commitments.
We have learned that we cannot surge trust. The enduring relationships built while
we develop partner capabilities provide us with the long-term strategic alliances we
need to address future challenges.
United States Africa Command and its component commands conduct engage-
ments and exercises throughout the region designed to strengthen key partnerships
and improve partner capabilities in basic military skills, maritime security, C–VEO
efforts, counter-trafficking, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and control of
key infectious diseases. United States Africa Command leverages an interagency
toolkit and coordinates a broad group of programs to complement our capability-
building efforts such as, among others, the Department of State’s Global Peace Op-
erations Initiative, Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, Africa Military
Education Program, and the Women, Peace & Security Initiative. These programs
help professionalize partner military and security forces and strengthen defense in-
stitutions through training on human rights, the rule of law, and prevention of vio-
lence against women.
United States-facilitated exercises offer some of the best return on investment by
advancing our force readiness and providing our African partners with exposure to
10
American values, expertise, and professionalism. Our exercise program improves
partners’ capabilities, encourages self-sufficiency, and develops opportunities for
burden sharing over the long-term. United States Naval Forces Africa completed Ex-
ercise Cutlass Express in November, combining for the first time with United States
Central Command’s International Maritime Exercise, creating the second largest
maritime exercise in the world for little in the way of additional resources. This ex-
ercise also allowed United States Africa Command and United States Central Com-
mand to practice cross-boundary operations along our seam. The ability to attract
large coalitions of partners and allies to exercises addressing shared security con-
cerns is a unique U.S. advantage that sends a strong message to our partners and
competitors.
Another United States Africa Command niche capability with long-term and high
return on investment is United States professional military education and training.
In 2019, African partners sent 763 of their best and brightest military leaders for
training at professional military schools in the United States through Department
of State’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In addi-
tion, in August, United States Africa Command’s Senior Enlisted Leader hosted the
third annual and largest African Senior Enlisted Leader Conference with over 67
African partners from 29 countries. These are important stakeholders that our com-
petitors dismiss—strong officer and enlisted leadership is a bedrock of responsible
defense institutions and our African partners look to United States Forces as a
model.
United States Africa Command engages partners to establish the security envi-
ronment required for economic opportunity and trade to flourish. With a whole-of-
government approach, enhanced security fosters development and investment with
United States initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Prosper Af-
rica, and the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD)
Act. Efforts like these open doors for United States companies to compete overseas
and respond to China’s increased economic engagement in Africa.
REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS

In East Africa, we see opportunity in several countries and strong partners in oth-
ers. Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya are the top African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) troop contributors and some of our strongest African partners
in the fight against al Shabaab in Somalia. Djibouti also contributes troops to
AMISOM and hosts our largest presence on the continent at Camp Lemonnier,
home to more than 3,000 Americans supporting multiple United States combatant
commands and other organizations. Thanks to our collective security and whole-of-
government efforts, we have seen real and tangible progress in Somalia over more
than a decade, albeit slower than we would like. AMISOM and the Somali National
Army (SNA) have made gains in al Shabaab strongholds in the south, holding terri-
tory and establishing outposts. Gains are fragile, though, and at risk of stalling, so
there is much work to be done. Al Qaeda’s al Shabaab is a very real threat to Soma-
lia, the region, the international community, and even the United States Homeland,
but political friction between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Fed-
eral Member States threatens to distract Mogadishu from the fight. Somalia’s Prime
Minister Khayre called 2019 Somalia’s ‘‘Year of Action,’’ and has led encouraging se-
curity sector reforms replacing corrupt leaders with reform-minded officers. United
States-trained ‘‘Danab’’ SNA units, along with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, are im-
portant to maintain momentum and secure hard-fought gains. Importantly, the Eu-
ropean Union continues to fund AMISOM stipends at over 200M EUR per year. Un-
derscoring the importance and urgency of the international effort, al Shabaab’s 5
January Manda Bay attack—the group’s first ever attack on a military base inside
Kenya—demonstrates their intent and capability to strike outside Somalia. It is crit-
ical that AMISOM remain in the fight, as the SNA requires more time and inter-
national support before they are able to counter al Shabaab themselves. In the next
6 months, I intend to review United States military operations in Somalia in detail
to assess our progress and the way ahead.
North Africa is home to some of our oldest friends and newest democratic part-
ners. Morocco was the first country to recognize our new nation in 1777 and re-
mains by our side through exercises, training programs, foreign military sales, and
counterterrorism cooperation. We’d like to strengthen our security cooperation with
Algeria as it enters a new era under its first new president in twenty years. Tunisia
just completed its second free and fair presidential election since its 2011 revolution.
The Tunisians are strong partners in the fight against ISIS–Libya and complement
our security cooperation investment dollars with national funds. However, much of
the international community remains paralyzed in Libya as we watch a civil war
11
play out with no real progress toward a political solution. As we continue to support
the United Nations action plan, Turkey and Russia are weighing in heavily on op-
posing sides. Notably, Russia continues to harvest benefits from the instability in
Libya—its military meddling has prolonged the conflict and exacerbated casualties
and humanitarian suffering. Moscow continues to deny any Russian involvement in
the conflict, but its private military companies (PMCs), such as the Wagner Group
with strong links to the Kremlin, are leading the fight for the self-styled ‘‘Libyan
National Army’’ against the UN-backed and United States-recognized Government
of National Accord. Turkey’s recent deployment of troops and hardware to counter
Russian PMCs risks a significant escalation, as both Russia and Turkey are at-
tempting to tip the scales in their favor. A potential bad outcome for both the
United States and NATO is Russia gaining access to oil and military bases with
long-range anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities on NATO’s southern flank.
Despite these frictions, United States Africa Command continues to keep pressure
on ISIS and other VEOs as they seek to take advantage of the security vacuum cre-
ated by the civil war in Libya. Our persistent focus on ISIS–Libya, in coordination
with our interagency and African partners and at low cost in Department of Defense
resources, continues to disrupt ISIS freedom of action as a regional terrorist threat.
We will remain vigilant to counter VEO reconstitution efforts.
In West Africa, we see functioning democracies, peaceful transfers of power, and
an engaged regional organization in the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). Senegal remains a stalwart, fully functioning democracy, focused
on bolstering their defense institutions. Ghana hosts our West Africa Logistics Net-
work, a unique shared-expense logistics hub that supports United States, African,
and European partners across the continent. However, we also see a serious re-
gional threat from VEOs emanating from the Sahel. Security is deteriorating rap-
idly, with a 250 percent increase in VEO violence since 2018 in Burkina Faso, Mali,
and western Niger. Having quickly spread from northern Mali, al Qaeda’s JNIM,
ISIS-aligned groups, and other VEOs are now operating throughout the Sahel re-
gion. They are taking advantage of porous borders, weak governments, under-
resourced and overextended militaries, and disenfranchised populations, and are
now even threatening Gulf of Guinea countries. Our African partners are trying to
help address this growing regional threat themselves through the G5 Sahel Joint
Force, the Accra Initiative and various ECOWAS initiatives. However, despite
United States bilateral security assistance and generous pledges of support from the
international community coordinated by the European Union, they cannot effec-
tively control their own borders or address security and related governance chal-
lenges in the region without substantive external assistance from their Western
partners. We praise our French partners who are assisting this African-led effort
in a significant way with over 4,400 French troops deployed as part of Operation
Barkhane. In our view, African and European partners must do more to roll back
the VEO threat and there must be a better synchronization of efforts in West Africa.
The window of opportunity to dig a firebreak and prevent the further spread of
VEOs is months, not years. We applaud emerging plans by the French and Germans
to develop new structures to improve coordination, synchronization, and effective-
ness of international assistance, and improve African partner fighting capabilities.
We encourage all approaches that will allow regional partners to be more self-suffi-
cient.
In Central and Southern Africa, we again see some strong partnerships and a few
opportunities. Botswana is a bright spot with its enduring democracy, continued sta-
bility, professional military and good relations with the United States In 2019,
Rwanda became the 15th African nation to join the SPP, establishing their partner-
ship with the Nebraska National Guard in December. South Africa is the second-
largest economy in Africa and the largest United States trade partner on the con-
tinent. There is enormous potential for Mozambique, where the United States,
France, and other partners have invested in an 11 billion USD liquid natural gas
project that is located in the same areas as an increasingly violent group that has
claimed links to ISIS. In addition, United States Africa Command support to USAID
for Cyclone Idai relief and recovery efforts have opened a door with Mozambique for
future security cooperation opportunities.
China and Russia are in a position of advantage in central and southern Africa.
Russia is testing its playbook for malign activity in the Central African Republic,
where they are deploying PMCs, extracting minerals, and attempting to buy influ-
ence. In Mozambique, Moscow provided second-rate counterterrorism assistance in
the hopes of buying oil and gas concessions. Russia also deployed strategic bombers
to South Africa, and participated in the first-ever trilateral Chinese-Russian-South
African naval exercise MOSI in November 2019. ISIS and other spoilers look to ex-
12
ploit long-simmering grievances and gaps in governance in the region. We are ex-
ploring renewed military-to-military outreach in South Africa.
ECONOMY OF FORCE

United States Africa Command continues to assess and implement reform efforts
to maximize value from our precious resources. For example, we prioritize the
warfighting readiness of assigned and allocated forces through refinement of our ex-
ercise program. We are committed to optimizing the effectiveness of our security co-
operation assistance and activities and we must be innovative in how we use our
assets in support of our strategic objectives. Honest assessments and prudent in-
vestments ensure the United States maximizes the impact of every taxpayer dollar
while remaining the premier security partner for priority African Governments.
U.S. foreign assistance should serve America’s interests and should support coun-
tries that help us to advance our foreign policy goals. United States Africa Com-
mand’s efforts are focused on priority nations and strategic objectives that are sus-
tainable, consistent with our national-level guidance, maintain our strategic access
and protect the Homeland and United States personnel on the continent.
It is a commander’s responsibility to ensure our world-class troops have the re-
sources they need. We must protect our forces when we move them into uncertain
environments. The pace of improved base defense capabilities against emerging
threats has been too slow. We need to accelerate C–UAS technologies to Africa to
improve local domain awareness and provide an additional layer of warning and
force protection while also improving capabilities across the joint force. As pre-
viously mentioned, our exercises hone partner capabilities and encourage self-suffi-
ciency and burden sharing. This small investment in relationships and the human
capital of our partners can make a difference in a crisis. With the continued support
of Congress, United States Africa Command can best provide our troops the protec-
tion they deserve while enabling engagements critical to war-winning activities in
any theater.
CONCLUSION

A secure and stable Africa is an enduring American interest.
United States Africa Command remains ready to protect United States citizens,
interests, strategic access, and respond to crises in our area of responsibility. The
men and women of United States Africa Command, our partners on the continent,
and our broad collection of stakeholders understand how important Africa is to the
global economy and security environment. Strategic access to Africa, its airspace,
and its surrounding waters is vital to United States national security. As outlined
in our governing strategies, long-term global power competition with China and
Russia and the need to limit the harmful influence of malign actors in the region
is of utmost importance.
In my first 6 months of command, and through our ongoing ‘‘blank slate review’’
process, I have learned that small investments in Africa go a long way. A few bucks
and a few troops can make a significant difference and have proven to be the corner-
stone of multinational efforts in the region. What United States Africa Command
accomplishes with relatively few people and few dollars, on a continent 3.5 times
the size of the continental United States, is a bargain for the American taxpayer.
That said, United States Africa Command is diligently working to make our oper-
ations even more efficient and adjusting our posture and activities to ensure United
States strategic access for today and tomorrow. Africa is key terrain for competition
with China and Russia, and our support to C–VEO operations is necessary. While
we can and will grow more efficient to contribute to higher NDS priorities, if the
United States steps back from Africa too far, China and Russia will fill the void to
our detriment. Violent extremist organizations will be able to grow unchecked, some
will ultimately threaten the Homeland, and we will lose opportunities for increased
trade and investments with some of the fastest growing economies in the world.
Finally, it remains my honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast
guardsmen, civilians, and families of United States Africa Command. Our efforts
have made the United States safer and advanced American interests while helping
Africans do more for themselves. United States Africa Command is an investment
in America’s, Africa’s, and the world’s future.
Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, General Townsend.
Admiral Faller?
13
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER, USN,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
Admiral FALLER. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
Senators, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am hon-
ored to be here with my shipmate and good friend, General Steve
Townsend.
We also thank you for the steadfast support you provide to our
men and women every day at SOUTHCOM, and I am truly grateful
for the honor and opportunity to lead them.
I am with Ambassador Jean Manes, our civilian deputy com-
mander, former United States Ambassador to El Salvador; and
Sergeant Major Zickefoose, Command Sergeant Major for
SOUTHCOM, two of the eyes and ears of our command.
The western hemisphere is our shared home. It is our neighbor-
hood and we are connected to the nations there in every domain,
sea, air, space, land, cyber, and most importantly, culturally and
with values. Over the last year, I have had the opportunity to visit
our partners and see firsthand the opportunities and challenges
that directly impact the security of our hemisphere.
I have come to describe the challenges of a vicious circle of
threats that deliberately erodes the security and stability of this re-
gion and the United States of America. This vicious circle is framed
by systemic issues of young democracies, with weak institutions,
rampant corruption, exploited by transnational criminal organiza-
tions often better funded than the security organizations they face,
external state actors that do not share those values, China, Russia,
and Iran, and violent extremist organizations. They are trying to
advance their interests at the expense of United States and partner
nation security.
In fact, the aha for me over the last year is the extent to which
China is aggressively pursuing its interests right here in our neigh-
borhood. This vicious circle can be seen most acutely in the tragedy
that is Venezuela. The human suffering of this once thriving de-
mocracy has driven 5 million people to flee to neighboring countries
like Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, and more.
These countries are dealing with this and the strains to their
health care, education, and social services are palatable. Colombia
alone spent $2.5 billion, a significant part of their GDP [gross
domestic product], over the last 2 years just to support the
migrants. While Russia, Cuba, and China prop up this illegitimate
Maduro dictatorship, the democracies of the world look for a way
to get the Venezuelan people what they deserve, a free and pros-
perous Venezuela.
The only way to attack this vicious circle is as a team. In this
neighborhood, a little goes a long way, and our partners are willing
to contribute. But we need the right and focused, persistent mili-
tary presence which might take the form of security force assisted
brigades or small teams of special operation forces or marines to
conduct specialized training or our National Guard forces forging
long-term relations via the State Partnership Program or our mari-
time forces where presence at sea establishes sea control and
attacks these transnational criminal organizations, as we have
recently done with the deployment of littoral combat ship USS
Detroit.
14

Deployments like the United States naval ship Comfort show the
best outstretched hand of America, and that mission treated over
70,000 patients and extended our enduring promise as a trusted
partner to the neighborhood.
Security cooperation is a critical tool in a region with willing
partners who thrive given the opportunity. International military
education and training, IMET [International Military Education
and Training], as a small investment, yields long-term returns. It
builds lasting trusted relationships. As I speak, half of our nation’s
chiefs of defense are graduates of IMET programs.
Finally, our people, our greatest asset. Joint Interagency Task
Force South, JIATF–South in Key West, our southernmost base in
the continental United States, holds significant strategic value in
defending against a wide range of threats to U.S. national security.
We are taking steps to improve the resiliencies of that head-
quarters building and to improve the quality of life of our military
and civilian personnel who struggle in one of the country’s most ex-
pensive economies.
At our headquarters in Miami, we are also working to address
the cost of living and housing concerns that create hardships for
our families.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you again for the
opportunity to testify today. The SOUTHCOM team appreciates
the support of Congress, and you continue to place trust and honor
in us and we will not let you down.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Faller follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL CRAIG S. FALLER
Strategic Environment. Thank you for your support to United States Southern
Command (USSOUTHCOM). As our National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs, we
are focused on sustaining our advantages in the Western Hemisphere—the most im-
portant of which are strong partnerships founded on shared democratic values. Re-
cent trends illustrate that the Western Hemisphere—our shared neighborhood—is
critical space in the global competition—and global challenges—posed by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. As the NDS notes, the U.S. derives im-
mense benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere, and keeping our partnerships in
the Western Hemisphere strong and vibrant will allow us to achieve the NDS objec-
tive of maintaining a favorable regional balance of power that reduces security
threats to the Homeland.
Beyond like-minded democracies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean,
the region is home to ∼25 percent of all United States exports and key global infra-
structure like the Panama Canal, sea lanes, and deep water ports that provide ac-
cess to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. It is directly connected to our Home-
land in every domain—land, sea, air, space, cyber, and most importantly values—
which makes any threat or encroachment in this region particularly concerning.
Latin America’s strategic importance lies in its unique potential as both a vulner-
ability and an opportunity for our own security, prosperity, and efforts to address
global challenges. 1
Concerning Trends. Last year, the Chinese Government absorbed three more
Latin American countries into its One Belt One Road Initiative, bringing the re-
gional total to 19—more than half of all countries in the region. Beijing now has
29 government exchange programs with Latin America and the Caribbean, and con-
tinues to expand offers of professional military education, equipment donations, and
funding for infrastructure projects. Russia once again projected power in our neigh-
borhood, establishing a military footprint in Venezuela; deploying (for the first time)
its most advanced nuclear-capable warship; and sending a research ship capable of
mapping and cutting undersea cables, as well as two other naval research vessels

1 R. Evan Ellis (2016). ‘‘Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean.’’
15
to operate near our Homeland. Under Russian and Cuban tutelage, oppression in
Venezuela is ever-increasing. The illegitimate former Maduro regime arbitrarily ar-
rested for political reasons more than 2,000 individuals in 2019. Between January
2018 and May 2019, regime-aligned security forces killed more than 7,000 people,
and many of these killings may constitute extrajudicial killings.
These malign state actors are part of a vicious circle of threats that deliberately
erode stability and security in the region. This vicious circle is framed by systemic
issues of young democracies, often with weak governance and porous legal frame-
works, exacerbated by a propensity towards patronage and corruption that is delib-
erately exploited by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), external state ac-
tors (such as the PRC and Russia), and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) to
advance their own ends at the expense of United States and partner nation security.
This vicious circle continues to negatively impact our Homeland, most acutely in the
form of illegal immigration and illicit drug flows, but also in other, more harmful
ways. Due to high levels of insecurity and frustration with government corruption,
support for democracy and democratic institutions in Latin America and the Carib-
bean is at its lowest levels in 15 years, 2 providing further openings for malign state
actors to increase their influence. A number of countries are experiencing demo-
cratic backsliding, with others sliding towards outright authoritarianism.
Positive Trends. These threats are real, and they demand a sense of urgency. But
so do the opportunities. Protests in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras,
and Peru demonstrate that, while democracy may be troubled, citizens are exer-
cising democratic rights to uphold their constitutions. Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador
now recognize the Cuban threat to freedom, expelling thousands of Cuban officials,
some even accused of instigating social unrest. Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Sal-
vador are doing more to stop the flow of drugs and irregular migration towards our
border; Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago regularly deploy to regional disaster re-
sponse efforts, to include supporting the Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian; and Co-
lombia, Brazil, and Chile continue to grow their contributions to global security.
Improving Performance & Accountability. The men and women of USSOUTHCOM
are moving out to break the vicious circle of threats and sustain our security advan-
tages in the Western Hemisphere. While doing so, we remain committed to making
good use of every taxpayer dollar Congress entrusts to us. Over the past year we
undertook a detailed review of all aspects of our organization to gain efficiencies and
support the Department’s reform efforts. I look forward to discussing how we are
freeing up time, money, and manpower to invest back into our top priorities:
strengthening our strategic partnerships, countering threats, and building the readi-
ness of our team.
Our Approach. The NDS highlights the importance of alliances and partner-
ships—which is exactly right for USSOUTHCOM, where strengthening partnerships
is the best way to counter threats, enhance our collective readiness and capability
to meet global challenges, and maintain the regional balance of power in favor of
the United States. We also support the interagency, including the Department of
State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, and the intelligence and law enforcement communities, reinforcing the impor-
tance of leveraging all tools of national security.
We break the vicious circle and outcompete Beijing and other competitors by play-
ing to our strengths of shared values, professionalism, and equipment built to last,
and by investing in education, intelligence sharing, personnel exchanges, exercises,
joint operations, and security cooperation. More than anything else, persistent pres-
ence matters in this fight. Like athletes, we have to be present on the field to com-
pete, and we have to compete to win.
Threats to our Neighborhood: Malign State Actors. As the Department of Defense
has prioritized the Indo-Pacific region, Beijing has aggressively turned its attention
to the Western Hemisphere, exporting corrupt business practices and disregard for
international law and standards to countries already struggling with government
corruption and weak governance. The competitive space is truly global and all-do-
main as SOUTHCOM plays a vital role in the effort to outcompete the PRC and
Russia. Nine nations in the Western Hemisphere (out of 15 worldwide) still recog-
nize Taiwan—a fact that has not gone unnoticed by Beijing, which is engaging in
persistent (and successful) dollar diplomacy to lower that number to zero. With 19
Latin American and Caribbean nations now participating in the One Belt One Road
Initiative and pledges of at least $150 billion in loans, the PRC is now the region’s
largest investor and creditor, practicing the same type of predatory financing and

2 2018/2019 AmericasBaromter report, funded by USAID. Available at: https://
news.vanderbilt.edu/2019/10/14/support-for-democracy-in-a-slump-across-americas-according-
to-new-survey/
16
‘‘no strings attached’’ largesse it has wielded in other parts of the world. On the de-
fense side, this includes ‘‘gifts’’ of equipment to regional militaries and aiming to
copy our successful military education program.
Beyond One Belt One Road, 25 out of 31 countries in the region host Chinese in-
frastructure projects. Most concerning, certain investments have strategic value for
future military uses. Chinese investment in numerous deep water ports and infra-
structure on both sides of the Panama Canal could enable the Chinese military to
threaten sea lanes vital to global commerce and the movement of United States
Forces. Fleets of Chinese-flagged fishing vessels routinely violate the sovereign
rights of coastal states to conduct illegal fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs) of Latin American countries, while Chinese mining and infrastructure
projects have created lasting environmental damage. Beijing sees immense value in
South America’s strategic location for space activity and is actively pursuing addi-
tional access to regional space infrastructure. With telecommunication projects in 16
countries, Huawei and ZTE provide the backbone of commercial and government
communication systems, providing a backdoor for the Chinese Government to mon-
itor or intercept official information we share with our partners. Beijing is also gain-
ing real-time, street-level situational awareness by selling surveillance technology
through its ‘‘Smart Cities’’ initiative—the same technology the Chinese Communist
Party uses to monitor and repress its citizens. 3
Russia continues to play the role of ‘‘spoiler,’’ seeking to sow disunity and discredit
the United States within our own hemisphere. As it does across the world, Russia
meddles in regional affairs by spreading false information on its media platforms
and engaging in malicious cyber activity. Russia’s ability to disseminate
disinformation is considerable; videos posted on Russia Today (RT) En Espanol’s so-
cial media platforms received more views in 2019 than any other Spanish-language
news source. While Moscow denies having a military presence in the region, Russian
‘‘advisors’’ continue to prop up the former Maduro regime. Beyond Venezuela, the
sanctuary of cozy relationships with authoritarian governments in Cuba and Nica-
ragua provide Russia with footholds close to our Homeland, giving Putin strategic
options. Cuba in particular is the gateway for Russia’s access to the Western Hemi-
sphere, allowing Russia to collect intelligence in close proximity to the United
States.
Iran, which has exported its state-sponsored terrorism to the Americas in the
past, maintains facilitation networks and raises funds through its proxy, Lebanese
Hezbollah. Some Hezbollah supporters cache weapons and raise funds, often via
charitable donations, remittances, and sometimes through illicit means, such as
drug trafficking and money laundering. Having a footprint in the region also allows
Iran to collect intelligence and conduct contingency planning for possible retaliatory
attacks against United States and/or Western interests.
After more than six decades, Cuba remains a bastion for authoritarianism, an ex-
porter of malign ideology, and an underlying driver of instability in the region.
Cuban intelligence personnel support and counsel non-democratic leaders, including
directly propping up the illegitimate Maduro regime in Venezuela. Cuba, Russia,
and the PRC all collect intelligence against the United States and seek to undercut
United States initiatives region wide. Although Cuba portrays the thousands of
Cuban medical personnel it sends as humanitarian, such aid routinely includes in-
telligence collection, propagation of Cuba’s failed ideology, and advancing a dis-
tinctly anti-United States agenda.
The final malign actors—Maduro and his cronies in Venezuela—pose one of the
most direct threats to peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. Emboldened
by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and Cuban protection and patronage, Maduro has al-
lowed Venezuela to become a safe haven for the ELN, FARC dissidents, and drug
traffickers while the Venezuelan people starve. If UN projections for 2020 hold, the
number of Venezuelans fleeing their country could soon surpass the Syrian exodus.
To date, nearly 4.8 million have fled, placing significant strain on Colombia, Brazil,
Peru, Ecuador, and other host countries in the region. Colombia bears the brunt of
this crisis and has generously stepped up to support the over 1.6 million refugees
while at the same time having 7.8 million internally displaced persons of their own,
the largest IDP population in the world. The consequences of the Venezuelan crisis
will last generations; a post-Maduro Venezuela will require significant support to
help Venezuelans address the decades of mismanagement, widespread insecurity,
and corruption of defense and other institutions in order to realize the natural rich-
ness of their resources.

3 Because of the intimate relationship between Chinese businesses and China’s National Intel-
ligence Law, citizens living in democracies in the Western Hemisphere could have their entire
digital identity under the surveillance of the Chinese Communist Party.
17
What We’re Doing. As I mentioned earlier, we have to be on the field to compete,
and when we are on the field, our impacts are positive and long-lasting. In the ab-
sence of an enduring U.S. military presence, recurring rotations of small teams of
Special Operations Forces, soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
national guard personnel help us strengthen partnerships and exchange critical ex-
pertise. The National Guard through the State Partnership Program (SPP) is
uniquely positioned based on its dual military experience to provide a persistent and
sustained presence to our partner nations by means of senior leader visits, ex-
changes, and cooperative training and exercises in areas ranging from humanitarian
assistance to cyber. In Central America, our Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF–B) and
Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) build col-
lective response and security capability and readiness in Army and Marine Corps
Reserve Forces and partner militaries. Expanding on the 2018 deployment, Brazil,
Colombia, and Peru integrated into the SPMAGTF last year, building interoper-
ability for expeditionary operations. Once again, these three partners also formed
part of the hospital ship USNS Comfort’s multinational team. The 2019 Comfort
mission delivered significant returns, providing world-class medical care to nearly
68,000 patients in 12 countries, reducing suffering caused by the man-made crisis
in Venezuela, and enhancing medical readiness in the United States Navy, our part-
ners, and allies. JTF–B facilitates strategic access to Central America, builds endur-
ing relationships with partner nations, and response to contingencies to create re-
gional stability and security. JTF–B provided medical care to over 20,000 partner
nation patients, rapid response capability for a wide range of contingencies, and as-
signed forces to participate in exercises.
As directed by the NDS, we’re deepening relations with ‘‘regional countries that
export military capabilities to priority regional and global security challenges.’’ Re-
cently designated a Major Non-NATO ally and the newest partner in the State Part-
nership Program (SPP), we work closely with Brazil on a range of priority missions.
Chile exports its security expertise to both the Asia-Indo-Pacific region and Central
America, and is actively partnering with us and United States Army South to
develop a concept for a combined, large-scale, combat-focused exercise later this
year. Colombia—NATO’s only global partner in the region—seeks to share its hu-
manitarian demining and counter IED expertise with NATO allies while also serv-
ing in South Korea as part of the United Nations Command, a legacy that stems
from its participation in the Korean War. Panama has been a particularly strong
supporter of United States efforts to hold global malign actors accountable, de-flag-
ging numerous vessels suspected of carrying cargo in violation of United States and
international sanctions. El Salvador punches well above its weight having supported
coalition operations with 12 rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan and applying training
and equipment received via the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) in their
current deployments to the UN Mission in Mali.
In the face of the PRC’s and Russia’s global assault on international norms, en-
gagement on shared values is more important than ever before. As I told this Com-
mittee last year, education, training, and security cooperation efforts like the SPP
and the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Trans-
formation (CE2T2) Program and the Department of State’s International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) are game changers for us. With modest investments of time and
money, these programs are helping us reinforce mutual understanding, shared val-
ues and culture, and doctrine. Along with IMET; our Human Rights Initiative; non-
commissioned officer development; and Women, Peace, and Security programs
enhance the professionalism of the region’s militaries and security forces. In par-
ticular, USSOUTHCOM’s decades-long commitment to promoting respect for human
rights has become a cornerstone of our strong partnerships with like-minded mili-
taries. These efforts are among the most effective ways we can expand competitive
space and outcompete any malign state actors, and encourage our partners to hold
the PRC, Russia, and others accountable to the Inter-American values of peace, de-
mocracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights.
Another way we blunt malign influence is by sharing information about Beijing’s
predatory economic practices, the security risks associated with Chinese technology,
and activities by Russia, Iran, and their authoritarian allies that undermine re-
gional sovereignty and security. In addition to expanding our information sharing
efforts throughout the hemisphere, we are also working multilaterally with partners
in the region to enhance our understanding of the security threats posed by the
Venezuelan crisis, which in turn assists with multinational efforts to plan for longer
term recovery and stability once free and fair democratic elections are held.
We also support the NDS’ focus on developing operational concepts to enhance
Joint Force lethality while building interoperability with allied and partner forces.
18
We leverage our science and technology portfolio in high-end multinational exercises
like UNITAS and PANAMAX, providing opportunities for the Services to test new
warfighting capabilities in a low-risk coalition environment. Through our Caribbean-
focused Tradewinds exercise, we are now laying the groundwork for a combined task
force that can counter a range of threats and enable sea control and denial oper-
ations. We conduct cyber training and capacity building with partners like Chile,
Argentina, and Brazil in an effort to build defensive cyber capabilities and establish
shared cyber situational awareness in the region. We continue to work closely with
other U.S. combatant commands and the Joint Staff to ensure globally integrated
plans, operations, and exercises reflect the threats and opportunities in this hemi-
sphere.
Threats to Our Neighborhood: TCOs and VEOs. As the NDS recognizes, ‘‘non-state
actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capa-
bilities.’’ TCOs engage in a wide array of illegal activities that generate approxi-
mately two trillion dollars in illicit proceeds annually, including drug and weapons
trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and illegal mining. We see these
impacts directly in our Homeland; drugs have killed 700,000 Americans since 1999, 4
costing our nation billions in criminal justice, healthcare, and productivity costs—
in addition to the suffering caused by shattered and lost lives. Through corruption
and violence, TCOs also challenge and erode the governance of partners that we rely
on to advance regional and global security, threatening to reverse decades of suc-
cessful U.S. policies and security investments.
Collectively TCOs exacerbate the already insecure environment facilitating oppor-
tunities for malign actors to expand influence, and VEOs leverage to move people
and weapons through our hemisphere. This latter vulnerability is particularly trou-
blesome; there is an interconnected system of pathways that spans our neighbor-
hood, running through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central
America. Many of these pathways lead directly into our Homeland, and anything
can move on them—for the right price. This ongoing threat was illustrated in 2019
by several successful U.S. law enforcement operations against human smuggling
networks, which continue to enable the movement of individuals with terrorist links,
many of whom attempt to enter the U.S. Homeland illegally.
What We’re Doing. We’re strengthening partnerships with countries that con-
tribute military capabilities to regional security and beyond, with a focus on ena-
bling combined operations and building interoperability to stop the flow of drugs to
the U.S. Homeland, reduce the effectiveness of priority TCOs, and prevent VEOs
from leveraging regional vulnerabilities to do us, or our partners, harm.
Colombia sees the fight against cocaine trafficking as a shared responsibility, and
one in which they are sacrificing blood and treasure to meet their commitment to
halve cocaine production by 2023. Last year Colombia built a 20-nation coalition to
conduct maritime counterdrug operations while working closely with Panama and
Costa Rica to seize drugs headed to the United States. In 2019, Colombia also
manually eradicated 82,000 hectares of coca plants, at the cost of almost 600 police
and military killed or wounded, largely due to IEDs emplaced to protect the coca
fields. Inside of Colombia, their security forces also disrupted and destroyed over
300 cocaine-producing labs, preventing over 400 metric tons of cocaine from ever
leaving the country. Colombia continues assisting us with Central America’s secu-
rity challenges, training 5,700 military and police from six Central American coun-
tries through the United States Colombia Action Plan program since the program’s
inception in fiscal year 2013. We continue to enable Colombian operations against
priority narco-terrorist organizations like the ELN and FARC dissidents, yielding
significant returns on security in Colombia and the United States.
In the Caribbean and Central America, we continue to focus our capacity-building
efforts on improving border security, drug interdiction rates, and institutional effec-
tiveness. Jamaica has now integrated its self-funded maritime patrol aircraft into
Joint Interagency Task Force South counterdrug operations, enhancing our oper-
ational reach and effectiveness. After receiving sustained training by Naval Special
Warfare teams, Guatemala’s Fuerzas Especiales Navales (FEN) is now entirely self-
sufficient and responsible for more than 80 percent of Guatemala’s drug seizures.
Like Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama and El Salvador are applying United States-
provided training and equipment to regularly interdict drug shipments more than
100 miles from shore, keeping those drugs off the streets of cities across America
from LA, to Tulsa and Providence. Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador are
leveraging our Civil Affairs support and Humanitarian Assistance Program to better
address factors driving violence and migration to our doorstep. Additionally, the

4 https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html. From 1999 to 2017, more than
700,000 people have died from a drug overdose.
19
William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies is a force multiplier across
the hemisphere, helping us deliver the right, focused support at the strategic level
and reinforce accountability and transparency in defense institutions.
In the counterdrug mission, we continue to deliver high returns on modest invest-
ment. Last year, the international and interagency ‘‘team of teams’’ at JIATF–South
helped keep 280 metric tons of cocaine off U.S. streets. JIATF–South-led interdic-
tions at sea account for almost four times the cocaine seized by all domestic and
border enforcement efforts combined. In an operating area that is 11 times larger
than the United States: the Coast Guard and JIATF–South continue to be among
the best investments in the U.S. Government.
In fiscal year 2020, thanks to congressional support, we are filling detection and
monitoring (D&M) capability gaps through innovative solutions like the Multi Mis-
sion Support Vessel (MMSV). Having only recently deployed, the MMSV already has
supported the disruption of over 3000 kilograms of cocaine, nearly 8,000 pounds of
marijuana, and the detention of 17 drug traffickers, while also keeping a low profile
vessel from reaching our shores. It also served as a capacity-building platform in
the Dominican Republic, a key transit point for cocaine trafficking into major United
States cities like Washington DC, Miami, and Philadelphia. We are also applying
commercially-available technology like unmanned aircraft systems to increase the
MMSV’s ability to conduct D&M and provide information to partner nations who are
conducting the interceptions. In addition to the MMSV, we now have one Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) deployed in the region that will provide needed naval capabili-
ties and technological advantage. We look forward to future U.S. Navy ship deploy-
ments—these will be game changers.
On the counterterrorism front, we continue to partner with SOCOM, and support
the work of our interagency partners to stop individuals with known or suspected
ties to terrorism who are attempting to exploit the region’s weak border security to
move into the U.S. Homeland. We deepened counter threat finance collaboration
with the Treasury Department, supporting the designation of a Brazil-based mem-
ber of al Qaeda last year. Additionally, our successful track record leveraging the
DOD Rewards Program continues to deliver meaningful returns for minimal invest-
ment; in 2019, we paid $1.2 million for 72 rewards (information) that led to the neu-
tralization of 97 terrorists, the seizure of 80 weapons caches, and the destruction
of 22 drug labs.
In the region, our strong partnership with Trinidad and Tobago continues to pay
dividends for international efforts targeting extremist networks supporting ISIS and
other dangerous groups. Our biometrics cooperation enabled Panama to identify and
stop known or suspected terrorists last year, while we deepened collaboration with
Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay to expose malicious activities by supporters
of terrorist groups like Lebanese Hezbollah.
Detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF–GTMO) support the
global fight against violent extremism by keeping enemy combatants off the battle-
field. As we take proactive steps to address infrastructure issues associated with
continued detention operations, the JTF–GTMO team remains the epitome of profes-
sionalism, conducting safe, legal, and humane detention operations that protect our
Homeland and U.S. troops serving in harm’s way.
Building Our Team. To deliver meaningful results for our Homeland’s defense, we
are focused on building an effective, efficient, and resilient team.
For decades, USSOUTHCOM’s modest budget and small footprint have encour-
aged us to embrace innovative, low-cost/high-return approaches. Over the last five
years, we absorbed 25 percent cuts to our personnel, a 10 percent reduction to our
Exercise program, and a steady decline in available assets and forces needed to sup-
port our mission. We’ve tried to absorb these cuts as smartly as possible to minimize
operational impacts, and we continue to look internally to gain efficiencies, improve
performance, and get the most from every taxpayer dollar.
With this mindset, we are leaning forward to support the Department’s current
reform efforts. Our revised campaign plan drove a review of all fiscal year 2020
operations, activities, and investments. We eliminated over 200 lower priority
events and are refocusing on priority threats and strategic partners. We’ve also re-
vised our joint exercise program to make it more effective and more relevant. In
2019, we sharpened our emphasis on building readiness of U.S. Forces and sup-
porting Joint Force experimentation. We are now reforming our other major exer-
cises to more directly support the global competition with the PRC and Russia.
Other areas we are examining for efficiencies include JTF–GTMO manning, con-
tracts, and theater posture.
At our headquarters, we streamlined internal processes, improved support to mili-
tary and civilian families, and enhanced our training and professional development
programs to build a more ready, results-oriented organization. We continue to work
20
closely with the Department of the Army and local South Florida community to ad-
dress housing and high living costs impacting our men and women. At JTF–GTMO,
we undertook a comprehensive review of existing facilities to determine long-term
requirements for mission success, the safety of our forces, and operational efficiency.
We are also taking steps to improve quality of life and resiliency of JIATF–South’s
headquarters building at Naval Air Station Key West. As the southernmost base in
the continental United States, NAS Key West has significant strategic value in de-
fending against a wide range of threats to U.S. national security. I look forward to
working with the Congress on our housing issues in the year ahead to ensure our
men and women get the support they need.
Congressional Support. I’d like to repeat last year’s invitation to members of this
Committee to visit our neighbors and reinforce the message that we value this re-
gion and the role our partners play in keeping our neighborhood safe. Your pres-
ence, attention, and engagement, along with that of other key leaders, matters. I
also want to thank Congress for passing a defense appropriation bill. Operating
under a continuing resolution is disruptive to mission and personnel. Confidence in
stable, predictable budgets will reassure friendly nations that we are reliable secu-
rity partners.
Broadly speaking, we need tools that allow us to maintain our competitive edge:
persistent presence and engagement. We appreciate congressional support for initia-
tives that have streamlined security cooperation processes and help ensure we re-
main the security partner of choice. Your continued support to these security co-
operation programs and capabilities like IMET and the Perry Center allow us to
build trust and long-term relationships that strengthen partnerships and grow con-
tributions to address regional and global threats. Similarly, support for analytic ini-
tiatives focused on open source/publicly available information helps mitigate reduced
intelligence resources and provides a steady stream of useful information (especially
about malign state actors) that we can share with partners.
As this Committee is aware, while improving efficiency in the counterdrug mis-
sion, we still only enabled the successful interdiction of about nine percent of known
drug movement. That is a small increase over previous years, but still significantly
below where we need to be. We appreciate your continued support to creative solu-
tions like the MMSV. As the U.S Coast Guard provides the bulk of our counterdrug
forces, the acquisition and deployment of their Offshore Patrol Cutter will be critical
to keeping drugs off our streets and ensuring the security of the Western Hemi-
sphere. Each additional force package (maritime patrol aircraft, flight deck capable
ship, embarked helicopter, and law enforcement detachment) enables the disruption
of 35 more metric tons of cocaine. 5 Grey hulls, in particular, still serve as a power-
ful deterrent, sending a clear message to our competitors, and a reassuring one to
our friends. They can also yield multiple cross cutting returns. For example, while
participating in our UNITAS exercise last year, the USS Michael Murphy supported
the interdiction of a low-profile submersible vessel carrying more than 2,000 pounds
of cocaine, simultaneously yielding a treasure trove of intelligence, demonstrating
rules-based maritime behavior, and providing coalition training opportunities for the
U.S. Navy.
Conclusion. I’d like to close as I began: with a note of caution, and one of hope.
Our ability to address global challenges at manageable cost depends on the secu-
rity of our borders and the stability of our hemisphere—both of which are under as-
sault. Likewise, our ability to advance diplomatic and economic goals depends on
the strength of both our partnerships and our shared values. We’ve seen what hap-
pens when we ignore security challenges in the Western Hemisphere. In the past
decade, we’ve seen migration crises, the influx of deadly drugs, increased presence
of malign actors, and negative trends in democracy.
We’re now in 2020. We need to be clear-eyed about both the security threats we
face now and in the near future, and the significant opportunities that await only
with our initiative and engagement in the hemisphere. There is no other region we
depend upon more for our prosperity and security, and with which we are more
closely tied through bonds of family, trade, and geographic proximity, than Latin
America and the Caribbean. Our partners want to stand with us, and for our shared
values. As I hope I’ve conveyed, the right, focused attention and modest investments
go a long way in this part of the world, paying significant security dividends to both
our global efforts and to our Homeland’s defense. When we don’t engage in our
neighborhood, our competitors benefit, and our Homeland security pays the price.
When we do engage, we reduce threats to the Homeland and limit opportunities for

5 USCG National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and/or the Navy’s Littoral Combat
Ship could fill this requirement, providing us with a game-changing edge, providing unique ca-
pabilities to engage drug traffickers where they are most vulnerable.
21
adversaries to operate in close proximity to us, and there is no better return on in-
vestment than that.
Thank you for your continued support to the men and women of the
USSOUTHCOM team and their families. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman INHOFE. Well, thank you, Admiral Faller.
The comments I made in my opening statement I am very sin-
cere about because a lot of people do not realize, when they look
at all of the comms that we have around, did we ever have the
right resources relative to the threats that are posed. I am going
to ask you each the same question, which I have worded very care-
fully because we hear from so many people who are not aware of
the threat to our national security that you would find in
SOUTHCOM and in Africa. Why does it really matter in terms of
our national security?
I am going to start with you, Admiral Faller. You have touched
on it. I know you believe in it, but the question would be, why
should the American people care what China and Russia are doing
in Africa and Latin America? Specifically, how does what they are
doing threaten our national security? I know the President is very
interested in this. He wants to make sure that we do not have re-
sources in places that do not have a direct threat on our national
security. I would like to have you restate what the direct threat is
out there to our national security.
Admiral FALLER. Senator, this region matters. It is the cultural
values. It is the extensive interaction we have in trade. We have
a positive trade balance with the region, but that is eroding. We
are the number one trading partner. China is fast catching us in
that regard.
Panama Canal, strategic access. Two-thirds of the traffic that
goes through that has an economic direct tie to the United States.
I look around the region and I see China working on multiple
port deals, IT [information technology] infrastructure, dams, min-
ing, logging, fishing, including significant illegal fishing, illegal
mining and illegal logging. I look at the port access that they are
pursuing in El Salvador, Jamaica, Bahamas. I ask myself the ques-
tion why would China want to buy an island and lock up a 99-year
lease for most of the coast of El Salvador, right here within a 2-
hour flight of the continental United States. They are trying to
achieve positional advantage right here in our neighborhood and
that is alarming and concerning to me. It drives a sense of urgency
with which I look at this competition.
Chairman INHOFE. You know, the terrorists that are out there—
we are not really talking about just locally there, even in El Sal-
vador and the rest. You are the door to this country, right through
your area, and I think you have stated that very well.
The same thing to you, General Townsend. I may not have men-
tioned this in the opening statement, but if you are looking for
places to save, I cannot see that you would find it there. I mean,
you have a total of what? Six thousand to six thousand five hun-
dred people in the whole continent. Of that, most of those, 4,000
of those, are in Djibouti. Of course, they have other missions out-
side of the continent of Africa.
But when you go to West Africa, you have only got what? Twelve
hundred to thirteen hundred people. It is not like the other comms
22

with 75,000, 80,000, and 100,000 people if what you are trying to
accomplish is to reduce our footprint around the world.
Specifically in Africa, talking about how that directly affects our
national security.
General TOWNSEND. Thank you, Chairman.
You asked why should America care about Africa. For a lot of the
same reasons that Admiral Faller talked about America caring
about South America, although it is a little bit more geographically
distant.
The strategic access that America needs to the African continent
rests on the fact that it is that global crossroads I talked about in
my opening statement. There are also tremendous natural re-
sources there, to include rare earth minerals that America needs.
There is also a burgeoning population there, and there is good and
bad news with that. It is a tremendous potential opportunity for
the future, also significant risk. I think that in the past maybe we
have been able to pay less attention to Africa and it would be okay
for America. I do not believe that is the case for the future.
As far as the threats go that you asked about, China and Russia
are every bit as busy in Africa today and for the same reasons that
Admiral Faller talked about them being busy in South America.
They are acting on their own behalf for positional advantage and
Russia, in particular, pursuing extractive ventures. China and Rus-
sia are seeking to counter the strategic access that we need for
American security and American prosperity.
Secondly, the violent extremist organizations that are on the con-
tinent both in the east and in the west. Some of those groups
threaten the American Homeland today. Some of them will poten-
tially be a threat in the future years.
Chairman INHOFE. I appreciate that. I am glad you mentioned in
your opening statement the IMET program because China realizes
what we have done with that program, how well that has served
us. They are now emulating that. They actually had a meeting in
Beijing—I think they had all 52 countries represented there, talk-
ing about how they were going to expand that program, put more
money in it. You are watching that, I am sure, very carefully
throughout your whole area.
General TOWNSEND. Yes, Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Okay, good.
Senator Reed?
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again, General Townsend and Admiral Faller.
I think it could be safely said that both of your COCOMs [com-
batant commands] are conducting economy of force operations. Is
that right, General Townsend?
General TOWNSEND. That is what we are doing, both of us.
Senator REED. Admiral Faller?
Admiral FALLER. We are at a very low level of force. Yes, sir.
Senator REED. We have to do that, but we have to do it smartly
and wisely and that means cooperation and collaboration across
our government and also collaboration with other governments.
General Townsend, the French are now conducting significant
operations in the Sahel part of Africa. If we drew down, what sig-
23

nal would that send and what practical consequences might that
have for their cooperation in the fight?
General TOWNSEND. Senator Reed, as you pointed out, the
French are the lead international partner in the Sahel region of
West Africa. They have about 4,500 troops there that are engaged
in active operations every day to counter the threat that is there.
The threat comes from both al Qaeda groups and ISIS groups
there. That threat is very serious and that threat is on the ad-
vance, and I think the French would say—in fact, they have said
publicly recently—that their efforts are not having the desired ef-
fect that they need. We are supporting both the French and the
larger international effort there.
There is a significant European effort there. Our position, the po-
sition of the Department of Defense, is that the Europeans need to
step up and do more in the Sahel to help the French. The French
are calling on Europe to step up and do more. I absolutely think
that is the right thing to do. But as we see the violent extremists
advancing, if we were to withdraw support from the French precipi-
tously, then that would not go in a good direction. I think what we
have to do is we have got to synchronize our support and the re-
moval of support, if we decide to do that, with the arrival of Euro-
pean support. But there is a chance there that the French can off-
set that.
Senator REED. What you are saying is it would not be particu-
larly coherent if we are telling the EU [European Union] to step
up support of France as we reduce our support.
General TOWNSEND. I think there is certainly a timing issue
there, Senator, absolutely.
Senator REED. Admiral Faller, following up the point that the
chairman made, which I think is an excellent point, programs like
IMET are just absolutely critical, and in your AO, China is aggres-
sively pursuing these IMET options. You indicated that in certain
countries—I think it was El Salvador—there is one IMET slot that
the United States offers and 50 that the Chinese offer. Is that——
Admiral FALLER. Recently an example was provided along those
lines where they have come in analyzing how many folks we were
sending to Carlisle, and they were going five times over that to
their war college in China, which they have copied from our pro-
gram and translated it into Spanish. We talked to the students
that come back from that to get a sense for the quality and the ap-
proach. It is all based off of the U.S. doctrine.
Senator REED. It has to be pointed out that the IMET program
is funded by the Department of State. One of the critical programs
we are talking about is not within DOD, which again suggests that
this whole-of-government approach—we have to look not just at
funding for your COCOM but are we putting the money in the
State Department? Are we putting money into AID [U.S. Agency
for International Development]? Are we putting money into various
programs that will allow you to conduct a much more efficient
economy of force operation? Is that fair?
Admiral FALLER. That is an accurate statement. We really de-
pend on that IMET, Senator.
Senator REED. Going back to Africa, General Townsend, you indi-
cated that the extremist threat is all through the continent, but my
24

sense is that al Shabaab and others are still contemplating pro-
jecting power outside of Africa, which is a much more critical
threat to the United States. Is that fair?
General TOWNSEND. Senator, that is accurate.
Senator REED. We are going to continue to focus on that threat
to the United States particularly.
General TOWNSEND. I believe we should.
Senator REED. Finally, I think again the issue here is maintain-
ing appropriate force and also maintaining the coordination with
our government and with our allies. You are pursuing that, and I
think you should continue to do so. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Rounds?
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first of all, thank you for your service to our country.
I would like to begin by just talking a little bit about the
disinformation and influence operations which Russia has used
successfully in a number of different instances, but specifically
what plans and actions that you have and your team have created
to address the technological advances and the changing character
of war to assure that America maintains a strategic advantage in
your areas of operation.
Admiral FALLER. The disinformation campaign that Russia has
been on is truly about, in all instances, painting the United States
in an inaccurate light. One example is reporting that I was on the
border of Venezuela about to lead an invasion force. Another exam-
ple was they twisted it just enough in an article in RT [RT Inter-
national] to say that I had said something that was at odds with
the Vice President of the United States, which was complete balo-
ney. Their largest by volume, outside of the Russian language, ef-
fort in social media is in Spanish. You have to ask what is the na-
tional interest of Russia in that disinformation here in our neigh-
borhood and around the world, and it is concerning to us.
We have countered within our means in information operations
(IO), military information, and support a strong relationship with
the State Department and alignment in messaging, information
with some increased authorities in cyber to go after them and put
the truth out and try to make a dent in that space. But more needs
to be done clearly, and more should be done to take advantage of
machine learning and those types of skills that the Department has
embarked on to really get after to thwart their disinformation cam-
paigns.
Senator ROUNDS. General Townsend?
General TOWNSEND. Senator, not unlike SOUTHCOM, we see the
same kind of disinformation campaigns and not just from Russia
but from other actors such as Iran. Recently Iran announced that
I was killed at the engagement at Manda Bay. I am glad to hear
that is exaggerated.
There is fairly low-tech warfare in Africa overall, but we do see
armed UAVs [unmanned autonomous vehicles], unmanned vehicles
armed, now being provided by multiple actors, China, Turkey, et
cetera. We also see sophisticated air defense systems. We also see
technologies that have I think even greater impacts like the Chi-
nese smart city technologies where they are coming in and, in the
25

interest of public safety and security, they are offering to equip Af-
rican cities with camera systems, surveillance systems all over, fa-
cial recognition technologies. Of course, we know that all of those
systems are reporting back to China first before they report to the
African country where they are established. I think that the growth
of high-tech is a concern certainly in Africa.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.
I think part of the challenge we have is sharing that, look, the
propaganda has never really quit from our adversaries. They un-
derstand its value. They are very good at it. They simply advance
to using social media and other means in which to really bend
things their direction. In doing so, they influence individuals who
really in many cases share the same values that we share in this
country.
The IMET program has been mentioned several times here, and
I think it is critical that we continue to be able to have communica-
tions and relationships with what is in many cases perhaps one of
the most stable parts of any one of these nations’ governments and
that is their military. While their civilian leaders come and go, in
many cases they have a stable force of professionals. The question
is, do they find and do they understand the way that we do busi-
ness to be appropriate and a better way than what our adversaries
offer them?
I would just like to once again offer each of you the opportunity
to talk a little bit about IMET at this time in which I think some
people question whether or not it is a valid program and how crit-
ical it is and how inexpensive it is for us to continue to have that
relationship with the militaries from the different countries.
Admiral FALLER. The value is in the building of trust. You get
to know your shipmate, your battle buddy. You share experience
and doctrine. A recent example. In El Salvador, the new president
came in, favorable connections to the United States, appointed a
new chief of defense and minister of defense. The minister of de-
fense is a Naval War College grad. The chief of defense is an Army
War College grad. You can sit down around a roundtable and have
a serious conversation without stilted talking points about the real
challenges and opportunities and the complexity of making
progress. That is just one of many examples I could cite, Senator.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.
General TOWNSEND. Senator, just like Admiral Faller has ex-
plained, IMET is invaluable to us. I think it is a long-term way to
influence a government and a military by training those people
who grew up to be the chief of defense, and that same kind of thing
is found in Africa as well.
I think the United States is their preferred partner for a number
of reasons, not the least of which is our competence and capability
but also our values. That is part of that. I think that is a strong
thing that is imparted through IMET.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Shaheen?
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Townsend, Admiral Faller, let me begin by adding my
condolences to those that have been expressed already for the
26

servicemembers lost in the month of January. I want to particu-
larly call out Captain Ryan Phanouf from Hudson, New Hampshire
who was an airman lost in Afghanistan earlier this week. I know
that all of New Hampshire mourns his loss and the loss of everyone
and sends condolences to all of the families. Thank you.
I want to begin, Admiral Faller, with where we are with drug
interdiction. When you were here last year, we talked about the
drug interdiction efforts which are still so important to States like
New Hampshire where we have a huge opioid epidemic still and
are seeing heroin now coming into the country. Can you talk about
what progress has been made and the role that the USS Detroit
has played in improving interdiction efforts?
Admiral FALLER. Senator, as we have discussed, the deaths due
to the narcotics overdoses, drugs are too many and are a national
security challenge. Those pathways that they come through just as
easily are used by terrorists and other illicit materials. We cannot
do enough to get after that challenge right here in our neighbor-
hood and how it erodes communities across the country.
Over the past year, we have focused on building our partners to
get them more into the game. Fifty percent of our interdictions last
year were partner-enabled, and nations like Colombia have stepped
up to lead their own exercises and operations, recently an Orion op-
eration where we had many metric tons which was lives saved
here. Eighteen nations participated, Colombian led, and all we did
with the United States was participate. That is a key effort, and
we have got to do more there.
In our own efforts, intelligence sharing is key—human intel-
ligence and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) from
platforms. We need more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance. Our human efforts were funded, but they were funded above
our core budget in an unfunded requirement. A key area to look at
and how do we get more efficient, but also apply leverage there.
Then finally in our platforms, we depend on ships. At the end of
the day, it has got to be a Coast Guard cutter. Our Coast Guard
performed brilliantly, supplying more ships than they had even
promised through the allocation process. Our Navy stepped up this
year with the USS Detroit. We need more ships. We think the num-
ber of Navy ships would be about three to sustain the presence and
pressure. The pressure matters on these nations, and that pressure
has got to be at the source in coca eradication and at the street
here in the United States. Colombia has made progress at that
source site, eradicated cocaine with the Colombian chief of defense
on the Ecuador border. They have made progress, and the result
has been that deaths are down but still too many. We had almost
a record year in interdictions but still not enough.
Senator SHAHEEN. Good. Well, thank you for those efforts, and
we hope that we can continue to do more to support them.
This question is really for both of you. We have now, for the last
21⁄2 years, had the Women, Peace, and Security Act in effect. DOD
has made significant progress in implementing that. We just put
$4 million for gender advisors into the 2020 defense budget.
Can you talk about the successes that you have seen both in
SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM because of the effort to better inte-
grate women and be able to appeal to those women in Africa, the
27

women in Latin America who we need to address if we are going
to be successful?
General TOWNSEND. Thanks, Senator. You asked me about
Women, Peace, and Security at my confirmation hearing 6 months
ago, and I told you I did not know much about it but I would look
into it. I was able to actually attend one of these forums.
At AFRICOM, Women, Peace, and Security is integrated into
every event that we do. We see some advantages here. It is not just
about promoting the role of women in the armed forces, but it has
an impact across their societies as well. It is integral to everything
we do, and we have had a communications symposium, which I was
fortunate enough to attend. We have a female intel officer training
program. There is a seminar that is about to kick off in a Flintlock
exercise that we are about to start. Those are just some examples.
We try to integrate some of that into every event.
Senator SHAHEEN. Good. Thank you.
Admiral FALLER. Similarly we integrate it in every event, Sen-
ator. Recently Ambassador Manes and I were in Colombia. We did
a roundtable with some key women warriors from the Colombian
Army. We had the chief of defense from Colombia, their chief of
their army, their chief of the air force. In that audience of women—
there were about 50 of them—were nine command sergeant majors.
I will tell you what. They were getting after it, and it was moti-
vating. Afterwards, the chief of the Colombian Army came and
said, hey, can you do some more of that with us because it really
brings out the competitive spirit. The reason why? We are better
when we are integrated and stronger when we are integrated.
Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you both very much. I think it is
a very important model for us to show to the rest of the world, par-
ticularly in developing countries in Africa and Latin America.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Ernst?
Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would second that. Thank you, Senator Shaheen for those
words.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here today. We truly
appreciate your efforts in some challenging regions that often are
not hitting the headlines of our newspapers every day. Thanks to
you, thanks for your teams.
Sergeant Major, good luck to you on retirement. I still think Ne-
braska or Iowa is a great place to go.
Admiral Faller, thank you for sitting down with me the other
day. I really do appreciate that. We had a great discussion.
I would like to go a little more into IMET. You have heard a
number of my colleagues just talking about how important it is. We
had an Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee hearing
just a while back, and you were able to visit with us about the im-
portance of IMET at that particular subcommittee meeting. It has
been in the press a lot lately. We all acknowledge that we can do
better in vetting. But strategically can you talk to what that means
for our partners strategically and what it does to assist not only
those countries but the United States as well?
Admiral FALLER. The United States military education system is
our strength. Like the education system in our country, our train-
ing education is sought after and valued, and it builds stronger
28

partners that know and trust us, and the relationships that go with
that last a lifetime.
Just an example of that comes up time and time again. I have
a Colombian brigadier general who is a full director of our exercise
division at headquarters. He is a graduate of Leavenworth, Car-
lisle, the PathFinder School, the Advanced Army Armor School,
and the Ranger School. He is an honor grad at Ranger School. The
Colombians value that as do our partner nations.
We can use more IMET. Our budget is about $10 million a year
for 28 democratic countries. Secretary of Defense Esper visited
SOUTHCOM last week. A priority of his is to seek more money. He
is seeking a 50 percent increase in the IMET budget. We could
spend that 50 percent increase in IMET next year in our school-
houses at the Western Hemisphere Institute for security at Fort
Benning, game-changer, the Inter-American Air Force Academy in
Texas. These are schoolhouses that we do not think a lot about, in
addition to Carlisle and Newport, Maxwell with the Air Force and
the Marine Corps university. But all these schoolhouses work to-
gether to make a difference in strengthening the hemispheric secu-
rity.
Senator ERNST. Thank you.
Yes, General Townsend.
General TOWNSEND. Senator, I could not say it any better than
Admiral Faller just did.
Senator ERNST. Thank you. No, I do appreciate that. Of course,
our State Partnership Programs as well. Iowa is partnered with
Kosovo, and I know a number of those officers that I worked with
a decade ago—I have seen them rise through the ranks and we
continue to stay in close contact. But those partnerships are very,
very valuable. Thank you.
Admiral Faller, I want to talk a little bit about the integration
of missions that we see between SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM
[U.S. Northern Command]. Obviously, there has been a lot of atten-
tion on our southern border and what has continued to happen
with drug cartels. Whether it is weapons crossing the border,
whether it is the drugs that Senator Shaheen just talked about, all
of that is very concerning.
But what I would like to focus on in just the minute and a half
that I have left is also the issue of human trafficking. Not only do
we have illegal drug trade wreaking havoc across Iowa, a lot of our
rural communities, but Iowa wrestles a lot with the serious prob-
lem of human trafficking. The Polaris Project in 2016 dubbed Des
Moines, Iowa as one of the top 100 human trafficking sites in the
United States. That is not something we are proud of.
Could you describe the resourcing and coordination challenges
that exist when you are trying to address the threat between these
different areas of responsibility between SOUTHCOM and
NORTHCOM?
Admiral FALLER. SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM work very
closely together. General O’Shaughnessy and I traveled to Mexico
City. We sat down with the head of their army and their navy to
talk about how do we improve information sharing, how do we get
after these ungoverned spaces that are spawning instability into
North America and beyond and South America, Latin America, the
29

Caribbean, and how do we help the Mexicans share information
with Guatemala. It was a very productive meeting. We came up
with tangible steps to do that.
Then we went to Guatemala City the next day and had that
same level of conversation with those nations to try to forge more
coordination. At the heart of getting after these wicked problems
that create instability here, including the human trafficking, is
sharing intelligence, building trust, breaking down barriers, under-
standing and then ensuring that the right agency, law enforcement
agency, other agencies, have the information they need to make an
impact. That is a key element of what we are doing as we move
ahead. Then we take that into exercise program which is also a
similar element.
We are adequately resourced to do this, but we are carefully
looking at how we can become more efficient as we move forward.
Senator ERNST. Very good. Well, please let us know if there is
anything additional that we as Congress can help with.
Gentlemen, thank you very, very much for your service to our
country. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Kaine?
Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our wit-
nesses.
I want to add my comments of support for the families of Colonel
Voss and Captain Phanouf. Colonel Voss, though a Guam resident,
was based out of Joint Base Langley in Virginia. Thinking about
his family and all those that you mentioned.
Admiral Faller, I want to start with you on Venezuela. There is
an article that was in The Wall Street Journal a couple of days ago
that I would like to put into the record.
[The information follows:]
HOW PUTIN OUTFOXED TRUMP IN VENEZUELA
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION UNDERESTIMATED HOW MUCH SUPPORT PRESIDENT
NICOLÁS MADURO WOULD RECEIVE FROM RUSSIA AND CUBA, AS WELL AS FROM U.S.
ALLIES

By Jessica Donati, Andrew Restuccia and Ian Talley
January 27, 2020
The Trump administration’s bid to replace Venezuela’s authoritarian leader Nicol
s Maduro hit a roadblock after a meeting with Russian officials in Rome last year—
and has never recovered.
U.S. envoy Elliott Abrams arrived at the Westin Excelsior hotel hoping to per-
suade Russia to withdraw its support for Mr. Maduro and to recognize Juan Guaidó
as Venezuela’s legitimate leader. Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov
instead demanded the U.S. back down from military threats and lift the economic
sanctions intended to force Mr. Maduro’s hand.
In the months that followed, the U.S. campaign spiraled into a foreign-policy de-
bacle, thwarted by familiar adversaries, Russia and Cuba, as well as allies, Turkey
and India-all countries that one way or another helped Venezuela sidestep U.S.
sanctions, according to current and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition
activists. The European Union watched from the sidelines.
The Trump administration, confident Mr. Maduro would fall, didn’t foresee Russia
leading the way for other countries to eclipse the sanctions. In turn, administration
reluctance to impose sanctions on Russian enterprises and others kept Venezuela’s
oil and gold flowing to buyers.
This month, in a sign of how much the opposition is floundering, Venezuela secu-
rity forces blocked Mr. Guaidó from entering the National Assembly building, where
he was seeking re-election as leader. Mr. Guaidó, in a blue suit, tried and failed to
scale the spiked iron fence.
30
Russia now handles more than two-thirds of Venezuela’s crude oil, current and
former administration officials said, including helping to conceal export destinations.
The lifeline has helped Mr. Maduro slow the economy’s free fall, consolidate his grip
on power and weaken the opposition.
Almost half of the $1.5 billion in Venezuelan crude exported to India in the 9
months after the U.S. sanctions was purchased by an Indian joint venture with Rus-
sia’s oil giant, Rosneft, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of data compiled
by trade database Import Genius.
The United Arab Emirates has imported around $1 billion in gold from Venezuela
since gold sanctions were imposed in late 2018, according to Venezuela trade
records. U.S. intelligence officials say the actual amounts are far higher, based on
evidence that Venezuelan gold is leaving the country masked as originating from
Colombia, Uganda and elsewhere. The exports land in Turkey, the U.A.E. and other
gold-trade hubs.
The Turkish Embassy in Washington denied any oil or gold trade with Venezuela
that breached U.S. sanctions. ‘‘The allegations do not reflect the facts, and they are
only speculative and hearsay,’’ a spokesman said.
The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment. It referred to past for-
eign-ministry statements criticizing the U.S. for interfering in Venezuela’s affairs.
Officials from India and the U.A.E. didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Administration officials acknowledge President Trump’s frustration and say the
White House continues to press for Mr. Maduro’s ouster. Mr. Trump, pointing to
America’s superior economy and military, suggested in a recent interview with the
Journal that the U.S. had the resources to outlast Mr. Maduro. ‘‘We have a lot of
options,’’ the president said.
Yet with an election, impeachment and attention turned to the Middle East, Ven-
ezuela has for now moved to a back burner, an administration official said.
The stalemate allows Mr. Maduro to take a star turn as David to America’s Goli-
ath. He makes speeches and appearances nearly every day to show he remains com-
fortably in charge. He chided Mr. Abrams and other U.S. officials, saying they mis-
led Mr. Trump that a regime change would be easy.
‘‘They’re trying to save their jobs because Trump is furious with the lies they’ve
fed him on Venezuela,’’ Mr. Maduro said in a recent address. ‘‘They failed, and Ven-
ezuela triumphed.’’
Mr. Maduro’s hold on the presidency has been costly for what was once Latin
America’s most-prosperous economy. Hyperinflation, high infant mortality rates and
a shortage of medical supplies contribute to the humanitarian crisis there. Food,
electricity and water shortages have driven an exodus of 4.5 million people.
Mr. Abrams, the U.S. envoy, acknowledged this month that the yearlong U.S. ef-
fort to remove Mr. Maduro hit unexpected obstacles. ‘‘We underestimated the impor-
tance of the Cuban and Russian support for the regime,’’ he said. ‘‘The Russian role
in the economy, particularly the oil economy, is larger and larger.’’
Mr. Guaidó, in an interview, sounded a similar note. ‘‘I think we did underesti-
mate things,’’ he said. He called on countries to help block gold exports from Ven-
ezuela. ‘‘You have to try to bring pressure on those who support the regime,’’ he
said. ‘‘Sanctions today are the only real tool we have.’’
Mr. Guaidó’s approval rating had fallen by more than 20 points to 38%, according
to Venezuelan pollster Datanalisis. Allegations against opposition members, includ-
ing accepting bribes from Maduro cronies, have eroded confidence.
Despite the setbacks, administration officials said there are no plans to abandon
Mr. Guaidó. Vice President Mike Pence last month summoned senior administration
officials to a meeting in the White House’s Situation Room. U.S. officials later
hosted a conference with opposition leaders to try to reinvigorate them, people fa-
miliar with the gathering said.
Mr. Guaidó’s backers see Russia as their principal obstacle and want the U.S.,
Europe and other allies to take a harder line on sanctions loopholes.
‘‘Russia in my view has become the most important partner of Maduro,’’ said Car-
los Vecchio, the Venezuela ambassador to the U.S. for Mr. Guaidó. ‘‘A multilateral
approach on sanctions is critical.’’
The EU hasn’t introduced oil sanctions or prevented Maduro officials from trav-
eling to the eurozone to raise money and support.
Charles Shapiro, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela who is now president
of the nonpartisan think tank World Affairs Council of Atlanta, said the Trump ad-
ministration’s predicament showed the difficulty of regime change without military
force.
‘‘And if you use military force,’’ he said, ‘‘there are all sorts of other problems.’’
31
The U.S. has warned officials in Russia, Turkey, the U.A.E. and India about sanc-
tions violations in private meetings, U.S. officials said, but hasn’t moved to blacklist
companies or individuals suspected of breaking the sanctions.
Policy options have split the administration. Some officials believe sanctions on
Russia’s oil firm Rosneft and other companies doing business with intermediaries
could close loopholes that have allowed Mr. Maduro to survive.
Others say they could undermine U.S. interests elsewhere, including Iran. India
agreed to stop importing Iranian crude as part of Washington’s pressure campaign
against Tehran, but it continues to import Venezuelan oil. India pays for the deliv-
eries in gasoline, a trade that the nation says doesn’t violate U.S. sanctions.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hasn’t ruled out negotiations with Mr. Maduro.
‘‘We will continue to tweak our policy to get the strategy just right, but we’ve seen
no evidence that Maduro is remotely interested in having free and fair elections,’’
Mr. Pompeo said recently about direct talks. ‘‘As far as our strategy, the tack we’ll
take, I’m sure that will change over time.’’
Long road
Mr. Guaidó, 36 years old, was virtually unknown in Mr. Trump’s circles before
he came to Washington with a delegation in December 2018. Administration officials
and opposition leaders made a plan to put Mr. Guaidó in charge, and Mr. Pence
was given a central role.
Administration officials targeted Venezuela, in part to punish Cuba and win sup-
port among Cuban Americans, a potent Republican voting bloc in Florida. Repub-
lican Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Mauricio Claver Carone, the National Secu-
rity Council’s head for Latin American affairs, had roles in forging Venezuela policy.
Cuba provides Mr. Maduro with intelligence and security services, helping to min-
imize defections in his government, U.S. officials said.
When Mr. Guaidó declared himself interim president in a widely watched oath of
office ceremony a year ago, the U.S. swiftly recognized him as Venezuela’s legiti-
mate leader. Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Peru and other South
American countries followed. They supported Mr. Guaidó on the grounds that Mr.
Maduro’s election to a second six-year term was a sham.
Two days after Mr. Guaidó’s oath, Mr. Abrams was appointed as the top envoy
to Venezuela. He was given one job: Remove Nicol s Maduro.
Mr. Abrams rattled some at the State Department, in part for his involvement
in the Iran-Contra affair, a covert operation in the mid-1980s to sell weapons to
Iran and use the proceeds to arm rebels in Nicaragua.
Some career State Department staff feared that any heavy-handed U.S. interven-
tion would derail Mr. Guaidó’s popular support, while political appointees ques-
tioned Mr. Abrams’s support of Mr. Trump.
In March, Mr. Abrams met with the Russian deputy foreign minister in Rome.
After Russia refused to back Mr. Guaidó, the U.S. envoy promised more sanctions
and possible military action. After this article was published, Mr. Abrams said: ‘‘I
and all the others in the U.S. party had very low expectations of what could come
from the meeting.’’
The realization that regime change wouldn’t be easy came in April. The opposition
planned to have Venezuela’s top court recognize the National Assembly, headed by
Mr. Guaidó, as the legitimate representative of the Venezuelan people. That would
give the country’s armed forces legal grounds to abandon Mr. Maduro.
Guaidó supporters expected high-ranking Maduro officials to announce they were
switching sides. The plan flopped, and White House frustrations erupted.
In May, secret talks brokered by Norway opened in Barbados between Mr.
Maduro and the opposition, which called for fair elections. In August, Mr. Maduro
quit the talks.
Looking back, the U.S. campaign originated with unrealistic expectations, current
and former U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition activists said.
‘‘There was a firm belief, and briefed to the president, that all that had to be done
was to recognize Guaidó, and Maduro would fall,’’ said Fernando Cutz, a former
White House National Security Council official during the Trump and Obama ad-
ministrations who was involved in U.S.-Venezuela policy.
The administration’s call for the Venezuelan military to defect and support Mr.
Guaidó was wishful thinking, said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American
Dialogue, a nonpartisan think tank: ‘‘The last thing the military are going to do is
follow orders from a foreign power, especially the U.S.’’
Mr. Trump complained to aides and allies that he was led to believe Mr. Maduro
would be removed quickly, people familiar with the matter said.
32
The president directed much of his anger at national security adviser John Bolton,
those people said, adding that those frustrations contributed to Mr. Bolton’s ouster
in September.
Helping hand
With Russia’s help, Venezuelan oil output could return to 1 million barrels a day
from a low of 650,000 to 700,000 barrels, Rapidan Energy Group, a geopolitical risk
consulting firm, said in December. Rosneft is helping Petr¢leos de Venezuela SA,
the state oil company, pay for overdue maintenance and the hiring of foreign ex-
perts, according to the group.
Russia has provided Venezuela more than $300 million in currency over the past
18 months-dollars and euros that have become more scarce under the sanctions, ac-
cording to the Journal analysis of data from Import Genius.
Mr. Abrams said he still believed sanctions will work. ‘‘The situation of the regime
is untenable and many people in the regime clearly know it,’ he said. ‘‘They would
not keep sending their money, their wives, their children, and their mistresses out
of the country if they thought it was stabilizing.’’
Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, said the standoff this month at the National As-
sembly underscored the opposition’s weakened state.
‘‘At the same time,’’ she said, ‘‘the [Maduro] government has no real options for
ending the economic, humanitarian and legitimacy crises that it faces.’’
The issue surfaced at a Trump re-election event this month in Florida, a battle-
ground state with the largest population of Venezuelans in the U.S. Some of Mr.
Trump’s supporters in Florida have voiced frustration that Mr. Maduro remained
in power.
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, speaking informally to a small group at the
event, said the administration had expected the leadership change to happen faster,
and that some officials sought more aggressive efforts, according to a person famil-
iar with conversation.
A spokesman for Mr. Ross declined to comment on the meeting but said the ad-
ministration is looking at all options. ‘‘The U.S. is 100% behind Guaidó,’’ Mr. Ross
said Thursday in a TV interview.
—José de Córdoba, Alex Leary, Kejal Vyas and Vivian Salama contributed to this
article.
Senator KAINE. The title of it is unnecessarily provocative. The
title is ‘‘How Putin Outfoxed Trump in Venezuela.’’ I do not think
the title is a fair characterization. I think the article, though, is
very, very good.
Basically if I were going to title the article, I would title it how
the United States underestimated the difficulty of what we were
trying to do in Venezuela. I think the U.S. has done a number of
good things. I think the Trump administration has. I could pick a
few faults, but generally done good. But the core of the article is
how we really underestimated how hard it would be.
I just remember this last year when we were talking about it
here and in the Foreign Relations Committee, there were sort of
some real blue skies scenarios that were being painted by the ad-
ministration about how Maduro is about to collapse. I went to Co-
lombia and visited in Colombia, then went to the border in Cucuta
in March, and everything I was hearing from the Colombians and
everybody down there is this is not easy. It is going to be really,
really hard. They were exactly right about how difficult it was
going to be. Here on Capitol Hill we were getting blue skies sce-
narios from the administration about the imminent collapse of the
Maduro Government. We just got it wrong. On the intel side, we
just got it wrong.
One of the things that is galling in the article is one of the rea-
sons it is so hard is not just our adversaries. Venezuela is propped
up by Iran and Cuba and China and Russia. The UAE [United
33

Arab Emirates], Turkey, India, allies of ours have helped them
evade United States sanctions and have helped prop them up, and
they are one of the reasons why the Maduro Government has had
some lasting power.
I guess I just want to caution all of us on matters like this. These
are tough situations, and we can do everything right and still find
it very hard to accomplish what we want. That is not our fault. But
we need to be very wary of blue skies scenarios and being told we
will support this person and things are likely to work out our way.
We are in for the long haul in these situations.
I will tell, Admiral Faller, I would love to talk to you further. We
have done European Reassurance Initiatives and Asian Reassur-
ance Initiatives. It might be time to do an Americas Reassurance
Initiative. I do not really like the title because ‘‘reassurance’’ al-
ready sounds defensive like no, no, no, we are really interested in
you. I do not know that we have to be defensive about it. But we
need to have a comprehensive, whole-of-government diplomacy and
military and economic trade focus on the Americas because while
we are focusing elsewhere, I know where our adversaries are fo-
cused. They are focusing on our own back yard.
General Townsend, I want to ask you a question. There was a
recent study of some challenges within the special operations com-
munity, and while it was special operations focused, a number of
the areas of the study dealt with items in AFRICOM. There is a
comprehensive review that SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Com-
mand] put out last week looking at a variety of cultural and ethical
challenges in the special operations forces, including some that led
to scandals. Many took place in AFRICOM.
One of the themes was extremely high operational tempos caused
problems. Here was the finding, ‘‘a trend of disaggregation at the
individual and small team levels risks employing forces where
operational requirements misalign with the four gen validation
standards.’’ I have been on the committee for 7 years. I think what
that means is we had forces deployed in teams and sizes that
lacked the oversight or the ability to do the missions they were as-
signed.
Now, I think the recommendations are largely for SOCOM, but
because SOCOM operates within combatant commands, what re-
sponsibility do you think the COCOMs have in making sure that
the forces provided to you are appropriately resourced and led?
General TOWNSEND. Thanks, Senator.
I am familiar with the study, and I am familiar with the conclu-
sions of it. I agree with what that study talks about. As you are
aware, most of the forces operating on the African continent these
days are special operating forces (SOF), not exclusively but a lot of
them.
This phenomenon you mentioned correctly does not just apply to
special operating forces. Over the course of this war, we have
disaggregated formations time and time again and separated small
teams from their higher echelons of command and leadership.
Senator KAINE. Some of the recommendations here or findings
are a little bit like the study about the McCain and Fitzgerald in-
stances in the Pacific. I mean, there are some similar challenges
34

about high OPSTEMPO [operations tempo] and other things lead-
ing to the problems.
General TOWNSEND. Right. So I think at the COCOM level, we
absolutely need to do whatever we can to keep teams together and
not disaggregate them. I am a firm believer in this. I have been
in a command that has had my team disaggregated and scattered
all over. So I am believer in keeping team integrity in every task
that we can.
Also, part of our blank slate review process that we are under-
going with the Department of Defense is to look at how we can re-
duce the operational tempo, particularly of SOF forces, but all
forces, reduce their operational tempo so it is not just about trying
to redirect resources but it is to return some resources to home sta-
tion. The SOF operational tempo is still stretched. Even though it
is now reaching a dwell of about 1 year deployed for 2 years at
home, the goal is 1 to 3, and there is still some work to be done
there.
Senator KAINE. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator McSally?
Senator MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Townsend, I represent Arizona, and on January 5
Dustin Harrison from Tucson was killed by al Shabaab terrorists
at Manda Bay in Kenya. His wife Hope and his 2-year-old daughter
Heaven are back home in Tucson grieving the loss of her husband
and father.
Now, I was a part of the team to stand up AFRICOM as my last
assignment in the military, one of the more challenging assign-
ments I had. So I am aware of the challenges you have on the con-
tinent.
But some articles about the situation there was that it was a
woefully undefended perimeter or surprisingly sparse security,
given the level of assets, air assets and others, that you have there.
I know an investigation is ongoing, and I do not want to put any
more of our service men and women into harm’s way. But what can
you share about what is happening today to make sure an attack
like that is not happening or the risk is not going to happen now
and in the future? What can I share with Heaven and Hope to
make sure that others are not going to be in a similar risk?
General TOWNSEND. Thanks, Senator.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I also offer our condo-
lences. Those family members are in our thoughts and prayers for
our fallen comrades.
Also, thank you for pointing out there is an investigation going
on, so I do not want to get in front of that. You know, you have
worn a uniform so you know that frequently what we think we
know at the start of an event is not what actually we discover after
we have thoroughly investigated it.
But there are some early conclusions, and I think it is self-obvi-
ous we were not as prepared there in Manda Bay as we needed to
be. Al Shabaab managed to penetrate onto that airfield. A lot of
people do not know but the base where our troops live is not where
the airfield is. But they were able to get access to that airfield, kill
three Americans, and destroy six aircraft there. So we were not as
35

prepared, and we are digging into that to find out why that is the
case.
But since that event, there are about 120 infantrymen there on
the ground now who are securing that place, and they have been
working hard since January 6 to put in the appropriate level of de-
fenses. I am confident that by the time they are done, Manda Bay
will be much more properly defended.
We are not just stopping there, though. We are looking across
the continent because I think that we viewed, and the Kenyans
viewed, Manda Bay as a safe area. The Kenyans have family hous-
ing there for their military. It is a resort area. So al Shabaab has
shown their reach and the danger that they pose, and I think we
need to take that seriously, and so I am looking with a clear eye
at every location in Africa now.
Senator MCSALLY. Great. Thank you.
I was at J–33 in that assignment running our counterterrorism
operations. One of the challenges we had at the time—this was
back in 2007 to 2010—we saw al Shabaab growing. We saw the
training camps. We were watching hundreds, thousands of fighters
being trained. At the time, they were a lawful legitimate target,
but the Obama administration felt like they were not a real prob-
lem or risk. So we could not take them out.
Last year, I think there were 67 strikes conducted in Somalia.
Can you share what the impact of those strikes are, and is it
whack-a-mole or what is the strategy here going forward in order
to address this growing terrorist threat in East Africa?
General TOWNSEND. There is an international effort there that
supports the Somali Government.
Senator MCSALLY. I know. We have been talking about that for
a very long time.
General TOWNSEND. Yes, and the Somali national army, and so
our role is in support of that. The two major tasks that we are
doing is helping to train a specific part of the Somali national
army, the Danab or special light infantry units, and we are also
doing our counterterrorism strikes. They are meant to help the
international effort and the Somali effort, but they are also meant
to protect America.
I do not believe that it is whack-a-mole. What we do is we keep
an eye on al Shabaab every day, and we are looking for ways to
reduce their capacity wherever we can. That effort to disrupt and
degrade al Shabaab and their leadership and their mid-level lead-
ership and higher-level leadership is a critical part of what we are
doing.
Senator MCSALLY. Great. Thanks.
Admiral Faller, I am out of time, but I will submit some ques-
tions for the record specifically about the drug flow coming up from
your AOR to our country through my State, Arizona, and the latest
tactics that the cartels are using and how we are countering them.
But I will have to submit those for the record. Thanks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator King?
Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to talk in a few minutes about China and Russia and
their activities both in Latin America and in Africa.
36

But, Admiral Faller, since we have been sitting here, eight Amer-
icans have died of drug overdoses in the last hour, 67,000 people
a year, one person a day in Maine.
What is going on with China and Russia are threats. They are
indirect threats. They are important. But we are talking about
Americans dying, and you and I have talked about this in the past.
I have heard from you and from other national security officials
that we are picking up—we are interdicting about 25 percent of the
drug shipments through the ocean to North America that we know
of. Twenty-five percent of what we know of. To me, we are talking
about allocating resources around the world for all kinds of threats.
This is a direct threat killing Americans that we do not have
enough ships. I do not get it. When do we get to interdicting the
ships that we know are carrying drugs into this country to kill our
people?
Admiral FALLER. It is a national security crisis.
Senator KING. Absolutely.
Admiral FALLER. It is actually worse statistics than you men-
tioned. We detect 25 percent. We are only interdicting 9 percent.
To interdict, we need greater partner capacity, as I mentioned in
the answer to Senator Shaheen. We also need assets. At the end
of the day, you have got to be on the field to compete. When the
playing field is twice the size——
Senator KING. Well, who do we need to talk to to get those as-
sets? The Secretary of Defense, the President, the Vice President,
who? Where do we go? It is infuriating that we know what is com-
ing. We know it out there, and the phrase I got was we have far
more targets than we can action. That is a euphemism for we are
woefully falling down on this responsibility.
Admiral FALLER. The Coast Guard stepped up in a big way. Our
U.S. Navy used to have readiness challenges that has them
stretched globally, and that has impacted their force allocation to
us.
Senator KING. Is it people or ships? Do we just need more ships?
Admiral FALLER. It is not just ships, Senator. We need the intel-
ligence, so we need the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
assets (ISR). We have about 20 percent of what our need is there,
and then that then turns into the ability to interdict. We also need
our steady funding and our security cooperation so we can help our
partner nations help themselves. So it is pulling this together in
a full court press beyond ships that we can work together with
partners and in our interagency and get the ‘‘W’’ back in front of
whole-of-government, Senator.
Senator KING. I appreciate that, and I know that you are work-
ing on this, but I just hope you will keep pressing. If you have to
say there is this really obnoxious Senator that is on my back and
I have got to do something, that is fine. I can fulfill that responsi-
bility quite adequately.
Let us talk about China for a minute. By the way, these charts
from both of you are very helpful. It really graphically indicates
what is going on.
It seems to me China is following sort of a two-track strategy in
both Africa and South America. One is what I call debt impe-
rialism. They are getting these small countries in debt to them,
37

and then they have got their hooks into them. General, is that part
of what you are seeing happening in Africa?
General TOWNSEND. That is exactly what we are seeing. We are
also seeing a new, more sophisticated development in that. So the
debt trap diplomacy has now become known on the continent. Most
African leaders are wise to it. Actually I would commend our State
Department for helping get African leaders more savvy about what
the Chinese are doing with some of these debt trap loans. The Chi-
nese are adapting, though, and evolving their presentation, and
they are becoming more sophisticated about it. So I am a little bit
worried because they are getting smarter about it.
Senator KING. Well, that is a concern. But the other thing is sort
of more direct. I think, Admiral Faller, you used the word posi-
tional advantage. Just looking at your chart, Jamaica, El Salvador,
Ecuador, Chile, Belize ports. Ports. I mean, that is a strategic ad-
vantage. Whatever happened to the Monroe Doctrine? We are al-
lowing an adversary—I will not say an enemy but an adversary—
to establish significant positional advantage within our hemi-
sphere. Admiral?
Admiral FALLER. Senator, it is not just the ports. It is IT infra-
structure. It is space stations. It is cyber. It is safe cities, as Gen-
eral Townsend mentioned. China has figured out that the nations
in Latin America and the Caribbean are cash strapped, so instead
of trying to do arms sales, they are coming in with significant gifts.
I could cite $17 million in one country in South America, $20 mil-
lion in a Caribbean nation. These are 1-year gifts of trucks and
boats and IT infrastructure, well beyond uniforms and PME [pro-
fessional military education]. That is alarming to me as they build
not just debt but dependency, and we are trying to build trust and
teams.
Senator KING. Maybe our motto should be beware of Chinese
bearing gifts and telecommunications equipment.
Thank you very much, gentlemen. I appreciate your testimony.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Cramer?
Senator CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you, both for your service and you being here
today.
I am going to ask each of you to elaborate on the topic that Ad-
miral Faller just brought up in response to Senator King’s first
question because each of you and/or your predecessors have com-
mented of the challenge, given the mass geography that you are re-
sponsible for, each of you, the challenges in ISR, Admiral, that you
just raised. Are you getting the assets that you have asked for? Are
you getting the assets you need? If not, why not, if you know?
Then to putting a finer point perhaps or an additional point on
that broader discussion that I want you to have with me. On De-
cember 20, with the signing of the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA), of course, we began the process of standing up the
sixth military branch in Space Force. Whether in ISR or whatever,
but Space Force seems to me to fit right into this. What I am won-
dering about is—I know it is early, but time is short—have you
been invited into the discussion or inserted yourself into the discus-
sion of how to best man, train, and equip a Space Force to assist
you? Maybe you can elaborate a little bit on your partner countries
38

and what role, if any, they could play. I would ask, Admiral, to go
first and then General Townsend.
Admiral FALLER. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is
a key part of our intelligence picture, and there is a global demand
and we are short in this hemisphere. I mentioned we were meeting
20 percent of our goal. A good chunk of that 20 percent is using
the Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protec-
tion (CBP) assets. So it is a team effort. The DOD portion of that
is probably closer to about 8 percent, and so it is key. We recognize
the global challenges, and we do the best we can with what we
have. I think there are some advances in machine learning and ar-
tificial intelligence that we can use and should pursue, and we are
going to work that.
With respect to Space Force, we have excellent coordination with
General Raymond and his team. It is a key interest like cyber in
every nation that we deal with. Fundamental to this is information
sharing into the space realm and space agreements that we are
working with nations like Brazil, Chile, and other countries that
will help counter China’s efforts in that realm and continue to en-
sure that we have positional advantage. We cannot work fast
enough in that arena, Senator, but we are working on it as hard
as we can.
Senator CRAMER. Thank you.
General TOWNSEND. Senator, on your question about resources,
I would say that my command, with one exception, is pretty ade-
quately resourced for the tasks we are given to do today. As small
as those resources are, I think it is adequate with the exception of
ISR that you mentioned, and I know that every combatant com-
mander that sits here in front of you will say the exact same thing.
Admiral Faller briefed his level of resourcing. We are at about 25
percent of our known validated requirement for ISR.
You mentioned the Space Force. Interestingly enough, I just met
with General Raymond yesterday. We were discussing about the
development of his new force, and we are in constant contact with
Space Force and Space Command. They have recently deployed
some folks to our headquarters to assist us with space.
Everything we do, of course, on the continent has ties to space,
and not only on our side but on our adversaries’ side as well. I re-
cently got a briefing, and the Chinese have somewhere between 13
and 16 space facilities on the African continent and the Russians
have 5 or 6. So they are also investing heavily in space infrastruc-
ture on the African continent.
Senator CRAMER. Thank you both, and with that, I yield my
time.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Peters?
Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your ongoing service as well.
You both highlighted in your written testimony the National
Guard State Partnership Program and how that works to ensure
bonds both at junior levels and senior levels with militaries in your
region. In the last 4 years, the Michigan National Guard has com-
pleted 19 events with Liberia, one of their State Partnership coun-
terparts, and they have also planned another 20 events coming up
in this next fiscal year.
39

I had the opportunity to see some of that firsthand in 2017 when
I was in Liberia, and I know that the partnership certainly helps
build relationships in West Africa as well as other places around
the world.
So my question to both of you is, how are you leveraging State
Partnership Programs in your area of responsibility? When I look
at the amount of money we are spending, roughly $3 million in
each of your areas, maybe you can give us a sense of what you are
doing. Is that adequate resourcing? If not, what would be adequate
and what would you do with it? General Townsend?
General TOWNSEND. Thanks, Senator.
The State Partnership Program is a fantastic resource for us,
and I did not have a good appreciation for it until I took this job.
One of the first conferences I went to, all of the—at the time—14
partnerships were present with their National Guard partners from
the United States. It is very responsive. It is very flexible. What
I like about it is the States and the countries do a lot of things sort
of below the radar, and it is a constant kind of presence.
We now have 15 partnerships in Africa. We have just added
Rwanda and Nebraska. That is the new one, and the next one in
the queue we are working up towards is Ethiopia. These countries
want these partnerships. They talk to their counterparts on the
continent that have them, and they realize the value of it. I cannot
say enough good about the State Partnership Program.
Senator PETERS. Are they resourced enough?
General TOWNSEND. You mentioned we have $2.9 million, about
$3 million that you mentioned. I think they are probably adequate
right now. What I have not done is I have not done an analysis to
see if we add Ethiopia, do we get more money, or is that another
mouth to feed from the same $2.9 million. I have to look into that.
I do not know the answer to that, and I will get back to you on
that.
Senator PETERS. Great. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
General TOWNSEND. We anticipate receiving additional resources from the Na-
tional Guard Bureau (NGB), but understand current appropriation for State Part-
nership Program (SPP) is relatively flat. In fiscal year 2019 AFRICOM received
about $2.9 million in SPP funding which allowed us to support 196 engagements
of 250 planned. I support appropriating more resources to the NGB (title 10, USC
section 341) to fund the valuable return on investment we receive through SPP.
Admiral Faller?
Admiral FALLER. Similar extremely positive experience. It is a
habitual relationship that aligns itself very well, and the year and
after year builds friendships. The training that is provided, the
equipment. Most of our exercise support for our major exercises
comes from State Partnerships, and that is something that we de-
pend on as our force provider. So it is a game-changer for us. We
added Brazil and New York this year, and it was a big deal for the
Brazilians and the New York National Guard.
In terms of the funding levels, we are seeking to get guard part-
ner reps established in every embassy as part of our embassy coun-
try teams. We are working through the funding with respect to
that. We think there is an opportunity for some additional State
partners within our headquarters to augment our force and to in-
40

crease the understanding of how we can leverage partner expertise.
Cyber is a particular area where some States are excellent in
cyber. How do we better leverage that? I have to get back to you
on a level of funding and I will take that for the record.
But the authorities piece is also an area too. So we can use the
flexible authorities.
One quick story. Recently in Colombia and we have Oklahoma.
It is not a State partner of Colombia, but the Oklahoma Guard has
surged ISR support for 6 months to help augment Colombia in get-
ting after FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] dis-
sidents, the ELN [National Liberation Army], and narcotraffickers.
Some tremendous successes with their MC–12’s with just 30
guardsmen and one contractor support. Lost cost, high payoff.
Senator PETERS. Thank you.
I have a very limited time. So it will be just a quick answer from
each of you.
We understand that climate change will have a significant im-
pact on security issues across the planet. The Army War College
just recently put out a report suggesting the challenges of climate
change. In the brief time we have left, is there one specific concern
related to climate change in your area that you think we should
be focusing on. General, do you want to start?
General TOWNSEND. Yes. I think probably the desertification that
we see expanding south from the Sahara into the Sahel and water
management I think. Water is going to be huge point of friction on
the African continent in the future.
Admiral FALLER. Recently in Central America—and we look at
the impact on changes in weather to the coffee and the white corn
and things like that. So we are really focused on how do we work
with whole-of-government to support that stability necessary so
people can stay home and find jobs.
Senator PETERS. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Tillis?
Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
I was struck by some of your comments. I think even Senator
King’s comments led me to kind of aggregate. You accomplish so
much with few people and few dollars. Admiral Faller, you said we
do the best we can with what we have. I have heard ‘‘adequate’’
used several times and ‘‘probably adequate’’ used one time.
So when we have this discussion about why are you not doing
more, I always wonder whether or not you all should just put a
mirror down there and say because you are not giving us the re-
sources to say ‘‘more than adequate,’’ thinking strategically, doing
more, anticipating threats.
To a large extent, the graphics were great, but what we are try-
ing to do is catch up with a pace in China and against China and
in Africa and South America where it looks like we are losing. The
gap is narrowing and some points we are trying to catch up. Is that
an adequate statement?
Admiral FALLER. We see our competitive advantage narrowing in
this hemisphere, and we have got to maintain that competitive ad-
vantage and across all the elements of national power focused in
the military. So what does it take to do that? Certainly more effi-
41

cient use of resources we have, leveraging other things. I men-
tioned artificial intelligence a couple times. But at the end of the
day, any athletic competition I have ever been in or anything I
have ever done takes a person to compete. So zero in any math
equation is either zero or unsolvable. We have to be present to
make a difference.
Senator TILLIS. General Townsend?
General TOWNSEND. Senator, I think that our competitive advan-
tage is not eroding. In some cases, they have an advantage. There
are some areas we are just not going to out-compete China in. One
example is spending money in large amounts on the African con-
tinent to build infrastructure. We are not going to build bridges
and dams and railroads and stadiums and palaces like they are
doing. So we have to rely on our strengths, and I think our inter-
agency and our military have a lot of those strengths. So I think
that we also do not have to compete everywhere in Africa. We have
to pick and choose where we are going to out-compete.
Senator TILLIS. If I have time, I am going to ask a little bit about
that.
We all have to take a look at what is happening around the
globe. When all of a sudden we see the threat of Iran in the Middle
East, we have to redeploy assets there. It has got to come from
somewhere.
ISR is something that is desperately needed across the board. I
have had several discussions with your predecessors, Admiral, and
they say the thing that is most frustrating to them is they have
enough intelligence to know there is a lot of stuff moving across the
border killing American citizens and there is not a damn thing they
can do about it. You just do not have the resources on the water,
on the ground to do it.
I really do believe if you take a look at the number of people who
are dying from narcoterrorism, it is remarkable to me, the hun-
dreds of people who die every day in this country. If that was a ter-
rorist organization doing that anywhere in the world, we would
stand up a capability and rain down hell on them. But it is hap-
pening every single day.
I want to ask you a question because I will run out of time. As
you are looking north of your area of responsibility and then to the
southern border of Mexico, how much better are we getting at se-
curing that border so you are limiting the pathways that these
drugs, guns, and victims of human trafficking? Are we starting to
tighten and make any progress there within your area of responsi-
bility? Any comments you can give on Mexico’s contribution will be
appreciated.
Admiral FALLER. We certainly look at the security as a required
zone defense. So border security is almost like a goal line stand.
You need your linebackers and your halfbacks as you move down.
I think the pressure has worked. We have seen some positive indi-
cation.
But clearly, given the migrant caravans that have recently come
up, the connection between those caravans and transnational crimi-
nal organizations and narcotrafficking and the political instability.
More needs to be done, and it has got to be those nations stepping
up. The partners have to step up and our whole-of-government ef-
42

forts sustained in a way. To get after sustainable security, it takes
time to get some of these efforts up. We saw Ambassador Jean E.
Manes make progress in El Salvador, but it was sustained, whole-
of-government efforts.
Senator TILLIS. Finally, General Townsend, you wake up in the
morning. What are the top three things that worry you most about
your job?
General TOWNSEND. I think the first one is another event like a
Manda Bay, an attack where we are just not looking for it.
Then I think what al Shabaab might do next that we are not
tracking on out of East Africa.
Then just making sure I can do right by the soldiers, sailors, air-
men, and marines of AFRICOM.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Manchin?
Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all especially for your service, but thanks for being
here to bring us up to speed.
Admiral Faller, I want to talk about Guantanamo just a little bit
because we talked about the efficiencies and the things that you
are trying to do there to get more accountability. My goodness,
when it is costing $13 million per inmate—$13 million—what type
of efficiencies do you think you can do to cut into that? How can
we better operate? Do you not think it is time we look at repo-
sitioning these prisoners that would be more cost effective to the
American taxpayers? West Virginians could do a lot with that $13
million. I can assure you on that one. So any thoughts you might
have on Guantanamo, what direction we should go, policy for the
long term, and then short-term efficiencies?
Admiral FALLER. Senator, the safe, humane, legal treatment of
those detainees is a top mission of ours. We have a significant
guard force aligned to that mission set, some 1,800. As part of this
combatant command zero slate review, we are going to take a hard
look at if there is a better way, a more efficient way to conduct that
mission set. That review is ongoing. I will report out to the Sec-
retary of Defense soon.
Senator MANCHIN. Let me just ask this question, and I am sorry
to interrupt you, sir.
Have you all looked to see if we are capable and able? I under-
stand we have quite a few detainees in the United States prisons
in some of our hardened facilities that would be more effective and
efficient. The geopolitical ramifications of this thing—we just got to
get more cost effective here and do the common sense thing. I can-
not explain this back home.
Admiral FALLER. As we look at our review, we are looking at dif-
ferent models on what we can learn from. As to whether we would
move that detention facility, that is a policy decision——
Senator MANCHIN. I understand. I understand that.
Admiral FALLER. I just want to note, Senator, that we remind
our team every day that the USS Cole, 9/11, and I know we are
all deeply committed to ensuring that we do right by that. The
United States needs the capability to deal with——
Senator MANCHIN. How many new prisoners have you brought
into Guantanamo this last year? How many new prisoners have
you brought to Guantanamo?
43

Admiral FALLER. Sir, we have currently 40 and that number has
remained steady.
Senator MANCHIN. So we have not put any more there.
Admiral FALLER. We are not increasing it.
Senator MANCHIN. We are not increasing at all. Where are we
putting them, our combatants? When we capture these combatants,
where do we put them?
Admiral FALLER. The detainees that are being taken off the bat-
tlefield in other areas are being dealt with by separate dif-
ferent——
Senator MANCHIN. It is not $13 million a person you do not
think. Do you?
Admiral FALLER. I do not know the cost in other areas, sir.
Senator MANCHIN. I am sorry, sir, on that.
General Townsend, if I can go to you. Just give me a comparison
of basically of where we are. Troop-wise I think we are up to
80,000 in the Middle East. Deployment—we are up to 80,000.
General TOWNSEND. I do not know the exact number.
Senator MANCHIN. Okay. In AFRICOM, where are you in
AFRICOM?
General TOWNSEND. Today on the continent we have about 5,100
U.S. servicemembers and about 1,000 DOD civilians and contrac-
tors.
Senator MANCHIN. We can say it is quite disproportionate. Right?
There is a difference. Extreme organizations, Boko Haram, al
Shabaab, al Qaeda, and many more. Basically the amount of man-
power you have dealing with the influence of China now, you have
got your hands full there and it looks like we are spread pretty
darned thin not being able to stop this in Africa with what we see
coming because it is not getting any less intense there and less vio-
lent and less threat to the United States of America, but most of
everything we have is going towards the Middle East and also on
fighting the drugs that are coming to this country, money going for
different things besides the front line of defense so far as stopping
the drugs coming into our country. Are you being hampered by the
amount of resources you are able to call on?
General TOWNSEND. Senator, as I mentioned previously, I think
that the tasks we are given today—we are adequately resourced
with the exception of ISR. I think that the defense-wide review
that all of the combatant commands are participating——
Senator MANCHIN. So in order to do the mission, you think at
5,100-plus you are in good shape.
General TOWNSEND. To do the tasks that we are assigned today.
That is right, and I think the defense-wide review will potentially
decrease the tasks that we have to do.
Senator MANCHIN. You think the tasks will change? It is very
mobile what is happening——
General TOWNSEND. The tasks we are assigned will change.
Senator MANCHIN. Yes, and by that, it could change as far as the
demand on resources. Right? Thank you, sir.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Perdue?
Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your career and for your willingness to hang
in there and take up these responsibilities.
44

As I see it, the world right now has four naval pinch points. You
guys own two of them, the Suez Canal and Panama Canal. The
Malaccan Strait I would argue is one and now the South China
Sea.
Let us talk about the Suez for just a minute. If you look at what
Russia has done in Syria with Latakia and Tortus and now what
they are talking about in Berbera down near Djibouti where we
have a base and now the Chinese have a base there, it is pretty
obvious that Russia is increasing their operational tempo in Africa.
General, tell me a little bit because one of the things I worry
about most—I have been listening to this stuff for a while here,
and the thing that I see beginning to develop is the opportunity
that Russia and China join together in an area where we are
under-deployed and it creates a real strategic challenge for us. Rus-
sia and China are members of the Shanghai Cooperative Organiza-
tion, along with India and Pakistan, four nuclear powers. But Afri-
ca is one of the few places where I can see, other than the Arctic,
that they have the potential to really come together and create a
real headache for us.
Would you share what Russia is doing in your AOR and how we
should be thinking about it as we look toward the NDAA this next
year?
General TOWNSEND. Yes, Senator.
So we provided some handouts there——
Senator PERDUE. They are very helpful.
General TOWNSEND.—to kind of lay out graphically what Russia
is doing, and you can see it is quite a bit.
Senator PERDUE. Yes, sir. Dramatically increased would you not
say over the last 3 years?
General TOWNSEND. They have.
I think Russia’s goals are predominantly for their benefit for re-
source extraction. They also want to position particularly in north-
ern Africa, particularly in Libya. They want a position on NATO’s
southern flank there. They also I think want to thwart what we are
trying to do and present themselves as a great power alternative
to the United States.
What I see them doing with China, though, we are not really see-
ing a great level of cooperation with one recent exception. There
was an exercise a couple of months ago in South Africa called Exer-
cise Mosi where the South Africans, the Russians, and Chinese na-
vies conducted an exercise on the very southern tip of the con-
tinent. That is the first visible sign of cooperation that we have
seen. We are not seeing that in a great measure, but they are all
over the continent and they are doing mostly resource extraction.
Senator PERDUE. One of the things we do not talk about here—
and it is a follow-up real quick, and I need to get to Admiral Faller
about South America with a couple of questions. But what are our
NATO allies doing in Africa to help us stand up to the require-
ments that we are trying to fulfill in your AOR?
General TOWNSEND. Senator, as you are aware, NATO itself is
not greatly active, but——
Senator PERDUE. I should have said the members of NATO.
General TOWNSEND. Members of NATO are very involved. In
fact, in West Africa, we are a tertiary supporter of the French, but-
45

tressed by several other European countries there. In East Africa
in Somalia, it is the European Union that is keeping the AMISOM
[African Union Mission to Somalia] forces in the field by paying for
their sustainment in the field. So the European partners are doing
quite a bit. I believe there is room for them to do more, and I think
our government has recently called on the Europeans to do more.
So has France by the way.
Senator PERDUE. I am really concerned. Your charts are great.
$145 billion already invested in Africa and a plan to get to $250
billion in South America within the next 5 years by China alone.
I think these numbers are correct. We put in $8 billion of aid into
something called Power Africa, and I am making a point with this.
We attracted something like $46 billion of foreign direct investment
to back that up. So we have employed over $50 billion with only
$8 billion of our seed money in there. Leverage is a big part of this
with our allies, and we have got to continue to do that, and you
guys are right in the middle of that.
Admiral, with regard to South America, 56 ports they have al-
ready invested in. I am worried about two things right now di-
rectly. In Argentina, the Georgia National Guard is a partner down
there, and you in our meeting yesterday talked about this a little
bit. But tell us a little bit about China’s PLA [People’s Liberation
Army] managing that space station in Argentina, and then second-
arily, what does the up-tempo mean in the Panama Canal Zone
that China has really undertaken just in the last—since you have
taken over in that AOR?
Admiral FALLER. As you state, beyond economic, China seeks to
take their soft aims and turn them into hard power targets, and
it is in space. It is in cyber. It is in port access. It is in access—
generally, they signed into the previous Panama administration
some 40 agreements for access, influence, including IT in Panama.
Fortunately for us, the current team in Panama, the administra-
tion there, has changed policy and has recognized the threat that
that could have on their sovereignty.
We look up into the Caribbean. In one Caribbean nation, China
has built a road across the country, 1,200 acres of access granted
for Chinese use. The equipment was brought in under dubious cir-
cumstances. They parked it right next to the embassy so we could
be reminded of that, and now they get to collect the tolls for 50
years on that road.
Those are just three quick examples of what we see with Chinese
influence.
I pivot and look into Venezuela where China, Russia, Cuba work-
ing alongside each other to block the forces and voices of democracy
particularly in cyber.
Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Jones?
Senator JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General and Admiral, for being here. I apologize for
being late. Demands on our time these days are a little bit over-
whelming.
General Townsend, first let me just say that I join my colleagues
in sending condolences to you and the families of those killed and
injured in the attack on Manda Bay. I especially want to point out
46

and send our condolences to the family of Army Specialist Mitch
Mayfield who was a valued soldier in the 1st battalion of the 58th
Aviation Regiment out of Fort Rucker, Alabama. It is an amazing
group down there, and he was certainly part of that amazing
group.
Admiral, I want to go back to something that I think you may
have touched on briefly with Senator Shaheen concerning the USS
Detroit and the littoral combat ships (LCSs) that are being used
around. That ship was not made in Alabama, but we have a lot of
the LCSs made down at Austal down in Mobile that are employed
around the world. I would like, if you could, tell me a little bit more
about how the LCS has been helpful in the operations in your area.
Is it possible to use or would you want additional LCSs or other
vessels like the EPF [Expeditionary Fast Transport] to help in your
area of expertise?
Admiral FALLER. So our counternarcotics mission demands plat-
forms for end game work and with law enforcement to take both
the detainees we gain intel from and the drugs off the streets here
in the United States Detroit has had success in that endeavor.
They have an unmanned aerial vehicle Fire Scout embarked along
with a helicopter. That is a great force package.
We have also used the Detroit in a freedom of navigation oper-
ation off the coast of Venezuela in waters that Venezuela claims
that international law does not recognize. Detroit did a magnificent
job sailing close to the coast of Venezuela and providing that intel-
ligence and reporting back to us.
So the ships are multi-mission. The ships are capable. Unfortu-
nately, we had a rocky start. I think the kinks are being worked
out. The Detroit’s performance since November has been above
standards in all manners of reliability, and we welcome the deploy-
ment of the next littoral combat ship to the region. We could use
more of these ships. They are well suited for the kind of missions
in this hemisphere.
Senator JONES. Great. Well, thank you very much.
As a former U.S. attorney, I am acutely aware of the drug prob-
lem that we have in this country and the importation of drugs, and
I would like to do all we can. I have been concerned about the ad-
ministration’s diverting of some resources to what I think would be
more appropriate for interdiction. But that is for another case, an-
other discussion.
I believe Senator Kaine mentioned an American reassurance ini-
tiative, and I want to give you a chance to talk about that a little
bit more, Admiral. There has been discussion for years about devel-
oping a western hemisphere security initiative, but so far we have
just not been able to get it down.
Can you tell us what the status of those conversations is and
what impact that may or may not have on the future in your area?
Admiral FALLER. Senator, proximity matters, and this is our
neighborhood. When you can fly to Central America shorter flights
than Washington, DC from Miami, it is telling of how closely con-
nected we are, and there have been doctrines over the years. We
had the Good Neighbor Policy for FDR [Franklin D. Roosevelt]. We
have had the Monroe Doctrine. I think there has been discussion
by others, the think tanks, and Senator Kaine has mentioned it. I
47

think there might be a big idea for this hemisphere where we pull
together the whole-of-government efforts necessary to recognize
that these interior lines, in military speak, this neighborhood mat-
ters. China and Russia certainly recognize that.
To the extent that it takes resources, some of that resources is
just our time and attention, and a little goes a long way. If it was
a stock, it would have a great P/E [price-earnings] ratio and you
would want to invest in it for the future, and the investments we
have made are sound. I think we need to stay the course and look
to where we can smartly increase and focus those investments. A
big idea associated with something like, as you mentioned, a west-
ern hemisphere initiative might be a great way to start.
Senator JONES. Great. Well, thank you, sir.
Now, I would like to encourage you to stay in touch with my of-
fice about it. We are right there in Alabama, right there on the
Gulf of Mexico. So it is closer to us than a lot of folks. My office
is more than willing to help initiate those discussions or help de-
velop those. So stay in touch and let us know.
So thank you very much to both of you for your service and for
being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Hawley?
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you for your service. Thank you for
being here today.
Admiral, let me start with you. My State of Missouri has been
deeply affected by the drugs coming into this country from Latin
America. Your testimony has provided examples of certain Latin
American countries who are stepping up their effort on the counter-
narcotics front.
I am interested in who is maybe not pulling their weight. Can
you give us some examples of places where countries could be doing
more but are not doing so, have refused to do so, whether that is
the result of corruption or other reasons?
Admiral FALLER. These transnational criminal organizations—
$90 billion they took in last year to fuel instability across the re-
gion. They have ungoverned territory in countries across the re-
gion, and that bridges over into the NORTHCOM AOR. It is some-
thing we look at to the extent we influence and leverage and put
pressure on our partners to do more.
Unfortunately, the worst offender of the whole lot is not a coun-
try that we can cooperate with right now, and that is Venezuela.
We look at Venezuela where the Maduro regime is being propped
up by Cuba, Russia, and China and we see the narcotrafficking
that has increased substantially in the air and over land from Co-
lombia into Venezuela. Then it becomes extremely difficult to track
as it leaves in commercial privatized shipping, private airplanes,
and so we look at countries stepping up, and I think the inter-
national effort on pressure on Maduro and that illegitimate regime
is a focus area where we can do more.
Within the Central American countries, I would call out Panama,
the relationship the Missouri Guard has with them. They have
stepped up. Costa Rica has stepped up. You have got another blight
of no democracy in Nicaragua which is another problem site. El
48

Salvador has done more. Guatemala has done more. Some others
can do more. They are working on it, but there is certainly more
effect that we can have from some of our partners.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you very much. That is very helpful.
General, let me turn to you. Secretary Esper has called on our
European allies to do more in the Sahel, and he has said recently
that additional contributions by European allies—I am quoting him
here—could offset whatever changes we make as we consider next
steps in Africa.
I am wondering if you agree with that first, and then I am going
to ask you to elaborate. But do you agree with that statement from
the Secretary?
General TOWNSEND. I do agree with the statement that European
contributions could in many ways offset what we are doing there.
Senator HAWLEY. Could you give us just on that point, General,
some specific examples of ways that you think our NATO allies
could contribute more in the Sahel than they currently are doing?
General TOWNSEND. Well, sure. The French have called on their
European neighbors to contribute more forces to the effort there
trying to directly confront the violent extremist groups there in the
Sahel, specifically Mali and Niger, Burkina Faso. I think that is
something they can do and should do.
Also, we are providing some support that European countries
have, specifically NATO allies, a capacity to do. Airlift is one thing
we are supporting the French forces with. Air refueling for French
fighter aircraft is another thing. These are capacities that are resi-
dent in many European countries that they could provide. I think
our Department is going to lead an effort to try to get some Euro-
pean partners to do some of those things and offset the support we
are providing right now.
I think they do not have the capacity to do some of the more
technical types of support. We do some technical intelligence type
of support that is fairly exquisite, and there are not a lot of coun-
tries that can do that at that same level. But they can mitigate a
lot of the support that we provide.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you very much.
General, let me ask you about China. I am very concerned by the
PLA’s presence in Djibouti. Do you worry that the PLA could use
its forces there to contest our ability to transit the Bab al Mandeb
or adjacent waterways in a future crisis?
General TOWNSEND. On a daily basis, I do not worry a great deal
about the Chinese presence in Djibouti at their base, but the poten-
tial is there. So we keep an eye on it. We are not blind to that.
But there is a potential there in some future crisis that they could
potentially use that base there to cause problems.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me just ask you, in your assessment what
should we be doing now to assure our access to that maritime
chokepoint in a future scenario?
General TOWNSEND. I think we are doing that to a great extent
and that is competing, making sure that those countries that are
there, Djibouti being one of them, Somalia being another one—
those countries prefer the United States as a strategic partner. I
am not saying that they should not interact with China or Russia
at all, but what I want is at 2 o’clock in the morning when the Sec-
49

retary of State calls a head of state in Africa and says America
needs to come in tonight, they yes to us and they do not say yes
to the Chinese or the Russians.
Senator HAWLEY. My time has expired.
Admiral, I want to ask you a few questions about the Chinese
activity in your AOR. I will submit those for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Townsend, General Esmail Qaani, who assumed the po-
sition as the head of Iran’s Qods Force after Soleimani’s killing, has
vowed to strike back at the United States and called on Hezbollah
to exact further revenge. The Voice of America reported earlier this
month that Iran may seek to strike back in Africa, citing the rise
of Iranian military influence on the continent and the potential of
softer targets.
What have you been doing to ensure the safety of our
servicemembers and American citizens in Africa? Second, how have
plans to reduce United States Forces in Africa accounted for the
possible increase in future terrorist activity? How well equipped
and trained are local forces in Africa?
General TOWNSEND. Senator, to your first question, we are fol-
lowing those reports. There is intelligence reporting that comports
with that. Both the Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah I think are
looking for opportunities to strike back at America wherever, and
we think one of those places is certainly Africa. We are watching
and listening carefully for that. We are not taking any specific
measures yet. We do not really have a good enough picture to take
actions, but we are watching and listening for that.
Then on your second question, the quality of African security
forces varies widely depending on where we are talking about in
Africa. Some are exceptionally good and others are not so good, and
the partners that we work with—we are trying to get them all to
a level where they can at least be self-sufficient would be the ideal,
if they could handle their own security threats on their own.
Senator GILLIBRAND. I took a CODEL [congressional delegation]
a few years ago and we did stop in Chad to assess our support and
how well they were doing to support Nigeria. Do you have any
thoughts about how that relationship is developing? Is it moving
forward or has it retreated?
General TOWNSEND. I think that relationship is pretty sound.
There is a multinational joint task force that operates there. All of
those countries around the Lake Chad basin are operating there.
Chad has recently redeployed some forces from Nigeria, but that
was part of a scheduled move, not some sort of breakdown in the
relationship or the partnership there in the joint task force. So I
think that that group is functioning.
Senator GILLIBRAND. Okay.
Earlier this month, the al Shabaab launch an attack on Manda
airfield, killing an American servicemember and two contractors.
The New York Times reported that al Shabaab used the attacks as
a message to African forces that American troops would abandon
them just as they did with the Syrian Kurds. At the same time,
50

an African Center for Strategic Studies report stated that the activ-
ity of Africa’s extremist groups has doubled since 2013.
How has the decision to withdraw support from Syria impacted
the resolve and trust of our African partners?
General TOWNSEND. I do not know that our decision to withdraw
from Syria has affected their calculus. That has not come up in any
discussions I have had with African leaders. But the thing that
they are always looking for is can we count on you as a partner.
But I have not heard that they are looking towards our withdrawal
from Syria as some indication.
Senator GILLIBRAND. Do you have any plans at this point or any
strategies to reduce our forces in Africa? What do you think the im-
pact of those reductions could be on our counterterrorism efforts?
General TOWNSEND. We are engaged in this blank slate review
process with the Department of Defense, and I think that is a nec-
essary and a good process to do to make sure that our resources
are always pointed at our highest priorities. We have made some
presentations and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
He is still in a decision cycle, and I do not want to get in front of
his decision about what may happen with our troop presence on the
continent.
I will say that there are threats to America that will emanate
from the African continent, both global power and great power
threats, as well as violent extremist organizations.
Senator GILLIBRAND. A quick question in my remaining time on
China. Both China and Russia have been making large economic
investments in both Africa and Latin America in order to expand
their influence around the globe. When we were in Africa, they
were investing in Djibouti and doing a huge investment in the air-
field there. This is yet another example of how the battle for world
leadership in this century cannot be fought by just spending more
money on weapons. Instead, we have to learn lessons from the fail-
ures in Iraq and Afghanistan and build lasting relationships and
partnerships.
What role do your COCOMs play in any whole-of-government co-
ordination aimed at aligning all of our levers of power towards a
common goal in your respective AORs?
Admiral FALLER. What you cited about China and Russia is so
key, Senator. We are seeing it in Cuba, 90 miles from Key West
where China and Russia are working alongside certainly not for
United States national interests or for any partnerships in the
hemisphere.
But our partnerships, our mil-to-mil partnerships, are key, and
working with our partners to build strong institutions. It is these
institutions that do the right thing and have trust and respect the
rule of law and human rights. We have a human rights office in
SOUTHCOM that we staff to work on these sorts of things that are
part of professionalism and part of trust building.
General TOWNSEND. Senator, I would just say our level of
resourcing is such that if we want to get anything done for America
on the African continent, we have to do it as a whole-of-government
working with the Department of State and USAID. That is just in
our DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] at AFRICOM how we operate
every day.
51

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Cotton?
Senator COTTON. I want to talk about the biggest and the most
important story in the world, the Wuhan coronavirus. This
coronavirus is a catastrophe on the scale of Chernobyl for China,
but actually it is probably worse than Chernobyl which was local-
ized in its effect. The coronavirus could result in a global pandemic.
While you were all sleeping overnight, the number of diagnosed
cases in China increased by 30 percent. Let me be clear. That is
not new cases. That is just newly admitted cases. It is probably
several orders of magnitude higher than that.
Also while you were sleeping, China now has its entire border
with Russia closed, 2,600 miles. Russia has closed that border. El
Al has shut down travel between Israel and China. Air France has
shut down travel between China and France, and that is in addi-
tion to all the other countries that have already shut down travel.
From what we know so far—and there are still many un-
knowns—this virus could have both a long incubation period, as
much as 14 days, and individuals could be contagious while asymp-
tomatic, which was not the case with SARS [severe acute res-
piratory syndrome] in 2003.
Furthermore, from some cases, it appears that the virus could be
aerosolized, which means it does not require the kind of contact
that you have with, say, a married couple kissing each other or a
family living in close quarters in a hotel or apartment, but rather
the distances we are all sitting apart right now.
Yet, China is still lying about all of this. They have been lying
about it from the very beginning, and you do not need their history
of lying about SARS in 2003, though it is relevant here. You just
have to see what has happened over the last 2 months. We now
know that the first case manifested no later than December 1, even
though China did not reveal it to the WHO [World Health Organi-
zation] until a month later on December 31st when they continued
to hide it from their own citizens and they continued to say that
it had been contained inside Wuhan. Today it is in every single
province in China.
They also claimed for almost 2 months until earlier this week
that it had originated in a seafood market in Wuhan, that locals
had contracted it from animals in, say, bat soup or snake tartare.
That is not the case.
The Lancet published a study last weekend demonstrating that
of the original 40 cases, 14 of them had no contact with the seafood
market, including patient zero. As one epidemiologist said, that
virus went into the seafood market before it came out of the sea-
food market.
We still do not know where it originated. It could have been an-
other seafood market. It could have been a farm. It could have been
a food processing company.
I would note that Wuhan also has China’s only biosafety level 4
super laboratory that works with the world’s most deadly patho-
gens to include, yes, coronavirus.
Now, look at China’s own actions. They have quarantined 60 mil-
lion people—60 million—more than the entire population of our
west coast. They have shut down schools indefinitely. Classes can-
52

celed nationwide indefinitely. Hong Kong, a part of China, has ba-
sically shut down all travel from the mainland.
That is why it is essential that we immediately stop all travel
on commercial aircraft between China and the United States, mak-
ing exceptions, of course, for American citizens to come back as we
just brought back yesterday, allowing a central trade to flow as
long as crews on ships and aircraft are not allowed to go into the
general population in America, and making exceptions, of course,
for medical personnel to go into China to try to get a handle on
this. It is essential that we take those steps and essential that we
get to the bottom of China’s deceit and incompetence on this meas-
ure.
Gentlemen, I raise this with you because you are responsible in
your combatant commands for some countries that have the most
fragile public institutions, to include the most fragile public health
institutions, in the world. So I ask, even though as of this morning
there are not yet confirmed cases of coronavirus in your combatant
commands, though I suspect there will be soon, what is your as-
sessment about the ability of the governments in your combatant
commands to handle a potential global pandemic like this. General
Townsend?
General TOWNSEND. Thanks, Senator.
There are not, that I am aware of, any confirmed cases as you
mentioned, but there are some suspected cases. The first report of
a suspected case I heard of is in Djibouti, which you would imagine
with the significant Chinese presence there.
The capacity of African nations to deal with this problem varies
widely. For example, in eastern Africa, central east Africa, they
have been dealing with Ebola and they have been dealing with
Ebola largely on their own and doing a pretty good job of it. So I
think capacity there, but anywhere else in Africa is probably not
to that degree.
Senator COTTON. Admiral Faller?
Admiral FALLER. The Venezuela crisis has already strained the
social services of many of the nations. As you are aware, Senator,
we had deployed the hospital ship Comfort twice in 1 year to 12
different nations. In one 5-day span, it can do the equivalent of a
whole month for a region of some of the major countries. So I would
be extremely concerned. Like General Townsend, the capacities
vary widely, but in many cases they are strained and to the limit.
I would be very concerned if we saw this spread.
Senator COTTON. Thank you.
As a defensive measure, I would just say again it is essential
that we shut down all commercial air travel immediately between
the United States and China. As an offensive measure, because
that probably will not stop it entirely and because if it becomes a
global pandemic, we have to deal with countries with very limited
capabilities here, we need a Manhattan Project level effort to work
with our best research scientists and laboratories in this country
to develop a vaccine as quickly as possible.
[Whereupon, at 10:51 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
53
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM)

1. Senator INHOFE. General Townsend, as of November 2019, the Nigerian Air
Base 201 is in service to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
operations, yet press reports have said the Administration is considering drawing
down our presence in Africa. What is the right balance of ISR assets throughout
the region to address rising violent extremism as well as great power competition?
General TOWNSEND. While different types of intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance assets are better-suited for these two problem-sets, we are now evaluating
what the right balance should look like through the Combatant Command Review
process. In short, AFRICOM does not have sufficient ISR to accomplish our cur-
rently assigned tasks with an appropriate balance of effectiveness and risk.
2. Senator INHOFE. General Townsend, due to the growing complexity of global
priorities, demand for ISR capacity is stretched to its limits. How can we work with
allies to collaborate on ISR priorities in Africa?
General TOWNSEND. We continually collaborate with partners to synchronize each
of our independent ISR capabilities and capacities to maximize our combined collec-
tion efforts for our common strategic goals through formal and informal engage-
ments. European partners can and should do more especially in West Africa.
3. Senator INHOFE. General Townsend, France has been a critical partner in ad-
dressing violent extremism across the Sahel—deploying MQ–9s as well as ground
troops. In light of recent reports that the Administration is considering a drawdown
of deployed troops, how can we marshal additional international support, including
those countries that currently operate U.S. unmanned systems, to support our objec-
tives in the region?
General TOWNSEND. Through our bilateral relationships as well as multinational
forums, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union,
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) we continue
to advocate for increased European support to French led operations in the region.
European partners can and should do more especially in West Africa.

4. Senator INHOFE. General Townsend, given the amount of engagement by China
and Russia in Africa, what is the risk to the National Defense Strategy and great
power competition if we withdraw some forces?
General TOWNSEND. USAFRICOM’s Campaign Plan nests within the NSS and
NDS; stressing the great power competition challenges faced on the continent.
China and Russia continue to challenge the United States power and influence in
Africa. Russia continuously attempts to marginalize United States efforts in coun-
tries with Russian interests. China challenges United States efforts across the con-
tinent with their One Belt, One Road Initiative; providing infrastructure and high
interest loans. If we withdraw additional forces in Africa, China and Russia will
likely fill the vacuum.
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND (SOUTHCOM)

5. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Faller, as the region currently competes for a limited
number of ISR assets, what is SOUTHCOM’s vision for expanding U.S. ISR oper-
ations to ensure adequate surveillance of illicit trafficking routes and counter global
and regional threats?
Admiral FALLER. We are always looking for innovative solutions to mitigate ISR
shortfalls in this region. We are investing in contractor owned and operated vessels,
government owned and contractor operated platforms, unmanned aircraft systems,
and open source means to fill the ISR requirements for our counterdrug mission and
to counter global and regional threats. With Congress’ support we have been able
to work with the Department of Defense’s Counternarcotics policy office and U.S.
Air Force to purchase commercial aircraft that can increase our surveillance capa-
bility against top threats in the region. Also with the support of Congress, we are
leasing a multi-mission support vessel that is currently supporting counter drug de-
tection and monitoring efforts. The vessel has an air surveillance radar, an un-
manned aircraft system, and expanded partner nation command and control capa-
bility. Regional partners are leading interdiction efforts with the vessel by embark-
ing their personnel and equipment.
We are also developing a concept to deploy unmanned aerial systems, for our-
selves, as well as for our partner nations that would increase our regional domain
awareness. Other areas in which innovation is advancing awareness are the cyber
54
and social media domain. We are exploring avenues to increase our capability to le-
verage and exploit publicly available information and open sources. The capability,
if appropriately funded, will provide near-persistent and organic ISR for this AOR
within the open source domain.

6. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Faller, what is SOUTHCOM’s future plan to equip
allies and partners with unmanned ISR systems in order to provide more thorough
situational awareness of regional threats?
Admiral FALLER. Partner nations throughout the region have expressed interest
in acquiring unmanned ISR systems to improve domain awareness of their sov-
ereign borders, as well as to detect and defend against transnational threats. Brazil
has purchased an unmanned aerial system (UAS), and they plan to purchase more
in the future. We are incorporating these types of systems into our strategic and
theater plans, and building these purchases into our long-term security cooperation
and foreign assistance plans. USSOUTHCOM complements those foreign assistance
programs by supporting key partners like Colombia and Brazil acquiring and/or re-
searching modernization programs for significant UAS systems such as the MQ–9
Reaper, Scan Eagle, and potentially Blackjack. We develop security assistance pro-
grams to support partner nations with smaller UAS requirements to support
counter narcotics and border security—once partner nations have this capability it
will improve our collective awareness of transnational threats in the region and
allow us to counter those threats collectively as well. To date, Brazil has used its
own funds to purchase Scan Eagle; Colombia has used a combination of counter-
narcotics, section 333, and FMF to acquire Scan Eagle and hand launched UAS like
PUMA; and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have acquired Raven and Puma
UAS with section 333 funds.

7. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Faller, how would you describe the role of unmanned
systems for use in future missions of disaster relief and humanitarian aid?
Admiral FALLER. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been deployed by several
organizations in support of Humanitarian Assistance missions, including other Com-
batant Commands, non-governmental organizations, and State and local govern-
ments with great success. We have informally experimented with UASs during some
humanitarian response efforts previously. UAS technologies enabled situational
awareness for a continuum of response options to optimize minimal resources and
maximum effect, saving lives and speeding recovery times.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
BORDER SECURITY

8. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Faller, what impact have the additional 15,000 Mexi-
can troops on the United States border and the additional Mexican Guard troops
on Mexico’s southern border made to the border security effort?
Admiral FALLER. Having a layered defense is the best approach to border security.
At SOUTHCOM, we work with our partners in Central America to improve their
regional security and border security efforts before threats reach the Mexican bor-
der. However, the Department of State is best capable to address this issue. The
Government of Mexico does not coordinate migration issues with the Department of
Defense.

9. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Faller, have these additional troops stemmed the flow
of illegal immigration through Mexico and into the United States?
Admiral FALLER. I would defer to NORTHCOM for specific migration information
associated with Mexican troop deployments.

10. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Faller, what, if anything, have the Northern Triangle
countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador done to prevent people from
fleeing north?
Admiral FALLER. Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have made great ad-
vances in helping stop migrants headed toward our southwest border. On Jan. 15,
2020, a migrant caravan originated in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. Because of en-
forcement actions by Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, the caravan
never arrived at our southwest border. Their actions included apprehensions, repa-
triations, increased border security, and arrests of organizers and facilitators. That
is just one example showing how these countries are working on this problem set
together.
55
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador also continue biometrically enrolling cara-
van migrants. Guatemala was the first country in the region to sign an Asylum Co-
operation Agreement with the United States in July of 2019. This agreement allows
the transfer of third-country nationals from El Salvador and Honduras who are
seeking asylum or other forms of protection in the United States to apply for asylum
in Guatemala in order to prevent abuse of the asylum process and removes key in-
centives for attempting to illegally enter the United States Guatemala has been re-
ceiving ACA transferees since November 21, 2019.
Ultimately, these countries will need to focus on citizen security so that their pop-
ulations feel safe, and economic development so that the people have hope for a bet-
ter life. USSOUTHCOM works with our partner militaries in the region to help
train and equip them to better secure their nations, largely through security co-
operation programs like 333 and joint, combine exercises—two programs at risk of
sustaining cuts in fiscal year 2021.

11. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Faller, have there been any specific military-related
cooperation efforts in this area between United States Southern Command and the
Northern Triangle countries?
Admiral FALLER. Through our security cooperation efforts, we have trained and
equipped various military units, to include partner nation air forces, armies, and na-
vies, to perform border and maritime security functions and protect their own sov-
ereign territory. USSOUTHCOM relies heavily on section 333 building partner ca-
pacity authorities to build and improve partner nation capabilities to counter shared
threats that directly impact the security of the homeland. Further, our security co-
operation programs are rooted in the fundamental respect for universal human
rights and emphasize the importance of civilian control of the military. Through our
Defense Institution Building programs, we strengthen the Ministries of Defense to
assist partners implement policies and processes that allow for more informed deci-
sion-making, and align scarce defense resources with mission priorities to address
national and regional security issues. This elevates the holistic output of our pro-
grams, ensuring our partner nations can similarly apply a whole-of-government ap-
proach to guarantee citizen security. We also share intelligence on transnational
criminal organizations that threaten our shared interests, which in turn helps these
partners develop their organic capabilities to identify and disrupt key criminal
groups involved in the movement of drugs and people to our Homeland. Addition-
ally, our civil affairs personnel work alongside other U.S. agencies, as well as non-
governmental organizations and host nation agencies to mitigate facets of instability
within the Northern Triangle. This improves host nation responsiveness to its popu-
lation by addressing civil vulnerabilities in order to reduce the causes of migration
and support capacity to conduct civil-military operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTHA MCSALLY
COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

12. Senator MCSALLY. Admiral Faller, last year you discussed the Cartels’ use of
submersibles, naval tracks going further out to sea, and remote air fields to facili-
tate the flow of drugs. Please provide an update on the latest tactics that the drug
cartels are using and how we’re countering them.
Admiral FALLER. Drug traffickers continuously adjust their tactics to improve
their concealment techniques, and have been moving toward secure communication
devices and applications to coordinate drug shipments. They smuggle cocaine pri-
marily via noncommercial maritime movements, using go-fast vessels, fishing boats,
and low profile vessels that originate from Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. We
are seeing an increase in illicit air traffic from Venezuela, indicating traffickers are
increasingly using the permissive environment under the Maduro regime to move
drugs toward the United States. The volume of known aerial drug flow from Ven-
ezuela in 2019 was about 11 percent higher than in 2018 and 94 percent higher
than in 2015. Additionally, traffickers are now using larger, faster aircraft to more
quickly move greater quantities of drugs while reducing their risk of interdiction.
For example, at least 10 of the 55 aircraft identified by Guatemalan authorities in
2019 as involved in cocaine trafficking were jets designed to move small groups of
people.
In addition to traditional air and maritime movements, drug trafficking organiza-
tions (DTOs) will continue to exploit the use of maritime container shipments to
transport narcotics. To combat these ever-changing tactics, we rely on Joint Inter-
agency task Force-South (JIATF–S) as the action arm of SOUTHCOM in the
56
counter-drug fight. JIATF–S has seamless integration between the intelligence and
operations directorates. Additionally, JIATF–S has Tactical Analysis Team (TAT)
positions in key source and destination countries to facilitate increased information
sharing between JIATF–S, foreign partners, and law enforcement. JIATF–S is work-
ing with SOUTHCOM and regional partners to deploy new ground-based radars to
increase real-time information flow an improve security response times and accu-
racy. JIATF–S has also developed a specialized container targeting cell that works
directly with the National Targeting Center to counter the increased use of con-
tainer shipments. Resourcing is key to the fight.
HUMAN SMUGGLING

13. Senator MCSALLY. Admiral Faller, criminal organizations in your area of re-
sponsibility have become more involved in migrant smuggling. In fiscal year 2019,
United States authorities apprehended nearly 608,000 unauthorized migrants from
the Northern Triangle at the southwest border. Families or unaccompanied minors
made up 81 percent of those apprehended, many of whom were seeking asylum.
Please provide an explanation of SOUTHCOM’s role in countering these criminal
smuggling operations, protecting potential asylum seekers, and securing our bor-
ders.
Admiral FALLER. Effectively addressing issues such as criminal smuggling oper-
ations, protecting potential asylum seekers, and securing our borders requires
SOUTHCOM to leverage our partnerships with the interagency community and to
take a whole-of-government approach. A key partner in this area is the U.S. Depart-
ment of State and State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL). Together SOUTHCOM and the Department of State use a wide range
of tools to counter crime, illegal drugs, and instability abroad, including foreign as-
sistance, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and reporting, sanctions,
and rewards. Specifically, SOUTHCOM leverages our partnerships and contacts
with partner nations to help develop and implement the architecture necessary for
international drug control and cross-border law enforcement cooperation.
SOUTHCOM works in unison with INL and our partner nations, international and
regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, U.S. Federal, State, and
local criminal justice entities to achieve these goals. All of our programs are con-
sistent with security and governance priorities of the United States Strategy for En-
gagement in Central America and the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI), and complement efforts under the Central American Governments’ Alli-
ance for Prosperity.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SCOTT
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

14. Senator SCOTT. Admiral Faller, we have watched over the last 2 years as Rus-
sia and Cuba continue to prop up dangerous dictators like Nicolas Maduro in Ven-
ezuela. Can you tell me the current status of their presence in Venezuela?
Admiral FALLER. Russia maintains several hundred military and civilian per-
sonnel throughout Venezuela. These personnel enhance Venezuela’s military readi-
ness by repairing Russian-origin equipment, improving intelligence and surveillance
capabilities, training personnel, and advising on cybersecurity and domestic secu-
rity. In 2018 and 2019, Moscow deployed two nuclear-capable Tu-160 Blackjack
bombers to Venezuela to demonstrate their support for the Maduro regime. Addi-
tionally, Russia has investments and joint ventures in the extraction of natural re-
sources throughout the country.
Havana’s security and economic partnership with Caracas remains very strong.
Cuba continues to provide to the Maduro regime an estimated 20,000 to 25,000
trainers, advisors, doctors, personal security forces, and intelligence agents who en-
able the regime’s control and oppression of the Venezuelan people. Caracas, in ex-
change, helps fulfill Cuba’s oil needs, as Havana remains heavily dependent on Ca-
racas for energy.

15. Senator SCOTT. Admiral Faller, do Russia and Cuba have plans beyond simply
keeping Maduro in power?
Admiral FALLER. Moscow’s and Havana’s goals in Venezuela extend beyond keep-
ing Maduro in power. Russia views a partnership with Venezuela as a key
geostrategic objective. Russia hopes to extract oil through several joint ventures,
and profit as an intermediary for Caracas’ oil sales. Venezuela still owes $800 mil-
lion to Russian oil firms, down from $2.3 billion in early 2019, as well as approxi-
57
mately $3 billion to the Russian Government. A close relationship with Maduro’s re-
gime also allows Moscow to deepen its security footprint, project power, and collect
intelligence out of Venezuela, challenging United States interests in our near
abroad. Moscow may also seek to expand its presence in the region beyond Ven-
ezuela, through other authoritarian regimes such as Nicaragua. Russia likely in-
tends to maintain a lasting presence in Venezuela to support its economic interests
and disrupt United States objectives.
Cuba sympathizes ideologically with Maduro’s regime and also seeks to keep Ca-
racas as an economic lifeline. Cuba is heavily dependent on external support for
vital resources, in particular oil from Venezuela. Cuba refines Venezuelan crude for
its own use and for resale, bringing in needed foreign currency.
16. Senator SCOTT. Admiral Faller, what is Communist China’s role in Venezuela?
Admiral FALLER. Beijing provides economic and security support to Maduro’s re-
gime. China is Venezuela’s largest creditor, with Venezuela facing $20 billion in
debt. Beijing seeks to maintain a close relationship with Caracas in part to ensure
payment of this debt through oil deliveries. Chinese state-owned enterprises have
provided significant loans for infrastructure support, including improving Ven-
ezuela’s 4G and 5G networks. Some of this support directly supports Maduro’s re-
pressive apparatus. For example, the assistance provided by Chinese state-owned
firm ZTE enables the ‘‘Carnet de la Patria’’ system, tying food rations to political
reliability. As of 2018, China had sold approximately $1 billion in military equip-
ment to Venezuela, to include combat aircraft, light tanks, and other armored vehi-
cles, and air search radars. Additionally, Beijing in 2019 provided to the Maduro
regime 68 tons of humanitarian aid, mostly medical supplies.

17. Senator SCOTT. Admiral Faller, what does Communist China want out of its
support for Maduro?
Admiral FALLER. China remains deeply invested in Venezuela’s natural resources,
and wants to protect its investments and joint oil ventures. Chinese official foreign
direct investment in Venezuela is over $3 billion, largely concentrated in the joint
petroleum venture, Sinovensa, as well as in railroads, telecommunications, and min-
ing. Beijing also wants to ensure Venezuela repays its $20 billion debt. The Chinese
Government also tries to use its approach to Venezuela to portray itself as a respon-
sible global power as opposed to foreign intervention in domestic disputes.
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

18. Senator SCOTT. General Townsend, what are you seeing in Africa in terms of
China’s efforts to get control of strategic ports and industries?
General TOWNSEND. China is Africa’s number one trading partner and is more re-
liant than any other nation on trade through the Red and Mediterranean Seas. Bei-
jing seeks to secure its access to those trade routes and is aggressively pursuing
military access to strategic ports in East and West Africa through infrastructure in-
vestments and securing port operator licenses. Beijing likely does not need full con-
trol over African nation’s port facilities to achieve its goals for commercial and mili-
tary access. These ports have political, commercial, military, and security objectives,
therefore they need better networks of roads and rail lines that China has already
started investing in.
China invests in companies and infrastructure for natural resource extraction in
African nations. The bulk of Africa’s exports to China is raw materials. Though Bei-
jing does not seek to directly control these industries, Chinese investments provides
Beijing a platform to secure access to African industries and exert influence on Afri-
can political and economic elites.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY
CHINESE INVESTMENTS NEAR PANAMA CANAL

19. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Faller, you wrote in your testimony that ‘‘Chinese
investment in deep-water ports and infrastructure on both sides of the Panama
Canal could enable the [People’s Liberation Army (PLA)] to threaten sea lanes vital
to global commerce and the movement of United States Forces.’’ Can you elaborate
on this statement?
Admiral FALLER. Chinese companies, many with close ties to the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP), manage ports on both sides of the Canal. While the Panama
Canal Authority controls overall canal operations, Beijing could leverage its compa-
nies’ access to the canal and associated critical infrastructure to slow or delay
58
United States vessels’ use of the canal during a crisis or during a political dispute.
China leverages military modernization, influence operations, and predatory eco-
nomics to coerce countries to its advantage and compete for influence.
PLA’S AMBITIONS IN SOUTHCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

20. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Faller, how would you described the PLA’s long-
term ambitions in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
Admiral FALLER. China is competing with the United States for influence in the
region and seeks to supplant the United States’ standing as the region’s partner of
choice. Beijing’s increasing economic engagement in the region over the past three
decades is a deliberate strategy China has used in other regions to create favorable
conditions for enhanced military-to-military cooperation, ranging from combined
training to expanding deployments. The PLA is likely to:
1. Provide security along the growing number of trade routes associated with Chi-
na’s One Belt One Road Initiative, particularly against non-state actors, such
as pirates;
2. Achieve Beijing’s stated goal of building closer relationships with host govern-
ment officials by providing military training modeled after the United States’
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs;
3. Engage in global humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations to gain
recognition as a responsible and reliable international humanitarian aid pro-
vider;
4. Increase naval diplomacy, to include deployments of its hospital ship ANWEI,
and pursue its long-term strategy to obtain naval bases overseas through con-
struction, purchases, and long-term leases; and
5. Provide ‘‘gifts’’ of military equipment to foster closer security relations, follow-
on foreign military sales, interoperability, and joint exercises and operations.
CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHCOM AOR

21. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Faller, China has been rapidly expanding its pres-
ence in Latin America. Can you describe the challenges posed by China’s efforts, es-
pecially when it comes to port access and telecommunications infrastructure?
Admiral FALLER. Our main concern is that Chinese investment in deep water
ports and infrastructure in the region could enable the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) to threaten sea-lanes vital to global commerce and the movement of United
States Forces during a crisis. Beijing’s focus on port development increases its global
and regional economic access and supports its efforts to become Latin America’s top
trading partner. China is the top trading partner for five counties in the region and
remains the regions second largest trading partner behind the United States. The
Chinese Government will provide loans to develop ports and other critical infra-
structure. When countries cannot pay back the loan, Beijing is not above taking
ownership of the project, as we have seen in its handling of Sri Lanka’s inability
to pay for a port development loan. This enables Beijing to exercise economic pres-
sure to resolve political or legal disputes.
Chinese companies are the main telecommunications infrastructure provider for
most countries in the region. These companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, are ag-
gressively promoting 5G wireless networks and Safe City technology in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean. Under Chinese law, Beijing can compel companies to share
data with its security and intelligence services, including those companies doing
business outside of China. Moreover, as National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien
stated in February, we have evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly to ac-
cess sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells around the
world. Adopting Chinese telecommunications technology could limit the United
States’ ability to share data with our partners because we would not be able to en-
sure the security/data integrity of these networks.
Additionally, most of the precursor chemicals necessary to produce the illicit drugs
that are trafficked to the United States originate from Chinese companies and are
exported to ports in both the producing countries and in Central America.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
LIBYA

22. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Townsend, what is AFRICOM’s role in miti-
gating ongoing tensions in Libya, and what are the key United States strategic in-
terests in resolving this conflict?
59
General TOWNSEND. USAFRICOM continues to support Ambassador Norland and
the Department of State’s Libya External Office efforts toward a diplomatic and po-
litical solution to the Libyan conflict. The United States has a strategic interest in
a stable and prosperous Libya. An independent and secure Libya promotes economic
growth and stability in the region.

23. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Townsend, will the Trump Administration de-
vote more military resources to supporting the Berlin agreement and supporting our
military partners on the ground?
General TOWNSEND. The Department of Defense is currently directing a series of
Combatant Command Reviews. AFRICOM is reviewing all of our military require-
ments and resources supporting the interagency and our African partners. We con-
tinue to emphasize military support to diplomacy and development engagement,
which serves to consolidate military and other security gains.

24. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Townsend, do you think that additional invest-
ment is helpful or necessary to support the Berlin agreement and support our mili-
tary partners on the ground?
General TOWNSEND. From a military perspective, AFRICOM recognizes the poten-
tial value of additional investment and resources but those decisions will be guided
by any future policy decisions. The Government of National Accord and our aligned
forces benefit from U.S. engagement, including the assets we provide to bolster Am-
bassador Norland’s engagements.

25. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Townsend, in addition to potential military
support, how do you think the United States should engage diplomatically in the
conflict in Libya?
General TOWNSEND. AFRICOM continues to support the Libya External Office
and all State Department engagements in Libya within our current resources and
authorities. Ambassador Norland’s recent travel to the Berlin conference shows how
diplomacy can leverage our support for a peacefully negotiated resolution to the con-
flict in Libya.

26. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Townsend, what does an escalation of violence
in Libya mean to the United States and our regional partner’s interests in the
Maghreb?
General TOWNSEND. Further escalation of the Libyan conflict will likely exacer-
bate a series of political, economic, and security challenges for the United States
and our regional partners. The widespread weapons proliferation, use of private
military contractors and foreign fighters, and oil disruptions are already over-
whelming Libya’s institutions, resulting in ungoverned spaces that increase internal
displacement and forced migration, and create opportunities for radical and extrem-
ist actors. These actors are also making use of private military companies and for-
eign fighters as combatants in order to obfuscate their activities. We expect these
trends will continue to spill over into other fragile countries, as we observed in Mali
in 2012. Our regional partners—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt—would feel
the majority of these effects, as would our European allies, who are the top recipi-
ents of Libyan migrants and largest importers of Libyan oil. Worsening violence
would also hamstring Libya’s greatest resource, hydrocarbons, causing ripple effects
across global oil prices.

27. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Townsend, what do you see as the most desta-
bilizing factor in the Libyan conflict, and what should the United States strategy
prioritize to encourage a peaceful outcome?
General TOWNSEND. The perpetuation and escalation of the Libyan conflict is a
direct result of foreign interference. External actors have not only armed and sup-
plied both sides, but are providing direct military support by providing reinforce-
ments in the form of private military contractors and/or foreign fighters, air support,
intelligence, and training. As long as external actors continue to replenish the forces
of each side, the conflict will continue.
IRANIAN PROXY THREAT IN SOUTHCOM

28. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Faller, how have recent events impacted your
force protection assessment of both United States Forces deployed forward and our
partners, as it relates to the threat of Iranian proxies in SOUTHCOM?
Admiral FALLER. Lebanese Hezbollah does maintain a presence in our neighbor-
hood, largely conducting logistical support, money laundering, and fundraising that
60
we watch closely. In recent months, Argentina, Honduras, and Paraguay have des-
ignated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and Brazilian officials stated they
plan to do the same. As the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, any increased
Iranian presence this close to our homeland is cause for concern. We have seen an
increased Iranian presence in Venezuela since its crisis deepened. We continue to
watch the threat from Iran closely.

29. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Faller, what are actions you are taking to ad-
dress these force protection concerns and keep both our servicemembers and our
partners safe?
Admiral FALLER. Our actions include persistent threat information and intel-
ligence sharing at the speed of relevance; education and training; key leader engage-
ments; security cooperation; defense/security institution building as well as the
strengthening of our partner nation military and security forces to counter threats
in order to enhance and operationalize security across the Joint Force. For example,
we work with our partners to conduct subject matter expert exchanges to share best
practices with military police teams that provide force protection and physical secu-
rity support. We have also conducted a short-notice force protection assessment of
our forward locations to ensure vigilance, adherence to procedures, rigorous train-
ing, and proper equipment.

30. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Faller, do you require any additional resources
to protect our people and our assets?
Admiral FALLER. It is imperative that we remain vigilant against this threat. In-
creased human intelligence (HUMINT) capacity, a lower cost solution to technical
ISR, provides a more penetrative capability to target groups, organizations, and net-
works to discern planned actions and intended outcomes of Iranian proxies that pose
a more nefarious direct threat to United States security. We must also marginalize
malign Iranian influence by continuously improving security cooperation and infor-
mation sharing with our partners and maintaining persistent presence throughout
the region.

31. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Faller, in your assessment, what regions with-
in your area of responsibility are most susceptible to targeting by Iranian proxy
groups?
Admiral FALLER. The Iranian Threat Network (ITN), to include Lebanese
Hezbollah, views the entire region as a permissive operating environment. Because
of the ITN’s diffuse presence in the region, the group could target Western interests
anywhere. The ITN could exploit migration flows through Central America or ref-
ugee streams out of Venezuela into neighboring countries to facilitate its terrorist-
related activities. Historically, Iranian proxies have operated in the ‘‘tri-border’’ re-
gion of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. They also have looked to carry out attacks
in areas with a pronounced DOD and/or Israeli presence in the region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO
POPULATION GROWTH

32. Senator HIRONO. General Townsend, as noted in your posture statement, the
population of the African continent is growing rapidly, projected to double by 2050
and double again by 2100. This population growth has the potential to exacerbate
the extreme poverty present on the continent, especially among younger generations
who both make up the majority of the population and who are most vulnerable to
recruitment by violent extremist organizations. How can the military prepare for
conflict in areas of highly concentrated large populations?
General TOWNSEND. The militaries of our African partners must prepare them-
selves to address these complex challenges by continuing their current efforts to pro-
fessionalize their forces. Not just in terms of operational capability, but also in
terms of solidifying command and control along with a respect for the protection of
civilians, so that more and more militaries in Africa are sources of stability. DOD
and DOS security sector assistance programs address both these aspects of profes-
sionalizing their armed forces.

33. Senator HIRONO. General Townsend, what role does interagency cooperation
play in addressing these issues and what partnership programs exist for AFRICOM
to address the results of population growth and poverty rates?
61
General TOWNSEND. In Africa, we see our work in the security sector as a critical
enabler of our interagency partners’ efforts across the continent. AFRICOM works
closely with interagency partners across our area of responsibility; our embedded
State and USAID experts reinforce that multi-level coordination to ensure our DOD
programs are synchronized with broader Whole-of-Government efforts. Our long-
standing partnership improves responsiveness to the challenges posed by population
growth and widespread poverty.
BORDER WALL

34. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Faller, the President has stated that he will fund
the border wall with money appropriated by this Congress for military construction
(MILCON) projects, including nearly $254 million in fiscal year 2019 (fiscal year
2019) military construction funds from SOUTHCOM, and $124 million in fiscal year
2020 counterdrug money. How will these anticipated transfers affect overall
SOUTHCOM readiness or will they at all?
Admiral FALLER. To date, SOUTHCOM funding has not been directly impacted
by these transfers. However, the budget uncertainty that comes from these policy
debates does impact our ability to plan internally, as well as with our partner na-
tions.

35. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Faller, what are the consequences of withholding
this funding?
Admiral FALLER. Right now, the only practical consequence we have observed is
an increased uncertainty in our ability to plan and our ability to execute contractual
obligations due to the slow movement of funding allocation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
BORDER WALL

36. Senator HEINRICH. Admiral Faller, the Washington Post has reported that the
Administration plans on diverting an additional $7.2 billion in counterdrug and
MILCON funding in the fiscal year 2021 bill to construct the President’s wasteful
and ineffective border wall. I understand you can’t speak to the fiscal year 2021
budget, but SOUTHCOM is charged with deterring and defeating threats to defend
the U.S. Homeland and our interests—many of the threats within SOUTHCOM’s
area of responsibility involve counterdrug efforts. Is a border wall the most effective
military or defense investment we can make to prevent entry of illegal drugs into
the United States?
Admiral FALLER. Border security is national security. DTOs are continuously ad-
justing and varying their techniques for smuggling illicit cargo into our homeland
and we must therefore create a defense in depth to counter these illicit pathways.
SOUTHCOM is charged with conducting detection and monitoring in support of law
enforcement in the air and maritime domains, which is where our experience and
expertise are focused. The United States-Mexico land border falls under the respon-
sibility of United States Northern Command.

37. Senator HEINRICH. Admiral Faller, what investments, capabilities, and re-
sources, in your experience, have proved to be most effective in disrupting the move-
ment of illegal drugs and preventing their entry into the United States?
Admiral FALLER. The most effective strategy in the fight against illicit trafficking
in the air and maritime domains is fighting it as a team. We are taking a three-
pronged approach to this mission—security cooperation to increase partner capacity,
increased intelligence to better understand the threat, and increased assets to action
that intelligence.
Last year, our partners played a critical role in 50 percent of our drug interdic-
tions, up from 40 percent the year before. Getting our partners in the game by
training and equipping them through security cooperation programs is exactly the
right approach as these threats affect us all, and we need to tackle them together.
Security cooperation programs allow us to train, advise, educate, and equip our
partner nations—enabling them to help us in this fight.
In order for us to function as an effective team, we need more intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance. The ideal force package for maritime detection and moni-
toring includes long and medium range maritime patrol aircraft, using capable mar-
itime radar and camera systems for detection, classification, and monitoring. The P–
3 and P–8 flying missions deep in the Eastern Pacific allow for interdiction of illicit
conveyances far from shore, and outside dense fishing fleets. Medium range mari-
62
time patrol aircraft like the DH–8 and HC–130 are very capable platforms utilized
closer to shore, but are nearly as effective. Similarly, persistent U.S. Coast Guard
medium endurance and national security cutters in high threat areas, properly
equipped with Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capable helicopters and Over-The-Hori-
zon (OTH) small boats are the backbone of counter-narcotics operations in the
source and transit zones. Creative solutions such as the Multi-Mission Support Ves-
sel (MMSV), the PALE ALE aircraft, and use of unmanned aerial systems like the
MQ–9 contribute to the mission by filling in asset gaps.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN
COMBATTING TERRORISM

38. Senator WARREN. General Townsend, the Sahel is experiencing a ‘‘devastating
surge in terrorist attacks,’’ according to officials from the United Nations, with ter-
ror-attack casualties in the region increasing five-fold since 2016. This challenge
cannot be addressed by military power alone and investing in our civilian tools is
a cost-effective way to prevent further conflict—for every $1 we spend on preven-
tion, we save $16 in response costs. How do investments in the State Department,
USAID, and other civilian tools of national security support your goals of promoting
security and stability in Africa?
General TOWNSEND. USAID and State lead U.S. efforts to support the long-term
solutions to insecurity and instability including economic growth, development, and
good governance. Additionally, USAID and State’s work on capacity building directly
supports security and stability, through professionalization of security forces via
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and institutional capacity
building programs funded with Foreign Military Financing and Peacekeeping Oper-
ations funds, as well as social cohesion and counter violent extremism messaging.
MIGRATION

39. Senator WARREN. Admiral Faller, as former SOUTHCOM Commanders Gen-
eral Craddock, General Hill, General McCaffrey, General Wilhelm, and Admiral
Stavridis have noted, ‘‘Improving conditions in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Sal-
vador is a critical way to address the root causes of migration and prevent the hu-
manitarian crisis at our border. This is a solution to many of the drivers that cause
people to leave their country and move north.’’ Do you agree with these senior mili-
tary leaders that we need a comprehensive civilian-military effort to tackle the chal-
lenges in the Northern Triangle and advance our security interests?
Admiral FALLER. I do strongly agree that the challenges facing our partners in
Central America are complex and require a comprehensive whole-of-government ef-
fort. Several factors contribute to individual or family units’ decision to migrate to
the United States. The United States Strategy for Engagement in Central America,
and Central America governments’ complimentary strategy, Alliance for Prosperity
broadens our vision for how we achieve security. The plans prioritize three inter-
connected objectives: prosperity, governance, and security. A secure, democratic, and
prosperous Central America will provide an environment in which all of its citizens
choose to remain and thrive.

40. Senator WARREN. Admiral Faller, what do you recommend that we do dif-
ferently to tackle the challenges in the Northern Triangle and advance our security
interests?
Admiral FALLER. The challenges in the Northern Triangle can be found all around
the region and would truly benefit from a sustained, whole-of-government approach
to address the threats and unlock the promise of this hemisphere. Getting our part-
ners in the game by training and equipping them through security cooperation pro-
grams like section 333, and professionalizing militaries through Defense Institution
Building is exactly the right approach. In order for us to be a reliable, trusted part-
ner, these security cooperation programs must be part of long-term strategic plans,
catered to the needs and capabilities of each country. This kind of out-year planning
would require increased, multi-year, consistent funding that protects against the in-
stability posed by things like government shutdowns and continuing resolutions.
Programs like IMET and FMF through the Department of State funding are also
a critical part of this holistic solution, as are economic development programs by
USAID and the newly developed U.S. International Development Finance Corpora-
tion (USIDFC), which is aimed at catalyzing market-based, private-sector develop-
ment, spurring economic growth in less-developed countries, and advancing the for-
eign policy interests of the United States.
63
41. Senator WARREN. Admiral Faller, new leaders in the Northern Triangle region
are taking responsibility for addressing migration to the United States. For exam-
ple, El Salvador’s new president is prioritizing tackling the root causes of migra-
tion—from corruption to poverty. However, in spite of these commitments, the U.S.
has not restored the majority of funding to the region that was cut off last spring.
Given the Administration’s focus on burden-sharing, are you concerned that con-
tinuing to withhold funding to the region could undermine efforts by these leaders,
who will need our support to bolster efforts to curb forced migration?
Admiral FALLER. In light of the administration’s policies toward the region, the
Department of Defense is permitted to fund security cooperation programs that di-
rectly impact the national security interests of the United States. This includes pro-
grams that address improving partner nation security forces to counter
transnational crime and secure porous borders. IMET, which is a critical tool in
building and strengthening relationships and partnerships in the region in the long
term, is also increasingly available. Both of these programs work in concert to en-
hance shared values and increase burden sharing throughout the region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DOUG JONES
SUCCESS IN COLOMBIA

42. Senator JONES. Admiral Faller, the United States has had some notable suc-
cess in helping Colombia develop its own security forces, who now help other coun-
tries develop theirs. Are there lessons from this relationship we can export to our
other train, advise, and assist missions?
Admiral FALLER. Colombia has invested a great deal of its own resources in treas-
ure and blood over the last two decades to achieve the successes you note. Signed
in 2000, Plan Colombia included both foreign and military assistance for Colombia.
It had a great deal of bipartisan support in the United States that has been strate-
gically sustained over the years. Efforts to assist Colombia were also international,
with the European Union supporting social and economic programs. This sustained
support has now enabled Colombia to export military and security training to seven
countries in the hemisphere.
The United States-Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security (USCAP) is a col-
laborative arrangement between the United States and Colombia to conduct security
cooperation capacity building training and investments in seven regional partner
nations. Since 2013, there have been over 500 engagements and a total of 6,200
partner nation personnel trained. Just one example of how Colombia is training
other nations through USCAP is the Regional Helicopter Training Center, which is
a Spanish language initial entry rotary wing qualification course located in Melgar,
Colombia. The center annually trains 50 Colombian military members and 24 Latin
American partner nation students.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton,
Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn,
Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King,
Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman INHOFE. The meeting will come to order.
I have already kind of explained the situation we have. You and
I are both going to waive our opening statements, as are our wit-
nesses. Then we get right into questions. I think we will be fine
with the votes coming up that way.
[Statement of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy as prepared
for delivery.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF GENERAL TERRENCE J.
O’SHAUGHNESSY, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES
NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE
DEFENSE COMMAND
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished
Members of the Committee: I am honored to be here today and to
serve as the commander of U.S. Northern Command and North
American Aerospace Defense Command. I am also pleased to tes-
tify alongside Admiral Chas Richard. Chas and his team at
STRATCOM have been outstanding partners every step of the way.
I will keep my remarks brief this morning, and I would ask that
my full written statement be entered into the record.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are charged with executing the Na-
tional Defense Strategy’s number one objective: Defend the Home-
land.
(65)
66

Our adversaries have watched, learned, and invested to offset
our strengths while exploiting our weaknesses. They have dem-
onstrated patterns of behavior that indicate their capability, capac-
ity and intent to hold our Homeland at risk below the nuclear
threshold.
The changing security envirnoment makes it clear that the Arctic
is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective
moats. They are now avenues of approach, which highlights the in-
crease in adversary presence in the Arctic.
We need to invest in a capable and persistent defense that can
deter adversaries, protect critical infrastructure, enable power pro-
jection forward and prevent Homeland vulnerabilities.
To deter, detect, and defeat the threats arrayed against the
Homeland today, USNORTHCOM and NORAD are transforming
our commands and our way of thinking. We cannot defend the Na-
tion against 21st century threats with 20th Century technology. We
must be able to outpace our adversaries using a layered defense in-
fused with our latest technology.
As such, our layered defense needs to establish awareness in all
domains, from below the oceans to the highest levels of space, in-
cluding the unseen cyber domain, which are all at risk. We need
a layered sensing grid, with sensors in all domains, to detect and
track threats from their point of origin.
It requires the ability to discriminate between ballistic missiles,
advanced cruise missiles, hypersonics and small unmanned aerial
systems at the full ranges from which they are employed as well
as the platforms from which they are delivered.
We need an adaptable architecture for Joint All-Domain Com-
mand and Control, capable of fusing a myriad of sensors across the
globe into accurate, decision-quality threat information, and at the
speed of relevance for effective command and control.
Lastly, we need the ability to deploy defeat mechanisms capable
of neutralizing advanced weapons systems in order to defend the
Homeland. We have put great effort into these areas, such as bal-
listic missile defense, and the need also exists to agressively defeat
additional threats, to include the ever-growing cyber and cruise
missile threat.
Consistent with these concepts, we are changing how we engage
with industry. We are in partnership with the Defense industry to
harness emerging technologies and also collaborate with the com-
mercial industry to leverage existing and rapidly advancing tech-
nology in order to apply them to our current Homeland defense
problem sets.
We have shared our toughest challenges with a wide array of in-
dustry partners, ranging from traditional large defense companies
to small and new commercial start-ups, so they can plug into our
Homeland defense system of systems. we have received an over-
whelming response from industry and we are optimistic. However,
more needs to be done to keep pace with the advancing threats to
our Homeland. We need to ensure we have complete awareness of
what is happening in and around our great Nation and have the
ability to defeat all threats.
In line with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and to capture
our sense of urgency, we have declared 2020 as the year of Home-
67

land defense. We are mindful of the gravity of our mission and of
the trust that you have placed in us. You and the Committee
should have great faith in the men and women at USNORTHCOM
and NORAD because together, we have the watch. Thank you for
your support and I look forward to your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL TERRENCE J. O’SHAUGHNESSY
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PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
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So that being the case, we will go ahead and just start with ques-
tions. I only have one that I really wanted to get to. I talked to
both of you guys on other occasions about this, but what we ran
up against—and this was kind of a surprise to a lot of us—the
NNSA’s [National Nuclear Security Administration] primary job is
to build the nuclear warheads to meet the requirements of the De-
partment of Defense (DOD). Earlier this year when we heard that
the NNSA budget had been cut, we called the DOD and asked
them what they thought, and to my surprise, when I got a hold of
them, they said they did not know because they do not get it until
after such time as—actually I think Energy gets it first, and so
they did not have it. I am not sure how it happened.
Then I went back and I have talked to you folks about it. What
are you really able to do if you do not hear about what the budget
is before it is already signed off or in the process of being con-
cluded? That is something we have a concern about.
Then it reminded me back when I was first elected—and that
was when David Boren had this job, and he called me. I remember
this. This was way back in 1994. He called me up and he said,
well, Inhofe, there is something I have been trying to get done for
a long time and I failed. Maybe you can do it, and it was correcting
this very problem that we are pointing out right now. So we may
be addressing this.
So the question I would ask you is do you agree this thing ought
to be changed. You got to be in on this thing to know—you remem-
ber what we did earlier this year. We had to go in and talk to the
President because they had dropped the budget down about 8 per-
cent on NNSA, and nobody was aware of it except the Department
of Energy. So we went and talked to the President and had a meet-
ing, and we brought it back up to just under the 20 figure. So that
is what happened there.
Do the two of you agree that this is something that needs to be
corrected after all these years?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, one, I applaud yours and the Com-
mittee’s leadership in addressing the necessary resources for the
nuclear weapons complex. That, along with nuclear command and
control and recapitalization of the triad systems, are essential for
maintaining strategic deterrence, which is foundational to every-
thing else we do inside the Defense Department.
Chairman, you are well aware of the responsibility of the Nu-
clear Weapons Council to certify NNSA’s budget, and I have a role
in providing a recommendation to the Nuclear Weapons Council to
that end.
Chairman INHOFE. Okay.
Admiral RICHARD. If there are weaknesses—and you described
one—in terms of our ability in a timely manner to do that, that is
something that I will take up with the Secretary to address how
we might be able to do that better.
Chairman INHOFE. Why do we not do this for the record? We will
just start this discussion going and not try to do it under the
timelines we are dealing with today.
So I will go ahead. I had one other area to bring up. Last sum-
mer, the Missile Defense Agency canceled their program to mod-
ernize the ground-based interceptors that were up in Alaska due to
116

technical failures. The next generation interceptor, then, we find
will not likely be fielded until 2030. I think that would be a good
thing for you to answer on the record as to what about that gap,
can we handle that gap, because everyone up here is going to be
interested in that. Okay?
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richard, I am terribly concerned that there has been no
significant effort to extend the New START [Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Treaty] agreement with Russia. Do you believe that New
START treaty gives you critical value in planning strategic con-
cerns based upon on-site inspections and deck relations, and if it
is not extended, you will be at a disadvantage?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, as you know, New START treaty has
been valuable to this Nation and to my command. The Russians
are largely compliant with it. It does have the benefit of not only
limiting the total number of strategic weapons to both nations’ ben-
efit, and it has the transparency and confidence-building measures
that you just described, all of which has been good for deterrence.
However, it does not address a very large class of weapons that
the Russians have a significant advantage in. It does not constrain
novel systems, and it is a bilateral treaty.
Ultimately a decision to extend a treaty is a political decision. I
do provide best military advice down the lines of what I just offered
to my department to contribute to that.
Senator REED. But if we do not do this, we will lose a great deal
in terms of deterrence, in terms of, just as I mentioned previously,
signaling for the first time in 40-plus years there is no arms control
regime in the world, and that could lead to proliferation, not just
eroded relationships between Russia and the United States.
Thank you, Admiral. I just want to—in the context of moving
quickly.
General O’Shaughnessy, one of the issues that came up in our
discussions and also in your testimony is the threat of cruise mis-
siles to the United States. We are configured pretty well since the
1950s for ballistic missiles, but cruise missiles and other
hypersonic weapon systems are more challenging.
Give us an idea of what you think you need to be effective to deal
with this cruise missile threat.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Thank you, Senator, for highlighting
that important threat that we have facing us today as a Nation
and something that we really have to invest in in order to maintain
our competitive advantage and our ability to defend this great Na-
tion over time.
Specifically, I think as we look at the way we have been ap-
proaching the threats we have been looking and from the ballistic
missile standpoint and then cruise missiles, kind of UASs—and I
think we have to look at this more holistically, and really we need
domain awareness over our entire territory and the approaches to
it. Then if we are able to have that domain awareness with sensors
from the undersea all the way up through space, we can then take
that to be able to defend ourselves against all the threats, to in-
clude the cruise missile threat that you mentioned.
Some of the things that we are doing right now to get after that,
as an example in this year’s budget, we are increasing our domain
117

awareness capability with sensors within the National Capital Re-
gion. For example, with our wide area surveillance program, we
have money this year for over the horizon radars that will not only
be helpful for cruise missile threats but also hypersonic threats. We
also have funding in place for some additional radars to give us the
ability to truly see and understand the domain on the approaches
to us.
But this is just a start. Senator, what I would say is we have to
invest into the future in understanding what is happening in and
around our territory and really understanding our ability to have
defeat mechanisms that can defeat these proliferated threats such
as the cruise missiles.
Senator REED. Thank you very much.
I yield back all my time.
[Laughter.]
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Fischer?
Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richard, your opening statement refers to an increase in
both Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. On page 4, it states that
China is likely to double the size of their stockpile by the end of
this decade. On page 5, it states that Russia’s overall nuclear stock-
pile is, ‘‘likely to grow significantly over the next decade.’’
Does our current program of record for modernization expand our
nuclear forces?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, it does not. We do not seek parity. It
is not only in the statement in terms of what they are going to do,
we could also back up and look at what Russia in particular has
been doing over the last 15 years to expand and modernize her ar-
senal, all while we just extended life-extended systems that we al-
ready have.
So the recapitalization that we are asking for is one-for-one. We
do not seek more. We do not seek a greater number. We simply
seek a sufficient number of capabilities to enable us to achieve na-
tional objectives.
Senator FISCHER. I have been struck by the reception that this
budget has gotten. Earlier this week, a New York Times column
summed up the budget’s investment in nuclear modernization by
saying, ‘‘the President’s spending proposal requests money for a
new arms race with Russia and with China and restores nuclear
weapons as central to military policy.’’
The truth is actually the opposite of that. There is no policy
change, as you stated, that relates to nuclear weapons in this budg-
et, and it is Russia and China that are expanding their arsenals
while we are not. Is that correct?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, I must confess the whole concept that
we are starting an arms race baffles me in terms of no nation has
done more than the United States to reduce the reliance on nuclear
weapons. No nation has divested more nuclear weapons than the
United States has. We have waited 15 years in some cases to the
absolute limits of what our systems will go before we simply sought
to replace like for like inside our triad. So I do not understand
where the concept of an arms race comes in, and you are absolutely
correct, ma’am.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you.
118

On page 12 of your prepared remarks, you state, ‘‘our nuclear de-
terrent underwrites every U.S. military operation around the world
and is the foundation and backstop of our national defense. I can-
not overemphasize the need to modernize our nuclear forces and re-
capitalize the supporting infrastructure to ensure we can maintain
this deterrent in the future. I am concerned that the oft-repeated
message of the need to modernize and recapitalize has lost its im-
pact and that collectively we have under-estimated the risks associ-
ated with such a complex and time-constrained modernization and
recapitalization effort. Even seemingly small issues can have a dis-
proportionate impact on the force. We cannot afford more delays
and uncertainty in delivering capabilities and must maintain a
focus on revitalizing our nuclear forces and the associated infra-
structure.’’
I really appreciate your candor on this. As you know, we continue
to hear calls to slow down, to cut funding, and to reexamine issues
that have already been studied numerous times. I appreciate your
clear description of the urgency that we have.
Do you have anything you would like to add to that?
Admiral RICHARD. No, ma’am, other than——
Senator FISCHER. I took the words right out of your mouth.
Admiral RICHARD. Yes, ma’am. We chose those very carefully to
accurately describe the situation this Nation faces. These capabili-
ties are foundational to our survival as a Nation. It is a great cred-
it that we have been able to take the—it is a once every other gen-
eration responsibility to recapitalize the strategic deterrent. We
had wise leaders back in the 1980s who saw the need for this—
leadership and resources. We have benefited with no nuclear use
for up to 42 years in some cases with particular weapon systems,
no great power war, and the return on investment that we
achieved—the submarine is a great example, designed for 30 years.
We thought that was what we were going to get. In fact, you wind
up getting 42. What a credit to the people that designed it, built
it, operated it, that we were able to take it out as far as we can.
But in the submarine’s case, we are literally reaching physics and
engineering limits such that you cannot extend it. You can only
take a piece of high-strength steel, pressurize it at great depths,
then take that pressure back off before you just do not want to get
in the tube anymore. That is the limits that we have reached, and
it is our turn to provide that leadership for the next 40 or 50 years
to give them the benefits that we have already received.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you.
Thank you, General O’Shaughnessy, for your meeting with me
yesterday. I would commend to my colleagues that they also con-
tact you to have a classified briefing on what we need to do with
our cruise missiles. Thank you, sir.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Fischer,
Since a quorum is now present, I ask the Committee to consider
two civilian nominations and a list of 871 pending military nomina-
tions. All the nominations have been before the Committee the re-
quired length of time.
First, I ask the Committee to consider the nomination of James
McPherson to be Under Secretary of the Army and Charles Wil-
119

liams to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installa-
tions, and Environment.
Is there a motion to favorably report these two civilian nomina-
tions out?
Senator REED. So moved.
Chairman INHOFE. Is there a second?
Senator FISCHER. Second.
Chairman INHOFE. Any opposition?
[No response.]
Chairman INHOFE. That does pass.
Finally I ask the Committee to consider a list of 871 pending
military nominations. Is there a motion to favorably report these
871?
Senator SHAHEEN. So moved.
Senator FISCHER. Second.
Chairman INHOFE. Second.
All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman INHOFE. Opposed?
[No response.]
Chairman INHOFE. It carries.
[The information referred to follows:]

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDER-
ATION ON FEBRUARY 13, 2020.
1. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander
(Colin R. Young) (Reference No. 1224)
2. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel
(Mario A. Ortega) (Reference No. 1378)
3. LTG Thomas A. Bussiere, USAF to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (Reference No. 1386)
4. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Joseph R. Harris II) (Reference No.
1387)
5. BG Billy M. Nabors, ANG to be major general (Reference No. 1388)
6. In the Air Force Reserve there are 24 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with AnnMarie K. Anthony) (Reference
No. 1389)
7. In the Air Force Reserve there are 14 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Dann S. Carlson) (Reference No.
1391)
8. In the Air Force Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Steven J. deMilliano) (Reference No.
1392)
9. BG Andrew J. MacDonald, ANG to be major general (Reference No.
1393)
10. In the Air Force Reserve there are 11 appointments to the grade of
major general (list begins with Todd M. Audet) (Reference No. 1394)
11. BG Christopher E. Finerty, ANG to be major general (Reference No.
1395)
12. In the Air Force Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
general (Joseph B. Wilson) (Reference No. 1396)
13. Col. Ronald F. Taylor, ARNG to be brigadier general (Reference No.
1398)
14. BG Aaron R. Dean II, ARNG to be major general (Reference No. 1399)
15. BG Michael S. Martin, USMCR to be major general (Reference No.
1401)
16. In the Marine Corps Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade
of brigadier general (list begins with Douglas K. Clark) (Reference
No. 1403)
120
17. LTG Jacqueline D. Van Ovost, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Commander, Air Mobility Command (Reference No. 1441)
18. In the Air Force there are 5 appointments to be major (list begins with Josh-
ua E. Erlandsen) (Reference No. 1443)
19. In the Air Force there are 44 appointments to be lieutenant colonel (list be-
gins with Matthew G. Adkins) (Reference No. 1444)
20. In the Air Force there are 31 appointments to be lieutenant colonel (list be-
gins with Jenara L. Allen) (Reference No. 1445)
21. In the Air Force there are 129 appointments to be lieutenant colonel (list be-
gins with Daniel J. Adams) (Reference No. 1446)
22. In the Air Force there are 18 appointments to be colonel (list begins with Jen-
nifer R. Bein) (Reference No. 1447)
23. In the Air Force there are 55 appointments to be colonel (list begins with
Wesley M. Abadie) (Reference No. 1448)
24. In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to be major (list begins with Lior
Aljadeff) (Reference No. 1449)
25. In the Air Force there are 294 appointments to be major (list begins with
Jason K. Adams) (Reference No. 1450)
26. In the Air Force there are 52 appointments to be lieutenant colonel (list be-
gins with Victoria M. Aglewilson) (Reference No. 1451)
27. In the Air Force there are 2 appointments to be major (list begins with
Junelene M. Bungay) (Reference No. 1452)
28. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel (Christopher
J. Nastal) (Reference No. 1453)
29. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Alexander Khutoryan)
(Reference No. 1454)
30. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Daniel S. Kim) (Ref-
erence No. 1455)
31. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to be major (Marilyn L. Smith) (Ref-
erence No. 1456)
32. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel (Zachary J.
Conly) (Reference No. 1457)
33. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Audrey J. Dean) (Reference
No. 1458)
34. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to be colonel (Michael W.
Brancamp) (Reference No. 1459)
35. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Tracy J. Brown) (Reference
No. 1460)
36. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Kenneth A. Wieder) (Ref-
erence No. 1461)
37. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel (Chong K. Yi)
(Reference No. 1462)
38. In the Army Reserve there are 11 appointments to be colonel (list begins with
John C. Benson) (Reference No. 1467)
39. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Ross C. Puffer) (Reference
No. 1468)
40. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Amanda G. Luschinski) (Ref-
erence No. 1469)
41. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (June E. Osavio) (Reference
No. 1470)
42. In the Army there are 2 appointments to be major (list begins with Yasmin
J. Alter) (Reference No. 1471)
43. In the Army there are 3 appointments to be lieutenant colonel (list begins
with Otha J. Holmes) (Reference No. 1472)
44. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to be colonel (Shaun P. Miller)
(Reference No. 1473)
45. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to be major (Keith A. Stevenson)
(Reference No. 1474)
46. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Krista H. Clarke) (Reference
No. 1475)
47. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be colonel (Peter K. Marlin) (Reference
No. 1476)
48. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (Angela I. Iyanobor) (Ref-
erence No. 1477)
49. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant colonel (John J. Landers)
(Reference No. 1478)
50. In the Army there is 1 appointment to be major (David P. Frommer) (Ref-
erence No. 1479)
121
51. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant commander (Catherine
M. Dickinson) (Reference No. 1480)
52. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be commander (Donald A. Sinitiere)
(Reference No. 1481)
53. In the Navy there are 61 appointments to be captain and below (list begins
with Stephen W. Aldridge) (Reference No. 1483)
54. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be captain (Paul J. Kaylor) (Reference
No. 1484)
55. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to be lieutenant commander (Andrew S.
Jackson) (Reference No. 1485)
56. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list begins with
Joseph P. Ball) (Reference No. 1489)
57. In the Marine Corps there are 5 appointments to be major (list begins with
Donald K. Brown) (Reference No. 1490)
58. In the Marine Corps there are 4 appointments to be major (list begins with
Christina L. Hudson) (Reference No. 1491)
59. In the Marine Corps there are 2 appointments to be major (list begins with
James M. Shipman) (Reference No. 1492)
60. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to be major (Christopher L. Kai-
ser) (Reference No. 1493)
61. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list begins with
Peter T. Graham) (Reference No. 1494)
62. In the Marine Corps there are 3 appointments to be major (list begins with
Daniel E. Fuson) (Reference No. 1495)
TOTAL: 871
Now, for those who may have come in a little bit late, we are
waiving opening statements. We are going to get right to the ques-
tions, and we are going to adhere to the 5-minute rule. Thank you
very much.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here and for your service.
I want to follow up on Senator Reed’s question about the New
START treaty because, as he pointed out, we are less than a year
from its expiration. We could extend it for 5 years without going
through a whole Senate confirmation process, and it seems to me—
while I recognize the concern that you expressed, Admiral Richard,
that I have heard from other sources about the fact that it does not
encompass a number of other weapons. The fact is we could extend
it and work on those other weapons at the same time without los-
ing the important information that we are currently getting from
New START.
So I wonder if you could describe how STRATCOM uses informa-
tion from New START such as through inspections and data ex-
changes as you look at your day-to-day planning.
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, so that insight gives us a much bet-
ter idea of what the threat level is from that particular class of
weapon systems are, which enables us to do a very calculated and
thorough job of determining exactly how we deter the use of that,
all very valuable and helpful. So I would desire to keep those at-
tributes.
But I am also required to do the same thing on the parts that
are not included in the treaty. So better for me if we could down
a path to address all of that.
Senator SHAHEEN. Sure. But if we do not extend New START
and it expires next February, you lose that information. Is that cor-
rect?
Admiral RICHARD. That is correct, Senator.
122

Senator SHAHEEN. I think this is probably for General
O’Shaughnessy. Last August, 33 airmen from New Hampshire’s Air
National Guard spent several weeks on a remote Alaskan island
near the Bering Sea. I am sorry Senator Sullivan is not here be-
cause they were part of a rotating group of airmen and guardsmen
who were helping to build a new home for a group of indigenous
people who have been displaced due to rising sea levels.
Can you talk about what you see from climate change and what
we are doing to try and shore up our infrastructure and to be pre-
pared for the challenges we are going to face as climate change in-
creases and creates more of these kinds of situations?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Senator, what I would talk to is the
importance of the Arctic and specifically in this case Alaska not
only, as you mentioned, with increased activity and the things that
we are seeing and some problems with erosion that are very real—
they are real from both a military aspect, as well as, of course, as
you mentioned, the indigenous population.
One of the things that we try to do is we partner, as you men-
tioned, with organizations that are tied to the indigenous people—
for example, Tulikika and AFN has been a great partner—because
I think we have common challenges of which we might have com-
mon solutions. We went to Barrow, for example, and saw some of
the erosion as the ice has melted and now the waves are hitting
the shore. That affects us and some of our radar installations just
as much as it effects the local village, and so we are trying to part-
ner with the local communities to truly understand what is hap-
pening and the impacts.
But we also see it because simultaneously this is a critical part
for us for the defense of our Homeland. If you look at it as an ave-
nue of approach and we see the Arctic as an avenue of approach
to our Homeland that we need to be able to defend, and we need
to be able to operate out of. Therefore, you need infrastructure. You
need the ability to actually bring your force in and sustain a force.
You need to be able to communicate. You need to actually under-
stand what is happening in that domain and have the domain
awareness.
These are very similar. We find multiple opportunities in some
of the forums that we have led with our partners in both industry,
local populations, local communities, all the way down to the vil-
lages that we find these common approaches that we might be able
to solve. We are working, for example, in communications that
might help us with the proliferation of LEO [low Earth orbit]. That
would bring communication not only to us as a military but even
to the remotest villages.
Senator SHAHEEN. So, as you are looking at preparing budgets
for future years, how are you factoring in the cost of those infra-
structure needs that we have as we are seeing the impacts of cli-
mate change?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. So what we are doing is we are trying
to look at the infrastructure that we need, the infrastructure that
we need to be able to defend our nation. This is actually not just
with the United States We are working in partnership with Can-
ada, and especially with my NORAD hat on, we are very interested
in similar issues that we see from the Canadian front of having an
123

infrastructure in place throughout the Arctic that will give us the
ability to defend our nation. In doing so, we have to have the sus-
tainability of that infrastructure going into the future.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Ernst?
Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
Admiral Richard, I will start with you as we continue the discus-
sion about modernization. As has been discussed, the ground-based
strategic deterrent will replace the Minuteman III as the sole inter-
continental ballistic missile starting about the mid-2020s. Congress
has appropriated the funds to do that for this fiscal year.
But while the GBSD will enter service this decade, the Air Force
will continue to sustain the Minuteman III into the 2030s. This is
an old program from the 1970s, and I think some of the silos date
back to maybe even the 1960s. I am concerned about failure to
modernize with our nuclear deterrent, and I think that in the long
run, this will be a lot more costly and makes it a risky gamble with
our national survival.
So just if you can, how are we balancing the maintenance issues
that will occur as we continue to hold onto the Minuteman III and
talk a little bit about that. Are you confident then that as we move
into the new system, that the timeline is suitable as a deterrent?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, the short answer is yes. It is yet an-
other example of why we have no margin left in terms of the need
to recapitalize. In terms of sustainment of Minuteman III, I am not
sure that it is often recognized the extraordinary levels the Air
Force went to to be able to accomplish that. Unlike a submarine,
which is designed to have depot level maintenance, the Minuteman
III was not. It was designed to serve for a certain period of time
and get replaced, and the Air Force went in after the fact and fig-
ured out how to take that and get a depot maintenance capability
retrofitted into the weapon system that will then enable it to go till
the crossover point. I think it is a great credit to the Air Force they
were able to accomplish that. That is what gives me confidence,
provided no further delay in GBSD, that this will work.
Senator ERNST. Well, God bless the Air Force, you know, their
extraordinary effort, and it just points to the fact, though, that as
Congress, we need to be aware of these issues and make sure that
we stay on top of it.
General O’Shaughnessy, thank you for being here.
I am going to redirect and talk about something that has not
been brought up yet.
At the SOUTHCOM posture hearing, I asked Admiral Faller
about challenges with COCOM and interagency coordination to
stop the flow of drugs and human trafficking over our southern
border and entering into the United States. It is surprising but my
home State of Iowa really sees one of the highest rates of human
trafficking, and I know that there are many colleagues here that
have those same concerns and same issues in their home States.
We have also felt the pain and the pressure of illicit drugs that
enter into the stream in our States.
124

What I would like to hear from you is thoughts on how that
interagency coordination is going, the collaboration that you might
have with SOUTHCOM, and what are the efforts that we see to
push back on some of the flows of drugs and human trafficking?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for high-
lighting that.
One of the things that we do find is a very strong collaboration
amongst the interagency. I think it starts with the Interdiction
Committee and that is led, of course, by the Drug Czar and Admi-
ral Schultz as the co-chairs, but it brings the entire interagency to-
gether with respect to the counternarcotics, counterdrug, and the
transnational organized crime and the aspects of that. It is a great
forum of which we all get together. Admiral Faller is there, as well
as myself, to really bring the team together, if you will.
In addition, as you mentioned, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM
have a great relationship. In fact, Admiral Faller is actually my
cousin, as it turns out. So there is a great relationship there.
Senator ERNST. Okay, good. Sounds a lot like Iowa.
[Laughter.]
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. We see that we clearly have to work to-
gether as we do this.
We actually went down together to Mexico City to meet with the
Mexican leadership and especially looking at SEDENA and SAM-
ARA and the great work that they are doing to help with both the
migration flow and the counternarcotics problem.
Then we went right from there to Guatemala, and we were able
to work with the local Guatemalan officials and really see how do
we stem this flow and how do we get to the roots to be able stem
that flow.
I think it is those kind of relationships and working together
that is important, but is also important what we are doing on our
actual border, and as you know, we are very active with respect to
some of the work that we are doing to provide assistance. We are
the lead Federal Agency but we provide great assistance because
we see this as a national crisis, 68,000 to 69,000 Americans killed
last year. That is something that we have to be a part of the solu-
tion, and we are. We flew over 5,000 hours in support of that last
year, over 2,000 man-days of intelligence analysis. It is one of the
things I think we bring as the military, that we can bring that ex-
pertise and bring that right to our interagency partners. We con-
tinue to find those areas where we can bring that value to the
interagency process.
Senator ERNST. I appreciate it so much. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here and thank you for your service.
Admiral, thanks particularly for your enormous contribution to
our submarine force. I assume you continue to share the Navy’s
strategy and support it to achieve 66 submarines by 2048.
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, I do.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. I am somewhat disquieted, even dismayed
by the apparent change of pace in construction reflected in this
budget, dropping one of the submarines that was planned for this
125

year at the Electric Boat shipyard. Do you share that concern that
we may be falling off the necessary pace?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, one, I am pleased that Navy is main-
taining the highest priority on the Columbia-class submarine,
which directly supports my mission set, and beyond that, I think
that is just indicative of the difficult budget choices that Navy and
the whole Department of Defense are having to make.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. But those budget choices reflect priorities,
and the Virginia-class—and I agree with you completely about the
Columbia-class and there is a lot of progress in the budget in that
regard. But the Virginia-class is essential to our undersea superi-
ority. Is it not?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, the Virginia-class submarine is the
finest submarine in the world.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. We want to continue to build more of
them.
Admiral RICHARD. Absolutely, sir.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. In that regard, I want to ask about
hypersonic missiles which in your testimony you say, ‘‘ensure our
deterrence and conventional power remains strong in the future.’’
Are you satisfied with the investment that we are making in
hypersonic missiles, given the Russians and the Chinese investing
so heavily in them? That can be a question for both of you.
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, what I will start with, because there
are two ways to answer—there are two aspects to your question.
One is offensive use of hypersonics by us, plus there is a defensive
piece, and I remind everybody the Russians have publicly reported
that they have hypersonics on alert now. This is a very real thing.
My command has had a longstanding requirement for conven-
tional prompt strike. Hypersonic technologies would be an ideal
way to go accomplish that, and I think that enables me to better
deter threats to this nation. Also, I have responsibility for global
strike already inside the Department of Defense, and I think we
would be an ideal command because we have concepts, command,
and control ready to go to use that to the best advantage.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are you satisfied, though, that we are in-
vesting sufficiently in all of the aspects of hypersonics both offen-
sive——
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, I am. I was actually very pleased in
the priority. It is in line with the National Defense Strategy in
terms of the priority that this budget submission puts in that and
a couple of other technical areas.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are you concerned about a developing po-
tential arms race in hypersonics?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, no. Again, it is do you have sufficient
capability, technologies to meet our national objectives. I think we
are on pace to do that.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Senator, I would highlight on the de-
fensive side, one of the key aspects I think is the space sensing
layer and the importance that we invest in that and continue to in-
vest, which we are and this budget includes that. But we need to
continue to invest in that space sensing layer because as we go
from a ballistic missile to a hypersonic glide vehicle, for instance,
it really changes the problem of maintaining custody of that weap-
126

on system throughout its entire flight, and the best way to get at
that is the space sensing layer. So I strongly endorse continued in-
vestment in that for a defensive.
It is also about awareness because unlike a ballistic missile
where you know where it is going, the hypersonic glide vehicle—
you do not necessarily know because it has the energy and the abil-
ity to maneuver. We have to be able to keep track of that, and so
I can give the warning to Admiral Richard so he knows where that
is going from the NORTHCOM and NORAD perspective.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I agree with you that it introduces
a potential game-changing technology and new challenges in terms
of both defense and deterrence and offense, and I would like to ask
for more information perhaps in a classified setting if we can ar-
range a briefing.
I am also going to submit for the record, because we are adhering
strictly to time limits, questions on the threats posed by cyber. I
understand there was a recent cybersecurity conference that in-
volved the National Guard, which I would like to learn more about,
and also troops at the border. So I will be submitting questions for
the record on those two topics.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you very much.
Senator Cotton?
Senator COTTON. Admiral Richard, I want to return to the budg-
et for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The Presi-
dent’s budget has it at just under $20 billion. Are you confident
that that is a sufficient number to proceed with nuclear moderniza-
tion?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator Cotton, the short answer is yes. There
is not a lot of excess margin that number, but it is sufficient.
I will also offer that I have a very close relationship with NNSA.
I just spoke to Ms. Gordon-Hagerty actually yesterday in a con-
tinuing series. I would point to that as an example of us making
sure that she has the right resources.
Senator COTTON. And if you take the warhead modernization
program on the one hand and you take the triad modernization—
the delivery systems on the other hand, that is also a number that
is satisfactory to keep those two things integrated over the next
several years?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, yes, again with no extra margin. I
would throw in nuclear command and control as the third piece of
that that also needs to be synchronized.
Senator COTTON. I would as well given the fact that we have
woefully—woefully—undercapitalized our nuclear command and
control and infrastructure over the last many decades.
The one thing I hear you say, not much excess margin. To the
extent that Congress does not meet that budget number of just
under $20 billion, would we be introducing more risk into those
programs for every dollar that we go below it?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, yes, and in fact, we are close enough
into this recapitalization that we can also give you a number where
you start to see points of no return, and they are not that far off.
They are in the early 2030s, that if we do not recapitalize now, we
simply lose the fundamental infrastructure and capacity that if we
127

cross over, you cannot recover for like a decade no matter how
much money you put at it. Those points are starting to come into
view.
Senator COTTON. General O’Shaughnessy, I want to talk about
the Wuhan coronavirus. It is the Wuhan coronavirus, not some po-
litically correct name that a bunch of politically correct bureaucrats
at the World Health Organization have come up with, to give you
a sense of their misplaced priorities.
You were recently directed in your role as Commander of the
Northern Command to begin prudent planning for a potential pan-
demic. I think it is very prudent to begin prudent planning. So
could you talk us through what the role for Northern Command
would be in such a situation and the extent to which you have al-
ready begun planning or even exercises for that scenario?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, sir. So, Senator, what we are
doing first and the immediate actions we have taken have been in
support of Health and Human Services with respect to housing
some Americans coming home, and I think right now we have over
600 still in our facilities in support of both the State Department
bringing their folks home, as well as HHS. That has been going ex-
tremely well, and we appreciate the close coordination through the
interagency to make that happen. It also is tied to 11 airports, of
which we have facilities that are on standby in coordination with
both the Department of Homeland Security, as well as HHS and
CDC, as you would imagine. The ongoing collaboration continues to
make sure we are part of the support structure that we would have
here within the United States to be able to respond to this virus.
Now, to your point about the global aspects of this and our role
as NORTHCOM, we are, as you would expect, doing the appro-
priate prudent military planning to ensure that we are able to re-
spond. The types of things that we are doing is, for example, we
are running a BTC every single day and that includes representa-
tives from all around the globe, all the geographic combatant com-
mands that are in there to make sure that we see what is hap-
pening within their regions and that we are centrally managing
that from our headquarters in NORTHCOM.
We have plans in place, as you would imagine, that look for what
is the scope that this could go to potentially and making sure that
we are not caught by surprise.
Both our role that we are doing in the day-to-day is very much
informative to the role that we are doing for the planning and mak-
ing sure that we are prepared for the worst case scenario that
might happen and make sure we are doing that globally not just
here in the United States.
Senator COTTON. Thank you, General. I think we are still at only
14 cases in the United States that have been confirmed by public
health authorities.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. That is correct, sir.
Senator COTTON. Let us hope that remains the case. I think we
are in a much better position than we were a few weeks ago when
we had 20,000 people landing in the United States from mainland
China every single day. So I commend the President and the ad-
ministration for the travel ban put in place.
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But there are still around a million and a half Americans who
traveled from—or a million and a half persons who traveled from
mainland China starting in mid-November until the travel ban
went into place. So we have even a fraction of what China re-
ported, just overnight, 14,000 cases, which I should add were not
newly discovered cases or the result of new scientific break-
throughs, but a political decision to finally start getting a little bit
closer to the truth. Obviously, it is going to put a lot of emphasis
and stress on the mission and the planning that you and your peo-
ple have been doing. So thank you for that.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Heinrich?
Senator HEINRICH. Admiral Richard, congratulations on your as-
sumption of command, and I would remiss if I did not invite you
back to Sandia and Los Alamos. I know you have been there before.
But during your confirmation hearing, you agreed that restoring
plutonium pit production at Los Alamos is the military’s top pri-
ority. However, in your answer you also stated that there are
issues. Now that you have had a little time to work with NNSA
and get up to speed on that, I would like to ask you to articulate
what the specific issues and impediments are that you see in meet-
ing the current goals.
Admiral RICHARD. Well, Senator, when I talked about the weap-
ons complex infrastructure, the plutonium pit would be the first
thing that I would call attention to in terms of our nation’s ability
to generate that number of pits that is essential simply for the
sustainment programs that we desire to go do. The concern actu-
ally again was funding. Step one is to provide adequate resources.
I am very confident, particularly in the near term at Los Alamos,
that with adequate funding we can deliver 30 pits per year by
2026, and I continue to work with NNSA and Ms. Gordon-Hagerty
to make sure the longer-term plan is also—I have equal confidence
in that.
Senator HEINRICH. One of my concerns with regard to that is if
we are going to do pit production at two locations and the intellec-
tual capital is currently pretty much all at Los Alamos, not losing,
not poaching that capital to a second facility before we actually get
job number one done. Do you share those concerns?
Admiral RICHARD. Well, Senator, not only do I share them, but
it is in the weapons complex and other areas writ large, do we have
enough talent to be able to accomplish what we have to go do.
So I work with Ms. Gordon-Hagerty closely on her stack of re-
sponsibilities with regard to that, as well as we do a number of
things at United States Strategic Command to bring talent into the
strategic deterrence area at large. I can give you a longer answer
for a question for the record. But, for example, we have an aca-
demic alliance with over 70 colleges and universities where we are
trying to encourage people to come in and develop expertise in na-
tional security strategic deterrence, and the weapons complex bene-
fits from that.
Senator HEINRICH. As you have articulated, we are pushing up
against very thin margins on all three parts of the triad. What are
the consequences for your command if any one of those legs experi-
ences a significant delay? And if that were to occur, how would you
rebalance?
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Admiral RICHARD. Senator, one, I thank you for that question.
I think we all well know the commanders of Strategic Command
have been repeatedly asked that question over time. Part of how
we got to the point that we are at was by doing operational mitiga-
tions to make up for lack of earlier decisions to recapitalize.
We are very close to turning that rheostat about as far as it is
going to go. So the last remaining things that I have—and you can
refer to them as a hedge. Sometimes that is more thought of for
the weapons complex. But the triad itself was built with an over-
lapping, interlocking set of attributes that are very complementary,
and each leg makes up for the weaknesses in the other leg.
I would get to the point where I—basically that is called inter-
leg hedging. I would have to start taking the attributes of the triad
apart, and I will lose attributes along the way. So I can cross-cover
with one piece of the triad on another, but I may lose the surviv-
ability of the ballistic missile submarines. I may lose the flexibility
and signaling for the bombers. That is about what is left for us to
do.
Senator HEINRICH. Moving on real quick, I do not have a lot of
time left. But you are familiar with my interest in hypersonics and
more broadly in just maintaining the R&D focus to have a third
offset, whether that is through the lens of hypersonics or directed
energy or, for that matter, artificial intelligence.
We are seeing a big bump in this budget in the area of
hypersonics. It is a $3.2 billion overall number. It is a 23 percent
increase. How is that money going to be spent so that when you
are scaling, that you are still efficient and spending it wisely?
Admiral RICHARD. Well, Senator, that question would be best an-
swered by the services that are responsible. All of them are work-
ing on it. I am pleased with the progress. I am working to make
sure that when that capability is delivered, I am ready to receive
it with concepts of operation and command and control, being able
to immediately put it to use defending the nation.
Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Scott?
Senator SCOTT. First, thank you both for your service.
General O’Shaughnessy, I think we have all been following what
Communist China has been doing around the world. I am from
Florida, and so everybody in Florida is clearly watching what is
happening in Latin America, especially Communist China’s in-
volvement in Venezuela but even in other countries with their in-
vestments. What they are trying to do is build relationships and
make people dependent on them.
How does Communist China’s involvement in Latin America im-
pact our national security?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Well, I think you bring up a good point
because sometimes it is easy to forget about our own neighborhood,
as we look at this global competition that we are in with China.
Admiral Faller has done a really good job I think of highlighting
that and the consequences thereof and the focus that we need to
have not only within the Department of Defense but as a nation
to that.
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Of course, we also see it, for example, in the Bahamas, which is
even closer to home, where we see China is trying to get an influ-
ence with one of our closest neighbors and great partners.
I think we have to be cognizant of it. We have to think about it
from the aspect of what are the implications to us from a national
security standpoint, and then what are the implications to us just
as a nation as we see this global competition playing out in our
own hemisphere close to home.
Senator SCOTT. Thank you.
Admiral Richard, do you think we have enough—whether it is
Communist China or Russia in Latin America, do you think we
have the right amount of assets there and the right amount of
focus there, or do we need to put more focus based on what they
are doing to try to have an impact close to our borders?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, one, I applaud the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs’ focus broadly on global integration, and when you
take a global view of the competitions that we have, it drives visi-
bility into those areas. So I think the Department is moving in the
right direction to look at the totality of what we need to be con-
cerned about and not just focus on one geographic region.
Senator SCOTT. So Canada is about to make a decision on 5G on
Huawei. It is my understanding that the military establishment in
Canada has said that the Trudeau administration should not go
forward with doing any business with Huawei with regard to their
5G.
How would that impact our relationship with Canada if they do?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Senator, what I would say is clearly we
see the security implications of 5G not only with Canada but with
our allies and partners and even here at home. Clearly we see this
as a national security implications at large, and making sure that
we, with all our allies and partners—that they all go into any nego-
tiations and ultimately procurement of infrastructure with clear
eyes to truly understand what are the risks and then what can we
do to mitigate those risks.
I think as we do continue to work with Canada as a close ally
and a partner, just like we have done with other allies and part-
ners, we need to make sure that we are sharing all the intel that
we have, which we are, and making sure that we provide them all
the things that they need to make the proper decision and an in-
formed decision to fully understand the risks that they take and ul-
timately the implications, to your point, that we might have here
at home with what we can share with them, how we would share
with them, and what the implications would be.
I think as we look at Canada with the NORAD aspect of that,
that becomes even closer to home because of our binational rela-
tionship we have with them and making sure that we understand
the rippling effects of potential security concerns relative to
Huawei, 5G, and we see as very real concerns.
Senator SCOTT. So knowing the risks especially like with
NORAD, what should Congress be doing to try to make sure that
Canada makes the right decision and to follow the lead of their
military establishment that Huawei should not be a partner for
5G?
131

General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I think the continuation of what we are
doing already, which is the great conversations and dialogue that
we are having with our partner in Canada, again sharing the intel
so that we make sure that they understand fully the risks that
they might be taking on so that they can make a decision, their
own sovereign decision that they will make, but it is an informed
decision fully understanding the risks, the consequences, and ulti-
mately what the rippling effects might be as a result of that from
a national security, for their own security, and then for us together
as a binational organization within NORAD as an example, and as
we are tied with North America very much so the rippling effects
through the binational, bilateral relationship.
Senator SCOTT. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Manchin?
Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you for your service.
I can only repeat to you what I have heard in talking and listen-
ing to people with expertise, and this is how they have kind of ex-
plained the Cold War coming to an end and where we are today
and if we are on top of our game or if we are ahead of our game.
Basically the United States in the 1980s took the position to be
very aggressive in some of the weapons we designed. Russia could
not keep up with what we were doing. It kind of forced them into
a situation where they had to evaluate could we defend ourselves
against America with the superior weapons they have designed.
That is what was given to me, along those lines.
Now, if you take it from the Cold War forward, have we still
stayed on top of our game? It sounds to me as if hypersonic weap-
ons and other future weapons have been more advanced by other
countries such China, even Russia coming back into the scene in
a real aggressive way, maybe North Korea to a certain extent. Are
we going to be able to deter them from moving forward because of
our superiority, or are we going to be playing defense to catch up?
So however you can help me with that to understand it better.
Admiral RICHARD. Let me start that in terms of, first, I go back
to that was a choice by China and Russia to develop those weap-
ons. We certainly could have done that and we did not. I think
their actions in many cases speak louder than what they tell us in
terms of what their intentions are. Again, this is a competition just
like any other military competition, and I am confident that this
nation has the ability to produce the capabilities we have to have.
For deterrence, again the basic equation has not changed. Can I
deny you your aim or can I impose a cost on you that is greater
than what you seek? I can do that if necessary.
Senator MANCHIN. Admiral and General both, the evaluation was
given to me about the Cold War and the end of the Cold War. Is
that accurate? We outpaced them so far that they had to come to
the realization they could not compete and defend themselves?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, what I would offer, I would break
that into a conventional piece and a strategic deterrence piece. On
the conventional side of the house, in general I would say that that
is in the main correct. What we were able to do on the strategic
deterrence side is hold strategic deterrence. The whole goal on stra-
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tegic deterrence is for nothing to happen, and we were successfully
able to do that. So I would recharacterize that slightly in terms of
a conventional force advantage that we achieved.
Senator MANCHIN. General?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Senator, what I would add to that,
though, as you fast forward to today, what we do see is our adver-
saries really investing in some of that conventional capability that
does have the ability to hold us at risk and we have to, therefore,
be able to defend against it. What I am referring to, for example,
is the submarine that has very good capability that carries cruise
missiles, some of the long-range aviation like the bombers——
Senator MANCHIN. We have the USS West Virginia. I have been
on it and spent some time with them. I appreciate it. You do an
excellent job.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. And so I think from our perspective we
think a lot from the Cold War about the nuclear aspect and deter-
rence. I think as we reach today, we also have to factor in the con-
ventional aspect of this and having peer adversaries that have the
capability to reach out to us at home in ways that we did not have
in the Cold War that we have to factor into our defense.
Senator MANCHIN. My final question would be basically you are
looking 30 years down the road—at least 30 years down the road—
for the life of the weapons and the defense that we are doing with
our triad. Are we looking at their capabilities and where they are
looking 30 years down the road too and if they might be to the
point to where they are advancing quicker, willing to make more
sacrifices, spend more money to become an equal super power?
The One Belt, One Road, as far as I am concerned, is China
wants to be the only super power left by 2050. I hope Americans
understand that, and I hope we in Congress understand it. That
is what I am concerned about. I am determined in my life and for
my children, whatever I can do and whatever decision can prevent
that from happening because this is the greatest country on earth.
There is no doubt what their mission is, what China’s mission is.
Admiral RICHARD. Sir, not only do I agree but I will give you a
quick example. Columbia is going to be in service until 2080. The
Navy and the submarine force—and there are Air Force equiva-
lents to this too—have long had very extensive programs that are
looking 30 years down the road, and they are physics-based—they
are not necessarily intel-based—and looking at anything that could
be developed into a threat so that we in parallel start working the
countermeasure to that. I have great confidence in those programs.
They have served us well.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. And in my time, I would just quickly
say that that is why the NDS implementation, which very clear fo-
cuses on this great competition and the competition with China in
particular and Russia drives, us to make sure we do invest in those
right resources that will allow us to compete appropriately going
into the future, Senator.
Senator MANCHIN. It is my confidence in military leaders like
yourselves that gives me the confidence for my children and grand-
children. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Blackburn?
Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Thank you for your thoughtfulness and coming before us today.
I want to talk a little bit about the hypersonics issue, circle back
to that, because of Arnault Engineering Development Complex
which is there in Tennessee, and of course, they are very much en-
gaged in some of the work that we are trying to do as we look for-
ward. I actually had some people in the office yesterday, and we
discussed this and Arnault’s importance to the Air Force.
But one of the things that continues to come up as we talk about
hypersonics is personnel and a trained workforce. General
O’Shaughnessy, I would love to hear from you. Do you think we
have what we need to meet the demand as we move forward, and
how do we go about backfilling that? How do you change recruit-
ment in order for us to be able to backfill that?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for high-
lighting that.
One of the things we look at, first, there is a capability but then
there is also a capacity. If you look at our entire defense industrial
base, one of the things I think we have to really focus on is are
we able to both have the technology and to make sure we are tak-
ing advantage of the emerging technology in the appropriate ways,
but also do we have the capacity to turn that into actual weapon
systems that can be relevant on the battlefield.
Senator BLACKBURN. I am glad you mentioned that because I had
noted in 2017 at a hypersonics conference—I think the Chinese had
like 250 papers, and it was 10 times what we had had.
So, Admiral Richard, as you look at this, are you attracting and
training and retaining the experts that are going to be needed in
order to meet the demand?
Admiral RICHARD. Ma’am, the short answer is you are high-
lighting a challenge for the department across the board. It is not
only in hypersonics that you talk about, but I could point to any
number of other areas where we face an equivalent challenge.
I had been very pleased in the efforts particularly by the services
to reach out, develop, attract, and create this industrial base that
we are going to have to have not only for hypersonics but for the
capabilities writ large. They are working very hard on it.
Senator BLACKBURN. Then human capital is one component, but
then facilities, areas like Arnault Engineering, are important. So
where are we on the sufficiency of our facilities and having what
we need there?
Admiral RICHARD. Again, I applaud service efforts to go after the
capacity and the industrial base physical plant necessary to
achieve the results that you are talking about. They are working
very hard on both pieces of that.
Senator BLACKBURN. Then highlighting another area, let us move
over and talk about electromagnetic spectrum. As you know, this
is something where I have spent a good bit of time working on how
we proceed in this area, how we utilize expertise when it comes to
working in a contested EW [electronic warfare] environment. Do we
have that? Are we moving forward with the right type work, the
visualization, the modeling, so that we are growing the expertise
in this area?
Admiral RICHARD. So, ma’am, let me start that.
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Senator, one, I applaud your interest and your leadership in
terms of electromagnetic spectrum. That is yet another domain not
unlike space and cyber that was permissive and we had freedom
of maneuver for a very long period of time, and that has changed.
So it too has to have a certain level of expertise. The services are
working very hard on that.
For example, if you would allow me to have a Navy flashback for
a second. I am a joint commander now but just left the Navy. The
submarine force, which I recently commanded, has been an emer-
gency flank wide open trying to develop that expertise to the point
that we have restructured the electronic technicians’ rating to ele-
vate greater numbers, better training, and I could go into more de-
tail on that. You see all the services working like that right now.
Senator BLACKBURN. Let me ask you this. Are we at a point
where we should develop a concept of operations for EW?
Admiral RICHARD. Yes, ma’am. You hit on a couple of things that
we have to continue to work on. There are numerous concepts of
operation. To be able to knit them together in a whole is——
Senator BLACKBURN. Right, but we need one overriding strategy.
Admiral RICHARD. One overarching piece——
Senator BLACKBURN. And if you are reworking training and look-
ing at a different utilization of expertise, then it seems to me we
would be well served to move to one concept of operations that
would enable each of our military divisions.
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, one, I not only agree, but I would
also highlight another point you made earlier that a key piece of
that concept is going to be electronic battle management, electronic
warfare battle management, the ability to visualize. We cannot be
statically assigned anymore in our use of the RF spectrum. We
have to be dynamic. We have to maneuver, and we are going to
have to be able to visualize and understand it to accomplish that.
Now, the concepts will start from there.
Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator King?
Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General O’Shaughnessy, one of the questions I ask quite fre-
quently in these hearings is what does China want, and I want to
ask you pointedly, what does China want in the Arctic?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Well, thank you, Senator, for allowing
me to highlight a little bit of the Arctic and the importance of the
Arctic. As it relates to one of our global competitors and potential
adversaries, I think it is important to look at what is their desire
in the Arctic.
What we see initially is clearly an economic desire because of the
natural resources there, and they want to be able to take full ad-
vantage of those resources.
But we also see activity, for example, the Xuelong, one of their
supposed scientific research vessels that potentially could be the
precursor to increased submarine activity and those things from a
more nefarious aspect.
So we are looking at it clearly to understand what is it they are
trying to do, but from our perspective, we are concerned about that
as an avenue of approach. We are concerned about that as——
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Senator KING. They are clearly highly interested. I was at an
Arctic conference in Iceland a couple of years ago. There was a 40-
person delegation from China, and they have designated them-
selves as a near-Arctic nation, which is like Australia saying—you
know. But there they are.
Now, let me follow up. There was a sentence in your presentation
that got my attention. Finally, in the past year, we observed signs
of nascent but growing strategic cooperation between China and
Russia, including a combined bomber patrol last July and Chinese
participation in multiple Russian exercises. I find that very impor-
tant and concerning. Expand on that a bit please.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. This was not particularly concerning
the Arctic, but I will get back to the Arctic in the answer.
What we do see is——
Senator KING. But the Arctic is one of the places where they may
well find common cause.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Absolutely, and that is where I will
move back to where I have some concern there.
One of the things we do see is Russia actually has more ad-
vanced operational capability with respect to the longer-range
bomber force, and as we see them fairly routinely flying in and
around our—Adak as an example. As we see them working with
Russia and China together, we have concerns as we just look at
that capability, and if they were to work together, they could poten-
tially advance China’s ability in that regard.
Clearly in the Arctic, we also see the potential if they work to-
gether, but I think there is a little bit different approach because
clearly Russia has concerns about China infringing on them from
an economic standpoint. Yet, nonetheless, we see Russia with some
very significant——
Senator KING. Russia is being very aggressive in the Arctic in
terms of icebreakers, airstrips. I mean, that is a big part of where
they are putting some of their major investments.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Exactly, and so that is where I was
going with this answer is that we can actually see the potential for
China to leverage Russia’s capability and capacity and under-
standing to develop China’s——
Senator KING. Do you have adequate sensors to determine if
something is coming over the top?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. We do not, sir.
Senator KING. And that is clearly a gap that needs to be ad-
dressed.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. It is, Senator.
Senator KING. This hearing seems to be the hypersonic hearing,
and I think that is important, and the budget is important, the ad-
ditional resources. But we are behind. Russia and China are field-
ing hypersonic missiles now, and are we not 4 or 5 years from
there? And my concern is that some of that research should be
going into defense because right now hypersonics are really a
nightmare weapon for an aircraft carrier, for all kinds of targets.
So are we going to put some money into how to defend ourselves
against hypersonics, Admiral?
Admiral RICHARD. The short answer is yes, and I think you see
the budget priorities that are being developed to do just that.
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But I will also go back and offer particularly for Russia and
China, we are defending today by deterrence. I can impose a cost
on them that I think they will find unacceptable, to deter their use
of that or any of their other novel weapon systems.
Senator KING. How do you deter? If we get into a conflict and
they—I mean, I do not understand deterrence when they use a
hypersonic to take out an aircraft carrier in the strait between Ice-
land and Scotland.
Admiral RICHARD. Sir, I would have to go into a classified session
to give you details of options that I could provide to redress that.
Senator KING. Well, I just hope that 23 percent budget in-
crease—part of that goes to defense.
Finally, very briefly, can hypersonics be nuclearized? Can a
hypersonic missile carry a nuclear warhead?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, absolutely, yes.
Senator KING. So is this really triad 2.0? It is not a ballistic mis-
sile. It is not a submarine. It is not an aircraft. Or it could be, I
guess, all three of those. But clearly we need to think about
hypersonics in terms of the triad, in terms of our strategic deter-
rence.
Admiral RICHARD. Absolutely, I will offer that it is not our policy
or intent right now to nuclearize hypersonics. Other nations can
choose to do what they wish in that area, and, yes, this is the com-
petition. This has a lot of similarities to the introduction of the
intercontinental ballistic missile back in the late 1950s and early
1960s, and we are ready to address it.
Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I
appreciate your testimony.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Cramer?
Senator CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you for your service and for being here.
I was going to start, Admiral Richard, with a question about
GBSD, and you answered it beautifully for Senator Fischer and in
your statements. But I will just emphasize the importance of doing
all we can to keep it on track, if not even escalate a little bit, and
that is reflected, of course, in the budget and I appreciate that.
I want to ask both of you some questions about the standing up
of Space Force, starting with you, of course, Admiral Richard, given
the unique relationship between STRATCOM and space and space
capabilities, and first, generally ask you, are you comfortable with
how it is going in terms of the standing up of Space Force? And
what and how are you communicating with Space Force in terms
of helping them be successful in training, equipping, manning the
force?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, I would draw a distinction between
Space Command, the joint operational command, and the Space
Force. My relationship is much more with Space Command. Sen-
ator, I would describe it as we are the proud parents. We were
where those responsibilities came from. I am delighted that the de-
cision the nation and the Department has made. It is putting nec-
essary attention to our freedom of maneuver and action inside
space. General Raymond and I speak frequently. We are setting up
a set of war fighter talks here in the very near future. I am encour-
aged across the board that it improves mission performance overall,
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particularly his responsibilities as the sensor manager, looking
across missile warning, missile defense, and space situational
awareness. The nation wins because we are more effectively uti-
lizing our assets.
Senator CRAMER. Very well said.
General O’Shaughnessy, so again same, basically because obvi-
ously the relationship between Space Command and STRATCOM
is special, but yours is awfully important as well.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
I am excited about both the Space Force and United States Space
Command. I think we are already starting to see some of the bene-
fits of this. I think we as a nation are very fortunate to have a
great American, Jay Raymond, leading both of these at this time
and really chartering the course that these will take going into the
future.
Specifically for us for Homeland defense, from the NORTHCOM
role we are very much tied from the U.S. Space Command side rel-
ative to those sensors. The very sensors that Admiral Richard men-
tioned are the ones that we are using for our own Homeland de-
fense.
The second aspect is we look at warfighting as space, a domain
of warfighting, that occurs, and we are talking about that in really
relevant ways, and clearly from a Homeland defense aspect, that
has significant consequences.
Then from a U.S. Space Force, excited about the potential there,
as that has now been stood up, of how that is going to allow us
to really focus like a laser on space going into the future.
Senator CRAMER. Well, just following up a little bit on that, one
of the challenges I think, of course, is actually manning, training,
and equipping this force. I think the services all play a role in that,
which I think is somewhat unique to the way Space Force has been
designed to be successful. I certainly look forward to anything that
you can add to that discussion as well.
As I run out of time, I want you to answer that if you have more
to say about it, and then actually ask you about our northern tier
bases—of course, I have three of them in North Dakota—and what
we ought to be looking for in terms of capabilities to meet a poten-
tial Arctic conflict and to make sure that we are in sync with the
strategy.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Well, I would start first on the Space
Force. Clearly the intent is it is not just a pulling away from just
the United States Air Force but actually looking within the Depart-
ment of Defense where are our space experts and how do we actu-
ally bring them into the Space Force as well.
That aside, relative to your question on the Arctic, we are actu-
ally excited about some of the things that we are actually doing
right now in your State to support our Arctic operations. Clearly
we see the future in our defense of our nation is very critically de-
pendent on our ability to operate in the Arctic, our ability to have
domain awareness. So, some of the things we are doing with over-
the-horizon radars are critically important for us to have that do-
main awareness, that understanding of what is happening on the
approaches to our nation and in cooperation with Canada through
North America is critically important. Whether you are talking
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hypersonics—and the over-the-horizon radars have great capability
against the hypersonics so we can maintain that custody—or
whether we are talking about the cruise missile threats and the
bombers, those are all played because of some of the work that we
are doing within your State.
Senator CRAMER. Well said, and I appreciate both of you and
yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Peters?
Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Richard and General O’Shaughnessy, your command
areas play a very important role in defending the United States
from the threat of ballistic missiles, and I note that the Missile De-
fense Agency’s budget request discusses a layered approach to
Homeland defense as the underlay to the current ground-based
mid-course defense system that protects the continental United
States. Specifically the MDA request discusses Aegis and THAAD
as potential options for a layered Homeland defense approach. But
I am also interested in the potential for transportable ground-based
interceptors or other systems that can serve as an underlay to ex-
isting GMD system and add flexibility and depth in a cost-effective
way.
As you know, MDA has completed an environmental impact
statement of three locations to host a potential third GMD site, in-
cluding two fields at Fort Custer in Michigan, which were identi-
fied as the least expensive and least environmentally impacted site.
But the question for both of you is, can you please discuss how
you view the potential of a layered Homeland missile defense sys-
tem, and what role would the three locations, which MDA has al-
ready studied, play in this layered system?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Senator, I will start with this.
First, I will talk to one of the reasons that this demand signal
is there, as we look at the cancellation of RKV and the resulting
timeline between now and when an NGI, next generation inter-
ceptor, could be fielded. We have very significant concerns about
that from NORTHCOM. We have been working closely with both
MDA, as well as OSDR&E, Dr. Griffin. I am pleased to announce
now that we are bringing time in as a variable within that discus-
sion. What we are trying to do—we cannot wait 10 years to get the
next generation interceptor fielded. We are trying to bring that left,
and so I think we will see, as the RFP actually gets released, we
are actually looking to bring time left and get that fielded faster.
I think we are in a good position there.
But that brings you to part of that mitigation, as the threat con-
tinues to advance, is this layered defense concept, which we very
much support, and you see money in the budget this year.
The initial concept, to your point, was to bring in as an
underlayer the ability to use, whether it be a THAAD modified po-
tentially with additional boost capability or whether it be an SM–
3 IIA missile that we could use in that regard is existing capability
that we could bring into the Homeland defense architecture to pro-
vide that ballistic missile defense.
But the follow-on to that is, okay, we will understand using that
existing capability, but what is the capability we could actually de-
velop that might not be what we need to deploy overseas but we
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could use specifically built for our Homeland defense. That gets
into the point where the next iteration of the layered defense might
be individual weapon systems that are designed to be fielded with-
in the continental U.S. and in Alaska to defend the United States
using maybe the technology that is in our current systems but por-
trayed a different way.
I think all the work that has been done with all of the conti-
nental interceptor sites will go into potentially where we could put
those, how we do those. So I think it is just part of the information
that we now have as we look at this new approach with both the
current GBI, the NGIs, this layered defense with the current sys-
tem, additional system informed by some of the work that we have
done to include within your State.
Senator PETERS. Great. Thank you.
Admiral, do you want to add anything?
Admiral RICHARD. Just very quickly. Missile defense is deter-
rence by denial. We have a very clear national policy on what it
is designed for and what it is not designed for, and so everything
General O’Shaughnessy just talked about not only allows him to
execute his mission responsibilities, but it is a part of the tailored
deterrent strategies that I am required by the Nuclear Posture Re-
view to develop. That is precisely the path I think we need to go
down. I would throw in sensing is also a key piece as both of us
have talked about.
Senator PETERS. One final question. I am the ranking member
on the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee within
this Committee, and one area that I have been focusing on are
some of the ethics associated with the military application of artifi-
cial intelligence and automation in particular. I know there are a
number of ethical concerns related to these weapons. I think the
dilemma is represented by the threat that you both identified in
your written statements of Russia’s nuclear-capable autonomous
underwater weapon, the Poseidon. I know what the threat is is all
up to debate to talk about.
But if we face time-sensitive threats in the U.S., are we at a tac-
tical disadvantage if we require human involvement in our decision
chain where our adversaries may not do that?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Senator, I will take that. What I would
say is what we have to get away from is what we now have as ei-
ther the human in the loop or sometimes the human is the loop in
some of our systems to a human on the loop. What that will allow
you to do is actually make those decisions at the speed of relevance
because what can and should be done by machines and by AI and
leveraging that will be done by that. But it will identify those key
areas where we humans have to be the ones ethically, morally
making those decisions. I think human on the loop is a concept we
need to apply to leverage that capability while not preventing our-
selves from operating at the speed of relevance.
Senator PETERS. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. By the way, we have been notified the first
vote is underway. So we are going to try to get to everybody here.
Let us try to keep our remarks brief.
Senator Hawley?
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
Admiral, let me start with you. As you know, we are the proud
home in Missouri of the Whiteman Air Force Base and the B–2
bomber. Let me ask you about the Air Force’s budget request and
the funding cuts for the B–2 defense management system. Does
that decision cause you any concern about the B–2’s ability to oper-
ate in high end threat environments to the end of its service life?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, I think it is a great example of some
of the difficult decisions that we are going to have to make in trad-
ing or balancing near-term risks for long-term risks. Overall, the
Air Force is way ahead on the bomber program. Bomber road map
I think it is referred to I endorse. I think that is a very thoughtful
approach, and the loss of the defensive management system—we
will accommodate that risk for the greater gain the Air Force is
going to provide overall.
Senator HAWLEY. That sounds like a yes to me. You think that
there is a risk that it will. There will be some detriment to its abil-
ity to operate in high end capacity.
Admiral RICHARD. There is but I can manage it.
Senator HAWLEY. What else do we need to ensure that the B–
2 maintains its ability to operate in those environments if this deci-
sion goes forward?
Admiral RICHARD. That is part of the planning that I have to do.
So we will use operational mechanisms to compensate for techno-
logical abilities of the aircraft. I retain full confidence that the B–
2 can do the missions that I will ask it to do.
Senator HAWLEY. Great. Well, I will be following up with you on
that.
General, let me turn to you for a second. Russian bombers make
regular visits to our coastlines we know. What role would you say
that the F–15EX could play in protecting our Homeland against
these and other threats in the decades that are coming?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. One of the things that we do see is it
is not only the increasing frequency but also the complexity of how
they are maneuvering and the missions that they are flying. Some
of it has to do with where we would need to go to intercept them
based on the length of their missiles that they carry, the range that
the missiles now have. For example, the S–23 is an example of a
long-range missile. What that means is we want to intercept them
further out. We want to go further so that we can not only get the
missiles. We want to hit the bombers so that they never actually
get to launch them.
So the F–15EX brings us that. It brings us that extended range
that we can get with the F–15EX, as well as a much significant im-
provement in the number of missiles it can carry. So we see that
from a Homeland defense aspect. We see that new platform as
being well suited for the Homeland defense role in both our
counter-cruise missile defense, our counter-airborne threats such as
the Russian bombers.
Senator HAWLEY. Great. That is great to hear.
Admiral, let me come back to you and let us talk a little bit
about nuclear policy. Are you confident that Beijing would stick to
its announced no-first-use policy if there were a conflict with the
United States?
141

Admiral RICHARD. Senator, I think I could drive a truck through
that no-first-use policy.
Senator HAWLEY. Why do you say that?
Admiral RICHARD. In other words, I am not trying to be flippant
on a very serious matter. Right? The number of situations where
they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our
definition of first use—I should back up. They are very opaque
about what their intentions are. They are very different from the
Russians. We have very little to go on in terms of how they inter-
pret that relative to what we see from the other competitor.
So what constitutes first use? Where might they say we are actu-
ally not—that is our territory. Therefore, it does not count as an
attack against you.
More broadly, the Soviet Union had a no-first-use policy. I do not
think we took great comfort in that either, and so the declaratory
policy things are not helpful in my mission area to deter.
Senator HAWLEY. That is very helpful and I think is a great
point for those who would advocate a no-first-use policy on our end
as to why that that would be I think a very serious strategic mis-
take.
Let me give you, Admiral, still on the same subject an oppor-
tunity to clarify something. A senior U.S. official recently was re-
ported as saying—and I am quoting now—the sole reason the
United States has nuclear weapons is to prevent others from using
nuclear weapons. That does not seem to be exactly what our declar-
atory policy is. Can you clarify what our declaratory policy is?
Admiral RICHARD. So the Nuclear Posture Review lays it out very
clearly in terms of our strategic capabilities are designed to deter
a strategic attack on the United States, which can be nuclear, but
I think it wisely acknowledged the fact that it now may be possible
to have a strategic attack against our vital interests that is non-
nuclear, particularly in space and cyber.
Senator HAWLEY. Right. So we will only consider the employment
of nuclear weapons in extreme countries to defend our vital inter-
ests or those of our allies or partners, and those circumstances
could include, as you just said, significant non-nuclear strategic at-
tacks. Is that correct? Am I getting that correct?
Admiral RICHARD. That is correct.
Senator HAWLEY. Great.
Admiral, I have got another question for you about the W–76
TAC 2. I will submit that for the record because I am about out
of time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you very much.
Senator Jones?
Senator JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service. In particular, Admiral Richard,
as one Alabama native to another, thank you for your service. Ala-
bama is very proud of you and so is the University of Alabama Roll
Tide. I just thought I would throw that in real quickly. I know you
appreciate that.
The other thing that folks in Alabama are particularly proud of
these days is our 117th air refueling wing, which as you know, won
the prestigious STRATCOM Omaha Trophy this past year. I want
142

to take the opportunity to congratulate Colonel Scott Grant, the
commander there—he has just done an amazing job—Command
Chief Master Sergeant Davis and the other airmen. I think some-
times our National Guard unit is going to get overlooked in the
scheme of things, and I so much appreciate them winning that
award. It is the first time a guard unit has won that.
Can you talk a little bit about the critical role that the unit plays
in the strategic deterrence mission that we have?
Admiral RICHARD. Senator, I just would highlight. That is a very
competitive award, and it speaks highly of that wing’s ability to
compete in that broad a competition.
Air refueling is vital. I am not an airman, but no gas, no bombs,
and so it is critical to my mission set for the bomber leg to have
adequate tanking capacity. General O’Shaughnessy will tell you
here in a second it is equally critical in his areas for Homeland air
defense. It is something we pay very close attention to in terms of
having capability in the right priority to meet those missions
Senator JONES. Great. Well, thank you.
This past Monday, the President’s Budget Request and the brief-
ings that we got indicated that the Air Force intends to divest sev-
eral aging aircraft, namely 17 B–1 bombers, 16 KC–10 tankers, 13
KC–135 tankers. To replace the tankers, the budget asks for 15
KC–146’s, but those are not going to be fully operational for an-
other 3 years.
So with the delay in the operational capability status of the KC–
46’s, does this in any way—does this divestiture of these legacy
tankers pose any kind of threat to the reliable in-air refueling ca-
pability of the joint force? I will ask either or both of you that ques-
tion.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I will start, Senator, and say in this
year’s budget, I think our United States Air Force made some dif-
ficult decisions in how do we get to the future faster. This is just
one of those decisions where we are trying to divest yourselves of
legacy platforms while moving to the future, in this case the KC–
46. So while, yes, there will be an impact in the short term to the
availability of tankers, we will be able to mitigate our way through
that. We still are working closely,. In fact, I talked to the
TRANSCOM commander just yesterday about this. I believe we
will be able to mitigate that going forward. But it is crucial that
we are able to get to the KC–46 and multiple other modern plat-
forms that the Air Force is trying to get to.
Senator JONES. Great. Well, thank you. Thank you both for being
here.
Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I will yield back. Thank
you.
Chairman INHOFE. I appreciate it.
We will now recognize Senator Sullivan. At the conclusion of his
remarks, we will be adjourned. Senator Sullivan presiding.
Senator SULLIVAN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
General O’Shaughnessy, I particularly appreciate your testimony.
It was probably the most comprehensive, insightful description of
our strategic interests in the Arctic that I have seen. In your testi-
mony, you say the Arctic is the new front line of Homeland defense.
143

It sounds like you are saying that the Arctic and Alaska are no
longer a sanctuary from which we can safely project power, but it
is more of a battle space area. Is that correct? What are the impli-
cations from your mindset as the NORTHCOM Commander?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. That is exactly correct, Senator, and as
always, I find myself well aligned with you relative to the impor-
tance of the Arctic. It is not only from the strategic location that
it is, but now, to your point, it is clearly an avenue of approach to
our great nation. As we look at what——
Senator SULLIVAN. That impacts the whole nation.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. It impacts the whole nation, absolutely.
As we look at now Alaska where—I will just use the Russian
long-range aviation. Whether it be hypersonics or whether it be the
cruise missiles that can be launched from that long-range aviation,
we clearly see that avenue of approach as being critical. So we
have to, one, have awareness of what is going on in that space, and
then we have to be able to defend in that space. The time that will
be required to respond is short because of the pure geography.
I think what we really need to think about in Alaska is how do
we invest to have that domain awareness, having the right sensors
and ability to understand what is happening, but also the ability
to defend immediately and what are the systems that we could in-
vest in that would allow us to have that persistent defense in Alas-
ka because it is key terrain that will be important to us as a nation
in any conflict whether that be with Russia or China going for-
ward.
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.
Let me go on to a little bit more detail. You know, it seems from
whether it is Secretary Pompeo’s speech in Finland at the Arctic
Council, major publications like The New York Times, 60 Min-
utes—you know, there is a lot of discussion about the great power
competition in the Arctic. I appreciate Senator King highlighting
that in his questions for you.
You know, unfortunately, this Committee has observed that the
Pentagon is the organization that sometimes seems the furthest be-
hind, with the exception of certainly your great advocacy, General
O’Shaughnessy.
In your personal opinion and the advocate for the capabilities in
the region, what specific capabilities are you advocating for to en-
sure that we can both protect the Homeland in these avenues of
approach that you talked about, but also to continue to project
power from Alaska to not just PACOM but EUCOM, STRATCOM?
And if you can talk on JPARC and even OCONUS KC–46 deploy-
ments, that would be helpful as well, in terms of capabilities.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Thank you, Senator.
First, I would say we have to complete the next generation inter-
ceptor. We have literally holes in the ground right now that we
need to fill with capabilities. So we need to bring that left, and we
need to bring that as fast as possible.
We need to augment that with additional ballistic missile capa-
bility that we could put in Alaska, whether that be SM–3 IIA’s,
whether that be potentially THAAD deployments there. We need to
bring that into Alaska. We need a sensing capability that will be
144

persistent, that will be steady state, that will always be there. We
have the technology today. We just have to deploy it to Alaska.
The second thing I think we need—and I would applaud the Air
Force for moving the additional fifth generation aircraft, the F–
35’s, to Eielson. It is now truly the fifth generation center of excel-
lence, and therefore, you need a place to train. I think continued
investment in the JPARC range is critically important not only for
fifth gen, but for the Arctic, and Arctic Edge upcoming exercise we
have with great participation—for example, from the marines—I
think is critically important because the joint force needs to train
in Arctic conditions.
I make the observation that we can deploy a force anywhere, all
over the world, and we can train that force very quickly and have
them out the door in a matter of days. You cannot do that to the
Arctic. If you are not training, if you do not have the right equip-
ment, and if you are not versed in operating in the Arctic, you will
not effectively be able to operate there. Our adversaries are oper-
ating there, and therefore, we need to be able to operate there as
well. To your point, it is now a battle space, and so we need to be
able to operate in Alaska in the Arctic in cooperation with Canada
from the NORAD side.
I think continued investment. The tankers are important because
it is a strategic place where you can actually get to the European
theater quicker than you can even get to the South China Sea from
Alaska. Therefore, having that as a center where we have robust
tankers is important, as well as the entire joint force I think just
continuing to be able to operate.
Senator SULLIVAN. The Secretary of Defense said that if you col-
located the over 100 fifth generation fighters that we are going to
have in Alaska with the OCONUS deployment of KC–46’s, it would
show that our adversaries—that we would have extreme strategic
reach whether in PACOM or EUCOM. Do you agree with that?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I do believe there is a powerful synergy
of bringing together the fifth generation with additional and mod-
ern day tanker capability.
Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask one final question for both of you.
Actually just two real quick ones.
In our office call, you talked about your number one unfunded
priority for some type of space-based communications for the Arc-
tic. Can you just briefly touch on that?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Thank you, Senator, for allowing us to
highlight that.
One of my main concerns in the Arctic is communication. Basic
communication that we normally use satellites for becomes chal-
lenged above about 65, even harder above 70.
One of the things we find is the commercial technology is there,
and so we have been working with commercial companies over the
proliferation of LEO and finding ways that we might be able to
bring that ability to have essentially broadband connectivity any-
where, for example, within Alaska. That is a huge implication for
us to be able to operate if we can connect the force in areas that
today we cannot connect the force even through our commercial
partners.
145

Whether it OneWeb or whether it is Starlink, we think, for ex-
ample, in some of our partnership with Starlink over the last sev-
eral experiments that we have done, for example, at Eglin where
we are able to show our ability to connect that force with their sat-
ellites—this is not hypothetical. This is satellites that are in orbit
today.
Senator SULLIVAN. But it is your number one unfunded priority
because that is not just protecting the comms in the Arctic. That
protects the whole Homeland in terms of the avenue of approach
concern that you talked about.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. That is exactly right, Senator. It is my
number one priority to have Arctic coms, and I think the prolifera-
tion of LEO and a Starlink or a OneWeb type solution is the way
to get it fastest.
Senator SULLIVAN. Final question for both you, gentlemen, and
it is a just a quick answer on this. But I have been frustrated with
Under Secretary Griffin. You know, I think we are seeing really
smart guys in the Pentagon making dumb decisions. Let me give
you one. It was already briefly touched on.
This Committee has worked really hard in a bipartisan way with
the administration fully supporting it to build up our missile de-
fense. There has now been a decision recently, despite the fact that
we just built 20 new silos at Fort Greely, to make those empty for
the next 10 years. I cannot think of something that is unequivo-
cally more—well, that is just going to harm our readiness in terms
of missile defense. I mean, there is no dispute about that. 20 empty
silos for 20 years.
How do we fix that gap, fill that, and correct what to me seems
like just kind of a boneheaded decision at the upper levels of the
Pentagon?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Senator, first I will say that the unfor-
tunate decision to cancel the RKV was the right decision that was
made at that time——
Senator SULLIVAN. But do you agree to have 20 empty silos for
10 years?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. No, sir. What I am very dissatisfied
with is it is going to take us 10 years to actually produce the next
generation interceptor. We have been working very closely with
MDA and Dr. Griffin personally. I met with him on Monday, and
I am pleased to announce that we are going to bring this left. The
way we will have to do that is we will have to find some trade
space, but we have to put time as an important part of this because
our adversaries are not waiting. Our adversaries are building capa-
bility and capacity, and so we have to be able to respond. So we
are going to insert time into this so that we are going to have trade
space developed so we can bring missiles to put, interceptors to put
into those holes sooner.
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.
Admiral, any views on that?
Admiral RICHARD. I would just say that General O’Shaughnessy
described that very well. We both have a role in setting the re-
quirements for missile defense. Those requirements are valid, and
General O’Shaughnessy just laid out how we are going to meet
those.
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Senator SULLIVAN. Well, I believe this Committee will be sup-
portive of any role that we can play in support to help fill that gap,
which I think is important for the nation’s missile defense overall.
Thank you very much, gentlemen. We all appreciate your testi-
mony.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:57 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON
COUNTER-UAS [UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS]

1. Senator COTTON. Admiral Richard, what are STRATCOM’s defined counter-
UAS requirements for the services to provide capability against current and future
threats?
Admiral RICHARD. Protect vital national security assets by detecting, identifying,
tracking and defeating UAS threats.
Attribution is another critical requirement in countering the UAS problem. We
must boost the ability to attribute ‘‘left of launch’’ activities in order to truly stop
the threat and achieve effective deterrence. A successful effort will involve whole-
of-government, to include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Intelligence Community, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) working together with DOD in the Homeland.

2. Senator COTTON. Admiral Richard what counter-UAS capabilities are fielded
today and how effective are they against the current threat? Are you confident our
strategic capabilities are defensible?
Admiral RICHARD. Our counter-UAS (C–UAS) capabilities include kinetic and non-
kinetic measures. Current C–UAS systems have had limited success; however, DOD
is working to develop and field more effective capabilities. While there are chal-
lenges for C–UAS systems, I am confident we are on the right path to enhance the
protection of our strategic assets. However, as mentioned above, we must not focus
just on the defeat, we must also present an effective deterrent which is achieved
through attribution.

3. Senator COTTON. Admiral Richard what capabilities are in the acquisitions
process for the future and how long will it take until they are IOC? Are you con-
fident our strategic capabilities will be defensible in the future?
Admiral RICHARD. The services are exploring multiple kinetic and non-kinetic C–
UAS capabilities, and are considering emerging threats such as swarms, pre-pro-
grammed control of UASs, and other control technologies like Wi-Fi. The United
States Army has been identified as the C–UAS Executive Agent (EA); I would defer
to them for specific programs and Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates. I am
confident they will facilitate necessary service development to effectively defend
strategic capabilities.
Additionally, over the last year, we have worked directly with OSD through the
Senior Integration Group and now the EA at multiple levels, to address the issue
of attribution and ‘‘left of launch’’ activities to achieve effective deterrence. We are
also in the process of advocating inclusion of the concepts of attribution and deter-
rence within the overarching EA C–UAS Strategy.

4. Senator COTTON. Admiral Richard are you aware of any counter-UAS capabili-
ties or innovations that might be available, but cannot be purchased because they
do not specifically fall within defined requirements for a current program of record?
If they exist, what would it take to be able to purchase those capabilities?
Admiral RICHARD. Purchasing C–UAS capabilities does not appear to be hindered
by bureaucratic procedures; the problem lies in the significant challenge of rapidly
developing effective technological solutions to pace the threat. I defer to the EA to
execute the evaluation and acquisition process for C–UAS innovations that do not
fall within defined requirements for a current program of record.

5. Senator COTTON. Admiral Richard can you quantify what you are losing by not
having the ability to buy off-the-shelf Counter-UAS technology that is ready today?
Are U.S. strategic assets at greater risk because of our bureaucratic processes?
147
Admiral RICHARD. While UASs pose an identifiable risk to our strategic assets,
the DOD has an established process to gain approval to purchase off-the-shelf C–
UAS equipment. The Services, led by the EA, are focusing appropriate resources
and proactively developing C–UAS layered defense and interoperable technologies in
response to the threat. I am confident in the EA’s ability to streamline the acquisi-
tion process for fielding required C–UAS capabilities.

6. Senator COTTON. Admiral Richard do you believe current acquisitions processes
will yield counter-UAS capabilities in time to defend against future threats?Would
the answer change if you were able to make iterative adjustments to current pro-
grams of record?
Admiral Richard if our current processes can take a decade to get you counter-
UAS capability, how do you plan to keep up with new technological threats?
Admiral RICHARD. I am confident the Army EA is addressing C–UAS require-
ments as rapidly as possible to meet existing and future threats. The EA is working
with the Services to compress the timelines needed for modifying current C–UAS
equipment to address the changing threats and capability gaps.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS
NORTHCOM / STRATCOM

7. Senator ROUNDS. Admiral Richard and General O’Shaughnessy, electro-
magnetic spectrum plays a critical role in many DOD missions. Can you describe
some of the ways that STRATCOM and NORTHCOM rely on spectrum to support
their missions? What are some of the future spectrum warfighter needs that will
be essential to competing with Russia and China on a future battlefield?
Admiral RICHARD. USSTRATCOM is highly dependent on the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS) to provide Strategic Deterrence and deliver Decisive Response, if
necessary. Every aspect of our mission—from sensor to shooter communications to
data management and information flow—requires EMS access to meet deterrence
objectives.
Our adversaries have observed America’s dominance on the battlefield and view
our reliance on the spectrum as a vulnerability. They organize, train and equip
forces to engage and maneuver within the EMS to gain military advantage. They
are investing heavily to counter our radar, navigation, communications, and data
link capabilities, and our technological advantages are eroding.
We must develop future redundant electronic protection systems and resilient ca-
pabilities to counter the growing EMS threat. Additionally, we must continue efforts
to develop an Electromagnetic Battle Management (EMBM) system that dynami-
cally characterizes the EMS Operational Environment (EMOE), provides near real-
time situational awareness, decision support, and command and control capabilities.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The electromagnetic spectrum serves a vital role in
USNORTHCOM’s missions and operations across our Area of Responsibility (AOR).
USNORTHCOM relies on spectrum-dependent systems to provide command and
control; voice and data communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR); advanced threat detection and targeting systems; electronic attack and
electronic protection; and battlefield situational awareness and protection.
Military operations in the future will see a widespread use of battlefield sensors,
radars, and cloud-based systems leveraging advanced quantum computing, artificial
intelligence, and machine learning for near real-time assessment and decision mak-
ing. In light of this, we must be able to continue to operate through a congested,
constrained, and contested spectrum environment for effective operations.

8. Senator ROUNDS. Admiral Richard, STRATCOM is the combatant command re-
sponsible for the advocacy and coordination of joint electromagnetic spectrum oper-
ations in the Department of Defense, which requires the accounting and
deconfliction of DOD, civilian, and adversary use of electromagnetic spectrum.
What is STRATCOM’s role in coordinating spectrum use by DOD and civilian en-
tities? In your opinion, is the Department well-postured to share spectrum currently
reserved for DOD use—does the Department have the appropriate modelling tools,
capabilities, and policies to allow for spectrum-sharing with commercial telecoms?
Does STRATCOM possess the required visibility into DOD, civilian, and adver-
sary systems’ use of electromagnetic spectrum to enable the Department’s electronic
warfare operations?
Admiral RICHARD. All warfighting domains fundamentally rely on the electro-
magnetic spectrum. The DOD CIO serves as the lead for coordination, approval, and
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representation of departmental positions on all spectrum matters within the U.S.
Government and in regional, national, and international spectrum management fo-
rums and organizations.
USSTRATCOM’s role is to advocate on behalf of CCMDs to ensure they have the
capabilities necessary to maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum, and the ability
to train and exercise in operationally representative environments.
Historically, the DOD, other government agencies and industry have viewed the
spectrum in terms of exclusive blocks of airwaves off limits to one another. Improve-
ments in spectrum sharing technologies are needed to enable real-time spectrum ac-
cess by all EMS users. These technologies, when combined with modeling tools and
policies, will facilitate the means to dynamically share spectrum and enable DOD
operations at the same time in the same slice of airwaves.
Dynamic sharing and the ability to maneuver in the spectrum requires the ability
to monitor and understand an increasingly congested and contested electromagnetic
operational environment. Electromagnetic Battle Management will be a key element
of the Department’s future Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Until
this capability is developed and implemented, our ability to characterize spectrum
use at the level required to deconflict DOD and civilian EMS use will remain a chal-
lenge.
We must continue to invest in personnel and technologies to enable Joint EMS
Operations (JEMSO) from the tactical through Joint Task Force and combatant
command levels. Maintaining a warfighting advantage requires superiority in the
electromagnetic spectrum.

9. Senator ROUNDS. Admiral Richard, mid-band spectrum, particularly between 3
gigahertz and 4.2 gigahertz where DOD operates many of its systems, has been
widely discussed as important for commercial 5G implementation. NTIA recently re-
leased an initial report with DOD that found that it would be possible to do real
time spectrum sharing that would protect the critical DOD systems that reside in
this band, while providing attractive opportunities for commercial businesses. What
are some examples of DOD systems in this area that support your missions? What
will be some of the challenges and opportunities toward evaluating potential real
time spectrum sharing of this band?
Admiral RICHARD. Examples of systems in this spectrum range are Aegis SPY ra-
dars for the missile defense mission and some commercial SATCOM used by DOD
for mission accomplishment. The Services (as capability providers), in conjunction
with DOD CIO and the Joint Staff, evaluate challenges and opportunities in poten-
tial real time spectrum sharing.
However, large high-power systems such as the Aegis SPY radar would be chal-
lenged to share spectrum real time while continuing to perform as designed for their
mission. SATCOM, on the other hand, can provide specific channels in the spectrum
to support some USSTRATCOM mission needs.
A lack of advanced EMS modeling and simulation capability limits the ability to
evaluate potential spectrum sharing implications. The ability to rapidly map radio
frequency systems with their parametrics—frequency, signal characteristics, spatial
impacts, and mission purpose—would allow better frequency use comparisons for
spectrum sharing considerations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
INSTALLATION SECURITY

10. Senator TILLIS. General O’Shaughnessy, what proactive measures have you
implemented to enhance force protection measures on our military installations to
reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against DOD personnel and their families?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. We continually assess the threat and adjust our protec-
tive posture to mitigate, reduce vulnerability, increase community awareness, and
prepare for a rapid response to heightened threat conditions. We work closely with
federal law enforcement agencies and have Federal Bureau of Investigation rep-
resentatives assigned to our Headquarters. Commanders at all echelons are empow-
ered to implement additional supplemental, site-specific actions to achieve a meas-
ured and sustainable protective posture consistent with our force protection prior-
ities.
ILLICIT TOBACCO TRADE

11. Senator TILLIS. General O’Shaughnessy, what impact has the increase of
Mexican troops on the southern Mexican border have on illicit tobacco trade?
149
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. We partner with Mexico’s Army and Navy (to include
the Naval Infantry) to build ground-based and maritime capacities to enhance Mexi-
co’s ability to secure its Southern Border. While these military capacities are some-
times applied to operations in support of civil authorities, we do not focus our capac-
ity development efforts to counter the trafficking of any specific commodity.
MISSION READINESS

12. Senator TILLIS. General O’Shaughnessy, what issue(s) have the greatest im-
pact on your mission readiness?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The rapid advancements of our adversaries, particularly
in the areas of precision missiles, cyber, and increased maritime activity, present
a challenge to our defensive capabilities. Adversary advancements in ballistic mis-
sile, hypersonic glide vehicles, and cruise missile capabilities, combined with in-
creasing evidence of adversary intent, challenge our ability to detect, defeat, and
deter aggression. Ever-increasing cyber threats also target our nation’s infrastruc-
ture and add to the complexity of the threat environment.
13. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Richard, what issue(s) have the greatest impact on
your mission readiness?
Admiral RICHARD. [Deleted.]
PERSONNEL ISSUES

14. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Richard, your command’s mission demands expertise
in highly technical and scientific fields, what challenges in terms of recruiting and
retention concern you, and how do you intend to approach them?
Admiral RICHARD. The Services undertake the bulk of recruiting efforts, evaluate
retention incentives and track the skill sets needed to support our mission require-
ments. We work closely with them to ensure appropriate workforce strategic deter-
rent expertise remains available for our missions.
The competitive marketplace for technical and scientific talent presents many re-
cruitment challenges. With a robust economy, hiring officials face fierce competition
with our private sector competitors. An additional challenge is the inability to se-
cure job offers pending security clearance adjudications, which can take several
months. Highly talented candidates either move on or lose interest while waiting
for their clearance before a firm offer can even be made. Our workforce is multi-
generational and we face the challenge of a large segment at, or nearing, retirement
eligibility.
Attracting and recruiting a highly talented workforce entails a three-pronged ap-
proach:
• First, we are utilizing our academic alliance to drive force renewal through
student internship and recent graduate program opportunities. These initia-
tives can lead to full-time positions creating a pipeline of talent acquisition
and succession. These programs provide outreach and partnership opportuni-
ties with educational institutions to brand USSTRATCOM as a premier em-
ployer.
• Second is the use of all available Direct Hiring Authorities (DHA) that apply
to USSTRATCOM. This enhances our ability to offer non-competitive opportu-
nities for critical talent in high-demand fields such as Information Tech-
nology. DHA also provides opportunities for community outreach with busi-
ness leaders, chambers of commerce and the wider public, to market imme-
diate USSTRATCOM employment opportunities through venues such as so-
cial media and electronic job boards.
• The third focus is the continued development, training, education and men-
toring of our current workforce talent.
• Additionally, USSTRATCOM will continue to sustain and foster a climate
that inspires; promotes and values trust; focuses on diversity and inclusion;
continues to offer training and development opportunities; and maintains a
sincere quality of life focus for the workforce. There are also numerous re-
sources available to USSTRATCOM geared to retaining a high-quality work-
force, including recruitment, retention and relocation bonuses, performance
incentives, flexible work schedules, a modern command facility, and a mul-
titude of training and development opportunities.
COMMAND TRANSITION

15. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Richard, have any significant issues occurred during
the transition of the responsibility of space operations from STRATCOM to United
States Space Command (SPACECOM) following the establishment of United States
150
Space Command last year? What is the current status of this transfer of space re-
sponsibilities?
Admiral RICHARD. None to date. From the beginning, USSTRATCOM has been
fully committed to providing the support required for USSPACECOM success. We
expect this process to continue until USSPACECOM reaches full operational capa-
bility. All space related UCP responsibilities have been transferred to
USSPACECOM.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE
ABMS

16. Senator PERDUE. General O’Shaughnessy, I understand that the Air Force
plans to conduct tests of ABMS every 4 months, with the next test occurring in
April 2020. Given that the Air Force has primary responsibility to develop ABMS,
how do you characterize NORTHCOM’s specific role in the development of this sys-
tem?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are partnered with the
Air Force on the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) to provide an oper-
ational, bi-national, and joint perspective and support for further development of an
adaptive joint all-domain command and control capability in support of defending
the Homeland. Due to COVID–19, the April 2020 test has been delayed until late
summer; exact date is pending.
Domain awareness, Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), and defeat
capabilities that are developed for peer-level Homeland defense threats must go be-
yond customized single-threat, one-Service solutions, and instead be developed col-
laboratively by the Joint Force to address a range of threats. The ABMS and JADC2
align well with our understanding of both the all-domain operational environment
and the decision superiority required for a capable defense of the Homeland. The
range of threats to the Homeland creates an urgency to develop the JADC2 system
that we need for the future and the rapid development cycle for ABMS aligns with
that urgency.

17. Senator PERDUE. General O’Shaughnessy, how does NORTHCOM’s role com-
pare to the role other COCOMs have in the development of ABMS?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Due to the urgency of threats facing the Homeland,
USNORTHCOM embarked on a campaign of rapid field prototyping and partnership
with industry to further advance our Homeland defense capabilities. Our proto-
typing efforts last year were extremely successful and aligned well with the vision
of combatant command-led Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) dem-
onstrations every 3 months.
We were excited to take operational lead for the ABMS Demonstration #1 in De-
cember 2019 and are partnered with United States Space Command for ABMS
Demonstration #2 in 2020. We’re looking forward to working with other combatant
commands for future ABMS demonstrations to globally integrate the ABMS develop-
ment efforts within the Department of Defense.

18. Senator PERDUE. General O’Shaughnessy, recent reports indicate that senior
Army leaders have expressed reservations about ABMS. The Army Chief of Staff
called the system ‘‘Air-centric’’. Additionally, the chief of the Army’s Futures & Con-
cepts Center said, ‘‘ABMS cannot be the sole solution, because it doesn’t account for,
in some cases, the scale of unique requirements of all the other services.’’ I under-
stand that an Army unit was also involved in December’s ABMS demonstration. To
what extent was Army leadership involved in designing and planning the December
demonstration of ABMS?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The Army and Marine Corps partnered closely with the
Air Force over the past year to develop joint fires capabilities that now have a cen-
tral role in the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). In the December
2019 ABMS Demonstration, we worked closely with the Army and leveraged their
capability to showcase command and control connections to an Army High-Mobility
Artillery Rocket System unit, which conducted a simulated strike on a target gen-
erated by the ABMS. We also integrated an Army Air Defense Artillery Sentinel
Radar system for detection and tracking of airborne threats, while connecting an Air
Force Special Operations Command ground unit to demonstrate individual-level
connectivity.
During the ABMS Demonstration #2 in 2020, we anticipate the Army’s participa-
tion in ABMS will grow considerably from their partnership in development of
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events on two of their major test ranges, Yuma Proving Ground and White Sands
Missile Range, as well as increased connections to Army Fires units. Additionally,
we are working closely with Army Futures Command to integrate its Integrated Air
and Missile Defense Battle Command System capability into the Air Force’s ABMS.

19. Senator PERDUE. General O’Shaughnessy, what will be the Army’s involve-
ment in future demonstrations?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I believe the Army’s participation in future demonstra-
tions is critical. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are currently working to integrate
Army Futures Command emerging capabilities and infantry unit-level connectivity
into the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), along with ex-
panding Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System connectivity.
Ultimately, the Army’s capabilities play an important role in development of a joint
system-of-systems architecture where any sensor connects to the best shooter at
every command and control node.

20. Senator PERDUE. General O’Shaughnessy, in Georgia, our Air National Guard
JSTARS operators are highly-trained and mission-capable, and I believe that these
operators can provide critical assistance as ABMS continues its testing and dem-
onstrations. To that end, I am pleased that the Air Force has invited the 116th and
461st Air Control Wings of the Georgia Air National Guard to the April demonstra-
tion of ABMS. In your view, to what extent will current Air National Guard
JSTARS operators improve your ABMS demonstrations and testing?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. We are working closely with operators from the 116th
and 461st Air Control Wings to further develop the operational concepts for the Ad-
vanced Battle Management System (ABMS). Our Blue Force team for ABMS Dem-
onstration #2 will contain two Air Battle Managers (ABMs) from Robins AFB. In
line with the Air Force’s efforts to develop a multi-domain operator career field, we
will work with the ABM community to create joint warfighters who can effectively
operate across all domains simultaneously. The airmen from Robins AFB, along
with others from the ABM community, bring valuable expertise that can be used
to design and build the Joint All-Domain Command and Control system to ensure
our competitive advantage against peer adversaries in the future.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY
SUBMARINE SURVIVABILITY POST-W76–2 MISSILE LAUNCH

21. Senator HAWLEY. Admiral Richard, some have argued that firing a missile
with the W76–2 would leave the firing submarine vulnerable to attack. Do you have
any concerns about our forces’ ability to safely perform split launches?
Admiral RICHARD. Introduction of the W76–2 has not changed the operating pat-
terns or objectives assigned to SSBNs and does not introduce any new
vulnerabilities to the force. Our submarine force has trained extensively for decades
and continues to train for this scenario, and I have full confidence that, if directed,
they can and will successfully execute such a mission.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED
METRICS FROM MILITARY DEPLOYMENT TO THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

22. Senator REED. General O’Shaughnessy, as I mentioned in my opening state-
ment, I remain concerned with the military utility of the ongoing deployment of ac-
tive duty forces to our southern border. Active duty troops are currently manning
Mobile Surveillance Camera (MSC) stations owned and deployed by CBP. Could you
tell us how many migrants active duty and guard troops have encountered or de-
tected while manning the MSCs, and if so, where exactly have they been encoun-
tered between legal points of entry?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. As of 27 May 2020, title 10 forces have detected 21,069
migrants in fiscal year 2020. Military personnel encountered a total of 780 migrants
during that same timeframe. Of these, 128 were encountered by title 10 forces, and
652 were encountered by title 32 forces. These encounters were near El Centro and
San Diego, CA; Tucson, Nogales, Ajo, and Yuma, AZ; Laredo, Del Rio, El Paso, Rio
Grande City, McAllen, Weslaco, Harlingen, Brownsville, and Fort Brown, Texas.
152
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
TROOPS AT THE BORDER

23. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, can you please provide this
Committee an update on U.S. Military operations at our southern border?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. We are assisting the Department of Homeland Security
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in four mission areas: 1) operating
mobile surveillance camera assets for detection and monitoring, 2) operational sup-
port such as motor transport maintenance, heavy equipment operations, and crisis
response force capabilities, 3) infrastructure support, to include barrier and fence re-
pairs, and 4) aviation support, to include light and medium rotary-wing, fixed-wing,
and unmanned aircraft systems. To maximize our direct support to DHS, our com-
mand and control structure is geographically-aligned with CBP sectors.

24. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, what are the current troop
levels at the southern border?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. As of 27 May 2020, there are 5,559 DOD personnel sup-
porting the southwest border operations. Of those, 3,112 are title 10 and 2447 are
T32 forces.

25. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, can you provide an updated
cost estimate for troop deployments for fiscal year 2019 and quarter 1 fiscal year
2020?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I defer to the DOD Comptroller. The Services and DOD
Comptroller capture costs associated with DOD support to our southwest border op-
erations.

26. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, can you tell us what re-
sources—if any—have been diverted to execute this mission?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services, deter-
mines sourcing solutions of units supporting the southwest border mission. Two
USNORTHCOM-allocated units have elements dual-purposed for southwest border
support, meaning they can be diverted to another mission if required by a higher
priority tasking. The first is the Aviation Brigade assigned to the Defense Chemical
Radiological Force that is providing 10 UH–60 aircraft in support of DHS. The sec-
ond is the Military Police Battalion assigned as the Homeland defense quick reac-
tion force while also serving as part of the crisis response force for southwest border
support. If a higher priority mission requires either of these forces, they can be di-
verted to that mission.

27. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, are there any unique capabili-
ties that the military is providing the Department of the Homeland Security that
they cannot provide organically?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. No. The support DOD provides to the Department of
Homeland Security is not unique to DOD. However, DOD is providing support with
capabilities and capacity that DHS lacks.

28. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, what is the criteria for with-
drawal of troops from the border?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The Secretary of Defense determines whether to support
requests for assistance from Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs
and Border Protection (CBP). DHS currently does not have sufficient resources to
meet all of their requirements on the southwest border.

29. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, last year—as the Operational
Commander when troops were initially deployed to the border—you said that you
felt that your perspective was considered in the decision making process. What is
your perspective now, and what is your current recommendation to this Committee
on the deployment of active duty troops to the southern border?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I continue to believe border security is national security
and that effective security reduces threats to the Homeland. While Homeland de-
fense remains the core mission for USNORTHCOM, we are providing military sup-
port to the Department of Homeland Security to help fill their gaps on the south-
west border.
153
30. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, what feedback are you getting
from subordinate Commanders on the impact of border deployments on mission
readiness and concurrent deployment commitments?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Deployments can have both positive and negative readi-
ness consequences. Feedback received through subordinate component channels and
deployed units indicates they have been able to conduct some individual-level train-
ing to help maintain or increase readiness levels.

31. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, have these deployments com-
promised readiness in the force providing services and units?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. As a combatant commander, I am a consumer of Service
readiness. Monitoring and evaluating force readiness is a Service responsibility.
That said, we continually seek ways to mitigate readiness impacts. We have been
able to keep some units at home station, which enables them to maintain readiness
and conduct normal training. For example, by dual-tasking aviation units for both
detection and monitoring as well as crisis response force missions, pilots are able
to fly and maintain proficiency vice standing alert. Marine Corps units are rotating
more frequently so that they are able to conduct normal unit training at home sta-
tion. All of these actions help to mitigate impacts to Service readiness.
ELECTRO MAGNETIC SPECTRUM/CYBER MANAGEMENT AND MISSILE DEFENSE

32. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Richard, your testimony highlights our need
to remain focused on hardening missile defenses and our strike capability in respect
to non-kinetic threats, specifically those that exist in cyber space or along the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum. You stated that, ‘‘Our adversaries have observed our use and
dependence on the Electro Magnetic Spectrum, and have developed and organized
their forces to achieve Electro Magnetic Spectrum superiority; it is essential we de-
velop capabilities and appropriately organize to counter this threat. ’’ How are you
testing and hardening your networks and lines of communication that allow you to
provide critical missile defense, deterrence, and strike against an enemy who has
specifically designed offensive capabilities to deny ours?
Admiral RICHARD. Our testing and certification process for Electro-Magnetic Pulse
protection implements established DOD standards, which include system level,
threat-relatable test protocols. We track the status of these assets and publish a re-
port annually. Infrastructure improvements require testing and validation as well
as periodic revalidation against threat relatable test protocols in order to maintain
their certified status. For example, the upgraded test facility at Patuxent River NAS
is expected to resume operations later this fall and the Air Force recently executed
a long anticipated test on a B–52 this past January.

33. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Richard, can you speak to the relationship you
have with CYBERCOM and the information sharing mechanisms that exist to com-
municate and respond to a non-kinetic attack—be it electronic warfare or cyber—
on our missile defense architecture or our strike capability?
Admiral RICHARD. USSTRATCOM communicates with CYBERCOM on a contin-
uous basis during steady-state operations and in crisis situations. USSTRATCOM’s
Cyber Operations Integrated Planning Element (COIPE) is provided to us by
CYBERCOM specifically for the purpose of facilitating coordination and information
sharing between our combatant commands. The COIPE collaborates on any intel-
ligence or observations from the field that potentially indicate a threat in and
through cyberspace to our critical mission systems, including our missile defense
and strike capabilities.

34. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Richard, can you highlight how you interact
with NORTHCOM and NORAD on missile defense in this regard?
Admiral RICHARD. From a cyberspace perspective, the same interaction and rela-
tionships exist with NORAD/NORTHCOM as they do with CYBERCOM. We have
an extensive amount of shared mission space with NORTHCOM when it comes to
the Missile Defense System and we have processes in place to accomplish the mis-
sion.
Day-to-day, our Joint Cyber Center and Cyber Operations Integrated Planning
Element collaborates with their counterparts at NORAD/NORTHCOM and other
combatant commands to stay current on any known or anticipated threats. We also
receive updates from CYBERCOM and the Intelligence Community via multiple se-
cure information sharing systems.
During a crisis, we are able to coordinate operational control and direct the activi-
ties of organic cyberspace defense forces within each of our Commands. If the de-
154
mand for defensive capability exceeds our capacity, we work with CYBERCOM to
request additional support or more specialized forces. In this situation,
USSTRATCOM would be working closely with NORAD/NORTHCOM to ensure we
are not duplicating effort and are maximizing our defensive capability on critical
mission systems.
35. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Richard, you are responsible for coordinating
global missile defense planning with other combatant commands, services, and
agencies that employ our Nation’s missile defense capabilities. Can you expand on
the maintenance of these complex relationships?
Admiral RICHARD. We maintain these relationships through constant outreach
and regular interaction with other combatant commands. We provide regional com-
batant commands recommendations in areas such as defense duration, defense suffi-
ciency, allied/partner missile defense integration, and risk to the global force
through the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) and its associated subordi-
nate groups to include the Operation Forces Standing Committee (OFSC). Our inde-
pendent analysis informs combatant command operational plan updates and assists
in their Integrated Priority List development.
Additionally, we provide support to the Chairman regarding Global Force Man-
agement and other assessments such as the Capabilities Gap Assessment and the
Annual Joint Assessment.
36. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Richard, how often you conduct exercises to
stress test these relationships and lines of communication?
Admiral RICHARD. USSTRATCOM exercises all mission areas while simulating
the need to conduct these missions in a denied and degraded cyber, space and EMS
environment at least twice a year in our global series Tier 1 exercises (Global Thun-
der and Global Lightning). Additionally, we also exercise USSTRATCOM missions
in support of other combatant command exercises while simulating these same con-
tested EMS conditions.
Our Global Storm exercises allow us to focus on specific objectives and procedures
for operating in a contested EMS environment; these are conducted several times
a year. During the last year we also conducted over 380 short duration (3–4 hour)
training events which focus both inside USSTRATCOM and with other commands;
these proficiency events test our battle staff members on various facets of command
control.
Finally, we have specific weekly exercises with combatant commands involving
challenging ballistic missile scenarios to test and stress interactions and lines of
communication.
All of these numerous exercise opportunities improve our ability and readiness to
successfully operate in future conflicts.
37. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Richard, in your current configuration and ar-
chitecture, which area presents you with the greatest challenge to meeting the Na-
tional Defense Strategy’s intent: deterrence, detection, or strike?
Admiral RICHARD. All of these areas are necessary, and all are challenged. We
now face multiple actors across all domains who constitute a strategic threat to the
United States, our allies and partners and we must recapitalize the capabilities as-
sociated within all areas that underpin our ability to meet National Defense Strat-
egy objectives.
While the problem has become more complex, the conceptual foundations of stra-
tegic deterrence remain sound, and we must continue the development of the next
generation of deterrence experts. Likewise, the detection capabilities we employ
today are the best in the world, but we must design and deploy the advanced meas-
ures, such as space-based capabilities, required to address emerging threats such as
hypersonic weapons.
Finally, our strategic strike capabilities are safe, secure and ready, but they are
rapidly approaching end of life. We must recapitalize our command and control ar-
chitecture, each leg of the nuclear triad and continue development of our conven-
tional hypersonic strike capability.

38. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Richard, what would you like congress to pay
attention to so we can better support your mission?
Admiral RICHARD. I thank Congress for your continuing support of
USSTRATCOM’s missions. An on-time budget ensures defense programs arrive on
time and are available to meet our warfighting requirements. Continuing resolu-
tions delay new program starts and impact critical programs such as the Columbia-
class SSBN from fielding when required.
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ELECTION SECURITY

39. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, in your advanced testimony
you talk about your efforts to open up lines of communication and integrate the nu-
merous agencies involved in the defense of the Homeland from both kinetic and non-
kinetic threats. You specifically mentioned that in December 2019, USNORTHCOM
hosted a cyber-forum that addressed election security and brought together all the
participating commands, departments, and agencies to ensure that you, ‘‘are aligned
and ready to defend our networks, critical infrastructure, and our democratic proc-
esses.’’ This is an overlap of several issues I am deeply concerned about—the protec-
tion of the privacy of our citizens, the infrastructure that keeps our economy run-
ning, and the democratic institutions and election infrastructure that will allow
American voices to be heard in 2020. Can you expand upon the cyber-forum that
addressed election security, and your key takeaways for NORTHCOM?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The December 2019 cyber forum included participants
from United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), United States Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM), the National Guard Bureau (NGB), as well as The Ad-
jutants General (TAGs). Representatives from the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) also participated, and we continue
to seek ways to improve information sharing with other federal partners.
Two key takeaways from the forum were the need for better communication chan-
nels among all partners for improved situational awareness, as well as a clearly de-
fined process for ensuring non-DOD partners understand how to levy DOD assist-
ance. We used these takeaways during Super Tuesday voting, when
USNORTHCOM, along with USCYBERCOM, NGB, DHS, DOJ, and the intelligence
community conducted real-time election defense coordination against foreign
threats.
40. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, what are the plans in the fu-
ture to keep conversations like this going as we move toward the 2020 election and
beyond?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead federal agency
for election security. In this role, we continue to work closely with DHS to defend
not only the 2020 elections, but future elections as well. USNORTHCOM will con-
tinue to refine our processes and exercise scenarios with our federal partners to en-
hance communications and streamline support to DHS.
41. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, in your testimony you state,
‘‘Our adversaries—including state and non-state actors—continue to actively target
military networks, civilian critical infrastructure, and our democratic processes
through network-based intrusions.’’ I am proud to say that the Connecticut National
Guard Election Task Force will be conducting cyber defense operations along with
several other states during the 2020 elections.
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The National Guard plays an essential role in defending
against malicious cyber activities targeting elections. I applaud the efforts of all Na-
tional Guard units supporting cyber defense of the 2020 elections.

42. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, can you speak to your plan to
integrate efforts such as those of the Connecticut National Guard—but also the role
of CYBERCOM and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency—to miti-
gate threats to our election infrastructure?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyberse-
curity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is the lead federal response agen-
cy for cyber election security and has been sharing information and providing assist-
ance to all organizations, including the National Guard, that request support.
USNORTHCOM, in partnership with United States Cyber Command, is assisting
CISA by providing intelligence information. Additionally, the National Guard Bu-
reau (NGB) has been sharing information and conducting tabletop exercises with
National Guard forces, and some states have already begun to execute support at
the state level.
THE THREAT OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND NEED FOR COGNITIVE SECURITY
(COGSEC)

43. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, the Emerging Field of Cog-
nitive Security (COGSEC) focuses on the evolving information environment and sug-
gests that in the future, governments, social platforms, and non-state actors will be
engaged in a continual arms race to influence—and protect from influence—large
156
groups of users online. This field was highlighted by RAND analyst Dr. Rand
Waltzman who previously testified in front of the SASC Cybersecurity Sub-
committee in 2017. I am concerned about these efforts to exploit the cognitive biases
of large public groups to support the execution of military objectives. This threat
was crystalized in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, in which information operations cam-
paigns targeted both civilian and military members of Ukraine based on their cog-
nitive biases to achieve a military objective, the annexation of Crimea. How can we
protect our Homeland from non-kinetic attacks like we saw in Ukraine?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Our adversaries have the ability to threaten our Home-
land in multiple domains—to include the information domain. Whether an attack
originates in cyberspace or in the physical domain, USNORTHCOM and NORAD
cannot deter what we cannot defeat, and we cannot defeat that which we cannot
detect. Protecting our Homeland in the information domain requires a collaborative
whole-of-government effort, and our contributions include intelligence support to in-
formation operations, cyber, and counter-messaging efforts in support of our inter-
agency partners.

44. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, what counter measure are we
taking now, or can we take in the future, to increase our defense of the Homeland
in this increasingly complex operating environment?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. As we defend the Homeland against threats in all do-
mains, USNORTHCOM is focused on countering adversary narratives by, with, and
through our fellow combatant commands and partners. In an age of rapidly advanc-
ing technology, strategic competition, and innovation, we cannot rely on antiquated
technology or outdated approaches. We are bringing new thinking, new approaches,
and new technologies to bear against our adversaries in order to defend our Home-
land. One such initiative is through the USNORTHCOM-created Homeland defense
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) program, which enables all com-
batant commands to conduct information operations as part of an integrated effort
to improve our Homeland defense.

45. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, great power competition in-
cludes being able to defend against adversaries like Russia, China, and Iran’s ability
to carry out non kinetic attacks on the Homeland. How do you see the problem of
our adversaries conducting information operations within United States borders?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Our adversaries possess the capability to threaten our
Homeland in the information domain. Defense against information operations re-
quires a whole-of-government effort, and close collaboration with a wide range of
partners. USNORTHCOM places a high priority on our support to the Department
of Homeland Security, U.S. Cyber Command, and other government partners to de-
fend the Homeland in the information domain.

46. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General O’Shaughnessy, over the past 10 years, we
have seen many attempts to destabilize the United States from the inside out and
subvert faith in democratic institutions. In coordination with CYBERCOM what are
you doing to protect the Homeland from these often invisible, but very meaningful
threats to the Homeland?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. In synchronizing efforts with USCYBERCOM, we are
bringing new thinking, new approaches, and new technologies to bear against our
adversaries to defend our Homeland. As we defend the Homeland against complex
threats in all domains, USNORTHCOM understands the status quo is not accept-
able and we are actively building a capable defense that provides a credible deter-
rent. In an age of rapidly advancing technology, rising strategic competition, and ex-
traordinary innovation, we are working closely with our partners in the Department
of Defense, to include USCYBERCOM and the National Guard Bureau to defend our
networks and our elections infrastructure to protect our critical democratic institu-
tions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE HIRONO
MISSILE DEFENSE OF HAWAII

47. Senator HIRONO. General O’Shaughnessy, in your written testimony you high-
lighted North Korea’s successful tests of ICBMs capable of ranging to most or all
of North America. How confident are you in the ability of the Ground-based Mid-
course Defense System to defend the United States against ICBMs fired from North
Korea, and does that confidence include ICBMs targeted at Hawaii?
157
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I am confident we can defend against an ICBM threat
from North Korea today, including threats to Hawaii. However, adversary capabili-
ties continue to advance. We are on the ragged edge for the Ballistic Missile Defense
System and need to modernize and advance our missile defense capabilities to keep
pace.
HOMELAND DEFENSE RADAR HAWAII

48. Senator HIRONO. General O’Shaughnessy and Admiral Richard, how impor-
tant is the Homeland Defense Raar-Hawaii (HDR–H) in terms of providing discrimi-
nating radar tracking information for the Ground Based Interceptors? Would there
be additional vulnerabilities or risks to Hawaii from evolving missile threats with-
out the HDR–H?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. I remain confident in our ability to defend Hawaii today
with the current Ballistic Missile Defense System and sensor suite, which includes
the Sea-Based X–Band Radar and AN/TPY–2 radars. In addition, the Homeland De-
fense Radar-Hawaii (HDR–H) could provide some improved capability for Ground-
Based Interceptor (GBI) defense of Hawaii. Specifically, the HDR–H could provide
further layered defense post-GBI engagement to track data to engage a threat not
intercepted by GBIs.
Admiral RICHARD. I defer to Commander, USNORTHCOM and NORAD to ad-
dress the importance of HDR–H radar tracking information to Ground Based Inter-
ceptors and associated risks to Hawaii in the absence of this capability.
HOMELAND SECURITY

49. Senator HIRONO. General O’Shaughnessy, Homeland defense is the number
one priority and focus of NORTHCOM and NORAD. In an era of cyber threats, mis-
information campaigns, hypersonic weapons and the growth of space as a
warfighting domain, how has the concept of Homeland defense evolved in the first
part of the 21st century?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. Given the changes in the global security environment,
the speed and complexity of war has accelerated such that future conflict will in-
volve all domains and will be trans-regional in nature. Accordingly, Homeland de-
fense is now an important consideration for all combatant commands, given that de-
fense at home and power projection abroad are acknowledged as interdependent ef-
forts. Homeland defense concepts and capabilities must continue to be at the fore-
front of planning and operations across the Joint Force in order to ensure our ability
to project power and influence abroad.

50. Senator HIRONO. General O’Shaughnessy, what metrics do you use to measure
the efficacy of programs foused on Homeland defense?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are driven by a single
unyielding priority: defending the Homeland. In order to defend against these 21st
century threats, our Homeland defense enterprise must reflect the fact that the
threats to the Homeland have expanded beyond the violent extremist threat that
led to USNORTHCOM’s establishment. Both USNORTHCOM and NORAD have re-
focused our efforts on deterring and defeating the complex nation-state threats and
adversarial strategies that have eroded our military advantage; our defense prior-
ities should continue to evolve to stay ahead of current and emerging threats identi-
fied in the National Defense Strategy. When acquiring capabilities to defend the
Homeland, individual programs are measured and tested to ensure they meet estab-
lished operational requirements.

51. Senator HIRONO. General O’Shaughnessy, what additional tools, if any, does
the United States need to develop further to address these evolving threats to the
Homeland?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. In order to effectively defend the Homeland,
USNORTHCOM and NORAD have developed a Homeland Defense Design (HDD)
consisting of three main elements: a layered sensing grid for domain awareness, an
adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), and new
defeat mechanisms for advanced threats, including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
hypersonic weapons, and small unmanned aerial systems. These three elements are
vital to deterring and defeating advanced threats to the Homeland, and
USNORTHCOM and NORAD are moving with a sense of profound urgency to bring
these capabilities into the fight.
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NORTH KOREA

52. Senator HIRONO. Admiral Richard, you have expressed STRATCOM’s commit-
ment to supporting DOD efforts to work with partners in the Indo-Pacific region to
reduce military tensions and support the achievement of the fully verified
denuclearization of North Korea. Given the variety of messages the United States
has received over the past year from North Korea’s leadership regarding the direc-
tion of their nuclear program, what do you think the next steps are to achieve full
denuclearization of North Korea, and what role can STRATCOM play in achieving
that goal?
Admiral RICHARD. USSTRATCOM supports the Department’s efforts to work with
regional partners to reduce military tension. I defer to the State Department for
their diplomatic efforts in achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of
North Korea.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN
NEW START AND ARMS CONTROL

53. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, can you tell explain how New START
verification help you do your job at Strategic Command? For example, how do you
use the 18 inspection per year and constant flow of information from Russia on the
whereabouts of their nuclear weapons to help protect the United States?
Admiral RICHARD. The verification regime enhances our ability to accurately as-
sess Russian capabilities which significantly contributes to our understanding of
their force structure and pace of modernization. For example, Russia’s new
Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle and Sarmat heavy ICBM will both be accountable
under New START and we will be provided access to those systems via the
verification regime.
54. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, the Trump administration is proposing to
negotiate a new arms control ageement that includes additional types of nuclear
weapons not covered by New START and also includes China. My understanding
is that such an agreement would be unprecedented and complicated. New START
expires in less than a year. Do you think it’s possible to negotiate and bring into
force a new trilateral arms control agreement before New START expires on Feb-
ruary 5, 2021? Is there a specific point at which you will recommend that the Presi-
dent extend New START regardless of the status of the trilateral diplomatic effort?
Is this country safer in a world where we have no controls over or insights into Rus-
sian strategic forces?
Admiral RICHARD. I defer to the State Department regarding the specifics for ne-
gotiating agreements. China has reaped significant benefits by not being bound to
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and has consequently built a sub-
stantial arsenal of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
I support any arms control agreement that enhances the security of this nation.
Russia has been largely compliant with New START (NST) as it sets a limit on the
number of deployed strategic weapons they have. However, as a bilateral treaty,
NST fails to account for thousands of non-strategic weapons and new systems in de-
velopment outside of the treaty definitions. In a perfect world, having all of these
attributes would make my job easier. When asked, my best military advice to the
President will be NST has served us well and we should preserve those treaty at-
tributes that are beneficial, seek to address those issues the NST does not address,
and remain cognizant of the limits of military advice to diplomatic initiatives.
Whether the world is safer without the insights provided by NST depends on the
evolution of Russian strategy and their forces absent such an agreement, and how
the United States strategy might need to adapt to address any changes. Our current
strategy and planned modernization as stated in the Nuclear Posture Review in-
cludes posturing our nuclear force structure and stockpile to hedge against these
prospective and unanticipated risks.

55. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, how does STRATCOM approach its mis-
sion of deterring China diferently from the mission to deter Russia? What adversary
presents the greater nuclear risk to the United States? Are you confident in your
strategic deterrence capabilities vis-á-vis China? How does the fact that New
START exists help you address the concerns you have with the risk presented by
Russia?
Admiral RICHARD. The deterrence strategies for Russia and China are broadly
similar as both countries pose an existential threat to the United States. For China,
159
our strategy is designed to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could
secure an advantage through the limited use of its nuclear capabilities or that any
use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is acceptable.
For Russia, the strategy is to ensure Russia understands that nuclear first-use,
however limited, will fail to achieve its objectives, fundamentally alter the nature
of a conflict, and trigger incalculable and intolerable costs for Moscow. Any use of
nuclear weapons, however limited, is unacceptable.
While Russia has greater nuclear capability today, China’s lack of transparency
and refusal to participate in arms control agreements produces considerable uncer-
tainty surrounding its intentions. China’s ongoing nuclear modernization, which in-
cludes it likely doubling the size of its nuclear warhead stockpile by the end of the
decade, is a glaring example.
Our current strategy and planned nuclear force modernization, in support of the
Nuclear Posture Review, includes posturing our forces and stockpile to hedge
against prospective and unanticipated risks from Russia and China.
New START helps address concerns regarding Russia. It provides a ceiling on spe-
cific strategic offensive arms and a verification regime (i.e., on-site inspections, data-
base exchanges, notifications) that permits visibility into Russian strategic offensive
capabilities.

56. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, what military developments by China are
most worrisome to you? If yo were asked for your military advice on which Chinese
nuclear weapons systems you would most likely to see reduced or eliminated, which
would you suggest?
Admiral RICHARD. While the full answer to this question includes higher classi-
fication considerations, there are a number of unclassified Chinese military develop-
ments that concern me:
• China’s investment in highly accurate medium- and intermediate-range bal-
listic missiles suggests that Beijing believes it can fight and win a regional
conventional war within the nuclear shadow.
• China is developing two new ICBMs to greatly increase the nuclear threat to
CONUS. Once operational, the DF–41 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic
missile will be able to strike most of the continental United States with mul-
tiple independently-targetable warheads. China is also developing the JL–3
next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile.
• Finally, China is investing in a defense industrial base capable of researching
and developing next-generation strategic capabilities, such as low observable
airframes, hypersonic weapons, quantum computing, artificial intelligence,
counter-space, cyber, and nanotechnology.
• See classified response for additional considerations.
My best military advice is informed by China’s actions, not its words. Their ongo-
ing nuclear modernization investments, their aggressive expansion activities in the
South and East China Seas, and the assessment that China will likely double the
size of its nuclear stockpile by the end of the decade, indicates China’s leaders either
no longer believe a small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to maintain a second-strike
capability, or they are pursuing a more aggressive nuclear strategy.

57. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, Russian officials confirmed that the
Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle an Sarmat heavy ICBM will be limited by New
START. Can you confirm this to be the case? Why is it important that New START
limits these systems—what is it about these specific systems that you find worri-
some? If New START expires, will you be concerned with the loss of transparency
into these brand new nuclear weapons?
Admiral RICHARD. Yes. Russian leadership made several public statements affirm-
ing Avangard did in fact meet the treaty criteria for reporting. A United States
team inspected the system in late November of last year. In addition, Russian For-
eign Minister Sergey Lavrov himself stated that the Avangard and Sarmat systems
will be accountable under New START (NST).
It is important for these systems to fall under the NST limits because they are
new strategic offensive capabilities. The NST imposes ceilings on these systems and
provides transparency, to the benefit of both parties.
The loss of the NST verification regime would reduce our ability to accurately as-
sess Russian strategic capabilities, including new systems like Avangard, Sarmat,
and others. The comprehensive deterrence strategy, as defined in the Nuclear Pos-
ture Review, includes the force structure and stockpile to hedge against prospective
and unanticipated risks.
160
A fully modernized nuclear Triad, including requisite NC3 capabilities and low-
yield nuclear weapons, provides the diversity and flexibility to tailor U.S. strategies
for effective deterrence as the geopolitical landscape evolves.
58. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, are the vast majority of Russia’s strategic
nuclear delivery systems coered by New START today? 90 percent of the systems?
More than 90 percent? Do you think this will be the case in 2021 as well?
Admiral RICHARD. One hundred percent of Russia’s strategic nuclear delivery sys-
tems are accountable under New START (NST) today. NST does not impose any
limits on the thousands of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons or developmental
systems designed to evade treaty restrictions.
It would be improper for me to speculate regarding the outcome of ongoing discus-
sions concerning NST extension.
SLCM–N

59. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, the Pentagon is currently undertaking an
analysis of alternatives for a ne nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile as pro-
posed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Did STRATCOM support President
Obama’s decision to retire the missile and warhead in 2010? If so, why?
Admiral RICHARD. Under General Cartwright, USSTRATCOM led a study which
ultimately recommended retirement of the TLAM–N [Tomahawk Land Attack Mis-
sile-Nuclear]. This recommendation was in-line with then President Obama’s policy
that the Nation needed to reduce nuclear weapons to the minimum required for de-
terrence and followed from the 1991 Presidential Initiatives to remove nuclear
weapons from all Navy vessels except Trident SSBNs.
The 1991 decision drove reductions in TLAM–N funding due to the need to sup-
port higher priority programs, causing TLAM–N readiness to degrade incrementally
and ultimately drove significant operational risk across the system. That operational
risk was the reason TLAM–N was retired and a suitable replacement was not pur-
sued.
When TLAM–N was retired, the threat environment was perceived as more be-
nign, and we determined the capability was not needed. Since then, adversaries
have increased their reliance on nuclear weapons by expanding their arsenals, modi-
fying policies for their use and adding new capabilities designed to complicate our
deterrence strategy. Russia has undergone a nearly complete modernization of its
strategic systems, while China has rapidly expanded their forces and will soon have
a nuclear triad of their own.

60. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, if a decision is made to renuclearize the
Navy’s attack submarine fleet with a SLCM, can you tell me what doing so would
entail? In addition to the cost to acquire the missile and warhead, would there be
additional certification, security, storage, and operational costs to maintain the ca-
pability?
Admiral RICHARD. The Navy is conducting a SLCM Analysis of Alternatives
(AOA) study; it is premature to presume answers to these questions at this time.
If the AOA concludes the Navy attack submarine is the appropriate platform, the
study would provide justification, trade-offs, and initial estimates of costs associated
with acquisition, sustainment, certification, security, storage and operational cycle.
I defer to the Navy to answer specifics on what is required and the associated
costs of acquiring a SLCM–N capability.

61. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, would arming attack submarines with nu-
clear SLCMs mean that each submarine could carry fewer conventional Toma-
hawks?
Admiral RICHARD. My response is stated in the answer to Question 60 above. I
defer to the Navy for specific SLCM–N AOA questions.
GBSD

62. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, according to the 2018 NPR, the life of the
Minuteman III ‘‘cannot be extended further.’’ However, in your testimony you did
not say that and instead said that extending the life Minuteman III (through 2070)
would be more costly than GBSD and that the Minuteman III cannot address future
challenges and threats to the ICBM force. Why did the NPR claim that the life of
the Minuteman III ‘‘cannot be extended further?’’
Admiral RICHARD. The 2014 GBSD AOA determined that the cost of pursuing the
GBSD program is comparable to a Minuteman III life extension program (LEP);
and, more importantly, will deliver the improved reliability, security, and effective-
161
ness required to meet current and future challenges—making replacement of the
Minuteman III system a more cost-effective choice. The 2018 NPR subsequently re-
affirmed the importance of maintaining an effective ICBM capability in meeting fu-
ture deterrence requirements, and endorsed continuation of the GBSD program.
We are six years removed from the correct decision to pursue GBSD over another
Minuteman LEP, and GBSD must achieve Initial Operational Capability before the
Minuteman III begins to age-out. USSTRATCOM continues to support GBSD as the
most expeditious, economical and cost-effective approach to maintaining the land-
based portion of our strategic deterrent force.
63. Senator WARREN. Admiral Richard, you stated in your testimony that the Min-
uteman III missiles ‘‘will have increasing difficulty penetrating future adversary de-
fenses.’’ But don’t the missiles contain a repertoire of countermeasures to overcome
such defenses? Unlike the United States, have U.S. adversaries figured out a way
to defend against a large-scale ballistic missile attack?
Admiral RICHARD. Minuteman III has carried a single countermeasure system for
decades. The 2014 GBSD AOA determined future adversary defenses will improve,
and GBSD must deploy improved countermeasures to defeat emerging challenges.
Today, no country can defend against a large-scale ballistic missile attack.
Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for developing and field-
ing missile defense systems, potential adversaries have long made substantial in-
vestments in their own missile defense systems. Russia and China are also devel-
oping ASAT capabilities that could threaten United States space-based assets.
For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding strategic missile
defense system deployed around Moscow, including 68 nuclear-armed interceptors,
and has fielded multiple types of shorter-range, mobile missile defense systems
throughout Russia. In addition, Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-
launched and directed-energy ASAT capabilities, and continues to launch ‘‘experi-
mental’’ satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance Russian
counterspace capabilities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TAMMY DUCKWORTH
GBSD CONTRACT

64. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Richard, can you explain why the Air Force de-
cided to move forward with a sole source award for GBSD, rather than canceling
the solicitation to rework the requirements and timeline to attract healthy competi-
tion?
Admiral RICHARD. I defer to the Air Force to answer specific questions regarding
the ongoing GBSD source selection acquisition process.
FTC INVESTIGATION

65. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Richard, the Federal Trade Commission issued
a civil investigative demand to the company that won the GBSD contract, request-
ing information on its bid. Before moving forward with sole source negotiations, will
the Air Force wait until the FTC investigation of the GBSD bid is complete?
Admiral RICHARD. I defer to the Air Force to answer specific questions regarding
any litigation related to the ongoing GBSD source selection acquisition process.
NON-NUCLEAR STRATEGIC THREATS

66. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Richard, during your confirmation hearing you
stated, ‘‘The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review was very wise in acknowledging the pos-
sibility that strategic attacks could be other than nuclear and start to set a policy
for us to address those.’’ Since this is most certainly a strategic capability our adver-
saries are pursuing, would you recommend any policy shifts in order to better ad-
dress deterring non-nuclear strategic attacks?
Admiral RICHARD. No. The NPR stipulates that a critical role of U.S. nuclear
forces is the deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack. Further the NPR recog-
nizes U.S. nuclear capabilities make essential contributions to the deterrence of
non-nuclear aggression. Accordingly, the NPR states the U.S. will maintain the
range of flexible nuclear capabilities needed to ensure nuclear or non-nuclear ag-
gression against the U.S., allies, and partners will fail to achieve its objectives.
Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for developing and field-
ing missile defense systems, potential adversaries have long made substantial in-
vestments in their own missile defense systems. Russia and China are also devel-
oping ASAT capabilities that could threaten United States space-based assets.
162
For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding strategic missile
defense system deployed around Moscow, including 68 nuclear-armed interceptors,
and has fielded multiple types of shorter-range, mobile missile defense systems
throughout Russia. In addition, Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-
launched and directed-energy ASAT capabilities, and continues to launch ‘‘experi-
mental’’ satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance Russian
counterspace capabilities.

67. Senator DUCKWORTH. Admiral Richard, should the Department be investing
in more research and development to counter non-nuclear strategic threats?
Admiral RICHARD. The Department’s current and projected R&D investments are
appropriate. R&D programs for artificial intelligence, cyber, autonomy, quantum
computing, hypersonics, directed energy and other innovative technologies will re-
sult in leading-edge capabilities to meet warfighter needs, defense priorities, and the
means to counter evolving non-nuclear strategic threats.
NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

68. Senator DUCKWORTH. General O’Shaughnessy, please tell me what actions
NORTHCOM needs to take in the coming year to better align itself with the Na-
tional Defense Strategy and great power competition?
General O’SHAUGHNESSY. USNORTHCOM and NORAD are aggressively imple-
menting the 2018 National Defense Strategy and executing the top priority of the
NDS: defend the Homeland. With that focus on the NDS, we are transforming the
USNORTHCOM and NORAD headquarters and our components while placing a
strong emphasis on integrating Homeland defense into global defense planning, ex-
ercises, and operations. We have also developed the Strategic Homeland Integrated
Ecosystem for Layered Defense (SHIELD) to provide a persistent, purpose-built de-
fense architecture. This forward-looking concept incorporates improved domain
awareness, joint all-domain command and control, and advanced defeat mechanisms
as critical pillars for defense of our Homeland.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, McSally, Scott,
Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal,
Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and
Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman INHOFE. Our hearing will come to order.
We meet today to continue receiving the posture statements.
There will be quite a few more. It is the time of year, and we have
General Tod Wolters—and I appreciate very much the time we
spent together in Munich last week—and General Stephen Lyons.
I appreciate the two and the years of service that you have donated
and given to your country.
As stated many times before, the Armed Services Committee’s
top priority is to ensure the effective implementation of the Na-
tional Defense Strategy (NDS). We pretty much—it surprised me,
Senator Wicker—how we have really stuck with that from the very
beginning. It means that we must ensure that in this era of great
power competition with Russia and China that our military serv-
ices are resourcing our combatant commands to address the chal-
lenge of strategic competition.
This is especially true of our two combatant commands
(COCOMS) that are here today. EUCOM [European Command] is
focused on deterring Vladimir Putin who has repeatedly shown his
willingness to use force to achieve his political objectives. Then
there is TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] whose focus on
full spectrum mobility operations includes sealift and airlift, both
of which face capability shortfalls.
(163)
164

I just returned from the Munich Security Conference with sev-
eral others here at this table. It was a great reminder of the impor-
tance of allies and partners as we deal with the challenges from
China and Russia. There are great opportunities to work with our
European friends especially in Africa, and I hope that we will con-
tinue to do that.
America’s commitment to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation] remains bipartisan and unwavering. We are matching our
words with action especially through our posture investments in
the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the upcoming exer-
cises called Defender 20, which will be the largest movement of
United States troops to Europe since the end of the Cold War. We
are talking about, in addition to the 10,000 already there, an addi-
tional 20,000, and so that is a large one. It is a record-setter.
General Wolters, I look forward to hearing about your priorities
going forward especially in the maritime domain where Russia is
increasing activity, advancing submarines and in air and missile
defense as China continues to threaten United States and allied
forces with its missile arsenal.
General Lyons, you recently stated that the aerial refueling fleet
is the most stressed in the U.S. Transportation Command’s arse-
nal. So we look forward to getting your thoughts on how we can
address the shortfall, much of which is due to the problems that
we have had with the KC–46. I am particularly sensitive to that
because I was honored to come back from all the way to Wash-
ington State to come back to Altus Air Force Base in the KC–46.
At that time—that was less than a year ago—I did not think there
was any problem with it. Obviously, there is.
Before we turn to Senator Reed, we would remind the members
that we will have a classified, closed, informal briefing at 2:30, and
that is going to conflict with some of the votes.
Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
to join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning. General
Wolters is testifying for the first time before the Committee in his
current position as Commander of United States European Com-
mand and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, or the
SACEUR.
General Lyons, I welcome your return to testify before the Com-
mittee on the posture of the U.S. Transportation Command.
Let me thank both of you for the many decades of military serv-
ice, and please extend our appreciation to the dedicated men and
women serving under your command.
The transatlantic relationship remains absolutely critical to U.S.
national security. Our close bond with our European allies and
partners is one of our greatest strategic advantages. In the fiscal
year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress
reaffirmed the unbreakable U.S. commitment to NATO.
I am concerned, however, that significant cuts in the European
Deterrence Initiative, or EDI, as proposed in the President’s fiscal
year 2021 budget request may send the wrong signal to our allies
165

and our adversaries regarding our support for the transatlantic re-
lationship.
The EUCOM Commander faces a wide range of complex security
challenges, including the reemergence of a revanchist Russia seek-
ing to reassert a claim to great power status. Russia is actively un-
dermining the rules-based international order that it views as con-
trary to its strategic interests. Russia has deployed its military ag-
gressively to attempt to coerce its neighbors and undermine their
sovereignty. Consistent with the 2018 National Defense Strategy,
EUCOM is developing the operational concepts, plans, and pro-
grams necessary for the strategic competition with Russia and to
ensure our combat credible military deterrent against Russia’s ef-
forts to threaten the sovereignty of our allies and partners. General
Wolters, the Committee will be very interested in whether you
have the force posture in Europe and resources to meet this chal-
lenge.
Additionally, Russia is engaged in a campaign of hybrid warfare,
below the level of military conflict, to advance its strategic inter-
ests. Recent news reports have highlighted that Russia is, once
again, conducting information warfare operations to influence the
upcoming United States presidential elections to advance preferred
candidates and sow division and undermine public faith in our
democratic process. I would be interested in how EUCOM is work-
ing with CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] and other agencies to
counter the Russian hybrid threat and what progress, if any, have
we made on ensuring a coordinated, whole-of-government strategy
to defend against Russian malign influence.
A major test of both EUCOM and TRANSCOM will come this
spring, as the Chairman has indicated, with the Defender-Europe
20 exercise. This exercise is about the transportation of a division-
sized combat force, the largest deployment of troops from the
United States to Europe for an exercise in the past 25 years. There
are some of us that still remember Reforger. In total, some 37,000
U.S., NATO, and partner forces will participate in Defender. This
exercise will highlight the combat-credible military deterrent pro-
vided by United States and allied forces against aggression in Eu-
rope.
Now, turning to TRANSCOM, the men and women of
TRANSCOM perform duties that sustain the entire Department of
Defense (DOD) effort in protecting our Nation’s security. With the
competitive edge and its ability to deploy and sustain America’s
armed forces, TRANSCOM provides DOD with unique capabilities
that we have come to expect and perhaps too frequently take for
granted. TRANSCOM forces are busy supporting all of the combat-
ant commanders every day, and without them, the United States
would be at a significant disadvantage almost everywhere in the
world.
The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a group of cargo ships held
in readiness by the Maritime Administration (MARAD). But it is
aging and will need to be modernized over the next decade. Three
years ago, the Committee authorized the Defense Department to
begin a program to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force. This pro-
gram will authorize DOD to purchase up to two foreign-built ves-
166

sels while the Navy designed a family of auxiliary vessels for a
number of uses, including recapitalizing the Ready Reserve Force.
Then, 2 years ago, Congress authorized the department to buy
five more foreign-built vessels as soon as the Department sub-
mitted a funded plan to build new ships for the RRF in U.S. ship-
yards, a plan we have yet to receive. General Lyons, I am inter-
ested in the status of the RRF recapitalization in fiscal year 2021.
The Defense Department also needs to ensure that the Civil Re-
serve Air Fleet, or CRAF, program, which provides as much as 40
percent of wartime airlift needs, remains viable and will be able to
provide needed surge capacity in the future. General Lyons, I am
interested in your views on the state of this fleet and if anything
needs to be done to ensure their readiness.
Our global transportation capability owned or managed by
TRANSCOM has been one of our asymmetric advantages of many
years now. However, we cannot assume that potential adversaries
will allow us free rein in this area in the future. Last year, we re-
ceived the report of the analysis of wartime transportation needs
in the Mobility Requirements Study. It was clear to the Committee
that the Department needed to continue the analytical effort to
identify requirements because the study presented last year did not
reflect implementation of the National Defense Strategy. General
Lyons, perhaps you could give us an update on where TRANSCOM
stands in updating this analysis.
Finally, TRANSCOM also faces a unique set of cyber threats be-
cause of the command’s extensive work with private sector entities
in the transportation and shipping industries. General Lyons, I
would like to get an update from you on where TRANSCOM stands
in its effort to improve its cybersecurity posture.
Again, let me thank the witnesses for appearing before the Com-
mittee today. I look forward to your testimony.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We will now hear opening statements. We will start with you,
General Wolters, and then General Lyons. Your statements should
be around 5 minutes. Your entire statement will be made a part
of the record. General Wolters?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND/
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
General WOLTERS. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, dis-
tinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear be-
fore you, and on behalf of the men, women, and families that rep-
resent USEUCOM, we thank each and every one of you for your
steadfast support. As all of you well know, it is an absolute privi-
lege to serve alongside the patriots that represent the United
States of America.
In Europe, political uncertainty, energy competition, and diffu-
sion of disruptive technology are stressing the established Western
order. Threats and challenges, most notably Russia, Iran, and
China, seek to take advantage of these conditions through aggres-
sive action using all instruments of national power and are backed
by increasingly capable military forces.
167

Fully aligned with the National Defense Strategy implementa-
tion efforts, we confront these challenges by adapting our approach
to most effectively employ our means. Together with the
likeminded allies and partners, our team of patriots defend freedom
in all domains across the area of responsibility and around the
clock. Thanks to their efforts and the authorities and resources you
provide, EUCOM continues to maintain positive momentum with
respect to readiness and is postured to compete, deter, and effec-
tively respond with the full weight of the transatlantic alliance.
In 2019, NATO took significant military strides with improve-
ments in command and control, indications and warnings, mission
command, and by approving a new NATO military strategy titled
‘‘Comprehensive Defense and Shared Response.’’ NATO continues
to adapt its force structure with the establishment of two addi-
tional NATO headquarters. Joint Forces Command Norfolk, which
is focused on maintaining transatlantic lines of communications,
and the German-led Joint Support Enabling Command focused on
rear-area logistics coordination. These headquarters increase our
ability to command and control, enable deployment, and sustain
NATO forces in crisis or conflict.
The European Union (EU), NATO, and EUCOM have made
progress improving infrastructure and transit procedures to facili-
tate rapid movement of forces across the Euro-Atlantic. We will le-
verage many of these advancements to facilitate deployment of a
division-sized force, as mentioned by the Chairman, during the
United States-led exercise Defender-Europe 20, an exercise that
showcases United States and allied commitment to collective secu-
rity of the Euro-Atlantic.
The United States’ position in Europe is an invaluable corner-
stone of national security. Today, United States servicemembers in
Europe continue to generate peace alongside our allies and part-
ners. We are grateful for sustained congressional interest and sup-
port through authorities and funding. Together with the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians of
USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Nation’s continued
commitment to defend the homeland forward and preserve peace
for the 1 billion citizens in the Euro-Atlantic.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Wolters follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL TOD D. WOLTERS
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished Members of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee, on behalf of the dedicated men, women, and their
families preserving peace in the Euro-Atlantic, it is an honor to testify before you
today. It is a privilege to serve alongside these dedicated patriots in a mission that
is essential to national security. Their selfless service and tireless commitment is
an inspiration. Together, with likeminded Allies and partners, our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and civilians work to defend peace and pros-
perity around the clock.
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) articulate how a free and prosperous Europe, defended by a capable and cred-
ible Euro-Atlantic Alliance, remains foundational to our security in an increasingly
competitive strategic environment. USEUCOM’s operations, activities, and invest-
ments are aligned with our strategies to meet the challenges of great power com-
petition from both Russia and China. Enabled by deep and meaningful Ally and
partner relationships, USEUCOM is ready to fight and win against capable adver-
saries should deterrence fail. We are proud of the collaborative work across the
168
Joint Force to implement these strategies and are grateful for continued Congres-
sional interest and support.
In Europe, political uncertainty, migration, energy competition, and diffusion of
disruptive technology are stressing the established democratic order. Competitors,
most notably Russia, China, and Iran, seek to take advantage of these conditions
through aggressive action using all instruments of national power, and are backed
by increasingly capable military forces. An environment exists where adversary
disinformation and destructive cyber campaigns can be amplified to foment insta-
bility. This nexus is testing national governments and multi-national institutions
like the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
RISKS AND CHALLENGES IN THE USEUCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

The USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers a large and diverse geo-
graphic area. It encompasses not only nations such as Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and
Israel, but a diverse set of perspectives from the Arctic, Iberian Peninsula, Medi-
terranean Sea, and Eastern Europe.
Russia
Russia’s sizable nuclear arsenal ensures they will remain a long-term, existential
threat to the United States. Russia’s vast non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile
and apparent misperception they could gain advantage in crisis or conflict through
its use is concerning. Russia continues to engage in disruptive behavior despite
widespread international disapproval and continued economic sanctions, and con-
tinues to challenge the rules-based international order and violate its obligations
under international agreements. The Kremlin employs coercion and aggressive ac-
tions amid growing signs of domestic unrest. These actions suggest Russian leader-
ship may feel compelled to take greater risks to maintain power, counter Western
influence, and seize opportunities to demonstrate a perception of great power status.
Over the past twelve years, Russia has invaded two neighboring states, violated
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, leading to the treaty’s termination,
developed new strategic platforms resulting in the Skyfallto deliverfor nuclear cruise
missile accident that killed 7 Russian scientists last year, weapons, and abrogated
its responsibilities under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, all
at the expense of strategic stability. Russia employs a below-the-threshold of armed
conflict strategy via proxies and intermediary forces in an attempt to weaken, di-
vide, and intimidate our Allies and partners using a range of covert, difficult-to-at-
tribute, and malign actions. These actions include information and cyber operations,
election meddling, political subversion, economic intimidation, military sales, exer-
cises, and the calculated use of force. Russian state-sponsored cyber actors have at-
tacked NATO member government and commercial data networks. Russian proxies
continue their attempt to undermine democratic institutions through concerted elec-
tion meddling against the United States, Allies, and partners.
Beyond Europe, Russia is working to build influence in the Arctic, Latin America,
Africa, and the Middle East. They are pursuing a partnership of convenience with
China to close off the current free and open international order. By probing United
States, Allied, and partner response thresholds, Russian leadership plays a dan-
gerous game fraught with the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
The Kremlin continues to maintain robust levels of defense spending, modernizing
its forces across the board, with the intent of building a more flexible and rapidly
deployable force to provide an enhanced capability to seize and maintain the initia-
tive in both competition and conflict. Russia continues to rotate its forces through
active conflicts in Syria and Ukraine to improve, test, and validate combat capabili-
ties. Russia counts on its malign influence capabilities, conventional military, and
nuclear forces to underwrite this aggressive approach. Modern Russian Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), cyber and electronic warfare systems, counter-
space, and long-range precision fires capabilities are postured and employed to chal-
lenge United States and Allied warfighting systems, doctrine, and authorities.
Ukraine
Following the purported annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and its proxies con-
tinue their campaign to destabilize Ukraine’s defense, economic, and political sectors
with the intent of cementing Ukraine into the Kremlin’s sphere of influence. Of par-
ticular concern is the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, instigated and stoked
by Russia. Even with the implementation of the Minsk agreements, ceasefire viola-
tions occur often. Russia also continues to undermine the government of Ukraine
through cyber-attacks, support of illegitimate elections in eastern Ukraine, and ag-
gressive actions in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, including an attack on Ukrainian
naval vessels. Contrary to Russian efforts, these coercive actions have energized
169
Ukrainian civil society and reinforced aspirations to membership in Euro-Atlantic
institutions like the EU and NATO. The recent election of President Zelenskyy fur-
ther solidified this pro-Western course. Ukraine has enhanced its commitment to
fighting corruption and enacting defense reform, including by meeting the require-
ments of our Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).
Poland and Baltics
Poland and the Baltics remain a strategic focal point for both NATO and Russia.
For NATO, this is the region at the greatest risk of Russian aggression and miscal-
culated escalation due to historical grievances and geographic position. For the
Kremlin, Polish and Baltic geopolitical alignment with the West are reminders of
a withered sphere of control, of the rush toward NATO’s open door, isolation of its
Kaliningrad exclave, and lost access to the Baltic Sea from the Russian mainland.
The Kremlin sees the region’s substantial ethnic Russian population as a potential
justification for intervention. It actively targets this population with extensive prop-
aganda and malign influence operations. While NATO forces in the region currently
help deter any overt Russian attack, Russian military forces in the Western Military
District and Kaliningrad hold a geographic advantage and outnumber NATO forces
postured in the region. Russia is actively employing malign information and cyber
operations in an attempt to weaken regional stability and Alliance resolve. Allies
in the region are deepening their knowledge and expertise in the cyber and informa-
tion domains to the benefit of the United States and the Alliance. Poland’s defense
budget increases, burden-sharing basing offers with the United States, and on-going
modernization that include Patriot and F–35 acquisitions, provide significant capa-
bility enhancements in the region and demonstrate resolve to meet and exceed the
2014 Wales Summit commitments.
South Caucasus
The Kremlin exerts influence over countries in the South Caucasus through ma-
nipulation of regional tensions and enduring military conflicts with all instruments
of national power. The Kremlin believes chronic instability in this area is central
to regional hegemony. Russia maintains leverage over Georgia through its occupa-
tion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including its attempts to alter the administra-
tive boundary lines of occupied territories, interfere with the transit of people and
goods within Georgia’s sovereign territory, and complicate Georgia’s NATO member-
ship aspirations.
Russia also maintains its political influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan by play-
ing both sides of the enduring conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, while questionably
serving as a neutral mediator in the Minsk Process peace negotiations. As an exam-
ple of supplying both sides of the conflict, Russia provides military grant assistance
to Armenia, a Collective Security Treaty Organization member, while simulta-
neously selling advanced military systems and hardware to Azerbaijan. Russia also
influences support of operations farther abroad, such as convincing Armenia to de-
ploy forces to Syria as part of the Russian contingent support for Assad’s regime.
Balkans
The Balkans remain a strategically important region where ethnic tensions within
nations and between neighbors continue to foster regional instability and are pri-
mary targets of persistent Russian malign influence. Aside from historical and cul-
tural ties with the Balkan region, Russia views the sustainment of social and polit-
ical tensions in the region as a central tenet of its goal to prevent individual Balkan
nations from progressing on a path toward Euro-Atlantic alignment and integration.
Nonetheless, Montenegro, and soon North Macedonia’s accession into NATO rep-
resent tremendous success stories in spite of Russia’s significant attempts to block
and dissuade integration.
Despite Kosovo declaring independence in 2008, Russia, China, and several other
nations have yet to recognize its status as a sovereign nation. Kosovo, and neigh-
boring Serbia, have not yet normalized relations, but despite tensions, we continue
to encourage both parties to maintain dialogue to find a peaceful solution. The prin-
cipal stabilizing force in Kosovo remains NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), which in-
cludes a small, but significant United States contribution. KFOR’s presence will re-
main essential to stability while Serbia and Kosovo pursue a stable relationship
through the planned 10-year transition of the Kosovo Security Forces.
Serbia has attempted to find a balance between Russia and the West but finds
its EU ambitions impeded by internal corruption, structural and economic chal-
lenges, EU–Russia sanctions, and the requirement to normalize relations with
Kosovo. China has emerged as an alternative patron, engaging in both economic and
defense support matters.
170
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains mired in political and ethnic instability. Fueled
by Russian influence, obstructionistsseek greater autonomy for Republika Srpska to
weaken state-level authorities and frustrate progress towards further alignment
with NATO and the EU. Nationalist politics and entrenched ethnic divisions be-
tween Bosniaks, Bosnian-Croats, and Bosnian-Serbs challenge Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s ability to chart a path towards lasting stability.
Turkey
Acknowledging tensions and political disputes, Turkey remains a strategic United
States Ally, critical to NATO and United States interests in Europe, EURASIA, and
the Middle East. Home to the second largest military in NATO, Turkey borders a
volatile region and is geostrategically located to assist in countering Russia. Turkey
is also the only NATO member to share a border with Iran. Ankara continues to
view the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates as their greatest security
threat. From Turkey’s perspective, continued United States support for the Syrian
Democratic Forces remains the principal irritant to our bilateral security relation-
ship. Turkey’s intervention into Northeast Syria to address these security concerns
degraded United States counter-terrorism efforts and further harmed our bilateral
relationship.
Turkey’s purchase of the Russian produced S–400 air defense system is incompat-
ible with Turkish procurement of the F–35, the S–400 cannot be integratedwith
NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense command and control network.
Turkey’s role in countering Russia, however, is pivotal. The relationship between
Moscow and Ankara remains transactional. Both nations view the Black Sea region
as their natural area of influence and they continue to clash in Libya and are in
direct combat in Idlib, Syria. Both United States and Turkey’s long-term strategic
interests are best served by continuing to work together to improve counter-Russia
cooperation both bilaterally and through NATO.
Israel
Israel continues to face a complex set of evolving security challenges spanning the
spectrum of conflict. Regional instability is fueled by Iran’s efforts to threaten Israel
and Russia’s expanded involvement in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean.
Israel’s adversaries, most notably Iran, Hamas, and Lebanese-Hezbollah, have
taken advantage of this turbulence. Iran has positioned forces to threaten and at-
tack Israel, attempted to expand its influence, and increased lethal support to re-
gional partners.
Iran and its proxies have also made significant gains in asymmetric capabilities,
including advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems.
Iran remains committed to modernizing its military and continues to improve the
range, lethality, and accuracy of its ballistic missile systems and has the region’s
largest ballistic missile arsenal with the capability of striking targets 2,000 kilo-
meters beyond its borders.
Mediterranean and Southern Flank
While migrant and refugee flows from the Middle East and Africa have decreased,
steady movement of people across Turkey and through the Mediterranean continue
to stress European nations and the EU. Migration remains a major security and hu-
manitarian concern for Allies and partners across Southern Europe and consumes
scarce defense and security resources.
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO)
VEOs remain a transregional threat with decentralized command and control, fi-
nance, and facilitation networks spanning from conflict zones into Europe. These ex-
tremists continue to take advantage of instability in North Africa, Iraq, and Syria
to hide and husband resources in the face of coalition gains. VEO-inspired and orga-
nized attacks in Europe further complicate integration efforts, isolate refugee and
migrant communities, and make these groups vulnerable to recruitment. Despite
the death of al-Baghdadi, ISIS and other VEOs still require persistent global pres-
sure to prevent a resurgence and preclude future attacks against the Homeland, Eu-
rope, and our global partners.
China
China’s aggressive economic and diplomatic activities in the USEUCOM AOR sig-
nal Beijing’s desire to build influence in Europe to tilt the international order to its
advantage. Seventeen Central and Eastern European nations have joined the China-
led, 17+1 framework for cooperation. Many European countries, including the 17+1,
are also signatories to China’s One Belt One Road Initiative. China also pursues bi-
lateral deals with targeted nations to build infrastructure and secure agreements
171
enabling cost-effective global trade. Chinese foreign direct investment and Chinese-
backed business ventures in Europe provide China an avenue to exert influence at
the expense of long-term United States, Allied, and partner interests.
Of particular concern are China’s efforts to expand 5G networks into Europe
through state-backed firms like Huawei and ZTE. These networks place intellectual
property, sensitive technology, and private personal information at heightened risk
of acquisition and exploitation by the Chinese government. This ongoing initiative,
coupled with China’s growing interest and investment in European ports and infra-
structure, complicates steady-state and contingency operations. We continue to ar-
ticulate this risk to European defense counterparts and highlight shared values, in-
terests, and business practices that distinguish the United States as a partner of
choice. We see encouraging signs from European nations as they become increas-
ingly wary of strings attached to Chinese capital and investment.
USEUCOM OPERATIONS, ACTIVITIES, INVESTMENTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES

Strategy Implementation
We confront challenges in the USEUCOM AOR by adapting our thinking and ap-
proach to meet assigned missions as detailed in capstone strategy documents and
maintain laser-sharp focus on expanding the competitive space with Russia.
USEUCOM acts as Coordinating Authority for the Russia problem set by overseeing
the global coordination of day-to-day operations, activities, and investments. In this
role, USEUCOM advises the Secretary of Defense on resource, force structure, and
synchronization of Department of Defense activities to deter Russia and curb its
global malign activities.
USEUCOM tirelessly works with the U.S. interagency, Allies, and partners to ad-
dress the evolving challenges posed by our adversaries. In this increasingly competi-
tive security environment, we remain vigilant to ensure any challenge or challenger
is met with a lethal, responsive, and resilient force, in all domains, in every stra-
tegic direction, and with a capable set of Allies and partners.
Support NATO’s Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area
USEUCOM’s primary mission is to deter and ‘‘posture’’ to respond to aggression
with the full weight of the NATO Alliance. In 2019, NATO took significant steps
toward improving command and control and other military capabilities to meet the
challenges and complexities of a dynamic security environment. NATO’s Military
Committee approved a new NATO Military Strategy, Comprehensive Defense and
Shared Response. NATO continued implementation of the adapted NATO Command
Structure with the establishment of two additional NATO headquarters: Joint
Forces Command Norfolk, focused on maintaining trans-Atlantic lines of commu-
nications, and the German-led, Joint Support Enabling Command, focused on rear-
area security and logistics coordination. These headquarters increase our ability to
command and control and will organize and enable the deployment and sustainment
of NATO forces in crisis or conflict. The EU, NATO, and USEUCOM have made
progress improving infrastructure and transit permissions to facilitate the rapid
movement of forces and logistic support across the Euro-Atlantic. We will ‘‘leverage’’
and ‘‘proof’’ many of these advancements during the United States led Exercise DE-
FENDER–Europe 20 this spring. The NATO Readiness Initiative will ensure
NATO’s ability to respond to aggression rapidly by identifying 30 battalions, 30 air
squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels, for use in 30 days. Finally, the forthcoming
accession of North Macedonia as the 30th member of NATO demonstrates the vi-
brancy of the Alliance through its Open Door Policy while continuing to show the
strength of purpose in defending shared values in the face of Russian malign influ-
ence.
NATO members contribute to common defense through capability investments,
support to Alliance members, and continued participation in operations, missions,
and exercises. Poland’s acquisition of F–35s and Patriot air defense capability, Ro-
mania’s acquisition of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) long-range
fires capability, and the fielding of F–35s by Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and the
United Kingdom are increasing interoperable combat power across the AOR. NATO
members provide host nation support to forward-stationed United States Forces
across the region and participate in Alliance and U.S. multi-lateral exercises focused
on enhancing responsiveness and interoperability. NATO members contribute forces
to ongoing NATO and United States-led coalition missions advancing and securing
our common interests in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria. NATO members help
underwrite infrastructure investments, defraying costs of United States military
construction in theater through the NATO Security Investment Program.
172
As NATO fortifies its position against a resurgent Russia, ballistic missile threats
from Iran, and the continued threat of international terror groups, United States
leadership within the Alliance is critical for ongoing activities to address competi-
tion and ensure combat-credible military forces are trained and postured to deter
any would-be aggressor. USEUCOM plays an important role in exercising this lead-
ership through our support to ongoing NATO operations, missions and engagements
as NATO adapts to ensure it is an Alliance fit for purpose.
USEUCOM’s participation in NATO operations and activities demonstrates U.S.
commitment to the Alliance. United States soldiers stand ready in Poland as part
of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence mission in one of four battlegroups holding
the line against Russian aggression in Poland and the Baltics. United States air-
crews fly alongside Allies as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission, helping to safe-
guard the sovereignty of Baltic airspace against Russian incursions. A U.S. de-
stroyer operates as the flagship of Standing NATO Maritime Group One, responding
to maritime challenges in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Baltic Sea. The Eu-
ropean Phased Adaptive Approach, including the Aegis Ashore in Romania and
United States Aegis destroyer presence in the Mediterranean, provides the founda-
tion of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense capability.
The support Congress provides through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
has been critical to our deterrence and posture successes in the USEUCOM AOR.
Through EDI, we have enhanced our presence in the theater to assure Allies and
deter adversaries. Increases of forward-stationed and rotational forces continue to
improve our posture and enable us to compete and win in a multi-domain crisis or
conflict. EDI funding for exercises, training, and building partner capacity programs
enhance the readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Alliance forces. EDI funds
have also improved our ability to respond using prepositioned stocks and improved
theater infrastructure. Together, these improvements enable the rapid deployment
and sustainment of forces. Section 333-funded Security Cooperation initiatives are
pivotal components to EDI. Programs such as the Black Sea Maritime Initiative and
enhancing Baltic Integrated Air and Missile Defense are potent, regionally-focused,
components of a resilient theater posture.
We continue to improve the infrastructure to enable swift response in any contin-
gency. On the ground, we are establishing a U.S. armored division capability
through the combination of forward-stationed and rotational forces. Army
Prepositioned Stocks in Europe hold equipment and logistics for an Armored Bri-
gade Combat Team and key enablers, facilitating increased lethality by rapidly inte-
grating deployed units into operations. United States Army Europe, with extensive
participation by NATO member states, will exercise this capability in the first de-
ployment and exercise of a division echelon formation on NATO’s eastern flank since
the end of the Cold War in Exercise DEFENDER–Europe 20 this spring.
In the air domain, we are improving the mix of 4th and 5th generation fighter
aircraft stationed in the theater along with rotational forces from the U.S. to en-
hance our IAMD networks and underwrite our Allies’ efforts to enhance air defense
systems. The build-out of European Contingency Air Operation Sets and Deployable
Air Base Sets enhance the resiliency of our forces.
In the maritime domain, we see predictable Carrier Strike Group and Amphibious
presence as key elements of an agile theater posture. The reactivation of U.S. Sec-
ond Fleet provides necessary maritime command and control capability in the Atlan-
tic, while reinforcing NATO’s western flank.
In the space domain, we are building an integrated planning element to leverage
the capability USSPACECOM is building to ensure our ability to plan and execute
multi-domain operations.
We have leveraged the Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) model to re-affirm our
commitment to Allies, deploy diverse military capabilities within the AOR to im-
prove our deterrent posture, and demonstrate operational unpredictability to adver-
saries. DFE deployments have included posturing the HARRY S. TRUMAN strike
group from the Mediterranean to the High North, deploying a Terminal High Alti-
tude Defense (THAAD) battery to both Israel and Romania, Bomber Task Force mis-
sions throughout the AOR, and an F–35 deployment to exercise with European Al-
lies, demonstrating our ability to rapidly generate significant combat power across
the AOR.
Rotational Army, Marine, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) maintain a pres-
ence on the ground in strategic locations across the theater. These forces work
alongside Allies and partners to deter aggression and build host nation defense ca-
pacity, interoperability, and readiness. DFE enables us to improve posture and unit
readiness simultaneously. In Eastern Europe, a rotational Armored Brigade Combat
Team and Combat Aviation Brigade are deployed as part of Operation ATLANTIC
RESOLVE to deter and are postured to respond if required. Rotational Marine
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Forces in Norway have improved an important position on NATO’s northern periph-
ery while training in Arctic conditions alongside our Norwegian allies. Additionally,
the tangible improvements by individual European nations and the EU to enhance
military mobility throughout Europe is increasing responsiveness and combat capa-
bility. The EU, in consultation with NATO and USEUCOM, is investing 6.5 billion
euros for improvements to civilian and military dual-use transportation infrastruc-
ture across the continent.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. The fun-
damental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coer-
cion, and deter aggression. The strategic forces of the Alliance are the supreme
guarantee of the security of Allies and underwrite every U.S. military operation in
Europe. Since 2015, the Alliance has placed increased emphasis on the role of nu-
clear capabilities in its overall deterrence and defense posture, and continues to
adapt its posture to ensure its nuclear capabilities remain credible, coherent, resil-
ient, and adaptable to the changing environment.
USEUCOM fully supports the continued modernization and recapitalization of our
nuclear forces. Congress has recognized the importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear
forces after decades of deferred recapitalization and has substantially funded these
programs. USEUCOM fully supports recommendations in the 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review to deploy the W76–2 Low Yield Ballistic Missile and to pursue development
of a modern, sea-launched nuclear cruise missile. These actions would address a
perceived deterrence gap, raise the Russian threshold for nuclear use, and disabuse
the Russian Federation of the misconception there is any path to victory through
nuclear escalation.
Counter Russian Malign Influence
Every day, USEUCOM and NATO compete to challenge and counter Russia’s
below-the-threshold strategy, and to counterbalance the multi-faceted and capable
military power which underwrite its malign approach. We bring potent assets to
this ongoing contest through coordination with the U.S. interagency and multi-na-
tional partners. A key platform for competing with Russia on this front is the Rus-
sian Influence Group. USEUCOM co-chairs this effort with United States Depart-
ment of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to promote Whole of Gov-
ernment cooperation and to identify, attribute, and counter Russia malign activities.
Congressional funding for information operations activities enables USEUCOM to
challenge adversary narratives and disinformation on a daily basis. Our SOF forces
are another vital element of this approach working with European Allies and part-
ners to enhance defense institutions, border security, and resilience to Russian ma-
lign attacks.
In the Cyber domain, our Cyber Component (Joint Forces Headquarters Cyber
(Air Force)) and USEUCOM’s Joint Cyber Center, in coordination with
USCYBERCOM, continue to mature manning, facilities, and authorities to actively
counter Russian cyber attacks. Together, these elements also assist with the en-
hancement of Allied and partner cyber capabilities. Recognizing worldwide cyber ca-
pabilities of China, Iran, and North Korea, we work with other combatant com-
mands and interagency partners to enhance global cyber defenses and our ability
to impose costs on aggressive adversary behavior.
National Guard and Reserve forces maintain vibrant relationships and unique ac-
cess with Allies and partners through the twenty-six-year-old State Partnership Pro-
gram (SPP). With more than 500 engagements, through 22 active programs annu-
ally, the SPP provides unique opportunities to cultivate regional expertise and
strengthen personal relationships to improve readiness and alignment across the
AOR.
Recognizing the state of competition between Russia and the West, escalation con-
trol/management must be foundational to our approach as military forces deter and
posture to defend. We make extensive use of authorized military-to-military chan-
nels for safety deconfliction and to maintain strategic stability while remaining
operationally unpredictable.
Assist in the Defense of Israel
USEUCOM underwrites the United States commitment to Israel’s inherent right
of self-defense from growing regional threats and our defense ties remain an impor-
tant anchor of United States-Israel relations. USEUCOM conducts a robust series
of exercises, activities, and senior leader engagements. We work closely with Israel’s
Defense Force to help maintain their qualitative military edge over any potential
competitor. This assistance demonstrates our unwavering commitment to Israel,
support for stability in the Levant, and the containment of Iranian malign activity.
174
Advance and Strengthen Strategic Relationships
Our strong bilateral and multi-lateral ties with European Allies and partners are
invaluable and enable advancement of our shared interests in Europe and further
abroad. USEUCOM’s strong military-to-military relationships with defense counter-
parts across Europe signal continued United States commitment and are
foundational to these national ties, particularly with countries such as Turkey,
Ukraine, Georgia, and our Arctic partners.
Turkey remains a key United States and NATO ally. Turkey’s military strength
and strategic position further United States and NATO interests. Our military-to-
military relationships remain close.
Along Russia’s border, key United States partners see a brighter future to the
West and resist Russia’s efforts to hold them in a sphere of influence. Despite an
ongoing Kremlin-sponsored malign influence campaign, violence by Russian-spon-
sored forcesin the Donbas region, and the purported annexation of Crimea, Ukraine
continues to seek closer partnership with the United States. Security cooperation
funding provided through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative enhances the
capability of Ukrainian formations and EUCOM’s stated mission to deter Russian
aggression. American servicemembers on the ground in the Joint Military Training
Group-Ukraine work shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukrainian forces, helping to build
competence and confidence. NATO partnership mechanisms and funds reinforce
these programs and present a unified and coherent approach in our collective sup-
port to Ukraine. Maintaining this positive momentum and continued USAI funding
for lethal aid are essential to enabling Ukrainian forces’ ability to defend their sov-
ereignty against well-armed, Russian-backed forces.
In the Caucasus, where Russian forces occupy the Georgian regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Georgia continues to be a steadfast partner and contributor to
global security. Georgia is the largest non-NATO contributor to Operation RESO-
LUTE SUPPORT—NATO’s ongoing Afghanistan mission. Georgia’s commitment of
870 soldiers in support of United States operations in Afghanistan demonstrates the
enduring strength of our strategic partnership. USEUCOM assists Georgian forces
in preparing for this mission through the Georgia Deployment Program. We con-
tinue to support Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity by improving their
capability to generate and sustain capable defense forces through the Georgia De-
fense Readiness Program.
In the Arctic, changing environmental conditions present new opportunities for
exploration, trade, and interaction. USEUCOM supports Whole of Government ef-
forts to preserve the region as a place nations act cooperatively to address shared
challenges and where U.S. national interests remain secure. USEUCOM leverages
its close relations with USNORTHCOM and European Arctic nations to build Arctic
awareness, increase operations, and strengthen the free and open order to secure
the Arctic. These bilateral and multi-lateral strategic relationships enhance Alliance
efforts to deter Russian aggression and advance shared interests.
Enable U.S. Global Operations
Europe and the United States remain the foundation for upholding a free and
open international order. USEUCOM’s unique geographic location is essential to en-
able global operations through synchronization, access, basing, and overflight per-
missions within Europe. From this key terrain, USEUCOM acts in support of mul-
tiple Combatant and Functional Commands, Allied, Coalition, and U.S. interagency
operations. Basing, access, and overflight permissions are built upon mutual respect
and trust between the U.S. and our sovereign Allies and partners, and should not
be taken for granted. We work within the Whole of Government to maintain these
relationships, permissions under bilateral agreements, and to resist Russian and
Chinese strategic investments. Absent these agreements, we would be unable to
meet our treaty obligations or protect vital national interests. Beyond strategic posi-
tion, the shared values, trust, and longstanding relationships we have in Europe,
with some of our most capable and willing Allies and partners on the planet, enable
the U.S. to generate coalitions for worldwide operations in support of shared na-
tional interests.
Most recently, European Allies and partners proved essential in our national ef-
forts to deter Iranian aggression. Our Allies and partners enabled USEUCOM’s
rapid posture shift of United States Forces in response to potential contingencies in
the Levant. Key partners provided indispensable access, basing, and overflight per-
missions that enabled our ability to protect American citizens and diplomats in
harm’s way, had the security situation deteriorated. This recent example highlights
the value of European support to enable United States global operations that pre-
serve and defend our national interests worldwide.
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Conclusion
The United States’ position in Europe is an invaluable cornerstone of national se-
curity, built by our predecessors upon the wreckage of two world wars. Today, U.S.
servicemembers in Europe continue to generate global peace and prosperity along-
side our Allies and partners in the face of growing challenges. Revisionist actors,
most notably Russia and China, present formidable, long-term challenges to pre-
serving a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace.
We appreciate Congressional interest in these challenges and your continued
pledge to meet them through support, funding, and authorities . . . particularly po-
tent are support for European Deterrence Initiative and Ukraine Security Assist-
ance Initiative (USAI). EDI enables USEUCOM’s ability to enhance U.S. and Alli-
ance readiness and posture to quickly respond in crisis or conflict. USAI ensures
Ukraine has the resources and training to deter further Russian aggression.
USEUCOM sits in a strategically significant part of the world and the dedicated
men and women of the command unceasingly strive to be good stewards of the trust
our Nation has placed in us. Together with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
coast guardsmen, and civilians of USEUCOM, your support demonstrates our Na-
tion’s continued commitment to defend the Homeland forward and preserve peace
for the one billion people living in the Euro-Atlantic.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you.
General Lyons?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General LYONS. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Inhofe, Rank-
ing Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is
my honor today to represent the men and women of the United
States Transportation Command who at this very moment are em-
ployed around the globe conducting mobility operations 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
Our mission at TRANSCOM is enduring, and that is to project
and sustain the force globally at our time and place of choosing,
thereby representing multiple options for our national leadership
and multiple dilemmas for potential adversaries.
With 85 percent of the force element stationed in the United
States, it is TRANSCOM’s job to move forces and materiel in sup-
port of the Secretary of Defense’s strategic priorities. Our National
Defense Strategy underscores the importance of advancing our na-
tional security interests, deterring potential adversaries, and
should deterrence fail, responding with overwhelming force to win.
Power projection is a distinct U.S. comparative advantage, but we
are not alone in this effort. Our vast global logistics networks are
underpinned by a deep bench of allies and likeminded partners
that facilitate critical access basing and overflight activities.
Today, I am confident in our ability to successfully execute our
mission. This past year, with a no-notice alert, we moved the 1st
Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division to CENTCOM [Central Com-
mand] in less than 5.5 days. In total, we moved over 42 Army bri-
gades, refueled multiple bomber task force and fighter movements,
delivered 1.9 million passengers, over 6,000 patients, over 100,000
containers, and over 26 million square feet of cargo. Much of this
activity largely went unnoticed. This is good news and a sign of
sustained success across DOD’s mobility enterprise.
However, as the Chairman pointed out, our world is changing.
The National Defense Strategy describes a future in which
TRANSCOM must be able to project the joint force under all-do-
main persistent attack. We acknowledge that our success today
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does not guarantee success for tomorrow, and we are actively pre-
paring to meet tomorrow’s challenges working through contested
environment war games, enhancing cyber defenses and resiliency,
and improving the integration of the sustainment warfighting func-
tion across the joint operations.
To maintain readiness today, our aerial refueling and sealift
forces require attention so they can continue to meet current and
future challenges.
Before I close, I want to highlight the Department’s ongoing work
to improve the personal property program, an area of great interest
for Congress. As directed by the NDAA, we have submitted a busi-
ness case analysis and worked closely with the GAO [Government
Accountability Office] on their report. Both reports underscore the
need for change. The Department can no longer afford to operate
a disparate confederation of government activities supervising its
similarly disparate collection of hundreds of transportation pro-
viders. We are on track to restructure our relationship with indus-
try through the award of a global household goods contract that
will begin moving DOD families ahead of the 2021 peak season.
My message for DOD families: we heard your call for improved
accountability, transparency, and quality capacity, and we are com-
mitted to deliver.
My message for industry providers: if you provide quality service
for our military members, you have a place in the future program.
We need every quality moving service, to include our small busi-
nesses, and appreciate all that you do.
It is an exciting time to be the commander of USTRANSCOM,
and I could not be more proud of the team of professionals that cre-
ate the strategic comparative advantage called the joint deploy-
ment and distribution enterprise.
I am pleased to join General Tod Wolters today and look forward
to your questions. Thank you for your leadership and support to
our amazing servicemembers.
[The prepared statement of General Lyons follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL STEPHEN R. LYONS
DELIVERING FOR OUR NATION

U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) exists as a combatant command
to project and sustain combat power at a time and place of the Nation’s choosing.
Powered by dedicated Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve and civilian men and
women, we underwrite the lethality of the Joint Force, we advance American secu-
rity interests around the globe, and we provide our Nation’s leaders with strategic
flexibility to select from a range of options while creating multiple dilemmas for our
potential adversaries.
USTRANSCOM’s mission is to conduct globally integrated mobility operations,
lead the broader Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise, and provide ena-
bling capabilities in order to project and sustain the Joint Force in support of na-
tional objectives. We accomplish this by balancing strategic mobility requirements
for the Secretary of Defense and executing the Unified Command Plan roles and re-
sponsibilities assigned by the President. USTRANSCOM’s mission is executed
through three component commands and one subordinate command: the U.S.
Army’s Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, the U.S. Navy’s
Military Sealift Command, the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, and the
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the Joint Force to be strategically
predictable with allies and partners while being operationally unpredictable to com-
petitors. USTRANSCOM was custom built for such a mission. We enable dynamic
177
force employment and deliver options daily. In 2019, USTRANSCOM executed 43
brigade-sized overseas movements totaling over 26 million square feet of military
cargo in support of all six Geographic Combatant Commands. In the air,
USTRANSCOM operated from all seven continents. We transported 1.9 million pas-
sengers and 1.3 million tons of cargo, and during air-to-air refueling operations we
dispensed 956.6 million gallons of fuel. Our aerial evacuation crews executed 6,609
patient movements, including 84 with battle injuries. One evacuation in particular
stands out as highlighting how USTRANSCOM integrates the incredible capabilities
of our Joint Force to protect American interests globally. Last August, a U.S. soldier
with life-threatening wounds required immediate evacuation from Afghanistan to a
stateside hospital for complex trauma treatment. A team of 18 joint medical profes-
sionals—armed with key life-saving capabilities—made a 19-hr non-stop flight from
Afghanistan to Texas aboard a USTRANSCOM aircraft. The soldier is alive today
because of the U.S. values embodied in the Joint Force and enabled daily by
USTRANSCOM.
As envisioned in the NDS, our operational focus has shifted from routine force ro-
tations in Southwest Asia to posturing for Great Power Competition globally. Our
accomplishments from 2019 underscore USTRANSCOM’s ability to respond any-
where in the world at scale, in order to assure our allies, deter our adversaries, and
ensure our national leaders always have options.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The world is changing. In the past, we were able to deploy our forces when we
wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and employ them how we wanted. In the
future, the NDS calls us to be able to project and sustain the Joint Force under per-
sistent, all-domain attack. Our competitors, such as China and Russia, clearly recog-
nize the United States’ ability to rapidly scale and deliver the Joint Force globally
as a strategic comparative advantage, and they seek to deny it. Today, adversaries
are active in the cyber domain. They infiltrate contract value chains. They invest
in critical global choke points. They attempt to erode geopolitical access. They de-
velop increasingly potent anti-access and area-denial weapons. These are clear indi-
cators of their intent and reflect the changing character of war. In the future, stra-
tegic mobility will remain critical to delivering dynamic and credible response op-
tions to guarantee our national security interests. Strengthened by a historic past
but with a critical eye towards the future, USTRANSCOM aims to remain ready to
answer our nation’s call.
USTRANSCOM’S WARFIGHTING FRAMEWORK

The key to conducting globally-integrated mobility operations is the dynamic syn-
chronization of our 1) global mobility posture, 2) global mobility transportation ca-
pacity, and 3) global command, control, and integration. These critical elements cre-
ate USTRANSCOM’s warfighting framework and allow USTRANSCOM to respond
to strategic priorities in both time and space.
GLOBAL MOBILITY POSTURE

Global Mobility Posture is the foundation of power projection, starting in the Con-
tinental United States (CONUS) with Department of Defense (DOD) installations
and the seaports, railways, and the highways that connect them. In close coordina-
tion with the Department of Transportation, the Strategic Seaport Program, Stra-
tegic Corridor Rail Network, and Strategic Highway Network provide 23 strategic
seaports, 15 alternate seaports, 37,000 miles of strategic railways, and over 62,000
miles of interstate and major highways to project combat power from the fort, to
the port, and on to the battlefield.
Beyond our nation’s borders, USTRANSCOM relies on a deep bench of allies and
like-minded partners that have stood with us for over 75 years in defense of free-
dom. These allies and partners provide access to key regions and support a substan-
tial basing and logistics system which expands our nation’s global reach. Through
a flexible, redundant, and resilient global posture, USTRANSCOM enables the DOD
to project and sustain a combat credible force that can deter adversaries, protect our
national security interests, and when necessary, respond to win decisively.
GLOBAL MOBILITY CAPACITY

Global Mobility Capacity includes the transportation conveyances and platforms
used to move troops, fuel, and equipment within global transportation networks, in-
cluding rail, motor transport, sealift, aerial refueling, and airlift. 60–70 percent of
178
USTRANSCOM’s mobility capacity resides in the reserve component, underscoring
the importance of a Total Force approach.
USTRANSCOM is inextricably linked to the commercial transportation industry
which provides important augmentation in peace and war. Utilizing commercial
partners expands USTRANSCOM’s global reach as well as access to valuable com-
mercial intermodal transportation systems and freight management capabilities, but
carries with it vulnerabilities we will need to mitigate. Emergency preparedness
programs like the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) augment USTRANSCOM’s global mobility capacity during con-
tingency operations. Incentive programs like the Maritime Security Program offset
costs incurred to maintain a U.S.-flagged fleet, strengthening the American sealift
industry for both economic trade and national defense. Currently, these programs
are fully subscribed and funded. This year, on behalf of the Department,
USTRANSCOM is leading a Congressionally-directed study on U.S.-flagged fuel
tanker vessel capacity, evaluating accessibility to domestic and international tank-
ers in order to satisfy the demands of the NDS in times of war.
With 85 percent of the Joint Force based in CONUS, Global Mobility Capacity is
critical in projecting overwhelming military force at a time and place of our Nation’s
choosing, and it serves as a deterrent to conflict by demonstrating our ability to
credibly defend our security commitments. Overall, we assess USTRANSCOM’s
global mobility capacity as adequate, but with elevated and increasing risk. NDS
requirements in daily competition and in times of war place high demands on aging
mobility capabilities. When coupled with adversaries that have the capability and
intent to contest our operations across all domains, it creates a daunting environ-
ment for future operations. Specifically, USTRANSCOM assesses elevated risk in
our two highest priorities: Aerial Refueling and Sealift.
AERIAL REFUELING

The aerial refueling fleet is USTRANSCOM’s most-stressed capability and num-
ber one readiness concern. The aerial refueling fleet continues to underpin the Joint
Force’s ability to deploy an immediate force across all NDS mission areas and is
comprised of KC–135, KC–10, and KC–46 aircraft.
The KC–46 is an important aspect of tanker modernization as it will enable us
to project and employ the force in a complex battlespace against a high-end adver-
sary. However, delays in delivery of capable KC–46s combined with reductions of
KC–10s and KC–135s create a critical and deepening gap in taskable aerial refuel-
ing aircraft and aircrews for the next 5–7 years. This combination of factors elevates
risk to not only wartime missions, but also in day to day global operations across
multiple combatant commands. Reduced capacity limits options and constrains deci-
sion space for senior leaders in crisis, as they are confronted with an earlier mobili-
zation timeline to generate adequate capacity. For Combatant Commanders to com-
pete daily, the Department must retain sufficient operational aerial refueling capac-
ity to provide adequate support to the Joint Force during the transition to the KC–
46. As the timeline to field taskable KC–46s continues to evolve, USTRANSCOM
recommends re-evaluating aerial refueling force structure plans annually.
SEALIFT

USTRANSCOM’s number two readiness concern is the Strategic Sealift Fleet. The
sealift fleet is responsible for moving approximately 90 percent of wartime cargo.
Sealift readiness rates have declined to 59 percent compared against a goal of 85
percent, with vessel material condition and age as the primary factors. Most sealift
ships are reaching the age where maintenance and repair costs are escalating and
service-life extensions will not yield proportional increases in readiness. Starting in
the mid-2020s, the sealift fleet will lose 1–2 million square feet of capacity each year
as ships reach the end of their useful life. That’s enough space to move two to four
Brigade Combat Teams in a single voyage. By the mid-2030s, over half the sealift
fleet will be unusable, placing an unacceptable risk on the Joint Force, especially
the Army, to deliver large-scale combat power over the ocean. To prevent this detri-
mental loss of capacity, the Department needs to recapitalize the fleet with newer
and more reliable vessels. USTRANSCOM continues to support the Navy’s plan to
acquire used vessels as the near-term solution that yields the greatest value. Cur-
rently, Congress has provided authority to purchase seven vessels, and the Navy
has provided funding for two in fiscal year 2021. This is an important first step to
improve fleet reliability, but we have much work ahead to lay out a long-range plan.
In September the DOD conducted the largest no-notice sealift activation exercise
in the command’s history, assessing the entire fleet and activating over half the
surge sealift vessels. The exercise validated known concerns regarding the degraded
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readiness of the Organic Surge Fleet. Simply put, the surge fleet is challenged today
to be immediately available for large-scale inter-theater force deployment without
delays or impacts to force closure. These findings reinforce the need for recapitaliza-
tion, appropriate levels of resourcing for maintenance and repair, and continued em-
phasis on readiness improvements.
GLOBAL COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTEGRATION

Global Command, Control, and Integration is central to our ability to make deci-
sions at echelon to create desired mobility outcomes. It creates shared under-
standing in order to align scarce mobility resources consistent with the highest stra-
tegic priorities. Global Command, Control, and Integration is imperative to retain
our strategic comparative advantage to project and sustain the Joint Force globally.
As we prepare to confront the contested environments described in the NDS, we are
working on several initiatives to strengthen mission assurance in the cyber domain,
and advance decision making across the USTRANSCOM enterprise.
CYBER DOMAIN MISSION ASSURANCE

Cyberspace is a warfighting domain, without sanctuary, in which capable adver-
saries continuously attempt to degrade our Nation’s ability to project the Joint Force
globally. We continually evaluate our large and complex attack surface, evolve key
cyber terrain, secure our cyber area of operations, and actively defend our ability
to conduct global command and control. USTRANSCOM maintains a strong rela-
tionship with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the Intelligence commu-
nity, providing increased understanding of adversaries’ intent. Several rigorous ex-
ercises matured our ability to request active defensive measures from
USCYBERCOM, leveraging their unique authorities to assure our global command
and control in a contested environment. In addition USTRANSCOM is pursuing nu-
merous technical solutions to harden our key cyber terrain, to include a trusted
transaction pilot with USCYBERCOM.
In Great Power Competition, we acknowledge our commercial partners are both
a strength and a potential target. Since 2017, we’ve contractually required our
CRAF, VISA, and Universal Services Contract providers to perform annual self-as-
sessments based on National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) stand-
ards for cybersecurity, and we use these self-assessments to identify vulnerability
trends and share best practices with industry. We continue to provide targeted rec-
ommendations to help our commercial partners improve their own cybersecurity.
Lastly, we are reviewing data sharing requirements to limit our exposure to adver-
saries, and we’re strengthening cybersecurity language in our information tech-
nology and software development contracts. Overall, we assess our transportation
providers are taking cybersecurity seriously, and the NIST standards will help them
improve their security and resiliency – but commercial companies will always be
challenged to keep out advanced persistent threat actors.
ADVANCE DECISION MAKING

Information technology and computational processing continues to advance rap-
idly as we approach game changing capabilities like artificial intelligence, machine
learning, and advanced analytics, all of which have enormous potential to improve
USTRANSCOM mission outcomes. As we evolve to meet tomorrow’s challenges, we
are enhancing our ability to understand the operational environment, improving our
ability to develop options, and advancing our ability to make decisions at echelon.
Cloud computing, balanced cybersecurity, information sharing, innovation at echelon
and warfighting outcomes serve as our guiding principles as we modernize our dig-
ital portfolio.
The foundation for our success starts with data. USTRANSCOM fully endorses
the DOD’s Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure cloud capabilities and is an early
adopter of cloud technology. We have migrated 14 programs to a commercial cloud
environment. We are establishing an Enterprise Data Environment within the
cloud, coupled with analytic technologies, to speed decision making, free up human
capital, accelerate learning, reduce costs, and improve productivity.
DEFENDER–EUROPE 20

DEFENDER–Europe 20 exemplifies how USTRANSCOM employs this
warfighting framework and addresses the contested environment described by the
NDS to deliver national objectives. Over the next 4 months USTRANSCOM is exe-
cuting the largest projection of force to Europe in 25 years. 20,000 troops and 1.6
million square feet of military cargo will flow from 26 CONUS origins through a di-
180
verse network of ports, move across simulated contested waters under the watch of
Second and Sixth Fleets, and arrive as a combat credible force in EUCOM. As we
exercise the global posture, mobility capacity, and global command and control re-
quired to favorably shape Great Power Competition, DEFENDER–Europe 20 is a
powerful opportunity to deter potential adversaries, strengthen alliances and part-
nerships, and evaluate future contested environments.
DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY PROGRAM (DP3)

After assuming command in August 2018, I received letters from 15 members of
Congress and more than 40 staff inquiries detailing servicemember concerns with
the Defense Personal Property Program. Issues with industry accountability, a
shortage of quality capacity in summer months, and a general lack of transparency
within the Department were common—and accurate—criticisms. Since that time—
and after personal consultation with Service leaders and industry executives—
USTRANSCOM worked to fundamentally restructure our relationship with industry
to generate the quality capacity to meet DOD’s peak demand and enable the Depart-
ment to affix the accountability and responsibility missing in today’s program.
The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA included several DP3-related provisions, including a
requirement for a Business Case Analysis (BCA) on the Global Household Goods
Contract (GHC) and a GAO report on the effects of this contract on DOD Families.
The BCA underscored the value of restructuring DOD’s relationship with industry,
while GAO’s draft report makes helpful recommendations on overall DP3 manage-
ment but highlights no flaws in our approach with GHC. The source selection proc-
ess is underway and our initial review of proposals is encouraging, with credible
candidates offering solutions to benefit DOD families at costs in-line with spending
on today’s program. We remain on track to award GHC to a single move manager
this spring. Military Families have been our North Star throughout this process.
Thank you for your continued support to improve the relocation experience for DOD
families.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In summary, USTRANSCOM provides the DOD with the ability to project and
sustain the Joint Force, deploying combat power to the right place, at the right
time, and in the necessary scale to be immediate, lethal, and decisive. Operating
around the globe and around the clock, our ability to project military forces is a dis-
tinct advantage unmatched by any nation, and it serves as the cornerstone of the
Joint Force’s ability to meet national objectives.
Today, USTRANSCOM assesses our ability to execute the NDS as adequate, but
with elevated and increasing risk, specifically in the areas of Aerial Refueling and
Sealift. Improving mission assurance within the cyber domain remains a
USTRANSCOM top priority. I thank Congress for their past and continued support
of this organization as we work together to defend the Nation and advance Amer-
ican interests.
Our purpose is enduring, but our success is not guaranteed. We must remain vigi-
lant. Underwritten by the dedicated soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, coast guards-
men, civilians, and commercial partners performing USTRANSCOM’s mission, I am
confident in our ability, and I’m proud to stand with them in our collective commit-
ment to our nation’s defense and dedication to America.
Together, We Deliver!
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, General Lyons. I appreciate your
bringing up that issue. We spent a lot of time on that in the de-
fense authorization bill addressing that, and I think you are car-
rying it out exactly as we had intended you to do that.
As I mentioned, General Wolters, we appreciate the briefing that
we got in Germany, and you covered something I think that might
be worth repeating here. In October 2019, the news report sug-
gested that Russia deployed as many as 10 submarines for some
of the largest fleet maneuvers since World War II. Can you de-
scribe, as you did this last week, how the pace and scope of Rus-
sia’s maritime activity has changed in recent years and what impli-
cations that has for EUCOM?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Chairman. We took note of the Russian
undersea activity in the summer/fall of 2018 and compared it to
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what Russia executed in the summer/fall of 2019. What we saw
was a 50 percent increase in the number of resources in the under-
sea that Russia committed to both those out-of-area submarine pa-
trol operations.
What we also witnessed was an improved degree of good order
and discipline on behalf of the Russian sailors. This observation is
one more reflection about how important it is to continue to im-
prove our competitive edge to buy down the risk to ensure that we
can operate with freedom.
Chairman INHOFE. Okay. That is good.
On that same trip we went through Rota, Spain, when they were
talking about adding two United States destroyers to the four that
are already there. Is that something you support? Where does that
fall into what level of request you have for additional forces in
EUCOM?
General WOLTERS. Chairman, it is precisely in line with our re-
quest for two additional destroyers, and what I am also proud to
report, with the support of this Committee through EDI, we have
been in a position to where we have been able to improve and ma-
ture the infrastructure at Rota. If you asked me to accept two more
destroyers tomorrow, we actually possess the infrastructure at Rota
to be able to house those two additional destroyers, a reflection of
the value of the funds for deterrence.
Chairman INHOFE. Yes. They made that very clear.
All right. General Lyons, I commented in my opening statement
about the KC–46. Some of us went from here in Washington up to
Seattle to fly the first ones down to Altus Air Force Base, and I
remember at that time, we had the Secretary of the Air Force,
Deborah James, there. I recall making an observation, and that
was that in 1959, two wonderful things happened. Number one, I
got married, and number two, the first KCs were actually delivered
to Altus Air Force Base. At that time, we did not know that there
was any problem. At least, I did not know, and I do not think any-
one else did either because we were just rejoicing. The fact that
that had lasted 60 years, and she even commented it looks like
that is going to enhance the prosperity of Altus Air Force Base for
the next 60 years. So that was something we were not aware of,
and so now you got a problem, and that problem, of course, is what
are we going to do to fill that function. I know you have given a
lot of thought to it. Why do you not let us know where you are
right now? You know, we have been doing this for years, getting
rid of old things before we got the new ones online ready to per-
form. So kind of tell us where we are. What is that going to do with
the preparations that we have already made for the KC–135’s and
the KC–10’s to actually be downgraded?
General LYONS. Chairman, thanks.
As you mentioned in your opening comments, aerial refueling as
a force element is the most stressed force element in the
TRANSCOM portfolio, both for day-to-day operations, as well as for
high-end conflict operations.
I will defer to the Air Force on the particular programmatics and
technical aspects of the KC–46 as it comes online.
182

Chairman INHOFE. Yes, and I mentioned that to you before this
meeting that we will be having the Air Force’s posture hearing,
and we will want to talk about that at that time too.
General LYONS. Yes, sir.
What I can describe is operationally. As we bring the KC–46 on
and we take on more jets and we convert more crews, when that
capability is not usable and it is not today presentable to the joint
force for some technical deficiencies, that means a dip in oper-
ational capability for the joint force in day-to-day operations in the
active component if in fact we continue to retire the KC–135 and
the KC–10 at the rate that was proposed by the Air Force. So we
are working very, very closely with the Air Force and the Depart-
ment to retain a level of capability, of legacy capability, so we can
continue to support joint operations.
Chairman INHOFE. So you are retaining some that you had not
planned on retaining had we not had the problem with the KC–46,
I assume.
General LYONS. Sir, we are working Air Force now. There was
some number of planes that were retired, were programmed for re-
tirement in fiscal year 2021, as you saw in the budget submission,
that we believe must be retained, 13 KC–135’s and 10 KC–10’s that
we believe must be retained during the conversion.
Chairman INHOFE. That is good.
Senator Reed?
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Wolters, the European Command’s strategy document
states meeting the challenge of countering the Kremlin-sponsored
malign influence campaign necessitates a whole-of-government so-
lution. So do you assess currently that we have a synchronized
campaign prosecuted in a unified manner to address malign influ-
ence, particularly directed at the 2020 election?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I think our campaign momentum is
improving in that area. As you are familiar with, we established
2 years ago the Russia integration group that bears the responsi-
bility to represent USEUCOM with the United States and with
many NATO nations to align a whole-of-nation, whole-of-govern-
ment activity and activities below the level of actual kinetic conflict
to ensure that we can have better control of the information do-
main.
I think we are to a point to where we expect to do better, and
I think that is a good place for military leaders to be. I will tell
you that I am pleased with the campaign momentum. I have had
the opportunity to visit with many of the U.S. entities and national
entities that represent whole-of-government and whole-of-nation
activity to provide more influence in the information domain, and
I am pleased with the progress.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Can you just give me your assessment of the current state of alli-
ance cohesion within NATO? I would assume that at a military
level, there is one sort of analysis and at a political level, another.
Can you touch on both?
General WOLTERS. Senator Reed, the mil-to-mil [military-to-mili-
tary] alignment that I see with the United States and NATO with
the North Atlantic extension through the Euro-Atlantic is as strong
183

as I have ever witnessed. I have had the opportunity to serve in
NATO since 1983.
I am pleased to report that at the political level, as a result of
recent documents that were approved at NATO at the political
level, we are seeing greater cohesion as well. For the first time in
over 6 decades, we at NATO approved the first NATO military
strategy. It is a document that is classified NATO secret that codi-
fies the threat and codifies the activities that we need to embrace
to more comprehensively defend. All 29 nations agreed to that
NATO military strategy, and I think that is a reflection at the po-
litical level and the military level of improving cohesion.
Senator REED. Thank you.
General Lyons, we talked about the shipbuilding program. Can
you just give us a quick sort of summary of where are at and where
we have to go?
General LYONS. Yes, Senator, I sure can.
As you know, we depend on sealift to carry about 90 percent of
our cargo capacity in a wartime scenario. Our current readiness of
the fleet is below where we need it to be. You indicated that it is
rapidly reaching end of useful life. We are working very closely
with the Navy. You mentioned the authorization to buy seven used
vessels. I anticipate we will purchase two, the first two, in 2021,
working very, very closely with MARAD and the Navy. My view is
we should have that first vessel in the first quarter of fiscal year
2021.
Senator REED. But we are far below what we would need for a
surge—a significant military operation at this point. Correct?
General LYONS. Yes, sir. That is correct. We need a much longer
plan.
Senator REED. The Chairman touched upon the air refueling,
which I think is another critical weakness. We talked about that
in the office.
One of the areas that is ubiquitous everywhere is cyber, and you
are in the position where you not only have to have a military or-
ganization that you have to keep sort of ahead of the curve, but you
have literally hundreds of private companies, some large, some
small. Can you give us an idea of the cyber challenges that you are
facing, and do we have a significant vulnerability there?
General LYONS. Senator, the way I would characterize the cyber
vulnerability is probably the most consequential to the mobility en-
terprise as we look at it. So we spend a lot of time on this par-
ticular issue looking at resiliency, looking at a number of other
issues to harden our defenses, et cetera. Particularly with regard
to the commercial carriers which is I think what you are asking,
we have included contract language in all of our contracts. We
check compliance. We have self-reporting mechanisms. We believe
that their level of cyber hygiene has increased significantly from
this level of effort.
I would not come here today and tell you that they could survive
a threat from a persistent threat actor, and so we have sufficient
resiliency in our contracts as well.
Senator REED. Just to follow on, do you have the ability to check,
you know, send in teams, no-notice inspections? You know, the old
line, a unit only does what the commander checks. If you are not
184

checking, you could have everything in the contract you wanted
and you would have nothing.
General LYONS. Senator, we do not have the authority that you
are describing.
Senator REED. Do you need that?
General LYONS. There are some second and third implications on
those kinds of activities.
Senator REED. Can you get back to us on that?
General LYONS. I can, yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
General LYONS. I often get asked the question as to whether we need additional
authorities to ’inspect’ commercial partner cyber compliance (implied is access to
their networks, etc.). From a practical point of view, we don’t have the technical ex-
pertise or bandwidth for such a mission, nor does USCYBERCOM. USTRANSCOM
is not advocating for the authority to conduct nonconsensual intrusions into an in-
dustry partner’s network. Our current authority is based upon our contractual rela-
tionship that our industry partners agree to voluntarily. There are several issues
that impact the inspection of contractor networks. For instance, these carriers are
U.S. companies and there are limits on the collection of U.S. persons. Additionally,
the companies have Constitutional rights in their systems under the 4th Amend-
ment, and the Posse Comitatus Act prevents DOD from serving in a law enforce-
ment capacity unless authorized by law. However, all these issues are resolved if
the contractor provides consent to inspect its network. Therefore, if we include the
ability to inspect as part of the contract, the company is consenting to our inspec-
tion, and we are conducting that inspection for valid purposes unrelated to law en-
forcement or intelligence. The downside to gaining access via consent, including con-
sent gained through contract, is that the company can withdraw their consent at
any time. While that withdrawal may result in the government taking action under
the Contract Disputes Act and may include termination, it will not result in govern-
ment access to the network. Thus, the more stringent we make our access require-
ments, the more it may limit competition since some contractors may not compete
for contracts if it means allowing full access to and monitoring of their IT systems.
The Government can perform onsite NIST 800–171 compliance assessments without
obtaining access to a contractor’s networks. The NIST Handbook 162 provides guid-
ance on how to perform assessments by reviewing policies and procedures, inter-
viewing staff, observing contractor IT personnel performing their duties, and in-
specting physical security and hardware environments. If we wanted to perform
these assessments, we would need to update our contract language with the option
to perform an inspection if the contractor provides consent. We are encouraged by
the newly released Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) and its pro-
visions for third party assessments. As the CMMC program matures, we will con-
sider adding the CMMC requirement in our contracts and requiring third party as-
sessments of our contractors’ compliance with NIST 800–171.
Senator REED. I am not surprised the 1st Brigade of the 82nd
conducted an outstanding operation. Thank you.
General LYONS. Airborne, sir.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Wicker?
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your great service to the United
States.
Let me ask you, General Wolters. The proposed OMB [Office of
Management and Budget] fiscal year 2021 budget requests $705.4
billion for DOD. This represents three-tenths of 1 percent over the
current fiscal year. In other words, the proposed budget buys us
fewer resources than the current year considering inflation. Am I
correct there?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator.
185

Senator WICKER. Let me just ask you this. Do we need fewer se-
curity resources in the European Command next year than we do
this year?
General WOLTERS. Senator, we need more.
Senator WICKER. In addition to that, the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Defense Strategy Com-
mission have all endorsed 3.5 percent real growth. Is that also your
opinion, General Wolters?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator.
Senator WICKER. General Lyons, is that your opinion also?
General LYONS. Yes, Senator.
Senator WICKER. I appreciate the distinguished Chairman men-
tioning early on in his questioning Rota, Spain, and I am glad that
he and his team visited there—a bipartisan delegation visited there
just the other day.
The DDGs are the workhorse of the Navy. General Wolters, in
European Command how does a mere three-tenths of 1 percent in-
crease over the current fiscal year affect what we are going to be
able to do there with the DDGs, with the two extra DDGs?
General WOLTERS. Senator, every cent counts. Those two addi-
tional DDGs would allow us the opportunity to continue to improve
our ability to get indications and warnings in the potential battle
space and also dramatically improve our ability to better command
and control. Because of the flexibility of those resources, they can
comprehensively defend in all geographical areas in support of Eu-
rope. Those destroyers are critical to improve the campaign to de-
liver peace, particularly in the areas of indications and warnings
and command and control.
Senator WICKER. Thank you. Thank you for that. We are going
to certainly try to help you I think up and down the dais here on
a bipartisan basis on the resources that we need to defend America
and Americans.
It is interesting that the leader of EUCOM would mention in the
first few seconds of his statement not only Russia but China. Could
you enlighten us about where you are seeing increased problems
with China and increased influence in the European theater from
China?
General WOLTERS. Senator, two areas. The first is seaport equi-
ties, and the second is 5G Huawei.
What we have seen in several critical nations on the periphery
of Europe is an economic majority on behalf of China and invest-
ment for seaports in critical nations like Belgium, Italy, France,
and Greece. That is a large concern to all of the NATO nations.
When you start to do the collective math, you discover that China
has access to 10 percent of the shipping rights into and out of Eu-
rope. Those are daunting figures that should lead one to believe
that we need to continue to be vigilant with respect to seaport equi-
ties on the economic side.
The second issue happens to be Huawei and 5G. I am firmly
aware of several European nations who have a tendency to lean to-
wards Huawei and 5G. My concern goes back to the soldiers. With-
out the appropriate network protection, there is a potential com-
promise of technical data and personal data, and that is not to the
186

good order and discipline of our United States soldiers and our
NATO soldiers.
Senator WICKER. Finally, General Wolters, a number of us have
been involved on a member-to-member basis with our parliamen-
tary brothers and sisters in the OSCE [Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe] Parliamentary Assembly. We have a
great new Ambassador to the OSCE, Ambassador Jim Gilmore. To
what extent is the OSCE organization important to you and to pro-
viding you information that you need?
General WOLTERS. Very important, Senator, and I think it builds
incredible trust for the Euro-Atlantic link. Your hearings that you
held in Gdansk last year were a huge boost in trust not only be-
tween the United States and Poland but throughout all of NATO.
Senator WICKER. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service and thank you for being here.
Many of my colleagues and I have received briefings as recently
as this morning from other departments and agencies in the ad-
ministration about the coordinated response to the coronavirus. I
am also concerned about the Department of Defense response to
protect servicemembers and family members that are stationed at
military installations abroad, the rapid spread of this virus, as well
as the number of diagnoses and deaths in countries where Ameri-
cans are stationed. A lot of Americans are stationed in, for exam-
ple, South Korea. This is very, very concerning. I am focused on en-
suring that the Department is reevaluating and updating proce-
dures and actions necessary to keep our servicemembers and their
families safe.
General Lyons, your command manages the inter-theater move-
ment of our servicemembers in and out of areas that have been im-
pacted by the coronavirus, making you really uniquely positioned
to address this issue. What action has your command taken to
mitigate the spread of COVID–19 and ensure the well-being of our
servicemembers and their families? Do you need additional re-
sources? Is there more we can do to help you? What more do you
think should be done?
General LYONS. Senator, I agree with your concern. The Sec-
retary of Defense has indicated that protection of the force is his
number one priority regarding the coronavirus.
U.S. Northern Command is the lead for the Department, working
very closely in support of Health and Human Services. We are con-
nected with them on a daily basis, a frequent number of times a
day, and we are watching this very, very closely for any implica-
tions on global mobility.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. What specific actions are you taking?
General LYONS. Inside the transportation enterprise, locations
like Travis Air Force Base has become a receiver for potential folks
coming out of the theater, particularly the Indo-Pacific. We are not
taking particular health protection measures inside the command
other than to protect the force, but in a more board sense, we are
187

in support of Health and Human Services and that is done through
the lead of USNORTHCOM.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, do you feel you have
been given the necessary resources and other tools to protect Amer-
ican servicemen and women and their families in Europe?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator, and we have also been given the
appropriate authorities. As we speak in Europe today, we have
over 300 cases, and the nation that is of most concern is Italy with
6 reported deaths. We have restricted travel to certain zones, and
we require all mil air arrival flights to be screened for the virus.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Are you taking any additional steps to
constrain travel by service men and women or their families on
leave and so forth?
General WOLTERS. We have in what we feel are the affected
areas, in particular two states inside of Italy.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you have plans to restrict travel in any
other states?
General WOLTERS. We anticipate the need may arise in Ger-
many, but that is still to be determined.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, in your posture state-
ment, you highlight American servicemembers on the ground in the
Joint Military Training Group Ukraine work, and you note they
serve shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainian forces. Can you expand
on the important efforts to deter Russian aggression there?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator. The Joint Military Training
Group initiated military training team activity on a rotational basis
starting in 2016, and they also began about 6 months later to ro-
tate military training teams in the special operations category.
There are several phases of the long-range plan, and here we are
31⁄2 years later and we are to phase 3, which puts those military
training teams that represent the Joint Military Training Group—
Canada and UK [United Kingdom] are other participants. Those
teams are now in observer status because of the demonstrated ex-
pertise of the Ukrainian armed forces and the conventional force in
the SOF [Special Operations Forces] side of the house. We are very
pleased with the progress of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the
stronger that they are and the more that they embrace democratic
values, the greater the alignment with the West, which is exactly
where need to head.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. Thank you very much, gentle-
men. My time has expired. Thanks for your service.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Fischer?
Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank both of you gentlemen for your service and
also to thank the men and women who serve under you.
General Wolters, how would you assess the progress that has
been made in implementing the NDS [National Defense Strategy]
and its emphasis on prioritizing strategic competition with Russia?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I am very pleased. As I mentioned
earlier on one of the questions from your colleagues, for the first
time in many decades, we approved the NATO military strategy,
and it looks very similar to the United States’ National Defense
Strategy. I believe this is one area that reflects the powerful align-
ment and a willingness on behalf of NATO to lean forward with re-
188

spect to what we do across the full spectrum from competition to
crisis to conflict, which is exactly what we called for in the NDS.
So I am pleased with the ever-improving alignment in NATO and
with our European nations.
Senator FISCHER. What do you think is the biggest challenge that
you have in fulfilling the goals of the NDS in Europe?
General WOLTERS. It is to do what we can to cure the malign in-
fluence on behalf of Russia, and that requires a more concentrated
effort in the competition phase of embracing a potential foe. What
we have heard throughout many of the questions today are the ac-
tivities that we have to embrace in 21st century military below the
actual activities of kinetic conflict and understanding what we are
doing and what the return on investment is, and we are making
rapid improvement in those areas.
Senator FISCHER. So in order to improve, basically you need to
work together more on your training?
General WOLTERS. Yes, ma’am.
Senator FISCHER. Do you feel that you have come together or are
coming together with other NATO partners in facing what the
threats are?
General WOLTERS. We are, and the reflection of that is the ap-
proval of a NATO military strategy that actually codifies those
threats and agreement on behalf of the 29 nations to identify those
threats.
Senator FISCHER. You and I yesterday—we discussed the grow-
ing recognition that there is among the NATO partners on the im-
portant role of our nuclear deterrence in keeping the peace. Obvi-
ously, we all understand that our deterrent, the triad, is the bed-
rock of the security of this country.
Can you tell us a little bit about what you are hearing from our
NATO partners when it comes to the deterrence in private con-
versations, if you can share that, but also in public the support
that you see?
General WOLTERS. Senator, there is a greater degree of aware-
ness of the importance of deterrence, and as we look at the success
that NATO has had for the last 7 decades to deliver peace, one of
the elements has to be the triad that exists from the United States
and its representation to nuclear deterrence on the European con-
tinent. It has been very, very effective, and the nations understand
more and more about that with each passing day as a result of em-
bracing deterrence to a greater degree than we have in the past.
Senator FISCHER. Would you say that our partners in their em-
bracing of this deterrence are also becoming better messengers
within their own countries about the importance of not just a
strong NATO, but of having that strong nuclear deterrence, that
umbrella, that is so vital in their freedom as well?
General WOLTERS. Absolutely, Senator. It has to do with the re-
sponsibility that we feel in NATO to generate peace not just inside
of the boundaries of Europe but on the periphery. As we embrace
missions for NATO mission Iraq and as we embrace Operation Res-
olute Support in Afghanistan, we see how important it is to pro-
liferate deterrence to the max extent practical to achieve greater
peace.
189

Senator FISCHER. What are your views, sir, on adopting a so-
called no-first-use policy? Do you believe that that would strength-
en deterrence?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I am a fan of flexible first-use policy.
Senator FISCHER. Do you believe developing ground-launched
conventionally armed intermediate range weapons will enhance
your ability to deter Russia?
General WOLTERS. It will. It dramatically complicates an enemy’s
task.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you, sir.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Kaine?
Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to the witnesses. I appreciated the opportunity to visit
with you each before the hearing today.
General Wolters, I want to ask you a question. In your testi-
mony—I think it was maybe in a back and forth with Senator
Reed—you talked a little bit about increased Russian sub activity
in the Atlantic. The President’s Budget proposes to cut the Vir-
ginia-class sub program 50 percent by only funding one of the two
in the block buy. On February 13, the DOD used its general trans-
fer authority to move $3.8 billion of Pentagon money to the general
drug account for use on the southern border.
Part of those funds that were moved was a reduction of $180 mil-
lion from the P–8 Poseidon aircraft program. As you know, that
airplane is a modified Boeing 737 that is used as a sub hunter. It
usually operates from Iceland or elsewhere in Europe to work with
the fast attack subs like the Virginia-class to track Russian sub ac-
tivity coming from the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap.
Without commenting on the budget, I would like you to talk
about the importance of both the Virginia-class sub and the P–8
Poseidon in countering Russian sub activity.
General WOLTERS. Senator, they are vital capabilities, and what
they contribute to overall maritime patrol activity has proven over
time to be very, very successful.
We are lucky to be part of NATO. We lean on our brothers and
sisters from a national perspective to ask them to take a look at
the resources they can contribute when we are in situations with
respect to some decrements in the maritime patrol area. Norway
has been a great contributor on the P–8 side of the house, and we
see the effectiveness of that system. They are vital resources and
very much needed to improve our overall deterrence posture.
Senator KAINE. Both of those platforms, the Virginia-class and
then the P–8 Poseidon.
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator.
Senator KAINE. General Lyons, I want to ask you a question. On
pages 5 and 6 of your written testimony, you talk about military
sealift issues. Again, Senator Reed asked you a little bit about it.
There was an IG [Inspector General] report about military sealift
command and readiness reporting, and one of the areas that they
focused on was that the readiness reporting was coming from the
ship captains and they were sort of doing a self-report about readi-
ness. These are our assets, but the operation of the ship was con-
tracted, and there was sort of a question about whether there was
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an incentive for the captains really to accurately report readiness.
What is their incentive to say, hey, we are really not ready?
What are you guys doing? You talk about in TRANSCOM the
current readiness measurement, but what are you doing to make
sure that the reporting of readiness from the ship level up is as ac-
curate as it can be?
General LYONS. Senator, it is a great question, and I concur with
that assessment. A lot of activity has taken place and I think we
have made a lot of improvements to elucidate the readiness that
we see today. Part of that is the reason we are seeing such low
readiness rates in the 50th and 60th percentile about our Ready
Reserve Fleet readiness to generate as we discovered during our
no-notice activation back in September.
What I would say is really back about 3 years ago, in 2017, the
military sealift commander really started to take this very, very se-
riously, deep diving. He has come up with a comprehensive readi-
ness plan. The DOD IG reflected his findings in 2017 in a 2018 re-
port that you are referring to, and there is a lot of work still to be
done.
Senator KAINE. Just to your written testimony, there is a goal of
85 percent readiness, but the current measure is at 59 percent, and
vessel material, condition, and age are the primary factors, and
those continue to degrade readiness. You have some additional tes-
timony about the sealift fleet will lose 1 million to 2 million square
feet of capacity each year as the ships reach the end of their useful
life.
So tell the Committee a little bit in my remaining minute just
about what are the plans to restore that readiness and hopefully
get more near the 85 percent goal?
General LYONS. It is a significant issue. It is a top priority for
TRANSCOM. We are working very, very closely with the Navy on
this.
We have a fleet that is about 43 years old on average. If you com-
pare that to the civilian industry, they are going to wash out their
ships between 15 and 25, depending on the business case. It is no
secret that when you retain a large fixed plant facility like one of
our large sealift platforms, it becomes increasingly more expensive
the older it gets.
What we would like to see very much is a little bit less in terms
of service life extension, in other words, extending these ships be-
yond 50 to 60 years. That is not returning the investment that we
thought it would. We are a very strong advocate of the acquired
use strategy. You granted the authorization to do seven. We need
to execute what you granted us the ability to do, and then I think
we need to come back to you with a long-range plan to consistently
recapitalize over the next 15 to 20 years.
Senator KAINE. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Cotton?
Senator COTTON. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance and
for your service.
General Wolters, let us talk a little bit more about coronavirus
and its impact in the European theater. I am reading here from a
Stars and Stripes report on Sunday saying that at Vicenza, there
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has been a temporary closing Monday through Wednesday of all
dependents schools, activity centers, fitness centers, theaters, and
chapels. Is that report accurate?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator.
Senator COTTON. Are there any updates from that report on Sun-
day in Stars and Stripes?
General WOLTERS. Those facilities remained closed and travel to
the two states are still prohibited in Italy.
Senator COTTON. Do you expect that those facilities in the
Vicenza community will reopen on Thursday as initially planned,
or do you think that closure might have to be extended?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I would give it about a 50/50 right
now about potentially extending the closure.
Senator COTTON. How many United States troops do we have at
Vicenza roughly speaking?
General WOLTERS. We have got about 6,000 or 7,000.
Senator COTTON. How many of those have accompanied spouses
or children?
General WOLTERS. Seventy to eighty percent.
Senator COTTON. So maybe about 4,000 to 4,500 husbands and
wives and then some larger number of children probably?
General WOLTERS. Absolutely, and over 35,000 United States
military members in Italy.
Senator COTTON. And they are all mostly just sitting at home
right now trying to avoid the coronavirus?
General WOLTERS. Not mostly but there is a fair amount, yes,
sir.
Senator COTTON. Coronavirus has been present in Germany as
well. In fact, that was one of the first European nations in which
it appeared. It has not appeared in the numbers yet that have ex-
ploded in Italy in the last few days.
First off, has there been any such closures at our military bases
in Germany?
General WOLTERS. Not yet, Senator, but we are anticipating an
increase in the number of cases reported in Germany and we are
prepared to execute.
Senator COTTON. It is a troubling situation.
Let us move to another troubling situation, which you have spo-
ken about briefly as well, Huawei, the Chinese telecom company.
You state in your written testimony that 5G networks by Huawei
will place intellectual property, sensitive technology, and private
personal information at heightened risk of acquisition and exploi-
tation by the Chinese Government. You further say that this ongo-
ing initiative, coupled with China’s growing interest and invest-
ment in European ports and infrastructure, complicates steady
state and contingency operations.
It sounds like you consider the use of Huawei and 5G networks
in Europe to be a threat to our national security. Is that correct?
General WOLTERS. It is certainly a threat to the soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines in Europe.
Senator COTTON. My next question was, is it a threat to the
troopers that you lead?
General WOLTERS. Affirm, Senator.
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Senator COTTON. Unfortunately, some European nations are
moving forward with Huawei technology in their networks, most
notably our NATO allies in the United Kingdom and Germany.
What are we to do about that and how can we guarantee the secu-
rity of our troopers, as well as our NATO command and control
systems?
General WOLTERS. Senator Cotton, it is vigilance, education, and
going back to the basics with respect to network protection of the
critical data on the technical side of the house and the personal
side of the house for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, not
just in the U.S. but all of our NATO forces.
Senator COTTON. Do your military counterparts understand the
threat that Huawei poses?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator.
Senator COTTON. So the problem may be at the political leader-
ship level. A statement, not a question.
Finally, I want to conclude on a somewhat related matter. We
discussed this yesterday in our meeting. I want to bring everyone’s
attention to an alarming poll by the Pew Research Center among
16 NATO countries. Happily it shows that NATO’s favorability rat-
ing is pretty strong, 2 to 1 in fact, 53 to 27 of the peoples of these
16 countries have a favorable impression of NATO. Not surpris-
ingly, NATO scored pretty low in Russia.
Somewhat disappointingly though, when asked who should fight
Russia if there were a conflict between a NATO ally and Russia,
only 38 percent of peoples in these nations said my nation should
fight Russia, whereas 50 percent said the United States should
fight Russia. In some of the biggest NATO allies, it was even more
alarming. In Italy, 25 percent said we will fight them. Seventy-five
percent said you Americans go fight. In Germany, it was 34–63.
That is a little better I guess but not too much.
General Wolters, can the Europeans expect Americans to care
more about their security and their kids than they care about their
security?
General WOLTERS. Senator, in my consultations at the mil-to-mil
level with chiefs of defense and ministers of defense, I see a very,
very eager desire and willingness to fight the Russians, and those
nations that I continually communicate with show that desire, if
required, to protect themselves.
Senator COTTON. I hear the same thing when I consult with Eu-
ropean defense leaders, not surprisingly. These are men and
women who have dedicated their lives to the service of their coun-
try and the defense of their country. So it is a really a political
problem at the level of political leadership in Europe both in the
leaders and the leadership that they show to their peoples to dem-
onstrate that they have to be willing to fight as hard for their fu-
ture and their security as they expect Americans to fight for them.
Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Peters?
Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony here today and for your
service as well.
General Wolters, I would like to focus on the Baltics. In 2017, I
visited Latvia and Lithuania to observe the United States Army’s
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Europe Operation Saber Strike exercise. The Michigan National
Guard regularly participates in this exercise as Latvia’s counter-
part in the National Guard State Partnership Program, as you
know.
Similarly, Latvian forces participate in the Michigan National
Guard’s annual Northern Strike exercise, which is a joint multi-
national exercise hosted at Camp Grayling in Michigan.
The Latvian military particularly benefits from this training in
Michigan because it offers an opportunity for them to certify as
JTACs [Joint Terminal Attack Controller], and as a result of this
program, Latvia is one of only eight allied countries that are cer-
tified to call in United States close air support in combat. Part of
the reason the Michigan National Guard and the Latvian military
have a strong relationship is because the Latvian military is built
around integrating reserve and their regular forces as a major com-
ponent of their national defense strategy.
So my question to you, sir, is, could you discuss how EUCOM tai-
lors its training and partner strategies to support the Baltic States’
reliance on these reserve forces and specifically the State partner-
ship with our National Guard and how integral that is to all of
this?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I can.
First of all, for the Baltics writ large the insertion of the four
battalion-sized battle groups into Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland in the summer of 2016 has dramatically improved our all-
domain security awareness. In particular, as you well know, with
the participation of your Michigan Air National Guardsmen who
have been very, very integral in the air-land integration piece, the
lead nation in Latvia at that battalion-sized battle group happens
to be Canada. We have many force elements that are intermixed
amongst the other nations.
The overall improvement day in and day out of those battle
groups to be able to see the battle space and defend their sovereign
territory is palpable, and they are doing so in all domains and all
functions. Our next step is to make sure that those battalion-sized
battle groups that represent generating peace in the Baltics are
aware of all the activities in the southeastern sector of Europe, as
well as the western portion of Europe. So we are very, very pleased
with the continued transparency and alignment and very, very
pleased with the air-land integration that we have seen improving
in Latvia for the last 2 years.
Senator PETERS. Well, thank you.
My next question is related to the development of the next gen-
eration combat vehicle which is now taking place in Michigan with
a cross-functional team. The first platform was intended to replace
the Bradley fighting vehicle that the Army has just recently re-
started the program. Much of the debate has basically focused on
the tradeoff between armor and mobility and specifically how read-
ily the vehicle can be positioned in a crisis zone.
However, in the European theater, the size and weight of the ve-
hicle could be equally problematic for its maneuverability through
European terrain and civilian infrastructure, particularly the
bridges there.
194

General Wolters, you seemed to address this issue in your writ-
ten statement where you mentioned the EU, in consultation with
NATO, is investing 6.5 billion euros in the improvement of civilian
and military dual use. However, I am concerned this approach may
not address the core issue that I just mentioned.
But my question to you is, what is more realistic? Should the
next generation of combat vehicles be built to accommodate Euro-
pean infrastructure limits, particularly in Poland and the Baltics,
or is the solution to reinforce transportation infrastructure
throughout eastern Europe?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I hate to give you this answer, but
I think it is a little bit of both, and I know that General McConville
leading our United States Army has his experts taking a peak at
that. I know that he steps up even one more level. It gets into a
discussion about armor versus mobility, and I think from a global
perspective, there are some tradeoffs and from a regional perspec-
tive, there are some tradeoffs. It all has to do with the dem-
onstrated capability of the nations in Europe, as well as other re-
gions. I know that we are taking a very, very serious look at that.
Senator PETERS. My follow-up question is, how do our western
European allies, who also produce heavy military equipment, how
do they accommodate limitations in civilian infrastructure particu-
larly in Poland and the Baltics?
General WOLTERS. A greater degree of education on the chal-
lenges that we face from a bridging perspective in eastern Europe
versus western Europe. It was an issue that all of Europe was
very, very aware of in the mid-1980s, and they are getting them-
selves reacquainted with it today and they understand the impera-
tive of making sure that we have bridging programs in the regions
in the northeast and the southeast of Europe to ensure that we can
shoot, move, and communicate fast.
Senator PETERS. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Ernst?
Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you very much.
General Lyons, we have already discussed a little bit of the KC–
46’s. So I will not dive into that. But just for note, our Iowa Air
National Guard does have the 185th air refueling wing that oper-
ates the KC–135’s. Certainly we want to make sure that this in-
credible unit is able to sustain operations ongoing, so it is some-
thing we will definitely want to discuss with the Air Force during
their posture review.
But, General Wolters, I am going to pick up where my colleague,
Senator Peters, left off. He was talking about the State Partnership
Program that his Michigan National Guard has with those Baltic
State members while Iowa, our National Guard, has a partnership
with Kosovo. I am just always very excited about that and have re-
lationships that I have carried on for about the decade of time that
the Iowa Army National Guard has been involved with those part-
ners.
As the only force that both the Kosovars and Serbians trust, how
can KFOR [Kosovo Force] best posture itself to ensure that there
is enduring stability between the two sides, Kosovo and Serbia?
195

General WOLTERS. Thanks, Senator, and I cannot thank you
enough for the contributions of your State to Kosovo.
Senator ERNST. Thank you.
General WOLTERS. As we sit today, KFOR is very, very active
and engaged more so than they were 1 year ago as a result of the
continued involvement of United States operations activities and
investments in Kosovo and Serbia, as well as the NATO invest-
ments of operations activities.
We typically rotate in NATO military training teams, but when
they land at those locations, to be able to have a soft landing with
the force element from your National Guard State Partnership Pro-
gram affords us the opportunity to reintegrate at a much faster
pace. We are very, very concerned about the security disposition in
the Balkans. We are very, very pleased with the efforts of KFOR,
and KFOR is far more capable today as a result of learning from
the experiences of the State Partnership Program like yours as
they reveal themselves in Kosovo.
Senator ERNST. Great. Thank you, and obviously, a number of us
here do support those State Partnership Programs.
What is NATO’s role for peacekeeping as the KSF [Kosovo Secu-
rity Force] transitions into a full army? Will it be able to guarantee
Kosovo’s territorial integrity? Do you see that in their future?
General WOLTERS. That is certainly the goal, Senator, and again,
it is by, with, and through in a very, very tough neighborhood. As
you probably know better than I, there are some very, very serious
tendencies that exist between Serbia and Kosovo that we are see-
ing improve over the course of the last several weeks. Ambassador
Grenell has been very, very aggressive on getting those security
apparati to communicate with each other. So we hope for continued
good news in that area with respect to the Kosovo-Serbia relation-
ship with respect to taxation.
Senator ERNST. Absolutely, and I think that there is undue pres-
sure obviously coming from Russia in that region as well.
General Lyons, if we could talk a little bit about autonomous ve-
hicles and how that impacts logistics and delivery. I am really ex-
cited. I chair the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabili-
ties, and we have talked extensively about autonomous systems
and how that can help our operators. Like I had wonderful truck
drivers that were out on the roads and how it would reduce their
risk.
Can you describe a little bit how you are leveraging and inte-
grating these emerging technologies into some of the modernization
efforts?
General LYONS. Senator, I agree with you. There is enormous po-
tential here for autonomous, and it can be a combination of
manned/unmanned. Each of the services are working distinct and
separate material development kinds of initiatives. You mentioned
the one in the Army, which was a bit of a combination teaming.
I think there is enormous potential to expand what we are doing
in the air domain and then even potentially space domain in the
future.
Senator ERNST. Absolutely, and what is the best way to speed de-
livery of those types of systems into operations today? We often-
times see large defense contractors—they are very slow moving,
196

but this is a great emerging technology. How can we deliver that
quicker?
General LYONS. Ma’am, it is a great question. As indicated, each
of the services are working these in the programmatic sense. As a
combatant commander, I have the requirements out there, but the
services present capability and so I cannot speak specifically to the
timelines that they are working. But it is a great question.
Senator ERNST. If you come up with the answer to that, let us
know because I think we really need to be much more nimble on
delivering emerging technologies to our men and women in uni-
form.
General LYONS. I agree.
Senator ERNST. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Jones?
Senator JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for your service. We really appreciate you being
here today.
General Wolters, we have taken the first steps to begin the De-
fender-Europe 20 military exercise, the largest of its kind in 25
years. I think there are 18 countries participating across 10 coun-
tries.
What are the biggest challenges you see in executing the De-
fender 20 program, and what are the key takeaways you hope to
see coming out of the exercise?
General WOLTERS. Senator, on the logistics side of the house, the
environment in Europe has to be mature enough to be able to ab-
sorb 20,000 soldiers and get those soldiers to the right
prepositioned locations to be able to grab the appropriate gear that
they are supposed to get and get to their foxhole and be able to
execute. What we want to do is count every second that it takes
to get the soldier from the first point of entry all the way to his
or her foxhole to be successful to adequately defend.
We anticipate that there will be some snags. I want to applaud
this Committee on the fact that 2 years ago we could not exercise
Defender-Europe 20. We were not mature enough with respect to
the prepositioned stockpiles to have a soldier show up at location
X and be able to grab resources. Today we can do that. We know
the fitness of the resources, and now we will be able to examine
their speed with which they can get to the foxhole and be able to
execute.
Senator JONES. Is Turkey participating?
General WOLTERS. Senator, they are as observers and they are
in certain areas with respect to activity on the periphery of Geor-
gia.
Senator JONES. Just to follow up real quick, what, if any, re-
sponse, reaction are you seeing from Russia, or do you expect from
the Russians or any of our other adversaries?
General WOLTERS. Senator, we have seen a fair amount of re-
sponse from Russia. They are not overly pleased with Defender-Eu-
rope 20. We are concerned mostly about the readiness of our forces,
and we are doing all that in accordance with international law in
sovereign space, in sovereign seas, in sovereign land.
Senator JONES. Thank you.
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General Lyons, we have got a air refueling wing in Alabama too,
the 117th, winner of an Omaha trophy this year. In your remarks
to the Atlantic Council, you were quoted as saying across
TRANSCOM, the aerial refueling force element is the most
stressed and probably the one that is pushing the red line or ex-
ceeding the red line.
Now, were you speaking strictly about the number available air-
craft there or also about the demands or the need for more crew?
General LYONS. Senator, it is a combination of both. I spoke ear-
lier about the iron, the tails, that we have to retain, legacy tails,
during the conversion before the KC–46 becomes available to the
joint force. But I would also comment that—and this is true across
all components, Reserve and the Guard—the high tempo of our air-
men that are running these missions. Particularly in the Guard, I
would say we do come very, very close. In some cases we penetrate
the mob to dwell in that particular force element, and I would
highlight, Senator, that the contributions that the Air Force Re-
serve makes in day-to-day competition is absolutely extraordinary
between volunteerism—involunteerism that still exists in the
CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility] and then long-term MPA
[Mentor-Protégé Agreement] pilots who we have flying every day.
Senator JONES. I take it you could use more crew? Is that fair?
General LYONS. Senator, crew is a friction point. There is no
question about that.
Senator JONES. What can we do to try to get more crew to the
air refueling in the Guard or wherever it might be?
General LYONS. Well, Senator, we are doing that today. The Air
Force is working some of this as a combination of what the KC–
46 will bring. Some of this is a function of what we must retain.
Then there is obviously a certain level of friction between what sys-
tems, how many systems you can crew and then the associated out-
put to the joint force.
Senator JONES. Thank you.
I think that is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Tillis?
Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your years of service.
General Lyons, I want to start with you on the HHG [household
goods] program. It is not in your lanes, but I have got a little his-
tory with military housing and trying to fix that problem and im-
prove accountability and really put the family at the tip of the
spear in terms of our focus. So I like the idea that you are moving
forward with the program. It should reduce costs and improve serv-
ice. That is really what we set out to do with military housing. We
did it for a while.
So with this program, can you tell me a little bit about how it
is going to execute, what your expectations are for performance in
the upcoming PCS [permanent change of station] season? And more
importantly, I would like to know the mechanics. How does that
family member who is coordinating the move—the spouse may be
deployed somewhere—to what extent are they going to have power
over really assessing the completeness and the satisfaction of the
move?
198

General LYONS. Senator, all great questions. You brought up the
housing issue, and part of what got us into the housing issue was
a lack of clear accountability with the private sector and the appro-
priate governance structure to manage that large contract. That is
exactly what is driving us here in the household goods industry to
restructure our relationship so that we do have defined levels of ac-
countability, key performance parameters if you would, and that is
the design of the global household goods contract. It is not designed
to put any providers out of business. It is designed to gain account-
ability, clarify responsibility inside the Department, and then
through a longer-range relationship with industry, incentivize the
growth of capacity to meet the peak season. I think for family
members, we owe them that.
Now, we will not in the 2020 peak season see this come to fru-
ition. We intend to award in 2020 and prepare for the 2021, and
then there will be a rather long transition to grow this capacity
over time. But key will be accountability and transparency for fam-
ily members.
Senator TILLIS. I think that is important because we do a lot of
housing town halls down at Fort Bragg and Camp Lejeune, and I
have heard some rumblings about a less than satisfactory experi-
ence with the status quo. So I think you are right. I appreciate you
taking the lead and trying to get it right and have a consistent ex-
perience across the globe. So I appreciate the work on that.
I am interested. We will do it maybe with a meeting in my office
if I could get with some of the people who are working on the con-
tracting. I would like to see how they are going after key perform-
ance indicators, customer satisfaction, those sort of things built
into it. Now we are trying to retrofit that into the housing program.
It looks like you are going to be ahead of it. So I thank you for your
work there.
General Wolters, tell me a little bit about how well your area of
responsibility, your partners are closing the gap on their cyber ca-
pabilities, how well we are actually coordinating, and your assess-
ment of our—if you take a look at Russia, they are all over the
place. Anytime I have traveled to that part of the world, you are
talking about Russia, information campaigns, and their malign ac-
tivities. Give me some hope on how we are either creating a gap
or filling holes that we have right now.
General WOLTERS. Senator, we are improving our strategic trans-
parency and alignment in the cyber domain. I would say that over
the course of the last 2 years, the NATO nations have done a much
better job of understanding the challenges that they face on the de-
fensive side of the house from a hygiene perspective. Once they
have got their back yard in order, now they are in a position to un-
derstand where they start with respect to network protection. That
truly has come about as a result of our USCYBERCOM’s willing-
ness to lead from the front.
Senator TILLIS. As you move into that answer, I would also like
for you to talk about Huawei, ZTE, and whether or not we have
gotten to a good place where clearly they are going to allow that
infrastructure to be present. But in terms of critical infrastructure,
are we getting to a good place?
199

General WOLTERS. Senator, that is a great point and that is ex-
actly where I was headed. The hygiene piece, the defensive cyber
piece has to be applied with respect to what is about to become an
issue in Europe with respect to proliferation of 5G activity in
Huawei. Network protection is going to be job one. So we are right
back to the basics. As you well know from your time with General
Nakasone, he is keen on that, and we have seen a marked improve-
ment in the manning for defensive cyber ops on the United States
side in Europe, and we have seen an increase in manning on the
defensive cyber ops side of the house for the NATO nations in Eu-
rope.
Senator TILLIS. Well, thank you, and thank you both. I have got
a lot of questions. But, General Lyons, we will be in touch so I can
get a little bit more insight into the direction of HHG. Thank you
both for your time.
General LYONS. Yes, sir. Happy to do so.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator King?
Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Lyons, we have touched several times on the transition
of the KC–46. I want to put a finer point on it. In your testimony,
you say this is your number one shortfall, and you go on to say it
will create a critical and deepening gap in taskable aerial refueling
aircraft and air crews for the next 5 to 7 years. You do a very good
job of outlining the problem, but then at the end of your prepared
remarks, you say we recommend reevaluating aerial refueling force
structure plans annually. Frankly, that does not reassure me.
I want to know what is the plan. You have identified a serious
problem here. We cannot project force if we cannot refuel those air-
planes, and you have identified a 5 to 7-year—you characterize it
as a deepening gap. What do we do? Perhaps you do not need to
give me a full answer here, but for the record, I would like to see
an action plan not just reevaluation.
General LYONS. Senator, we will be happy to work with the Air
Force and come back to you on that with a joint plan.
In the near term, we had agreed with the Air Force to retain 28
legacy aircraft to mitigate the conversion for the KC–46. The KC–
46, as we receive that aircraft, as the Air Force receives that air-
craft, will take some time to work through the technical, the Cat-
1 deficiencies, as well as convert crews, and so you can appreciate
there is going to be tension between crews. In some scenarios we
are tail limited; in some scenarios we are crew limited. It is a bit
of a combination. It is a very complex program for the Air Force
to work. They are pushing as hard as they can with Boeing.
Senator KING. If you could give to the Committee a detailed anal-
ysis of what you identify as the gap, how many tails, how many
crews, and what the solution is because if we have a crisis and
need that capacity, saying well, you know, it was a complicated
problem is not going to cut it.
General LYONS. Senator, I agree, and the issue is not when there
is conflict. Actually it is in day-to-day competition. So just to be
clear, in today’s day-to-day competition, that is where we are tak-
ing the reduction.
Senator KING. We are stressed right now.
200

General LYONS. We are stressed today and that is where the 10
and the 13 that are in the current fiscal year 2021 reduction that
we are working with the Air Force and the Department to bring
those back.
Senator KING. I look forward to working with you on that.
General LYONS. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
General LYONS. USTRANSCOM continues to work with the United States Air
Force (USAF) to retain sufficient aerial refueling capacity to support daily demands
and crisis response to mitigate delays in KC–46 operational capability. Since my tes-
timony, two significant events have occurred which have solidified the Department’s
way forward for the air refueling mission area. First, in early April Boeing and the
USAF agreed on a fix to the most serious KC–46 deficiency for the Remote Visual
System (RVS). With a known technical solution in hand, the USAF now believes
they will deliver an RVS 2.0 solution to retrofit some KC–46 aircraft in fiscal year
2023 and have a fully capable KC–46 in production by fiscal year 2024. In light of
this outcome, in March and April USTRANSCOM worked closely with the USAF to
develop an acceptable reduction in KC 10 capacity while sustaining KC–135 aircraft
that I believe creates an acceptable action plan which I will describe more fully
below. USTRANSCOM’s ultimate objective is to balance retention of usable KC–135/
KC–10 air refueling capacity while simultaneously building the foundation to rap-
idly assimilate fully capable KC–46s into the air refueling fleet. Over the last sev-
eral years, the USAF identified a measured pace of KC–10 retirements, as the KC–
46 program progressed, provides a high-benefit cost savings given budget con-
straints. I support modest reductions in the KC–10 fleet which means accepting
some near-term risk in air refueling capacity. I am now more willing to accept these
measured reductions in April knowing a KC–46 RVS 2.0 solution is identified and
we’re on a path to producing fully manned and operationally capable KC–46s.
USTRANSCOM agrees with the USAF on a force structure profile that includes re-
ductions in KC–10 aircraft. The agreed upon Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory
profile; consists of not less than 50 KC–10s in fiscal year 2021, not less than 38 KC–
10s in fiscal year 2022, and not less than 26 KC–10s in fiscal year 2023 with full
retirement of the KC–10 fleet in fiscal year 2024. Any further delays in fielding
operationally capable KC 46 aircraft would cause USTRANSCOM to reassess this
profile. The USAF has committed to retaining current KC–135 Total Aircraft Inven-
tory of approximately 393 aircraft for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2023 with ade-
quate aircrews to mitigate the risk to daily competition missions. KC–135 reductions
in fiscal year 2024 and beyond are conceptually on a one-for-one basis after we
reach the current requirement of 479 capable air refueling aircraft. USTRANSCOM
continues to support USAF efforts to recapitalize the air refueling fleet which will
consist of 300 KC–135s in fiscal year 2029, at an average age of 67-years, and the
full complement of 179 KC–46s. These adjusted retirement profiles assume funding
is made available by Congress or the Department. We are working with the Depart-
ment’s senior leaders to realize this air refueling profile that accepts some modest
risk in the near-term and delivers a more modern, capable air refueling fleet in the
long-term.
Senator KING. General Wolters, a quick question. Do we have
sufficient visibility of Russian submarines in the Atlantic? Do we
know where they are?
General WOLTERS. We do but not for 100 percent of the time.
Senator KING. I do not want whatever the missing percent is to
be off the coast of Maine.
General WOLTERS. I agree, Senator.
Senator KING. Or New York, not to be too parochial about it.
[Laughter.]
Senator KING. I think it is unlikely—I hope I am right—that
Russian tanks are going to roll across the border into the Baltics.
But what is our thinking and strategic thinking about a hybrid
kind of activity involving Russian language, a kind of Crimea
model? Is that a concern, and do we have a strategic response?
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General WOLTERS. It is very much a concern, Senator, and it has
to do with the posture of our forces as we sit today in competition
and attempt to effectively deter. We are improving in our ability
to do so, and we have to do so to a point to where we compel any
potential enemy of us to not take those first steps against us.
NATO agreed in the NATO military strategy to also recognize a
whole-of-government, whole-of-nation approach, and that will allow
us to dramatically improve our posture so that we can better see
the battle space from an indications and warnings standpoint and
better be able to more proactively deploy to defend.
Senator KING. And be prepared for a different kind, for not a tra-
ditional tanks rolling over the border invasion.
General WOLTERS. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator KING. I think we should—I am sure you are—a lot of
study on Crimea and how that played out and what the response
could have been or might have been.
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator.
Senator KING. Final question. The attacks on the Saudi tanker
field and also the Iranian missile in Iraq after Soleimani’s death
to me raise concerns about our ability to defend against—I do not
know what you want to call them—cruise missiles, low-level mis-
siles, intermediate range, and I believe the Iranian missile was an
ICBM. What is our capability to defend against those kinds of at-
tacks? Because it did not work in Iraq and it did not work in Saudi
Arabia.
General WOLTERS. Senator, it is improving, but it has to get bet-
ter. We have a plan that prefers to integrated air missile defense
that comprehensively takes into account what happens at long
ranges and long altitudes and short ranges and lower altitudes. It
all has to be nested together from an indications and warnings
standpoint and command and control standpoint.
Senator KING. So you would agree that this is a significant gap
in our defense that we really need to get to work on in a hurry.
General WOLTERS. It is a shortfall, Senator, and we need to con-
tinue to work on it.
Senator KING. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Scott?
Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service.
With our NATO members that are now picking up the—you
know, spending the money they were supposed to spend in the
past, does it give us any opportunity to reduce our funding, or does
it give us any opportunity to reduce our troop deployment in Eu-
rope?
General WOLTERS. Senator, it could in the future.
Senator SCOTT. Does it concern you that countries like Germany
still do not want to pay their fair share, and does it impact our
ability to defend? And does it give us a need to start thinking about
where we should have troops and where we should not have
troops? And are we thinking about should we be in Poland more
than we should be in Germany?
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General WOLTERS. Senator, I believe all those are a concern, and
in my mil-to-mil consultations with my German counterparts, they
are just as concerned about meeting the 2 percent as we are.
Senator SCOTT. But there is no action that we need to be taking?
General WOLTERS. I think the vigilance that we continue to show
with respect to requirements collocated with defense spending
needs to continue. Today what we have observed between fiscal
year 2016 and 2020 is an actual increase across NATO of an addi-
tional $130 billion of funds for defense. That is positive and we
need to continue on that track.
Senator SCOTT. With Turkey buying the S–400 and it seems like
cozying up to Moscow, does it impact your ability to rely on them
as a partner?
General WOLTERS. Senator, it has not to this point. Turkey re-
mains a very reliable NATO ally.
Senator SCOTT. And with Huawei, have you had to make changes
on the types of information you are willing to share as a result of
knowing that these countries are going to continue to use Huawei
in 5G but also even in their existing infrastructure?
General WOLTERS. Senator, we have not at this point because of
the current posture with respect to 5G and Huawei and in par-
ticular UK. But my guess would be in the near future, we have to
be more vigilant with respect to network protection and Huawei
and 5G.
Senator SCOTT. The investment that Communist China is mak-
ing in Europe and all around the world—is that impacting our abil-
ity to be—not just the United States but other members to be able
to defend against a Russian invasion but even what China is
doing?
General WOLTERS. Senator, it is not an impact today, but it could
be in the future if we continue to see that economic equity increase
with respect to seaports on behalf of China in Europe.
Senator SCOTT. For them, it is mostly the seaports that is im-
pacting in Europe?
General WOLTERS. Today that is the biggest issue, Senator.
Senator SCOTT. How about the supply chain? How dependent the
world is on China as a member of the supply chain—does that
cause you any concern?
General WOLTERS. It does cause a concern, Senator. I have not
seen those reflections yet in Europe, but I anticipate that we could.
Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Sullivan?
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your service and your testi-
mony.
General Lyons, I think you mentioned at the outset your combat-
ant command does so much great work. I think Alaska we have
more understanding of that than most places and how you do it
professionally, quietly, but critical to the whole military.
I also thought the anecdote that you mention in your testimony
about saving the life of one soldier was very powerful. So please
tell the whole TRANSCOM civilian and military members that we
respect and appreciate all that you are doing.
203

I am glad you mentioned the personal property program in your
opening statement. I am going to have a number of questions for
the record that if you and your team can get back to me on rel-
atively soon, I would appreciate that a lot.
You know, you talk about also the most stressed capability and
number one readiness concern is on the aerial refueling fleet and
the tankers. So I mentioned this a number of times in this Com-
mittee. Billy Mitchell, when he was testifying in front of this Com-
mittee in the 1930s, the father of the United States Air Force, men-
tioned that Alaska was the most strategic place in the world be-
cause of our location to Asia, to Europe, to other places.
Secretary Esper, when he was testifying here several months
ago, said that we are going to have over fifth generation fighters
located in Alaska starting in April with the F–35’s coming to
Eielson Air Force Base to collocate KC–46’s with 100 fifth genera-
tion fighters. The Secretary of Defense said that would provide the
warning to our adversaries, particularly China and Russia, that we
have extreme strategic reach.
Right now, the Air Force is looking at their OCONUS decision
on where to put the OCONUS KC–46 fleet. Almost everything is
focused in INDOPACOM [Indo-Pacific Command] with the excep-
tion of Alaska which, as you know, could be INDOPACOM,
EUCOM, any com because where we are on the top of the world.
Can you give me your sense on that? To me, this seems like a
no-brainer. But I think it would help you with your most stressed
capability and number one readiness concern if you put tankers in
a place that can service EUCOM, PACOM, STRATCOM,
NORTHCOM versus place them all in Guam, which is kind of con-
ventional wisdom but in my view does not make any sense.
General LYONS. Senator, thanks. There is no question about the
strategic significance and location of the State called Alaska. As
you and I have discussed before, the Air Force does have a basing
methodology and a basing plan for the KC–46 as it comes online.
I will defer to them on those particular discussions.
Senator SULLIVAN. I am not telling you to make—but do you
have a view on that? You call it the most stressed capability, aerial
refueling. Does it help to have capability in a place that can help
TRANSCOM reach other COCOMs other than just INDOPACOM?
General LYONS. Senator, I would have to look at the analytics.
Senator SULLIVAN. Well, I think the answer is yes. Maybe you
can get back to me on that. It seems to me pretty damned clear.
General LYONS. Senator, I will come back to you.
Senator SULLIVAN. We want to help you with your most stressed
capability and number one readiness concern. I think there is a
way to do that, which is to make this decision, which to me seems
like a no-brainer.
General Wolters, I appreciated your reference on Arctic issues in
your testimony. Even though that is not necessarily Alaska, we are
kind of in the seams. Right? We got INDOPACOM forces. We got
the threat from Russia. We got STRATCOM. We got TRANSCOM,
NORTHCOM, everybody.
Let me just mention, this Committee has been very focused on
Arctic issues. The Chairman mentions great power competition.
There has been an important Arctic focus. The problem is the Pen-
204

tagon has been pretty slow to address some of these challenges and
recognize it.
We have two icebreakers right now. One is broken. That is the
American capability. Russia has 54, and this article for the record,
they just recently announced they have nuclear icebreakers and a
Russian shipyard launches a cruise missile-capable icebreaker.
Can you talk to the challenges of the Arctic with regard to Rus-
sia and how you are addressing it?
General WOLTERS. Senator, it is of great concern. As we crafted
the NATO military strategy, its title is ‘‘Comprehensive Defense
and Shared Response.’’ One of the realizations was the fact that we
need to be as focused in the Arctic as we are in the Baltics, as we
are in the Black Sea, as we are in the Mediterranean, as we are
in the central portion of the Atlantic. The Arctic needs to ensure
that it gets the appropriate scrutiny and the appropriate
resourcing.
We are excited about the fact of NORTHCOM serving as the ex-
ecutive agent for capability development in the Arctic. We are also
pleased that in the summer of 2019, DOD delivered their Arctic
strategy. I know you drove that, Senator, and we appreciate that.
It is vital. We see a lot of activity on behalf of Russia in the Arc-
tic, and we also see activity on behalf of China in the Arctic. We
think most of that has to do with money and commercial fishing
activity.
So it is of great concern and security exists on the periphery in
Europe, and the Arctic is a big reason why we have to make sure
that we maintain our vigilance.
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and generals, both of you, thanks
again for your service.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Shaheen?
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both you, General Wolters, and you, General
Lyons, for your service and for being here this morning.
I want to begin, General Wolters, with the continuation of the
discussion we had yesterday. I appreciated your taking time to
meet with me. But earlier this month, the President informed Con-
gress that he was going to divert another $3.8 billion from the Pen-
tagon toward the border wall. This is on top of the $3.6 billion that
he took from military construction (MILCON) projects last year.
These reprogrammings would eliminate, among other things, the
military weapon systems. I know Senator Kaine referred to one of
those. But that includes eight MQ–9 Reapers, which are an ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] asset, and my recol-
lection of previous conversations is that ISR assets are at a pre-
mium within the European theater and other areas.
So can you discuss how the elimination of these weapon systems
and MILCON projects are going to affect your campaign momen-
tum?
General WOLTERS. I would like to address the fact that we had
44 projects that were MILCON-related that were deferred because
we could not get those projects on contract by September of 2019,
and the total value of the 44 projects was approximately $1.3 bil-
lion, and they came in two buckets. One was a set of projects—25—
205

that were European Deterrence Initiative MILCON projects. The
other projects were baseline MILCON, 19. The EDI MILCON was
about $771 million, and the MILCON base was about $550 million.
When you take a look at all 44 of those deferred projects, which
we hope will reappear one day, what you see is three major areas
of reduction of campaign momentum. The first has to do with ad-
vanced airfield infrastructure on some of the NATO airfields in the
farther eastern side of Europe. The second has to do with the infra-
structure that supports prepositioned stockpiles for fuel and for
ammunition. The final area of impact for campaign momentum is
the modernization of infrastructure that supports a couple of mili-
tary headquarters and schools. All those are important to campaign
momentum. It slows the campaign momentum.
Despite all that, Senator, we still maintain positive campaign
momentum in the critical areas of indications and warnings, as you
alluded to ISR, command and control and mission command. It just
slows down the progress.
Senator SHAHEEN. As you read the National Defense Strategy,
what is a bigger threat to our national security? Is it a threat from
Russia and China and the great power competition? Or is it a
threat from immigrants coming across our southern border?
General WOLTERS. Senator, both are threats. As the Commander
of USEUCOM, I will tell you that I am most concerned about Rus-
sia.
Senator SHAHEEN. That was a very diplomatic answer, and
thank you. I am sorry. I should not have put you in that position.
But I think it is an important point to make, that the threat that
you are dealing with is one that has significant implications for our
future when we look at Russian aggression and its potential to im-
pact the United States.
I want to go back, General Lyons. I know there have been a
number of questions around the KC–46 and the delays in the air-
craft and what that challenge means for us, and it is an issue for
our National Guard, the 157th air refueling wing, which lost its
last KC–135 because we thought the 46 aircraft would be arriving
this year, and obviously, due to problems, it has been delayed.
But last month, General David L. Goldfein sent a letter to Boe-
ing asking them to review the remote vision system, which is prob-
ably the most prominent problem at this point, to give a design re-
view by March 2020 and a flight demonstration by 2020.
Can you tell us whether we have heard from Boeing at this point
and what they have said with respect to that review of the remote
vision system?
General LYONS. Senator, I really appreciate General Goldfein’s
focus on this particular area, and I have relayed that to him as
well.
I know there have been many contacts between Boeing and the
Air Force, and I do not want to get into the programmatics. I know
there are some design issues that they are working through. I do
not have a complete answer yet, and I will defer to the Air Force
on the particulars of the program.
Senator SHAHEEN. Well, can I ask, do we expect an answer from
Boeing by the end of March?
206

General LYONS. Yes, ma’am. I believe General Goldfein expects
an answer. He said that explicitly and I believe that will come to
fruition.
Senator SHAHEEN. Okay, thank you.
General Wolters, I want to go back to NATO because with Sen-
ator Tillis, he and I chair the Senate NATO Observer Group, which
is an effort to try and make sure that the Senate is aware of what
is happening with NATO and what we need to do.
I wonder if you could give us an update on the new Cyber Oper-
ations Center that NATO is planning to be fully functional by 2023.
General WOLTERS. We are very pleased, Senator. As you know,
it all originated in Estonia, and it started with the involvement of
the United States and the declaration by the United States
CYBERCOM to have one United States single military commander
responsible in the military for the domain of cyber, and the Euro-
peans have embraced that. We are excited about the future, and
NATO headquarters on the political side is also very excited.
Senator SHAHEEN. I am out of time, but I will do a follow-up
question for the record on this.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Hawley?
Senator HAWLEY. General Wolters, let us talk a little bit, if we
could, about the European Deterrence Initiative. I assume that you
would characterize this as a success. Is that fair to say?
General WOLTERS. Yes, Senator, I would.
Senator HAWLEY. Can you give us some specific examples of
things that EUCOM would not have been able to do without EDI?
General WOLTERS. Senator, the first largest example is we had
started Defender-Europe 20, an exercise that brings over a divi-
sion-sized force. We could not do that a year ago. We could not do
it 2 years ago. We can do this exercise as a result of the benefit
of EDI funds.
Senator HAWLEY. Why would EUCOM have struggled to do some
of these things without EDI? What specific obstacles has EDI
helped you overcome in your judgment?
General WOLTERS. First of all, it has funded the rotational bri-
gade combat teams that go to Poland, and that teaches all of our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines how to lift and shift larger
quantities of forces across the Atlantic and do so without any
harm. That in itself is very important.
We have also through EDI been able to fund our Army
prepositioned stockpiles, our emergency contingency operation sets
for the Air Force, and our deployable airbase systems for the Air
Force.
We have also been able to dramatically improve the airfield in-
frastructure and the reception infrastructure in the eastern part of
Europe to where it is equipped today to safely receive those re-
sources and effectively get those resources where they need to go
for our soldiers and sailors and airmen and coast guardsmen and
marines to be effective.
Senator HAWLEY. That is an impressive record of success, and it
is one of the reasons I think we need something similar in other
theaters, INDOPACOM in particular as I have long advocated for.
General, staying with you, Whiteman Air Force Base. My home
State of Missouri, of course, is the proud home of B–2 and the
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proud future home of the B–21. Can you just speak to the role that
you see the B–2 and one day the B–21 playing in deterring Russia
from using nuclear weapons as part of any attempted fait accompli
in the Baltics?
General WOLTERS. Senator, those airframes are part of the crit-
ical triad, and I am firmly convinced that the nuclear deterrence
umbrella that sits over Europe is part of the great success that we
have had for the last 7 decades in NATO to be able to generate
peace. I am excited about the future of the B–21 because I think
it will do more of the same with even a greater impact.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good.
Let me shift to China for a moment, if I could. In your written
testimony, General Wolters, you said that China’s efforts to build
5G networks in Europe, coupled with its growing interest and in-
vestment in European ports and infrastructure, complicate steady
state and contingency operations.
Can you just say more about that? How specifically do these Chi-
nese activities complicate steady state and contingency operations?
General WOLTERS. The equities that they have on the shipping
capacity inside and outside of Europe is very alarming, and when
you control the ability to take in and regulate resources, you have
a large impact on what actually exists on the continent with re-
spect to its ability to effectively generate peace and security. That
is the concern.
Senator HAWLEY. How do our European allies respond when you
raise these concerns with them, as I am sure you do?
General WOLTERS. With vigilance. In some cases they are sur-
prised to the degree of equities that China has with respect to sea-
ports, but in most cases, very concerned and vigilance increases
once we get past the education stage.
Senator HAWLEY. You also wrote that you are seeing encouraging
signs—those are your words—from European nations as they be-
come increasingly aware of the strings attached to Chinese capital
investment. Can you give us a sense of what those encouraging
signs are?
General WOLTERS. Several nations not willing to accept 5G
Huawei, and we have had reports of that in other nations being a
lot more stingy and scratchy with respect to their willingness to en-
gage in deliberations on port equities.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you for a second about our allies’
contribution to NATO, which is something that has come up, right-
ly so, a number of times already this morning.
I think that the progress towards the 2 percent mark is very im-
portant but only just a first step because the division of labor with-
in NATO has to fundamentally change, and I think as this Com-
mittee has been saying now for some time. What is your assess-
ment about what would need to happen for our European allies to
get to the point where they are able to assume primary responsi-
bility for their security in your theater?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I think we need to continue on the
current campaign that we are on. As you know, from 2016 to 2020,
in the cash portion of contributions for burden sharing, we have
had a net increase of $130 billion. There is also the examination
of contributions in capabilities, and in NATO we have been very,
208

very vigilant with respect to our focus on improving our readiness,
the ability of force elements to be more resilient, more responsive,
and more lethal. That is all part of the equation with respect to
European contributions to adequately defend, and we are improv-
ing.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you very much, General. I look forward
to seeing you both this afternoon.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Duckworth?
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Lyons, thank you for making the time to sit down with
me earlier this month to talk about TRANSCOM and logistics more
broadly.
I want to touch again on the state of the sealift fleet in the U.S.,
and I know that Ranking Member Reed asked about the state of
sealift in his question line. But I sort of want to go a little further
into this. You said that our current readiness is lower than where
we need to be, but you are working to recapitalize on sealift capa-
bility when you answered Ranking Member Reed.
How do you ensure that this plan continues to be prioritized with
the Navy and the DOD leadership when they are always balancing
other higher cost programs and initiatives? I feel like this is sort
of the plain sister and it needs a little bit more attention. How do
you make sure that that priority is also placed on your particular
recapitalization plan?
General LYONS. Senator, first let me just publicly thank you for
your leadership and leading our logistics efforts across the Depart-
ment. I appreciate your particular interest here.
I think this is a hard decision for the Navy. They have a lot of
competing requirements, and Sealift is one of many.
My own view on this, if you go back to the original recapitaliza-
tion of sealift back when John Lehman was Secretary of the Navy,
we had something which we have today, but we do not use, the Na-
tional Defense Sealift Fund. I think the way that we are going to
move in a positive direction is we are going to have to have an ap-
propriation that feeds the National Defense Sealift Fund. It allows
us the flexibility to capitalize on opportunities in the open market
to continue the acquired use strategy, and I think that is what we
need to do over a long period of time, over the next 15-plus years
where we have 46 vessels aging out.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you.
Another category of concern that I have in logistics is based
around fuel. We have talked in the past about solutions for alle-
viating stress on the Air Force’s tanker fleet, but this time I would
like to focus on bulk fuel capacity for distribution and storage as
an example.
How would you work with the services’ logistics arms to properly
identify each of their needs and how to meet those needs as they
come around and reframe to face near-peer competitors under the
NDS? Because I feel like there is not a lot of really good commu-
nications between the services on what those bulk fuel needs and
capacities. What do you need to do to push it forward into theater?
General LYONS. Yes, ma’am. I mean, you are alluding to some-
thing that is very important across the department and fuel is liq-
209

uid gold essentially. We require it for everything that we do in
every single domain. We have got a study directed by Congress
that we will complete this year in terms of assessing our ability to
access maritime tankers, for example, in an end-to-end value chain,
to look also at the nodes. The way we look at it today in terms of
global posture is very large, fixed-base facilities. We need to see if
that is the applicable way to go for contested environments and
then assess where we need to go for the future for global posture
and maritime transportation, as well as aerial refuel that we
talked about.
Senator DUCKWORTH. I feel like this sort of reflects the struggle
we had just a couple years ago when I was in the House about am-
munition, you know, across the services, and that we were not talk-
ing to each other well enough before we did a whole audit. I feel
like we are getting to the same issue with fuel. I mean, you cannot
fight and win without class 3 and class 5. Right? I feel like we are
sort of in the same problem with fuel. Am I correct in this sense
that we have to do better with communicating among the services?
General LYONS. Senator, I think you are absolutely correct. I
think we need what I would characterize as a global innovative
view of the end-to-end liquid energy supply chain to make sure
that we have sufficient not just supply and posture but resiliency
to continue to operate under a contested environment. I agree with
you wholeheartedly.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you.
General Wolters, I would like to bring you into the discussion
here. We have been hearing a lot about Defender-Europe and what
we hope to learn from this exercise. I am looking forward to hear-
ing about not only the successes but perhaps more importantly the
challenges that the exercise helps identify as well.
How would you classify your level of concern going into Defender-
Europe 20 whether from an overall capacity standpoint, from a lack
of previous exercise familiarity, or due to other factors inside and
outside our control, and how are you going to leverage that into les-
sons learned going forward?
General WOLTERS. Senator, a great question, and I would like to
extend a personal thanks to you for your support in the logistics
area.
As we speak, there are soldiers downloading at Bremerhaven for
Defender-Europe 20 at this very moment.
I am concerned about the bandwidth to be able to accept this
large force, and I am also concerned about road and rail from the
center portion of Germany to the east, all the way to the eastern
border. Because we have the appropriate resources, we now possess
a white team capability to examine our speed of move from west
to east. We also have enough white cell individuals to assess how
safely we get stuff through Bremerhaven and to the next point.
Bandwidth with respect to size and speed are my greatest con-
cerns.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you.
I am over time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Blackburn?
Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
210

I know you all are so happy to see me because I am the last one,
and you will get to finish up and head off.
I want to go back, General Wolters. You told Senator Reed that
the Chinese controlled 10 percent of the shipping rights in and out
of Europe. I would like for you to expand on that just a little bit,
talk about do you think it is pretty much going to stay at that
level, if it is going to increase, the rate of increase, a little bit more
insight into what you think this means.
General WOLTERS. The Chinese investment covers 10 percent of
European shipping capacity, and I would contend that is a whole-
of-government, whole-of-nation concern to make sure that Europe
has the appropriate equities with respect to shipping capacity.
Senator BLACKBURN. So you see that as a floor or a ceiling?
General WOLTERS. I see that as the conditions that exist on the
ground today, and I think the nations need to understand what
that means with respect to their ability to effectively ship what
their nation needs for their national interest, and an education
process needs to follow fast.
Senator BLACKBURN. Well, I think we see the need for that edu-
cation process not only when it comes to infrastructure but the Belt
and Road Initiative, the implications that that may have as we look
at 5G and the rollout there, the implications that it has.
So what is NATO going to do to address this? Because it does
not matter if it is shipping and that infrastructure or building
roads and connectors or 5G with that infrastructure. There is an
issue, and being able to communicate with our allies over a Huawei
network is a very difficult thing to do. So give me kind of a
timeline and the steps that you all are taking to implement an edu-
cation process.
General WOLTERS. In the NATO political paradigm, there is a
growing realization that this is an issue, and there will have to be
a common understanding at the political level at NATO that this
is an issue that NATO should embrace. I think that is the start of
success to ensure that the national interest of the 29 nations in
NATO are protected with respect to China proliferation, and we are
at that phase. As a military member supporting NATO, it is my job
to report the facts and that is what we are doing.
Senator BLACKBURN. Okay. So who is receptive to this message?
The first part of solving a problem is defining a problem. So you
say there is awareness in defining this problem. Correct?
General WOLTERS. Correct, and the first task is to ensure of the
29 nations which ones have concern and which ones still need more
—
Senator BLACKBURN. Okay, and out of those 29 nations, who is
receptive to this and who are you getting pushback from? Are you
at a 50/50 on this, or what is the standing there?
General WOLTERS. Senator, I can only speak at the mil-to-mil
level not the political level for the 29 nations, and I would say that
the majority of the nations are incredibly concerned about China
proliferation.
Senator BLACKBURN. I hope we can talk a little bit more about
that this afternoon, if that would be okay.
General Lyons, let me move to a couple of things with you, the
NDS and cyber and space. Have they been identified as contested
211

warfighting domains? Talk to me a little bit about how
TRANSCOM is working with its private sector partners to improve
their cybersecurity, their ability to defend because Senator Ernst
asked you about autonomous vehicles and as we look at building
out Space Command and artificial intelligence and autonomous ve-
hicles, we know that the cyber component is going to be more rel-
evant in those discussions. So talk with me for just a couple of sec-
onds about that.
General LYONS. Yes, ma’am. Thank you.
For USTRANSCOM, cyber is a very, very high priority. You
asked specifically about our commercial providers. We have worked
over the last several years now to instill contract language that I
would characterize as at least brings our commercial providers up
to a basic level of minimum cyber hygiene. I think we have been
successful in that. I think we have been successful in gaining the
attention and focus of the C-suite as an issue that they have to con-
tend with whether it is for national defense or whether it is for
their private equities, and so we are making progress.
But as I said earlier, I would also say that when confronted with
an advanced persistent threat actor, I do not think any of our com-
mercial providers necessarily are in a position to protect them-
selves in that particular scenario. We very intentionally have mul-
tiple providers in each of the commodity areas so that if we lose
one, we can count on others.
Senator BLACKBURN. Are you increasing the standards of compli-
ance for them?
General LYONS. Yes, Senator, we are, and as you may have seen,
the Department’s cyber maturity model that they just rolled out
will do significant good in that area.
Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you very much.
The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
HOUSEHOLD GOODS MOVES

1. Senator TILLIS. General Lyons, what are your expectations on accountability
and transparency of moving companies in the household goods process this upcom-
ing permanent change of station (PCS) season?
General LYONS. Accountability and transparency are indispensable to the success
of the Defense Personal Property Program. My expectations of moving companies on
these principles are straightforward. I expect industry to abide by our program’s
business rules; to be forthcoming with DOD customers with information on the sta-
tus or condition of their shipment; and to follow established processes to ‘make fami-
lies whole’ when things go wrong. When moving companies do not abide by these
principles, my staff will follow business rules to hold them accountable. I also be-
lieve industry has a reasonable expectation of these principles from USTRANSCOM.
I am committed to transparency with industry when it comes to the program’s direc-
tion and will similarly hold my organization accountable for following our business
rules. Ultimately, it is DOD families that are owed accountability and transparency.
The Defense Personal Property Program exists for one reason, and one reason only:
to provide a safe, quality relocation experience for DOD families as they prepare to
serve at their next duty assignment.
212
2. Senator TILLIS. General Lyons, how different will family’s experience be in the
quality of service?
General LYONS. For the 2020 Peak Season, we’ve instituted changes to Defense
Personal Property Program business rules that address long-standing pain points
for DOD families. From a safety perspective, we require that all moving companies
perform background checks on employees and meet local installation access require-
ments (whether they are serving homes on or off base). Recognizing that many
issues center on communication, we require moving companies to be more respon-
sive to customer inquiries, provide more lead time to customers before delivery ap-
pointments, and offer more information to customers on the status of their shipment
while it’s in transit. In instances of loss or damage, we’ll give families more time
to file claims and require that moving companies settle claims under a certain
threshold faster. While many of these changes were inspired by our requirements
for the Global Household Goods Contract (GHC), the structure of our current model
limits the quality improvements we can make and many of our processes deter com-
panies from participating in the program. Our current construct is a constraint to
innovation and advancement, as we are tied to the capabilities of ‘the lowest com-
mon denominators’ in the program. Additionally, the current model prevents us
from capitalizing on existing capabilities in industry such as digital inventories,
near real-time event status updates as shipments are in-transit, and mobile applica-
tions to provide families modern tools to manage all aspects of the move process (in-
cluding claims). The GHC is an opportunity to raise the standard for DOD families,
attract additional quality capacity to the program, and incorporate modern capabili-
ties (which we take for granted in every aspect of our personal lives) into the Per-
sonal Property Program.

3. Senator TILLIS. General Lyons, where are you still experiencing shortfalls or
limitations in improving household goods moves for military families?
General LYONS. I see three limiting factors to improving the personal property re-
location process for DOD families. The first relates to our existing business model.
The transactional nature of our relationship with a disparate confederation of sup-
pliers prevents us from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits investment in gener-
ating additional capacity, stymies our ability to hold industry accountable, and in-
hibits us from incorporating modern capabilities (the kind of convenient technology
we take for granted in every aspect of our personal lives) into the Personal Property
Program. The second relates to the similarly fractured nature of the DOD’s manage-
ment framework. The Department is taking steps to align and integrate activities,
but more work is required to evolve from our current series of service-centric activi-
ties into a truly Department-wide Personal Property Program. The third relates to
the sustained, day-to-day executive leadership required to drive Personal Property
reform across the Department. I’ve temporarily reallocated a member of the Senior
Executive Service (SES) from my own staff to lead the Personal Property Program
at USTRANSCOM. Meanwhile, I’ve submitted a request to the Department for an
SES allocation to permanently lead the Personal Property Enterprise.
GLOBAL MOBILITY CAPACITY AND POSITIONING

4. Senator TILLIS. General Lyons, in light of force operational changes proposed
by each of the services, how is your OCONUS [outside contiguous United States]
mobility capacity or positioning impacted?
General LYONS. USTRANSCOM’s posture of forces globally is consistent with the
National Defense Strategy and Globally Integrated War Plans. Our global mobility
posture is critical and allows us to shift rapidly to the highest priority DOD mis-
sions. USTRANSCOM’s robust global network relies heavily on access, basing, and
overflight privileges we leverage as a result of our extensive network of allies and
like-minded partners around the globe. We continually assess our global mobility ca-
pacity against requirements as war plans are updated in conjunction with the ever-
changing geopolitical environment. The Mobility Capability and Requirements
Study directed in the latest NDAA will evaluate the demands placed on the mobility
enterprise, both in terms of capacity and forces. We will provide a status update to
Congress in June and are scheduled to deliver the final report in Jan 21.
INFORMATION WARFARE/ STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

5. Senator TILLIS. General Wolters, it is great to hear that our allies in the region
are maturing in their knowledge and expertise in the cyber and information domain,
where can we improve to gain even more proficiency, effectiveness, or functionality,
in light of Russia’s propaganda activities?
213
General WOLTERS. We must continue to array our resources and leverage a whole-
of-government approach to best defend critical cyber infrastructure and compete to
win in the information domain. A key platform for competing with Russia on these
fronts is the Russian Influence Group. USEUCOM co-chairs this effort with U.S. De-
partment of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to promote whole-of-
government cooperation and to identify, attribute, and counter Russia malign activi-
ties. Our military-to-military security cooperation programs engage Allies and part-
ners to improve alignment and strengthen our collective ability to compete in the
cyber and information domains. Increased flexibility with security cooperation re-
sources, policies, and processes to offer more tools, training, and equipment to Allies
and partners would help sustain our positive momentum in these 21st Century do-
mains.
6. Senator TILLIS. General Wolters, you stressed your concerns of Chinese efforts
to expand 5G Networks in Europe through Huawei and ZTE. Take a few seconds
to explain regional or national security significance of your concern.
General WOLTERS. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to gain influence
abroad and access to sensitive information through the One Belt and One Road ini-
tiative, and other national means. CCP leaders are leveraging Chinese vendors,
such as Huawei and ZTE, in this pursuit. Fielding 5G networks in Europe could
provide an intelligence and information advantage to the CCP and other challengers
in competition, crisis, or conflict. Leveraging these advanced technologies is one way
the CCP is attempting to tilt the free and open international order in their favor.

7. Senator TILLIS. General Wolters, it is a positive achievement to note that Euro-
pean nations are becoming increasingly wary of strings attached to Chinese capital
and investment. What do you need to double your efforts in this area to achieve in-
tentional impact or broader messaging?
General WOLTERS. In our increasingly interconnected and data-driven world, we
must double efforts to communicate the vital importance of a trusted 5G network
by leveraging a whole-of-government approach. Trusted networks and infrastructure
are a critical requirement to protect sensitive information and competitive advan-
tage. We must remain vigilant with respect to Chinese investment in shipping and
logistics hubs across Europe and its potential implications to military mobility into
and across the Area of Responsibility (AOR). Improving AOR-wide transparency on
these activities helps Allies and partners fully understand the economic and security
risks associated with continued increases in Chinese capital and investment.
RELATIONSHIP BUILDING

8. Senator TILLIS. General Wolters, in your view, how do we best operationalize
the DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) model to strategically
foster stability and relationships with countries in the South Caucasus, Balkans, or
others? In other words, how do we pivot from a transactional to a more trans-
formational relationship?
General WOLTERS. USEUCOM supports and applies a whole-of-government ap-
proach across the theater. Our security cooperation exchanges, which bring leaders
from across the AOR to the U.S. through the International Military Education and
Training programs, and our well-established State Partnership Programs are both
transformational examples of DIME in action. These programs develop multi-year
cultural and regional expertise as well as foster lifelong relationships. This expertise
and these relationships provide unique access and positively affect our ability to
compete, deter, and defend in the South Caucasus, the Balkans, and across the
Euro-Atlantic.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) OBSERVER GROUP

9. Senator TILLIS. General Wolters, as the co-chair of the Senate NATO Observer
Group with Senator Jeanne Shaheen, I am interested in maintaining consistent
communication between Congressional leaders and the military leadership of our
NATO allies. In your role as United States European Command (EUCOM) com-
mander, how can Congress continue to ensure that U.S. NATO commitments con-
tinue to be upheld, and that the shared strategic objectives of alliance members are
promoted?
General WOLTERS. Sustained Congressional interest and support of NATO reas-
sures Allies across the Euro-Atlantic and strengthens our ability to preserve peace.
Congress’ steadfast support of the European Deterrence Initiative continues to un-
derwrite the positive momentum we have maintained with respect to readiness. EDI
has been pivotal to our efforts to strengthen U.S. and NATO readiness by sup-
214
porting operations, activities, and investments, which generate options for Allies
and dilemmas for our challengers.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY PROGRAM (DP3)

10. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, as you know I have paid close attention to
the United States Transportation Command’s (TRANSCOM) proposal to replace the
current Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) with a sole-source Global House-
hold Goods Contract (GHC) and worked to include a provision to conduct a Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO) report on the validity of this contract in the fiscal
year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Historically, I have observed
that when the Department of Defense (DOD) awards large sole-source contracts it
results in less competition for industry, the potential for greater cost, and decreased
customer satisfaction with their service. How will the proposed GHC contract en-
courage competition to decrease cost and increase the value for the servicemember?
General LYONS. DOD families are our North Star and are the reason we seek to
change the program. The GHC is one aspect of a broader DOD reform plan to im-
prove the relocation process for DOD families. USTRANSCOM, on behalf of the
DOD, seeks to award the Global Household Goods Contract (GHC) to a single move
manager in order to improve access to—and management of—quality capacity to
meet peak demand and enable the Department to affix the accountability and re-
sponsibility currently lacking in today’s program. While pursuing the GHC was
never about saving money, I am encouraged by the bids we’ve received as they are
in line with DOD spending in the current program. I acknowledge—and will comply
with—the DOD Appropriations language to provide a report on the impact of GHC
to Service budgets. Regarding competition, the GHC single move manager will have
the latitude to partner with companies it believes add value to the program on the
terms and conditions those companies think make sense (versus being bound by the
DOD’s overly-complicated rule set, which is often cited as a deterrent to participa-
tion). The DOD currently pays competitive rates, but we’re often told our program
isn’t worth the hassle. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to eliminate the bar-
riers of entry and attract more agents, packers, and truckers to meet our demand.
Revenue distribution is a common complaint in our current program, with agents
and drivers routinely highlighting that non-asset owning companies retain in excess
of 20 percent of billed revenue. Such ‘pass-thru’ companies add cost to the DOD
without adding value, and siphon income from the men and women who perform
the hard work of moving military families. We’ve built a transparent pricing model
to capture cost at a granular level for all services at origin, destination, and in-tran-
sit. This model includes a separate management fee paid directly to the single move
manager contractor for each move processed. Additionally, it clearly identifies the
revenue we expect the single move manager to generate and the revenue we expect
to flow to those doing the work. Potential bidders are required to comply with all
laws—including the Service Contract Act (SCA)—when submitting proposals; we ex-
pect SCA to increase wages for contractor employees performing services ‘at the
curb.’ The move-manager will also be required to ensure a minimum of 40 percent
of the total acquisition value of the domestic work performed flows down to subcon-
tracted small businesses. DOD acknowledges that non-asset companies are at risk
as a result of GHC. Many of these niche companies exist solely to exploit the gaps
and seams in the current program and do so at the expense of the Services’
MILPERS accounts without adding value.

11. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, in your opening statement you stated, ‘‘My
message for industry providers, if you provide quality service for military members,
you have a place in the future program. We need every quality moving service to
include our small businesses and appreciate all that you do.’’ How will the GHC con-
tract continue to utilize the supply of quality small business moving companies
around the country that currently exist in the DP3 program?
General LYONS. Companies that provide quality capacity to the program will be
relied upon for as long as DOD moves families around the globe. Far from excluding
capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more agents, pack-
ers, and truckers to meet DOD demand. The majority of today’s capacity comes from
small business (agents, packers, truckers, etc.). This capacity will remain critical
under the new construct. The GHC single move manager will have the latitude to
partner with companies it believes add value to the program on the terms and con-
ditions those companies think make sense (versus being bound by the DOD’s overly-
215
complicated rule set, which is often cited as a deterrent to participation). The DOD
currently pays competitive rates, but we’re often told our program isn’t worth the
hassle. Far from excluding capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and
attract more agents, packers, and truckers to meet our demand.
12. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, when evaluating which moving companies
are slated to stay in the new GHC program, what criteria will be used to eliminate
bad actors, while retaining companies that have performed well in the DP3 system?
General LYONS. When it comes to selecting companies for the GHC,
USTRANSCOM will only select the single move manager contractor and—with few
exceptions—cannot dictate to the single move manager which subcontractors it
hires. For example, the GHC single move manager is prohibited from subcontracting
with a company that has previously been disqualified from DOD business in the
past three years. Similarly, we will not mandate what companies they must use.
Companies that enable the single move managers to meet the contract requirements
and key performance indicators will thrive; conversely, companies that fail to meet
contract standards will likely (and ideally) not be used to handle DOD shipments.
Within the contract, we will apply a combination of financial penalties and incen-
tives to drive industry performance. The most notable ‘penalty’ will come in the form
of inconvenience claims, where the GHC single move manager will compensate DOD
families directly in instances of late pick-ups or missed delivery dates. The most no-
table incentive will come in the form of ‘award terms.’ If—and only if—the GHC sin-
gle move manager meets all Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), the contractor can
earn two additional years of contract performance without competition. The con-
tract’s KPIs were developed by USTRANSCOM and the Military Services to address
longstanding pain-points identified by DOD families. As the award terms may rep-
resent in excess of 25 percent of the GHC’s lifecycle revenue, the GHC single move
manager has a strong incentive to meet them—and, as previously mentioned, can
only meet them if they employ quality companies.
13. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, how will TRANSCOM protect high-per-
forming small businesses in the transition to the GHC contract to help ensure that
these businesses do not go out of business?
General LYONS. Moving and storage companies achieve—and retain—any ‘high-
performance’ label through their own merit. USTRANSCOM will take action to
place companies that do not abide by DOD business rules into a ‘non-use’ or ‘dis-
qualified’ status. Under GHC, all subcontracting decisions will be made by the GHC
single move manager. Companies that enable the single move manager to meet the
contract requirements and key performance indicators will thrive; conversely, com-
panies that fail to meet contract standards will likely (and ideally) not be used to
handle DOD shipments. Companies that provide quality capacity to the program
will be needed as long as DOD moves families around the globe. Far from excluding
capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more agents, pack-
ers, and truckers to meet DOD demand. The majority of today’s capacity comes from
small business (agents, packers, truckers, etc.). This capacity will remain critical
under the new construct.

14. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, in your opening statement you stated,
‘‘after personal consultation with Service leaders and industry executives—
USTRANSCOM worked to fundamentally restructure our relationship with industry
to generate the quality capacity to meet DOD’s peak demand and enable the Depart-
ment to affix the accountability and responsibility missing in today’s program.’’ How
has TRANSCOM worked with industry to develop the GHC contract and how will
DOD ensure that best practices from industry are implemented by the winner of the
GHC contract?
General LYONS. DOD coordinated extensively with industry to develop GHC. The
USTRANSCOM staff hosted two industry days to exchange information (which in-
cluded opportunities for one-on-one meetings with interested companies); posted two
requests for information to solicit formal industry input; posted two draft Requests
for Proposal (RFP) for industry to share insights on; answered nearly 800 questions
from industry on GHC; and posted the answers to those questions on the U.S. Gov-
ernment’s official contracting website for all parties to review. Additionally, I per-
sonally hosted two sets of meetings with industry CEOs and association leaders to
outline my vision for GHC. The GHC postures DOD to capitalize on industry best
practices and innovation in a way the current construct simply cannot. The trans-
actional nature of our relationship with a disparate confederation of suppliers pre-
vents us from capitalizing on existing capacity, limits investment in generating ad-
ditional capacity, stymies our ability to hold industry accountable, and inhibits us
216
from incorporating modern capabilities (to include the modern, convenient tech-
nology we take for granted in every aspect of our personal lives) into the Personal
Property Program. Until we fundamentally restructure our relationship with indus-
try, the program will never generate the quality service DOD families deserve or
the accountability Congress demands.
15. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, how will the GHC contract affect rural and
isolated states like Hawaii and Alaska where there are fewer shipping companies
and higher transit costs?
General LYONS. Taking Alaska as an example, the GHC rate structure enables
bidders to propose Alaska-specific rates (and regional rates within Alaska). Under
the current program, Alaska is divided into five distinct ‘rate zones’ to allow pro-
viders to account for key considerations (logistical, labor, etc.) across the state. The
rate zones under GHC are identical to the current program, meaning the GHC sin-
gle move manager can account for differences in handling household goods ship-
ments in Alaska. GHC represents an opportunity for quality providers in Alaska to
sustain—or grow—their business. The majority of today’s capacity comes from small
business. This capacity will remain critical under the new construct. Far from ex-
cluding capacity, we seek to eliminate the barriers of entry and attract more agents,
packers, and truckers to meet our demand.
16. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, how has TRANSCOM considered these fac-
tors in the planned award of the GHC contract?
General LYONS. The GHC outlines standard levels of performance, both at the
program level (overall Key Performance Indicators) and at the individual service-
member level. While GHC is clear on required service levels, DOD avoids being pre-
scriptive in how industry should meet those standards; similarly, DOD does not
force industry to apply common pricing across all markets. Many move managers
and asset-based providers (as well as industry associations that represent them, like
the American Moving and Storage Association) agree that DOD’s business model is
outdated and recognize the business opportunities associated with this change.
17. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, once the GHC contract is awarded, there
will likely be a destabilization of the industrial base as small contractors and ven-
dors assess opportunities outside of the construct of the revised DP3 program. This
destabilization may occur during the peak summer moving season when capacity
needs are at their highest for the DOD. How will TRANSCOM ensure they have
a stable base of contractors during the transition phase of the GHC contract, par-
ticularly during the initial peak summer moving season?
General LYONS. Although it’s the GHC single move manager responsibility to
meet its contractual requirements, I agree USTRANSCOM shares the responsibility
to establish the conditions in which the single move manager can succeed. One of
the ways USTRANSCOM is setting favorable conditions is through the deliberate,
responsible transition plan we’ve established. The current timeline envisions the
GHC contractor managing shipments in the continental United States beginning in
February of 2021—a full 9 months after contract award. The single move manager
is required to handle 25 percent of total volume beginning in February 2021 and
roll in additional shipments (25 percent per month thru May 2021) until they are
postured to support 100 percent of continental U.S. shipments during the 2021 Peak
Season. With an award planned for no earlier than 30 April 2020, this timeline
gives the single move manager a full year to prepare (IT integration, staffing, train-
ing, etc.) for the 2021 peak season. We will wait until October 2021 (following peak
season) to continue the transition to GHC and incorporate international shipments.
While I believe a 9-month transition period before requiring the single move man-
ager to accept any bookings is a responsible timeline, DOD will remain flexible and
adjust the transition plan as needed. During transition and implementation phases,
we will be driven by improvements and not the calendar.

18. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, TRANSCOM currently uses a performance
incentive program in the DP3 system in which companies are given financial pen-
alties to regulate poor behavior. How will TRANSCOM maintain control and ac-
countability over a large company that is awarded the GHC contract where financial
penalties may not be as effective?
General LYONS. To be clear, the DOD does not have effective performance man-
agement measures in the current program. DOD does not have a formal contract
with any of our current providers and cannot hold them accountable in a meaningful
way. Over time, DOD allowed the program to evolve in a manner that now favors
industry, with suppliers exploiting business rules to generate revenue at the ex-
217
pense of military families & Service budgets. Implementing the GHC offers the De-
partment the opportunity to set terms and conditions that favor DOD families and
an avenue to hold industry accountable. As we restructure our relationship with in-
dustry, we will similarly restructure and align the DOD’s management framework
(the Service-owned Personal Property Processing and Shipping Offices around the
globe) to provide the rigorous, centralized oversight required of a program that di-
rectly and personally impacts DOD personnel. Just as our transition period postures
the GHC single move manager for success, the timeline also postures the DOD for
success; we will use that time to appoint and train Quality Assurance Evaluators,
Alternate Contracting Officer’s Representatives, Ordering Officers, and Invoicing Of-
ficers to effectively manage and oversee the contract. These offices are the center
of gravity for holding industry accountable. Within the contract, we will apply a
combination of financial penalties and incentives to drive industry performance. The
most notable ‘penalty’ will come in the form of inconvenience claims, where the GHC
single move manager will compensate DOD families directly in instances of late
pick-ups or missed delivery dates. The most notable incentive will come in the form
of ‘award terms.’ If—and only if—the GHC single move manager meets all KPIs, the
contractor can earn two additional years of contract performance without competi-
tion.

19. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, it is my understanding that TRANSCOM
is now preparing comments on the GAO report regarding the GHC contract that
myself and Senator Tim Kaine requested last year. Do you believe that TRANSCOM
will need to postpone the awarding of the GHC contract to respond and address con-
cerns in the GAO report?
General LYONS. No, the GAO report does not delay our planned GHC award. After
10 months of detailed data exchanges and more than one hundred requests for in-
formation, USTRANSCOM is confident GAO had access to all the relevant informa-
tion in order to conduct an exhaustive review of our work on GHC and broader per-
sonal property reform efforts. GAO makes three recommendations in their report:
1) that DOD develop a process to track data during the first three years of GHC
operations to more precisely determine overall Defense Personal Property Program
(DP3) manpower requirements; 2) that DOD develop metrics for DP3 activities that
fall outside of the GHC (for example, things like Service-retained counseling and
processing timelines within the Military Claims Offices); 3) that DOD articulate the
linkages between metrics and overall program goals. These recommendations are
sensible and are consistent with USTRANSCOM’s vision to evolve the program from
a series of disparate Service-owned activities into a truly integrated, synchronized
Departmental program. Moreover, the report confirms many of the issues
USTRANSCOM has highlighted to the Department and Congress over the last two
years. It is important to note that GAO issued no negative findings or recommenda-
tions regarding the single move-manager construct, nor did GAO recommend any
changes to the acquisition strategy or overall timeline for GHC award and imple-
mentation.
KC–46 BASING

20. Senator SULLIVAN. General Wolters, on October 24, 2019, the Air Force an-
nounced the start of the Strategic Basing process for the Main Operating Base
(MOB) 5 beddown of KC–46 aircraft. Alaska has the existing infrastructure to sup-
port aerial refueling operations, a robust current need for aerial refueling capability,
and a strategic location which is in close proximity (but not too close) to three of
five main threats prioritized within the 2018 NDS. These factors make my state an
ideal platform from which to deploy a larger amount of combat power to multiple
areas of operation. What benefit would EUCOM potentially gain from the basing of
these aircraft in a geographically-central and strategic location such as Alaska?
General WOLTERS. From the perspective of USEUCOM’s role as global coordinator
for the Russia Problem Set, basing KC–46s in Alaska could further support dynamic
employment of forces into and out of the USEUCOM AOR and increase strategic
and operational dilemmas for Russia. Service Secretaries are the decision authority
for basing of forces within the United States, in the case of KC–46s and Alaska,
the decision rests with the Secretary of the Air Force.

21. Senator SULLIVAN. General Wolters, what message might it send Russia – the
main threat in EUCOM – if the United States Air Force were to co-locate the next
generation tanker with over 100 5th Generation fighters in a place like Alaska?
General WOLTERS. Co-locating next-generation tankers with a large number of 5th
generation fighters in Alaska would send a strong message to Russia. Arraying com-
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bat power in this manner is one way to communicate our preparedness to defend
the Homeland, and our ability to respond rapidly and at scale, to a violation of U.S.
airspace along our Western borders. Such positioning of assets should be balanced
with Russia’s elevated threat perception and long-term counteraction.
22. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, in your testimony under ‘‘Aerial Refueling’’
you state, ‘‘USTRANSCOM’s most-stressed capability and number one readiness
concern. The aerial refueling fleet continues to underpin the Joint Force’s ability to
deploy an immediate force across all NDS mission areas and is comprised of KC–
135, KC–10, and KC–46 aircraft.’’ Given the substantial need for added aerial re-
fueling assets and U.S. Air Force’s desire to grow the number of its tanker squad-
rons as a part of the 386 squadron construct, does it not make sense for the U.S.
Air Force to pursue additive basing actions (as opposed to replacement basing ac-
tions) for KC–46 tankers, especially when the tankers to be replaced are KC–135s?
General LYONS. As the KC–46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging KC–135 and
KC–10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided using the United States
Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process, which is led by the Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF). This SECAF-led process accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the
tanker fleet and is designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to in-
clude routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent possible, while ac-
counting for global air refueling demand to ensure the posture support Combatant
Commander requirements. I appreciate the Secretary’s transparent process and the
efforts to identify where best to base the KC–46 to meet global demand. Although
basing is important, USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC–46 will be an air re-
fueling asset capable of supporting global missions.
23. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, in your personal opinion, would the basing
of a squadron of KC–46s at Kadena Air Force Base or Anderson Air Force Base re-
sult in them – largely or almost exclusively – being tasked for operations in a single
area of operation?
General LYONS. As the KC–46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging KC–135 and
KC–10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided using the United States
Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process, which is led by the Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF). This SECAF-led process accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the
tanker fleet and is designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to in-
clude routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent possible, while ac-
counting for global air refueling demand to ensure the posture support Combatant
Commander requirements. I appreciate the Secretary’s transparent process and the
efforts to identify where best to base the KC–46 to meet global demand. Although
basing is important, USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC–46 will be an air re-
fueling asset capable of supporting global missions.

24. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, from your perspective, does it make stra-
tegic sense to pigeon-hole a low-density, high-demand aerial refueling asset like the
KC–46 to one area of operation, or more importantly, to largely a single operation
plan (OPLAN) within that area of operation?
General LYONS. As the KC–46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging KC–135 and
KC–10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided using the United States
Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process, which is led by the Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF). This SECAF-led process accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the
tanker fleet and is designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to in-
clude routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent possible, while ac-
counting for global air refueling demand to ensure the posture support Combatant
Commander requirements. I appreciate the Secretary’s transparent process and the
efforts to identify where best to base the KC–46 to meet global demand. Although
basing is important, USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC–46 will be an air re-
fueling asset capable of supporting global missions.

25. Senator SULLIVAN. General Lyons, would you agree with Secretary Mark T.
Esper when he said that basing KC–46s in a place like Alaska would provide ‘‘ex-
treme strategic reach’’?
General LYONS. I would agree with the Secretary on the value of ‘‘extreme stra-
tegic reach,’’ with the context that strategic mobility assets like our air refueling
fleet provide that every day around the globe. The home station of our mobility air-
craft is but one component of global responsiveness. Across the broad spans of the
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Indo-Pacific region the elements of access, basing, and overflight to en route and for-
ward locations are essential to position and employ combat capability and as impor-
tant if not more so to where we home station mobility assets. The ability of
USTRANSCOM to control and rapidly shift assets anywhere in the world to address
emerging and high priority needs is also foundational to global responsiveness. So,
using the notion of ‘‘extreme strategic reach,’’ mobility assets must operate not only
across broad regions such as INDOPACOM, but globally with the responsiveness to
fully leverage the combat power of the Department when and where it is needed
– USTRANSCOM is uniquely capable of performing these tasks and that is my pri-
mary focus.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE
PORT OF SAVANNAH

26. Senator PERDUE. General Lyons, the U.S. Department of Transportation re-
cently announced the awarding of an additional $34.6 million grant for critical infra-
structure improvements at the Port of Savannah, building on the President’s budget
request of $93.6 million in federal funding in support of the Savannah Harbor Ex-
pansion Project. The Port of Savannah is the third largest container port in North
America and is a strategic seaport within the National Port Readiness Network. The
Port of Savannah is also one of the commercial ports used to transport U.S. forces
from the United States to Europe as part of the Defender-Europe 2020 exercise. The
Port of Savannah’s participation in this exercise emphasizes the increased capabili-
ties an expanded Port of Savannah can provide for the future deployment needs of
the U.S. military. To what extent does the expansion of major commercial ports like
the Port of Savannah improve military readiness and support your command’s mis-
sion of efficiently transporting large U.S. troop formations in times of war and times
of national emergency?
General LYONS. There are two primary operating terminals at the Port of Savan-
nah, Garden City Terminal and Ocean Terminal. Garden City Terminal is a pur-
pose-built container terminal, and Ocean Terminal is a dedicated breakbulk, heavy-
lift and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) facility. The DOD Strategic Seaport Program Port
Readiness Plan (PRP) for the Port of Savannah currently only includes infrastruc-
ture at Ocean Terminal. As you may already be aware, the Savannah Harbor Ex-
pansion Project is essentially a dredging effort which will increase the shipping
channel depth from 42 feet to 47 feet. The primary objective of this project will be
to allow the port to berth and service the larger container vessels coming through
the Panama Canal from Asia, more than likely bound for Garden City Terminal.
DOD surge deployments would rely on a variety of military and commercial vessels
to deploy unit cargo and combat equipment. The largest of these is typically the
Large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) from the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift
Command (MSC) and Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) vessels from the Maritime Adminis-
tration’s (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force. The maximum water draft of these vessels
ranges from 35 feet to 37 feet which means that the current (pre-Harbor Expansion
Project) channel depth of 42 feet already meets DOD’s needs. In general, most port
expansion efforts are understandably focused on enhancing the infrastructure sup-
porting contemporary commercial port business, which is predominantly container-
ized cargo. The cargo DOD must move through our Strategic Seaports is mostly
oversized, overweight equipment, rolling stock, tracked vehicles and some con-
tainers. As a result, the most suitable facilities for DOD movements are typically
breakbulk, heavy-lift and RORO facilities like Savannah’s Ocean Terminal, rather
than purpose-built container facilities like the Garden City Terminal. The condition
of the existing Strategic Seaport facilities which DOD relies upon is currently being
assessed as directed within the fiscal year 2020 NDAA. We anticipate this report
will be delivered to Congress by the end of July 2020. Additionally, USTRANSCOM
periodically assesses the sufficiency of the existing Strategic Seaports to meet DOD’s
requirements, to determine if there is a need to bring additional ports into the Stra-
tegic Seaport Program. Based on the current assessment, we have access to suffi-
cient seaport capacity on each coast (East / West / Gulf) to meet rapid deployment
needs.
JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM (JSTARS)

27. Senator PERDUE. General Wolters, JSTARS aircraft have been active in sup-
porting the National Defense Strategy (NDS) around the world. The 116th Air Con-
trol Wing, based out of Robins Air Force Base, deployed to Germany this past fall.
With the return of great power competition, the 116th Air Control Wing’s deploy-
220
ment to Germany provides needed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities in support of our military’s forward-deployed forces in Europe. The
116th Air Control Wing’s deployment sends an additional signal to our NATO allies
that the United States remains committed to the collective defense of the Alliance
in the face of both near-peer and emerging threats. To what extent does the forward
deployment of JSTARS aircraft and its ISR capabilities in the EUCOM area of re-
sponsibility (AOR) improve United States and NATO readiness in the face of near-
peer competitors?
General WOLTERS. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
is a critical contributor to USEUCOM and NATO’s Indications and Warnings frame-
work. It provides a unique capability to establish and maintain patterns of Russian
movement within the AOR and provides a distinctive capability to reassure our
NATO Allies and deter Russia.

28. Senator PERDUE. General Wolters, JSTARS aircraft also need avionics up-
grades in order to become fully-compatible with European defense systems. Can you
provide an update on what upgrades are necessary to ensure JSTARS can remain
fully operational in the EUCOM AOR?
General WOLTERS. Three specific avionics upgrades must be completed for
JSTARS to be fully compatible with European defense system mandates. By Euro-
pean Union mandate, VHF radios must be upgraded with a 8.33kHz channel spac-
ing frequency, aircraft must be equipped with the Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance-Broadcast Out capability, and the aircraft’s Identification Friend or Foe equip-
ment must be equipped with Mode 5 capability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN
NATO CYBER OPERATIONS CENTER

29. Senator SHAHEEN. General Wolters, can you provide an update on the oper-
ational status of the NATO Cyber Operations Center, as well as your expectations
regarding its long-term impact?
General WOLTERS. As a component of NATO’s Command Structure, the Cyber Op-
erations Center (CyOC) maintains positive momentum towards full operational ca-
pability in spring 2022. The CyOC is integrated with baseline activities and current
operations across the Alliance. It plays a critical role in NATO’s comprehensive de-
terrence and defense activities. At full capability, the CyOC will provide NATO an
operational theater cyberspace component. In this role, it will be responsible for per-
sistent, centralized, and comprehensive cyberspace situational awareness and a
focal point for the coordination of NATO military activities in cyberspace.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
EUROPEAN DETERRENCE INITIATIVE

30. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, the United States continues to build
interoperability is through deliberate efforts like the European Deterrence Initiative
(EDI), which you highlight in your posture statement. You state that this initiative
is ‘‘critical to our deterrence and posture successes’’ and allows you to ‘‘enhance the
readiness and interoperability of U.S. and alliance forces.’’ But the President’s budg-
et request cuts security cooperation funding within the EUCOM AOR by around 40-
percent. Additionally, funding for EDI was cut by over 1 billion dollars in this year’s
proposal. Are you concerned about these drastic funding cuts?
General WOLTERS. To ensure alignment of ends and means, EDI must continue
to be an annual request until either the base budget fully accounts for ongoing ac-
tivities to compete with Russia, or the security environment changes significantly.
Maintaining EDI funding levels sustains positive momentum with respect to posture
and readiness. EDI funding is pivotal to fully implement the National Defense
Strategy and our efforts to compete with Russia and counter malign influence.

31. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, how will these proposed cuts impact
your ability to partner with, and conduct exercises with, our EUCOM allies?
General WOLTERS. EDI resources enable USEUCOM to compete and deter ade-
quately. USEUCOM will work with Allies and partners to balance and prioritize ex-
ercise objectives and to determine appropriate levels of participation in due course
of our exercise planning process. We will continue to work relentlessly to get the
most out of resources available. Where required, we will adjust the scale and scope
221
of our operations, activities, and investments to best meet the objectives laid out in
the National Defense Strategy with available means.

32. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, how does security cooperation within
EUCOM—including joint exercises, subject matter exchanges, and other military-to-
military engagements—contribute to a strong and peaceful European continent?
General WOLTERS. Security cooperation reinforces efforts to preserve peace and
improves collective preparedness should conflict occur. These efforts improve part-
ners’ ability to participate in Coalitions and project security. Security cooperation
bolsters relationships between U.S., and partner nations, and provides a network of
valuable security relationships to be leveraged in competition, crisis, or conflict.

33. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, General Wolters said in his posture
statement that, ‘‘European Deterrence Initiative funds have also improved our abil-
ity to respond using prepositioned stocks and improved theater infrastructure. To-
gether, these improvements enable the rapid deployment and sustainment of
forces.’’ Can you expand on how the EDI has improved TRANSCOM’s ability to
project and sustain combat power in Europe?
General LYONS. Infrastructure improvements initiated first by the European Re-
assurance Initiative (ERI) and continued through EDI largely serve to expand the
scalability and resiliency of the Global Distribution Network in Europe. Any one
particular project cannot showcase the impact; it is a layered approach that im-
proves the state of our network as improvements are made over the years. To list
a few improvements as examples, added multimodal infrastructure capacity in Ro-
mania enables transload of combat power from large vessels to aircraft in a region
where such a capability was limited in the past. Improved transit facilities in Italy
mitigated an ammunition distribution capability shortfall in that region of the AOR.
Placement of deployable air base systems and rapid airfield damage repair kits in
Germany, Denmark, Romania, Norway, Spain, Iceland, and Hungary will signifi-
cantly increase our ability to deliver to both dispersed airfields and those damaged
by enemy fire.
General WOLTERS.
TRANSCOM MODERNIZATION AND SURVIVABILITY IN THE ERA OF GREAT POWER
COMPETITION

34. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, TRANSCOM has consistently delivered
over nearly 20 years at war, deploying and sustaining our forces across the global.
General Lyons, you rightfully highlight in your posture statement that while this
is an impressive logistical display, it has been done largely uncontested. You point
out the critical requirement that TRANSCOM must ‘‘ . . . be able to project and sus-
tain the Joint Force under persistent, all-domain attack.’’ How are we modernizing
Maritime Sea Lift Command and Air Mobility Command to be more resilient to the
realities of a contested mobility environment?
General LYONS. USTRANSCOM continues to analyze the operational environment
and explore modernization opportunities in the near, mid, and long-term in order
to maintain our comparative military advantage in power projection. Our ability to
project the force under persistent all domain attack requires us to understand ad-
versarial capabilities and intent, upgrade platforms with defensive counter-
measures, modernize C2 architecture, and most importantly, integrate the
sustainment warfighting functions with the other warfighting functions like protec-
tion, fires, and maneuver. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study, as
well as wargames and global exercises, continues to highlight the need to balance
force modernization efforts with mobility capacity in order to operate in contested
environments as described in the National Defense Strategy. For maritime sealift,
the DEFENDER 20 exercise afforded the opportunity to integrate Military Sealift
Command sealift forces with Commander, Second Fleet and Commander, Sixth
Fleet surface forces to ensure freedom of movement. The U.S. Air Force is working
to improve integration of Mobility Air Forces with electronic warfare training and
Joint All Domain Command and Control. As a joint force, we are training to operate
in a new environment where our logistics are consistently under attack, and to miti-
gate the effects to our joint deployment and distribution enterprise. Operating in a
contested environment now and in the future requires USTRANSCOM to drive re-
quired force development efforts through established planning and budgetary proc-
esses to mitigate risk and enable our transport platforms to operate successfully.
222
35. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, how have we adjusted our land based
and maritime pre-positioned stockpile posture to address the challenges created by
great power competition?
General LYONS. USINDOPACOM and USEUCOM have enhanced pre-positioned
stockpiles, including ammunition and deployable air base systems, in their respec-
tive AORs. Pre-positioning these assets enables TRANSCOM high demand / low
density strategic mobility assets to be available for other critical movements during
conflict. We continue work with INDOPACOM to analyze fuel posture in the Indo-
Pacific AOR and identify any necessary fuel posture changes to overcome the chal-
lenges posed by great power competition. In addition to fixed fuel posture, we are
also looking at ways to optimize our afloat pre-positioned fuel posture as part of the
same study.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND ARTIC POWER PROJECTION

36. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, what is TRANSCOM doing to adjust to
the realities of climate change as it relates to the United States’ ability to conduct
power projection into the Artic and utilize previously unavailable sea lines of com-
munication?
General LYONS. USNORTHCOM serves as the executive agent for capability de-
velopment in the Arctic. USTRANSCOM supports the DOD Arctic Strategy as well
as geographic combatant commands and Service-led efforts to ensure access to Arc-
tic waters and infrastructure as it relates to our nation’s ability to project power.
As described in the DOD Arctic strategy, Russia and Canada both claim the right
to regulate Arctic waters in excess of the authority permitted under international
law. There is also increased activity in the region to include Russian commercial
and military investment and Chinese presence.

37. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, what are the unique challenges that
you face when deploying and sustaining forces in the Artic?
General LYONS. USNORTHCOM serves as the executive agent for capability de-
velopment in the Arctic. The harsh environment and, in the USNORTHCOM AOR,
limited infrastructure in the high north is expected to complicate deployment and
sustainment of forces in support of homeland defense. USTRANSCOM supports
USNORTHCOM planning through scheduled OPLAN reviews and development of
the Theater Distribution Plan, a key element of the Campaign Plan and associated
bi-annual review.

38. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, how are we coordinating with our part-
ners and allies that provide us with critical nods in the Global Deployment Net-
work—such as airfields and seaports—to ensure they are investing in climate resil-
ient infrastructure?
General LYONS. USTRANSCOM coordinates through the Services to ensure that
host nation funded construction planned for DOD OCONUS installations is designed
and constructed to the same standards as U.S. funded construction, including provi-
sions for climate resiliency. As an example, we coordinate with the Services to en-
sure that new host nation funded infrastructure at DOD OCONUS installations is
constructed outside of the 100-year flood plain where possible. Regarding commer-
cial airfields and seaports, the DOD’s ability to influence investment in climate re-
silient infrastructure is very limited. Many of our partners and allies recognize the
importance of investing in climate resilient infrastructure and have taken appro-
priate action to do so. Factoring in climate resiliency in construction, renovation,
and area development plans has become a standard engineering practice that my
command benefits from. This will ensure the viability of the commercial deployment
and distribution nodes that are so very critical to USTRANSCOM missions.
CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE

39. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, in your posture statement you point
out that, ‘‘Russia and its proxies continue their campaign to destabilize Ukraine’s
defense, economic, and political sectors with the intent of cementing Ukraine into
the Kremlin’s sphere of influence.’’ United States reassurance and efforts to
strengthen our partnership with Ukraine is essential to their ability to resist malign
efforts to undermine their sovereignty. Can you provide this Committee with an up-
date on what EUCOM is doing to deter Russian aggression – both kinetic and non-
kinetic – and to counter Russia’s propaganda and misinformation campaign?
General WOLTERS. USEUCOM supports and applies a whole-of-government ap-
proach to competition and deterrence. A key platform for countering malign Russian
influence is the Russian Influence Group (RIG). The RIG is an interagency network
223
co-led by USEUCOM and the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs. The RIG operates along six lines of effort: support democratic gov-
ernance and the rule of law; assess and respond to disinformation/propaganda;
strengthen NATO’s capability, capacity, and resolve; disrupt the Kremlin’s mobiliza-
tion of local support; constrain informal actors with opaque funding, and counter the
Kremlin’s coercive use of the energy sector.
Our military-to-military security cooperation programs engage partners to im-
prove alignment and strengthen our collective ability to compete and deter. As a
member of the Multinational Joint Commission-Ukraine, Strategic Communications
Sub-Committee, USEUCOM coordinates and provides training on core strategic
communications competencies. The Joint Multi-national Training Group-Ukraine is
a United States-led, dedicated training mission focused on improving Ukrainian
forces’ ability to conduct wide-area security and combined arms maneuver at the
brigade level. Ukraine participates in multiple United States-sponsored joint exer-
cises in the Black Sea, improving interoperability with NATO air and maritime
forces, and strengthening deterrence and defense in the Euro-Atlantic.

40. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, what progress has been made in the
last year specifically in the cybersecurity realm to improve the capabilities of
Ukrainian forces?
General WOLTERS. In March 2019, United States DOD delivered, installed, config-
ured, and tested equipment for a Cyber Security Operations Center (CSOC) to the
Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) currently being accredited by Ukrainian authori-
ties. It is scheduled for initial operational capability later this year, and the CSOC
will provide an ability to protect and monitor classified and unclassified networks.
In November 2019, U.S. DOD facilitated the assignment of a Defensive Cybersecu-
rity Advisor to the AFU to accelerate the development of their defensive cybersecu-
rity program. Cyber training and education centers are in the early stages of devel-
opment and will be the platform to train and educate Ukraine’s cyber force.

41. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, what metrics should Congress use to
measure the effectiveness of United States efforts in Ukraine?
General WOLTERS. The key metric of effectiveness is Ukraine’s continued inde-
pendence, sovereignty, and the ability to conduct free and fair elections. Continued
progress on civilian oversight of the military, reforms to command and control,
human resources, and defense industry practices are other appropriate metrics for
assessing the success of United States efforts in Ukraine.

42. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Wolters, how would you assess our current
support for Ukrainians?
General WOLTERS. United States servicemembers at the Joint Military Training
Group-Ukraine work shoulder-to-shoulder with Ukrainian forces to inform and sup-
port Ukraine’s military planning efforts and increase combat capability. Ukraine
continues to benefit from International Military Education and Training funding,
and we view this as a critical investment in Ukraine’s future. Sustained Congres-
sional support for assistance to Ukraine continues to be impactful. Since 2014, Con-
gress has appropriated more than one billion dollars to Ukraine in security assist-
ance funds. This consistent, visible support is a demonstration of our commitment
to Ukraine. Earlier this year, Ukraine concluded it’s first-ever Foreign Military
Sales purchase of defensive Javelin anti-tank missile systems. The flexibility Con-
gress has provided by allowing 50 percent of fiscal year 2020 Ukraine Security As-
sistance Initiative funds to be committed over two years has been significant. This
provision has improved our ability to target Ukraine’s defensive equipment needs,
including the acquisition of Mark VI Patrol Boats, which enhance Ukraine’s defense
capabilities. The flexibility to obligate all of the fiscal year 2021 Ukraine Assistance
Initiative funds over a multi-year period would further enhance the Department’s
ability to better support Ukraine’s capability needs.
DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY PROGRAM

43. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, in January the DOD Inspector General
released their report on the Personal Property Relocation Program. It stated that,
‘‘TRANSCOM can improve how it holds Moving companies accountable for poor per-
formance in its current structure of the moving program.’’ Have you identified a via-
ble candidate in the GHC selection process who can fully handle the entire PCS
process?
General LYONS. USTRANSCOM is working through the process of evaluating pro-
posals to make an award no earlier than 30 April, at which time we will determine
224
and announce the winning company. During this time, information cannot be shared
about the selection process. However, USTRANSCOM is confident the proposals re-
ceived include the requisite details to handle the elements of the PCS process that
industry has historically supported (i.e., packing, transport, delivery of household
goods, etc.). The GHC integrates those functions performed by commercial entities
now, as the government will continue to maintain ordering of services and a strong
accountability program for contractor performance.
44. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, what contingencies exist if the GHC
goes thru and results in a similar failure of performance to that seen in the privat-
ization of military housing?
General LYONS. A contract alone is not a solution—the success or failure of a con-
tract ultimately comes down to an organization’s ability to manage and oversee the
contract. Learning from military housing issues, DOD has made a single organiza-
tion—USTRANSCOM—responsible for management and oversight of GHC. To be
clear, DOD does not have effective performance management measures in the cur-
rent program. DOD does not have a formal contract with any of our current pro-
viders and cannot hold them accountable in a meaningful way. Over time, DOD al-
lowed the program to evolve in a manner that now favors industry, with suppliers
exploiting business rules to generate revenue at the expense of military families and
Service budgets. Implementing the GHC offers the Department the opportunity to
set terms and conditions that favor DOD families and an avenue to hold industry
accountable.
45. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, I have read that TRANSCOM may be
looking to end the Personal Property Relocation Advisory Panel, in what many be-
lieve is a premature move, as this panel would be beneficial to help disseminate in-
formation during the GHC transition and provide feedback from family members.
Why do you believe this is a good plan?
General LYONS. In the fiscal year 202020 NDAA, Congress directed DOD to estab-
lish a Military Relocation Advisory Committee consisting of members of
USTRANSCOM, military services, moving companies, and consumer representatives
who are either members of the Armed Forces or spouses of members of the Armed
Forces. At my request, OSD delegated establishment and management of this Com-
mittee to USTRANSCOM. My staff is currently coordinating with the Services to
identify their nominees for this Committee, which may include the representatives
they have currently designated to participate in the PPRAP. We will continue to
host PPRAP sessions until the Military Relocation Advisory Committee is fully oper-
ational.
46. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, last year, I asked you to commit to
prioritizing the needs of military families as you consider reforms to DP3 and that
you to provide Congress an update on how families’ input is being implemented to
improve the process. Can you provide an update on where your command stands
on this issue?
General LYONS. For the 2020 Peak Season, we’ve instituted changes to Defense
Personal Property Program business rules to address long-standing pain points for
DOD families. Key actions include: From a safety perspective, requiring that all
moving companies perform background checks on employees and meet local installa-
tion access requirements (whether they are serving homes on or off base). The safety
and security of DOD families is paramount. We recognize that many issues center
on communication, we require moving companies to be more responsive to cus-
tomers. Moving companies must maintain a call center during specified hours; re-
spond to customer inquiries within 30 minutes; provide e-mail updates on the status
of the shipment throughout the process; and provide a single point of contact for
all aspects of the moving process. Requiring moving companies to provide pre-ship-
ment weight estimates 10 days prior to pack-out, and to perform automatic ship-
ment reweighs in the event the actual shipment weight is within 10 percent of a
customer’s weight entitlement. This provides families with the information to avoid
exceeding weight entitlements and excess cost scenarios. Providing more lead time
to customers before delivery appointments. Previously, moving companies were only
required to provide two-hour notice—and if a family didn’t respond fast enough to
accept the shipment, it was placed into storage. For Peak Season 2020, companies
are required to provide 24-hour notice and make at least two attempts to schedule
the delivery before it goes into storage. We have established a baseline for inconven-
ience claims (where none currently exists) and streamlined the process for cus-
tomers. Inconvenience claims are payable with moving companies miss their as-
signed pick-up or delivery dates. When applicable, customers will be paid the base-
225
line rate—which is tied to the local meals and incidental per diem rate—without
having to document and provide receipts for each expense. We’ve preserved the proc-
ess for customers to seek reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs in the event their
expenses exceed the per diem baseline (any amount above and beyond that baseline
may be reimbursed when supported with receipts). We are providing more time for
families to submit loss and damage claims (from 75 days to 180 days) and requiring
that moving companies settle claims faster (any claim under $1,000 within 30 days,
and any other claim within 60 days). Historically, moving companies made the deci-
sion on whether to repair a broken item or pay the customer an amount equivalent
to repair costs. For Peak Season 2020, we empower DOD families to make that deci-
sion. Finally, we clarified rules that the moving company (and not the subcontracted
agent) was responsible for any damage to a family’s residence (customers have up
to 5 days to identify damage to real property). Although moving will never be an
enjoyable process for families, the GHC does posture the Department to improve
availability of quality capacity to meet peak demand; communication throughout the
process; service standards ‘at the curb;’ clear accountability when things go wrong;
and improved claims process in the event of loss, damage, or inconvenience. To the
point of your question, we are wholly focused on delivering an improved relocation
experience for DOD families. While pursuing the GHC was never about saving
money, I am encouraged by the bids we’ve received as they are in line with DOD
spending in the current program. I acknowledge—and will comply with—the re-
quirement in the fiscal year 202020 NDAA to provide a report on the impact of GHC
to Service budgets. We remain on track to award the GHC no earlier than 30 April.
47. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, what specific actions have you taken in
the interim to address the issues military families face moving under the current
system?
General LYONS. For the 2020 Peak Season, we’ve instituted changes to Defense
Personal Property Program business rules to address long-standing pain points for
DOD families. Key actions include: From a safety perspective, requiring that all
moving companies perform background checks on employees and meet local installa-
tion access requirements (whether they are serving homes on or off base). The safety
and security of DOD families is paramount. We recognize that many issues center
on communication, we require moving companies to be more responsive to cus-
tomers. Moving companies will be required to provide pre-shipment weight esti-
mates 10 days prior to pack-out, and to perform automatic shipment reweighs in
the event the actual shipment weight is within 10 percent of a customer’s weight
entitlement. Providing more lead time to customers before delivery appointments.
For Peak Season 2020, companies are required to provide 24-hour notice and make
at least two attempts to schedule the delivery before it goes into storage. Estab-
lished a baseline for inconvenience claims (where none currently exists) and stream-
lined the process for customers. Inconvenience claims are payable with moving com-
panies miss their assigned pick-up or delivery dates. USTRANSCOM preserved the
process for customers to seek reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs in the event
their expenses exceed the per diem baseline (any amount above and beyond that
baseline may be reimbursed when supported with receipts). Finally, we will provide
more time for families to submit loss and damage claims (from 75 days to 180 days)
and requiring that moving companies settle claims faster (any claim under $1,000
within 30 days, and any other claim within 60 days).

48. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, have the metrics improved?
General LYONS. Customer Satisfaction Scores—the metric typically associated
with DP3—have improved—2017: 90.8 percent (full calendar year)—2017 Peak Sea-
son: 83 percent to 85.8 percent—2018: 91.4 percent (full calendar year)—2018 Peak
Season: 84.3 percent to 86.9 percent—2019: 93.7 percent (full calendar year)—2019
Peak Season 89.3 percent to 91 percent. Although we saw improvements in satisfac-
tion this past year, our current model limits the quality improvements we can make.
Our current construct is a constraint to innovation and advancement, as we are tied
to the capabilities of ‘the lowest common denominators’ in the program.

49. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, what oversight and accountability
measures have you implement to incentive better performance?
General LYONS. In addition to adjusting business rules to address longstanding
pain-points identified by DOD families, USTRANSCOM has taken steps to improve
accountability where possible within our currently flawed framework. Rather than
relying on a disparate network of Shipping Offices to be the primary enforcers, the
Personal Property Staff at USTRANSCOM has taken on a much more active role
in investigating and holding industry accountable for poor performance and viola-
226
tions of business rules. In the first 3 months of 2020, for example, we’ve put moving
companies into a non-use status for defrauding the U.S. Government by imper-
sonating servicemembers to complete satisfaction surveys; for failing to declare
Common Financial and Administrative Control in the international market, which
disadvantaged its competitors; and for failing to maintain insurance on storage fa-
cilities, which put DOD families’ possessions at risk. In several cases, military inves-
tigative services and the Department of Justice are involved. Regarding oversight,
USTRANSCOM holds routine workshops with the Services to develop and refine
business processes, hold monthly calls with Military Spouses, and reinvigorated the
General Officer Steering Committee to ensure senior Service leaders have visibility
and oversight of program operations. Most notably, I’ve reorganized staff to improve
program oversight. I’ve elevated the Defense Personal Property Program to an inde-
pendent staff section within USTRANSCOM and have assigned a member of the
Senior Executive Service to lead it. That Director reports to directly to me and is
responsible for advocating for DOD families during the relocation process, and for
integrating the operational, financial, contractual, policy, and IT aspects of the De-
fense Personal Property Program.

50. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, the fiscal year 2020 NDAA directed
GAO to conduct a study on this issue in order to inform the best way forward and
ensure we avoid the same challenges that we did with the transition to privatization
housing, and your posture statement mentions a draft of such a study. When do you
expect that this study will be completed and transmitted to the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee?
General LYONS. The GAO report was released on 6 April.

51. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, can you share some of the GAO’s pre-
liminary findings?
General LYONS. After 10 months of detailed data exchanges and more than one
hundred requests for information, USTRANSCOM is confident GAO had access to
all the relevant information in order to conduct an exhaustive review of our work
on GHC and broader personal property reform efforts. GAO’s report contains two
findings: 1) USTRANSCOM did assess cost implications of moving to GHC but may
not have accurately calculated some costs because of unanswered questions on coun-
seling and how overseeing contractor performance will be performed. 2)
USTRANSCOM has developed performance metrics for some, but not all DP3 activi-
ties. GAO makes three recommendations in their report: 1) that DOD develop a
process to track data during the first three years of GHC operations to more pre-
cisely determine overall Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) manpower re-
quirements; 2) that DOD develop metrics for DP3 activities that fall outside of the
GHC (for example, things like Service-retained counseling and processing timelines
within the Military Claims Offices); 3) that DOD articulate the linkages between
metrics and overall program goals. These recommendations are sensible and are
consistent with USTRANSCOM’s vision to evolve the program from a series of dis-
parate Service-owned activities into a truly synchronized Departmental program.
Moreover, the report confirms many of the issues USTRANSCOM has highlighted
to the Department and Congress over the last two years. It is important to note that
GAO issued no negative findings or recommendations regarding the single move-
manager construct, nor did GAO recommend any changes to the acquisition strategy
or overall timeline for GHC award and implementation.

52. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Lyons, did you agree with GAO’s preliminary
findings and recommendations?
General LYONS. I agree with GAO’s findings. Like all things, though, context is
critical—my staff is working with the GAO team to ensure the findings are framed
correctly. I do agree with the three recommendations. Although USTRANSCOM con-
curred with—and will take action on—all recommendations, USTRANSCOM did
submit a list of 31 technical issues to correct in GAO’s narrative; while none alter
GAO’s very sensible recommendations, the edits are necessary to ensure an accurate
report. At GAO’s request, USTRANSCOM also performed a sensitivity review to re-
move all acquisition sensitive information, thus ensuring a publicly releasable re-
port.
227
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO
RUSSIA’S GOALS IN THE PACIFIC

53. Senator HIRONO. General Wolters, in addition to Russia’s influence in your
area of operations, it has expanded influence into the Pacific as well. What is your
assessment of Russia’s strategy and goals in the Pacific?
General WOLTERS. Russia seeks to regain its status as a global power by expand-
ing its diplomatic, security, and economic footprint, and challenging United States
dominance. Russia’s strategy for projecting power in the Pacific region includes in-
creasing bilateral engagements, pursuing defense sales agreements, participating in
combined military exercises, and endorsing expanded membership in regional and
international organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As the
global coordinator for the Russia Problem Set, USEUCOM’s Russia Strategic Initia-
tive works closely with USINDOPACOM to coordinate our strategy across geo-
graphic combatant commands.
SEALIFT REQUIREMENTS

54. Senator HIRONO. General Lyons, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has
released new planning guidance recognizing the need for distributed operations be-
cause of adversary precision strike capabilities. To support these operations, he calls
for the use of ‘‘inter-theater connectors and commercially available ships and craft
that are smaller and less expensive’’, thereby increasing affordability and allowing
acquisition at a greater quantity. How do you envision engaging American carriers
who operate ships in the Pacific trades, including U.S. flag ships not enrolled in the
Maritime Security Program, to not only support the Commandant’s desires but also
ensure the TRANSCOM mission has adequate sealift capabilities in the Pacific?
General LYONS. The Maritime Security Program (MSP) and the Voluntary Inter-
modal Sealift Agreement (VISA) provide DOD with assured access to commercial
U.S. sealift ships, mariners, and global intermodal capability that, when augmented
with our reserve organic fleets, allow us to project and sustain the force with sub-
stantial inter-theater sealift capability. Additionally, American carriers participating
in the VISA program provide 300+ non-MSP vessels, which are generally smaller
and more uniquely capable to support smaller scale missions, shorter range require-
ments, and when required, support to distributed operations. Specifically, seven
VISA participants operating in the Pacific provide over 1 million combined square
foot of capacity and can help support the Geographic Combatant Commands’ more
localized intra-theater requirements. USTRANSCOM will continue to leverage both
MSP and VISA in meeting Combatant Commander requirements as well as to fill
inter-theater and intra-theater gaps identified through exercises, wargames, and
other planning events. USTRANSCOM will continue to engage industry for their
support and solutions through our industry outreach events we conduct throughout
each year.
MILITARY MOVES

55. Senator HIRONO. General Lyons, thank you for your attention to DP3 and your
efforts in ensuring our military members receive their belongings in a timely man-
ner. Can you provide an update on the fiscal year 2020 NDAA requirements for the
business case analysis on the GHC?
General LYONS. The Business Case Analysis (BCA) on GHC was submitted to de-
fense committees as directed on Friday, 17 January 2020. The BCA underscores the
value of restructuring the Department of Defense’s relationship with industry and
implementing a single move-manger construct to generate quality capacity to meet
peak demand, improve industry accountability, and enable DOD to properly align
responsibility within the Department. The BCA also highlights risks associated with
this construct and outlines the steps we have taken—both during the source selec-
tion process and in realigning DOD’s overall management framework—to mitigate
them. We shared the Business Case Analysis with the GAO to assist in their report
on the Global Household Goods Contract, and GAO assessed the BCA using its own
Assessment Methodology for Economic Analysis. GAO’s methodology identifies five
key components of an economic analysis: objective and scope; methodology; analysis
of effects; transparency; and documentation. GAO assessed that the BCA informed
decision-makers and stakeholders, while fully meeting four of the components and
partially meeting the fifth (documentation). A summary of GAO’s assessment of the
BCA is in Appendix II of its report.
228
AERIAL REFUELING

56. Senator HIRONO. General Lyons, what are the current plans in terms of fol-
low-on tankers based with the Hawaii Air National Guard (i.e., replacement/recapi-
talization plans for the eight KC–135s); will they be KC–46s or KC–Y/Z?
General LYONS. As the KC–46 is fielded to recapitalize the aging KC–135 and
KC–10 fleets, the beddown of those aircraft will be decided using the United States
Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process, which is led by the Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF). This SECAF-led process accounts for fiscal and operational impacts to the
tanker fleet and is designed to be repeatable, defendable, and transparent, to in-
clude routine interactions between the SECAF and Congress. The USAF process
strives to leverage existing infrastructure to the maximum extent possible, while ac-
counting for global air refueling demand to ensure the posture support Combatant
Commander requirements. I appreciate the Secretary’s transparent process and the
efforts to identify where best to base the KC–46 to meet global demand. Although
basing is important, USTRANSCOM recognizes that the KC–46 will be an air re-
fueling asset capable of supporting global missions.
PEARL HARBOR C–17S

57. Senator HIRONO. General Lyons, what are your thoughts on having the C–17s
at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam under operational control of INDOPACOM
[United States Indo-Pacific Command] versus TRANSCOM?
General LYONS. The C–17 is a global asset. TRANSCOM’s Operational Control
(OPCON) of C–17s allows agile global support to all Combatant Commanders. Our
current Command to Command agreement with INDOPACOM concerning C–17s al-
lows INDOPACOM to perform their mission and allows TRANSCOM to support
global requirements.

58. Senator HIRONO. General Lyons, what are your thoughts on swapping ‘‘owner-
ship’’ of the C–17s at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam from Active Duty tails to Ha-
waii Air National Guard tails, similar to the transfer of the C–17s at Elmendorf Air
Force Base from Active Duty to Air National Guard that occurred in Alaska?
General LYONS. Assigning C–17s to the 176th Airlift Wing at Joint Base Elmen-
dorf-Richardson (JBER) was the result of a unique situation with force structure
changes at JBER. In order to maintain maximum access to limited C–17 resources,
I suggest retaining forces at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam as is.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN
CORONAVIRUS

59. Senator WARREN. General Wolters, the AOR for EUCOM includes Italy, which
reportedly has over 500 cases of the Novel Coronavirus (COVID–19) and 14 deaths
as a result. Other countries in the EUCOM AOR with confirmed cases of COVID–
19 include Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Russia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In your testimony regarding
the protection of servicemembers and their families in Europe, you noted that
EUCOM has ‘‘restricted travel to certain zones and we require all mil-air arrival
flights to be screened for the virus’’ and ‘‘in particular, two states inside of Italy.’’
You also noted that that you ‘‘anticipate the need may arise in Germany, but that
is still to be determined.’’ While the most senior global health security position at
the National Security Council (NSC) has been vacant since 2018, on February 27,
2020, Vice President Mike Pence appointed Dr. Deborah L. Birx, the Coordinator
of the United States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS and U.S. Special
Representative for Global Health Diplomacy, to serve as the White House
Coronavirus Response Coordinator. Given the global public health threat posed by
COVID–19 and the need for an integrated inter-agency response, how will your com-
mands work with Dr. Birx’s office to protect servicemembers and their families re-
siding in the EUCOM AOR?
General WOLTERS. In the time since this question was posed, the health crisis
brought about by COVID–19 has gripped the world. USEUCOM coordinates daily
with counterparts in the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense to syn-
chronize our efforts, preserve the health of the force and families, and supports the
whole-of-government response to COVID–19.

60. Senator WARREN. General Lyons and General Wolters, please explain the es-
tablished procedures that your commands would follow in the event that
229
servicemembers or their families are found to be infected with the Novel
Coronavirus.
General LYONS. Per USTRANSCOM Force Health Protection Guidance for Novel
Coronavirus and current CDC recommendations, Servicemembers and their families
would be directed to self-isolate and contact their health care provider for further
medical care related guidance. In parallel, appropriate public health officials will be
contacted to initiate contact tracing and additional notification of exposure if nec-
essary. Servicemembers are also directed to contact their supervisor for formal noti-
fication to Command Leadership. Further, the command is actively engaged in so-
cial distancing through telework and alternate means of communication in order to
reduce the risk of transmission within the organization.
General WOLTERS. USEUCOM has activated its existing pandemic response plan,
and on March 7, 2020, we confirmed our first case of COVID–19. Our military treat-
ment networks are fully integrated with host-nation health authorities to share in-
formation, evaluate, and treat servicemembers, civilians, and family from across the
USEUCOM AOR. Public health teams, throughout the USEUCOM AOR are closely
monitoring those infected, those shielded, and those most at risk to determine when
they should return to duty and normal activities.

61. Senator WARREN. General Lyons and General Wolters, the most recent unclas-
sified Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence, published in January 2019, observed, ‘‘The growing proximity of humans
and animals has increased the risk of disease transmission. The number of out-
breaks has increased in part because pathogens originally found in animals have
spread to human populations.’’ The Director of National Intelligence also assessed
that ‘‘the United States and the world will remain vulnerable to the next flu pan-
demic or large-scale outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive
rates of death and disability, severely affect the world economy, strain international
resources, and increase calls on the United States for support.’’ Have your com-
mands assessed the potential adverse impact to the readiness of U.S. Forces due to
the Novel Coronavirus outbreak?
General LYONS. USTRANSCOM working with our Components are closely watch-
ing the COVID–19 pandemic development and continue to provide applicable force
health protection guidance as the situation unfolds in order to safeguard mission as-
surance. In addition, USTRANSCOM will continue to support the Geographic Com-
batant Commanders and the Joint Staff to assist in determining the risk to force
presented by the Novel Coronavirus.
General WOLTERS. USEUCOM remains laser-focused on the deterrence and de-
fense of the Euro-Atlantic. We have taken prudent measures to preserve the health
of our force and our families. USEUCOM has supported national efforts to combat
COVID–19 and stands ready to continue to assist national efforts. While we have
prudently modified some activities to prevent the spread of the virus, we continue
to sustain our essential deterrence and defense activities, and our conventional and
nuclear forces remain ready. Best practices and lessons identified during COVID–
19 will continue to strengthen our future posture and readiness to confront the in-
visible threat of a pandemic.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DOUG JONES
IN FLIGHT RE-FUELING

62. Senator JONES. General Lyons, given the proposed divestment of aerial re-
fuelers, can you imagine a scenario, short of full-scale conflict, that the in air refuel-
ing apparatus fails? If so, describe the scenario.
General LYONS. No, I do not see a scenario where the air refueling apparatus
fails. While the air refueling mission is the most stressed mission in USTRANSCOM
and is my #1 warfighting readiness priority, I have full confidence that the men and
women from the Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard components that execute the air
refueling mission, will continue to find a way to get the job done. However, addi-
tional divestments in legacy air refueling platforms prior to the fielding of an oper-
ational taskable KC–46 exacerbates the challenges for this already stressed mission
set; additional divestments will result in reduced output to meet global demand
until the KC–46 is fully operational. Retaining capacity until the KC–46 is usable
is crucial to be able to project the force around the globe in times of crises. Hard
choices would be made on supporting the highest priority global missions that would
elevate risk and early mobilization of Reserve Forces may be required, but not ap-
proach mission failure.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
AIR FORCE POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Roger F. Wicker,
presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Wicker, Fischer, Cotton,
Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally, Scott, Blackburn,
Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine,
King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
Senator WICKER. Well, this hearing will come to order.
Senator Inhofe’s plane will arrive later this morning, and I am
privileged to open the hearing in his behalf today and to recognize
the ranking Member, Senator Reed.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture
of the U.S. Air Force and its fiscal year 2021 budget request.
This is Senator Inhofe’s statement, which I am happy to read on
his behalf.
We welcome Barbara Barrett, Secretary of the Air Force, and
General David Goldfein, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Thank you
both for your distinguished service and your continued willingness
to serve our great Nation.
The National Defense Strategy directs our Nation’s military to
prepare for the return of great power competition. This means we
must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat our near-peer
adversaries like Russia and China.
In order for the Air Force to achieve that goal, it must be prop-
erly manned, trained, and equipped. At the end of the Obama ad-
ministration, the Air Force was at a historic low in readiness and
size. Less than 10 percent of combat squadrons were ready to de-
ploy and even less were prepared for a peer fight.
We commend the progress you have made in rebuilding readi-
ness, but more needs to be done. A high state of readiness is cru-
cial for our Nation to demonstrate peace through strength.
(231)
232

While our force has suffered from being ill-prepared, our adver-
saries moved out and recapitalized both their conventional and nu-
clear forces with alarming speed. China and Russia present a cred-
ible threat to America and our allies. In fact, in some areas they
have even surpassed us.
You both have testified that the Air Force is too small and too
old to do what the Nation asks. We agree with you and the many
independent studies that show the Air Force needs to grow and
modernize. But, we are concerned that your current budget is inad-
equate to allow you to reach the requirement of 386 squadrons.
Given the need to grow, there is concern that this year’s budget
request takes a risk by divesting the aircraft we need today in the
hopes of buying modern capability in the future. Historically, that
approach has failed to achieve the desired results.
We understand that much of those decisions were caused by a
flat budget that falls well short of the 3 to 5 percent growth rec-
ommended by the National Defense Strategy Commission report.
In fact, it does not even keep up with inflation.
Any successful modernization strategy needs to focus on results
and meeting the needs of tomorrow’s fight, but should also main-
tain forces capable of deterring and defeating an adversary today.
We look forward to working with you to ensure that we meet the
needs of today’s warfighters while modernizing to ensure we regain
our advantages for the future.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcome Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein to
the Committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs
of the Department of the Air Force in our review of the fiscal year
2021 President’s Budget request. We are grateful certainly to all
the men and women of the Air Force for their service and to their
families for their continued support.
I want to particularly note that this will probably be General
Goldfein’s last appearance before the Committee as Air Force Chief
of Staff. I want to thank you, General Goldfein, for your many
years of distinguished and dedicated service to the men and women
of the United States Air Force and to this Nation. Thank you very
much, sir.
In preparing this budget request, the Air Force faced difficult de-
cisions in balancing the need to modernize and keep the techno-
logical advantage over near-peer competitors and the need to sup-
port ongoing operations and sustain today’s readiness. This budget
request tries to maintain that balance by increasing funding to ad-
dress readiness concerns and munitions shortfalls but also funding
technologies for the future fight and modernization of our strategic
deterrent capability. I am interested in the witnesses’ views on
what the most difficult decisions were. I also understand that the
Secretary of Defense has asked the military departments to under-
take a review to find resources, and I would like to know the status
of that review.
I would also note that because significant levels of funding are
being transferred to build the wall on the southern border, some
233

Air Force modernization efforts will not proceed as planned, mak-
ing it harder to find savings to apply to high priority programs and
activities. I am interested in hearing if the Air Force has a plan
to mitigate this issue.
This year, the Air Force is proposing to retire and realign a num-
ber of aircraft systems, presumably to free up resources for other
programs. The budget request would reduce or alter force structure
for A–10’s, B–1’s, C130’s, KC–135’s, KC–10’s, Global Hawks, and
Reapers. Any Air Force proposal deserves our careful consideration,
but we must consider it against the recent history of abrupt Air
Force changes of direction on such programs as A–10, U–2, Global
Hawk, JSTARS, Compass Call, AWACS, light attack aircraft, and
C–27 airlift aircraft, several of which I will admit were reversed by
congressional action. I hope the witnesses will provide the Com-
mittee with their reasoning for these retirements and realignments
and assurances that decisions are well thought out before disrup-
tions to the force structure begin.
Perhaps most troubling to me among the force structure adjust-
ments is the planned reductions in the air refueling tanker force
in the near term. The Commander of TRANSCOM recently testi-
fied before this Committee that the scarcity of available tankers
has sorely taxed his command’s ability to keep up with the peace-
time demand, let alone manage support for major contingency oper-
ations.
As we all know, while the KC–46 is being accepted by the Air
Force and taking air crews, it is only operating with significant re-
strictions. Coupling that with the early retirement of KC–135’s and
KC–10’s creates significant risk in our refueling capability. I want
to hear why you have proposed this in the face of TRANSCOM’s
significant concerns.
I am also interested in hearing about your continuing effort to
improve the shortfalls within the remotely-piloted aircraft operator
community and how the Air Force has addressed shortfalls within
the larger pilot community and maintenance personnel. Certainly,
if the Air Force were to retire a large number of Global Hawks and
Reapers, that action would help the shortfall by reducing demand
for pilots. However, I am interested to know whether you have had
a reduction in demand for Reaper support from the combatant com-
manders and how their input has affected your decision.
Two years ago, the Air Force budget request proposed to truncate
the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, or
JSTARS, modernization program and replace it with a combination
of other systems, including unmanned systems and overhead sen-
sors. That program has since been named the Advanced Battle
Management System, or ABMS. I look forward to receiving an up-
date on progress of the ABMS system.
Again, there are many issues to cover, and I thank both Sec-
retary Barrett and General Goldfein for being here today and look
forward to your responses.
Thank you.
Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, you submitted a joint
statement, which will be entered into the record at this point.
234

Would each of you like to make a brief 5-minute opening state-
ment? Secretary Barrett?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BARBARA M. BARRETT,
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
Secretary BARRETT. Thank you very much. Chairman Wicker,
Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you for
inviting us to appear before you today.
I also would like to acknowledge and thank David Goldfein
whose final appearance before this Committee for this purpose will
be today. I would like to thank him for the incomparable service
that he has provided to the United States Air Force, making the
Air Force better and our Nation better. It has been a great privi-
lege to serve with General Goldfein.
The international security environment changes unpredictably.
China and Russia challenge American capabilities with new tech-
nologies and new systems. Iran and North Korea threaten regional
and global stability, while violent extremism remains a global men-
ace.
The National Defense Strategy calls for the Air Force as a crit-
ical component of a joint force to deter and, if needed, defeat these
threats. This fiscal year 2021 budget request sets the course for the
Air Force we need to accomplish these aims.
Specifically, the United States Air Force invests in a future force
that allows us to connect the joint force, dominate space, generate
combat power, and conduct logistics under attack. We will continue
to present ready forces to combatant commanders as we defend the
Homeland, ensure strategic deterrence, and counter violent extre-
mism.
Finally, we will strengthen the foundation of our forces, our air-
men, as we develop and care for our people and their families. This
budget submission shifts force design to create irreversible momen-
tum toward achieving the mission of the NDS [National Defense
Strategy] while growing strong and resilient leaders and families.
The top policy priority for the department is the successful
launch of the United States Space Force. The space domain is inte-
gral to the joint team success in all warfighting domains. The De-
partment of the Air Force supports a lean, agile service to preserve
access to space for America and our allies while deterring and, if
necessary, defeating malicious actions.
Our most important investment is in connecting the joint force.
We are developing the technologies to connect every sensor, every
shooter, and every echelon of command to enable seamless, joint,
all-domain operations. This battle network is essential to defeating
current and future threats.
We are also directing pivotal resources to recruit and retain the
best people our Nation has to offer. We are an inclusive and di-
verse force and are modernizing our promotion system while in-
vesting in the professional development of airmen.
The Air Force is expanding ongoing efforts to support and care
for families. We are tackling privatized housing and PFAS chal-
lenges. Along with our sister services, we encourage State reci-
procity for occupational licensing for spouses and for quality
schools for our children. We are investing in professionally de-
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signed and advised programs to reduce suicides and sexual as-
saults.
To fund the Air Force we need, we must divest some aging legacy
systems. This budget retires limited numbers of aircraft, consoli-
dating resources to increase readiness in remaining aircraft, or in-
vest in recapitalization and modernization efforts.
We thank the Committee and the entire Congress for fully fund-
ing the recovery efforts to rebuild Tindall and Offut Air Force
bases.
We will seek additional support as our installations and per-
sonnel assist with the ongoing novel coronavirus quarantine and
responsive efforts.
With your continued support, America’s Air Force stands ready
to deter, defend, and defeat any adversary.
We look forward to your questions.
Senator WICKER. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.
General Goldfein?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
General GOLDFEIN. Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to present
my last budget submission for the first time with Secretary Bar-
bara Barrett, the 25th Secretary of the Air Force. She is an inspir-
ing leader who cares deeply about airmen and their families, and
this hearing allows me the opportunity to publicly thank her on be-
half of all active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen who stand
the watch, own the high ground, and follow her lead. Thank you,
ma’am.
So my bottom line up front. This budget, building on the last
three, offers the most aggressive package of strategic trades we
have made as a service in over 2 decades to achieve complete align-
ment with the National Defense Strategy and secure our Nation’s
military superiority over the next decade.
Secretary Esper’s guidance for this budget build was crystal
clear. Build an Air Force that can compete, deter, and win shoulder
to shoulder with our joint teammates and our allies and partners
against a nuclear peer in an era of great power competition. This
budget is designed to achieve this objective and we are asking for
your support to make the tough but necessary trades we will dis-
cuss today.
In numerous war games against our best assessment of the
threat in 2030 and beyond, as Secretary Barrett stated, we found
that investment in four key areas produced the Air Force needed
to prevail.
First, this budget connects the joint force in ways we are not
today connected in order to truly fight as a joint team. Under the
leadership of our Chairman, General Mark Milley, the Joint Chiefs
and the combatant commanders are fully engaged in developing a
new doctrine of warfare called joint all-domain operations. Under
this warfighting construct, the Air Force is the designated lead
service to connect platforms, sensors, and weapons from all do-
mains, all services, and our allies and partners so we can truly op-
erate at the speed of relevance. We call it joint all-domain com-
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mand and control, or JADC2 for short, and we are moving out
quickly with advanced battle management, sir, as the pathfinder.
Every 4 months, we host a demonstration and link joint capabili-
ties that are not currently connected to advanced joint all-domain
operations to the next level, and I look forward to describing what
we have achieved to date and where we are headed during ques-
tioning.
Second, we must dominate space, and while you will have a fol-
low-on hearing in April with Chief Jay Raymond and Secretary
Barrett focused on the Space Force and Department of the Air
Force investments, I want you to know that it is my top priority
to make Chief Raymond and his new service successful.
Our third area of focus is generating combat power beginning
with our nuclear enterprise. This budget moves us forward to re-
capitalize our two legs of the triad and the critical nuclear com-
mand and control that ties it all together.
Fourth, this budget invests in a new way of approaching how we
keep our joint team deployed and sustained in contested combat
environments. We must assume our logistics enterprise will be
under attack.
The foundation of this budget submission is the greatest treasure
in our Nation’s arsenal, our airmen. We look forward to working
with this Committee to ensure that we keep the faith with the air-
men that will defend the Nation, and we support their families en-
trusted to our care.
As this Committee is aware and was stated, the 2021 top line is
relatively flat from last year, well short, as the chairman stated,
of the 3 to 5 percent growth required to properly support the Na-
tional Defense Strategy. In a flat budget environment, if a service
is to move forward, it must do two things. It must make better use
of what it has by connecting all platforms, sensors, and weapons
in a battlefield network, JADC2, and it must find internal savings
to pay for new capabilities.
So we held our own night court and identified $21 billion across
the FYDP by retiring the oldest of our legacy weapon systems that
are either not survivable or do not contribute significantly to the
2030 peer fight, and not one of these trades is easy. Every weapon
system we are asking to retire has performed well in the current
fight, but many are at the end of their service life or have no future
in a nuclear peer fight. This is today’s hard reality, and not sur-
prisingly, of the services, the Air Force has the largest classified
portfolio of investment. This makes the story harder to tell since
most of what we are retiring is unclassified and visible, while many
of our game-changing investments are classified.
I want to thank many of you for taking our classified briefing
and offer it to any of you or your staff between now and end game.
When you see what we are trading for, our budget submission will
make more sense.
If we are to achieve truly meaningful gains for our Nation’s secu-
rity through implementing the NDS in a flat budget environment,
we must work together on these hard choices.
Chairman, I am honored to be the 21st Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, and if we go to war against a nuclear peer, I am 100 percent
confident that we have what we will need to win. I can say that
237

because of decisions made by my predecessors, men like John
Jumper and Mike Ryan, such as the lead time required for building
an Air Force. I believe one of my jobs is to ensure that when Chief
24 sits in front of this Committee in 2030, that Chief will be able
to state with equal confidence that our Nation’s Air Force has what
it needs to win. With your support, we can achieve this goal.
Secretary Barrett and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Barrett and General
Goldfein follows:]
JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA BARRETT AND GENERAL
DAVID L. GOLDFEIN
AIR FORCE DESIGN FOR GREAT POWER COMPETITION

The international security environment is rapidly changing and becoming increas-
ingly complex. China and Russia present real and growing threats to the national
security of the United States and our allies. They continue to employ aggressive tac-
tics to coerce neighbors, suppress dissent, and undermine freedom. Iran and North
Korea seek outsized regional influence through violent extremism or the pursuit of
nuclear weapons. These and other nations are pursuing capabilities specifically de-
signed to limit or negate the advantages of the United States and our allies.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) reoriented United States defense
strategy to focus primarily on great power competition with China and Russia. This
shift profoundly changes the conversation on United States defense strategy, plans,
and programs. We are developing new operational concepts to focus on more fully
integrating joint military capabilities across warfighting domains. We will employ
U.S. military forces in more distributed ways as we build technologies to connect
those forces into advanced battle networks.
The United States Air Force has been working to align with the NDS for several
years. In 2018, we needed Congress’ help to recover from the damaging effects of
sequestration and halt declining readiness across the force. The NDS and Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) were also released in 2018, and we began to align future con-
ventional and nuclear forces design with the guidance in these documents.
In 2019, we continued readiness recovery, making significant gains across mul-
tiple aircraft and spacecraft fleets and mission sets. The Air Force also worked with
Congress to make essential decisions on two important programs—the Joint Surveil-
lance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and the Overhead Persistent Infrared
(OPIR) satellite system—that set the tone for future modernization. The plan for re-
capitalizing these platforms had to change as they would not have survived in fu-
ture conflict given the emerging threats. We moved away from developing large, vul-
nerable aircraft and satellite systems, and instead pursued the Advanced Battle
Management System (ABMS) and Next-Generation OPIR. These systems are essen-
tial to robust Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and the networked
future force.
The Air Force’s 2020 budget submission was our first informed by and focused di-
rectly on 2018 National Defense Strategy implementation. The demands this strat-
egy placed on the Air Force drove Congress to ask: what forces are required to suc-
cessfully execute the NDS? The Air Force We Need study assessed the baseline ca-
pacity required to meet NDS objectives, assuming current capabilities and concepts,
at medium risk based on Combatant Commander Operational Plans and Timelines.
As we established this baseline, we also made key organizational changes to drive
toward future capabilities and concepts. Significantly, we helped launch the U.S.
Space Force which now stands as an equal branch of the military.
In preparation for the 2021 submission, the Department of the Air Force con-
ducted an exhaustive review of our portfolios and made hard decisions to better
align with the NDS. Some choices required investments in the future at the expense
of legacy platforms. In doing so, we will accept calculated short-term risk to pursue
the Secretary of Defense’s goal of irreversible momentum toward NDS implementa-
tion. We conducted multiple, complex wargame scenarios to assess alternative
warfighting approaches against a peer adversary. We shared the results with Con-
gress over the past year and talked openly about the implications for our Air Force.
This 2021 budget reflects current analysis on the Air Force We Need for the future.
To achieve the objectives of the NDS, the United States Air Force will pursue an
integrated design and field modernized forces that can:
• Connect the Joint Force so we can more seamlessly integrate as a Joint team,
238
• Dominate Space through support of our sister service, the United States Space
Force,
• Generate Combat Power to blunt any attack against the U.S. or our allies, and
• Conduct Logistics Under Attack to sustain high-tempo operations as long as
needed.
In each of these areas, we will work with Congress and our sister services, indus-
try, academia, allies, and partners to develop and field innovative solutions. While
focusing on the four key investment areas above, we will also continue to provide
Combatant Commanders with Ready Forces to conduct Strategic Deterrence, Home-
land Defense, and Counter Violent Extremism.
Finally, Developing and Caring For Our People and Their Families is an enduring
imperative. American parents have entrusted their sons and daughters to our care.
It is our sacred duty to ensure they are properly organized, trained, equipped, and
courageously led. It is also our responsibility to take care of their families. With the
enduring support of Congress, we will continue to provide them the resources and
support they deserve.
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE DESIGN PRIORITIES

Connect the Joint Force
Modern warfare is increasingly all-domain. Conflicts are not limited to the air or
space or land or sea or cyber. Rather, they involve engagement in and effects across
many or all domains, simultaneously. To prevail, the future joint force must be pre-
pared to employ Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), where individual military ac-
tivities are more than synchronized or deconflicted. Instead, activities in one domain
enhance the effectiveness of those in other domains and compensate for
vulnerabilities.
Joint All Domain Operations as a new Joint Warfighting Concept creates simulta-
neous dilemmas for adversary forces, overwhelming them with too many threats to
counter successfully. The Air Force will generate windows of superiority in air and
cyberspace, with the joint force converging on the most important targets at speed
and scale. When the Air Force employs in concert with Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Space Force capabilities, opponents will have to defend their forces across all
domains, all the time.
The Air Force will enable JADO by helping connect all forces into a cohesive bat-
tle network in ways they are not connected today. For example, our fifth-generation
aircraft cannot easily share data with some legacy fighters, sensors on many Navy
ships cannot cue Army Air Defense Artillery batteries, and soldiers and marines in
battle cannot always access real-time video feeds from our international partners.
The key to this effort is to build on our Advanced Battle Management System in-
vestments. ABMS is the foundation of true Joint All-Domain Command and Control
which enables convergence of joint combat power. JADC2 connects sensors, systems,
and weapons from different services and nations to allow the seamless sharing of
information to all friendly forces. Our fiscal year 2021 budget includes funding to
develop the network, connectivity, and infrastructure for this critical capability
while working closely with joint, interagency, and international partners.
The Air Force is leading efforts to develop JADC2, and early experiments are al-
ready yielding positive results. A recent demonstration in Florida connected Air
Force aircraft, Space Force sensors, Navy surface vessels, and Army Air Defense Ar-
tillery units to successfully defeat a simulated cruise missile attack. This joint team
achieved 26 of 28 connectivity objectives and a series of firsts in this initial effort
to effectively employ JADC2 in an operational setting directly supporting the Com-
mander of USNORTHCOM/NORAD in defense of the Homeland. This fiscal year
2021 budget accelerates JADC2 experimentation, and the next demonstration is
planned for April 2020.
To achieve true JADC2, this budget invests in digital engineering and common
data architecture to connect our Air Forces with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Space
Force, and international teammates. Success in modern warfare requires a digital
infrastructure with more open data systems than we have today. As part of these
efforts, we will continue investments in the Digital Air Force initiative as we transi-
tion from in-house communications networks to an Enterprise Information Tech-
nology as a Service framework, using best practices of industry. This allows airmen
to focus more on warfighting and less on maintenance of our networks. The fiscal
year 2021 budget expands investments in technology solutions that streamline non-
essential tasks for our airmen.
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Dominate Space: The United States Space Force
Maintaining a position of advantage in space is essential to winning in future con-
flicts. The President formally declared space a warfighting domain in March 2018
with the announcement of the new National Space Strategy. On 20 December 2019,
the President and Congress established the United States Space Force as the new-
est branch of the Armed Forces, an historic milestone for our Nation. The standup
of the U.S. Space Force is a critical priority for the Department of the Air Force.
The Air Force will aggressively support our sister service as they develop the capa-
bilities, warfighting doctrine, and expertise needed to outpace future threats.
While the Space Force will eventually drive budgets, personnel, and operations of
our space capabilities, the Air Force retains many systems and personnel in the
near term. We will work with our joint teammates to support the transition of space
systems and the professionals who employ them.
Generate Combat Power
To prevail in future conflict, the joint force must generate sufficient combat power
to blunt an attack against the U.S. or its allies. The Air Force will deliver rapid,
lethal warfighting capability to combatant commanders. Air forces are expected to
arrive first because we fly into theater and are then called to halt enemy activity
while follow-on joint and allied forces are brought to bear. This budget continues
critical recapitalization across multiple missions to include the B–21, KC–46, F–35,
F–15EX, HH–60W, and T–7 fleets along with the critical munitions and sensor
suites required for Joint All-Domain Operations.
In addition, this budget modernizes existing platforms that will fly well into the
next two decades. Examples include a modernized B–52 with new engines and up-
graded radar technology and munitions delivery options; updated F–16s with ad-
vanced fire control radars and datalinks; and the venerable A–10 which will provide
close air support to ground forces well into the 2030s. Connecting these platforms,
sensors, and weapons through ABMS and JADC2 will maintain their viability and
combat lethality.
The fighter force is one example of how this budget invests in a new way of gener-
ating combat power. The Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program is ma-
turing novel technologies for the networked, multi-domain joint force. NGAD will in-
tegrate legacy and future platforms with a mix of manned, unmanned, and option-
ally-manned aircraft.
This budget continues to fund Air Force investments in the intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, systems, and capabilities that enable
current joint force operations. At the same time, it lays the foundation for an archi-
tecture that will eventually link sensors, shooters, and decision makers. The Air
Force seeks to balance both near- and long-term risk by right-sizing the ISR avail-
able to dominate today’s fight, while building the ISR enterprise necessary to pro-
vide decision superiority to the joint force in the future.
This budget takes full advantage of breakthroughs in digital design technology by
investing in three critical areas: digital engineering, agile software development,
and open systems architectures. Recent application of digital design technology in
the T–7 program resulted in an 80 percent reduction in assembly hours versus con-
ventional aircraft design and manufacturing methods. This engagement with indus-
try will allow us to develop smaller fleets of new aircraft much faster with rapid
technological innovation and adaptation. It is not good enough to procure better air-
planes and satellites; rather, we must design and build systems differently today.
This budget submission pursues advanced technologies and incorporates them
into our weapons and platforms. These technologies include hypersonic, directed en-
ergy, autonomy, cyber, propulsion, and mass weapon payload systems. These future
capabilities will complement existing systems to allow us to achieve effects against
enemy targets, kinetically or non-kinetically, in all domains, at speed and scale pre-
viously unseen.
Even as we generate combat power in new ways, humans will still operate in
many of our combat aircraft. This will place them in harm’s way and potentially
require their rescue from hostile areas. Recovering isolated personnel remains a no-
fail mission, so we are continuing our efforts to modernize our rescue aircraft. In
2019, we began testing our first HH–60W aircraft. This budget continues acquisi-
tions as we recapitalize the helicopter fleet. In 2021, we will retire the first 27 leg-
acy HH–60 aircraft.
Conduct Logistics Under Attack
Since the end of World War II, the United States has relied on established, fully-
supplied, and well-defended bases. Today, American forces are extremely efficient in
deploying large numbers of people, materiel, and weapons systems across the globe
240
to fight from a small number of forward operating bases with well-developed infra-
structure.
Our assessment, in line with the NDS, indicates that future battlefields will not
allow us to fight this way, so we must be prepared to move to win. The Air Force
will invest in forward-based stocks to enable forces to rapidly deploy to distributed
forward locations. These locations will vary in size, setup, and security, so we must
be postured to protect our forces and make it difficult for enemies to target them.
Logistics will need to be lean and agile, allowing us to rapidly move people and
materiel to and within a theater. As we reinvent logistics, the Air Force is investing
in future transportation platforms and autonomous capabilities. We will continue to
develop and field future vertical lift to move smaller amounts of equipment quickly
to many more places than in the past. In these efforts, we are closely engaged with
our sister services and industry to reimagine what is possible. These capabilities
will be integrated with our battle networks, so we are taking steps to reinforce sup-
ply chain security with the components, subcomponents, materials, and software in-
corporated into defense systems and equipment.
In addition to developing future capabilities, we will continue investing in our ex-
isting and modernized mobility aircraft fleets. The joint force will depend upon the
KC–46 to provide force extension and power projection. The Air Force continues to
work closely with the contractor to reach full mission-capable status. This budget
retires sixteen KC–10s and thirteen KC–135s in fiscal year 2021 while maintaining
the required 479 tanker aircraft. We are also looking closely at the right mix be-
tween modernized and legacy tactical airlift platforms.
Ready Forces
The United States Air Force fields capabilities the Nation relies upon every day.
Airmen are always on duty: standing the watch in missile launch facilities; con-
ducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions; patrolling and de-
fending the cyber domain; delivering nuclear command, control, and communica-
tions capabilities; and guarding our skies. As we modernize to counter growing
threats, we must also ensure that forces remain ready and able to offer options to
our Nation’s leaders.
The demand for Air Force capabilities across the globe remains high. Over 28,000
airmen deployed worldwide last year as part of the joint team to deliver America’s
air, space, and cyber power. In 2019, our servicemembers flew more than 75,000
strike sorties and employed more than 11,000 weapons in Iraq, Syria, and Afghani-
stan. Mobility forces conducted more than 27,000 airlift and refueling sorties across
the United States Central Command area of responsibility, offloading more than 590
million pounds of fuel and moving more than 226 million pounds of cargo. Air Force
personnel deployed in support of NATO collective defense missions in Poland and
the Baltic States, filled continuous bomber rotations in the United States Central
Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command areas of responsibility, and
brought humanitarian assistance to millions of people in need around the world.
Despite this operations tempo, a major success story over the past several years
has been the improved readiness across our force following the harmful effects of
sequestration. We have increased mission capable rates across our pacing squad-
rons—our most in-demand units—and are continuing our efforts across all fleets.
This budget requests $17 billion in sustainment and support for weapons systems
and $9 billion for 1.2 million flying hours to train and hone combat proficiency.
The Air Force is also expanding investment into harnessing the power of data and
the efficiencies it brings to operations. Predictive maintenance initiatives have yield-
ed faster and cheaper maintenance for our C–5 and KC–135 fleets, and this budget
expands the initiative to other aircraft. We are digitizing data from years of main-
taining legacy platforms, such as the B–52, to preserve and extend some of our old-
est aircraft.
In 2018, we faced major readiness deficits which negatively impacted the morale
of our airmen. With the support of Congress, we have made major improvements
to readiness over the past three budget years and are now more ready than at any
time in the last decade. The momentum is undeniable.
Strategic Deterrence
Nuclear deterrence is the highest priority mission of the Department of Defense—
our deterrent underwrites every U.S. military operation around the world and is the
foundation and backstop of our national defense. As the steward of two-thirds of the
nuclear triad, the Air Force needs the continued support of Congress to maintain
the Nation’s credible and effective strategic deterrent. This need is even more crit-
ical today, due to the on-going evolution and fielding of other countries’ strategic nu-
241
clear capabilities, including hypersonic weapons, which continue to challenge U.S.
and allied security.
The Air Force is making significant investments in modernization and recapital-
ization programs that address both delivery platforms and weapons. Modernized
versions of existing weapons, such as guided bombs, and modern replacements for
existing capabilities, such as the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, will be joined by
new technologies that provide advanced capabilities to the joint force. These systems
are being fielded on a tight schedule that depends on stable requirements and re-
sources to ensure our national strategic deterrence mission does not fail.
The Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile weapon system has served as
the bedrock of nuclear deterrence since 1962. However, this system’s service life can
no longer be extended. The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent developed in this
budget represents a modern, sustainable design with the capabilities to ensure the
Nation maintains its most responsive leg of the nuclear Triad well into the 21st
Century.
Our nuclear-capable bomber force represents the most flexible leg of the nuclear
triad. The Air Force’s future bomber, the B–21 Raider, is proceeding on schedule
and on cost, and the initial test aircraft is progressing toward first flight. The Raid-
er will be the core of our future nuclear-capable bomber fleet, and we are committed
to fully funding the program in its current development phase to maintain our ag-
gressive and critical timeline for bringing it online. Combined with the Long Range
Standoff Weapon, investments in this budget for B–21 development and B–52 mod-
ernization will maintain America’s capability to deter adversary aggression, assure
allies, and project combat power across the full spectrum of conflict.
To modernize the Nation’s strategic and bomber forces, we propose an acceptable
reduction in near-term capacity to increase overall capability. The B–1 fleet is near-
ing the end of its service life. For a period of time last year, only 12 of the 55 air-
craft in the B–1 fleet were fully mission-capable. We propose retiring 17 B–1 air-
craft in fiscal year 2021 to invest in the most mission-capable bombers.
2020 is the Year of Integrated Base Defense, focusing on training and equipping
our airmen to defend bases as our primary power projection platforms as we guard
our Nation’s critical installations and infrastructure. This fiscal year 2021 budget
continues developing and deploying the technology to fully integrate the command,
control, and communications capabilities essential to effective base defense.
Congress has recognized the importance of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces after
decades of deferred recapitalization and has fully funded these programs. We re-
quest continued support to modernize and sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent.
Homeland Defense
Our ready forces that support the Homeland defense mission include radars and
early warning systems, alert aircraft and aircrew, and supporting infrastructure.
This fiscal year 2021 budget invests across all these areas. The centerpiece of the
overall Department of Defense budget, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, is
the most essential investment we can make to enable the Commander
USNORTHCOM/NORAD to have the situational awareness and the ability to bring
joint all-domain capabilities to bear. We continue to partner with this team daily
on the number one mission in the NDS: defense of the Homeland.
Defense of the Homeland includes defeating malicious threats online, where we
must counter direct aggression as well as indirect sources of influence. Air Force
cyber warriors are constantly at work, under the newly-reactivated 16th Air Force,
to ‘‘Defend Forward’’ with actions to deter adverse action and defend friendly net-
works and information. We are also closely examining all friendly systems and capa-
bilities to identify and mitigate potential cyber vulnerabilities and reduce the poten-
tial for adversary exploitation.
To successfully execute the Homeland Defense mission, the Air Force will con-
tinue upgrading limited numbers of existing aircraft to include modernizing the ra-
dars in some F–16s. These updated legacy aircraft will be complemented by new-
build F–15EX aircraft which are significantly more capable and cost-effective than
the F–15Cs they will replace, aircraft already many years past their designed speci-
fications and no longer candidates for service life extensions. The F–15EX will help
eliminate the gap between the fighter aircraft we have and the fighter aircraft we
need while leveraging other Nations’ investments in updating the F–15 program. Ul-
timately, the Air Force must field a robust fighter force, anchored by the F–35, able
to detect and defeat threats across a wide spectrum. Homeland defense requires a
mix of 4th- and 5th-generation capabilities, and we are investing to achieve that fu-
ture force.
Engagement across the globe also contributes to the Homeland Defense mission.
As we build a network of partners, allies, and emerging security partners, we enlist
242
help in deterring aggression and containing threats. We will continue to provide
training and assistance to foreign nations through military equipment sales, train-
ing programs, and personnel exchanges. The Air Force remains committed to col-
laboration with key allies and partners, and we have accelerated and expanded com-
bined participation in air and space operations, exercises, wargames, and education.
Residing at the intersection between the United States Homeland and two critical
regions—Indo-Pacific and Europe—the Arctic is an increasingly vital region for
United States national security interests. The Air Force has more missions and in-
vestments in this region than any other U.S. military service. We are a cornerstone
of the Nation’s defense in this region with installations positioned across Alaska,
Canada, and Greenland and composed of large air bases, training complexes, and
a constellation of more than 50 early-warning radars and missile defense facilities.
We are continuing our investments to include the upcoming beddown of the F–35
at Eielson AFB, placing more 5th-generation aircraft in Alaska than anywhere else
in the world. In addition to modernizing the world-class Joint Pacific Range Com-
plex, we continue to build interoperability with Arctic allies and partners. Sustained
future investment in modernized missile defense, enhanced space capabilities, and
improved domain awareness will ensure the Joint Force can respond to contin-
gencies in, and from, the Arctic.
Counter Violent Extremism
Countering violent extremist organizations (VEO) is a critical and complex mis-
sion that requires interagency and international cooperation. The military is one
source of power available for this task, and the Air Force is at the leading edge of
these efforts. Airmen of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) are en-
gaged worldwide to counter VEOs. They are coordinating airstrikes, conducting di-
rect action missions, employing munitions, and providing persistent armed
overwatch and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
We are also working to build partner capacity and help foreign forces combat
VEOs in their own homelands. The Air Force, working with the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense, has split the Light Attack experiment into two separate but
linked efforts. First, building on the fiscal year 2019 approval to procure several
AT–6 and A–29 aircraft, we are establishing two experimental detachments at
Hurlburt Field and Nellis AFB. Using these aircraft as prototypes, we will continue
development and fielding of a coalition-friendly battle network that increases inter-
operability and allied and partner contributions. Second, we will partner with U.S.
Special Operations Command through our air component, AFSOC, to build require-
ments and rapidly field armed overwatch aircraft to support ongoing and future
counter-VEO and counter-terrorism missions.
These two efforts are complementary as the Light Attack experiment feeds tech-
nology and tactics, techniques, and procedures for this fight while we improve sup-
port for our Special Operations Forces engaged in combat operations. We appreciate
the support of Congress as we continue this important work.
Developing Our Airmen
Our platforms and systems may be the best in the world, but our most valuable
assets are our people. With the support of Congress, we have grown our force over
the last three budget years by 7,820 airmen on the way to an active force of 333,700
for a total force of 699,013 authorized end strength to include Active Duty, Guard,
Reserve, and civilian airmen. Our fiscal year 2021 budget adds 1,500 additional per-
sonnel in F–35 and refueling operations, maintenance, and combat support.
Additionally, we are currently developing detailed plans to transfer more than
6,000 personnel into the U.S. Space Force in fiscal year 2021. We will continue de-
veloping this cadre of Space professionals across more than 15 career fields who will
eventually form the core of a Space Force that will protect U.S. interests in space
well into the future. During the transition, members eligible for transfer will be pro-
vided options, depending on their specialty code, their preferences, and Service
needs. We also anticipate that airmen will continue to provide support to the Space
Force across numerous other functions, to include legal, chaplain, and medical ca-
reer fields.
The Air Force is continuing our efforts to develop the joint leaders essential to
our future force. In order to develop and promote the right kind of leaders, we have
established criteria by which we assess performance and potential. Underpinned by
a foundation of impeccable character, we ask of our leaders:
• How well do they accomplish their mission?
• How well do they lead their airmen or space professionals?
• How do they manage the resources they have been assigned?
• How have they improved their unit?
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We have also reformed our promotion boards, expanding the Line category into
six competitive sub-categories in order to better match personnel with requirements.
Furthermore, we are eliminating below the primary zone promotions to better align
the experience and rank of our officer corps with those of our sister services while
allowing our leaders more time to develop the excellence and expertise they will
need.
Diverse, resilient, and ready airmen are the bedrock of the Department’s readi-
ness and lethality. We are continuing efforts to increase representation of diverse
servicemembers through a number of initiatives. These include the Rated Diversity
Improvement Strategy, the Air Force Junior ROTC Flight Academy, recruiting ef-
forts at Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and the Aviation-Inspiration-
Motivation (AIM) High Outreach Program which engages young females through
interaction with Air and Space Force role models. Increasing the overall diversity
of our force is a warfighting imperative, and we are committed to fielding and devel-
oping a diverse Air Force.
Caring for Our People and Their Families
While we develop our people, we must also care for them and their families. The
Air Force, along with our sister services, continues to address numerous challenges.
These include suicide and sexual assault, aircrew retention, personnel retraining,
spouse employment opportunities, quality of schools and Privatized Military Hous-
ing, and PFAS issues affecting our installations and the communities that host
them.
Suicide and sexual assault continue to be insidious threats to our force. Suicide
devastates families and units, and it affects the entire Service. Sexual assault is a
crime against a fellow airman, one which is unacceptable and unthinkable. We will
continue to devote resources and invest in programs, such as the True North initia-
tive, which are designed to increase resiliency and connectedness among our airmen.
We will reinforce a culture of dignity and respect where our people feel protected,
valued, and supported.
Shortages across our aircrew career fields persist as threats to readiness. We have
seen signs of progress in addressing these complex and critical issues, but much
work remains. We must increase production, absorption, and retention of aircrew
and their families. The Air Force is employing lessons learned from Pilot Training
Next, now in its 3rd major iteration, to streamline undergraduate pilot, combat sys-
tems officer, and air battle manager training programs.
Absorbing new aircrew into mission-ready units and providing necessary experi-
ence remains a challenge. Total Force partnerships help us place newly-trained
members in highly-experienced units as we strive to balance experience levels across
the force. These efforts require retaining aircrew, especially pilots, in higher num-
bers than in recent years. We are expanding the Career Intermission Program to
provide flexibility and choice to our aircrews as they reach critical career decision
points.
Our investments in this budget will involve some mission changes for some units,
to include our Reserve and Air National Guard forces. Aircraft type or mission
changes will require new skills, and we are committed to retaining and retraining
personnel as we adjust capabilities. We are expanding efforts to ease transitions
from Active to Reserve and Guard components, allowing increased flexibility along
a continuum of service. Even with changing aircraft or missions, there are no plans
to inactivate any wings at this time.
Airmen could not make the necessary sacrifices to serve without the support of
their families, and the Air Force is making investments to address crucial quality
of life concerns. Alongside our sister services, we will continue to advocate for recip-
rocal professional licensing for spouses and improved quality of schools. We have re-
cently implemented the Support of Military Families initiative, which will explicitly
consider such issues when the Department of the Air Force makes basing decisions.
A vital part of caring for our airmen and their families is providing a safe, secure
environment for them to live and work. We are addressing serious challenges with
Military Privatized Housing and have directed considerable resources toward cor-
recting substandard living conditions. This budget increases manning at the base
level, providing personnel required for proper oversight of our Project Owners and
advocacy for our residents. We will also continue to address the root causes of mold
or moisture issues in many of our housing units. Along with our sister services, we
are preparing to institute a Privatized Housing Tenants’ Bill of Rights to further
empower residents. We are committed to regaining the trust of families who have
been let down, and we will continue this work for as long as it takes to get it right.
PFAS is a national issue that requires national solutions. The Department has
already spent $447.5 million identifying, investigating, and responding to PFAS re-
244
leases; taken drinking water response actions at 23 installations to improve safety;
and completed 165 of 189 required CERCLA PFAS Site Inspections. To enable our
continued work, this budget requests $304 million for the Environmental Restora-
tion program as part of the total $851 million Environmental Program request at
Active and Guard bases.
Moving Forward
The message of the National Defense Strategy is crystal clear: a more lethal, resil-
ient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of al-
lies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of
power that safeguard the free and open international order. Failure to meet our de-
fense objectives will result in decreasing U.S. global influence, eroding cohesion
among allies and partners, and a loss of military advantage.
To align the U.S. Air Force with this direction, we are putting forward an aggres-
sive budget based on a new blueprint for joint warfighting. Joint All Domain Oper-
ations and the command and control networks required to connect the joint team
form the centerpiece of this strategy. If we are to achieve the vision of the NDS,
the joint force must fight together and deliver all-domain capabilities in a way that
overwhelms our adversaries. We must acknowledge that all global military oper-
ations are connected to and rely on a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. We
appreciate Congress’ support with on-time budgets and the willingness to take pru-
dent near-term risk to build a winning, networked force of the future. With this
budget, the Air Force makes significant contributions to achieving irreversible mo-
mentum toward implementing the National Defense Strategy.
Senator WICKER. Thank you very much to both of you.
We will begin now with a 5-minute round.
General Goldfein, these savings of $21 billion found in night
court, is that within the Air Force or the total defense budget?
General GOLDFEIN. Air Force and it is over the whole FYDP.
Senator WICKER. Well, in doing what you had to do with the
budget submission and understanding that you had to make some
tough decisions, where do you see the most risk in this budget?
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, I think the two hardest decisions we
made at end game were two weapon systems that we are asking
to retire some number of them, and I will talk about both, KC–
135’s, KC–10’s, and also the A–10.
When it came to the KC–135 and the tanker portfolio, this is the
classic tension between a combatant commander that is looking at
a 2-year problem to solve and a Service Chief that is trying to build
a force that wins in 2030. That tension has always been there and
it always will be there.
When we looked across the portfolio of tankers, the congressional
mandate is that we never go below 479. Secretary Mattis used to
say, hey, before anybody says the ‘‘risk’’ word, you have to answer
three questions: to who, for how long, and what is your mitigation.
This is risk to the combatant commander who testified about that
risk. This is going to be until the KC–46 comes on line, which we
expect to be in 2023 to 2024. Our mitigation is that the retirement
we are asking for in the KC–135 represents 3 percent of the overall
KC–135 fleet, and we have committed to the combatant com-
mander and the Secretary of Defense that if we go to a high end
contingency, we will put every KC–46 we have into the fight. We
will not use it for day-to-day operations, but it will be made avail-
able for a contingency. So we think it is a reasonable risk portfolio
going forward.
On the A–10, also as we looked at that right at end game, on the
A–10 we are putting almost a billion dollars into that weapon sys-
tem, about $880 million, to re-wing, new avionics. We are going to
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keep that weapon system flying, albeit with smaller numbers, well
into the 2030s.
Those are the two areas that I think are a significant risk.
Senator WICKER. On the tankers, what will happen between
2021 and 2023?
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, we will manage the force like we do all
other areas where we have shortfalls. What the TRANSCOM com-
mander was laying out for you was the stacked requirements that
he has to deal with day to day, and so just like we are short in
bombers, fighters, tankers, ISR, command and control, the Sec-
retary of Defense managed those forces against all of the demand
signal, and in certain areas, he tells the combatant commanders
they can have less of what they are asking for. We will do the same
thing in the tanker force between now and when the KC–46 comes
on line.
Senator WICKER. Secretary Barrett, with a budget decrease of ap-
proximately $12 billion from last year, are you comfortable with
how the funding is allocated among personnel, equipment mod-
ernization, and operations and maintenance?
Secretary BARRETT. Senator, while we would like very much, of
course, to have more funds, the reality is with these funds we be-
lieve that the allocation is appropriately designed.
Senator WICKER. General Goldfein, the Air Force requires 72
fighter aircraft per year to begin to recap its nearly 30-year-old, on
average, aircraft. General Goldfein, you have said this is a min-
imum.
When do you believe we will be able to achieve this number, and
given the importance of extending the range of our aircraft in any
potential conflict and the comments from TRANSCOM, how do you
balance the current air—you have spoken about the air refueling
already. But if you would comment on the first portion of that
question.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. Seventy-two is the number we need
to be able to drive aircraft age down to about a 17 to 18-year aver-
age age which we think is sustainable. Without the 3 to 5 percent
growth or some growth in the budget, to be honest with you, sir,
I do not know at what point we would ever get to 72 fighters a
year.
I will thank this Committee, though, because there was some
lean years there where we were buying 20 to 30 airplanes total in
several years, and so at least we are up into the 50s and the 60s
now, so we are doing better. But I do not know at what point we
will get to the 72 aircraft per year, if the budget stays flat.
Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.
Senator Reed?
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up a bit on the tanker issue. First, thank you
for your thoughtful response, General. It was very insightful.
Madam Secretary, I presume that you are really focused on get-
ting the KC–46 in the air and operational working with the con-
tractor Boeing. Can you give us some insight as to what you are
doing, and can we be confident that in 2023 it will be fully oper-
ational?
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Secretary BARRETT. We are meeting every day on that topic. It
is really one of the highest priorities in the building, including
meetings just yesterday afternoon. The Chief has been very much
involved as well and working directly with the company.
At the moment it is not meeting all the requirements. It is able
to be used for passenger transport, for cargo transport, and for
aeromedical evacuation purposes and for some training. But we do
look forward to having the remote visual system repaired to be usa-
ble, and we are looking to have some solution even by the end of
this month on a way forward, and the Chief has been very much
involved in that.
Senator REED. General, I understand from your response to
Chairman Wicker that part of the contingency plan would be to es-
sentially put the KC–46 in operation if there was a stress to the
system. Doing the numbers, would that give us the capacity to en-
gage in a significant contingency operation?
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, it would definitely reduce the risk. I
think the TRANSCOM Commander, if he was here to tell you, we
are living every day with the tanker shortage, and the KC–46 is
not going to completely fill that in. However, because we are buy-
ing at 12–15 per year, every one of those tankers with crews would
be made available in a high end contingency. It would certainly be
able to overcome, for that period of time that we use them, the re-
tirement that we are asking for.
If I could just add on to——
Senator REED. Yes, please.
General GOLDFEIN.—Secretary Barrett’s point.
I wrote a letter to the CEO 3 days ago, and he came to see me—
Mr. Calhoun, and he committed to me that the KC–46 was his top
military priority and he was going to do what was required to fix
it. I have seen a change in the behavior of that company since he
took over, and so that is why we are more confident sitting here
today that we have a serious fix on the table. We are in final nego-
tiations so we cannot go into any more detail than that. But I will
say that it is looking better today than it was even 6 months ago.
Senator REED. Just to follow up. I have no expertise with aircraft
as you do. But today we will not use them in operational because
of the visual system, et cetera. But in a contingency operation, we
are prepared to use them. Would that require a significant modi-
fication in the way the aircraft approaching to refuel would oper-
ate? Again, are we just at this point being abundantly cautious or
there is still some profound problem with the system?
General GOLDFEIN. No, sir. There are profound problems with
the system. I would not be comfortable putting them into——
Senator REED. This contingency would be—there would be no
other choice. We got to throw these in the mix, but it is going to
be hope for the best.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. I will tell you I have been pulled out
of a really lot bad places by some courageous tanker crews really
low on gas. We want that tanker to be able to plug that receiver.
Senator REED. We had a chance, General, to speak yesterday
about the sustainment costs of the F–35. I think most people would
be—I know I was a bit surprised when the current sustainment
cost is about $39,000 an hour. I know you are working to get it
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down. But that raises the question of can we afford to buy more
aircraft if we cannot afford to fly them. Can you comment very
briefly on sustainment costs?
General GOLDFEIN. I can, sir. I met with all of the CEOs, to in-
clude Lockheed Martin and all of the subcontractors, and I told
them in no uncertain terms both as the largest customer, as a Joint
Chief that represents my fellow Chiefs who also have bought this
aircraft and my international Air Chiefs who have bought onto
this, the current flying hour costs are unsustainable.
We met. I gave them a list of requirements. They did a 180-day
sprint with the Joint Program Office. I then went down and spent
an entire day at Lockheed Martin with the leadership there and
brought 27 stars with me. We went through a full day, and like
what we have seen in Boeing. I believe Lockheed Martin has taken
a serious look at sustainment costs, and their plan right now is to
lower sustainment costs to $25,000 per hour by 2025. We are going
to hold them to that.
Senator REED. Well, we are going to keep watch on your efforts
and wish you well.
I will submit a question for the record, General, with respect to
the MQ–9 industrial base. We talked about it yesterday. We looked
and it appears to us that after fiscal year 2020, there are no MQ–
9’s in the budget, and we just want to get a better picture of where
we are going with that asset. I will send it for the record.
Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator WICKER. General, what can the KC–46 not do in the
next 2 years?
General GOLDFEIN. For normal refueling, what is happening with
the remote visual system is a couple things. One, the boom oper-
ator struggles to see about the last 10 feet between the boom and
the aircraft. It is a focus issue on how the system was designed.
What is happening then is you start—there is the high potential
for striking the aircraft around the receptacle if you cannot actu-
ally see it very closely at end game. That, as you might imagine,
is not a good thing. While I would accept that with a highly trained
crew in a high end contingency, I would not accept that for day-
to-day operations. This is a hardware problem requiring a hard-
ware fix.
Senator WICKER. Thank you.
Senator Fischer?
Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Barrett, General Goldfein, first of all, thank you so
much for your service to this country.
I also want to express my appreciation for the robust way this
budget funds nuclear modernization.
I want to thank you both for the attention that the Air Force has
paid to the rebuilding of Offut Air Force Base as well. Your teams
have been valuable partners as we have worked together to secure
the funds necessary to repair, replace, and rebuild following the
historic flooding that occurred in Nebraska a year ago.
Secretary Barrett, the 55th wing is the number one provider of
large, fixed-wing Air Force ISR in the Nation. This is a capability
that is in constant demand. I hear it from our combatant com-
248

manders. The newly contested environments that we are faced with
now mean that we need to think creatively about integrating these
platforms like the RC–135 into future networks.
Given that fact, how are you working to ensure the continued ca-
pability of the RC–135 as we look into the future time frame?
Secretary BARRETT. Thank you, Senator.
The RC–135 is pivotal to our ISR capabilities. As you know,
training capability was lost during the floods at Offut. So I want
to thank you for the funding to help get that back up so that we
can renew the training.
The other key thing that is happening with that platform and
others is the computer connectedness, building that as an element,
a node on the network for our combatants.
Senator FISCHER. The Air Force laid out a future road map for
the ISR mission in the ISR dominance flight plan. What progress
has been made in implementing the points of that plan? General?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, thank you, ma’am.
The most progress we have done is actually how we have tied to
distributed ground system where we do all the analytical work in
the ISR into this battlefield network, this advanced battle manage-
ment, because it used to be that we would have platform sensors
or weapons from all of our services that were operating independ-
ently, and then the universal translator across weapon systems
was a phone or a chat room operating at human speeds. That is
not going to work in the next fight. We have got to be able to work
seamlessly at machine speeds, and that is what advanced battle
management system does, and the RC–135 is a significant player
in that.
Senator FISCHER. You had mentioned the ABMS and the JADC2,
and the fiscal year 2021 budget makes significant investments in
that next generation networking capability. How is the Air Force
working to ensure integration of existing platforms with these new
capabilities that are coming on line?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. That is the foundation of this, is
how do we take existing capabilities, in addition to new capabili-
ties, and connect them in.
When this Committee supported our move from Joint STARS
into a battlefield network solution for the future, we took those
savings and we put it into demonstrations and connected capability
that is no longer PowerPoint slides with lightning bolts that are as-
pirational. We turned this into real capability. We are no longer
talking about cloud capability. We actually built a cloud. We con-
tracted with industry and all the services are connected in. We are
not just talking about common data architecture. We built the uni-
fied data library, and now we are connecting and sharing.
Every 4 months, we connect portions of the enterprise, and we
do a demonstration. We operate at machine speeds. What we are
learning is that each of the weapon systems that we are connecting
now jumps in its capability when you can connect it into a common
architecture.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you.
Secretary Barrett, the Air Force is still conducting an analysis of
alternatives, and I believe this is the second study that we have
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had for that for the recapitalization of the E–4B. It is my under-
standing that the AOA will conclude soon.
What is the Air Force’s plan to move forward after the AOA fin-
ishes? I ask this because this has been an issue of constant study,
and I believe the first AOA was directed back in 2008. The chal-
lenges of maintaining that outdated airframe are only getting hard-
er, and I think it is vital that the Air Force move forward after this
AOA concludes and this issue should not be studied indefinitely.
Can you speak to this, please?
Secretary BARRETT. We have found that sometimes studies are a
never-ending process. I can assure you that we will review that
study at its conclusion and make a decision based on its rec-
ommendations.
Senator FISCHER. We always want to make sure that we have all
the information available at the time, but we do need to move for-
ward. Thank you.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here. General Goldfein, we appreciate
your service and we will miss you, even though you may not miss
us and these hearings.
[Laughter.]
Senator SHAHEEN. I want to go back to the KC–46 because that
is a continuing concern for us in New Hampshire with the 157th
air refueling wing, and we lost our last KC–135’s over a year ago
now. While the 46’s have replaced them and we are seeing the
planes come in and we hope to have all 12 new tankers by the
summer, as you know, they are not flying and we are hearing from
our Air Guard that they would like to fly some missions.
So I have two questions. The first is, is the biggest challenge still
remaining the remote vision system? Do you have any sense from
Boeing based on your communications back in January when this
is going to get resolved and how long it will take to address that
in the tankers that have already been put out?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, thank you, ma’am.
So right now, we are in final negotiations with the company on
the fix. So I have got to be a little careful about how much detail
I go into.
But I did have a conversation, a follow-up conversation, with the
CEO and told him that not only the quality of a serious hardware
fix is important but also time because the longer we wait to get
that aircraft operational, the longer we are having to extend KC–
135’s, KC–10’s, and it continues to add up. So, we are going to be
holding them not only to a really serious fix but also to time. Right
now we are targeting initially about the 2023 to 2024 time frame
to have the fix in place and operational. Then there will be some
kind of retrofit time plan that we will have to work.
Senator SHAHEEN. So that is significant.
General GOLDFEIN. It is.
Senator SHAHEEN. I know that last week, Dr. Will Roper testified
that—and General Lyons said that we are below the mark on both
tanker capacity and tanker capability right now.
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So if we are talking about 3 or 4 years before we are going to
get up to capacity, what are we assuming is going to happen with
the units like the 157th that would like to do missions? Are there
other things that they can do as we look at the potential to utilize
the KC–46 for medical missions or other things?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. So two missions that we are in
the process of certifying now. It can do lift. We bought it for not
heavy lift, but it can do lift missions and it can also do
aeromedical. We are still in the process of certifying it for that. As
soon as it is certified, we will start using it for those missions as
we then go into the long-term fix for the remote visual system.
To your units, as you know, we took the Active Duty manpower
out of the total force unit and moved it. Our plan is to have that
available right now for the tankers that are operational and then
as soon as we get the KC–46 online and the fixes in place, that
manpower comes back.
Senator SHAHEEN. So that manpower is not going to come back
until 2023–2024?
General GOLDFEIN. As soon as we can get a fix, and I will just
tell you that Boeing has heard loud and clear that time is of the
essence.
Senator SHAHEEN. Three or four years does not sound like time
is of the essence to me, so I hope that this Committee will do what
we can to address that as well because that is unacceptable. I
mean, it really is.
Secretary Barrett, I want to go back to PFAS, which you men-
tioned in your opening statement, which we know is a concern.
Again, I appreciate the commitment that the Air Force has made
to address the situation at the former Pease Air Force Base. But
I wonder if you have gotten an update from the Navy, who is the
lead in developing a fluorine-free fire fighting foam, and where
they are on that. The NDAA that we passed this year said that we
needed to phase out all of the fluorine-containing foam by 2024. Do
you know where we are on that?
Secretary BARRETT. I know the Navy is working and doing ex-
periments with other foam additives. They have not yet, it seems,
come upon a solution that meets the requirements to extinguish
fires, intense fires, in contained areas. Of course, the Navy is very
concerned about fires aboard ships. So they are very attentive.
Right now, so far the PFAS formula is the one that is most effec-
tive at fire extinguishing.
We no longer use the PFAS in our training. When we do use any
containing product, we contain it, and we are working diligently to
clean up the problem that has been caused by the Air Force as
every community around the country has been doing. But we take
it very seriously. The health and safety of our communities is
among the most important things that we work with.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.
My time is up, but I just want to also thank you for committing,
as did former Secretary Wilson, to address the occupational health
study at Pease, and if there are more resources needed and we can
be helpful with that, I hope you will share that with our office.
Secretary BARRETT. Thank you.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
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Senator Cotton?
Senator COTTON. Secretary Barrett, General Goldfein, thank you
for your appearance here again today.
General Goldfein, I want to go back to something you said in
your opening statement. I want to see if we can put it a little more
bluntly and just not beat around the bush on it. You and Secretary
Barrett and your whole team have done a lot to try to identify
what our Air Force needs to fight the future fight. That is going
to require some divestments, some cuts in current programs.
An issue is that over here in current programs, you got a bunch
of stuff that flies around right now that we can all see, or maybe
more importantly, that sits on the ground in our States and em-
ploys people in our States. Over here, you have a bunch of stuff
that is super secret, very classified, very cutting edge that we can-
not see. Is that right? So you are talking about making cuts to the
stuff that we can see and spending money on the stuff we cannot
see. Is that the crux of the matter that you are getting at?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir.
Senator COTTON. I do not think anyone doubts that we need all
this super secret stuff over here. We have had a number of hear-
ings on it. We created Space Force in part to address it. I just think
it is important that we lay that out there and make it very plain
so when we get down to brass tacks on the NDAA or we get down
to brass tacks on the defense spending bill, that we all on this
panel remember and that the other Senators in the Senate remem-
ber that the secret stuff is very needful and the public stuff that
has been with us for a long time and very comfortable may need
to be trimmed back to pay for the secret stuff.
That is not a strategy issue. That is a political issue for all of
us to deal with, and that is not endorsing any single kind of cut
that you may have to make here or any single kind of program you
may spend here. We may have different thoughts on that. We may
want to tinker around the edges. But, I think it is really clear that
we just be up front about the dilemma that the Air Force faces,
which is at root a political dilemma that we all should handle in
a responsible and sober fashion given the threats that we face in
the future.
General GOLDFEIN. Thanks, sir.
Senator COTTON. I now wanted to speak about spectrum, specifi-
cally the mid-band spectrum. Secretary Esper said that DOD is
willing to explore sharing that spectrum, and we know that some
of your systems like AWACS operate there. Can you talk to us
about what mid-band capabilities that you are concerned about and
how critical the spectrum is to those capabilities? I will throw that
open to either one of you.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir, and I will back up exactly what Sec-
retary Esper says. We cannot vacate, but we can look at sharing.
It does affect in the mid-band our AWACS and other command and
control assets, and it certainly impacts where we are going with
battlefield networks. But we do think that there is a strategy
ahead for sharing.
Senator COTTON. So talk to us a little bit more about what not
vacating but sharing would look like.
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General GOLDFEIN. Meaning we have to operate in that spec-
trum. So there may be ways to parcel and share some portions of
it, but we cannot leave it. There are some that are asking us to
give that up, and that is not something I could ever advise you to
do.
Senator COTTON. Okay.
Secretary Barrett, did you want to——
Secretary BARRETT. I would just say that sharing it has to be—
the only sharing we can do is a sharing where the fidelity of our
signals is not intruded. So what use others would have of it can
only be made where it does not intrude in the signal that we are
using.
Senator COTTON. Any thoughts on the kind of costs we are look-
ing at here?
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, I know that they are taking a look at it.
I have not seen any costs that I could give you yet. We can take
that one for the record, if you like.
Senator COTTON. Yes, please do.
Secretary Barrett, did you want to add?
Secretary BARRETT. No, thank you.
Senator COTTON. One final question that is really on point. Un-
fortunately, some of our allies are moving forward with Huawei
products in developing their 5G wireless systems, even countries
where we have some of your airmen positioned. What are your con-
cerns about their personal and operational security if the countries
in which they are based are developing 5G systems using Huawei
products?
Secretary BARRETT. It is a great disappointment to have allies
that are using Huawei. Alternatively, we have not been forth-
coming with good alternatives to the Huawei system. So we need
to up our game to have as competitive a system, a more competi-
tive system so that we are providing that. But it does put our sig-
nals at risk and our airmen at risk.
Senator COTTON. Yes, I agree. I will say that we have not been
particularly effective at providing alternatives. I mean, we—I
would say the entire West, the United States Government, allied
governments, and our businesses—although I would say in all their
defenses, it is hard to compete against a company like Huawei,
which is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party and enjoys effec-
tively unlimited subsidies. So when our allies are saying things
like, well, we have to go with a reasonable cost provider, the only
reason why Huawei is a reasonable cost provider is not that they
are the best company or they have the brightest minds or most ef-
fective manufacturing techniques. It is because their bills are paid
by the Chinese Communist Party, and that is something that we
as policymakers should take into account when we are trying to
identify possible alternatives.
General, I know this is your last posture hearing. Maybe it will
not be your last hearing. I am sure you hope it is. But if it is not,
it has been an honor to be able to serve with you these last few
years, and we thank you for your service to the Nation.
Senator WICKER. General, we customarily invite retired experts
with a lot of wisdom to come back. So I dare say this will not be
your last hearing, but it will be on a voluntary basis.
253

Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Blumenthal?
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to join in expressing my appreciation and thanks—I am
sure everybody on the Committee shares it—for your extraordinary
service to our Nation and look forward to seeing you back again
voluntarily.
Madam Secretary, I appreciate your focus on PFAS contamina-
tion and leading that effort. Is there a specific budget item for
cleanup involving Air Force bases and facilities?
Secretary BARRETT. Senator Blumenthal, we have spent almost
a half billion dollars in cleanup to date and will continue. I do not
know what the exact number is for this year, but we will continue
that cleanup effort and work with the communities for cleanup.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Maybe you could provide that number.
The second point on this issue. Have you made a recommenda-
tion to the FAA that they eliminate their current requirement, as
I understand it, that PFAS be used in the fire fighting foam on ci-
vilian airports around the country?
Secretary BARRETT. We have not made that recommendation to
the FAA.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Would you make it?
Secretary BARRETT. It looks like something we would look at. Let
me say that.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. I hope you will look at it and
make that recommendation because I think it could be important
in speeding their consideration of ending the PFAS requirement.
I am very interested in the discussion that you had with Senator
Cotton about the classification issue. I will just restate—you may
have heard me say it in our classified briefings—that the American
public needs and deserves to know more so that it can appreciate
the threats to the Nation and what you are doing to address those
threats. I share your view that a lot of the super secret stuff is vi-
tally important. The Nation needs to understand more about it and
I think could well be told more about it without compromising our
security.
I want to go from the super secret to the more mundane at the
Air National Guard in Connecticut where NP–2000 propellers are
currently in use. I am sure you are familiar with this issue because
it is longstanding. The replacement of those legacy propellers is es-
sential to the safety—literally the safety—of the men and women
of our Air National Guard who fly those C–130H aircraft. Can the
replacement of those propellers be expedited and accelerated, Gen-
eral?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, thank you, sir. I will tell you I have been
down there. I have looked at the propeller. I have watched it going
in. It is an excellent propeller. We have, as you know, replaced all
of the pre-1971 C–130H engines with that new propeller. At the
same the same time, on the post-1971, we have adjusted our over-
haul and our depot procedures to cover the safety issues associated
with the older propeller. But we are studying and looking at
whether we want to look at the MP–2000 for expanded use, and
we look forward to working with you on that.
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Senator BLUMENTHAL. I hope that we can follow up on that issue.
I do not have time to cover it fully here, but I hope that we can
talk more about it.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. On again the Air National Guard at Brad-
ley, as you may know, $60 million has been invested in that Air
National Guard base, and yet the C–130H modernization is going
to be impaired by the diversion of $169 million going to the border
wall instead of two cargo planes for that base. I want to know what
can be done to overcome the obstacles that are created. These ob-
stacles are presented in longer form by letter that I have received
from General Evon of our Connecticut Air National Guard, the act-
ing general. I would like to put it in the record if there is no objec-
tion, Mr. Chairman.
Senator WICKER. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
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Senator BLUMENTHAL. I am sure you are familiar with the situa-
tion. So I would like to ask you what is the impact of diverting
$169 million of C–130J procurement.
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, we are working through all of the mitiga-
tion efforts relative to the money that has gone towards the wall.
I think the best I could tell you is that when the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs was asked to describe the impact, his answer was this
amount of dollars relative to the strategic, immediate defense of
the Nation did not have a significant impact I believe were his
words. That is where we as Joint Chiefs are now relative to that
issue.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Finally, although my time has expired, I
would like to ask a question for the record, not to be answered here
but in writing, about also the impact on the F–35 program of ap-
parently diverting money from the 48 F–35’s requested in the
budget. I know that you put 12 additional F–35 aircraft on the un-
funded priorities list. I think that we need to explore what the im-
pact is going to be on procurement timelines in that program. Sen-
ator Reed has rightly raised the issue of the sustainment costs, but
the building and manufacturing costs I think also need to be con-
sidered.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, and we will
look forward to that answer on the record.
Senator Ernst?
Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Secretary Barrett. Good to see you as always. Gen-
eral Goldfein, thank you very much for your service. We certainly
do appreciate it.
As we just spoke, General Goldfein, I would like to address the
issue of the KC–135’s. A lot of discussion here today about the 46’s
and the 135’s, and I would like for you to state just so the folks
back home in Iowa understand where we sit. The 185th Air Na-
tional Guard, the air refueling wing is one of the highest per-
forming units in all of the Air National Guard. If you could just ex-
plain for those folks where they sit with their KC–135’s, and at this
point, we are a little bit thankful we do not have the 46’s right
now. So thank you.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. I can tell you that there will be
no impact or no change to the 185th in terms of the 135’s relative
to the planned retirements.
Senator ERNST. Okay. Thank you very much for that. We dis-
cussed that with TRANSCOM last week as well. I think many of
us are very, very concerned about that, and then how we do get to
a point where we are transitioning to those 46’s. That is yet to be
seen, but we do appreciate your attention to that matter.
Secretary Barrett, we are in an exciting time where we have a
lot of new and emerging technologies out there, and these tech-
nologies can augment our Air Force capabilities, which will help us
anticipate and respond to various threats. We are pretty lucky that
tech development in our civilian sector has boomed, and the Air
Force now has a new way of taking a look at some of this tech-
nology, and as we move into acquisitions. It is kind of like an Air
Force Shark Tank. Can you maybe tell us a little bit about that
257

and how that is developing and how we are able to see some of
those technologies and apply them to today’s modern Air Force?
Secretary BARRETT. Thank you very much, Senator. In fact, just
last week I participated as a judge—we both participated as judges
in Spark Tank, which was an evaluation of innovations that mem-
bers of the air staff throughout the Air Force had come forward
with ideas that were money saving or new inventions, new capa-
bilities. That is inside the Air Force.
In addition, we are working very closely with pitch days for busi-
nesses and innovations outside of the Air Force.
Both of these are developments, ideas from the creative mind of
Dr. Will Roper in acquisitions to think of ways of inspiring innova-
tion and creativity and rewarding people that are initiating new
ideas. So both internally within the Air Force, externally to small
companies outside who have maybe in the past found doing busi-
ness with the Department of Defense daunting but are excited
about presenting their technologies, and instead of having months
and years to get a contract with the Defense Department, one par-
ticipant described it as they can get a contract from the Defense
Department faster than they can order a beer in New York City.
So there are some new processes that inspire people to want to do
business with the Defense Department especially with new tech-
nologies and innovations.
Senator ERNST. That is outstanding. Can you describe some of
the businesses that are taking advantage? Are they large busi-
nesses, small businesses?
Secretary BARRETT. These are almost all very small businesses.
They are small businesses with good ideas.
The internal ones were people that saw damage being done to
equipment and to stores and figuring out a way of loading cargo
aircraft without doing damage, people that saw in test ranges the
ability to move the threat that had been positioned—there were
four standing threats but much easier, much better training if they
can move those threats. There were a number of great ideas of
ways to make the training better, cut costs, reduce waste, and have
a better Air Force.
Senator ERNST. So you do believe this is a positive step forward.
Secretary BARRETT. Absolutely.
Senator ERNST. Fantastic.
Just very briefly, General Goldfein, autonomy. We have been dis-
cussing this with your colleagues in the Navy as well. The Air
Force labs also do great work in this area. Can you briefly—very
briefly—explain some of the technologies we are seeing come from
that?
General GOLDFEIN. I will describe one very quickly, Skyborg,
which is the Valkyrie drone system that we use successfully. In the
upcoming demonstration in April, we are going to use it to be a
universal translator between fifth generation capability in Navy
and Army, and so Loyal Wingman technology where the manned
platform and the unmanned platform are actually working as a
team is where our future lies.
Senator ERNST. Excellent. My time has expired, but I would love
to visit more about that at another point. Thank you, General
Goldfein, for your service. We certainly do appreciate it.
258

Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Heinrich?
Senator HEINRICH. Secretary, General, Space Force Vice Com-
mander Lieutenant General David Thompson recently indicated
that the U.S. Space Force will propose the consolidation of current
space acquisition organizations under an entity called Space Sys-
tems Command. As you are aware, Congress specifically mandated
that the Space Rapid Capabilities Office act as an independent
agency. We did that to ensure that it continues to be able to adapt
and innovate quickly.
What consequences would this kind of consolidation have on the
organization’s ability to innovate as Congress intended?
Secretary BARRETT. Our mission will be to design the systems so
that we optimize creativity and adoption of technology in the use
of our space assets.
Senator HEINRICH. So I am sorry. Say that again.
Secretary BARRETT. We will be designing things with that intent
to have optimized technology for our space resources.
Senator HEINRICH. So you think by consolidating Space RCO into
this broader capabilities office, you are actually going to be improv-
ing their ability to——
Secretary BARRETT. So I am not speaking to specifically that con-
solidation, with which I am not really familiar.
Senator HEINRICH. Because my concern is that one of the reasons
why Congress has historically—General, do you want to jump in
here?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir.
Senator HEINRICH. We have been trying to protect this entity be-
cause it innovates quickly, and bureaucracy has a tendency to want
to swallow things that innovate quickly.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. Amen.
The Secretary’s direction to us has been crystal clear. While
there will be a lot of discussions about administrivia and bureauc-
racy, our job is to deliver capability and deliver it fast at the speed
of relevance because that is exactly what the threat countries are
doing. Space RCO, as designed—and you had a huge hand in put-
ting that together—needs to stay independent and it needs to be
able to move fast without a lot of lines and boxes that all get a
chance to vote on what they are doing. So we specifically built that
on the model of our Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, same board
procedures, same authorities to move fast, and so we want to keep
it independent.
Senator HEINRICH. That was the answer I was hoping I might
hear.
I want to move on to PFAS, and, Secretary Barrett, I do not
know how to say this other than I am—you know, I heard you ear-
lier say that you are working with communities. But in the case
of Clovis, New Mexico, I am sort of beyond frustrated by the utter
lack of communication and any level of coordination at this point
between Air Force leadership and local government elected officials
for the City of Clovis. We recently received a response letter to the
entire delegation. It was wholly inadequate. This is a community
that has bent over backwards for decades with great pride to host
259

the Air Force in their community, and they feel like they are get-
ting absolutely stonewalled right now.
So I want to ask you if I can have your commitment that you
will direct whoever the appropriate Air Force personnel are to es-
tablish direct communications with local officials in Clovis to work
together to remedy the PFAS situation there.
Secretary BARRETT. You have my commitment.
Senator HEINRICH. Thank you very much.
I also want to ask you with regard to the authorities that were
given to the Air Force in the most recent NDAA, if you will work
with New Mexico and State and local officials to find a permanent
PFAS solution and actually use those authorities that Congress
gave the Air Force in the NDAA.
Secretary BARRETT. We are doing research now and will continue
to do that. It is a Navy lead, but the Air Force is working it as
well.
Senator HEINRICH. Because one of the things we did when this
issue popped up is ask the former Secretary, you know, what can
you do and what can you not do. She was very blunt about what
she could not do. We changed much of that in the NDAA, and we
would like to see you use those authorities.
I want to move on to MQ–9’s, and Congress obviously appro-
priated a lot of money for MQ–9 training. That money was taken
by the President to pay for a third century technology being de-
ployed along our southern border. I want to know what the plan
is because these folks are training in very substandard conditions
over a sinkhole in a building that could not pass code enforcement
in a third world country.
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, we are working through the mitigation
right now. As you know, it has been fairly recent that we are work-
ing our way through this.
I just go back to the question we were asked as Joint Chiefs,
which is describe the impact relative to defend the Nation and the
immediate significant strategic impacts. That is where the Chair-
man gave his answer, and so that is where the Joint Chiefs are
right now.
Senator HEINRICH. Yes. I understand the strategic impacts. I
think it is just reprehensible when you walk through that facility
to see our best and brightest training in a facility that is not safe,
that you could not get to pass code in any community in the United
States, where there is duck tape on the walls, and these are our
best and brightest.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Heinrich.
Senator Cramer?
Senator CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for being here and both of you for your serv-
ice. A special thank you to General Goldfein again. I never ceased
being amazed at the talent that replaces really good talent, but I
also never cease being concerned by the loss of excellent talent. I
am concerned but grateful to you for your service.
Also thank you for last week. I did take advantage of the invita-
tion to participate in the classified discussion, and I would encour-
age all of my colleagues who have not taken advantage of that to
260

do that. It was very helpful. It created a lot of answers but a lot
of questions as well.
So with that in mind, I am just throwing a few of them and let
each of you respond, if you will.
With regard to the here-to-there strategy—and you referenced I
think quoting General Mattis the ‘‘risk’’ word and talked a little bit
about it. But my specific parochial interest, of course, is the ISR
mission specifically, the Global Hawk wing at Grand Forks, to
some degree as well the MQ–9’s, but particularly the Global Hawk
wing at Grand Forks and the retirement of the block 20s and block
30s at Beale and how that affects the folks in Grand Forks and in
North Dakota and would love to hear anything you can tell us and
tell them about the future of that base and its mission.
Also, while you are talking about that, maybe ask the question
about the Arctic and the Arctic fight. We have had a lot of discus-
sions in this room, with others as well, but I would give you the
opportunity as well to maybe give us some insight into what is
being planned.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. I will do ISR and then the Secretary
will take Arctic.
On the ISR portfolio, so as you saw when we sat down, there are
certain capabilities that we are bringing together in a classified
realm and we are connecting capabilities that today are not con-
nected. Because almost every platform out there, whether it flies,
orbits, submerges, runs, rolls, it is a sensor. But we have not been
able to tie together those sensors to be able to fuse data in ways
that can make this common operational picture, and so now, as we
tie things together, we are finding that we get far greater fidelity
on what it is that we are doing. So a combination of space capabili-
ties, you know, missions that we are doing in the air today that we
are migrating into space, classified capabilities, and pulling these
all together with common digital engineering and common data ar-
chitecture is actually improving our ISR and allow us now to take
some risk when it comes to individual platforms. That is our strat-
egy for the future.
Senator CRAMER. So can you expand a little bit then on what the
future to Grand Forks specifically may look like in light of this?
General GOLDFEIN. So what you will see in this budget is the re-
tirement of the older Global Hawks, and with all of these, we want
to make sure that we work with the communities and with you, sir,
and with all of the Senators to make sure that we minimize impact
on the base as we go forward because Grand Forks, like many
other bases, is key strategic terrain. It is key to the Arctic strategy
because of its location. It also supports some of our ground-based
intercept radar feeds that are so important to us. So we want to
make sure we mitigate the impacts to Grand Forks.
Senator CRAMER. Madam Secretary?
Secretary BARRETT. The Arctic is of increasing importance to the
United States, and it has been important for a long time, but ever
more increasing now. As a result, the Arctic strategy is a key ele-
ment of the Air Force and the Department of Defense’s effort, but
the Air Force more than other elements because 80 percent of the
Arctic defense is provided by the Air Force or Department of Air
Force elements.
261

So you know from my background, I have paid quite a bit of at-
tention to the Arctic. One of my first visits was to Thule. I spent
time in Finland and later this week, I will be visiting the Minot
operations and later this month be in Alaska also looking at those
facilities. So it is a very important topic and of increasing impor-
tance to us.
Senator CRAMER. Thank you.
In my remaining seconds, I might just ask in general as we look
at the DOD budget—and I know you have a heart for a discussion
about the pass-through part of your budget and how that may work
and how people view the budget. I mean, the Air Force always
seems to me, with its being the tip of the spear and the highest
priority in DOD operations, to sort of be at the short end of the
stick budget-wise. I mean, are you generally satisfied with what we
have in terms of the entire budget for the Air Force?
Secretary BARRETT. Well, we have to live within the top line, so
we have had to make a lot of trades that we wish we would not
have to. The pass-through is an especially disconcerting matter be-
cause it does create a misperception. We are looking at that as
something that we will come to Congress with a proposal in the
next budget on how that should be treated in recognition of a Space
Force and the reconstruction that will be occurring through the De-
partment of the Air Force.
Senator CRAMER. It is a conversation whose time has come.
Thank you.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator Peters?
Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses, thank you for your testimony today. General
Goldfein, I would like to join some of my colleagues in wishing you
all the best in the years ahead. It has been a pleasure working
with you these past years, and we will look forward to your next
adventure, whatever that may be.
Secretary Barrett, I would like to discuss the issue of PFAS with
you, as several of my colleagues have mentioned. As you know,
PFAS is very dangerous to human health, and the contamination
has been identified at the former Air Force base at Wurtsmith in
Oscoda, Michigan. It is something you and I have discussed many
times in my office, and I appreciate your openness to that discus-
sion. Also, I have discussed this with Assistant Secretary Hender-
son who visited the former base on my invitation, and we have also
discussed it a great deal.
I want to just say I appreciate your recent letter confirming the
little over $13 million will be going towards cleanup at Wurtsmith.
That is $13 million out of the $60 million that we appropriated for
the country. So I appreciate that commitment to the former base.
My question to you is, could you provide me an update on how
the remediation money is going to be spent and will that have an
impact on the timeline at the former Wurtsmith Air Force Base?
Secretary BARRETT. Senator, I do not know the sequence of the
spending and the impact on Wurtsmith. But I know that we are
working closely with the communities. Our mission is to preserve
and protect the safety and health and to involve all of government
262

so that we have solutions that engage with the needs of the com-
munity as well.
Senator PETERS. Well, if I may ask if you could have someone get
back to us as to specifically how you see that money spent and
what the timeline would be, it certainly would be very much appre-
ciated by the community. The community appreciates the addi-
tional resources and they are anxious to see what the details are
regarding the money.
Secretary Barrett, I also would like to talk to you a little bit
about the F–35 basing decision, something we have also talked
about a great deal, and the basing of F–35’s at the Selfridge Air
National Guard Base in Michigan. Since we have been in these dis-
cussions, President Trump has made a number of comments, and
I would like to get an update, if I could, from you. President Trump
recently said—and I am going to quote from President Trump—and
that is why we are giving strong consideration to deploying some
of our mighty F–35’s to Selfridge Air National Guard Base, and you
know what that means. Right? You know what that means. That
is a big deal.
He goes on to say, quote, so Selfridge, you are going to see a lot
of very fast planes. Actually they are totally stealth. So maybe you
will not see them coming in. Okay? You will not see them come in
but they are coming in. End of quote.
That certainly got a lot of folks very interested in Macomb Coun-
ty especially in Michigan, and I know the Air Force recently final-
ized the environmental impact statement relating to the basing de-
cision. So I know the choice is with you.
If you could just provide us an update on the Air National
Guard’s F–35 basing process, where we are on it.
Secretary BARRETT. I think as we have discussed, there is a very
deliberate process with criteria and a down select process. We are
in that process now, and therefore it is inappropriate for me to go
into detail about the participants in the search. But we are going
through a very deliberative and pre-established and approved. That
does include an evaluation of the environmental impact, the costs
that are going to be required, the facilities that are there, and we
are looking at the community interest and involvement.
Senator PETERS. The environmental impact study has been final-
ized, so you are well down the path.
Secretary BARRETT. Yes, and comparing those of the various con-
testant bases.
Senator PETERS. Thank you.
The last question. I am concerned about the recent reprogram-
ming of the $1.3 billion from the National Guard and Reserve
equipment account that was reprogrammed to support the con-
struction of the southern border wall. As both of you know, that
funding provides the National Guard resources to mitigate key
readiness shortfalls. Two specific programs that benefit from those
funds that are being shifted to the southern wall are MQ–9 up-
grades to support domestic operations and the KC–135 modification
to improve survivability. Those are two platforms that we have in
Michigan. The 127th wing operates eight KC–135’s. The 110th
wing supports MQ–9. They are both, as we discussed here today al-
263

ready, in high demand and play a very, very important role in na-
tional defense. It makes me skeptical as to the impact on readiness.
Will the Air Force reprioritize how it approaches National Guard
modernization priorities when these funds have been repro-
grammed away from key National Guard units?
Secretary BARRETT. Senator, we will be evaluating the impact.
All of the deferred projects are important, but the President’s has
declared an emergency on the southern border. The Chairman has
indicated there is no immediate, significant strategic diminution of
readiness as a result of this transition. But the application of reas-
signing the resources is—nothing further is expected beyond what
has been announced.
Senator PETERS. I am out of time. Thank you.
Senator WICKER. Senator McSally? I am sorry. Senator Perdue
scooted away from the dais, and I was looking for you.
Senator PERDUE. Well, first of all, I have used 5 seconds now al-
ready.
Senator WICKER. Reset the clock.
Senator PERDUE. I want these two to know—I am going to say
this for the public record. They know personally privately how
much I personally think of each of them in their careers and appre-
ciate so much each of them individually. You guys are at the turn-
ing point in the U.S. military right now in so many ways.
I just have three issues I want to get at real quick, but just two
quick questions. One is I think this whole thing that you are in the
middle of, this transition, is what we have already said, visible cur-
rent capability versus classified replacement capability. Obsoles-
cence—we know we have maturing assets all over the Air Force.
I am very concerned about one specific thing I will get in just a sec-
ond.
The second thing, in terms of the JSTARS capability moving to
an ABMS, picking up—ABMS capability picking up the JSTARS
capability, is this whole development of new technology versus an
old acquisition structure. You got AI in here, and AI, as I under-
stand it—it is machine learning, so the more data you give it, the
faster it learns. Well, that does not necessarily fit an acquisition
structure.
So Will Roper just recently—he is the Acquisition Chief, as you
know, Chief. We have come so far in ABMS, that we realize it is
bigger than just replacing the capability that JSTARS provides. If
get ABMS is right, you just built the military’s Internet of Things.
That is super exciting, et cetera. But this does not fit the traditional
acquisition structure.
The third thing is how do we interact. Given all of that, Congress
is funding—we have an oversight called the NDAA. We try to give
direction. We do not want to become bureaucratic. But right now,
I am very concerned. So in the first few months, you have had one
demonstration in December. You got another one coming in April.
My concern is in the first two gates we had—I think it was August
30th or somewhere in there—the AOA was to be completed. Within
6 months after that, Secretary, you are to give us an update, as I
understand that. Now, I understand this is somewhat fast moving.
The next thing is a briefing in January of some sort here.
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I realize this is a classified topic but, Secretary, I need your com-
mitment today that the Air Force will abide by the current NDAA,
the public law that exists today that relates to JSTARS and ABMS,
specifically section 236 and section 147, and that we can expect to
receive the AOA, or analysis of alternatives, and the capability de-
velopment document. Can you commit to that today?
Secretary BARRETT. I am not confident that I can commit to it
today, but we will evaluate it. May I get back with you even later
today?
Senator PERDUE. Well, absolutely, but what we are talking about
is a new NDAA. We are preparing for the new NDAA. So if
changes need to be made to the structure of oversight, now is the
time. You are new in this. This is your first cycle. It is the Chief’s
last cycle. So we have got the best of both worlds here, but let us
get this right, because this cannot be an acquisition process that
we wake up in 3 years and realize it is 3X in cost and 10 years
late, just to be blunt. It’s really unacceptable that we do not get
these reports on time when we have asked for that and we had
commitments of predecessors to do that.
The second thing, Chief, the events that we are doing now, the
demonstrations, the capability that JSTARS has—the two I am
concerned about is GMTI, ground-moving target indicators, as you
have spoken before about, and then battle management. We get
some feedback from other services that, well, we are headed in the
wrong direction or we need to adapt this. Can you talk about spe-
cifically those two capabilities, and then what does that mean in
terms of the organic force structure at Robbins to help facilitate the
headquarters development there of ABMS?
General GOLDFEIN. Sure. I will hit the last part first. There is
no intent to reduce the size of the force at Robbins, and we are
committed to working with you on that.
Senator PERDUE. I apologize to interrupt. But you are talking
about the force of JSTARS, and there is a gap as JSTARS matures
out and you replace it with ABMS, there is a gap of capability. We
know it exists today. But in terms of organic force structure, I ac-
cept your answer. I appreciate that. Can you address the other part
of that?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. But to the gap, once we determined
that we could fly Joint STARS well into the late 2020s and into
2030, that actually filled the gap. So this whole plan is to ensure
there is no gap because there can be no gap for the warfighter.
Senator PERDUE. Very good.
General GOLDFEIN. But we have to ensure that we can get them
this information on day one of the fight, which you were very help-
ful.
What we are trying to do here is incredibly disruptive, and it is
disruptive in the eyes of the adversary. What we did to bring on
a new way—this goes to your point about the current acquisition
system. We brought in 12 pioneers from industry and put them on
the advanced battle management system. We have the designer of
Uber on our payroll, and so we are using industry’s best practices,
and industry is in here with us doing this.
The next demonstration we are going to do at Nellis Air Force
Base where all the Joint Chiefs will go to it, we are going to be
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doing live fly connective capability at Yuma, at Eglin, off the shore,
at White Sands, at Nellis Air Force Base. We are going to have
three supported commanders, and we are going to have a number
of firsts. If we do this right, about 60 percent of it will work.
Senator PERDUE. So will the next demonstration have GMTI and
battle management demonstrated in that demonstration?
General GOLDFEIN. It will but it will do it, not from where we
want to eventually take it. It will do it in an interim step.
Senator PERDUE. Yes, sir.
General GOLDFEIN. I will just leave it at that.
Senator PERDUE. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Perdue.
Next is Senator Hirono.
Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I add my thanks to you, General, for your service and my best
wishes on your impending retirement.
Madam Secretary, I was pleased to hear about your pitch days
where you encourage small businesses to pitch their ideas. Where
do these pitch days occur?
Secretary BARRETT. They have been taking place around the
country. I attended one in San Francisco. They are in a variety of
cities around the country.
Senator HIRONO. Nothing in Hawaii yet.
Secretary BARRETT. Not that I know of.
Senator HIRONO. Think about that.
Secretary BARRETT. Yes, I will put that on the list.
Senator HIRONO. I want to add my concerns to those expressed
by some of my colleagues about the reprogramming of DOD money
to go to the wall on the southern border. So I just want to express
that. At some point, I think it does have a negative impact on read-
iness and other aspects of what the DOD is supposed to be focused
on.
Madam Secretary, the National Defense Strategy highlights
great power competition with China and Russia and it includes
North Korea, Iran, and transnational violent extremism. Four of
these five threats are in the Indo-Pacific AOR. I am glad to see the
focus on the region given its growing importance to our national se-
curity.
What concerns you most with regard to the Indo-Pacific region
as the Secretary of the Air Force?
Secretary BARRETT. A key issue there is the vastness of the terri-
tory, and logistics, being prepared to position, station our capabili-
ties through that area.
Senator HIRONO. Yes. It is the biggest AOR.
Do you believe then that additional assets and investments are
needed for the Air Force to maintain its competitive advantage
against our adversaries in this part of the region—or this part of
the world?
Secretary BARRETT. There is a significant review of how we are
positioned for the greater peer threat.
Senator HIRONO. When is that review going to——
Secretary BARRETT. I think there is continual review.
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Senator HIRONO. So do you think that this review will result in
more concentration of certain assets in the Indo-Pacific Command
area?
Secretary BARRETT. I do not want to predict the outcome of it,
but I would anticipate that the realities will be a significant part
of how those assets will be decided.
Senator HIRONO. I hope so. General, do you agree?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. So the Chairman is leading us
through global integrated exercises that is looking at global cam-
paigns because a China or a Russia campaign will not be confined
within that geographic area of responsibility. So we are working
our way through what does the command and control look like
which is why this JADC2 is so important for how we look at this
new way of warfighting going forward. We are doing that review
now.
Senator HIRONO. Thank you.
This is for Secretary Barrett. Last fall, the Air Force indicated
Barking Sands, a specific missile range facility, in Kauai as the
preferred location for a Pacific-based space controlled squadron op-
erated by the Hawaii Air National Guard. I have not heard much
else since that initial announcement. Can you advise what the sta-
tus of the space controlled squadron is and when will the unit be
activated?
Secretary BARRETT. Senator, I do not know the answer to that.
May I get back with you?
Senator HIRONO. Yes, thank you.
So for both of you, as the Air Force prepares for a future possi-
bility of conflict with a near-peer adversary, I understand you are
investing in agile combat employment where you would launch, re-
cover, and maintain aircraft away from main bases using partner
nations, military fields, or civilian airfields. Secretary Barrett,
what nations in the Pacific theater, if any, have been approached
thus far as possible locations for these agile combat employment
teams and assets? Or if the General would like to respond.
General GOLDFEIN. Well, I would just say we are really blessed
that my successor has been nominated publicly, and that is Gen-
eral Brown. This is his concept of operations that he will no doubt,
if confirmed, bring into the seat. I actually went to his Pacific Air
Chiefs conference, and this was a central topic of discussion. I will
tell you that from the Philippines to Singapore to—I mean, I could
go around the region, and all of them are talking about this new
concept of employment.
Senator HIRONO. Great. We will have an opportunity to talk with
General Brown about that.
General Goldfein, what are your thoughts on having the C–17’s
at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam under operational control of
INDOPACOM versus TRANSCOM?
General GOLDFEIN. I think the decision has been made to actu-
ally chop all of the strategic lift to TRANSCOM for the purposes
of global mobility. This is part of the global integrated exercise. We
have just been working through this as well in Central Command
as well. So TRANSCOM through the last directive from the Chair-
man has been given operational control of strategic lift. You know,
General Lyons is the one that manages that for the globe.
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Senator HIRONO. I do have some questions for the record relating
to how we are dealing with the issues of suicide and sexual harass-
ment. So I will submit those for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Hirono. We will look for-
ward to those answers on the record.
Senator McSally?
Senator MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you both again and thanks for your service. I appre-
ciate all you are doing to ensure our Air Force is ready for the high
end fight, but we also have an obligation when our troops are on
the ground to have the best capability overhead for combat search
and rescue and close air support. So on to our beloved A–10.
General Goldfein, is the Air Force committed to complying with
all laws on the books and the intent of Congress related to the A–
10?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am, we are.
Senator MCSALLY. Thanks.
When I first got to Congress, if they had gotten their way in the
last administration, we would have no A–10s flying right now. So
we stopped that in fiscal year 2016. In fiscal year 2017, I took a
different approach. I said we need to make sure that we think
about this as we develop the F–35 and we have a thoughtful se-
quential approach.
So we required in section 134 of the fiscal year 2017 NDAA two
reports. I wrote this and it made it into law. The first was for the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to submit the F–35
IOT&E report to Congress and to you. Then the second was a re-
port by the Secretary of the Air Force specifically after the IOT&E
report was delivered, not later than 180 days—and I am going to
read this—the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to Congress
and the defense Committees a report that includes the views of the
Secretary with respect to this report, including any issues or con-
cerns—I am kind of summarizing here—a plan for addressing any
deficiencies, carrying out the corrective actions, and the short-term
and long-term strategies for preserving capability of close air sup-
port and combat search and rescue.
This also included the fly-off competition that I mandated, and
that has been conducted between the A–10 and the F–35.
So the final paragraph in that fiscal year 2017 NDAA says, the
Secretary of the Air Force may not retire, prepare to retire, or
place in storage or on back-up aircraft inventory any A–10 air-
craft—any A–10 aircraft—until a period of 90 days has elapsed fol-
lowing the report, the second report.
So, first, IOT&E after the fly-off competition, then the Secretary
of the Air Force report. No A–10 can even be planned to be put into
storage. I wanted to add ‘‘thought about,’’ but we could not enforce
that. But I think you get the point.
The question is—and these are just kind of yes and no, General
Goldfein, have you received the initial operation test evaluation re-
port for the F–35?
General GOLDFEIN. No, ma’am.
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Senator MCSALLY. Neither have we, so you have not been able
to then inform any planning by the Secretary for the second report
because we do not yet have the first report. Right?
General GOLDFEIN. Correct.
Senator MCSALLY. So this Committee and the Air Force does not
have any plan for addressing deficiencies potentially from the
IOT&E report.
General GOLDFEIN. Correct.
Senator MCSALLY. And also we do not have the plan for correc-
tive action. Right?
Finally, neither the Air Force or the Committee has the Air
Force’s short-term and long-term strategies for preserving close air
support and combat search and rescue. Correct?
General GOLDFEIN. Right.
Senator MCSALLY. So based on your answers and based on the
law we wrote, I just think it is premature to plan to retire even
one A–10, never mind the 44 that are planned to retire in this
year’s budget. So how do you justify the planning starting for this
when we have not met the intent of the law yet?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. The DOT&E report—the fly-off
is complete. They are holding that report until they deliberate. The
director informed me that he would deliver that to this Committee
in September, the first month of the fiscal year. We understand the
timeline that is in the law, and we will absolutely comply with the
law.
What we put in the budget was where we will need to work with
you on because—and the question is timing, as you brought up.
Will there be time in that fiscal year to be able to move forward
on any retirements and still be in compliance with the law? So that
was our thinking.
Senator MCSALLY. Yes, I got it. Look, we made it, I thought, very
clear, like we should not even start having a conversation to plan
anything related to the floor we have of the number of A–10 now
until this is all complete. What is your plan going forward related
to the A–10?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. I will tell you straight up. You
saved the A–10. Nobody else can make that claim, and as a result
of your efforts and the efforts of this Committee, we are putting al-
most a billion dollars into the A–10. We are going to be doing the
wings, the avionics, the radios, and we are going to keep that air-
plane in the inventory flying well into the 2030s.
The challenge we faced is what I said in my opening statement,
which is we have to transition to the future while we are con-
tinuing to apply fire power against the current fight. There is no
better weapon system to do that than the A–10. So the investment
that we are making is a good investment. We just got to take a
look at what the cost would be if we keep the entire fleet, and that
is what we have got to work with you on to do that.
Senator MCSALLY. And we will. Thanks.
In my remaining time, I want to talk about the President re-
cently reprogrammed resources. Look, as a veteran, as a border
Senator, we need to support our military and secure our border.
These should not be choices and obstruction to stop happening.
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But I want to specifically ask about the F–35, the money that is
being reprogrammed. We plused up from your 48, we plused up 14,
so we funded 62. What is the impact on the Air Force F–35 and
specifically any impact to Luke Air Force Base?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am. There will be no impact to Luke
Air Force Base. The money that was diverted was for long lead
items for aircraft that actually did not come through in the budget.
So we put 12 in the unfunded request for this year, but that was
long lead items for certain parts. It was not procurement for the
aircraft. So no impact on Luke.
Senator MCSALLY. So we are still going to have 62 come off the
production line this year.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, ma’am.
Senator MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator McSally.
General, did your attorneys advise you that you are compliant
with Senator McSally’s provisions in the NDAA with regard to the
A–10?
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, they did, and they did that based on
again time. The fact that the report that Senator McSally is refer-
ring to was going to be delivered in the first month of the fiscal
year and the number of months ahead of that, there was time to
work with this Committee on the retirement of those aircraft in
this timeline.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, and thank you, Senator McSally.
Senator Manchin?
Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank both of you for your service and congratulations on your
retirement, General. Some day I hope to be there.
Anyway, as you can imagine, the 13 States that qualify for the
C–130J recapitalization as appropriated in fiscal year 2017 and
2019 are eager to hear where the Air Force is in this process. Our
staffs were told in November we would get some kind of an update
this winter. It has not come yet.
In the meantime, I have inquired about the Air Force’s strategic
basing scoring process for the decision both because I am interested
from an oversight perspective and as someone who has to prioritize
what I push for as an authorizer and an appropriator. I asked the
Air Force if Congress would be allowed to know the score of its Na-
tional Guard location particularly as it relates to others, and I was
told no. The Air Force responded to my request for information the
strategic basing process uses score sheets to determine a location’s
viability for a basing bed-down decision.
However, the score sheets alone do not provide the full context
of decision criteria and are no longer used in the basing process
once candidate locations have been selected. Once selected, site sur-
veys are conducted in each candidate location as part of the holistic
assessment of its suitability. The Secretary of the Air Force also
leverages inputs from Air Force corporate leaders, Chief of Staff,
and military judgment.
I understand what you need to do what is best for the Air Force,
and we all need to support you to do what is best for the Air Force,
and I am not one who ascribes, just because I have something in
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my State, that is the best. If they are not performing, I am the first
to say either get with it or get out of it.
So with that being said, I am very proud of the 130th air wing
in Charleston where we score really high on the score sheet, but
might not be selected. So I want to make sure that we have a fair
shot at this.
So my question to you, Madam Secretary, is the Air Force needs
to show its work. Do you understand the Air Force process limiting
my ability to do oversight? Do you think it is too subjective what
I am asking in response?
Secretary BARRETT. Senator, the process is a complex one and
goes through a variety of criteria, some of which are not easily
measurable in quantifiable terms.
Senator MANCHIN. If I could just say—I do not mean to interrupt
you, but time is limited. In that, I know any type of performance
is based on past performance, how well the readiness, mainte-
nance, being able to complete the missions, and that is what I
think to me would be at the top of the list of looking if they have
been performing, not just saying I am going to do it better if you
do this for me, but have they performed in the past. We are hoping
that is a high score too, but we would like to see that.
Secretary BARRETT. Past performance is deeply valued, and West
Virginian’s demonstrated their ability to produce and perform. So
we appreciate it very much.
The criteria are spelled out for the initial cut, and then there are
site visits and things that are lot less——
Senator MANCHIN. Will we be able to see any of that as an appro-
priator and as legislators? Will be able to see the process you are
going through, or is that not available?
Secretary BARRETT. I do not know whether it has been made
available in the past, but I would be happy to take a look——
Senator MANCHIN. Would you consider that? Maybe you could get
back with me on that?
Secretary BARRETT. I would be happy to.
Senator MANCHIN. First of all, I want to say I am for the wall.
I am just not for the executive branch appropriating money as they
see fit, and here is my concern. What really angers me is the $1.3
billion cut from the National Guard and Reserve equipment ac-
count; $205 million, which is cut from the Air Force Reserve; $395
million cut from the Air National Guard.
So, Secretary, I would ask you, did you agree to the reprogram-
ming request or were you involved in that decision?
Secretary BARRETT. The Air Force worked with the Department
of Defense to minimize the disruption that would be caused by the
reappropriation of those funds.
Senator MANCHIN. Were Governors and the TAGs—were they
consulted on the reprogramming?
Senator MANCHIN. I do not think they were.
Senator MANCHIN. Yes, I do not think so. From what we are
hearing, they were not either.
The reprogramming of the $365 million. That is four fewer C–
130J’s for fiscal year 2020, affect the ability to support
TRANSCOM airlift missions in the event of a conflict. It really puts
us in jeopardy and behind the 8 ball there because we are flying
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0–H’s now, and we are hoping that you are going to refurbish them
with new avionics, propellers, and engines and things that need to
be done. We are behind. I am really concerned about this.
General, you might want to state on that I guess. What are your
plans to ensure there are no gaps in readiness?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. I will tell you that we are right now
still working through the impacts. The Chairman was asked to give
his assessment of the impacts on not only readiness but the stra-
tegic ability to defend the Nation, and I think you saw his response
and that is where the Joint Chiefs are.
Senator MANCHIN. Well, there is no doubt there is going to be an
impact. We all know that. How severe is going to be—we will be
back here next year, if money is taken again from what we appro-
priate, we go through and do our job, and then all of a sudden it
vanishes and we are back to square one again. I do not have a
problem voting for the wall. I sure have a problem with money
being taken for what is needed for us to defend our country.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
Senator Hawley?
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, General, thank you for being here. Thank you
for your service.
General, let me start with you. My home State of Missouri is
very excited and proud to receive the B–21, which will form a crit-
ical part of our nuclear triad and also our conventional global
strike capability.
Let me ask you this, how do you envision the B–21 helping to
defeat a Chinese fait accompli scenario involving Taiwan when you
consider both its nuclear and its conventional capabilities?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. You know, very often I tell my slide
builders, the next slide I see that has a big red dome over China
or Russia, I am going to execute choke on on the slide builder.
China cannot put a big red block of wood over itself. It can put a
block of Swiss cheese over itself, and our job is to know where the
holes are and how to get in and how to hold targets at risk. That
is what the B–21 does.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you about the number. You pre-
viously stated, General, that the Air Force requires at least—I
think your words were—at a minimum 100 B–21’s. You have also
said you are in lockstep with various analyses showing the Air
Force may need more than 100 B–21’s. So give us your best esti-
mate. How many B–21’s does the Air Force actually require to
cover now and above its nuclear and conventional missions?
General GOLDFEIN. Our assessment—and that has been backed
up by independent assessments—is that a moderate risk force is
220 bombers, of which 145 would be B–21’s.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Thank you.
General, Missouri is also home to the 139th airlift wing, which
does incredible work to ensure that the joint force has the tactical
airlift it needs. We are very proud of that as well. Can you tell us
how you see the Air National Guard airlift with units like the
139th enabling distributed operations in the Indo-Pacific and Eu-
rope?
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General GOLDFEIN. That unit, like all of our Guard units—that
is one of the beauties of the way the Air Force is organized. You
know, when I have traveled around as the Air Component Com-
mander in Central Command, I would go to the cockpit of a C–17
or a C–130, and I would say, okay, who is Active, who is Guard,
who is Reserve? And all three hands would go up. Such is the na-
ture of how we are integrated.
We could not do the Nation’s business without our Guard and
Reserve. Could not do it.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you about modernizing the C–130H
and the expanding number of C–130J’s. How might doing those
things for the Air National Guard enable those units to support the
kind of operations we have been talking about?
General GOLDFEIN. Well, both in the C–130J, which is just a phe-
nomenal weapon system—I think we are running out of letters in
the alphabet for the C–130. So the C–130J is just incredible. The
upgrades we are doing on the C–130H with the new avionics is
going to keep that weapon system flying as well.
When we get back to Senator Hirono’s point about agile combat
employment, part of your ability to be able to move to win is your
tactical lift. We are taking a fresh look at where do the C–130’s live
and how do they play relative to being able to move very quickly
around a battlefield. I think that is going to become more impor-
tant as we go forward.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good.
Let me ask you about the LRASM missiles. The fiscal year 2021
budget, General, says the Air Force is planning to buy, I think, 129
LRASMs between now and fiscal year 2025. I am just curious. Does
the Air Force have any other advanced anti-ship weapons in its in-
ventory besides the LRASMs?
General GOLDFEIN. That is the only one I can talk about in the
unclassified realm, and I will tell you, sir, that the munitions story
is actually a really good news story. Based on additional money
that was given to us, we have been able to grow the munitions bins
and some preferred munitions in ways that we have not done for
years. Just to give you an example, in fiscal year 2018, we were
at 44 percent for JDAMs. We are now at 88 percent. Just to give
you an example of how we have done the munitions bins.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you just about the LRASMs in par-
ticular. Considering the vital role that they play, particularly in de-
feating Chinese surface forces, do you think 129 is enough? Do we
need to be buying more?
General GOLDFEIN. We always need to be buying more. Sir, I will
tell you that we balanced that against all the other requirements.
Right now, I will tell you that some of the lowest stock numbers
we have are in air-to-air missiles, and so we have been focusing
there recently.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me ask you—General, shifting topics just
slightly. Over the last 5 years, the Air Force has, I think, pretty
dramatically improved its ability to conduct distributed operations
in the European theater. Is it fair to say that a lot of those im-
provements were made possible by the European Deterrence Initia-
tive? Is that a fair statement?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes.
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Senator HAWLEY. Can you just speak just briefly about how EDI
has helped the Air Force adopt a more resilient posture in Europe?
General GOLDFEIN. So the Army focused on prepositioned stocks.
We focused on access and basing because an air force is expected
in the operational plan to arrive quickly because we can fly into
theater, halt enemy activity, and stabilize the situation for follow-
on activity. So therefore we need bases that we can operate from.
So we put our money into access and basing, and that has allowed
us to have a much larger footprint.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you for that.
I will just say, Mr. Chairman, this is why I continue to believe
that something similar to a dedicated funding stream is vital for
INDOPACOM. Thank you.
Thank you, General. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
Senator King?
Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am not sure to whom to address this question, but I am curious
about $77 million for Space Force OCO. I think of OCO as overseas
contingency operations. Are we 77 million people up in space? I am
just curious. What is the $77 million for OCO for Space Force?
Secretary BARRETT. Well, in just our conference, it seems likely
that is places like Thule, the Arctic. Alaska is considered OCO, so
those would be——
Senator KING. People manning space-related facilities? Is that
what we are talking about?
Secretary BARRETT. So the space-related facilities and the man-
ning of them.
Senator KING. If you could give me a little more robust informa-
tion, I would appreciate it.
Secretary BARRETT. I would be happy to.
Senator KING. Madam Secretary, how are we doing on the
sustainment cost of the F–35? Are we going to be able to afford to
keep it?
Secretary BARRETT. It is one of the topics of great attention. It
is being driven down, but it is, from our perspective, too slowly and
still too high. We have a commitment that by the year 2025, it
would be at $25,000 per hour, and we anticipate that that will be
achieved.
Senator KING. But you continue to make this a priority? It is a
serious ongoing issue. We are not going to be able to sustain this
important asset indefinitely at the kind of costs that we are talking
about now.
Secretary BARRETT. Agreed.
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, if I could jump in as well. I met with the
CEO for Lockheed Martin and all the CEOs who are partners in
this and told them that the current flying hour costs are
unaffordable, and the sustainment enterprise was not scaled to the
size of the fleet. So we worked through about a 3 to 4-month sprint
both with the Joint Program Office and the company, and I went
to Lockheed and walked through all the things they are doing in
the sustainment enterprise. I will tell you that they made some sig-
nificant changes to the point where I am more confident that we
274

are going to be able to drive to that lower flying hour cost than we
were 6 months ago.
Senator KING. Could you supply for the Committee some data
and material on this issue?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir.
Senator KING. Because I think it is one we just do not want to
let it get away from us.
General GOLDFEIN. I would be happy to.
Senator KING. Madam Secretary, I noticed there is an increase
in end strength of about 1,500 people. I hope some of those are
maintenance personnel because I understand that is a bottleneck
in terms of readiness. How are we doing on maintenance personnel,
techs to keep these airplanes flying?
Secretary BARRETT. Historically that has been a confining topic.
Some good news is that in the Active Duty Force, our maintainers
are up to speed. At this point, we are still working on the Guard
and Reserve account.
Senator KING. How are we doing on recruiting? Are you meeting
goals? General?
General GOLDFEIN. We are, sir.
The good news on that on the maintenance is we have actually
filled in what was a 4,000 shortfall. We got that down to zero. We
still have some work to do in the Guard and Reserve on maintain-
ers.
When it comes to recruiting, we are meeting our numbers. One
of the things we have done recently is we have gone to total force
recruiting. We pooled Guard and Reserve and active into one re-
cruiting command, and so now when you go to a strip mall, you do
not see three different storefronts. You see one, United States Air
Force. Because, quite frankly, for the Secretary and I, when a
young man or woman wants to join the Air Force, we do not really
care which component they join. They are joining us.
Senator KING. Because we have an integrated force in reality.
General GOLDFEIN. Because it is an integrated force.
Senator KING. Now, the Army is doing some work on diversifying
the geography of their recruiting. As you know, in New England or
in the northeast, there are very few military facilities left, and we
really do not want the military to be regionalized. Are you attend-
ing to that issue?
General GOLDFEIN. We are, sir, and we are also looking at it es-
pecially through how do we hire civilians. You gave us authority
to direct hire civilians faster, and so this is a competitive market.
This is a fight for talent, and so now with those authorities, we are
able to go to universities, many of them in New England, and di-
rect hire folks into the Air Force. Especially I think as Chief Ray-
mond looks at how he builds the Space Force, there are some really
creative things that we might be able to do there with the authori-
ties that you have given us.
Senator KING. I appreciate that, and if you need additional au-
thorities or if there are other bottlenecks, let us know.
One final question. General Lyons was here a week or 2 ago and
talked about the impending gap in refueling capacity, which he
identified as one of the most serious threats that we face. We can-
not project power unless we have refueling capacity. Is there a
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plan? How are we going to meet that 5- to 7-year problem that ap-
pears to be imminent?
General GOLDFEIN. So the first thing is, in terms of mitigation,
we have committed to him and the Secretary of Defense that if we
were in a major contingency, every KC–46 would be put into the
fight. We are comfortable that it is capable of doing operations in
a high-end fight.
Senator KING. Even with the deficiency.
General GOLDFEIN. Even with the deficiency. I would not put it
into day-to-day operations, but I would put it in a high end fight.
When we took a look at the retirement numbers, what we are
talking about is 3 percent of the entire KC–135 fleet. We are man-
aging risk across the board. We are managing shortages in bomb-
ers, tankers, ISR, fighters, command and control, and so tankers
is one area that we are having to manage, and so that is why in
the beginning, I mentioned that that was one of the most difficult
decisions we had to make end game was to ask for us to take risk
in the tanker business.
Senator KING. I appreciate—and I had asked some General
Lyons some further backup on the plans——
General GOLDFEIN. Yes.
Senator KING.—because for want of a nail, the horse was lost—
you know, the battle. We do not want to lose a battle because we
cannot get our airmen and their horses to the battlefront.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir.
Senator KING. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator WICKER. General, we talked about this earlier, and Sen-
ator King brought it back up. The Ranking Member and I are just
wondering. The refueling can be done. It is just trickier?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. So I flew in the airplane twice, and
let me describe it for you.
Senator WICKER. Did you do a refueling?
General GOLDFEIN. We did. Actually I refueled a C–17. I got to
fly the remote visual system, got to see it in all different lighting
conditions.
There are operational workarounds that allow me to tell you that
I would put it in the fight, but I would not accept that aircraft
today in terms of what we are paying the company to deliver, and
so what happens is that the receptacle on the airplane, at the last
10 feet or so as you are now trying to connect with an airplane,
the last 10 feet, it is difficult for the boom operator to actually
focus in and see those last 10 feet. So we are seeing more strikes
around the receptacle before it actually plugs in.
The worse case conditions would be blue skies, sun at your back
because what happens is there is a glare that now bounces off the
airplane that makes it harder to see. Well, you check about 20 de-
grees away, and you can mitigate that risk. But I ought not be hav-
ing to mitigate that risk in daily operations. We ought to get what
we paid for.
Senator KING. Mr. Chairman, I flew the boom on a tanker once.
Senator WICKER. That does not give me a comfort level.
Senator KING. No. It will because there was not another airplane
attached.
276

[Laughter.]
Senator WICKER. If the other Senators will defer to Senator
Reed.
Senator REED. Just to very briefly. There are two aspects to this.
One if flying the tanker. The other is the aircraft that is approach-
ing to refuel.
General GOLDFEIN. Right.
Senator REED. If we are not training on a regular basis these air-
craft to refuel with the KC–46, to suddenly put it into the fight is
not going to be particularly effective because all the other aircraft
will be coming up there for the first time, and it will be a problem.
General GOLDFEIN. These airplanes, though, sir, will be involved
in tests. So they will be doing refueling as we work through the
tests of the fix that we are hoping to get to. So we would not be
starting nor would I put a crew in that was not trained for the mis-
sion. In terms of mitigation on why we would retire some tankers,
part of the mitigation is that we would put the KC–46 into the
fight.
Senator REED. This is a continuing conversation, but the concern
I have, just briefly, is that in the fight, which will be sudden and
quick and now these aircraft, the KC–46, is suddenly a primary re-
fueler, you would have literally hundreds of aircraft and pilots who
have never approached this before. That is not the way you usually
operate.
Senator WICKER. They would have in training. Would they not?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. But I will tell you if you are up at
the receiver, quite frankly I have refueled on every different kind
of tanker out there, plus I have refueled on remote visual systems
off a Dutch tanker. When you are on the receiving end, all you
need is a stable boom. Because you are training on refueling all the
time, the boom is the boom is the boom. It is not going to matter
that much for the receiver. We just got to make sure that when
that fighter, bomber, what have you comes off and they are low on
gas and they are in really bad territory like I have been that that
connection happens and they get the fuel passed that they need.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Senator WICKER. Thank you for allowing us to interject there.
Senator Sullivan?
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Goldfein, I do want to thank you, like many others, for
your exceptional service to our Nation. I think you are going to be
sorely missed, and you really, really, really have done a great job.
I do hope you come back, and I appreciated the breakfast and the
briefings just a couple of weeks ago as well.
Madam Secretary, we look forward to getting you to Alaska,
hosting you. The whole State is looking forward to having you up
there. You will see why Billy Mitchell called it the most strategic
place in the world, see our great airmen and JPARC. You can prob-
ably see Russia too if it is a clear day. So we are really looking for-
ward to that.
I am going to continue the theme here on the KC–46. This might
be a really dumb, basic question, but for now, just following up on
this discussion we just had, like is there any way to just take the
boom hardware from the KC–135? I mean, that works. You cannot
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do that as an interim replacement until they figure out what the
heck—you know, as Senator Shaheen said, time is of the essence.
You said it. But 4 years does not seem like time is of the essence.
Is there no fix to help? I mean, the KC–135 is a workhorse. It
works pretty well.
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, there is no option to just swapping the
boom because the boom is not the problem. The visual system that
allows the boom operator to be able to connect with the receiver is
the problem. So what we have to have——
Senator SULLIVAN. You cannot use a KC–135.
General GOLDFEIN. No.
Senator SULLIVAN. Okay.
General GOLDFEIN. No, because in the 135 there is a huge win-
dow in the back where the boom operator is laying down looking
at——
Senator SULLIVAN. Let me ask on the other issue. You will not
be surprised to hear my continuing advocacy on the issue, but it
is not just me. On the OCONUS bed-down decision on the KC–46.
You know, this Committee has weighed in in a number of
NDAAs—so the Congress has weighed in because they become
law—talking about characteristics. General Goldfein, I raised this
in the last hearing. You know, strategic location, the ability to
serve several COCOMs, how the air combat power, 24/7 NORAD
mission that routinely intercepts Russian bombers, world class
training, three Red Flag exercises a year, 100 fifth generation
fighters, C–17, C–130’s, F–16’s. These are all characteristics that
this Committee has said are important.
I just had breakfast this morning with the SECDEF. He in his
confirmation hearing mentioned that you collocate 100 fifth genera-
tion fighters and KC–46’s in a very strategic location, that would
send the message of extreme strategic reach to our adversaries,
particularly our great power adversaries.
Do either of you care to comment on this upcoming decision as
it relates to these congressionally mandated characteristics, which
certainly favor in my view one of the locations you are looking at?
Secretary BARRETT. My ability—in the line of decision-making, I
will await the input and analysis. But those, no doubt, are going
to be elements that will be considered.
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Just building on that—and again, General Lyons recently testi-
fied—it just last week I think. As you have already heard, he said
the air refueling fleet—that is the most stressed capability and
number one readiness concern, the ability to deploy the force across
all national defense strategy mission areas.
Again, to me, if you put the KC–46’s in a place that can strategi-
cally reach not just PACOM, but PACOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM,
NORTHCOM, which is what Alaska presents, it helps with that
stress. I think that is actually an important concern.
Would either of you care to comment on that? He did in the clas-
sified briefing, just for the record. You can take a look at what he
said, which was I think along the lines of what I have been argu-
ing.
General GOLDFEIN. No, sir. I would align with that.
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Senator SULLIVAN. Madam Secretary, do you want to wave that
one off too?
Secretary BARRETT. No further comment on it.
Senator SULLIVAN. Just as you are making the decision, take a
look at his testimony also I think helps.
General Goldfein and Madam Secretary, I just want one final
quick question on the JPARC and the fifth generation center of ex-
cellence. You know, I just asked my staff. I did not know that num-
bers are this big, but as you probably know, JPARC is 13 times
larger than Nellis, and as we have increasing offsets that are need-
ed for good training with the fifth generation aircraft and the abil-
ity to expand that air space, which in Alaska we are doing, and it
is not that controversial as it is in the Lower 48 to expand air
space. Can you comment on that?
General GOLDFEIN. Sure. I will just say it is critical strategic ter-
rain, and the larger air space becomes more important as we end
up engaging at longer ranges, which is what fifth generation is all
about and what comes after that. So I see actually more of an effort
to ensure that we can replicate the higher end threat at JPARC
and Nellis and Utah in these ranges.
The good news is that software-defined radios are giving us more
inexpensive ways of replicating higher end threats, which has been
challenging in the past. So one of the things we are looking at right
now is how do we scale very quickly in that range space to put a
robust array out to be able to replicate a high end threat. I think
over the next couple of years we are going to be able to do it.
Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Thank you.
Senator WICKER. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Tillis?
Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here, and, General Goldfein, I wish you
the very best in what I hope is just a change of jobs, not a real
retirement.
But I want to start back maybe on the KC–46. We know we are
going to have some down at Seymour Johnson. We have got the
hangar project. I know that it was originally slated for later this
year—where we are with the hangar project, where we are with
the deployment. There was one project that was affected with some
of the reprogramming of the MILCON money. I think it was a rel-
atively low dollar item, but I believe it did have to do with the ulti-
mate deployment of the tankers. So if I can get an update on that,
I would appreciate it.
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, sir. Right now I have not been briefed
that it would have any impact on the bed-down timing, but let me
take that to make sure. Can I get back to you?
Senator TILLIS. Yes. I know at the time that we were going
through those discussions, it did not look like it was on the critical
path. I would like to know when it would be as we work to backfill
that funding. Thank you.
I know that we recently, I think as recently as last week, put out
the tenant bill of rights for our military housing situation. It looks
like it may be a good start, but there are some who feel like it
needs to go further. Can you give me an update specifically with
279

Air Force, what progress we are making and what priority this is
for you. Secretary Barrett?
Secretary BARRETT. It is a very high priority. My first visit as
Secretary was to go to a base and to do a walk-through of housing.
I have gone through a number of base housing facilities and have
been very much involved in this process.
We signed out the bill of rights, but only 15 of the 18 elements.
The three elements that were not on the bill of rights, in contrast
with what were the directed 18, were three things that we could
not unilaterally do. They were mandate the disclosure of mainte-
nance records back 7 years. In some cases, there are not 7 years
of records, so we have to work on that. The dispute resolution tech-
nique, because again in some cases the housing provider has bonds
that they cannot reach in the dispute resolution process. The third
item is withholding of the rent. So those three items we are work-
ing through as a contractual matter, and we will anticipate having
solutions to those as well as time goes on.
In the meantime, we are withholding payments to these contrac-
tors, in some cases, significant amounts of payments. So there is
a financial involvement. We I believe do have their attention at
this point, and there is apparently a good faith effort to move this
forward.
Senator TILLIS. Very good. After the NDAA, I know that you all
tried to move forward with the promulgation of the tenant bill of
rights. We are looking for feedback on additional things that we
should put into this NDAA to help us get rid of what I think is an
unacceptable situation with a lot of our military families in hous-
ing. So thank you for that.
One other parochial issue and if I have time, I may have one
other question, otherwise I will submit it for the record. North
Carolina has the most historically black colleges and universities is
the Nation. We have 11. We have the largest at NCA&T, and we
have the most affordable down at Elizabeth City State. They have
got a program specifically focused on aviation science. They are
doing a good job there. They have got a great collaboration with the
Coast Guard. We are working right now to help out with maybe
some runway upgrades, and they also have the college student pre-
commissioning initiative there that I think has been very good for
talent building.
One thing that I would be interested in getting your commitment
to is just considering whether or not we could have an Air Force
ROTC program down there, just to take a look at it. I had some
of my staff down visiting with the chancellor recently. It is an im-
pressive program. We have got a record of collaboration with the
Coast Guard and I would like you all to give that a look. Can I get
your commitment to take a look at that?
Secretary BARRETT. Full commitment.
Senator TILLIS. Thank you.
Last thing. I will submit the question I had on the EQ–4 and
some movement to manned versus unmanned platforms for the
record.
I got a great briefing from the Army on their taking advantage
of some of the provisions in the NDAA around talent management.
They look like they are really moving aggressively. Can you all give
280

me an idea of how we are going to look a year from now or in the
coming months with the Air Force?
General GOLDFEIN. Sir, we are going through the largest over-
haul of our officer talent management and enlisted talent manage-
ment since about the early 1980s. So, not only are we using tech-
nology for the purposes of managing career paths, but we have
busted the single line of the Air Force promotion category into six
categories. We are defining what behaviors that we desire and
what constitutes a competitive career for the purposes of pro-
motion. So a year from now, it is not going to look anything like
it does today.
Senator TILLIS. Good. If we can get an opportunity, I would love
to have maybe a briefing in the office. I thought it was very helpful
for us to do that. We can get into greater detail.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both.
Senator WICKER. And thank you, Senator Tillis.
Thank you to our distinguished witnesses. We look forward to
continue working with you.
This marks the conclusion of our hearing, and the hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
TALENT MANAGEMENT

1. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Barrett, the National Defense Strategy called for
‘‘broad revision of talent management among the Armed Services.’’ The Army has
taken the lead on this effort by deploying its Talent Management Task Force. When
should we expect to see a similar shift in Air Force culture and subsequent execu-
tion of Air Force talent management reform?
Secretary BARRETT. Over the past several years, the Air Force has implemented
significant changes and new processes to its talent management system. Similar to
the Army’s Talent Management Task Force, the Air Force has the Talent Manage-
ment Innovation Cell: a small, full-time team focused on creating innovative adjust-
ments to policy and procedures to drive mission-focused behaviors and cultural
change.
One of our first moves revolutionized the assignment matching process with a
new platform called Talent Marketplace. Modeled after the Nobel Prize winning Na-
tional Resident Matching Program (NRMP), this platform created greater trans-
parency, agility, and responsiveness in how we manage assignments while increas-
ing each airman’s voice and optimizing how we develop and employ our talent.
Additionally, this past year we established six distinct competitive categories for
active component field grade line officers. The new structure builds developmental
agility to meet evolving mission needs, ultimately providing our joint partners and
allies with better professional warfighters across our full spectrum of capabilities.
The change also recognizes and caters to the need to deliver the appropriate edu-
cation, training and unique career field experiences to build the bench of officers we
need at all levels. This was the first major change to the officer development and
promotion process since the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service in
1947.
Another significant change made last year was implementing a board only process
by removing the testing requirement for enlisted personnel meeting E–7 thru E–9
promotion boards. This optimizes our ability to select the best senior noncommis-
sioned officers based on the whole-person concept, with emphasis on performance.
Similarly, for officers, this year we will exercise the authority to re-order officer pro-
motion lists based on merit, helping us incentivize performance on a much greater
scope than previously possible. Through all of this, we are modernizing our perform-
ance evaluation systems to better assess airmen according to what we value in per-
281
formance; provide better insight into performance through lifetime evaluator aver-
ages; and yield more transparent feedback to airmen.
AIR FORCE ROTC AT ELIZABETH CITY STATE UNIVERSITY

2. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Barrett, North Carolina has the most Historically
Black College and University (HBCU) out of any state. Of our 11 HBCUs, Elizabeth
City State University offers a four-year Bachelor of Science in Aviation Science Pro-
gram that produces pilots, navigators, avionic technicians, and flight instructors to
name a few. Elizabeth City State University and the U.S. Air Force could benefit
in a myriad of ways with an Air Force ROTC Program. Do I have your commitment
to consider establishing an Air Force ROTC program at Elizabeth City State Univer-
sity?
Secretary BARRETT. I am pleased to let you know this year Air Force Junior
ROTC has partnered with Elizabeth City State University, enabling the Air Force
to capitalize on the school’s great aviation programs and continue to develop tomor-
row’s aviators. The Air Force is committed to diversity in our programs and cur-
rently has formal relationships with 46 HBCU’s nationwide. This includes seven
host Air Force ROTC Detachments and 39 cross-town relationships. North Carolina
is well represented and leads in this area with two HBCU hosts (Fayetteville State
University and North Carolina A&T State University) and six HBCU cross-town re-
lationships.
ISR PROGRAMS

3. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Barrett, what is the replacement costs of the EQ–4
for a similar but manned platform, the EQ–11? Particularly, how is the MQ–9 Reap-
er and its longevity affected by this program replacement?
Secretary BARRETT. The cost to procure an E–11A Bombardier Global 6000 air-
craft and integrate the Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) payload
onto the aircraft is $101.9 million. There is no correlation between the E–11A and
the MQ–9 mission sets, thus there is no impact to MQ–9.
The E–11A has multiple advantages over the EQ–4B to include operational flexi-
bility allowing rapid deployments to anywhere in the world with a runway greater
than 6,500 feet; the capacity to double its current payload size as new warfighter
requirements emerge; and it has ample available power supply (four 40 kVA genera-
tors on E–11A versus one 25 kVA generator on an EQ–4B) to operate a larger and
more capable payload. The EQ–4B requires time consuming mission planning and
site setup to deploy, and it offers no additional space and power for equipment.

4. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Barrett, if we are expanding the mission set of EQ–
11s, how will this affect their planned service life/longevity, lifecycle of logistics, and
survivability?
Secretary BARRETT. The E–11 role will not significantly increase, even with the
retirement of EQ–4 Block 20, since it flies the majority of BACN support today. Re-
tiring the EQ–4 remotely piloted aircraft in favor of the E–11A manned platform
consolidates the current mixed fleet. A single aircraft fleet will provide enhanced ca-
pability and improved reliability to combatant commanders and reduce operating
costs. Our budget request procures five additional E–11A aircraft at a rate of one
per year, purchases/integrates BACN payload capability, and provides initial main-
tenance and sustainment support as required. The E–11A is more suited to the
BACN mission and is survivable in this role.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SCOTT
TYNDALL AIR FORCE BASE

5. Senator SCOTT. Secretary Barrett, can you give us an update on the rebuilding
efforts at Tyndall AFB after the devastation of Hurricane Michael?
Secretary BARRETT. Rebuilding efforts at Tyndall Air Force Base are on schedule.
We are spending over $362 million in Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Mod-
ernization-funded, in-progress, repair projects, and the installation is transitioning
from planning and design to acquisition of the $3 billion military construction pro-
gram this spring. We expect to begin awarding construction contracts later this
year. The Tyndall Program Management Office is closely monitoring what effects
COVID–19 will have on reconstruction timelines; for now, reconstruction continues
to proceed.
282
6. Senator SCOTT. Secretary Barrett, does the Air Force still plan to make the re-
built Tyndall a more modern and technologically-advanced base, and do you have
the resources for that?
Secretary BARRETT. We will rebuild Tyndall Air Force Base as the Air Force’s first
Twenty First Century Installation. The base will benefit from modern construction
techniques and the rebuild will incorporate advanced technologies. The end state
will result in an installation resilient to future climatic threats. Presently, the Air
Force is resourced to deliver the new Tyndall Air Force Base, but will keep Congress
informed as contractor bids open this summer.
MILITARY HOUSING

7. Senator SCOTT. Secretary Barrett, can you give me an update on the base hous-
ing problems and how the solutions are working out to date?
Secretary BARRETT. The most important part of taking care of our airmen and
space professionals and their families is providing a safe, secure environment for
them to live and work. We continue to work closely with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the other Services to share ideas, develop policies, and implement
strategies to improve housing for our Service Members. Since my 3 December 2019
hearing before this Committee, we have taken a number of steps to address housing
concerns through our Military Housing Privatization Initiative Improvement Pro-
gram. This program includes five lines of effort: empower residents, integrate lead-
ership, improve communications, improve oversight, and standardize policies. Air
Force leadership reviews a 51 item action plan on a weekly basis and we have ad-
dressed 38 (74 percent) of the actions to date. We will complete nine additional
items in 2020, and complete the final four by March 2021.
Empower Residents
As of 3 April 2020, the Air Force toll-free housing call center has received 49 calls
from residents and has resolved all but one issue, which is still being worked. As
of 1 April 2020, residents of 61 of our 63 installations can submit work orders elec-
tronically, and residents at 60 of our 63 installations can view the current status
of their work order requests online. We are working with the other project owners
to provide those capabilities at the remaining sites.
In our fiscal year 2020 budget, we added a Resident Advocate position at each
installation with more than 100 housing units. We classified and funded these posi-
tions in January 2020, and installations are currently in the process of hiring.
Integrate Leadership
We continue to emphasize that the health and safety of members is commander’s
business and we have codified commander roles and responsibilities in the new Air
Force Instruction on housing published on 18 March 2020.
Additionally, the Air Force is negotiating a revised incentive fee structure that
raises the bar for project performance and provides a greater voice to installation
commanders in determining whether project performance warrants the payment of
incentive fees.
Improve Communications
The Air Force is revising the annual resident satisfaction survey to ensure resi-
dents are being asked consistent and precise questions about their experiences with
privatized housing. Effective this year, the Air Force, rather than project owners,
will administer the annual resident satisfaction survey, thereby allowing the Air
Force greater visibility into the survey process and results.
The Air Force revised its housing policies to require clear identification of the
Military Housing Office staff, established Resident Councils, and clarified roles and
responsibilities of the Air Force Military Housing Office personnel, project owner
personnel, and Resident Advocates.
Improve Oversight
Our fiscal year 2020 budget also adds 148 new permanent positions for the Mili-
tary Housing Offices to provide additional oversight of the entire privatized housing
portfolio. Those new positions have been added to the installation’s unit manning
documents and hiring is underway.
Quality and Performance Challenges
In October 2019, the Air Force directed Balfour Beatty Communities, LLC (BBC)
to submit a performance improvement plan to address its maintenance and work
order practices at each of the 21 Air Force installations it manages. The Air Force
approved the plan in February 2020, and the Air Force will hold face-to-face
progress reviews of the plan to ensure compliance and meaningful implementation
and improvement.
We have identified a fourth installation where facility design, construction, or ma-
terials are a key contributor to moisture and mold growth: Randolph Air Force Base,
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Texas. The Air Force now has additional oversight resources at four installations—
Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma; Keesler Air
Force Base, Mississippi; and MacDill Air Force Base, Florida—to assist in ongoing
housing quality improvement efforts.
At MacDill Air Force Base, Clark Realty has experienced systemic moisture issues
due to breaches or a lack of vapor barriers in 241 housing units constructed by the
Air Force prior to privatization. Since 2017, Clark Realty has treated the mold and
completed $4.7 million in repair projects to correct the underlying causes of systemic
moisture issues in 294 homes. An additional 68 homes are scheduled for repair with
work to be completed in 2022 at a cost of $6.8 million. Additionally, the Air Force
has put a Corrective Action Plan in place at MacDill to address work quality issues.

8. Senator SCOTT. Secretary Barrett, the Tenant’s Bill of Rights falls short of the
expectations we laid out in last year’s NDAA. Air Force families in Florida have
faced and are still facing numerous problems with base housing. What are you doing
to make sure military families are being fully supported?
Secretary BARRETT. On February 25, 2020, I joined the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretaries of the Army and Navy in jointly issuing the Military Housing Privat-
ization Initiative Tenant Bill of Rights. In doing so, we committed to work expedi-
tiously to develop the processes to implement 15 of the 18 tenant rights established
by the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, to work with the project owners to incorporate these
rights into appropriate legal documents, and to ensure all tenants are aware of their
rights. Fourteen of these fifteen tenant rights are now available to our tenants. The
remaining right is an electronic work order system for tenant requests; this capa-
bility is available at 61 of 63 Air Force installations and will be available at the
remaining two installations by 1 October 2020. The remaining three rights require
additional work. Specifically, maintenance history, dispute resolution, and with-
holding of rent present implementation challenges as they require project owner,
bond holder, and investor consent. We are also working closely with the DOD, the
other Services, and project owners in an effort to implement these rights as expedi-
tiously as possible.
Since my 3 December 2019 hearing before this Committee, we have made progress
on several additional measures to ensure military families have safe and habitable
housing. Perhaps most significantly, in our fiscal year 2020 budget and as supported
by the NDAA, we have added a Resident Advocate position at each of our installa-
tions with more than 100 housing units to assist our military residents with dis-
putes, to connect them to the proper resources for their various needs, to include
Exceptional Family Member Programs, and to communicate their needs to the in-
stallation leadership team. These positions were classified and funded in January
and installations are in the hiring process at this time.
Our fiscal year 2020 budget also added 148 permanent positions to our Military
Housing Offices to provide additional oversight of the privatized housing portfolio.
Those positions have been added to the installation’s unit manning documents and
they are hiring the permanent personnel at this time.
The Air Force toll free housing call center has been in place since May 2019 and
as of 3 April 2020 has received 47 calls from residents, resolving all but 1 issue
which is still being worked.
We have also been working with project owners to ensure residents can submit
work orders electronically and can view the status of their work order requests. As
of 1 April 2020, residents of 61 of 63 installations can submit work orders electroni-
cally and residents at 60 of our 63 installations can view the current status of their
work order requests on-line. We are working with other project owners to provide
these capabilities at the remaining sites.
Finally, the Air Force has developed a pamphlet for housing residents that pro-
vides information on dispute resolution resources (to include legal assistance), clari-
fies the availability of legal assistance, and provides contact information for legal
assistance. Additionally, on 1 May 2020, the Air Force implemented an interim pol-
icy on displaced families.
As we move forward in this endeavor, our focus will remain on oversight,
sustainment, and the long-term success of the privatized housing portfolio in order
to provide safe and healthy housing for our air and space professionals.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY
ISR–T

9. Senator HAWLEY. General Goldfein, what are the Air Force’s plans for devel-
oping an ISR architecture that is persistent and resilient enough to provide tar-
geting data for large numbers of targets near Taiwan in the early days of a poten-
tial war with China?
General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force has developed a Sensing Grid Concept as part
of its development efforts for Joint All-Domain Operations. The concept includes the
need for a resilient architecture that supports numerous targets in a wide range of
scenarios and integrates data from an assemblage of sensors, platforms, people, de-
vices, content, and services. This architecture will deliver accurate and timely char-
acterization of the environment, to include identification and tracking of targets, en-
abling the Joint Force to maintain decision advantage during joint operations. In
order to fully build out the concept, we are evaluating technologies against a range
of threats in a range of scenarios through studies, modeling and simulation, experi-
ments, and recurring combatant command-sponsored demonstrations. As our ‘‘build,
demonstrate, and adapt’’ approach is getting underway, it will help us realize a
Sensing Grid and Joint-All Domain Command and Control vision preparing the
USAF for the next war rather than for a specific war.

10. Senator HAWLEY. General Goldfein, what is the right mix of stealth and
attritable assets in an ISR architecture that is persistent and resilient enough to
provide targeting data for large numbers of targets near Taiwan in the early days
of a potential war with China?
General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force has developed a Sensing Grid Concept as part
of its development efforts for Joint All-Domain Operations. The concept will also re-
quire a yet undetermined mix of stealth, attritable, and manned/unmanned plat-
forms to characterize numerous targets in an equally wide range of scenarios. We
are evaluating technologies against various threats in a range of military operations
under various environmental constraints. Studies, modeling and simulation, experi-
ments, and recurring combatant command sponsored demonstrations will inform
what the right mix is to enable the Sensing Grid concept and Joint-All Domain
Command and Control vision. This will prepare the USAF for the next war rather
than for a specific war.
ADVANCED ANTI-SHIP WEAPONS

11. Senator HAWLEY. General Goldfein, what advanced anti-ship weapons does the
Air Force have in its inventory besides LRASM?
General GOLDFEIN. Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is the only anti-ship
weapon in the Air Force inventory.

12. Senator HAWLEY. General Goldfein, how many non-LRASM advanced anti-
ship weapons does the Air Force have or plan to procure within the FYDP?
General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force does not plan to procure additional non-LRASM
advanced anti-ship weapons within the FYDP. LRASM is the sole anti-ship weapon
the Air Force is procuring.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
F–35A

13. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, given the importance of the F–35A
for the Air Force, I was pleased to see that the Air Force included procurement
funding for 12 additional F–35A aircraft on its unfunded priorities list. But if the
F–35A is such a priority, why is the Department diverting $156 million in F–35A
advanced procurement funding—already appropriated by Congress in fiscal year
2020—to the border wall?
Secretary BARRETT. Although the Air Force cannot speak to OSD priorities, the
$156 million for F–35A advanced procurement were un-executable fiscal year 2020
dollars and therefore had no significant impacts on F–35 procurement timelines.

14. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, how will this diversion increase risk
to procurement timelines for the F–35A?
Secretary BARRETT. We do not foresee any increased risk to procurement
timelines.
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15. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, how will this impact the readiness
of our fifth-generation fleet?
Secretary BARRETT. We do not foresee any impacts to the F–22 or F–35A fleets
at this time.

16. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, as adversaries like Russia and China
build their 5th generation aircraft inventories, do you believe the air superiority the
Air Force has previously enjoyed is challenged?
General GOLDFEIN. While adversary build-up of 5th generation aircraft doesn’t
preclude our ability to gain and maintain air superiority in and of itself, it does
change the landscape and we should be mindful. Conceptually speaking, air superi-
ority is much more involved than just aircraft platforms. This is why we remain fo-
cused on developing a family of capabilities that operate in and across the air,
space, and cyberspace domains, so that we can wield air superiority at a time and
place of our choosing.

17. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, can you expand on the role and capa-
bility that a 5th generation tactical fighter aircraft like the F–35A provides in a
near peer fight?
General GOLDFEIN. The role and capabilities of the F–35A and F–22 are critically
important to U.S. success in a near peer fight. These weapons systems enable air
dominance in highly contested battlespaces that challenge our legacy fleet. Fifth
generation aircraft use stealth to enable freedom to maneuver where legacy systems
cannot, and use sensor fusion to quickly and accurately locate and identify threats
and increase battlespace awareness across multiple domains. All these capabilities
are essential to enhance our lethality across the Joint operational spectrum.

18. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, can you expand on how our allies ac-
quiring the F–35 facilitates interoperability, and strengthens our ability to deter
and respond to the growing 5th generation fighter threat?
General GOLDFEIN. Integrated operations with allies and partners that employ the
F–35 will be dramatically more lethal, survivable, and sustainable. A highly capable
and connected force that can train and fight together with common capabilities and
tactics is critical to outpacing and deterring our advancing adversaries.

19. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, within our own Joint Force construct,
can you speak to the capabilities gained by all the services moving to an F–35 vari-
ant and what advantages that affords us on the battlefield?
General GOLDFEIN. The F–35 is the quarterback of the joint force, using stealth
and sensors to provide battlespace awareness for Joint, all-domain operations. With
all three Services operating the F–35 we can deploy from main and forward oper-
ating air bases, the deck of an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship, or take-
off from austere locations and provide the Joint Force integrated fifth-generation
combat power virtually anywhere on the globe.

20. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, can you provide an update on the
plan to improve the Advanced Pilot Training program and ensure our 5th Genera-
tion pilots remain ready and capable of operating the F–35A?
Secretary BARRETT. The Air Force is actively pursuing innovations to modernize
pilot training in light of the changing capabilities provided by 5th generation air-
craft, as well as changing student learning methods and adaptation of technology
to learning. The Advanced Pilot Training program (APT–X) explores how incor-
porating the T–7 into undergraduate pilot training drives instructional changes.
APT–X is in the developmental phase, currently focused on developing syllabus re-
quirements. Rather than simply plugging the T–7 into the existing training struc-
ture, adapting instruction to the new aircraft capabilities will enable undergraduate
pilot training to prepare students to meet changing operational needs.
C–130H MODERNIZATION

21. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, last week, TRANSCOM Commander
Gen Lyons testified that 60–70 percent of TRANSCOMs mobility capacity resides
in the reserve component, including 50 percent of all tactical airlift. In 2006, the
Air National Guard began exploring a modernization effort to install the NP–2000
propeller system made by Collins Aerospace in Windsor Locks onto the C–130H air-
craft to modernize an outdated propulsion system. Over a decade later, the NP–2000
program has been implemented at a snails pace. As you know, the legacy propellers
are the same propellers that failed on a Marine Corps KC–130T in 2017 causing
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the death of 17 of our servicemembers. Last year, I sent a letter along with 16 of
my Senate colleagues to the department of the Air Force asking you to expedite the
approval of the new blades for the Air National Guard C–130H fleet. The current
modernization pace will have this effort completed by 2034, considering the risk and
proven undependability of the legacy system, this is unacceptable. In light of pre-
vious mishaps and the subsequent revelation of the serious risk to our Air Force
C–130H aircrews while flying the legacy propeller, what is the proposed timeline for
installation of the NP–2000 propeller on the C–130Hs like the ones we have in Con-
necticut?
Secretary BARRETT. Currently the NP2000 program is approved to produce, in-
stall, and sustain 44 total C–130H aircraft. The Air Force has already modified 12
aircraft. NP2000 installations for the remaining 32 aircraft started in March 2020,
beginning with the Air National Guard unit in Reno, Nevada. Modification sched-
ules are based on deployment timelines and mission profiles. At current funding lev-
els, we project completing these remaining 32 aircraft in fiscal year 2022. If we con-
tinue to receive funding at the current rate beyond that, we are projected to com-
plete NP2000 installs on the remainder of the C–130H fleet (up to 115 additional
aircraft) in fiscal year 2034.

22. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, due to the risk associated with the
legacy propeller, would you support an increase to 3–4 aircraft per month if Con-
gress appropriated additional funding to support the increased production costs?
Secretary BARRETT. Should congress appropriate additional funds, it is possible
the Air Force could accelerate the modification.

23. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, the fiscal year 2021 President’s
Budget plans to retire 45 C–130Hs and 5 squadrons—4 in the Guard and 1 in the
Air Force Reserves. What are the impacts to TRANSCOM’s ability to meet the 300
tactical airlift identified by the Mobility Capability Requirements Study as required
to meet the National Defense Strategy?
General GOLDFEIN. The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018
(MCRS–18) identified the current fleet of 300 Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) as ‘‘suf-
ficient’’ to meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Within
all AF core functional areas (as directed/guided by the NDS) there is a spectrum
of risk that can be assessed based on simultaneity, theater specificity, and joint/coa-
lition collaboration. Theater risk thresholds are currently being refined and will in-
form the congressionally mandated MCRS–20. United States Transportation Com-
mand (USTC) and the Air Force are working in concert to balance the risk we take
in reducing the tactical airlift fleet with being able to reasonably meet NDS intent
and theater requirements.
The AF’s decision to reduce the tactical airlift fleet below 300 TAI is based on tak-
ing an acceptable amount of risk within this mission set (as established by MCRS–
18 and as anticipated by MCRS–20 preliminary findings) as well as the need/direc-
tion to focus resources on the future force and near-peer competition.

24. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, can you expand on the rationale be-
hind this decision and what risk is being assumed?
General GOLDFEIN. The NDS has provided clear guidance that our focus should
be on winning the future fight against near-peer competition, and that we should
not be funding programs on legacy platforms that do not contribute to that guid-
ance. Specifically stated ‘‘we cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with
yesterday’s weapons or equipment’’ (NDS, pg. 8)
Investing in capabilities to win future high-end competition requires the Air Force
to take risk in force structure that has a less defined role in high-end competition.
Given the current capability of the tactical airlift fleet, the AF is taking a measured
amount of acceptable risk that we believe is excess capacity in terms of the fleet’s
contribution to the future fight.
C–130J FUNDING DIVERSION TO BORDER WALL

25. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, in addition to my concerns about C–
130H modernization and the need for upgraded NP2000 propellers in order to im-
prove the safety of our Air National Guard aircrews, I am also deeply concerned
about the diversion of congressionally-appropriated fiscal year 2020 funds for the C–
130J. One hundred sixty-nine million dollars that will go to the border wall, instead
of two cargo planes for the Air National Guard. The Adjutant General in Con-
necticut—General Evon—expressed that this diversion will negatively impact the
Connecticut National Guard, and unfairly disadvantage the Air National Guard as
287
a whole. In addition to supporting the tactical airlift required to meet the needs of
the National Defense Strategy, the Air National Guard provides a unique capability
to provide domestic support during natural disasters. What is the impact of the re-
cent decision to divert $169 million of C–130J procurement funding to the border
wall on the readiness and capabilities of the Air National Guard?
Secretary BARRETT. The diversion of C–130J procurement funding reduces the
total from four aircraft to two. That change essentially delays the Air National
Guard’s ability to recapitalize a fourth operational C–130H unit to the C–130J. A
basing action currently underway in the Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process will
recapitalize three of the ANG’s existing 13 operational C–130H units.
Each Air National Guard operational squadron is currently comprised of eight
total aircraft; seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) and one Backup Aircraft In-
ventory (BAI). Thus, a minimum of seven (eight preferred based on training/readi-
ness, mission taskings and depot/modernization) is required in order to recapitalize
a unit. Procurement totals below this threshold can still be fielded as BAI at exist-
ing ANG C–130J units and contribute to aircraft availability and unit readiness.
Mixing C–130Hs & C–130Js at the same unit is not feasible since C–130H and C–
130J aircraft have significant differences and separate qualifications for Operations
and Maintenance personnel.

26. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, how will this decision degrade our
ability to meet the 300 tactical airlift requirement identified to execute the National
Defense Strategy?
General GOLDFEIN. The diversion of C–130J procurement funding reduces the
total from four aircraft to two. That change essentially delays the Air National
Guard’s ability to recapitalize a fourth operational C–130H unit to the C–130J. A
basing action currently underway in the Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process will
recapitalize three of the ANG’s existing 13 operational C–130H units.
Each Air National Guard operational squadron is currently comprised of eight
total aircraft; seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) and one Backup Aircraft In-
ventory (BAI). Thus, a minimum of seven (eight preferred based on training/readi-
ness, mission taskings and depot/modernization) is required in order to recapitalize
a unit. Procurement totals below this threshold can still be fielded as BAI at exist-
ing ANG C–130J units and contribute to aircraft availability and unit readiness.
Mixing C–130Hs & C–130Js at the same unit is not feasible since C–130H and C–
130J aircraft have significant differences and separate qualifications for Operations
and Maintenance personnel.The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2018
(MCRS–18) identified the current fleet of 300 TAI as ‘‘sufficient’’ to meet the re-
quirements of the NDS. Within all Air Force core functional areas (as directed/guid-
ed by the NDS) there is a spectrum of risk that can be assessed based on simulta-
neity, theater specificity, and joint/coalition collaboration. Theater risk thresholds
are currently being refined and will inform the congressionally mandated MCRS–
20. United States Transportation Command (USTC) and the Air Force are working
in concert to balance the risk we take in reducing the tactical airlift fleet with being
able to reasonably meet NDS intent and theater requirements.
The AF’s decision to reduce the tactical airlift fleet below 300 TAI is based on tak-
ing an acceptable amount of risk within this mission set (as established by MCRS–
18 and as anticipated by MCRS–20 preliminary findings) as well as the need/direc-
tion to focus resources on the future force and near-peer competition.

27. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, will this cut in funding impact the
C–130H modernization efforts?
General GOLDFEIN. No. This TAI reduction does not change the Air Force’s four-
pronged approach to C–130H modifications (safety, compliance, modernization, par-
tial recapitalization).

28. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, given the constrained fiscal environ-
ment and recent cuts to the C–130J program, would you agree that C–130H mod-
ernization and the installation of the NP–2000 is a good way to meet National De-
fense Strategy requirements?
General GOLDFEIN. The NP–2000 propeller does not affect the Air Force’s ability
to meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy.
HYPERSONIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

29. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, both Russia and China are devel-
oping credible hypersonic weapons programs that present significant challenges to
the United States ability to maintain strategic deterrence. The fiscal year 2021
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President’s Budget allocates $3.2 billion towards the development of hypersonic
weapons. The Navy, Army, and Air Force are all involved in the development of
hypersonic weapons, including the Air Force’s Hypersonic Conventional Strike
Weapon and the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon. I am fully supportive of
maintaining our qualitative edge in this technology, and accelerating hypersonic de-
fense capabilities. From an oversight perspective, the rapid growth in hypersonic re-
search has the potential to result in stove-piped, proprietary systems that duplicate
capabilities and increase costs. I am very interested in how these efforts are being
economized, how information is being shared between services, and your thoughts
on the role hypersonic should play in the future of our National Defense Strategy.
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, can you
speak to how the Air Force is conducting responsible and coordinated research, de-
velopment, training, and evaluation to ensure that there are not redundant efforts
in development and cost?
Secretary BARRETT. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is committed to mini-
mizing redundant efforts in research, development, training, and evaluations by col-
laborating with the Department of the Army (DA), Department of the Navy (DON),
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA), and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Air-launched Rapid Re-
sponse Weapon (ARRW), our flagship hypersonic weapon prototype program, is built
upon a hypersonic glide vehicle made possible through decades of Air Force Re-
search Laboratory (AFRL) Science and Technology (S&T) investment most recently
matured through a joint AFRL/DARPA Tactical Boost Glide advanced development
demonstration program. The ARRW program is dependent on the success of the Tac-
tical Boost Glide program to deliver the glide vehicle which is concurrently being
integrated with a tactical booster and warhead to demonstrate and deliver an oper-
ationally relevant prototype by fiscal year 2022. As part of the DAF/DARPA efforts,
an Executive Steering Group has been developed to ensure an efficient transition
of the glide vehicle design and test data to the ARRW prototyping program.
To reduce the risk, the Air Force invested in a second hypersonic prototype, the
Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW). This prototype was based on the
flight-tested OSD Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Hypersonic Glide Vehicle and
is also the basis of near term Army and Navy Hypersonic Weapon programs. To en-
sure cooperation and reduction in duplication or competition for scarce resources
across the Services, the DAF signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between
OSD, DA, DON, DAF, and MDA for Hypersonic Boost Glide Technology Develop-
ment. The MOA created a multi-service and agency board of directors that has re-
sulted in a sharing of knowledge, analysis, and test results, as well as early indus-
try involvement to transition laboratory designs to industry for the CPS Hypersonic
Glide Body. In fiscal year 2020, the DAF made a decision to halt HCSW after con-
clusion of the Critical Design Review and focus resources on ARRW. With the deci-
sion to halt the HCSW program, the DAF continues to support the Army Hypersonic
Project Office by developing co-use agreements for the accredited HCSW classified
Local Area Network/Wide Area Network and development infrastructure that cur-
rently connects the prime contractor Lockheed Martin facilities at Sunnyvale, Den-
ver, and Huntsville.
Additionally, the DAF works closely to harmonize S&T investments, critical test
infrastructure investments, and lessons-learned across on-going hypersonics pro-
grams across the DOD.

30. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, what are you doing to develop and
implement an integrated science and technology roadmap for hypersonics that pro-
motes information sharing?
General GOLDFEIN. The DAF has a robust continuing investment in S&T as well
as a targeted acquisition-focused weapon prototype program. The Air Force Re-
search Lab’s (AFRL) High Speed Strike Weapon (HSSW) Technology Maturation
portfolio manages a deliberate technology and experimentation investment in
hypersonics. For example, in HSSW, AFRL is investing in multiple enabling tech-
nologies such as tactical solid rocket boosters; air-breathing hypersonic propulsion
systems; fuzes for hypersonics applications; and guidance, navigation, and control
components for hypersonic vehicles. These investments also include advanced tech-
nology demonstrations such as the AFRL/DARPA Tactical Boost Glide and the
AFRL/DARPA Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept development demonstra-
tion program.
Furthermore, the DAF is working with OUSD(R&E) on the completion of the
Hypersonics S&T Roadmap. The effort includes the combined S&T activities
throughout the DOD from DAF, DA, DON, MDA, and DARPA to minimize duplica-
tion of efforts and ensure the services are informed investors across the FYDP.
289
Finally, the DAF is working with academia and international partners to ensure
collaboration amongst our national academic institutions and with our allies. In the
S&T community, the Air Force Office of Scientific Research is leading the way with
the Boundary Layer Transition (BOLT) project which looks to provide better design
tools for hypersonic vehicles. BOLT consists of researchers from universities, NASA,
and international partners such as The German Aerospace Center. Additionally, the
DAF is partnering with OSD’s Allied Partner Initiative to further develop the
AFRL/DARPA Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept demonstrator towards a
scramjet powered hypersonic weapon prototype.

31. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Goldfein, how do you assess that the fielding
of offensive hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
General GOLDFEIN. Strategic stability fundamentally depends on the ability of the
United States and its strategic competitors, China and Russia, to either deny the
benefit of aggression or impose unacceptable costs. The nuclear deterrent capabili-
ties of the United States, China, and Russia are the basis of strategic stability. My
assessment is hypersonic weapons are unlikely to impact the effectiveness of our or
their nuclear deterrence postures, and that strategic stability will be sustained even
as hypersonic weapons are fielded.

32. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Barrett, what more do you think that Con-
gress should be doing to ensure that we are keeping pace with our near peer adver-
saries in hypersonics? Do you agree that we are approaching a ‘‘hypersonics arms
race’’ with Russia or China?
Secretary BARRETT. Though the United States has a long history in hypersonic
research and development, we may no longer maintain the technological advantage
to field the first operational hypersonic weapon. China and Russia are developing
and testing their own hypersonic weapons and are close to fielding an operational
capability.
The Air Force needs steady and predictable funding for the ARRW to stay on
track to deliver an early operational capability in Fiscal Year 2022, which we antici-
pate will be the Nation’s first operational hypersonic weapon.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE HIRONO
AIR FORCE POWER PROJECTION

33. Senator HIRONO. General Goldfein, please explain the concept of Agile Combat
Employment.
General GOLDFEIN. Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is an operational concept,
first championed by PACAF and now evolved across every MAJCOM, which enables
distributed employment of air power. ACE focuses on the ability to disperse, recover,
and rapidly resume operations in a contested or austere environment. It involves
rapid deployment to a variety of locations, and involves a fusion of operations with
command and control, logistics, protection, and base operating support functions. It
is a modern effort facilitating a shift away from the hyper-efficient, specialized oper-
ations of recent decades towards the redundancy, resiliency, decentralized control
and decentralized execution required to enable an effective campaign against a
near-peer adversary.

34. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett, regarding Agile Combat Employment,
what nations in the Pacific theater have been approached thus far as possible loca-
tions for these forward projected teams and assets?
Secretary BARRETT. At this time, we are examining and refining potential location
options through analysis and wargaming support. Factors in play in the trade space
are bases, force structure, platform ranges and Air Base Defense design among
other factors. That said, the Air Force has already engaged key allies and partners
like the FVEYs, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore to discuss the Concepts
of Operations for Agile Combat Employment and where opportunities may exist for
aligning concepts and capabilities.

35. Senator HIRONO. General Goldfein, will the Hawaii Air National Guard re-
ceive KC–46s or KC–Y/Z as backfills for their current 8 KC–135s?
General GOLDFEIN. The Hawaii Air National Guard is not slated to recapitalize
within the first 179 KC–46As.
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36. Senator HIRONO. General Goldfein, if not, what is the replacement or recapi-
talization plan for the 8 KC–135s the Hawaii Air National Guard operates?
General GOLDFEIN. The KC–135 aircraft will continue to remain a critical part of
our tanker inventory for the foreseeable future. Across the total force, we will work
to ensure the KC–135s are modernized. This effort includes all Total Force units,
to include the Hawaii Air National Guard.
SUICIDE RATES IN THE AIR FORCE

37. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, the Air Force had
137 suspected suicides last year, the highest number since the service began track-
ing suicide in 2008. This 2019 figure includes Active Duty, Reserve, Guard and Air
Force civilians and compares to 103 suicides across the service in 2018 a 33 percent
increase. The report noted that aircraft maintenance and security forces are consist-
ently the career fields with the highest number of suicide deaths. I understand you
have been beta testing the ‘‘True North Task Force’’ on a few bases. What does this
task force do?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. The Air Force takes the physical and
mental health of our airmen and space professionals seriously and is committed to
suicide prevention. Airmen, space professionals and their families face various situa-
tions that impact their Comprehensive Airman Fitness (physical, mental, social, and
spiritual). We seek to provide our forces with the resources and culture to seek help
and successfully decrease the risk of harming themselves and others, increase mis-
sion readiness, and ultimately save lives.
In December 2016, Task Force True North was created to beta test initiatives that
bring resiliency resources closer to our airmen and drive a culture that accepts, em-
braces, and drives help-seeking behavior. The three primary elements of the concept
are to 1) engage forces and families early; 2) normalize help-seeking behavior as a
strength; and 3) decentralize—push help to where our forces are (at the squadron
or group).
The Task Force identified four beta test installations. At the Maintenance Groups
and Mission Support Groups at each of those installations, they embedded a con-
tract Licensed Clinical Social Worker at each squadron, a contract Mental Health
Technician at each group, and a Religious Support Team (a Chaplain and Religious
Affairs Airman) at each group. Additionally, they installed an installation Program
Manager at the Wing, and provided funding assistance to create an integrated in-
stallation Welcome Center with Wing Commander-owned sponsorship and on-board-
ing program.
In September 2018, the Air Force Community Action Board, Chaired by the
VCSAF, directed the Task Force to begin program actions to initiate a DAF wide
expansion beginning in fiscal year 2021. The first expansion set in fiscal year 2021
rolls it out fully to all four beta test installations and targets an additional 12 in-
stallations. The fiscal year 2021 budget begins a long effort to scale the program
across the DAF. The key to scaling the program is two-fold: 1) identify the installa-
tions within the DAF with the historically highest risk for negative outcomes; and
2) identify the unit types within the DAF with the historically highest risk for nega-
tive outcomes. The roll-out begins at the top of the installation priority list and cou-
ples that with the highest priority units and builds the embedding effort to fill those
unit needs first. Once those highest priority units are addressed in the first group
of expansion installations, the roll-out progresses to the next highest priority units
at those installations, and so forth.

38. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, have there been any
indicators of success thus far?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. The True North team has certainly re-
flected indicators of success. True North Team’s impact is assessed in two ways: 1)
output numbers of airmen seeking help; and 2) a qualitative assessment provided
by the RAND Corporation.
The output numbers are collected via monthly reports submitted by the embedded
mental health providers and the Religious Support Teams at each installation.
These monthly reports reflect the immediate impact of embedded behavioral health
providers, demonstrating a clear demand signal on the part of our personnel. Al-
though anticipated that it could take up to 6 months for personnel to begin engaging
the services of the embedded provider, reports from some units reflected that within
a month unit personnel were waiting in line to speak with the embedded provider.
By the one year point, across the 12 groups in the beta test, the embedded Licensed
Clinical Social Workers were conducting 300–600 individual engagements per
291
month, spending 240–385 hours per month in counseling sessions. Likewise, the Re-
ligious Support Teams were conducting 170–270 individual engagements per month.
The key issues addressed by the embedded providers and the Religious Support
Teams were: relationships, anxiety, depression, life skills, work stress, coping skills
and substance (i.e. alcohol) use. Engaging these types of issues early—before they
become toxic—is critical to reducing negative outcomes such as suicide, domestic vi-
olence, workplace violence and child maltreatment.
Additionally, the DAF contracted RAND to conduct a qualitative analysis of the
beta test impact. After interviewing leadership (squadron, group and wing), pro-
viders, and airmen, they concluded there was great value in the combined effect of
the welcome centers, mental health providers and spiritual providers. The DAF is
awaiting release of the final report.
Other indicators of success, such as genuine decreases in negative outcomes, last-
ing culture change, and potential decreases in long-term VA care costs, must be
measured over many years and the data are therefore many years away.

39. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when will results
of the beta test be available?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. As of Friday, 19 June, RAND reported
that they were in the process of sending the draft final report to SAF/PA. This is
part of the review process, because in order for it to be released, it needs three AF
reviewers that are outside of the sponsoring office and SAF/PA assists. This part
of the process typically takes little time, so they expect the actual report to release
soon. They did not provide a date for release.

40. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, what do you need
from Congress to help save lives?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. Funding promising solutions to in-
crease airmen and space professional resilience, connection, and help seeking are
critical to saving lives. The fiscal year 2021 True North budget begins a long effort
to scale the program across the DAF. Funding for the program has increased signifi-
cantly from $9.9 million in fiscal 2019 and 2020 to $53.3 million in the fiscal year
2021 budget request. This is just the start. We are preparing to assess the True
North needs of our Guard and Reserve Total Force members while pursuing a com-
prehensive approach to suicide prevention that leverages partnerships with aca-
demia, industry, and other government organizations. We need Congress to continue
to fund these efforts to increase the readiness and lethality of our Force.
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION

41. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, a recent Pentagon
report on sexual assault at the Air Force Academy estimated that 90 percent of sex-
ual assaults went unreported and that reporting rates consistently declined over the
past 6 years. I am on the Board of Visitors at the Air Force Academy and I remain
concerned that not enough has been done to combat this culture. How will the Air
Force fix this issue at the Academy and across the Air Force?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. USAF Academy reporting was con-
sistent from academic year 16/17 to 17/18 (23 reports each year) with a rise in aca-
demic year 18/19 (40 reports). With the rise in prevalence, the DAF began a com-
prehensive, integrated, and holistic approach to violence prevention that addresses
common factors underlying interpersonal and self-directed violence (ISDV): sexual
assault, domestic violence, child maltreatment, suicide, and workplace violence. The
DAF initiated a 3-phase sexual assault prevention strategy that focuses on system-
atically addressing risk factors for sexual assault using proven policy and programs.
1. Developing a comprehensive strategic plan including proactive universal and
selected development and interventions to address ISDV prevention at various
points across the DAF lifecycle for airmen and space professionals (accession, basic
and tech training, operational unit, and Professional Military Education (PME); de-
livering more effective problem solving skills (e.g. coping and emotion regulation)
and fostering a culture of connectedness to prepare air and space professionals to
face any adversity;
2. Relying on evidence-based research/interventions to reduce perpetration, vic-
timization, and re-victimization. As an example, research shows these adapted inter-
ventions can reduce sexual assault victimization and perpetration by 50–60 percent;
and,
3. Ensuring integrated policy, processes, and assessments, while providing func-
tional leadership for installation-level prevention strategists and collaborating with
others to mobilize best practices and maximize results.
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This approach is a paradigm shift for how the Department has been addressing
sexual assault prevention. It focuses on what Air and Space professionals are, can,
and will do rather than relying on what leaders tell them to do. The DAF is focused
on reducing prevalence while increasing victim reporting to seek care.
AIR FORCE’S ADVANCED BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

42. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, the DOD Budget for
fiscal year 2021 requests investment in Joint All-Domain Command and Control
JADC2 to ‘‘create an agile, interoperable Joint Force that can fight with a fully
networked platforms, sensors, weapons, and command and control capabilities’’ even
in contested environments. The backbone of this JADC2 effort appears to be the Air
Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). The Air Force has requested
a budgetary increase to pay for increased experimentation and technology advance-
ment of the JADC2 system. Will the Air Force continue to be the lead on the sup-
porting infrastructure for the entire Joint Force? If not who will maintain and con-
tinue to build out the JADC2 system?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. The Department of the Air Force leads
the development of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS), the battle
network of the joint force that enables Joint All-Domain Command and Control
(JADC2). ABMS also connects with complementary networks across each of our sis-
ter Services. The Department of the Air Force is working closely with the Depart-
ment of Defense’s JADC2 Cross Functional Team—led by DOD Chief Information
Officer Dana Deasy and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen John
Hyten—as they ensure each Service builds interoperable capabilities that support
JADC2. The Department of the Air Force is also the lead for the development of
the DOD Concept for Global Command and Control on behalf of the Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

43. Senator HIRONO. General Goldfein, how do you plan to mitigate cyber attacks
on the JADC2 system?
General GOLDFEIN. The ABMS is being developed with security from the begin-
ning rather than as a consideration once the technology has been built. All ABMS
software will be developed using our platformONE approach, following the software
principles described in the ‘‘DOD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design’’ pub-
lished in August 2019, where DevSecOps refers to the continuous iteration of devel-
opment, security, and operations. This reference design incorporates security into
the development pipeline and enables a continuous Authority to Operate (c-ATO)
and the transportability of reliable code across multiple platforms in secure software
‘‘containers.’’
Software developed for ABMS will include continuous monitoring and robust au-
thentication measures at all layers. Further, the meshONE network is software de-
fined, meaning it is rapidly configurable which will provide added security protec-
tion to re-form the network or isolate potential threats. Finally, ABMS is also devel-
oping zero trust capabilities that extend beyond the traditional, but limited, ‘‘perim-
eter defense’’ approach to an in-network defense approach. Together, these methods
ensure a robust and multi-faceted approach to technological development, deploy-
ment, and execution of the capabilities that will make up the battle network for
JADC2.

44. Senator HIRONO. General Goldfein, are you getting support for this effort from
the whole of government?
General GOLDFEIN. Secretary Barrett, Chief Raymond, and I could not develop
these critical capabilities nor develop them at the speed of relevance were it not for
the continued support and leadership of Congress. The authorities and resources
provided to the Department of the Air Force from Congress for the ABMS have en-
abled us to truly pursue the required integration of our capable, but too often dis-
connected, platforms our warfighting leadership and combatant commanders need
to fight and win in the National Defense Strategy environment. The ABMS team
is also partnering with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Intel-
ligence Community agencies, and the Coast Guard on key initiatives.

45. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett, does the Air Force have all the authorities
it requires to succeed with JADC2?
Secretary BARRETT. At this time, the Department of the Air Force has all the au-
thorities it requires to pursue JADC2 through ABMS development. In the event ad-
ditional authorities are required, the Department will propose them through the ap-
propriate channels.
293
SPACE CONTROL SQUADRON

46. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, last Fall, the Air
Force indicated Barking Sands Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai as the pre-
ferred location for a Pacific-based Space Control Squadron operated by the Hawaii
Air National Guard. What is the status of this Space Control Squadron?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. We are currently conducting the envi-
ronmental analysis and anticipate completion in the summer of 2021. After a thor-
ough review of the environmental impacts, we anticipate a final basing decision in
late summer or early fall of 2021.
47. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when will the unit
be activated?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. We anticipate activating the squadron
in fall of 2021.
SPACE FORCE CREATION

48. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, with the creation
of Space Force, is the Air Force currently adequately manned to cover the personnel
needs of both the Space and Air Force?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. Even with the creation of the Space
Force, the Department of the Air Force is too small for what our Nation needs. Our
Air and Cyber, as well as Space, missions require more personnel than requested
in the Fiscal Year 2021 President’s Budget but our approach and budget request
recognize fiscal realities and the need to balance manpower with readiness and
modernization.
Over the Future Years’ Defense Plan, we plan for moderate end strength growth
for both the Air and Space Forces while balancing those missions amongst cost limi-
tations. For the Space Force, we project additional growth and end strength trans-
fers from the Air Force, Army, and Navy to meet the demands of today’s space mis-
sions and the mission growth required to effectively protect, defend and provide
space capabilities in a contested domain.
The Department will continue evaluating and striking a balance for the right
number of personnel against mission, readiness, modernization, and fiscal dynamics.
49. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, you can’t grow air-
men with specialized Space control education overnight and will need to train air-
men in space operations. What do you anticipate the need for increased personnel
to be and by when?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. Last year, we briefed we needed an
additional 1,900 billets to stand up the Space Force. This number represents essen-
tial requirements to stand up not only our Headquarters but mission-focused capa-
bilities, which we are addressing through establishing key Centers or Center-
equivalents for the space domain—Doctrine Center; Warfare Center; Intelligence
Center; Professional Military Education (PME) Center; Test Center; and Personnel
Center.
As the question states, there are additional manpower requirements coming in the
next several years based on the need to add space control units and capabilities to
account for cand forecast threats. As our servicematures and threats by our adver-
saries grow, our projections will be similarly updated to best reflect the resources
required to protect and defend our interests in space.
We are taking a ‘‘clean sheet’’ approach to infuse innovation and improvement,
streamlining processes to reduce costs, save money, and appropriately steward De-
partment resources. Across the FYDP, we are using existing resources to establish
the Space Force within existing DOD topline, made possible by the support of Con-
gress and the DOD.

50. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, when will Space
Force achieve budgetary independence from the Air Force or will it?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. Program Objective Memorandum proc-
ess will allow Gen Raymond to independently advocate for Space Force mission re-
quirements, funding needs, and other key resources essential for a separate service.
Having an independent budget will allow us to continue to advocate for DOD re-
sources so we can protect and defend the space domain.
Moving forward, the Space Force must have stable and consistent funding to en-
able it to address growing threats in the space domain. The Space Force is com-
mitted to minimizing cost and bureaucracy, but its end strength and budget should
reflect rising threats from our adversaries.
294
Under one Department, the Space Force will continue to have close ties to the Air
Force. The Space Force will leverage the Air Force for more than 80 percent of its
enabling functions like business systems management, financial management, and
auditing to significantly reduce cost and avoid duplication of support functions.

51. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Barrett and General Goldfein, what do you envi-
sion the role of the Air National Guard to be under the Space Force?
Secretary BARRETT and General GOLDFEIN. National Guard and Reserve space
units play a critical role in space missions today. Both Reserve and Guard units pro-
vide strategic depth for U.S. space operations, while also recruiting and retaining
personnel with unique civilian experiences across this enterprise.
At this time, existing Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve space units are
aligned with and can continue to integrate effectively with the U.S. Space Force for
the foreseeable future.
We have the unique opportunity to consider a clean sheet, 21st Century approach
to Active Duty /Reserve Component roles and human capital management specially
designed for our mission set. We are currently developing and analyzing innovative
options for the new Service, and will discuss the options with Congress once our
analysis is complete.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DOUG JONES
JROTC FLIGHT ACADEMY

52. Senator JONES. Secretary Barrett, in last year’s NDAA, Congress encouraged
the Air Force to continue and to expand the JROTC Flight Academy program, and
Congress appropriated funds for the program in the fiscal year 2020 bill. This very
successful program provides a phenomenal opportunity for a diverse pool of young
people to gain pilot’s certifications and to help address the pilot shortage in both
civilian and military aviation.
Please provide an update on the fiscal year 2020 Flight Academy program.
Secretary BARRETT. The Air Force Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC)
Flight Academy is in its third year of execution. The Air Force funded 200 Air Force
JROTC cadets to attend the Flight Academy in summer fiscal year 2020 (fiscal year
2018 funded 120 and fiscal year 2019 funded 150). Additionally, this year approxi-
mately 20 ROTC and 10 Civil Air Patrol Cadets will attend. The program has also
grown to 17 partnering universities, of which 4 are Historically Black Colleges and
Universities. Moreover, this year the program reached 51 percent overall diversity
for the first time (fiscal year 2018 equals 40 percent and fiscal year 2019 equals 45
percent), the largest growth in demographic groups was young women. This number
remains significant as AFJROTC boasts almost 900 high schools and 125,000 ca-
dets. As you know, overall AFJROTC cadets are 58 percent minority and 40 percent
female. Air Force JROTC has requested $250,000 through the Air Force Rated Di-
versity initiative, for communication and marketing as the Air Force continues to
work to reach these underrepresented communities and to pull a more diverse tal-
ent pool towards aviation.

53. Senator JONES. Secretary Barrett, is the Air Force committed to funding this
program for fiscal year 2021?
Secretary BARRETT. Yes, the Air Force remains committed to adding $8.4 million
in fiscal year 2021 which provides for 400 scholarships: 300 AFJOTC cadets, 20
ROTC, 20 Civil Air Patrol, and for the first time, 10 USAFA cadets and 50 young
people who will compete for slots through a collaborative effort between Air Force
JROTC, Air Force Recruiting Service and several Nation-wide ‘‘affinity’’ groups such
as Women in Aviation and the Organization of Black Aerospace Professionals.

54. Senator JONES. Secretary Barrett, have you considered its expansion and if
so, please describe your plans.
Secretary BARRETT. The Air Force continues to look for ways to develop a diverse
talent pool. As such, the Air Force views JROTC as an ‘‘untapped human resources
asset’’ for the Nation. Investing in these cadets brings a positive return on invest-
ment for the Air Force and the Nation. The long-term goal for the program is to
maintain funding for 500 scholarships annually, with 400 earmarked for Air Force
JROTC and 100 allocated for other Air Force student groups.
295
SPACE COMMAND BASING DECISION

55. Senator JONES. Secretary Barrett, Space Command was reestablished in 2019
as a combatant command. The Air Force has still not announced the location of that
combatant command’s headquarters. By every measure, Redstone Arsenal in Hunts-
ville is the best choice to be the home of SPACECOM HQ. Can give me an update
on the process and timeline for this basing decision?
Secretary BARRETT. With the establishment of the United States Space Force, the
Department of the Air Force, on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
re-evaluated the basing action for United States Space Command. Our revised ap-
proach leveraged best practices from the Department of the Air Force strategic bas-
ing process and the Army’s recent Futures Command stationing action.
We announced the revised approach with the screening and evaluation criteria on
15 May. The revised approach expands the number of eligible locations for the
USSPACECOM headquarters, and gives communities an opportunity to self-nomi-
nate based on the approved screening and evaluation criteria.
We anticipate making a final selection for the preferred location and reasonable
alternative(s) in early 2021 subject to compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act. In the meantime, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, will remain the pro-
visional location for the headquarters of U.S. Space Command until a permanent
headquarters location is selected and facilities are ready in approximately six years.
AERIAL REFUELING SHORTFALLS

56. Senator JONES. General Goldfein, in order to alleviate the already high stress
on the aerial refueling fleet and to assure we have the capacity to meet the needs
of a high-intensity conflict if we are going to retire our tankers before their replace-
ments are operationally ready, has the Air Force considered options to increase ca-
pacity, rather than just ways to manage a decrease in capacity, such as aircraft
leases or commercial air refueling service contracts?
General GOLDFEIN. Yes, the Air Force is actively considering options to increase
the aerial refueling fleet capacity. We are currently working in coordination with
United States Transportation Command and Air Mobility Command on assessing
the feasibility, affordability, and advisability of using contractor-operated aerial re-
fueling aircraft to support Air Force receiver requirements. A business case analysis
is required to analyze the current tanker air refueling shortfall to determine wheth-
er commercial contract air refueling might be a viable option for the Air Force.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in room
SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cramer, McSally,
Scott, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono,
Kaine, King, Heinrich, Peters, Manchin, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman INHOFE. The meeting will come to order.
The Committee meets today to receive testimony on the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request.
I welcome our witnesses and thank them for their service, both
Dr. Mark Esper and General Mark—we’ve got a pair of ‘‘Marks’’
this morning.
This Committee’s top priority is ensuring the effectiveness and
implementation of the National Defense Strategy. That’s our vote
that we have been adhering to for a long period of time now, about
3 years.
Unfortunately, under the last administration, we asked our mili-
tary to do more with less, and that got us into trouble. Between
2012–2017, we lost $150 billion to sequestration, our defense budg-
et and the readiness of our forces were devastated. I think we all
understand that. As a result, when President Trump came to office,
he inherited an American military in crisis. Thankfully, he deliv-
ered on his promise to begin rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces.
Last year, President Trump negotiated the highest level of de-
fense spending ever, a downpayment towards getting our military
back to where it needs to be. But, that’s not enough. We face a
more dangerous world today than we anticipated we would. Since
then, the Russians have invaded Crimea, backed Assad in Syria,
sent mercenaries to Libya, and violated the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF Treaty]. China began building islands
(297)
298

in the South China Sea, harassing its neighbors more frequently,
and accelerating its military and nuclear modernization.
The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission Report
said, if we’re going to adequately fund the National Defense Strat-
egy (NDS) and take on these threats, it’s going to take a 3 to 5 per-
cent net increase above inflation each year. Now, we’re not doing
that, but that’s what we committed to. We had a meeting here. Ev-
eryone adheres to the logic of this contract that we agreed to. But,
we’re not carrying through with it. That should mean the budget
request would have been, if we had adhered to that, $775 to $790
billion this year. Instead, we’ve got a budget agreement that pro-
vides $740.5 billion for all that we’ve got to do for our military de-
fense. That’s not your fault, not you guys, but the Congress needs
to do more, be more realistic about what it’s going to take to main-
tain a force capable of deterring and, if needed, defeating our en-
emies.
We’re trying to do more while spending less, and the math just
doesn’t work that way. That’s why we’ve—you’ve seen so many sto-
ries about how we can’t buy necessary equipment. That’s why we
can’t do the training that we need to do. That’s why we can’t give
our troops the tools that they need to keep the peace. It’s all in the
NDS.
We can pay them now, or we can pay them later, and leave the
debt to our children and grandchildren to pay. They’ll be doing so
in the more dangerous world if we don’t fix the budget tragedy that
we’re facing right now.
I know you’ve tried to do the best you can within the limits of
what you have been given. I appreciate that you’re already have
found a lot of savings, and you are to be applauded for that. That’s
hard to do with the decreasing budget which we have today.
On that happy note, I look forward to continuing to work with
you to make sure our troops have the resources that they need to
fight and win.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses today, thank them
for their service to the Nation, and I look forward to their testi-
mony.
Before we consider the details of the budget request, I’d like to
address some broader concerns I have with the Department.
The National Defense Strategy Commission Report, released in
November 2018, expressed significant concern about the balance of
power between civilian and military leadership at the Department
of Defense. Specifically, the Commission Report stated, ‘‘Civilian
voices have been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S.
defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of ci-
vilian control.’’
Unfortunately, the situation has only gotten worse since the
Commission issued its report. The Office of the Secretary of De-
fense is without Senate-confirmed leadership in many of its most
important positions. In the Policy Office, of the seven positions re-
quiring Senate confirmation, there are only two confirmed individ-
299

uals, and one of these is now serving as the Acting Under Sec-
retary. We just received the nomination for Under Secretary of Per-
sonnel and Readiness, after a 2-year vacancy. Then, on Monday,
the administration withdrew the nomination of Elaine McCusker to
be the Department’s Controller. These vacancies continue to chal-
lenge the Department’s ability to effectively respond to national se-
curity challenges and undermine civilian inputs into the decision
making process.
With political appointees largely absent, a large amount of work
in the Department is now being done by career civil servants, and
they, too, are beleaguered. Congress shares the blame in adding to
civilian workforce woes with headquarters cuts. However, pay
freezes, hiring freezes, exemption from collective bargaining, and
having career civil servants carry the weight of defending political
decisions is likely to lead to a hollowing out of the workforce whose
experience and expertise we desperately need.
Furthermore, October 23rd of last year, I should say—last year,
not this year—I joined Chairman Inhofe and our House Armed
Services Committee (HASC) counterparts in sending you, Mr. Sec-
retary, a letter expressing concern about the Department’s failure
to properly empower and staff the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in
order to fully exercise its congressionally mandated responsibilities
for oversight and advocacy of Special Operations Forces. This is an-
other position that has had an Acting Principal for more than half
the administration, and it’s unacceptable, frankly, that we still
haven’t received a response to our letter, more than 4 months later.
Now, turning to the budget request before us, the fiscal year
2021 budget, the Department of Defense seeks $636.4 billion for
the base budget and $69 billion in overseas contingency operations
funds, of which $16 billion is designated to pay for base require-
ments. In its base budget request, the Defense Department high-
lights resources targeted for the modernization of a more lethal
force that is prepared for a high-end fight against near-peer com-
petitors and to operationalize the National Defense Strategy, in-
cluding investments in the space and cyber domains, the recapital-
ization of our nuclear deterrent, and the largest-ever research and
development (R&D) budget for artificial intelligence, directed en-
ergy, and hypersonic weapons. The base budget request also sup-
ports the quality of life for our servicemembers by sustaining fam-
ily support initiatives and by authorizing a 3 percent pay raise.
However, it is clear that the base budget request will not cover all
the Defense Department’s requirements. So, once again, we have
been presented with an overly generous use of the OCO account.
I acknowledge that both Congress and other administrations have
included elements of base funding in OCO accounts in the past, but
overloading the OCO request with $16 billion worth of activities
that truly belong in the base budget is difficult to justify.
I would also highlight that this year’s budget reflects the out-
comes of the Secretary’s defense-wide review. The Department sub-
mitted a report to Congress in January that stated, ‘‘In an era of
flattening budgets, it is more important than ever that we find cre-
ative ways to fund NDS-driven activities.’’ The review identified
more than $5 million in savings from defense programs that were
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deemed a lower priority or inconsistent with the priorities of the
NDS. Mr. Secretary, let me commend you for taking this review on.
It’s a tough job, and you did it thoroughly, and you did it with
quite a bit of energy.
Now, these savings will be taking, however, from, among other
things, health affairs, DOD schools, and cooperative threat reduc-
tion programs. So, I’m interested in hearing more about the anal-
ysis behind the programs that were cut or eliminated, and the
areas in which these resources were reinvested.
Scrutinizing current programs to determine which ones support
the Department’s priorities and which ones should be reduced or
eliminated is appropriate and necessary, and again, I commend
you. However, it is somewhat disingenuous to argue that flat de-
fense budgets have forced the Department to realign funds inter-
nally to support NDS implementation, when the Department is
making affirmative decisions to divert funding from NDS priorities.
For example, the Department recently approved the transfer of
$3.8 billion from National Guard equipment, additional combat air-
craft, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets,
and amphibious ships in order to pay for the President’s border
wall. In addition, the budget request before us proposes significant
cuts to initiatives like the European Defense Initiative (EDI). This
is after funding for several military construction projects in EDI
was taken out last year to, again, pay for the wall. Our close bond
with our European allies and partners is one of our greatest stra-
tegic advantages and key to countering the near-peer competitor
competition of Russia. However, the cut to EDI sends exactly the
wrong message to our allies and our adversaries.
It is the responsibility of this Committee to ensure the men and
women we send into harm’s way have the resources necessary to
complete their mission and return home safely, and I’m proud that
this Committee, under the Chairman’s leadership, has always
worked in a bipartisan fashion during this process. I look forward
to working with all the Committee Members to come to a reason-
able agreement again this year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We will now have opening statements from Secretary Esper and
General Milley. Your entire statement will be made a part of the
record, and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK T. ESPER, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Secretary ESPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Mem-
bers of this Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in
support of the President’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2021. I’m
joined today by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Mark Milley.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy provides a clear roadmap for
the Department of Defense to address the reemergence of long-term
strategic competition from near-peer competitors, China, then Rus-
sia. Throughout the Pentagon and across the Joint Force, the NDS
guides our decisions and actions as we adapt the force to simulta-
301

neously contend with the threats of today while preparing for the
challenges of tomorrow. We do this by increasing the readiness and
lethality of our warfighters, strengthening our alliances and part-
nerships, and reforming the way the Department does business.
Additionally, we have placed renewed emphasis on taking care of
our servicemembers and their families.
The Department is grateful for the strong support provided in
the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
and DOD appropriations, which allowed us to make vital invest-
ments in our military’s modernization, enabled the creation of the
Space Force, and provided our servicemembers with the largest pay
increase in a decade. Our continued success is contingent upon pre-
dictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding, and I encourage
Congress to pass a full-year spending package for all fiscal year
2021 on time to avoid the debilitating effects of another continuing
resolution.
The Department’s total fiscal year 2021 budget request is $705.4
billion. This represents a minor increase from fiscal year 2020 en-
acted amount of $704.6 billion, but does not keep pace with infla-
tion. Given this flattened funding level, we were required to make
many tough decisions to ensure our highest priorities were ade-
quately funded. To enable our decision maker, we conducted a com-
prehensive defense-wide review aimed at reallocating resources
from programs and activities that offer a low return on investment
relative to the goals and objectives of the NDS. Over a 4-month pe-
riod, we conducted over 20 review sessions examining almost $100
billion in programs, agencies, and activities that make up the
fourth estate. This review generated $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2021
savings that were reinvested back into readiness and lethality ef-
forts.
Each of the military services is also instituting a similar review
process across their budgets to achieve the same outcome of re-
aligning resources and finding savings that can be reinvested into
higher priorities.
Additionally, I have initiated the process of conducting full re-
views of all combatant commands to properly align our global mili-
tary posture to the NDS. This effort will enable the Department to
shift greater emphasis to our highest-priority region, the Indo-Pa-
cific, or allow us to return troops home to build readiness. Thus far,
we have ongoing reviews of AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM, and will
expand to other commands over the coming months.
My recent decision to deploy elements of an Army Security Force
Assistance Brigade to Africa to replace units from an Infantry Bri-
gade Combat Team is an example of how this process is enabling
us to better match resources to the mission of each combatant com-
mand.
The Department’s fiscal year 2021 budget request reflects the
same disciplined adherence to the NDS. To preserve our over-
match, we have made significant investments into several critical
technologies that will alter the future battlefield. Our RDT&E
budget is the largest in our history and prioritizes hypersonics,
microelectronics, 5G communications, autonomous systems, and ar-
tificial intelligence. We are moving forward with a long-overdue re-
capitalization of the Nation’s nuclear triad, with key investments
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in the ground-based strategic deterrent, the B–21 stealth bomber,
the Columbia-class submarine, and improved nuclear command,
control, and communications systems, to name a few. We are also
enhancing our missile defense capabilities to protect against the
growing threat of advanced enemy missile systems.
This budget request expands our capacity to defend our interests
in space as we consolidate much of our space enterprise into the
Space Force. It also advances the Department’s cyber capabilities,
allowing us to protect our digital infrastructure while disrupting
covert foreign malign activity. This includes defending the integrity
of our democracy by assisting in the security of our elections.
Finally, in the traditional air, land, and sea domains, we are fo-
cused on modernizing our formations by divesting from platforms
and equipment that are no longer suited for the emerging strategic
environment. The Department appreciates this Committee’s advo-
cacy of the National Defense Strategy, and we value Congress’s
guidance on reform.
I now ask for your support so that we may fully implement our
decisions and move forward with the investments needed to ensure
America’s military maintains our competitive advantage, continues
to deter war, and preserves our Nation’s security.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Esper follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MARK T. ESPER
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Com-
mittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of the President’s budget
request for fiscal year 2021.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) provides a clear roadmap for the De-
partment of Defense (DOD) to address the re-emergence of long-term strategic com-
petition from near-peer competitors: China, then Russia. Throughout the Pentagon
and across the Joint Force, the NDS guides our decisions and actions as we adapt
the force to simultaneously contend with the threats of today, while preparing for
the challenges of tomorrow. We do this by increasing the readiness and lethality of
our warfighters, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and reforming the
way DOD does business. Additionally, we have placed renewed emphasis on taking
care of our servicemembers and their families.
The DOD is grateful for the strong support provided in the Fiscal Year 2020 Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the Fiscal Year 2020 DOD Appropria-
tions Act. This legislation supported vital investments in our military’s moderniza-
tion, enabled the creation of the Space Force, and provided our servicemembers with
the largest pay increase in a decade. Our continued success as a Department is con-
tingent upon predictable, adequate, sustained, and timely funding. We encourage
Congress to pass a full-year spending package for fiscal year 2021 on-time to avoid
the debilitating effects of another Continuing Resolution.
The DOD’s total fiscal year 2021 budget request is $705.4 billion, consisting of
$636.4 billion for base requirements with an additional $16 billion categorized as
overseas contingency operations for base, and $53 billion for overseas contingency
operations. After removing disaster relief emergency funding, this year’s budget re-
quest represents a minor increase from the fiscal year 2020 enacted amount of
$704.6 billion, but does not keep pace with inflation. Given this flattened funding
level, we made many tough decisions to ensure our highest priorities were ade-
quately funded.
To guide our decision making, we initiated a comprehensive Defense-Wide Review
(DWR) aimed at reallocating resources from programs and activities that offer low
return on investment relative to the goals and objectives of the NDS. Over a 4
month period, we conducted over 20 review sessions, examining almost $100 billion
in programs, agencies, and activities that make up the ‘‘Fourth Estate.’’ This review
generated $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2021 savings for reinvestment in areas such as
303
nuclear modernization, space, missile defense, hypersonic weapons, artificial intel-
ligence, and 5G communications.
Additionally, to make room for investments in future capabilities, each of the
Services has divested some legacy systems. These were necessary measures to en-
sure our highest priority programs were sufficiently resourced. I urge Congress to
support these tough choices, as the alternative is to underprepare for the challenges
of great power competition.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget request is directed toward achieving irrevers-
ible implementation of the NDS by focusing on strengthening military readiness and
lethality; advancing critical modernization efforts across all domains: air, land, sea,
space, and cyber; prioritizing nuclear deterrence recapitalization; enhancing missile
defense capabilities; and providing our servicemembers and their families with the
quality of life they deserve.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Today’s global security environment remains complex and volatile. The re-emer-
gence of great power competition has challenged the United States military’s long-
held competitive advantage in certain key areas. Meanwhile, rogue regimes continue
to foster regional instability, while terrorist organizations seek out sanctuary in new
parts of the world. It is critical that the DOD maintains the momentum provided
by the last few budgets, which enabled vital investments in modernization and
lethality, and enhanced our military’s deterrence capability.
The Department’s highest priority remains China, as its government continues to
use—and misuse—its diplomatic, economic, and military strength to attempt to alter
the landscape of power and reshape the world in its favor, often at the expense of
others. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to invest heavily in the mod-
ernization and expansion of its military in areas such as space, cyber, electronic
warfare, undersea warfare, fighter aircraft, bombers, long-range missiles, and other
anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
China’s goals are clearly stated: by 2035, the CCP’s leaders seek to complete its
military modernization, and, by 2049, become a preeminent global military power.
What is most troubling is that China is pursuing these objectives by any means nec-
essary, including forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, cyber espio-
nage, and commercial acquisitions. Once Beijing obtains and develops these tech-
nologies, it leverages them to intimidate or coerce smaller states, while simulta-
neously narrowing the United States’ competitive advantage. When American com-
panies fall victim to state-backed cyber theft, are forced to surrender intellectual
property, or are undercut by a Chinese corporation selling below cost, it erodes our
important industrial and innovation bases and diminishes our military overmatch.
As part of its efforts to manipulate the long-standing free and open international
order to its advantage, Beijing continues to militarize features in the South China
Sea, threatening freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce throughout
the region. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China is expanding its political
and economic ties across Asia, Europe, South America and Africa, with the less pub-
licized objective of expanding the People’s Liberation Army’s influence and reach.
Meanwhile, Russia remains intent on upending international norms and re-
asserting regional dominance by violating the sovereignty of neighboring states,
breaking treaty obligations, and engaging in malicious cyber operations on a global
scale. Moscow continues to press forward with the rapid modernization of its mili-
tary. Its sophisticated coordination of drones and cyber attacks during its invasion
of Ukraine, as well as its recent public display of new nuclear hypersonic systems,
validate our concerns about Russia’s burgeoning military capabilities and intentions
to undermine the NATO alliance.
Concurrently, North Korea seeks to build legitimacy through the development of
a variety of nuclear, conventional, and unconventional weapons, and by growing its
ballistic missile capabilities. Our forces on the Korean Peninsula remain at a high
state of readiness, alongside our Republic of Korea counterparts. While we support
continued diplomatic efforts to bring about lasting peace in Korea, we remain pre-
pared to fight and win tonight, if required.
In the Middle East, the United States remains committed to working alongside
our allies and partners to advance our strategic priorities for the region: ensuring
the enduring defeat of ISIS, supporting a strong and independent Iraq, and deter-
ring Iranian aggression. The United States’ actions over the past year, including the
deployment of additional defensive forces to the region, the defeat of ISIS’ physical
caliphate, and the operations that resulted in the deaths of terrorist leaders Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi and Qasem Soleimani, were essential to restoring deterrence and
degrading our enemy’s military capabilities.
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Guided by the NDS, the DOD seeks to right-size our force disposition in all thea-
ters over the long-term to better compete with China and Russia. Concurrently, we
must sustain efforts to counter rogue regimes such as Iran, while bolstering the ca-
pability of our allies and partners to maintain regional stability. Enhancements to
our posture in the Middle East in recent months are consistent with this strategy.
BUILD A MORE LETHAL FORCE

The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget request is focused on designing a future force
that is dominant in all warfighting domains. This is particularly important at a
time when our strategic competitors are developing advanced capabilities to chal-
lenge our areas of traditional military overmatch. We must continue to invest in
modernization to solidify our competitive advantages and build new areas of asym-
metric advantage.
Nuclear Modernization
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the need for the nuclear triad, vali-
dating DOD’s long-overdue recapitalization of the nation’s nuclear armed missiles,
submarines, bombers, dual-capable aircraft, and related infrastructure to keep the
U.S. nuclear deterrent secure, effective, and reliable for decades to come. Most of
the Nation’s strategic nuclear delivery systems, built in the 1980s and prior, are
reaching the end of their service life in the 2025 to 2035 timeframe, with all cur-
rently fielded systems having been extended well beyond their original service lives.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget invests $28.9 billion to sustain and modernize
all three legs of the triad with key investments in the ground-based strategic deter-
rent, the B–21 stealth bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, and enhanced nu-
clear command, control and communications (NC3) systems.
Missile Defeat and Defense
The Department is committed to implementing the 2019 Missile Defense Review,
which calls for comprehensive missile defense capabilities, flexibility and adapt-
ability, tighter offense-defense integration and interoperability, and highlights the
importance of space. The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget funds enhancements to U.S.
Missile Defeat and Defense (MDD) capabilities to defend the Homeland, deployed
forces, allies, and partners against an increasingly complex adversarial missile
threat. This budget request increases missile defense capacity and capability to keep
pace with adversary missile systems, while investing in new approaches to a layered
defense of the Homeland.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget includes $20.3 billion for MDD, which includes
$9.2 billion for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), $7.9 billion in regional and stra-
tegic missile defense capabilities outside of the MDA, and $3.2 billion in missile de-
feat or left-of-launch activities. Notable investments include the development of the
next-generation interceptor, and increased funding for the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense.
Critical Technologies
We are in the midst of rapid technological change that has the potential to fun-
damentally alter the character of war. Our adversaries are systematically and stra-
tegically developing and fielding advanced systems, eroding the advantage the
United States military has maintained in conventional warfare. Maintaining techno-
logical superiority is essential to our future security. To ensure we lead in the devel-
opment and fielding of new systems that harness these advancements, we must
prioritize critical technology investments.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget reflects this commitment by investing $106.6
billion in research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E), the largest
RDT&E budget in our history. The DOD’s focus on research and technology efforts
to bring advanced capabilities to the field will ensure we maintain overmatch
against near-peer competitors. This budget request maximizes the amount of money
we can effectively and responsibly spend on these critical and emerging tech-
nologies. Select efforts include:
• Hypersonics—Accelerates development of Army Long Range Hypersonic Weap-
on; increases funding for Navy Conventional Prompt Strike, and Air Force Ad-
vanced Rapid Response Weapon ($3.2 billion).
• Microelectronics/5G—Accelerates our access to both advanced commercial and
specialty microelectronics while adopting a zero-trust security paradigm; has-
tens our mastery of ‘‘ubiquitous connectivity,’’ so that we can fully leverage the
power of 5G technologies for our mission, while preventing our adversaries from
using it against us ($1.5 billion).
305
• Autonomy—Enhances speed of maneuver and lethality in contested environ-
ments; develops human/machine teaming ($1.7 billion).
• Artificial Intelligence (AI)—Continues the AI investments that focus on next-
generation AI R&D (research and development) at DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency], expands the intelligence AI pathfinder Project
Maven, and accelerates fielding of AI capabilities at scale to meet warfighter
needs through the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) ($0.8 billion).
More so than any other emerging technology, AI is transforming our society and
affecting the ways in which we do business, interact socially, and conduct war. Our
competitors have also recognized the transformative potential of AI and are invest-
ing heavily in it as they modernize their military forces. Maintaining a competitive
advantage in AI is essential to our national security.
The DOD is committed to employing AI in a responsible and lawful manner that
promotes our Nation’s values. As such, I have approved the implementation of the
DOD’s AI Ethics Principles to ensure the development and use of AI is guided by
an ethical framework. These principles will help guide, inform, and inculcate the re-
sponsible use of AI—in both combat and non-combat systems—by the Department
to help maintain our technological edge, while upholding our values. By adopting
these Principles, DOD will lead the way in the responsible use of AI across the en-
tire government and with our allies and partners.
Space
The NDS recognizes that space is fundamental to U.S. prosperity and national se-
curity. Great power competitors are increasingly developing weapons to disrupt sat-
ellites and other space-based capabilities. The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA created the
sixth branch of the military, the United States Space Force (USSF), within the De-
partment of the Air Force, to organize, train, and equip military and civilian per-
sonnel to maintain freedom of operation in, from, and to space. As the first new
military service established in over 70 years, the USSF will protect and defend our
military capabilities and economic interests in the space domain as our near-peer
competitors continue to expand their presence in space.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget invests $18 billion in the space warfighting
domain. These investments will enable the expeditious building of USSF, reduce
risk to satellite communications jamming, build resiliency in global positioning sys-
tems, improve space-based missile warning capabilities, and increase our space
launch capacity.
To manage DOD space forces efficiently and holistically, the Department’s vision
remains to consolidate the preponderance of space missions, units, resources, and
personnel from the existing Military Services into the new USSF. These transfers
are critical to unifying today’s disparate space-related research, development, acqui-
sition, fielding, and operations into a single organization led by a single leader. The
DOD’s goal is to transfer the appropriate space-related assets into the USSF no
later than fiscal year 2022, consistent with law.
Cyber
Cyber attacks represent a long-term threat to our national strength and military
advantage. Persistent and sophisticated adversaries are continuously targeting our
systems and networks through malicious cyber activity. This challenge is equally
applicable to public and private networks across the United States. A proactive
DOD cyber approach is necessary to guard against these threats by defending for-
ward to protect our infrastructure and disrupt covert foreign malign activity. This
includes defending the integrity of our democratic processes by assisting in the secu-
rity of our elections.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget invests $9.8 billion into cyberspace activities
that continue to build on the goals laid out in the DOD Cyber Strategy. This request
improves cybersecurity by mitigating key cyber deficiencies and strengthening our
defensive capabilities to counter adversary efforts to exploit U.S. technology. While
robust defensive cyber capabilities are our priority, the joint force is also improving
offensive capabilities to engage threats at a time and place of our choosing.
The Cyber Operations budget includes $2.2 billion to support the Cyber Mission
Force (CMF), consisting of 133 teams working as the operational arm of U.S. Cyber
Command, to carry out cyberspace operations in defense of the Nation’s interests.
Cyberspace domain investments, underpinned by digital modernization efforts, pro-
vide our CMF the tools necessary to execute offensive and defensive cyberspace op-
erations.
Air
In the air domain, we continue procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft
and modernization programs for existing Navy and Air Force strike fighter aircraft
306
and bombers. We also include a cost-effective mix of 4th generation fighter aircraft
by procuring 24 additional F/A–18E/F Super Hornets and capitalizing on existing
Foreign Military Sales production lines to procure 12 F–15 EX aircraft. This will
increase readiness of the Navy and Air Force fighter fleet and relieve pressure on
the aging legacy platforms. Additionally, we continue procurement of the KC–46A
aerial refueling tanker, which will replace aging legacy tankers.
Sea
In the sea domain, the DOD remains committed to building a Navy of at least
355 ships. The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget request procures eight surface and
subsurface battle-force ships, including one Columbia-class ballistic missile sub-
marine and one Virginia-class submarine. Importantly, we remain focused on the
readiness of our current fleet—our top priority—by allocating an additional $3.4 bil-
lion into the Navy’s operations and maintenance account relative to fiscal year 2020
(excluding disaster relief emergency funding).
To maintain our maritime dominance and freedom of maneuver, we are exploring
a range of alternative ‘‘future fleet’’ designs that are capable of meeting the de-
mands of the NDS, while remaining compatible with future warfighting doctrine,
threat developments, and budget constraints. In concept, the future fleet must
prioritize integrated Navy and Marine Corps operations; distributed awareness and
lethality; survivability in a high-intensity conflict; adaptability in a complex world;
the ability to project power, including through precision long-range fires; and dem-
onstrate presence, providing a visible deterrent to potential adversaries while reas-
suring our allies and partners.
The composition of the future force will emphasize fewer large surface platforms,
more and smaller surface combatants, lightly/optionally-manned ships, and an
ample submarine force. Just as the Air Force and Army are integrating more re-
motely piloted aircraft and optionally manned ground vehicles, the Navy must begin
to integrate and deploy lightly/optionally-manned ships. Future analysis and experi-
mentation will drive the NDS-based force structure for the Navy and Marine Corps,
and will inform the direction of future shipbuilding plans.
One of my top priorities is ensuring that the Department has a robust, data-driv-
en review of the future integrated naval force. To that end, I have initiated a war
game and analysis process led by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to evaluate pro-
posals from across the DOD, to possibly include experts from the Naval War Col-
lege, Naval Postgraduate School, and Marine Corps University. The Department of
the Navy intends to continually iterate the recent Integrated Naval Force Structure
Assessment and align what it learns with the annual planning, programming, and
budgeting process.
Land
In the land domain, the DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget improves the lethality and
survivability of ground forces by divesting legacy systems and investing in modern-
ized combat systems that will be needed by the future Joint Force. Building on the
research and development investments made over the past 2 years, we continue to
prioritize funding for the development and testing of long-range precision fires, fu-
ture vertical lift, ground combat vehicles, air and missile defense, the network, and
soldier lethality systems to replace many of the Army’s aging platforms. This budget
will ensure our ground forces remain ready and lethal by upgrading 89 M–1 Abrams
main-battle tanks, procuring over 4,200 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles and 72 Am-
phibious Combat Vehicles, and upgrading over 150 Stryker Vehicles.
Joint Warfighting Concept
In addition to developing these capabilities we must also modernize how we fight.
Our budget request supports the creation of a new Joint Warfighting Concept to en-
able our transition to All-Domain Operations by aligning our personnel, equipment,
training, and doctrine.
This concept builds on the recent experimentation conducted by the Services as
we develop a new approach to integrating our warfighting capabilities. As part of
this effort, the Air Force is leading the Department’s new Joint All Domain Com-
mand and Control (JADC2) initiative, which is critical to linking any sensor to any
shooter on the battlefield in real time.
Dynamic Force Employment
Our military’s force posture must be adaptable to account for the uncertainty that
exists in the strategic environment. Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) provides op-
tions for proactive and scalable use of the Joint Force in response to emerging secu-
rity requirements. DFE will allow the DOD to compete more effectively by employ-
ing military forces outside of the steady-state pattern of deployments our adver-
307
saries have come to expect. This concept will induce unpredictability into our oper-
ational decisions, and demonstrate the capability to rapidly reposition forces in re-
sponse to changing security conditions.
STRENGTHEN ALLIES AND ATTRACT NEW PARTNERS

The United States’ competitive advantage is not only a result of our unrivaled
warfighters and state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, but also our unmatched
network of alliances and partnerships. Forged over decades of shared values, inter-
ests, and sacrifice, these relationships provide us a strategic edge our adversaries
cannot match. The United States military works every day to strengthen and ex-
pand the alliances and partnerships that form the backbone of the free and open
international order, which has enabled security and prosperity for millions around
the world.
Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific remains the DOD’s number one priority region. We have an en-
during commitment to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific in which all nations,
large and small, are secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth
consistent with accepted international rules and norms. We are committed to en-
hancing this shared vision alongside our allies and partners in the region.
However, an increasingly aggressive China continues to undermine regional sta-
bility through its coercion of neighboring states, illegitimate maritime claims, and
predatory economic practices. Unlike the Communist Party of China, the United
States respects the sovereignty of all nations, regardless of their size or strength.
Our approach continues to prove itself superior to Beijing’s, as evidenced by our
growing partnerships across the region.
For example, last November in Vietnam, I announced the provision of a second
high-endurance cutter to enhance the Vietnamese Coast Guard’s capabilities and
build greater trust between our Nations. In Thailand, I signed Joint Vision 2020
with the Prime Minister in order to chart a course for increased interoperability and
expanded exercises and training between our forces. In December, I signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding with Singapore announcing the establishment of a fighter
training detachment in Guam, which will deepen our defense cooperation.
That same month, the United States hosted the second ever India 2–Plus-2 Min-
isterial, where the world’s two largest democracies continued to strengthen our ties
and finalized important agreements that will expand our ability to co-produce and
co-develop critical technologies. Our burgeoning defense relationship, evidenced by
the new Tiger Triumph annual amphibious exercise, will be crucial to improving our
military interoperability.
NATO
The United States’ leadership has been critical to getting the world’s strongest
military alliance back on the right trajectory. President Trump succeeded in ele-
vating the issues of burden sharing and readiness, securing widespread agreement
that NATO members must do more. As a result, our NATO allies invested an addi-
tional $130 billion into defense since 2016, and are projected to reach $400 billion
by 2024. Additionally, the number of member states that currently meet the 2 per-
cent GDP commitment has doubled over the past 3 years.
Last December, NATO reached its goal of identifying 100 percent of the contribu-
tions for the NATO Readiness Initiative. This plan provides the alliance with the
capability to have 30 mechanized battalions, 30 combat vessels, and 30 air squad-
rons ready to fight in 30 days.
In fiscal year 2020, the United States military will deploy over 20,000 troops to
participate in Defender 2020, one of the largest military exercises in Europe in the
last 25 years. Defender will demonstrate our force projection capabilities, exercise
the Army’s ability to conduct Division-level maneuvers, and enhance interoperability
with our allies and partners in the region, thereby deterring conflict.
Middle East
In the Middle East, we remain committed to supporting a regional constellation
of strategic partners to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS, deter Iranian malign ac-
tivities, and support a strong and independent Iraq.
The United States maintains its leadership role in the 82-member Defeat-ISIS co-
alition. Together, the United States and its partner forces have destroyed ISIS’s
physical caliphate and liberated millions from its barbaric rule. United States troops
deployed to Iraq and Syria continue to work alongside our allies and partners to
ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.
308
After months of escalating acts of aggression from the Iranian regime, the United
States military took decisive action to protect our personnel and interests, which in-
cluded a no-notice deployment of 3,500 soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne. The
DOD also helped internationalize the response by leading the development of the
International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC) in September 2019, which pro-
tects freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. The IMSC cur-
rently includes contributions from seven nations and continues to deter malign ac-
tivity in the Strait of Hormuz.
In Afghanistan, we remain committed to ending the war through a political agree-
ment that ensures Afghanistan cannot be used as a safe haven for terrorist groups
to attack the United States. On February 29, the United States signed an agree-
ment with the Taliban that paves the way for intra-Afghan negotiations in pursuit
of a permanent ceasefire and lasting peace. If the Taliban honors the arrangement,
the United States will reduce its military presence to 8,600 troops within a matter
of months, in line with commensurate reductions from other NATO allies that con-
tribute forces. If progress continues, the United States and its partners will further
reduce our presence over the next 14 months until all United States and coalition
forces are out of Afghanistan. The entire process will be conditions-based, and
should the Taliban renege on its commitments, we will adjust our withdrawal
timeline accordingly. Throughout the course of our drawdown, we will retain the
necessary capabilities to protect our servicemembers and support the Afghan secu-
rity forces.
International Professional Military Education
The DOD is committed to expanding our International Professional Military Edu-
cation (IPME) to deepen our defense relationships and build partner capacity.
IPME, provided principally via the International Military Education and Training
program, is a low-cost program that builds long-term relationships with future for-
eign leaders, strengthening our alliances and partnership throughout the world. In
concert with the State Department, I plan to increase participation by 10 percent
in fiscal year 2021. As we do so, we will ensure rigorous vetting of the students se-
lected to participate, much like we do for the U.S. recruits with whom they train.
REFORM THE DEPARTMENT

Defense-Wide Review
The DOD is aggressively pursuing reforms to free up time, money, and manpower
to reinvest back into our highest NDS priorities. Our most significant reform effort,
the Defense-Wide Review, consisted of an extensive review of 50 Defense-Wide orga-
nizations and activities. In 4 months, we made over 120 programmatic decisions
generating $5.7 billion in fiscal year 2021 savings, $0.2 billion in Working Capital
Fund efficiencies, and another $2.1 billion in activities and functions realigned to
the Services, demonstrating the DOD’s commitment to responsible stewardship of
American taxpayer dollars.
Moving forward, we will institutionalize the Defense-Wide Review to ensure we
remain focused on increasing performance, decreasing cost, and remaining aligned
with our priorities. To this end, we have established a new governance model over
most Defense-Wide agencies and activities led by the DOD’s Chief Management Of-
ficer who will now: review current year budget execution and develop a consolidated
annual program and budget for Defense-Wide organization and accounts; conduct
bottom-up reviews of Defense Agencies and Field Activities (DAFAs); and reform
business operations and evaluate DAFA performance against measureable business
goals.
Additionally, each of the Military Services has instituted a similar budget review
process to achieve the same outcome of realigning resources and finding savings
that can be reinvested into higher priorities.
We value Congress’ guidance on reform, and we now ask for its support to fully
implement our decisions. We look forward to working with Congress to ensure that
necessary adjustments are made in the Fiscal Year 2021 NDAA and the Fiscal Year
2021 DOD Appropriations Act so that we may realize these savings and continue
investing in NDS priorities.
Operational Reviews
The DOD has also initiated a full review of all military forces, programs, and ac-
tivities within each combatant command to ensure alignment with NDS priorities.
This effort will enable the DOD to shift greater emphasis to our top concern—
China—or allow us to return troops to home station to build readiness. Thus far,
we have ongoing reviews of United States Africa Command and United States
Southern Command. My recent decision to deploy an Army Security Force Assist-
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ance Brigade to Africa to relieve a Brigade Combat Team is the first of many deci-
sions to rebalance the force for great power competition.
In parallel with this initiative, we are reviewing all major operational plans to
ensure they are aligned with our policy objectives, starting with China and Russia.
This integrated civil-military review process will ensure we remain ready for any
crisis today, while also identifying key gaps, shortfalls, and limitations in our plans
that need to be mitigated.
AUDIT

The DOD owes accountability and transparency to the American people, as the
taxpayers deserve a level of confidence that their money is being spent effectively.
In 2018, the DOD completed its first-ever consolidated financial statement audit,
covering almost $2.8 trillion in assets. Now an annual institutionalized process, a
second audit was subsequently completed in 2019, which showed that over 25 per-
cent of the first year’s findings have already been corrected, and there was no evi-
dence of fraud or abuse.
The audit is about more than just compliance and financial management. Quali-
tative changes are happening every day that will, over time, result in real change
to the way the Department does business. The DOD workforce’s understanding of
audit requirements continues to grow, and, as efficiencies are gained, value is being
realized. The audit is helping galvanize change that advances cybersecurity, prop-
erty management, inventory, and readiness, for the benefit of the warfighter and
the American people.
PEOPLE

We recognize that our people—servicemembers, military families and DOD civil-
ians—are our most valuable resource and the key to accomplishing the objectives
outlined in the NDS. It is critical that we remain committed to taking care of our
people so they can focus maximum attention and energy on accomplishing the mis-
sion. Everything we do depends on the dedication and skill of the men and women
who sacrifice their own comfort and safety to safeguard the freedom we enjoy every
day.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget supports a three percent military pay raise
and an increase in end strength of approximately 5,600 personnel. To enable our
ability to continue to attract, develop, and retain a highly talented workforce, we
are pursuing several initiatives to improve quality of life for our people.
Military Housing Privatization Initiative
The DOD has an obligation to ensure our servicemembers and their families have
access to safe and secure housing. Under the Military Housing Privatization Initia-
tive (MHPI) legislation enacted in 1996, the DOD began privatizing installation
family housing. Following significant initial improvements to on-base housing units
many years ago, the DOD reduced its oversight activities over a period of several
years, resulting in cases of sub-standard living conditions for some residents living
in privatized housing.
Since early 2019, we have taken extensive action to improve the quality of instal-
lation housing. Senior DOD leaders now meet regularly with key executives from
each of the MHPI partners to ensure our initiatives continue to progress. Improve-
ments to date include the development of a universal lease framework, increased
training for installation commanders and housing personnel, and the hiring of addi-
tional housing staff across the Military Departments, to include resident advocates.
Additionally, the DOD recently released a Tenant Bill of Rights to protect and em-
power our servicemembers and their families. Fifteen of the 18 rights will be fully
available by May 1, 2020. The three remaining pertain to legal agreements between
the Department and the housing providers that the DOD cannot unilaterally
change. We are working aggressively to resolve these issues, and, if needed, will re-
quest Congressional support. In the meantime, servicemembers and their families
can leverage their military department’s procedures to address and resolve issues,
while we work toward formal, uniform solutions.
The DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget increases funding for Military Housing Privat-
ization Support by $54.6 million, an 82 percent increase over the fiscal year 2020
budget request. This funding increase enables enhanced oversight of MHPI housing
consistent with the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA requirements, to include staff aug-
mentation and additional training, improved quality control measures, and database
development and management.
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Military Spouse Employment
Military spouses living in the United States face an average unemployment rate
of 24 percent, nearly 7 times the current national rate. Many employers are hesitant
to hire military spouses due to the frequent permanent change of station moves as-
sociated with military life. Furthermore, military spouses face significant financial
hurdles when they are required to renew their occupational licenses following a
move to a new state. These employment challenges impact the readiness of the force
and adversely affect servicemember retention.
The DOD continues to work with State governments to develop policies and legis-
lation that grant state-to-state licensure reciprocity or other methods to ease
credentialing for military spouses. Many states have enacted positive changes, and
we are calling on them to continue this trend. To support spouses’ careers and en-
courage a high quality of life for military families, I recently directed the Secretaries
of the Military Departments to include military spousal hiring assistance and other
family considerations as criteria in future basing decisions.
Access to Childcare
Childcare is a workforce issue that directly impacts the efficiency, readiness, and
retention of the total force. Earlier this month, I issued a directive prioritizing uni-
formed servicemembers for childcare at on-base Child Development Centers. The
Department is committed to ensuring quality care and meeting the increased de-
mand for child care services due to frequent deployments and high operational
tempo. I will be pursuing other initiatives along these lines in the coming months.
CONCLUSION

We cannot lose sight of the significance of the challenges we now face. It is clear
by the actions of today’s revisionist powers and rogue regimes that the free and
open international order, which has provided peace and prosperity for decades, is
under duress. America’s adversaries are intent on eroding our military’s long-
standing overmatch, undermining our robust architecture of allies and partners, and
degrading our standing as the global partner of choice.
The Department of Defense is up to this challenge. With the support of Congress
and delivery of on-time appropriations, we will have the means to continue to ag-
gressively implement the NDS. By building a more lethal force, strengthening alli-
ances and partnerships, and carrying out aggressive reforms, we will ensure Amer-
ica’s military maintains our competitive advantage, continues to deter war, and pre-
serves our Nation’s security.
Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Secretary Esper.
General Milley.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General MILLEY. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, dis-
tinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the oppor-
tunity to join Secretary Esper here today.
It’s my distinct honor and privilege to represent the almost 3 mil-
lion soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and civil-
ians of the United States Armed Forces, the best-trained, best-
equipped, and best-led military force in the world, and it would not
be possible without your continued support.
This budget is a strategy-driven budget. It is driven by the NDS,
which you are fully aware of and I fully support. We stand really
and capable to deter war, defend our Homeland from attack, sup-
port our allies; and, if deterrence fails, we are fully capable today
to fight and win our Nation’s wars against any potential adversary,
anywhere on the Earth’s surface, at any time.
But, our competitive advantage has eroded, and no one should
have any doubt about that. China and Russia are increasing their
military capabilities to outmatch the United States and its allies in
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order to exert their global influence, and China’s objective is to do
that by mid-century.
North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations fuel re-
gional instability and pose direct threats to partner nations and
United States citizens. While the nature of war is constant, ad-
vanced technologies have stressed our Industrial Age capabilities,
concepts, and processes, and the changing character of war is hap-
pening in a very, very fundamental way.
Additionally, we are recovering from readiness shortfalls and
modernization deferments from 20 years of continuous warfare and
a decade of fiscal instability. This year’s budget builds on previous
readiness and modernization gains, and I believe the fiscal year
2021 budget submission is the best allocation of resource in a bal-
anced way to support the National Defense Strategy. It builds a
more lethal force. It strengthens allies and partners, and it reforms
the Department for greater performance and affordability. It also
prioritizes, as the Secretary said, the Indo-Pacific region to deter
Chinese aggression, maintain stability, and ensure access to com-
mon domains in order to preserve a free and open international
system, for which my parents fought for in the second World War.
It continues in Europe to counter Russian aggression, and it will
continue to allow the United States military, in concert with our
allies and partners, to deter a provocative North Korea and Iran
from aggressive action in their regions. All the while, it provides
money to continue our counterterrorist operations in various parts
of the world. In short, President’s Budget 2021 supports a ready,
agile, and capable joint force that can compete, deter, and win
across all domains today and in the future, and it targets specific
investments in readiness, modernization, leader development, sup-
port to our people and their families. It invests in our readiness re-
covery that was built over the last 3 years. With this Committee’s
support, all the services are scheduled to meet their readiness re-
covery goals in this Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). It
funds modernization for great-power competition across all
warfighting domains, and it improves the safety, security, and reli-
ability of our very critical nuclear enterprise. It invests in and
stands up the Space Force, and increases resiliency, deterrence ca-
pability, and warfighting options in both space and cyberspace. It
funds joint all-domain command-and-control to improve our inter-
operability across all the services and with our allies, and it invests
in the advanced technologies that the Secretary mentioned to ad-
dress the more complex threats and the faster pace as the char-
acter of war changes.
This budget also invests in our most valuable asset. The most
valuable asset of the United States military is our people. It also
funds the facilities, infrastructure, family support, and quality-of-
life programs in a balanced way. It invests in education and talent
management in order to develop our junior leaders with the values
and intellectual agility to fight and win future conflicts. The lieu-
tenants and ensigns of today will be the generals and admirals of
tomorrow.
Ultimately, our military needs sustained, predictable, adequate,
and timely funding to retain its competitive advantage in this era
of great-power competition, with the understanding that we must
312

be good stewards of the resources entrusted to us by the American
people and by Congress.
I want to thank this Committee for your continued support to all
of our military. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Milley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL MARK A. MILLEY
INTRODUCTION

Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of this Com-
mittee, it is an honor to testify before you today on the President’s Budget for fiscal
year 2021.
It remains my distinct honor and privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, air-
men, and marines of the United States Armed Forces—the best-trained, best-
equipped, and best-led military force in the world. America’s servicemen and women
stand watch in the air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace defending our Nation and
protecting the values bestowed upon us in the Constitution.
The United States military is a vital component of U.S. national power to deter
great power war and protect the security of our Nation. Should deterrence fail, we
are prepared to fight and win our Nation’s wars against any potential adversary.
The last four defense budgets Congress passed have done much to address readi-
ness shortfalls, and reduce the backlog of deferred procurement and modernization,
resulting from sequestration in the Budget Control Act of 2011, repeated continuing
resolutions, and simultaneously fighting two contingencies. Still, readiness and mod-
ernization challenges remain. Our competitors are making steady gains and are
closing the gap in all warfighting domains. It requires sustained, predictable, ade-
quate, and timely budget authorizations and appropriations to effectively compete
in an era of great power competition.
I applaud the Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2018 and 2019 for improving predict-
ability by authorizing a funding baseline in two-year periods. I especially thank
Congress for an on-time fiscal year 2019 appropriation. Unfortunately, continuing
resolutions for fiscal year 2020 reduced predictability again. I urge Congress to con-
tinue providing two-year funding baselines to improve our planning, and to pass an
on-time appropriation for fiscal year 2021 so our Department can most effectively
apply taxpayer dollars to our national defense.
The President’s Budget for 2021 requests $705.4 billion, consisting of $636.4 bil-
lion for base requirements and $69 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations. It
is a product of many hard funding choices. It aligns resources to the strategic objec-
tives outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy
(NDS), and National Military Strategy (NMS), and delivers a ready, agile, and capa-
ble Joint Force that can compete, deter, and win across all domains today and in
the future.
Specifically, the Department’s President’s Budget 2021 request makes invest-
ments in four priority areas: improving Joint warfighting readiness, developing the
future Joint Force; developing Joint leaders; and supporting our troops and their
families. These investments prioritize capability and capacity while reforming the
department for better performance and accountability. They also reaffirm our com-
mitment to existing Allies and partners, while helping attract new partners to ad-
vance U.S. interests around the world. President’s Budget 2021 provides the best
balance of resources to address the security challenges we face today and in the fu-
ture.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

As we begin the third decade of the 21st Century, we are in an era of great
geostrategic change and face a complex range of challenges. International institu-
tions and norms are under attack and the free and open order that has brought
prosperity and great power peace since the Second World War is being challenged
every day. We face threats to the Homeland and our national interests from state
and non-state actors across every domain—land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.
While the nature of warfare is constant, the character of war frequently changes
due to advances in technology and how humans apply technology in the conduct of
war.
The NDS provides guidance for how we use military force today and in the future.
It emphasizes the return of great power competition and prioritizes our efforts for
long-term competition with China and Russia. It also directs us to deter and counter
313
the regional influence of North Korea and Iran while consolidating our gains against
violent extremist organizations (VEOs). This strategic framework—not meant to be
predictive of future conflicts—informs our planning, capability development, risk as-
sessments, and investments. Each of the challenges outlined in the NDS threaten
our national interests to preserve great power peace, and protect the American peo-
ple, our Homeland, and the American way of life.
China seeks to undermine the free and open Indo-Pacific, our global alliance
structure, and the status quo of powers around the world, by ignoring international
norms, standards, and laws. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party exports au-
thoritarian practices around the world to undermine United States interests. They
assert control of disputed spaces in the Indo-Pacific region through a campaign of
low-level coercion and use of ‘‘through a campaign of low-level coercion and use of
‘‘through a campaign of low-level coercion and use of ‘‘through a campaign of low-
level coercion and use of ‘‘
Russia is attempting to undermine the credibility of our NATO alliance, and
United States credibility globally. Opportunism is a cornerstone of their behavior in
the strategic environment to exploit political instability and uncertainty. Moscow
uses information warfare, cyber operations, and political influence to achieve their
objectives around the world. We have seen examples of revanchist behavior in their
invasions of Georgia and Crimea, activities in the Donbas, and backing of authori-
tarian regimes in Syria and Venezuela. Since 2016, we have worked to counter their
efforts to sow doubt in democratic processes and to exacerbate societal divisions in
Europe and the United States.
China and Russia have invested in capabilities designed to nullify our strengths
and exploit perceived weaknesses—specifically targeting our ability to project power
and operate freely around the world.
Despite the diplomatic thaw between the United States and the Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea, North Korea threatens our regional Allies and our Home-
land with nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. We must have a force posture
to deter and defend against these threats, as well as Pyongyang’s extensive conven-
tional forces. The Joint Force must maintain readiness on the Korean Peninsula, as
well as in defense of our Homeland, to be prepared for multiple contingencies.
Iran is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, including groups that threat-
en United States personnel overseas and in our Homeland. Iran has taken advan-
tage of instability to expand its influence through partners and proxies to challenge
the interests of the United States and our Allies and partners. Tehran also uses cov-
ert and overt military action to restrict our military and economic access to the Mid-
dle East, especially threatening freedom of navigation along commercial maritime
routes. Recently, the Iranian regime’s attacks have become more aggressive and
they are taking steps to resume development of nuclear weapons. Iran continues to
develop cruise and ballistic missiles, improve their intelligence capabilities, and un-
dertake malicious cyber activities intended to challenge our competitive advantage.
to develop cruise and ballistic missiles, improve their intelligence capabilities, and
undertake malicious cyber activities intended to challenge our competitive advan-
tage.
Violent extremism is a generational, transregional struggle requiring sustained
political, fiscal, and military solutions. While we have achieved significant progress
in our counterterrorism efforts, the threat to the United States and our Allies re-
mains. With a coalition of like-minded nations, we continue to apply military pres-
sure against VEOs in Afghanistan and Syria to protect the American people from
terrorist attacks against the Homeland. Our military strategy remains to work by,
with, and through Allies, partners, and local forces; however, a coordinated, whole-
of-government approach is necessary to address the underlying conditions of violent
extremism.
To meet these priority challenges, the Department requires a flexible and agile
Joint Force with the capability and capacity to respond to any contingency now and
in the future. We must be able to adapt quickly to the rapid evolution in advanced
technologies to compete and win against potential adversaries. Our President’s
Budget 2021 request targets specific investments in readiness, modernization, lead-
er development, and support to our people and families to retain overmatch in an
era of great power competition.
IMPROVE JOINT WARFIGHTING READINESS

The U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to defeat any adversary that threatens the
Homeland or its vital national security interests around the world. Investment in
readiness is essential to maintain this posture, and readiness continues to be a focus
of our budget request this year.
314
The President’s Budget 2021 builds on readiness improvements from fiscal year
2017 to fiscal year 2020 with a funding profile that meets readiness recovery goals
for all Services within the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The President’s
Budget 2021 requests $125.1 billion to robustly fund readiness across the Joint
Force, augmented by cooperation with our Allies and partners. This represents an
increase of $9 billion, or 7.8 percent, over fiscal year 2020 enacted levels to continue
readiness recovery and meet global readiness needs. The President’s Budget 2021
funds major readiness accounts to grow operational availability and recover from
years of wartime operations and budget instability. It will replace aging equipment
with accelerated procurement of newer gear, improve training of ground and avia-
tion elements, and invest in manpower with critical skills. Specific readiness status
and major priority investments by Service follow.
U.S. Army: Recent budgets have reversed readiness declines and facilitated mod-
est gains, achieving and sustaining the Army’s highest readiness levels in the last
3 years. Since 2016, the Army’s non-deployable rate has decreased from 15 to 6 per-
cent, and over the last year, active component Brigade Combat Team average readi-
ness is holding steady at 74 percent. Despite significant progress recovering core
mission readiness, global operational demands continue to challenge the Army’s
ability to sustain its gains and to achieve the readiness levels needed to meet con-
tingency planning requirements.
The President’s Budget 2021 budget enables the Army to maintain its current tac-
tical readiness levels while improving its strategic readiness. The President’s Budg-
et 2021 budget produces modest end strength growth to build cyber operations and
electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and increases funding for ground and air readi-
ness—resourcing training strategies at 100 percent for the Active Component and
80 percent for the Reserve Component. The budget proposal also enables the Army
to improve training, support, and command facilities through the activation of a 4th
Corps headquarters.
U.S. Navy: Navy readiness bottomed out in June 2018 and has trended slowly up-
wards after the implementation of a readiness recovery strategy. By October 2019,
the Navy improved mission-capable rates for all aircraft types and achieved the de-
sired 80 percent mission capable rates for F/A–18 E/F and EA–18G primary mission
aircraft inventory. However, complete readiness recovery requires continued sus-
tained implementation and funding of the recovery initiatives to address challenges
in supply, munitions, and infrastructure. In the long term, the Navy must balance
sustainment of the current and growing force with the need to increase capacity and
field new capabilities.
The President’s Budget 2021 implements the NDS and prioritizes readiness recov-
ery of force elements required in a major contingency while sustaining a combat-
credible force forward. The Navy prioritizes funding for its people—growing its end
strength by 3,970 personnel over the 2020 projected level. This growth will elimi-
nate shortfalls in critical warfighting readiness specialties, align manpower to force
structure as the Navy grows the Fleet, and reduce manpower gaps at sea. The Navy
is focused on data-driven process improvements that drive the implementation of in-
dustry best practices for aviation readiness and ship maintenance. Maintaining and
improving public and private shipyard infrastructure capacity is essential to ship-
building and conducting required maintenance of a growing Navy. Planned Naval
Shipyard investments and completion of Naval Shipyard optimization analyses are
a necessary step to minimize maintenance delays, increase on-time deliveries, and
incentivize private shipyards to grow much-needed shipbuilding capacity. mainte-
nance of a growing Navy. Planned Naval Shipyard investments and completion of
Naval Shipyard optimization analyses are a necessary step to minimize mainte-
nance delays, increase on-time deliveries, and incentivize private shipyards to grow
much-needed shipbuilding capacity.
U.S. Marine Corps: Funding increases have enabled the Marine Corps to sustain
its role as a ready, agile, and expeditionary force ready to meet global demand. Cur-
rent unit readiness remains high for deployed forces and total force readiness con-
tinues to trend upward. However, the Marine Corps has entered a period of trans-
formation to build a force that is postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolv-
ing future operating environment and align with the NDS.
As an inherently naval force, President’s Budget 2021 enhances the Marine Corps’
capability through naval integration. It prioritizes investments that incorporate rev-
olutionary warfighting concepts, such as littoral operations in contested environ-
ments, expeditionary advanced base operations, and distributed maritime oper-
ations. The President’s Budget 2021 invests in ground combat capabilities by divest-
ing known legacy and low-demand programs that do not meet future operating re-
quirements and reinvests these funds in capabilities that enable a naval expedi-
tionary force-in-readiness to operate inside contested maritime spaces. Marine avia-
315
tion continues to advance through ongoing and comprehensive readiness recovery ef-
forts to increase the capacity and quality of mission capable aircraft.
U.S. Air Force: Fiscal year 2017 to fiscal year 2019 funding contributed to readi-
ness improvements across various platforms by investing in pilot training and pro-
duction, depot maintenance, and aviation spare parts, while increasing flying hours.
Increased aircraft mission capable rates have resulted in over 75 percent readiness
of the Air Force’s pacing squadrons. However, aging programs, such as the legacy
tanker fleet, and programs that lack sufficient sustainment capacity to support total
inventory, prohibit additional improvements in the Air Force’s readiness. The Presi-
dent’s Budget 2021 divests of programs like these and reinvests in new procurement
and advanced technology to improve readiness, address future threats, and lower
aircraft sustainment costs.
The number one priority of the Air Force is multi-domain command and control.
This investment allows current and future platforms to instantly share important
data, and increases effectiveness, survivability, and lethality. The Air Force is also
continuing to leverage data analytics, innovation, industry best practices, and cut-
ting-edge technologies to reduce sustainment costs, increase efficiency, and improve
weapon system reliability. The President’s Budget 2021 addresses operational train-
ing infrastructure shortfalls through targeted near-term investments and a long-
term funding strategy to upgrade both its live and synthetic training infrastructure.
U.S. Space Force: We are expeditiously building the newest branch of the Armed
Forces—the Space Force—as a co-equal Service under the Department of the Air
Force. To complement U.S. Space Command, which the President established as a
unified combatant command in 2019 to integrate Joint Force operations in the space
domain, the Space Force will focus on the title X responsibilities of manning, train-
ing, and equipping U.S. Forces to maintain a competitive advantage in space. We
expect the Space Force to be an agile and lean organization that will initially grow
its membership from the U.S. Air Force, and eventually other Services pending Con-
gressional approval. There is much work to do to establish the mechanisms to com-
mission, enlist, appoint, train, equip, and support members of this new military
service. We look forward to working with Congress in these areas to create the
world’s most capable Space Force.
DEVELOPING THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE

To effectively compete and deter in a time of great power competition, we must
modernize existing capabilities, accelerate the evolution of advanced technologies,
and develop and implement joint warfighting concepts.
Analytical assessments, like the Joint Military Net Assessment, the Chairman’s
Risk Assessment, and Contingency Planning Guidance, allow us to assess risk, esti-
mate the future operating environment, and make comprehensive, threat-informed
decisions. Based on these assessments, the Joint Force has prioritized the following
capability areas as critical to achieve the NDS objectives and counter tomorrow’s ex-
pected challenges.
Nuclear Deterrence: As the Department’s top priority, President’s Budget 2021
robustly supports the nuclear enterprise under the NDS and the 2018 Nuclear Pos-
ture Review. It invests in nuclear modernization to improve the safety, security, and
reliability of our nuclear enterprise, and supports simultaneous recapitalization of
capabilities across all three aging legs of the nuclear triad and sustainment of leg-
acy systems. Key investments are in the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, the B–
21 bomber, the Columbia-class submarine, Long-Range Stand Off Weapon, missile
warning, and resilient assured Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications.
Space: The President’s Budget 2021 requests funding to increase our resiliency,
deterrence capability, and warfighting options in the space domain. It includes fund-
ing to modernize existing space assets, diversify offensive and defensive space con-
trol capabilities, and improve space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR). The budget also requests continued funding for the Space Development
Agency’s first project to develop a new data transport layer to enhance connectivity
among our warfighting platforms. As they move forward, they will set an example
of how the Department can move quickly and leverage industry best practices and
innovation in developing new space capabilities.
Cyber: The President’s Budget 2021 request prioritizes the defense of DOD Infor-
mation Networks, improves offensive and defensive cyberspace operations capabili-
ties, and matures our cyberspace command and control structure. It continues to
build, train, and equip Cyber Mission Forces. It also makes investments in next-gen-
eration encryption to secure DOD communications, and invests in secure, cloud-
based information technology for the Department’s business and mission operations
through the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure Cloud contract.
316
Command and Control: The President’s Budget 2021 increases investment in
Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) to create an agile, interoperable
Joint Force that can fight with fully networked platforms, sensors, weapons, and
command and control capabilities, even through contested environments. The Air
Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) and our collective digital
modernization efforts across the Department increase our speed, agility, and capa-
bility to fight and win in all-domain operations.
Air: The President’s Budget 2021 requests funding to modernize air capabilities,
while divesting legacy air programs. It maintains tactical aviation capacity through
continued procurement of both 4th and 5th generation aircraft, including F–35, F/
A–18 E/F, and F–15EX aircraft. It invests in developing Next Generation Air Domi-
nance platforms to meet future Joint Force requirements. President’s Budget 2021
reduces the size of the B–1 fleet, but funds selective legacy bomber upgrades, to im-
prove aviation readiness, while investing in development of the future nuclear-capa-
ble bomber, the B–21 Raider. It also requests funding to build the future tanker
fleet.
Sea: The President’s Budget 2021 requests funding for a battle force of 306
deployable ships in fiscal year 2021, including funding to recapitalize the Columbia
strategic ballistic missile submarine, our Nation’s sea-based strategic deterrent. The
President’s Budget 2021 invests in a more lethal and innovative maritime force
through increased research and development for maritime strike tomahawk, the
hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike weapon, unmanned systems, a family of la-
sers, cyber and information warfare capabilities, and Marine Corps expeditionary
equipment. Our budget request also includes key readiness investments in ship
depot maintenance and ship operations. research and development for maritime
strike Tomahawk, the hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike weapon, unmanned
systems, a family of lasers, cyber and information warfare capabilities, and Marine
Corps expeditionary equipment. Our budget request also includes key readiness in-
vestments in ship depot maintenance and ship operations.
Land: Further developing long-range fire capabilities remains a priority in the
land domain. The Army and Marine Corps intend to field an initial ground-launched
cruise missile capability in the next few years. The President’s Budget 2021 also in-
vests in the recapitalization of combat vehicles with the fielding of the Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle, which provides increased protection and restored payload charac-
teristics compared to the legacy High-Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)
fleet. Army Combat Vehicle and Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle invest-
ments will help meet the Joint Force’s operational needs in the face of the changing
character of modern land warfare.
Missile Defeat and Defense: The President’s Budget 2021 strengthens missile de-
fense of the Homeland, deployed forces, and our allies and partners. It supports con-
tinued investment in the modernization of critical near-term layered capabilities to
meet the threats of today while building additional capacity and lethality to outpace
evolving threats. Additionally, this budget is aligned with the Missile Defense Re-
view which places emphasis on Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense and reduces risk
by pursuing multiple developmental efforts. These investments support a flexible,
adaptable, and expanded missile defense architecture on the ground, in the air, and
from the sea that leverages space technology.
Advanced Technologies: Great power competition requires the Department to be
on the cutting edge of advanced technologies. Hypersonic weapons, artificial intel-
ligence (AI), and autonomous systems are a few of our key advanced technology in-
vestment areas. President’s Budget 2021 represents the Department’s largest-ever
investment in research, development, testing, and evaluation. Through this infusion
of funding, we will draw on the power of America’s industrial base and technology
sector as partners in our modernization and innovation efforts.
The President’s Budget 2021 increases our investment in hypersonic weapons de-
velopment. This request supports promising long-range conventional and advanced
rapid-response strike capability development in each military department, including
the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, the Navy’s Conventional Prompt
Strike, and the Air Force’s Advanced Rapid Response Weapon. Hypersonic weapons
provide an offensive capability against time-sensitive and high-value targets. They
challenge adversary sensors and interceptors, and complement existing cruise and
ballistic missile capabilities. Hypersonic weapons provide an offensive capability
against time-sensitive and high-value targets. They challenge adversary sensors and
interceptors, and complement existing cruise and ballistic missile capabilities.
President’s Budget 2021 also increases our investment in AI research, proto-
typing, and fielding. The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) and Project
Maven are leading cross-Service AI efforts, while each Service leads projects focused
on their unique needs. Funding for the JAIC provides a common foundation upon
317
which multiple organizations can develop, test, certify, and share AI capabilities.
JAIC also provides a single point of contact for government, industry, academia, and
other Allies interested in collaborating with DOD on AI. Project Maven’s application
of AI to full-motion video exploitation demonstrates how the Department can to rap-
idly develop, test, and field AI capabilities to address operational problems. We are
rapidly expanding our AI efforts to logistics, cyber operations, command and control,
and semi-autonomous and autonomous vehicles, while we refine how humans will
interact with this technology in our future.
The President’s Budget 2021 also requests funding for autonomous and remotely
piloted systems in the air, on and under the sea, on land and in space. These sys-
tems increase the capacity of our force, allow us to focus human efforts on more
complex tasks, and enhance our speed of maneuver and lethality in contested envi-
ronments. Combined with developments in piloted and optionally-piloted platforms,
our advanced autonomous systems will enhance our speed of maneuver and lethality
in contested environments.
Joint Warfighting Concept (JWC): Advances in technology and great power com-
petition are driving us to refine our Joint Warfighting Concept. The JWC will pro-
vide a threat-informed capability development roadmap for all-domain joint maneu-
ver warfare. We will harness the innovation within our force, the intelligence com-
munity, industry, and other sectors of America to develop and test this concept to
ensure it reflects the best ideas for the future fight. President’s Budget 2021 invests
in Joint wargames and experiments so we can accelerate our learning and adapt
concepts and capabilities faster than our adversaries.
DEVELOP JOINT LEADERS

In order to retain our competitive advantage into the 2030s and beyond, we are
refining Professional Military Education (PME) and talent management to develop
Joint Leaders with the skills, values, and intellectual agility to fight and win the
wars of tomorrow.
Our President’s Budget 2021 complements measures we are taking to reorient the
PME enterprise to prepare Joint leaders to operate globally, across all domains, and
in an environment where the character of war is constantly changing. Measures in-
clude shifting PME curricula from a predominantly topic-based approach to instead
focus on outcomes, and modifying instruction to emphasize ingenuity, military pro-
fessionalism, and historical insights in the art and science of warfighting. The Joint
Chiefs and I are committed to ensuring our PME enterprise can continuously assess,
adapt, and innovate.
Our collective talent management enterprise, based on individual Service per-
sonnel processes, must likewise continuously assess, adapt, and innovate. The posi-
tive benefits of adaptation and innovation in our PME enterprise are sub-optimized
if we do not wisely identify and nurture the development of the human talent in
the Joint Force. Our best and brightest must be identified, assigned to schooling,
and employed in such a way that maximizes both their potential and the benefit
for the Joint Force. Careful selection of who goes to school and when, who teaches
them, assessments of cognitive abilities, and purposeful post-PME assignments re-
quire adaptation and innovation to realize this vision.
The increased speed, complexity, and ambiguity of today’s strategic environment
require that we develop strategically-thinking joint warfighters who can critically
and creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally in-
tegrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change. Through rig-
orous, specialized military education combined with enhanced talent management
approaches, we will provide the Joint Force intellectual overmatch and competitive
advantage in all domains.
TROOPS AND FAMILIES

The United States military is the strongest in the world because of our people.
We maintain a resilient and adaptable military by providing unwavering support,
care, and leadership to our troops and families, to include our extended family—the
civilian employees who serve across the Joint Force. troops and families, to include
our extended family—the civilian employees who serve across the Joint Force.
The President’s Budget 2021 requests funding for family support initiatives, to in-
clude child care for over 160,000 military children and various youth programs serv-
ing more than 1 million dependents. President’s Budget 2021 also requests a signifi-
cant investment in a variety of military spouse programs. These include family ad-
vocacy, financial readiness, and the Military OneSource network. We are also imple-
menting programs to offset the costs of acquiring and transferring professional li-
censes for our military spouses.
318
In broad terms, President’s Budget 2021 focuses on improving our facilities infra-
structure and maintenance to support operational and training readiness, while also
providing our military families safe, high-quality residences. In recognition of the
deficient conditions with some of our base housing, each of the Services has en-
hanced oversight of their public-private housing partnerships consistent with the
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA requirements.
America’s military operates globally and at a high operational tempo. We must
keep the trust of our servicemembers and their families by ensuring that they con-
tinue to receive superior quality of life benefits. Our All-Volunteer Force will con-
tinue to be the greatest in history only if we continuously affirm how much we value
the service that our military and civilian members provide their country.
CONCLUSION

The United States Armed Forces is a flexible and adaptable force ready to deter,
fight, and win our Nation’s wars. The President’s Budget 2021 budget request in-
creases the lethality of the force by improving readiness, developing the Joint Force
of the future, developing Joint leaders, and taking care of our troops and their fami-
lies. I appreciate the support of Congress to provide sustained, predictable, ade-
quate, and timely funding so America’s Armed Forces will achieve all-domain domi-
nance now and into the future.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, General Milley.
Because of a scheduling problem, we’ll begin our questions with
Senator Cotton.
Senator COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
consideration. I have to go preside over the Senate in 10 minutes,
known as presiding officer duty, which Lieutenant Esper and Lieu-
tenant Milley could relate to staff duty, back in their days. It’s a
duty, not an honor, and only the most junior personnel get to pull
it.
Secretary Esper, I want to commend your remarks at the Munich
Security Conference about the threat that Huawei poses to the
United States and our NATO allies. Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem
like all of our NATO allies got the message or agree with it. Could
you talk about the threat that Huawei’s presence in Europe, espe-
cially in nations where we have troop presence, threatens our secu-
rity and NATO security?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, Senator. Since my first NATO Ministe-
rial—Defense Ministerial, in June of last year—so, I’ve been to
three or four now—I’ve had a common message, one of many, and
this is the threat that Huawei technology imposes on our networks.
The message has been that if countries—if our NATO allies incor-
porate Huawei technology, it may very well have a severe impact
on our ability to share information, to share intelligence, to share
operational plans, and for the alliance to conduct itself as an alli-
ance. The fact of the matter is, some countries get it, many more
don’t. It’s a continual process, where we’re trying to work. I think
we also need to work together, some countries, on alternatives to
Huawei, because otherwise we will find the alliance compromised,
in due course.
Senator COTTON. Should some of our allies in Europe move for-
ward with Huawei in their networks, will we have to at least con-
sider our force posture in those countries, given what it means for
the security and privacy of our troops and their families?
Secretary ESPER. I think, Senator, depending on how they move
forward, we’re going to have to assess what they’ve done and how
they’ve done it, and make an assessment for each country, and
then, from there, decide what we’re going to do with regard to
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those things I mentioned—information-sharing, intelligence-shar-
ing, and so forth.
Senator COTTON. Okay. Last month, there were media reports
that the Department of Defense had reservations about a regula-
tion related to Huawei that the Commerce Department has pro-
posed. That regulation has now moved forward—those objections.
Could you just make clear for us, and maybe all the people that
work for you directly, what the Secretary’s position is on Huawei?
Secretary ESPER. Well, I’m very concerned about Huawei and
other Chinese technologies, so I think we need to take a very care-
ful eye with regard to our export controls—Chinese technology in
general, Huawei specifically—and I think we need to be very con-
scious of Chinese technology in our system. By the same token, I
also want to—I need to balance the equation and make sure we un-
derstand our own technology companies and ensuring that we have
access to that, as well. But, overall, I’m very concerned about Chi-
nese technology, espionage, cybertheft, you name it, that’s ongoing,
and has been for many years in our country.
Senator COTTON. Thank you.
On the topic of espionage, let’s turn to Russia, and specifically
the Open Skies Treaty, and how they use that, and how they cheat
on it in their own country. Specifically, refusing to allow us to fly
Open Skies flights over Kaliningrad, their strategically located en-
clave in Europe, and also around and near Georgia. Other wit-
nesses in the past in front of this Committee, like General Dunford,
General Milley’s predecessor, Vince Stewart, former head of the De-
fense Intelligence Agency (DIA), have testified that Russia has
been cheating on the Open Skies Treaty, that we don’t get much
benefit out of it as long as they’re cheating, that—even called it a
relic of the past. Do you think that the Open Skies Treaty still
serves United States interests, given the fact that Russia contin-
ually cheats on that treaty?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, they have been cheating for many
years. I raised this at the Defense Ministerial last month with all
of our NATO partners, that we need to speak out more clearly
about Russian noncompliance. You mentioned Georgia and
Kaliningrad. Those are two good examples. We’ve also been denied
access to military exercise over-flights. There are some other
issues, that we cannot discuss in this session, which we should
come and talk to you about. But, I have a lot of concerns about the
treaty as it stands now.
Senator COTTON. So, I noted the President’s Budget did not in-
clude money to recapitalize the Open Skies Treaty aircrafts, the
OC–135s. But, I’ve also heard that there may be, as early as next
month, the possibility of contracts announced to modernize those
aircraft. What can you tell us about that use of funds?
Secretary ESPER. At this point in time, until we make a final de-
cision on the path forward, I’m not prepared to recapitalize aircraft.
I want to make sure we understand what the direction is. I would
note that many of our allies that are in the Open Skies Treaty—
and I’ve talked to them a lot; this is important to many of our
NATO allies—that they have the means to conduct the over-flights.
We still have the means to conduct over-flights. I was at Offutt Air
Force Base just last week. I had a chance to walk on—to walk
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about one of the OC–135s and talk to the crew and take a look at
the aircraft. But, at this point in time, we’re holding until we get
better direction.
Senator COTTON. Good.
Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Reed.
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
Mr. Secretary, let me return to some of my comments in the
opening statement about the vacancies in the Department. There
are two significant issues. One, as I highlight, civilian control of
the military, which you need civilians to do that. Also, institutional
capacity, people who have been on the job, have the credibility and
the legitimacy of being confirmed and are not acting. Can you tell
us why we have so many unfilled positions and acting personnel?
We’ve—speaking for the Chairman—I think he’s done a remarkable
job of getting people through when they get up here. So, could you
comment?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, Senator. Let me, first, give you a rundown
on the numbers.
So, of 60 confirmed slots—it was 58 until the NDAA was passed,
we added 2 new Space positions—so, of 58, 39 are currently filled,
we have 2 nominees waiting on the floor for a vote, we have 4
nominees in committee, we have 2 intents to nominate, we have 4
more that are right behind them, and then we have 5 more in the
process. So, of the balance, there are—I think that’s six in the bal-
ance that we have to identify positions for.
Now, as you know, many of us have been in this town a long
time. You—it becomes more challenging as you get into the fourth
year of a first term, in terms of finding people. That is a challenge,
and we also have challenges with moving people through the proc-
ess. These are long processes. So, with regard to where we are, I
don’t think the situation is as dire as some may think, and we have
very capable people in the positions. I’ve gotten the chance to work
with them, both in their current role and my previous role as Sec-
retary of the Army, and we have very capable DOD civilians—ca-
reer civilians who also help out.
At no time have I had any concerns about civilian control of the
military, to be frank. I know that’s part of the NDS review. When
I came in, my first week or two on the job, I instituted a number
of changes, where the uniform and civilian leadership works to-
gether, sits together in weekly meetings. We, together, review our
National Defense Strategy implementation. We, together, review
OP PLAN implementation or development. We have a much better
integration today between civilians and military than we did, I
think, 9 months ago.
Senator REED. In regard to the nominations that are coming up
to us, I don’t think I’m alone when I was surprised that Elaine
McCusker’s nomination was withdrawn. From everything I have
heard, she’s a very capable and experienced individual. In fact,
that’s why she was nominated in the first place. To your knowl-
edge, can you tell us why her nomination was withdrawn?
321

Secretary ESPER. Well, Elaine is a very capable and dedicated
public servant, but the President has the right to choose his mem-
bers, who he’s going to nominate.
Senator REED. So, it was the presidential decision, not a rec-
ommendation by you or anyone else in the Department of Defense.
Secretary ESPER. Well, it was a PPO decision. At this point, I
don’t have any more fidelity at this juncture.
Senator REED. Well, again, I think one of the concerns we go
back to is that your role, as Secretary of Defense, you should have
a critical voice in all these nominations. That goes with the terri-
tory, and——
Secretary ESPER. Sure.
Senator REED.—you should have it, and if you didn’t have it in
this case, I think that is a problem, which I hope we can address.
The other area I spoke in my opening remarks was a Special Op-
erations and Long-Intesity Conflict (SOLIC) position, and you real-
ize that, over several years, through several NDAAs, we’ve tried to
build up the capacity of the SOLIC to be a secretary-like indi-
vidual. Again, we have a—someone who’s an acting position. That’s
been since last June, when Secretary West retired. So, can you
promptly provide the Committee with a plan for implementing, not
just getting a person in place, but making that person act like a
Service Secretary?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, Senator. First of all, thanks again. I think
you brought this up a month ago when we sat down together, and
I was not tracking it. That’s on me. I have a high regard for
SOLIC. Believe it or not, I worked as an IMA [Individual Mobiliza-
tion Augmentee] reern bservist in SOLIC many, many years ago.
But, since then, we’ve taken a number of actions, so we’re pushing
forward on the nominee. We are looking at—we are going to re-
consolidate SOLIC back in the Pentagon. I have tasked the SOLIC
to provide a number of recommendations on section 922 implemen-
tation. We will begin frequent meetings between the SOLIC and
myself and/or the deputy on a routine basis. So, we’re—and then,
also committed to recruiting and retaining more talent in SOLIC.
So, I think we’re taking a number of steps to integrate SOLIC and
to achieve what was in law that you talked about.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Secretary ESPER. And I look forward to updating you on this as
we go forward.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Just a different topic here, but due to exceptional staff work on
both the majority and minority side, we discovered, about 2 years
ago, that many of our allies were not paying for fuel, the Saudis
and Emirates, for example. It was about a $300 million bill. The
Emirates, when confronted with it, paid up. The Saudis are still
paying. But, just today, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has released a report indicating that the Department has
failed to secure reimbursement for more than $1 billion worth of
support to other nations. I have no time left, but can you, briefly—
very briefly—comment, and also indicate what you’re going to do
to collect the money, basically?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. I’ve tried to track that number down.
I can’t find the billion-dollar number. I am tracking that with re-
322

gard to payments. They are caught up at this time. They’ve reim-
bursed us for approximately $113 million. There is still approxi-
mately $38 million outstanding in flying costs. But, I want to pull
the thread a little bit more on that billion-dollar number to make
sure I’m not missing something, and that——
Senator REED. Thank you.
Secretary ESPER.—GAO report is helpful.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Fischer.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary and General Milley, there’s been a lot of reporting
about the reduction in funding for the Virginia-class submarine in
connection with the National Nuclear Security Administration’s
(NNSA) budget increase. Critics of nuclear modernization are
equating concern for the Navy’s shipbuilding plan with opposition
to funding the NNSA, and are using some recent comments made
by Acting Secretary Modly and also you, General Milley, to suggest
that DOD does not support the current budget request for NNSA.
Now, I share the concern for the Navy’s shipbuilding budget, and
Congress will have an opportunity to look at that. But, I know that
you are both very strong supporters of nuclear modernization, and
also, Admiral Richard was before this Committee when he was
here several weeks ago testifying that there was no excess margin
in the NNSA’s budget. So, I just want to be clear on this. Do you
both support the requested level of funding for nuclear moderniza-
tion at the NNSA?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, I do, and if you don’t mind, I’ll give
a little bit explanation. I think it’s vitally critical that we recapi-
talize our nuclear triad. That’s why we placed that as number-one
defense priority, in terms of our funding. That means not just the
platforms—the B–21, the ground-based strategic deterrent, and the
Columbia-class submarine—but also nuclear command/control, and
a few other things, like long-range strike. But, you also have to
have the packages, the warheads, et cetera, the plutonium pits go
with that. So, it’s critical that those be funded and moved quickly
forward so we can have them paired up in time to recapitalize, en-
sure that the strategic deterrent is modeginning in the year 2030.
Senator FISCHER. And there’s no room for pausing——
Secretary ESPER. Ma’am, there——
Senator FISCHER.—the production——
Secretary ESPER.—there is no room for margin. I have been
working with our folks at OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
and Admiral Richard to try and actually build margin into our cur-
rent fleet so that we have some room. But, it’s critical that we meet
that timeline.
Senator FISCHER. General Milley?
General MILLEY. I absolutely support fully funding the nuclear
enterprise. It’s the number-one priority. It’s kept the peace—world
peace, actually, from great-power war for going on 71⁄2 decades. So,
I absolutely support that. I think what we’re talking about is the
HASC’s testimony from last week. I was not involved in the deci-
sion to move the money from the SSN (attack submarines), but I
fully support fully funding our nuclear enterprise.
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Senator FISCHER. Thank you. I think it’s important that the
record reflect that.
Mr. Secretary, section 1039 of the 2013 NDAA requires the Nu-
clear Weapons Council to certify NNSA’s budget and ensure it’s
adequate to meet requirements. Conferees clearly stated, in the ac-
companying report, their expectation that, through this provision,
the Nuclear Weapons Council will, ‘‘take an active role in shaping
and reviewing the NNSA budget as it is prepared for submission
to Congress and negotiated with the Office of Management and
Budget during the budget review process’’.
This year, the certification letter submitted pursuant to this pro-
vision read, ‘‘NNSA is unable to provide detailed budget informa-
tion to support certification in advance of the budget release of the
President’s Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget. The NWC cannot perform the analysis re-
quired to produce a budget certification letter without this informa-
tion’’.
I think it’s obvious that the process is not working but what is
your view of the situation, and how can we resolve this to ensure
the intent of the provision is being met?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, I completely agree. I think this—we
need to let the Nuclear Weapons Council work. I think that looking
at budgets needs to begin very, very early, arguably in the late
summer of the year before. I would like to have a look at that, as
well. I want to make sure that we’re prioritizing the right thing so
that we have a capable strategic deterrent. I think if that were the
case, then we would have been in a much different situation. We
have already got agreement from NNSA to do that in DOE [De-
partment of Energy], and I got an agreement also from OMB to
support us on that. So, I think it’s very important, and we intend
to implement that, going forward.
Senator FISCHER. Thank you. As you stated earlier, this has to
work together. It has to be on time in order to meet our number-
one priority of the NDS.
Also, Mr. Secretary, in the time since the budget was released,
we’ve heard complaints, including many here in Congress, about
things that either weren’t included or were perceived to be under-
funded in this budget: ships, aerial refueling tankers, Stars and
Stripes, rumors about a withdrawal from Africa, the European De-
terrence Initiative, the list goes on and on. You’ve heard those.
What’s forgotten, sometimes, is that it is Congress that sets the
funding level, not the administration.
So, Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say that these tradeoffs are the re-
sult of the lower top-line that was approved by Congress?
Secretary ESPER. They are, Senator. I would still scrub my budg-
et really hard year after year, regardless, because I think it’s nec-
essary to do defense-wide reviews. But, as the Chairman mentioned
up front, we have to get back on the trajectory of 3 to 5 percent
annual real growth if we’re going to modernize the force and imple-
ment the NDS.
I was shown a number, a few days ago, that if you’d go back to
the Budget Control Act—I think it was August 2011—and the
amount of funding we would have had if we hadn’t gone that
course, it’s somewhere between 450 to 550 billion dollars lost that
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we could have put into modernization, and so, that’s the catchup
we have to look at, at this point in time.
Senator FISCHER. Okay.
Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here, and for your service.
Secretary Esper, I appreciate all of the comments that you’ve
made about your efforts to find additional funding within your
budget, given the constraints that you’re looking at. But, as you’re
aware, I’m sure, last year the Department realigned $6.1 billion for
its budget towards constructing a border wall along the United
States southern border with Mexico. More recently, the administra-
tion is going to divert another $3.8 billion from the Pentagon to-
ward the border wall. They’re taking that from a number of pro-
grams, in—as Senator Reed outlined in his opening statement, in-
cluding eight MQ–9 Reapers, which I—we heard, from General
Walters, are very important as they’re looking at ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] along the eastern European bor-
der.
So, I guess—explain to me how we can feel comfortable with
raiding the Defense budget at a time when you’re telling us you
have needs and are expecting a shortfall based on a flatter budget
for 2021. Why should we assume, if you can divert that kind of
money for the border wall, that we should give you additional fund-
ing to address other areas of need?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, as you know, the southwest border
was declared a national emergency by the President, based on what
has been happening down there.
Senator SHAHEEN. And, as I’m sure you know, the Congress actu-
ally voted that we did not agree with that designation, and, in fact,
it’s only because the President vetoed it that that didn’t change. I
think there are some real questions about whether taking money
that has been appropriated by the Congress, signed into law for an-
other use, is actually legal and constitutional.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, Senator, I understand. It’s with the dec-
laration of the national emergency and—we were asked to support
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Border security is na-
tional security. With that, it is our understanding under the law
that, as directed, we were able to transfer that money to support
that, much like we do many other things, whether it’s fighting
wildfires or helping with floods, whatever the case may be. But, I
think the larger issue is with regard to modernizing the force.
We’re talking about making some big investments that are going
to require a divestiture of things we’ve done in the past in order
to invest in the things we need in the future. I think the demands
there pale in comparison to what is being used to support DHS on
the wall.
Senator SHAHEEN. We had the Acting Secretary of DHS before
the Appropriations Subcommittee last week, and he showed us
numbers that indicated there are significant dollars there for addi-
tional construction on a border wall that they are not likely to use
in the next year. So, it’s hard for me to understand how we can
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justify taking money that we need from our military to construct
a wall along the southern border. I’m not going to ask you to re-
spond to that, because I’m going to be running out of time, but I
think it’s a very real question. I certainly hope that we won’t see,
past this year, any further effort to take money from our military.
I hope you will commit to that.
Secretary ESPER. Senator, at this time, we don’t foresee the need,
at this time, to draw upon these sources next year, and I will follow
up with the Secretary to find out, because we want to support
DHS, but not over-support DHS, if that makes sense.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.
I want to commend you on, the day that you were sworn in, ap-
pointing a commission to deal with PFAS [Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl
Substances] contamination. It is an issue for us in New Hampshire,
as I know you’re aware, as it is in so many other States. I’m sure
you know that the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA included a provision to
phase out the use of fluorine-containing firefighting for military use
by 2024. Can you give us an update on where the military is in
finding an alternative?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am. We’re working that issue hard.
It’s—to replacement, it’s, what, the AFFF [Aqueous Film Forming
Foam], I think. It’s an acronym.
Senator SHAHEEN. Right.
Secretary ESPER. The three things we’re focusing on is the re-
placement for that; number two, making sure we’re taking care of
our people and then the communities that they live in or near; and
then, number three, making sure we understand the health effects
on humans from these foams. So, the task force has been working
very hard since I launched them, integrating well with the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other parts of the Govern-
ment. I hope to have a report come up here very soon, within a
week or two, to update you on that and the progress we’re making.
I know we have some hard marks to make, in terms of replacing
the current foam with a new mechanism. But, we’ve been putting
a lot of dollars into researching that. I want to say, we went from
$139 million last year to $200 million this year requested to tackle
PFOS [perfluorooctanesulfonic acid], PFOA [perfluorooctanoic
acid].0
Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you. I appreciate your continued
commitment. I think it’s something that we all need to work on.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am.
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Rounds.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, first, let me begin by thanking you and your families
for your decades of service. It is not unnoticed, and we most cer-
tainly appreciate what you have done.
General Milley, I’d like to begin with you. I—part of the discus-
sion—and Senator Shaheen has started this discussion with regard
to the resources that we have, and the need for those resources—
I’d like to give you an opportunity to talk a little bit about mod-
ernization, but also I want to talk about readiness today.
I want to preface it by simply sharing that, over the last number
of years, this Committee has received reports about the challenges
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we have in readiness of our Armed Forces today, and the fact that,
over a period of years, and the fact, as you’ve both alluded to, we’ve
had—or we’ve been at war for 20 years, and that takes its toll.
When it comes to the equipment that our young men and women
use, I’m just going to list them out, and I’d like to have you, if you
could, give us an update:
B–1s: May of last year, we had six of them that were actually
operational.
F/A–18s: At one point a little over a year ago, it was reported
that less than 40 percent, or at about 40 percent, were operational.
F–15Cs: You were limited to about 2 Gs, in terms of maneu-
vering, less than what a King Air would do in regular aviation.
You’ve got approximately—on F–22s, you’ve got perhaps 125 re-
maining that might be operational at a time, a percentage of those.
With regard to your nuclear submarines, your attack sub-
marines, you’ve got four of them right now that are at dock. I be-
lieve the Boise may be in drydock now, but, nonetheless, clearly
we’ve got a shortfall there of nuclear attack submarines that are
sitting, waiting for their half-life to begin.
Along with that right now, I think you’ve got somewhere around
31 BCTs [Basic Combat Training] in the Army. I’d like to know—
I think, at one point, we had as few as—less than single digits, the
numbers that were ready to ‘‘fight tonight.’’
General Milley, are we making progress? And can you give us an
update, just on these particular ones, with regard to where we may
have improved on those numbers over the last couple of years?
General MILLEY. Thanks, Senator, for the opportunity.
What I’d like to do, if I could, is get you the specific numbers.
They’re on this card, but this card’s classified. So, actual readiness
data, by type weapon system, with numbers that you’re talking
about, is classified information. We don’t want the enemy of our
country to know all that. On the one hand.
On the other hand, I can tell you that it has improved, and I
would put it in the—about a third or so—as I look at these num-
bers, about a third improved over the numbers that you probably
saw anywhere between 12 and 24 months ago. So, there is—there’s
two steps forward, one step backward in some of this stuff, in
terms of readiness, and we monitor it very, very closely every
month. It has improved, and I can get you the exact data, if you’d
allow me to do that in a classified way.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator ROUNDS. Well, that’s fine, sir, but I just want to make
it clear, the numbers that I gave you, I received in a non-classified
session. Matter of fact, in open session, just like this.
General MILLEY. Okay.
Senator ROUNDS. The reason for my point is not to be critical,
but, rather, to point out how important it is that we have the re-
sources available to you——
General MILLEY. Sure.
Senator ROUNDS.—to continue to make those improvements,
and——
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General MILLEY. Well, readiness is our number-one—in terms of
the amount of money that we’re putting towards this budget and
in past budgets, we’re trying to radically improve the readiness of
the force, the ‘‘fight tonight’’ sort of thing, and, at the same time,
you have to have balance for modernization, for the changing char-
acter of war, against those investments that the Secretary talked
about earlier.
Senator ROUNDS. Well, and I think the fact that we’re modern-
izing our nuclear weapon systems is probably absolutely——
General MILLEY. Sure.
Senator ROUNDS.—it is absolutely critical, because right now,
based upon our nonmilitary capabilities——
General MILLEY. Right.
Senator ROUNDS.—they fear our military because of our nuclear
capabilities as much as anything else.
General MILLEY. There’s no question about it, that the—‘‘peace
through strength’’ is not just a bumper sticker. It matters in the
whole idea of deterrence. You have to have the capability, and the
will to use it, and your enemy’s got to know that you have the ca-
pability and the will. So, the capability’s important. That goes right
into the readiness piece, and we want to make sure that our en-
emies know that we are ready. In my opening statement, I said we
are ready. I don’t expect you to take it on faith. I’d like to report
out, in a classified way, exactly how ready, by type system, if I
could.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.
Secretary ESPER. Senator, if I may, what you’re looking at, it is
a tradeoff between current readiness and future readiness, and
Senator Fischer draw this out. I talk about the $450 to $550 billion
of lost funding. That’s really important when you’re trying to re-
capitalize, whether it’s the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine
Corps, but particularly big capital projects, like shipbuilding. If you
don’t have that funding, if it’s not predictable and steady for the
industrial base, they just can’t—you just can’t build. What you do
is—so, what you’re doing is—as you know, it’s like driving an old
car; you reach the point where you’re putting so much maintenance
into the old car, you’ve got to buy the new one, or else it’s a losing
battle.
Senator ROUNDS. No question, sir, and you’re making the point
that I think we want to have made——
Secretary ESPER. Right.
Senator ROUNDS.—which is—and you can’t do it without contin-
ued resources on an expected basis year to year. I think you are
making progress, and I was hoping to be able to share some of that
progress, but to say, if given the appropriate resources, we are
making improvements, and will continue to. But, I agree, it’s readi-
ness versus modernization in many, many cases, and that tradeoff
is tough to handle once in a while.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Hirono.
Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We’re all monitoring the coronavirus closely, and I appreciate the
Department taking this seriously and working to keep our
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servicemembers and their families safe. While in Hawaii we do not
have any confirmed cases, we are a gateway for travelers from
China, South Korea, Japan, so we must be exceptionally vigilant
and coordinated.
Mr. Secretary, will you commit to me that the DOD will act
quickly on requests made by the State of Hawaii to assist with re-
sponse, in the event it is needed—I know there are some factors
we have to meet—pursuant to the National Response Framework
and DOD Directive 3025.18?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am, under title 10. Of course, title 32
would require action by the Governor first.
Senator HIRONO. Yes, I understand.
Secretary ESPER. Okay.
Senator HIRONO. That’s my question.
So, Mr. Secretary, you say in your posture statement that the
Indo-Pacific remains DOD’s number-one priority region. I have a
series of questions about the threat in this region, and, as I have
only, now, 4 minutes left, I’d really appreciate your answers to be
very brief, and a yes or no would be great.
In your statement, you say North Korea is seeking to build legit-
imacy through the development of a variety of nuclear, conven-
tional, and unconventional weapons, and by growing its ballistic
missile capabilities. Is the threat of North Korea’s ballistic missile
capabilities becoming increasingly dangerous?
Secretary ESPER. It’s becoming increasingly complicated as they
seek to modernize the——
Senator HIRONO. Yes.
Secretary ESPER.—full range of missile systems.
Senator HIRONO. So, I’d say that’s a yes.
You say in your posture statement that the fiscal year 2021
budget request is directed toward achieving an ‘‘irreversible imple-
mentation of NDS’’ which includes enhancing missile defense capa-
bilities pursuant to the 2019 Missile Defense Review. That’s cor-
rect, isn’t it?
Secretary ESPER. Yes. We are putting additional money into mis-
sile defense and defeat.
Senator HIRONO. And do the North Korean long-range ballistic
missiles pose a threat to the United States, which, of course, in-
cludes Hawaii?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, if our intelligence is correct, they would.
Senator HIRONO. Yes, and you also state, your budget request,
‘‘increases missile defense capability and capacity to keep pace with
adversary missile systems,’’ while investing in a layered defense of
the Homeland. But, Mr. Secretary, in spite of 4 years of authoriza-
tions and 3 years of appropriations from Congress, and your own
2019 Missile Defense Review, you have zeroed out the HDR Ha-
waii, which is the radar for Hawaii, which is part of a system that
provides layered defense of the Homeland. Is this decision to zero
out the funding for HDRH [Homeland Defense Radar Hawaii] a de-
cision to not build this radar at all in Hawaii?
Secretary ESPER. Not necessarily, Senator. As you know, there—
for many years now, we’ve had a problem with State and local au-
thorities giving us permission to get onto that site and do what we
need to do, if I recall correctly, and it seemed—the latest report we
329

had at the time of building the budget is, we probably wouldn’t see
any resolution for another year or two or three.
Senator HIRONO. So, does that mean that we can expect you to
request—I am very familiar with certain delays with regard to the
siting. So, does this mean that we can expect a request of money
for the HDRH in fiscal year 2022?
Secretary ESPER. I think, when we see a light at the end of the
tunnel with regard to getting clearance to build, yes, ma’am.
Senator HIRONO. Okay. That’s good to know.
Because, otherwise, the decision to zero out the HDRH and
reprioritizing the funds from DOD’s number-one priority region, as
you say, for another purpose, really doesn’t make sense.
I’d also like to have a commitment from you now that you will
not seek to repurpose F–20 funding for this radar that is still being
used to continue the HDRH Hawaii contract.
Secretary ESPER. Senator, I’m not sure I can make that commit-
ment, because I’m not sure I fully understand what you’re asking.
But, again, our——
Senator HIRONO. Well——
Secretary ESPER. What we’re trying to do is, in the era of tight
budgets, make sure we don’t put money against something that has
no possibility of being effected in the near term.
Senator HIRONO. Well, I don’t know what you mean by the ‘‘near
term,’’ because——
Secretary ESPER. Well, in the——
Senator HIRONO.—this radar——
Secretary ESPER.—upcoming fiscal year——
Senator HIRONO.—this radar is part of a system, and was sup-
posed to be pretty much operational by 2023, which means that
it’s—aside from the delays that I understand that’s occurred, we’re
supposed to be on track, because that’s what the National Defense
Strategy calls for. So, in 2020, there was some $188 million. This
is being expended right—even as we speak. So, I would like to
know that you are not going to repurpose this funding that’s al-
ready there——
Secretary ESPER. Well, Senator, if I recall the——
Senator HIRONO.—for other purposes.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am. If I recall the issue properly, it’s—
developing of the system is one thing, but if I develop a system and
I can’t put it somewhere, that it has no effect, it’s wasted money.
Senator HIRONO. Well, you know that this contract is—as far as
I know, Lockheed Martin is already building this radar. So, there
is already a contract for them. This thing was supposed to be, in
fact, operational in 2023. So, if we don’t go ahead with this, I think
that you’re going to have some contractual things to deal with. But,
you know, what I’m hearing from you is, aside from the delays that
were caused by the siting, mainly, of this radar, that you have a
commitment to pursue the radar and have it built in Hawaii as a
part of our missile defense system.
Secretary ESPER. I am making a commitment to you that we, of
course, intend to defend all 50 United States and territories with
radars and effectors as necessary. What I don’t under-—what I
need to come back to you with is a better understanding where
things lie. It’s one thing to build a radar, but if I invest hundreds
330

of million dollars in the radar and then not—cannot place it some-
where, then it’s wasted money.
Senator HIRONO. Of course I realize that. That’s not what I’m
asking.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Ernst is recognized.
Senator Fischer is presiding.
Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being with us this after-
noon.
There are a few things that I’m very interested in as the chair
of Emerging Treats and Capabilities, and, of course, one of those
is hypersonics. Secretary Esper, if I could focus on that for a mo-
ment. A key component of our NDS is assessing and recalibrating
our posture with regards, of course, to the great-power competition.
China has a leg up—I can’t—we can’t dispute that—in developing
technologies like a hypersonic aircraft and missiles. The technology
could give users the tactical long-range capability to hit targets yet
with such speed and surprise that defending against them is very,
very difficult. Great concern to all of us.
So, how is the DOD investing in deconflicting research priorities
across the services—we have a lot of research going on out there—
to limit the duplicative spending on hypersonics?
Secretary ESPER. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, you’re correct, hypersonics is one of our top priorities,
in terms of developing capability, lethality in that field. We are
doing very innovative work. I would tell you it’s more innovative
than what you would see coming out of Russia or China. I can——
Senator ERNST. Right.
Secretary ESPER.—assure you of that.
Senator ERNST. Good.
Secretary ESPER. We have maximized every dollar. We put into
this year, I think it’s $3.2 billion, and over the FYDP, to make sure
that we get inventory out in the field as soon as possible. Each of
the services has a variety of programs. DARPA [Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency] has programs, as well. Through either
collaboration between the services or through work through our
R&E shop under Dr. Griffin, we’re working very hard to make sure
there’s not duplication, but, more importantly, sharing. We see a
lot of sharing between the services. So, I’m very confident that, in
the next few years, we’ll be deploying hypersonic weapons, as the
commanders need them, throughout the theater, but in the Indo-
Pacific theater in particular.
Senator ERNST. Okay. Just to be clear, you said it’s $3.2 billion
over FYDA——
Secretary ESPER. No, ma’am, it’s $3.2 billion this year.
Senator ERNST. This year, okay, and is that—you feel that that
is sufficient——
Secretary ESPER. I asked multiple times to make sure, ‘‘Is that
every single dollar we can put against it and effectively use?’’ In
other words, there’s no more—one more extra dollar would be a
wasted dollar. I was assured multiple times that that was the max
we could put into that.
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Senator ERNST. Okay, and—thank you, Secretary. How does this
fit into our nuclear modernization efforts?
Secretary ESPER. It certainly gives us—we’re talking about con-
ventional systems here—it gives us a—an incredible strike capa-
bility below the nuclear threshold, which is important, to reach out
at long ranges to strike somebody with precision, at speeds of 5, 10
times the speed of sound, with great capability. It’s going to give
us a lot of reach, which is what we’ll need in the—in a conflict
against a near peer.
Senator ERNST. Absolutely. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I know that we’re embracing innovation at every
level possible—and I appreciate that—within the DOD, and we’re
modernizing to give our warfighters that tactical advantage over
our adversaries. Of course, another area I’m interested in is quan-
tum information systems technology. Again, one of Mr. Griffin’s
areas. But, we are exploring options for quantum integration in a
variety of areas. However, we hear, from various industry, that
DOD requirements are too broad for the current scope of research.
What the industry leaders are recommending is that the DOD re-
fine their requirements, and this can help drive unified efforts to
advance rapidly first in the narrow area instead of slowly across
a very large spectrum. Can you speak a little bit to some of the ad-
vances we’re seeing in quantum information systems?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am. Quantum definitely is a top pri-
ority. It’s probably in the top tier, if you will. Dr. Griffin’s very pas-
sionate about this. I’ll have to go back and get you an answer.
Typically, what we ask of industry, though, is—they ask us not to
give them requirements, per se, and they ask us to tell them the
solution we’re looking for, help us—tell them the problem we’re try-
ing to solve, and help them—let them help us develop the solution.
So, this is a little bit different than what I typically hear, so I’d
like to——
Senator ERNST. Okay.
Secretary ESPER.—run this down and come back to you on it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary ESPER. Where there is a clear mission payoff, and technology is mature
enough that we have clear performance metrics that will get us to that mission pay-
off, the Department is ready to push ahead and advance quickly. But the state of
the art for most quantum technologies is not there yet. In some cases, our system
analysis shows us that the speculated potential of the technology does not translate
directly into a military mission payoff. In other cases, where we still anticipate a
clear military mission impact, the technology readiness level is not yet mature
enough to warrant immediate acceleration.
The most significant advances, from a military standpoint, are the refinement and
miniaturization of portable atomic clocks. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to
military timing needs, and progress has been made on a number of form-factors and
performance levels. Small, low-power versions of high-performance atomic clocks
have recently been developed under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Atomic Clocks with Enhanced Stability Program. Other, chip-scale atomic clocks are
now available commercially due to years of Department of Defense research invest-
ments, and we continue to fund even higher performance atomic clocks for new mili-
tary applications. These will play an important part for position navigation and tim-
ing resilience of our joint forces in GPS-denied environments.
Several quantum sensors have demonstrated amazing precision in laboratory ex-
periments and are on a path toward rapid maturity for military application. As one
example, we have seen impressive progress with quantum gyroscopes and
accelerometers. These have the potential to be incorporated in future strategic grade
inertial guidance systems at a fraction of today’s cost.
332
In quantum computing, both academic and commercial progress in quantum com-
puting hardware continues to be a national strength. Google, IBM, Microsoft, Hon-
eywell, and several venture-capital-backed startups have been making significant
investments in the field. Because there are big open questions about the military
utility of these machines, and because the computer science of quantum algorithm
development is so early in its development, our research labs are partnering with
industry leaders to understand which military computational problems can be ad-
dressed using these new quantum computing machines.
Finally, in the defensive role, great progress is being made to develop new public
cryptographic standards and update our cryptographic systems to ensure that the
U.S. military is not vulnerable to attack from a quantum computer should our ad-
versaries ever gain access to a large enough machine.
Senator ERNST. And certainly, we’d love to partner on that. It’s
just critical that, in some of these areas that we see in Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, a lot of the discussions that we have,
that are very focused on advancing technology and working with
industry partners, small businesses, and so forth——
Secretary ESPER. Right.
Senator ERNST.—in that area.
But, I do appreciate you both, gentlemen, very much for being
here today, and look forward to working further with you.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am.
Senator ERNST. Thank you.
Senator Fischer [presiding]: Senator Jones.
Senator JONES. Thank you both for being here, and for your serv-
ice. I really appreciate your opportunity to come here.
Secretary Esper, it would come as no surprise to folks here that
I have been advocating Redstone Arsenal to be the head of Space
Command. You and I have talked about that——
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir.
Senator JONES.—a good bit, and in May of 2019, before you were
even the Acting Secretary, the list was winnowed down. There was
a series of visits, an extensive process that was winnowed down to
a few sites, and Redstone Arsenal was a part of those. Space Com-
mand was supposed to be announced in the fall. It wasn’t, and
we’re still—now we’re in March, it’s still not, and then, yesterday,
Lieutenant General Thompson testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that the Air Force had been directed—and he
emphasized the word ‘‘directed’’—to go back and open this up. He
said open up the aperture and look at all of them, including some
nontraditional locations, and that they would establish the criteria,
which I thought had already been established months, if not a cou-
ple of years, ago, and that none of these—the list—Redstone Arse-
nal and others were on there. So, you know, a cynical person
would, in today’s world, think that there was some political elec-
toral politics coming into this—into play into this, because Con-
gress has wanted to do this, and we’ve been supportive, but now
we’re going to get delayed again in opening this process up.
So, I have a series of questions. Number one, did this come from
the White House? If so, who? If it didn’t—or if it did, was there
pushback? If not, if it came from you or others—tell me how that
process up to open this up again, because a lot of folks have been
looking at this for a long time.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, Senator. It came from me.
Senator JONES. All right.
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Secretary ESPER. I’m the responsible party. During my talks on
the Hill, prior to my nomination—more particularly, after my hear-
ing here—I visited the House, and I heard from members, on both
sides of the aisle, that they felt that the process that had been run
was unfair and not transparent, and there were a number of com-
plaints. So, I directed, at that time, that we pause in place. I took
a briefing on it, along with Deputy Secretary Norquist, and we did
not feel, as well, that it was transparent enough, that enough
States, Members, et cetera, had a chance to participate. So, we di-
rected that it be revisited and a different approach be taken, where
they outline the criteria, the screening criteria by which a place
would meet as a qualifying material, that we would go out to all
members and offer them to nominate locations, if you will. We’d
screen from there. But, do a very iterative, transparent thing,
where members can also comment on the criteria, we would update
at various points in time, and then keep narrowing it down, much
like we did on Futures Command, till you get to the final site, so
that everybody had confidence that it was fair and there were no
politics involved in it, and that it was the best site for the mission
at hand.
I regret to say that that process began late. I had another revisit
with them, about a month ago, which is what probably prompted
that testimony. But, I’m the one that did it. It was my initiative,
simply to make sure that there was transparency and buy-in and
consent from members who were——
Senator JONES. How long will the process take now?
Secretary ESPER. It’s going to take several months. I think—I
don’t see anything being announced—if it helps to assure you, I
don’t see anything being announced before the election.
Senator JONES. All right. Great.
Secretary ESPER. In fact, I would probably—regardless, I think
it’s best to keep it out of the election, for the reasons that you cited.
Senator JONES. All right.
Let me ask you about some—a concern that I think has been
raised by a couple of folks here, and that is the transfer of funds
to build the border wall. Taken out of that was $261 million out
of Mobile, Alabama, at Austal, to build an EPF [Expeditionary Fast
Transport], which is, I think, a very, very important ship, and it
was one that is in part of this transition. Austal, as you know, is
the only shipbuilder that’s delivering ships to the Navy on time
and on budget. Was any consideration given to how that might im-
pact folks like down in Mobile when these decisions were made?
And the first part of that question, though, is—I want to make sure
I understood the reasons. The reasons for this part of the money
is strictly for trying to close off drug smuggling. It has nothing to
do with immigration, but drug smuggling. Is that correct?
Secretary ESPER. It’s—under this authority, the 284 authority,
it’s directed at counterdrug, narcotrafficking routes, if you will, in
support of DHS. That’s the provision of law under which it falls.
Senator JONES. All right, and I’ll——
Secretary ESPER. I’m sorry.
Senator JONES. Talk to me about Austal.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. So, what we tried to do in this process
is to make sure that we could find, as best as possible, a way to
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look at the problem that was objective and apolitical, and that we
could stand behind. The staff came up with—as they looked at it,
is the fact that the items that were either not requested in the fis-
cal year 2020 budget or items that were ‘‘early need,’’ either. So,
either ‘‘excess to need’’ or ‘‘early to need’’ was a very clean-cut line
that took—did not take politics or anything like that into account,
and it was very objective. That was the standard by which we
went. I consulted with my Service Secretaries. The Chairman con-
sulted with the Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, and that was the
basis upon which we made the decision, recognizing fully that there
are a lot of different players and equipment and things caught up
in that, but that was the way we approached it.
Senator JONES. All right. Well, I will—out of time, but I will
have some questions for the record, including maybe a little bit
more of an explanation on the Space Command, and also a report,
the current conditions of facilities used by the Senior Reserve Offi-
cer Training Corps at minority-serving institution, another on the
commitment to the Junior ROTC Pilot Program—Scholarship Pro-
gram that we’re doing, and also——
Secretary ESPER. Great program, by the way.
Senator JONES. Thank you, and also, review a report about the
Department of Defense Child Development Center. So, I’ll have
those for the——
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir.
Senator JONES.—questions for the record.
Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator FISCHER. Senator Cramer.
Senator CRAMER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary and General, for your service, for your ap-
pearance today.
A special thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your recent trip to Minot,
and please thank Leah, as well. It was an exceptional day for the
airmen and missileers in Minot. I hope you took something away
from it, as well.
Since we’re on the topic, and since the——
Secretary ESPER. I went there in the winter, so——
Senator CRAMER. You—well, the fact you came in February does
add to your ‘‘street cred,’’ without a doubt, but you also got to see
them at their best, in the toughest conditions, working with some
very old equipment——
Secretary ESPER. Right.
Senator CRAMER.—as you noticed, no doubt—some very old air-
planes flown and maintained by some very young airmen, and
some very old missiles maintained by some very young missileers,
and so, we appreciate that—the priority of modernization, obvi-
ously.
With regard to the missiles, specifically, you know, ‘ since the
GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent] has been on the plan-
ning board, I’ve pressed pretty hard about the timeline, and par-
ticularly knowing there are detractors here and there, and, of
course, the lack of competitive—added to that. If you could just
give an update on GBSD, the progress, and what you see, if any,
335

challenges there might be, and what risks we run if there is a
delay.
Secretary ESPER. Thank you, Senator. Yes, we continue to move
forward on GBSD. It’s vitally important as the land-based leg of
the triad, as you know. What concerns me most is the same thing
that I discussed with Senator Fischer, is, we have no margin left
with regard to the timeline. It’s utterly important that we move out
quickly. I share your concerns about lack of competition, so we’re
going to have to be very clever. Under Secretary Lord is working
on a number of ways by which we keep the pressure on the con-
tractor to stick to cost and stick to performance and timeline, to
schedule associated with that, because there is no margin with re-
gard to replacing that. We tend to have this recapitalization prob-
lem coming all together at around the same time.
But, that said, I’m also looking for ways to build margin in that
leg of the triad. Are there different things we can do to extend it?
And then, as you know, I have—personal concern after speaking to
folks there is to make sure we maintain the health and vitality and
readiness of the missile force, itself. A very important mission, and
a very tough mission, when you have a chance to get down one of
those silos and experience what they go through.
Senator CRAMER. It is that.
General Milley, with regard to this, I think the Secretary re-
ferred to the divest—to divest of some of the things of the past, to
invest in things of the future. We hear a lot lately in this budget
about the risk associated with getting from here to there, and the
divestiture of some of those legacy systems. One of the things that
comes up often, of course, is the ISR demands in the theater. I
think pretty much every combatant commander I’ve talked to says
we’re woefully short, and yet, some of the legacy systems that are
being targeted for retirement to make room for modernization in-
clude some very important ISR assets. I’d be interested in, your
take on all that, if you’re comfortable with, for example, Global
Hawk, future MQ–9, whether the risk is worth it, or what the risk
might even be.
General MILLEY. Well, it depends on what adversary or enemy
you’re talking about. So, many of the ISR systems that we have
today that are in very high demand are very, very useful against
terrorists, insurgents, against fixed sites, et cetera, and they have
clear penetration capability when there’s no significant air defense
threat or there’s no other types of threats. If you’re talking about
great-power competition, which is what this NDS talks about and
what this budget is all about, that’s a different type of ISR. So,
we’re trying to divest ourselves of the ISR that is not particularly
useful against a Russia or China, or even high dense air defense
systems of an Iran or a North Korea, and invest in those ISR sys-
tems that do have penetration capability. That’s why you see some
of the ‘‘divest in order to invest.’’ Now, there’s no need—it makes
no sense to me to continue to buy stuff that isn’t in alignment with
the NDS. So, it’s a ‘‘depends’’ question on what your enemy is.
With respect to the quantity or capacity relative to the COCOMs
[combat commands[, you’ll never find a combatant commander who
has enough ISR. It’s just not going to happen. We are—we have
been, every single year, year in and year out for 20 years, always
336

been short of ISR. We continue to build it. You’re never going to
buy your way out of the problem, because it has to do with infor-
mation and having to do with knowledge and decision-making. So,
we will always be chronically short of ISR. But, the key, though,
for the ‘‘divest to invest’’ is, it depends on who you’re going against.
We need to invest in the capabilities that are worthwhile against
a China or a Russia.
Senator CRAMER. Thank you, both of you. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator FISCHER. Senator Manchin.
Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank both of you all for your service. I appreciate very much
your being here today.
Secretary Esper, I support the wall, and I have always supported
the wall. But, I really have a problem with the funding, which I
think you all know our position on. It should be appropriated by
us. That’s our job. The reprogramming of the $3.8 billion of appro-
priated funds to support the border wall—and the reason it trou-
bles me is that it’s—$1.3 billion of that is taken out of the National
Guard and the Reserve equipment. The National Guard is—every
one of us have an affinity with our National Guards.
So, how do we justify the disproportionate cuts to the Guard de-
spite knowing the vital and ever-growing role in aspects of national
security? And I know about Homeland security. But, the Guard’s
our front-line defense in Homeland security.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. I—thank you, I appreciate that, and
I think, with regard to your first remark, we would agree, our pref-
erence would be that this be funded through DHS.
Senator MANCHIN. Right.
Secretary ESPER. But, that said, we are where we are, and DOD
will support DHS in this regard. As I was saying to Senator Jones,
when we try to find a clear line, objective line by which to draw
the sources, we came up with the one with regard ‘‘either to need’’
or ‘‘excess to need.’’ And, as things popped out, it became obvious
that the impact would be on the National Guard. It’s no pleasure
for me——
Senator MANCHIN. Yeah.
Secretary ESPER.—to have to make that——
Senator MANCHIN. I know.
Secretary ESPER.—decision, as a former guardsman myself, but
it—we tried to not play——
Senator MANCHIN. Well, also, Secretary, you have said that your
Night Court Program has been very successful at freeing up
money. Could nothing be freed up there, on the Night Court?
Secretary ESPER. Well, we—I spent 22 sessions over 4 months,
and we found $5.7 billion out of $99 to free up. I—we’re going to—
we’ve started again this year. So, I did find $5.7 to put into our
NDS priorities, Senator.
Senator MANCHIN. Well, let me—another thing I would just say,
since the TAGs and the Governors are so intertwined——
Secretary ESPER. Right.
Senator MANCHIN.—have they had any forewarning of this what-
soever?
337

Secretary ESPER. No, sir. The only forewarnings that went out
were the consultations I had with the Service Secretaries and that
the Chairman had with General Lengyel and the Service Chiefs.
Senator MANCHIN. I’ll—another question is, I’ve just been briefed
on the Afghan fighting that’s going on, attacks from today—I think
the 4th. I just got briefed on that. Maybe you could bring me up
to where we are in Afghanistan with the Taliban right now. Also,
the peace agreement, do you think it might hold? Because it hasn’t
helped very long, and what direction and what do I tell West Vir-
ginians and people that have been upset about the problems in re-
leasing 5,000 enemy fighters? That did not go over well in the
State of West Virginia.
Secretary ESPER. Sir, I’m not sure I can do it justice in 2 minutes
and 12 seconds, but I’ll say this much. It’s my view—and I—I’ll let
the Chairman—I’ll save time for the Chairman——
Senator MANCHIN. Sure.
Secretary ESPER.—to speak. But, my view is, the best, if not
only, path forward is through a political agreement. We have an
historic opportunity here. We signed, on Saturday in Qatar—I was
in Kabul at the same time—this agreement that lays out a frame-
work by which we could proceed toward an eventual intra-Afghan
negotiation. It was supposed to happen, at this point, 5 days from
now, and the results, so far, have been mixed.
Senator MANCHIN. What kind of signals will we get today? I’m
pleased to see at least we’ve supported defending the Afghan fight-
ers. We didn’t just leave them.
Secretary ESPER. Which is what—what has allowed us, under the
document, under the agreement, to defend them. It’s the commit-
ment I made to the Afghans when I was there on Saturday.
Senator MANCHIN. Right.
Secretary ESPER. We will continue to defend the Afghans, sup-
port them. The Taliban, to their—are honoring their piece, but—
in terms of not attacking United States and coalition forces, but not
in terms of sustaining a reduction of violence. Our Special Envoy
is over there now. He’s going to be pulling the parties back to-
gether. The critical thing, in the next 5 days—few days, will be get-
ting the conditions set for them to sit down with regard to negotia-
tions.
Senator MANCHIN. Will we see any retreat whatsoever once we
hit the Taliban today? From their aggressiveness against the Af-
ghan fighters?
Secretary ESPER. You know, the Chairman and I spoke to Gen-
eral Miller earlier on this.
Do you want to comment?
General MILLEY. Yes, Senator. Bottom line is, there was a vari-
ety of attacks over the last 24 to 48 hours. They’re all beaten back.
They’re at small little outposts. We did use United States air in
support of our Afghan allies.
What is important, though, for the agreement—we’re on day 4.
This was small, lower-level attacks out on checkpoints, et cetera.
But, the Taliban have signed up to a whole series of conditions, of
which—I believe the Committee and all the Members of the Con-
gress have all the documents associated with this agreement. You
can go through all of it, and, of significance, there’s no attacks in
338

34 provincial capitals, there’s no attacks in Kabul, there’s no high-
profile attacks, there’s no suicide bombers, there’s no vehicle-borne
suicide, no attack against United States Forces, no attack against
coalition. There’s a whole laundry list of these things that aren’t
happening. Yes, there were significant numbers of attacks, small
attacks. They were all beaten back, and we will continue to sup-
port——
Senator MANCHIN. Well, we’ve seen that they’ve been able—we’ve
seen that they’ve been able to control their field fighters, right?
General MILLEY. We saw that over the 7 days, where they were
able to——
Senator MANCHIN. So, but——
General MILLEY.—go from a high of about 125 attacks a day
down to about 15 a day. They issued out instructions not to attack.
That’s correct.
Senator MANCHIN. So, we don’t know what the cause is.
Secretary ESPER. Well, keeping that group of people on board is
a challenge. They’ve got their range of hardliners and softliners,
and so they’re wrestling with that, too, I think.
Senator MANCHIN. Please keep us informed. I appreciate it.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir.
Senator FISCHER. Senator Perdue.
Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
General Milley, I want to address—and both of you, actually, on
this thing—you mentioned ISR just now, and I agree 100 percent.
One of those—perfect examples. I want to lead into my question
about asset allocation. As JSTAR [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar] is going to ABMS [Advanced Battle Management
System], and then the JDC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and Con-
trol] development, this is a lot of moving parts, very rapidly, and
I’m shocked at, really, the progress we’ve made in the last year. I
know we’re not in a classified environment; I’m not going to go
there. I want to know—first, Secretary, if you don’t mind—the allo-
cation of resources, after we take about 14 or 15 percent for over-
head in the DOD, the—what’s remaining after that, we allocate al-
most a third, a third, a third. Is that consistent with the NDS
refocus on the maritime that General Mattis talked about, back in
2016—or 2017, relative to standing up to our major competitor,
China?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. It’s—first of all, it’s not cleanly a third
and a third and a third. There is a traditional background. Nor-
mally, Navy——
Senator PERDUE. It’s very close.
Secretary ESPER.—Navy has the highest, Army usually has the
lowest, Air Force in between, and there’s a lot of different
things——
Senator PERDUE. Well, actually—I’m sorry to correct, but I—the
2021 budget, Army and Navy are almost equal.
Secretary ESPER. Oh, I—no, sir, they’re quite different——
Senator PERDUE. Okay. Well, let’s—we’ll take that offline——
Secretary ESPER. Okay.
Senator PERDUE.—but, I’d like to see that, because the numbers
I have are a little bit different.
339

Secretary ESPER. The Navy’s at 207——
Senator PERDUE. Correct.
Secretary ESPER.—billion, and the Army at 177.
Senator PERDUE. Okay. Go ahead. I’ll——
Secretary ESPER. So, anyways, I—that said, it—that is where it
is. What—as the Chairman and I have talked about this, we’ve
talked about with the chain of command, what we need to do, I
think, is, first of all, have—update our war plans—they haven’t
been updated—and have OP PLANS that are relevant in the post-
NDS environment, number one.
Number two—and the Chairman’s working on this—we need a
new joint warfighting concept that takes into account all domains
of warfare. The Joint Staff is working on that right now. I think,
once we have updated war plans that—and we have a new
warfighting concept, and we have a good sense of what future sys-
tems will look like, I do think we need to look at that reallocation.
But, to kind of scramble it up right now, I think would be pre-
mature.
Senator PERDUE. That’s a great characterization. I accept that. I
have all the respect in the world for you two, and I’m not ques-
tioning your authority at all. I know this is a moving target right
now.
The shipbuilding plan, though, was due with the budget. I know
it’s on your desk, and I know that—I think I understand all the
reasons why. It’s a tough decision. You’ve got the Columbia-class
requirement sitting right there as the number-one priority. I
wouldn’t argue with that at all. That’s going to be about 25 per-
cent—in some years, as much as 30-plus percent—of the total ship-
building budget.
But, I want to highlight some numbers that are just shocking
today. I mean, today China has about 345—I think these numbers
are correct—345 service ships, ours to 295. Over the next 15 years,
their plan right now, based on what we are seeing publicly, is,
they’re taking it to 435, and we have a 355 plan, comes from 16.
Is the 355 consistent with the NDS? And, secondarily, is that being
looked at seriously in the shipbuilding—the 30-year shipbuilding
plan that we’re going to see when it comes out of your office?
Secretary ESPER. Well, on the plan, I think the Navy’s going to
brief me sometime in the next few days on what their proposal is
with regard to the plan.
With regard to the number, I’ll echo what the CNO [Chief of
Naval Operations] says. The—the CNO says he—355 is the num-
ber, but we need to look at effects and capabilities. But, if you want
to stick to the number, I actually—my gut feeling is, we need more
than 355, not just to deliver effects, but we need presence.
Senator PERDUE. But, is that a function of lethality, as well,
given we’re not hamstrung by INF anymore, and with ranges and
new capabilities that we’re also——
Secretary ESPER. I think, as I’ve laid out in my plan, my think-
ing—because we’re going to do—we’re going to run some internal
wargames to look at our range of options. The Navy has some
ideas. Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) has some
ideas. Some think tanks have done some good work. I think some
core principles we’ve worked around is, we have to have more
340

ships, but smaller. We need to have, I believe, more attack sub-
marines. We need to move more quickly into unmanned, and, in all
cases, we need to have distributed sensors and shooters, we need
to have the ability to be survivable in this environment, and there
are a number of other things. But, again, I was just meeting with
the CNO and the Acting Secretary yesterday on this. We agree that
you—lethality is critical at range, but, for the Navy, it’s also pres-
ence. You have to have enough surface combatants available at any
one time to have a presence, to show + assurance, deterrence, et
cetera, which is why my instinct is that we need more than 355.
Senator PERDUE. Well, we have many more combatant com-
manding areas at other than the Indo-Pacific that we are respon-
sible for today.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. Many responsibilities, whether it’s
counterdrug——
Senator PERDUE. Yes, sir.
Secretary ESPER.—or maintaining freedom of the seas, and all
that. We have the world’s greatest Navy, and we need to keep it
that way.
Senator PERDUE. General Milley, going to one other thing. We’re
talking about finding every billion dollars, right? And you’ve railed
about this, and I have, too, so has the Secretary. You’ve got 23 sec-
onds. Go after CRs [continiuing resolutions]. Tell us exactly what
continuing—12 of the last 13 years, we have hamstrung the mili-
tary with a continuing resolution for at least the first quarter of
the fiscal year. We’re in the 6th month of our fiscal year, we
haven’t even started this process yet. So, we’re facing down another
CR this year. It’ll be the 13th in 14 years, and so, we are esti-
mating, now—your service directors—surface commanders have
told us, roughly, in aggregate, it’s about $5 billion per quarter.
General MILLEY. Per quarter.
Senator PERDUE. Per quarter.
Secretary ESPER. Lost buying power.
Senator PERDUE. So, General Milley, tell us how it really affects
our readiness and our recapitalization efforts. That’s—over 10—
that’s $50 billion. I mean, that takes care of a lot of these long-
term shipbuilding issues that we’re talking about.
General MILLEY. Well, I’m already over time, and I haven’t even
started, but——
Senator PERDUE. No, you go, sir.
General MILLEY.—I would just tell you that it’s a very ineffec-
tive, inefficient way of managing the taxpayers’ money, because in-
dustry can’t rely on a steady cashflow and stream and predict-
ability in industry. Then we, in terms of programming and acquisi-
tion, et cetera, our program managers can’t rely on steady building,
as well. So, it’s a very inefficient way. We’re budgeting, basically,
9 out of 12 months, or 6 out of 12 months of a year, and that’s just
no way to run a railroad station, sir. It’s just not a good way to
do it.
Senator PERDUE. Well, thank you.
General MILLEY. CRs are not good.
Secretary ESPER. I do.
Senator PERDUE. Yes, sir.
341

Secretary ESPER. Just a quick follow-up. I—one thing the—that
the DOD is going to come with you soon, Senator, is a legislative
provision. Other departments of the Federal Government have it.
It would seek legislative authority to transfer any expired Navy
funds, which otherwise would go back to Treasury, back into the
SCN account. Our conservative estimate is, this would free up an-
other billion dollars a year that we can go back and—put back into
shipbuilding. Otherwise, it goes back into the Treasury, and it
would be money that you’ve already appropriated and authorized
to us for this purpose.
Senator PERDUE. I want to indulge the Chairman for one last
comment on this.
We’re working with OMB, too, and I think there are opportuni-
ties in there. We’re going to give some freedom, and our appropri-
ators to give you some freedom, within the current rules, that
they’ve never envisioned before, because they never realized how
expensive this is, to give you some latitude that, when you are in
a CR, you’re not as hamstrung as you are today. But, I agree with
General Milley, this is an absolute travesty.
Secretary ESPER. Particularly important for the shipyards.
Senator PERDUE. Thank you.
Senator FISCHER. Senator Kaine.
Senator KAINE. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, to our two witnesses, to the Chairman and the Sec-
retary. I appreciate each of your service.
Testimony today has been about this budget being directed to-
ward the National Defense Strategy. General Milley said, about
something, ‘‘Why would I purchase something not aligned with the
National Defense Strategy?’’ And we’ve also heard, ‘‘in an era of
tight budgets.’’ So, where in the National Defense Strategy is there
a phrase ‘‘a border wall on America’s southern border’’?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, there’s—Homeland security is in the
National Defense Strategy. It’s——
Senator KAINE. It is, but is there a mention of a border wall on
the southern border?
Secretary ESPER. I don’t believe so, but nor is there——
Senator KAINE. You’re right.
Secretary ESPER.—mention of dealing with floods and putting out
wildfires and——
Senator KAINE. Right. I just read the NDS, and you’re talking
about—this is a budget that is focused on the NDS. The National
Defense Strategy has a 14-page synopsis. The border wall on the
southern border is not mentioned. The southern border of the
United States is not mentioned. There’s one mention of a border in
the 14-page public synopsis, and it is this: ‘‘Russia has violated the
borders of other nations.’’
So, when you come and tell me that this is focused on the NDS,
I’ve got a real problem with that, and I know that that’s maybe
above decisions or other people’s decisions, but $6 billion came out
of the Pentagon’s budget last year, 31⁄2 for MILCON and 21⁄2 com-
ing to—from the—into the counterdrug fund and then into the bor-
der wall.
You have done a reprogramming, I believe, of $3.9—There have
been earlier questions about that—$3.8 into this counterdrug fund.
342

There’s also been a report in the Washington Post that there’s an-
other shoe to drop, and about $3.7 billion is likely to be taken out
of MILCON. Is that accurate? Should we expect to see that?
Secretary ESPER. That is not an accurate number, but it is a pos-
sibility that that could happen. Yes, Senator.
Senator KAINE. So, the number may not be accurate, but it is—
is it likely that we’re going to see another tranche taken out of
MILCON?
Secretary ESPER. We could. I don’t want to put an estimate on
it, at this point in time.
Senator KAINE. So, I mean, it’s just—I can’t imagine a scenario
in which this Committee—I’ll just say it bluntly—would allow a
Democratic President to take money out of the Defense budgets
used for nondefense priority. I cannot imagine it. I appreciate, Sec-
retary Esper, that you, in response to Senator Manchin, said the
preferred way would be to have a tough appropriations battle, ap-
propriate money for the border wall, and then spend the money ap-
propriated for the DOD within DOD accounts. I think that makes
perfect sense. But, you know, it’s just—it’s hard for you to look us
in the eye and say, ‘‘This is very focused on the NDS,’’ when I can’t
find mention of the border wall or the border in the NDS, and
when earlier witnesses have testified, though this be an emergency,
it’s not a military emergency.
Let me dig into another issue. When you do the—just using the
$3.8 figure—you do that transfer within the DOD into the
counterdrug fund, and then use that for the wall. Is that transfer
subject to the transfer authority that we give you, where there’s a
general transfer authority in the Appropriations Act, where you
can transfer up to $4 billion a year within DOD accounts, with no-
tice to Congress, but without approval. Is that $3.8 transfer within
that $4 billion transfer authority?
Secretary ESPER. I think so, Senator, but I’d want to come back
with you to affirm it.
Senator KAINE. I’d love that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary ESPER. The $2.2 billion of the transfer was within the $4 billion in gen-
eral transfer authority provided in section 8005 of the Department of Defense Ap-
propriations Act, 2020.
The $1.6 billion was within the $2 billion special transfer authority provided in
section 9002 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020.
Senator KAINE. But, my belief that it is, too. So, you have $4 bil-
lion of transfer authority. We’re a few months into the fiscal year.
It’s often the case that transfer authorities are most needed at the
end of the fiscal year. You’ve used $3.8 billion of the transfer au-
thority by the beginning of March, when we have a whole lot of
months left in the fiscal year. So, for example, how much in the
President’s Budget for DOD is coronavirus response if we need to
maintain people in place on South Korean bases and on bases in
Italy, bases in Germany, bases in other places around the world,
our troops and our families? It’s probably not in the President’s
Budget. But, that would be the kind of thing for which we give you
transfer authority. But, you’ve now almost bumped up against the
limit of your transfer authority out of that $4 billion to build
343

money at the wall, and we still have, you know, 8 months left in
the fiscal year. Isn’t that right?
Secretary ESPER. Your assessment is correct, Senator.
Senator KAINE. Would it make your job easier if we eliminated
your transfer authority and said, any transfer authority, you had
to come to us for permission? The $4 billion, you can do it without
our permission. Over $4 billion, you have to get our permission. If
we had said you can’t do any transfers without Congress’s position,
would that actually help you? Because it would enable us to say
you’ve got to get it through appropriations. If you want something
for a wall, if you want to fight climate change, if you want to fight
gun violence, you’ve got to get it through appropriations. Because
if you had to come back to us to ask for authority to do that $4
billion transfer, then we could actually keep the money in the
budget that is directed toward the National Defense Strategy.
Secretary ESPER. Senator, as—there’s no head of any organiza-
tion that wants his or her hands tied by narrowing the options.
You always want to expand your options in your maneuver space.
So, no, not necessarily.
Senator KAINE. But, in an odd way, aren’t your hands kind of
tied in this way? I mean, if money can be taken out of your budget
to use for DHS or to battle climate change or gun violence, if it can
be taken out of your hands, that’s sort of a tying of your hands,
in terms of putting together a budget that promotes the National
Defense Strategy, isn’t it?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, I recognize what you’re saying. Like I
said, the President has declared a national emergency. We’ve been
tasked to support DHS, and it’s—if it’s legally available, we intend
to support DHS.
Senator KAINE. I appreciate your answers.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Senator FISCHER. Senator McSally.
Senator MCSALLY. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good to see you again, Secretary Esper and General Milley.
I want to talk about the killing of terrorist leader Qasem
Soleimani. It’s been about 2 months. I agreed with that important
decision to take out that terrorist leader who has a lot of American
blood on his hands. Despite the ridiculous politicizing that we saw
at the time, people almost cheering that we were about to go to war
with Iran. Unfortunately, it should have been a unifying issue. It’s
now been 2 months. Can you share at all what you’ve seen? I be-
lieve that that was a body blow. We heard, from you and others,
that it was a body blow, the impact that that’s having on Iran’s ter-
rorist activities, their threats in the region, their proxy forces, and
the threat to us and Israel?
Secretary ESPER. I think, Senator, that—as you well know, the—
he, Soleimani, was a terrorist leader of a terrorist organization who
killed many, many Americans, wounded thousands more, killed his
own people, killed people throughout the region, a very capable ad-
versary. But, I think it’s clear that taking him off the battlefield
has set back the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and
the Iranian Government with regard to spreading their malign ac-
tivity throughout the region. I think, by the same action, we have
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restored deterrence, to a degree. For all those things, I still believe
it was the right call made by the Commander in Chief.
Senator MCSALLY. As do I. Thanks.
General Milley, you got anything to add to that?
General MILLEY. I would add that—absolutely think it was the
right goal, and I second the idea that we reestablished deterrence.
I think that’s really critical. We can talk about that in a classified
forum, exactly what makes me believe that. But, I do believe that’s
been reestablished.
Senator MCSALLY. Thanks.
Staying on Iran, the reports of coronavirus there—again, another
talitarian opaque country. I don’t believe anything they’re reporting
or the way they’re going to handle it. But, there’s been reports that
23 members of Parliament, 10 percent of their Parliament, a senior
advisor to the Supreme Leader, Vice President, Deputy Health
Minister, all contracted the virus. Are you seeing anything related
to the impact, especially with Iraq, with our forces in the region,
or how that may further put pressure on the regime, both inter-
nally from their own people as they are failing to deal with this?
Secretary ESPER. I think that, Senator, becomes a factor. Obvi-
ously, as we see this unfold, authoritarian countries having a prob-
lem with transparency and being forthright with their folks. Quite
honestly, though, my attention has been focused on the three prior-
ities I’ve been outlining internally to my commanders. One is pro-
tection of our force, our servicemembers and their families. Number
two, safeguarding our mission capability, and number three, sup-
porting the interagency.
Senator MCSALLY. Great. Thank you.
I want to totally change topics here on military sexual assault.
So, last year I worked with your predecessors, and I championed
reforms that made it into the NDAA specifically focused on improv-
ing the process from a report forward, the investigative process and
the support, going forward, after a report has been made. When I
went to Yuma, in Arizona, I had heard they had no special victims
counsel there full-time, that oftentimes victims were waiting a sig-
nificant amount of time before they get to meet with a special vic-
tims counsel (SVC), which they often wanted before their first, you
know, meeting with investigators. So, I put in the bill that they
needed to have an SVC available within 72 hours, every single vic-
tim. We now have a full-time one at Yuma, for example, but we’re
seeing this all over the country now. Victims are able to get their
special victims counsel quicker, and have a more immediate re-
sponse. We’re also hearing other reports of just increases to NCIS
[Naval Criminal Investigative Service] and how that’s having a
positive impact.
So, just a question. Given the successes, we still need to
prioritize implementation of those provisions. Can you report back
to me on anything else you’re seeing in the field and the implemen-
tation?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am. First of all, your efforts and assist-
ance in establishing the Sexual Assault Accountability Investiga-
tive Task Force are directly helping servicemembers. We have a lot
of good information data so far, both factually and anecdotally. The
Department has approved all 22 recommendations in the four crit-
345

ical focus areas. They are all now policy, which I’m pleased to re-
port, and we’re in the process of implementation across the board.
The task force continues to meet the track implementation. So, a
lot of this is moving on. It’s critical to reducing timelines for cases
and ensuring the best evidence for consideration. I’d love to come
back or send a team up to update you. But, it’s all, it seems to me,
moving in the right direction, generally, and it’s having an impact.
Senator MCSALLY. Great. Thanks.
The next thing we want to now focus on, obviously, is prevention,
stopping these crimes——
Secretary ESPER. Right.
Senator MCSALLY.—from happening in the first place, and we’ve
talked extensively about this. I don’t know, General Milley, if you
want to pipe in and—you know, in your long experience in the mili-
tary, how we get to the front end in preventing these crimes from
happening, in the age groups where it’s happening. We know ex-
actly what we need to get after, but what we’ve been doing for
training and prevention is just not working.
General MILLEY. I—again, I want to thank you for your personal
leadership. But, the key here is the chain of command, and com-
manders and noncommissioned officers, starting at the senior lev-
els, but also going all the way down to team sergeants and team
leaders and first-line supervisors. Everyone is, as the Sergeant
Major of the Army used to say, ‘‘not in my squad’’ sort of thing, or
‘‘not in my squadron,’’ or ‘‘not in my battalion.’’ This takes owner-
ship, and you have to embrace it completely, and it’s a function of
good order and discipline of the force for which commanders, and
commanders alone, are personally responsible and should be held
accountable, for the good order and discipline of their force. Re-
gardless of whether it’s sexual assault or drugs or crimes of vio-
lence or whatever the—whatever it is, the key here to success is
commanders.
Senator MCSALLY. Thanks.
I’m over my time. I look forward to continuing to working with
you on this issue.
Thanks.
Senator FISCHER. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Madam Chair.
Thank you both for your service and for being here today.
I sent a letter last month, along with Senator Murphy, to express
my frustration that the Navy budget included funding for only one
Virginia-class submarine, and reports that you signed off on a deci-
sion to shift $1.6 billion in funding from Virginia-class submarine
construction to the National Nuclear Security Administration. I’m
not here to ask any questions about it, because I hope that you con-
tinue to believe, as you expressed when you pivoted—Groton—the
last time you were there, Mr. Secretary, that the undersea warfare
superiority of the United States cannot and should not be com-
promised, that we need to meet the goals for submarine production,
and that, hopefully, two Virginia-class submarines for fiscal year
2021 will be accomplished. But, I’m concerned, also, about the
delay in delivering the Force Structure Assessment and 30-Year
Shipbuilding Plan that apparently is still on your desk or some-
where in the Pentagon for approval. I expect that both will be de-
346

livered to Congress and the Navy as soon as possible, both in a
classified and unclassified version. I hope that’s true. Would you
confirm that it is?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, I’ve been briefed, about a week ago, on
the INFSA, the Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment. I
have yet to be briefed on the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. Of course,
they cover different timelines, different horizons.
But, what I want to do is step back and look at, not just one
view, in terms of the future fleet, but I want to take in a range
of views. So, I regret that it’s late. I don’t have a good reason why.
But, what I want to do is give you a full, good assessment of what
I think the future is, and I’ll give you a quick note on this.
I am a big believer in attack subs. I believe it’s an advantage we
have, a distinct advantage we need to grow, both in terms of capa-
bility and capacity. I was very impressed by the trip I had up to
Groton. But, the numbers I see right in that—in at least the
INFSA right now for attack subs, I think the number needs to be
higher. So, what I want to do is take a broad look at this, in light
of an approved OP PLAN, in light of other ideas out there, and
make sure that, before I sign off on it, albeit late—while it may be
late, I want to make sure I get it right, or at least I’m comfortable
with it, because I do think we need a bigger fleet, and I think we
need to put more emphasis on attack submarines.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, you couldn’t find a more enthusi-
astic and passionate supporter of a bigger submarine fleet, and I
hope we have an opportunity to discuss it——
Secretary ESPER. The Chairman’s with me, too, on that.
Senator BLUMENTHAL.—before our markup in May on this Com-
mittee.
I want to shift slightly to a point that’s been raised by at least
one of my colleagues, Senator Hirono, the coronavirus impact on
not only our servicemen and women and their families, grave and
important as it is, but also on, for example, F–35 production. Right
today, the supply line in Japan was completely shut down. That’s
just one example of our defense industrial base that could be grave-
ly impaired by coronavirus. I’d like, from you and the Chairman,
an assessment of what the impact is likely to be, what you’re doing
about it, and what your plans are to be more specific.
By the way, I was disappointed by a report that I saw—I’m not
vouching, necessarily, for its accuracy—that you indicated that
American military commanders were warned overseas, ‘‘not to sur-
prise President Trump on the coronavirus’’. So, maybe you can re-
spond.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. First of all, that—I was disappointed
by that story, as well. It’s completely wrong. It’s bad reporting, at
its worst. I’ve been very clear with my commanders, both privately
and publicly—I said this at a press conference Monday—our three
priorities, in this order, are: protection of our servicemembers and
their families; number two, safeguarding our missions, which could
include production; and then, number three, support the inter-
agency. The commanders have all the authorities they need, and
I’m providing them resources, to make decisions. They’ve made any
number of decisions. I don’t think I’ve had to make one. My one
request of them—and the Chairman will vouch for this—is, ‘‘If
347

you’re going to make a very big decision, a high-profile decision,
give me a heads-up, because I want to make sure that we’re inte-
grated across the interagency, that HHS [Health and Human Serv-
ices] knows, that State knows—indeed, the White House knows,
and that Congress knows,’’ because that’s what I’ve got to do. I’ve
got to make sure we’re integrated across. So, that was a bad report,
completely false.
Chairman, if you want to add anything on that——
General MILLEY. Senator, thanks. Two things. One is, I was in
the VDC. All the Secretary said—it was to Abrams, General
Abrams, over in Korea—all he said was, ‘‘Hey, look-it, if you’re
going to make the decision of imposing this emergency declaration
that he has authority to do, please give me a heads-up so I can
make sure everybody here in DC is informed.’’ That’s all it was. It
wasn’t any kind of thing where—trying to squelch people. So, that
was a mischaracterization. I read the article, and I was in the
thing, and I—it struck me as very odd.
But, more importantly is the impact on the military. On the uni-
form military, we have a demographic that’s different than society
at large—young, healthy, fit. To date, we’ve only got—unless
there’s some new ones today or something—but, the reporting I’ve
got as of 24 hours ago is, we’ve got one uniform member that’s
come down with it over in Korea. A couple of family members.
We’re screening lots of people. So, in terms of the numbers relative
to the whole, very small impact.
Secondly is on exercises. There are exercises, mostly in Indo-Pa-
cific, that we’re taking a hard look at. One of the CPXs [Command
Post Exercises], for example, at the request of the ROK [Republic
Of Korea] Chairman, was canceled over on the Peninsula of Korea.
There are some other exercises that are being looked at to scale
down or canceled or postponed. So, there might be some impact on
exercises.
But, broadly speaking right now, the impact on the uniformed
military is very, very minimal. Break. We are also preparing to
help whatever the Nation needs, and we’ve got all kinds of plans,
and we’re able to support other agencies, as necessary and as re-
quired by the President and Congress.
Secretary ESPER. To include our medical research institutes, et
cetera. We’re all—all hands are in, in terms of supporting this ef-
fort to come up with the solutions.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. My time is expired. I want to thank you
both. I want to suggest, respectfully, that telling the American peo-
ple more about those plans, to use your word, would be reassuring.
You know, the enemy here really——
Secretary ESPER. It’s panic. It’s lack of information.
General MILLEY. Lack of information, lack of panic, and——
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Exactly.
General MILLEY.—and these aren’t classified plans and all that
kind of stuff. This is stuff that we could easily——
Senator BLUMENTHAL. It’s not like the enemy——
General MILLEY. No, that’s right. We could easily let people
know.
Secretary ESPER. Right. Completely agree.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.
348

Senator FISCHER. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Sullivan is going to ask questions now.
Senator SULLIVAN [presiding]. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your exceptional service. I
appreciated our meetings yesterday. I think both of you are doing
an excellent job for our Nation.
General Milley, I wanted to just get a little bit more. You have
stated publicly—you stated in our classified hearing on the
Soleimani strike, which I think was not only constitutional, but in
the Nation’s interest—you mentioned about your duty, how you
saw that strike after you read the intel. As we all know, General
Soleimani wasn’t in Iraq on vacation, he was there targeting the
killing of more American servicemembers, which he has a long his-
tory of doing. Almost half the servicemembers in Iraq at the time
were Alaskan-based forces, so this was something that particularly
of interest to me.
Can you succinctly say what you’ve said otherwise—because I
think it’s very important to hear directly from you, someone with
over 35 years of military experience, service to your country—about
what you thought your duty was after reading the intel?
General MILLEY. Well, what I had said publicly, and I reiterated
it in classified sessions, was—and reiterated in more detail—was,
I believe the intelligence was compelling. I believe it was imminent.
Not only was Soleimani have a long track record, going all the way
back to the Beirut bombing and being involved in that, but, more
importantly, his command-and-control role and what he was about
to do. I believe that I, Secretary Esper, the President, and many,
many others would have been culpably negligent had we not take
the action we did, because I think many Americans would have
died as a result. So, I believe it was the right thing to do then, and
I believe it was the right thing to—I still believe that. I believe we
contributed to reestablishing deterrence with aggressive action
from Iran.
Senator SULLIVAN. So, I appreciate that. I think reestablishing
deterrence anywhere, in any theater, is actually really hard to do,
and you’ve been able to do it, so far, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Secretary, we had a good discussion yesterday on this issue
of the DPRI [Defense Posture Realignment Initiative], and I’d like
to get your views—you know, there was language in the NDAA
from last year that, essentially, has the two of you focusing on the
DPRI. The issue of, I think, the National Defense Strategy is
warmly and strongly received here in the Senate, in a bipartisan
way. But, if you look at our force posture, particularly in the Asia
Pacific, it’s stale. A lot of it exists, really, after World War II or the
Korean War. How are you thinking about that, and how should we
be thinking about that here in the Senate?
Secretary ESPER. Thank you, Senator. I do think we need to take
a fresh look at our force posture in the Pacific. By the way, I think
we need to take a fresh look at our force posture everywhere, which
is why we’re doing these COCOM reviews. So, I’ll be working my
way through these to look at just these things. We’re—by the way,
we’re finding some things already that just don’t make sense.
But, with regard to INDOPACOM, absolutely, we should think
about what it means to—if we have to face off against China in the
349

year 2035 or 2049. DPRI is one example of something that was de-
veloped many, many years ago. I know it’s a little bit tricky.
There’s a lot of diplomacy involved in this. But, I think that’s some-
thing also we should take a look at to make sure that we are well
postured, particularly our Marine capabilities, our Marine forces, to
not just be able to respond flexibly, but also be able to train and
sustain our forces in the region for an extended period in light
of——
Senator SULLIVAN. So, can I dig into that a little bit with you?
The issue of training, I think, is a really important one, whether
it’s on Guam, whether it’s other places—Okinawa, for example. We
don’t get the opportunity to do a lot of training in those places,
and, I think, to have sustainable deployments, but also keeping our
forces sharp, we need good training areas. Would you agree with
that?
Secretary ESPER. We absolutely—I mean, training is the—it’s the
lifeblood of a unit’s effectiveness, his ability to train, maintain, and
equipment their force.
Senator SULLIVAN. Well, we look forward to working with both
of you on that continued important reassessment that you’re doing.
The other issue that I know—I’ve been raising quite a long
time—Mr. Secretary, you might remember, in your confirmation
hearing, you mentioned that if the Air Force, in its upcoming
OCONUS [outside the continental United States] decision on where
to place the next squadrons of KC–46s, did it in an area that was
co-located with over 100 fifth-generation fighters, that it would pro-
vide the United States with extreme strategic reach, and it would
show that to our potential adversaries. The TRANSCOM Com-
mander testified last week that one of the most stress-capable as-
pects and their number-one readiness concern was the air refueling
fleet. My question to him, and to you, and the Secretary of the Air
Force yesterday—having a deployment of KC–46s in the OCONUS
bed-down in an area that can reach multiple COCOMs, like a place
like Alaska, with the 100 fifth-gen fighters—from your perspective,
what message does that additionally send to our adversaries?
You’ve already talked about the issue of extreme strategic reach
when I asked that question earlier.
Secretary ESPER. Well, I do think two critical needs for our forces
right now are to have that strategic lift, refueling, and sealift, by
the way. But, the location of Alaska gives you great reach, in terms
of whether you go across the Pole into Russia or toward China.
When you couple it up with an amalgamation of forces, it does put
the enemy in a different posture, your adversaries in a different
posture, because you now have that reach, that lethality at hand,
and ready to do what it might need to do, if called upon.
Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Thank you very much.
General MILLEY. Senator, if I might.
Senator SULLIVAN. General, please.
General MILLEY. I also don’t want any adversary to walk away
thinking that the United States of America cannot project power
because of stress on the tanker fleet. We can, and they should have
no doubt about it. Yes, we’re giving up 10 KC–10s, and 13 KC–
135s, but we still have almost 500. We can get there, ‘‘the firstest
with the mostest.’’ And no one should doubt that.
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Senator SULLIVAN. But, certainly one of the best ways to relieve
the stress is to have——
General MILLEY. It is.
Senator SULLIVAN.—tankers in places that can reach several——
General MILLEY. It is.
Senator SULLIVAN.—COCOMs.
General MILLEY. But, we can get there.
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.
General MILLEY. I don’t want anybody to think we can’t.
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.
Senator King.
Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. I appreciate it.
Senator SULLIVAN. I know you’re going to ask a question on the
Arctic, so——
Senator KING. I am, as a matter of fact.
Senator SULLIVAN. Excellent.
Senator KING. You left it for me.
Secretary Esper, first, I want to thank you personally for the
participation of the Department in the National Cyber Solarium
Process. Over a year, we’ve worked very hard. Ken Rapuano and
David Norquist made significant contributions in intellectual fire-
power and criticism and thoughtfulness. I just want to thank you
for your authorization for that participation. It was very meaning-
ful.
Secretary ESPER. Thank you, Senator. I’m very encouraged by
that—by all that, too. It’s—there’s a lot good coming out of it.
Senator KING. Well, we’ll be releasing our report next Wednes-
day, as a matter of fact, and——
Secretary ESPER. Oh, great.
Senator KING.—and I think it’s a good piece of work, and, indeed,
we’ve spent a whole session here and really haven’t talked about
cyber, which is a—an essential—that’s not the right word—a very
real domain of warfare today. That’s what we’ll be talking about
extensively next week. So, I just wanted to thank you.
Secretary ESPER. Well, thanks, and we’re in cyber competition, if
not conflict, every single day.
Senator KING. Exactly. We’re at war today.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir.
Senator KING. General Milley—I guess this is a question for both
of you—I’m very concerned about a gap in defense against
hypersonic weapons. Both of our principal adversaries, China and
Russia, have developed these weapons, have actually deployed
them, and this puts at risk our—particularly, our naval resources.
Talk to me about what we’re doing to counter that threat.
Secretary ESPER. Senator, as part of our hypersonics research,
we are putting money into defensive systems. One of the early
things that we know we need, that money is going directly into, is
a low-Earth orbit (LEO) missile tracking system, if you will, that
would be able to track hypersonic systems moving through the at-
mosphere or——
Senator KING. Because one of the problems with hypersonics is,
they don’t leave a radar signal. They move so fast, they create a
plasma shield. So, we need the tracking.
351

Secretary ESPER. We’ve determined that you need a low-—a LEO
tracking system to do that. So, that’s one of the priorities of our
R&E [Research and Engineering] efforts to do that, and then, of
course, you have to figure out the effectors by which you would
knock one out of the sky, if you will. There are a variety of things
that we’re exploring. But, it is critical to have that defense, because
it is such—the maneuverability, the speed, the effectiveness of
these systems is remarkable.
Senator KING. Another——
General MILLEY. Two things——
Senator KING. Yes, sir.
General MILLEY.—Senator King, on that. One, on the defense, if
it can be seen, it can be hit, and there is no defense against
hypersonic. It goes 5 to 10 times the speed of sound. You’re not
going to defend against it. So, what you have to do is be invisible.
There’s all kinds of techniques and procedures that we’re working
on in order to make our forces very difficult to see, from an acquisi-
tion standpoint, of enemy radar. So, that’s on the defense.
On the other part, you’re not going to shoot the arrow. Those
things are going so fast, you’re not going to get it.
Senator KING. Right.
General MILLEY. You’ve got to shoot the archer. You’ve got to go
deep downtown, and you’ve got to get on the offense. If you want
to defeat hypersonics, you’ve got to go to the source, the launch
pads——
Senator KING. And you have—ISR in order to——
General MILLEY. That’s right.
Senator KING.—know where——
General MILLEY. You’ve got to have the ISR to get in there. If
you’re launching hypersonics at the United States, then you’re
going to war with the United States, and you’re going to pour it
on, and pour it on with mass and firepower, and fast and hard.
Senator KING. But, I thought you made an important point ear-
lier in the hearing, where you talked about ISR. We’ve sort of had
a vacation on ISR.
Secretary ESPER. That’s right.
Senator KING. Because we’ve been acting against enemies——
Secretary ESPER. That’s right.
Senator KING.—that don’t have any—that capacity. It’s a whole
different ball game when we’re talking about a peer-state compet-
itor.
Secretary ESPER. That’s right.
General MILLEY. And you want to invest in ISR that can pene-
trate——
Secretary ESPER. Right.
General MILLEY.—the airspace of these great-power competitors.
Secretary ESPER. It’s also why we talk—as I’ve laid out the ship-
building principles, if you will, going forward, is to—and the Navy
agrees with this—is a move away from very large platforms into
smaller platforms, a more distributed force so that you complicate
the enemy’s plans, particularly with regard to the employment of
hypersonics.
Senator KING. Well, you raised shipbuilding. We talk about the
Indo-Pacific as being the most important region. We talk about the
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National Defense Strategy, and yet, the budget talks about knock-
ing out four destroyers and, I think, an amphib in the future plan.
How was that decision made? How firm is it? Can we revisit it? I
want to get a little bit of thoughts on that.
By the way——
Secretary ESPER. Yeah.
Senator KING.—one thought—the other thought is, you know,
we’re doing this recapitalization out of operating costs. In any other
organization, you’d have a capital budget and a—and you’re build-
ing 40-year—an asset—a Columbia submarine is a 40-year asset,
and yet we’re building them out of cashflow instead of some kind
of long-range attributing to the cost over the life of the object. But,
to get back—talk to me about——
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir.
Senator KING.—the shipbuilding.
Secretary ESPER. Well, as I said earlier, I think we need—to me,
I don’t focus as much of the number, but that number, 355, is out
there. I think we need to be—have a fleet larger than 355. My gut
tells me that. I’m convinced of that.
Senator KING. Senator Purdue had a chart this morning at the
Seapower Subcommittee that, if you saw it, the—it shows what
China is doing—you’d feel vindicated.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. But, we do have a qualitative capa-
bility over them. There are some other things out there. But, none-
theless, it’s—if it’s not just capability and lethality, it’s presence.
You have to have the presence, and so, I do think we need to get
on that path. I think there are a number of things that we need
to do.
First of all, I completely support what the CNO did. The CNO
decided to reallocate $4 billion or so out of SCN and put it into
O&M to get readiness up. We have a readiness challenge. It’s been
well documented.
Senator KING. The ship’s no good if it’s in the dock.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. I think the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) said, last year, in 2019, due to maintenance chal-
lenges, the equivalent of 19 ships didn’t go to sea, and so, we’ve got
to fix the readiness challenge and then put more money into ship-
building. If we can get the legislative approval change, Secretary
Modly is digging in deep. He’s doing what the Army and Air Force
did to find $40 billion over 5 years. That’ll free up a good chunk
of what they think they need, and then we’ve got to get this higher
top-line moving in the right direction.
Senator KING. Well, but we also have to—I mean, what worries
me about what you’re talking about—and I’m sorry, I know I’m
over time—but, I worry about—there’s a—you can’t turn the indus-
trial base off and on with a switch. If we drive it down, and you
have a loss of personnel, loss of welders, loss of skilled shipbuilders
in Bath, Maine, or Pascagoula or Marinette, Wisconsin, you can’t
turn them back on.
Secretary ESPER. Completely agree, Senator. I—that’s why I
think we need to look more, particularly with large capital invest-
ments like ships, multiyear, and even—I think the Navy, we dis-
cussed yesterday, is, Can you multiyear O&M so that your—you
don’t have the same perturbations in your maintenance cycle?
353

Senator KING. Right.
Secretary ESPER. Because you can’t afford to go—you know, take
a ship out of maintenance and then have a month or 2-month gap,
and I know they’re struggling with this up in Groton right now,
with the sub—with the maintenance up there. So, you’ve got to fig-
ure out a way to smooth that out so workers will be incentivized
to stay in the trade.
Senator KING. Are you suggesting that consistent funding from
Congress might be a benefit?
[Laughter.]
Senator KING. I’m shocked.
Secretary ESPER. Consistent and timely.
Senator KING. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator SULLIVAN [presiding]. Senator Hawley.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Esper, General, thank you for being here. Thank you
for your service.
Mr. Secretary, let me start with you. In your confirmation testi-
mony last summer, you wrote that we needed a distributed and re-
silient force posture in the Indo-Pacific. I’m concerned about the
concentration of our forces currently in Japan and South Korea.
Give me your assessment about our ability to compete effectively
with China, given that concentration.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. What we—those forces are there for—
you know, for a variety of reasons. I think Senator Sullivan men-
tioned it. You know, we have a presence that largely reflects where
we’ve been for many, many years, and so, I do think we need to
step back and look at that. I know Admiral Davidson is looking at
that to make sure we have more distribution. I’m trying to get out
there. I’ve traveled to the INDOPACOM two or three times now to
visit nontraditional partners. I’ve been from Mongolia to Vietnam,
I’ll be going to Indonesia. I think there’s much more ground we can
cover and to build more relationships with more countries.
Senator HAWLEY. You anticipate my next question, which is
whether we can disperse U.S. Forces to other locations in the Pa-
cific to improve survivability and reduce risk to operations. You
think that we can?
Secretary ESPER. Improve survivability, but also grow more part-
ners and more people, in terms of standing up and telling the Chi-
nese they have to obey the international rules of order, and abide
by that. That’s going to take a lot of investment. So.
Senator HAWLEY. What investment do we need to be able to dis-
perse our forces along those lines?
Secretary ESPER. Well, I think we need to think creatively, Sen-
ator, about—you know, as you think through the war plans, how
we might fight in the future, is—where do we need to be? Does it
require MILCON, does it require—I’m—the Chairman and I are
big believers in IMET [International Military Education and Train-
ing]. So, get more countries from the Indo-Pacific, even nontradi-
tional partners, into our schoolhouses, grow that relationship over
a career. There are a number of things that we should do that, by
the way, the DOD is doing. We’re committed to a 50 percent
growth in IMET over 5 years.
354

Senator HAWLEY. Just sticking with the question of investment.
At your confirmation hearing, you said that you were open, in prin-
ciple, to using something like EDI to accelerate investment in
INDOPACOM. I don’t see anything like that, however, in your
budget. Why is that?
Secretary ESPER. The more I think about that—I mean, we’ve
discussed this a lot, and sometimes I get concerned, if you bucket
a certain amount of money for a certain region, it can be both lim-
iting and—in other words, if you put so much money in there, peo-
ple say, ‘‘That’s it, and that’s all you need,’’ or you get trapped by
that fund. I actually appreciate the flexibility of putting more or
less in, depending on how circumstances change. But, clearly, I
think—and we’re talking to the commander out there about, ‘‘What
are your investment plans, focusing them more, in terms of future
presence, what do we need to do, where do we need to grow rela-
tionships?’’
Senator HAWLEY. EDI has been so successful in that theater and
for our needs there. I continue to believe that something like that
mechanism——
Secretary ESPER. The one fact—the only thing I’d say, Senator,
is, sometimes it takes the pressure off of countries to invest their
own dollars into supporting us and providing host-nation support.
Because they see that fund out there, and they go after that in-
stead of going to their parliaments and saying, ‘‘How can we sup-
port the U.S. presence?’’
Senator HAWLEY. I just want to make sure that we are getting
the resources we need to what is our priority theater, I believe,
under the NDS, in a timely fashion, if we’re going to be postured
successfully. I mean, we are behind the curve, I think.
Secretary ESPER. I’m impatient. I think we can and should do
more. That’s why I’m trying to do these COCOM reviews to free up
time, money, and manpower, to invest more into that future fight.
Senator HAWLEY. I applaud your COCOM reviews, by the way,
and let’s talk for a second about AFRICOM. The AFRICOM Com-
mander, General Townsend, recently testified that he thought our
European allies could send more forces to West Africa and take
over some of the missions currently being done by our forces, like
airlift, for instance, and aerial refueling.
Secretary ESPER. Sure.
Senator HAWLEY. Do you agree with that assessment?
Secretary ESPER. Absolutely, and I’ve talked to the allies about
this, and we’ve talked a few times about aerial refueling. We pro-
vide that to the French for free, if you will, and that’s one of the
areas where I’ve talked to the French to say, ‘‘Look, I’m having a
problem with air refuelers right now. If somebody else can pick up
that mission, that helps us all out a lot.’’ That’s part of the review,
is looking at, How do we do the same mission, but maybe do it dif-
ferently?
Senator HAWLEY. Yeah. Well, this seems to me like a clear situa-
tion where we can and should expect our allies to do more. Again,
I applaud your COCOM reviews.
General Milley, let me switch topics. Let’s talk about Iran. If
Iran resumes provocations in coming months, what is your assess-
ment of how many troops we can send to that theater without risk-
355

ing our situation in INDOPACOM, without undermining deter-
rence, if you like, in the Indo-Pacific?
General MILLEY. I don’t think I could answer that in an open
session. I’d rather come back to you in a classified session, point
one.
Point two, just to be clear, though, there is a significant amount
of force in Indo-Pacific—300,000 troops, 7 aircraft carriers, the—I
mean, there’s a lot of force in the Pacific, and in Central Command,
you’re looking at about 70,000 troops currently, right now. There’s
an adequate amount of force in Central Command to maintain de-
terrence. If deterrence breaks down, we’ll analyze the situation,
and we’ll do whatever is required to achieve whatever national se-
curity objectives are necessary, relative to Iran. I’d rather get back
to you in classified session on exactly what that would be.
Senator HAWLEY. You bet. I’ll pursue that with you in a classi-
fied setting.
My last question on this, Mr. Chairman, is just to your comments
about the relative balance between CENTCOM and PACOM. Is it
your sense that there’s a little bit of slack, then, General, in
INDOPACOM? I mean, is that—am I——
General MILLEY. Well, I mean, again, it’s a ‘‘depends’’ I mean, if
you think that, you know, you’re close to a war with Korea or
China, then probably not, but—so, it depends on what the situation
is in INDOPACOM at the moment in time. It—we will do whatever
is required to achieve U.S. national security interests, no matter
where it’s at in the world, and if something were to happen, very
significantly more than what’s current in the Middle East, then de-
cisions will be made by the President and Secretary of Defense to
move the right amount of forces to achieve our objectives.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator REED [presiding]. On behalf of the Chairman, let me rec-
ognize Senator Peters.
Senator PETERS. Thank you, Ranking Member Reed.
To our—both the gentlemen, thank you for testimony here today,
and your service.
Secretary Esper, briefly, I’d like to discuss prescription drug
prices under TRICARE. This is an issue that Senator Rounds and
I have been working on, along with some of the other Members of
the Committee here. This Committee previously authorized a pilot
program that would lower the cost of prescription drugs for
TRICARE beneficiaries, including servicemembers, their families,
and our military retirees. I know that the Department has begun
the process of preparing for this prescription drug parity pilot pro-
gram, but it still has not begun. So, my question is, Can you com-
mit to working to—with us on action to lower the cost of prescrip-
tion drugs for our servicemembers under TRICARE, and particu-
larly expanding their opportunities to purchase these drugs?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, sir. Without knowing—having too much
detail, I’m always committed to improving quality and access.
Senator PETERS. Great.
Secretary Esper, last week, Senator Cotton and I sent a letter
urging you to establish a United States-Israel Operations Tech-
nology Working Group. This group would coordinate and canalize
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military research and development efforts between the United
States and Israel, focusing on the shared threats that our countries
face, and capitalizing on, clearly, the world’s leading national secu-
rity innovation base in both countries, both the United States and
Israel. So, this is to both Secretary Esper and General Milley.
What is your view on enhancing the security cooperation with
Israel, particularly in the areas of technology research and develop-
ment? How can we strengthen that between our two countries?
Secretary ESPER. Senator, without having seen your letter yet, I
would tell you that, you know, we have a very good innovative
base. They have a very good innovative base, and I think the more
we can cooperate together as allies and partners to come up with
common solutions, the better. We do a lot of work with them now
on a number of things. Certainly, at the industrial level, they com-
pete to against—against and with American companies. So, I think
if there are ways to improve that, we should pursue it.
General MILLEY. And we—as you know, we work very closely
with Israel on a lot of areas, and specifically in R&D and S&T. In
combat developments, for example, we have the active protective
system on our armored vehicles. That’s an Israeli-produced system.
We’ve looked at the Arrow for our ballistic missile defense system,
and a wide variety of other systems. So, there’s a—there’s an ex-
change of ideas and knowledge, research, development between us
and the Israelis on a regular basis.
Senator PETERS. Secretary Esper, on February 24th of this year,
the DOD officially adopted a series of ethical principles for the mili-
tary use of artificial intelligence. The principles were designed to
complement existing ethical frameworks, and you structured the
ethical framework around five specific areas for military use of AI:
responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable. I’ve had
longstanding concerns about the consequences of the United States
and our allies adopting ethical standards without similar and equi-
table standards being adopted by our competitors and adversaries
that operate under a different framework than we do. My question
is, Is the U.S. placed at a competitive disadvantage at the tactical
and operational level by adopting AI ethical standards not shared
by our adversaries? And, if so, how do we compensate for that dis-
advantage?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, Senator. First of all, it’s a lot of good work
done by the Defense Industrial Board with a lot of outreach to a
wide range of persons and organizations to develop these. I was
briefed on them. I had a number of discussions with a lot of leaders
about them. But, look, I think this is an area where we lead, and
I think the principles, from what I’ve read and studied and learned,
I think they put us in a leadership position. So, I think we are es-
tablishing the standard, if you will, and I think it will make us bet-
ter. The more we can get other countries to come on board and
align themselves to those, the better.
Senator PETERS. In the past, the U.S. has successfully used inter-
national agreements and arms control treaties to provide some sta-
bility, particularly with emerging technologies and in the attempt
to minimize potential catastrophic mistakes that could occur. In
terms of AR, are we at a stage where AI requires the equivalent
357

of an arms control treaty to ensure the current rules-based inter-
national order? And, if so, how would that look?
Secretary ESPER. It’s a good question, Senator. I’d have to think
about it and get back to you and consult with people, and I just
don’t know. It’s not something I would take off the table, but it’s
a fair question. Again, I think we want to develop some common
standards, if you will, and I—we try to set the bar by my signing
out those AI ethical principles and to set a high bar from the begin-
ning, and urge others to come on board.
[The information referred to follows:]
Secretary ESPER. No, we are not at a stage where Artificial Intelligence (AI) re-
quires the equivalent of an arms control treaty to ensure maintenance of the current
rules-based international order. It will likely be difficult to apply traditional arms
control approaches to AI. AI is an enabling technology that is inherently ‘‘dual-use,’’
useful for both military and civilian applications. Depending on how one defines
‘‘AI,’’ it may very well become ubiquitous and manifest in multiple systems on every
platform and vehicle, as well as in the devices carried by ordinary civilians and mili-
tary personnel. AI does not involve objects such as missiles or warheads that can
be readily counted, nor does it require analogs to the distinctive precursor chemicals
or machinery that we monitor as part of our efforts to control the proliferation of
nuclear and chemical weapons.
Although the Department of Defense (DoD) does not support negotiating an AI
‘‘arms control treaty,’’ we believe that it would be productive to begin with discus-
sions about international norms and standards of behavior. DoD is committed to
leading in military ethics and AI safety. To that end, we are working to ensure that
we adopt AI-enabled capabilities in a manner consistent with American values, U.S.
domestic law, and U.S. obligations under international law. For example, working
with the Defense Innovation Board, which consulted with experts and stakeholders
across DoD, academia, and the private sector, DoD developed a set of AI ethical
principles. Those principles, which are consistent with the AI principles developed
and unanimously endorsed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), were adopted and promulgated as guidance for the Department
of Defense in February 2020. Efforts such as these will allow DoD, along with like-
minded allies and partners, to employ AI-enabled capabilities in a responsible man-
ner that is consistent with our values and enhances compliance with the Law of
War.
Senator PETERS. General Milley, any thoughts?
General MILLEY. I think artificial intelligence, as I’ve testified be-
fore, is sort of the mother of all technologies out there. It’s extraor-
dinarily powerful, and there’s no doubt in my mind that it’s going
to be used for military purposes in the not-too-distant future.
There’s a wide variety of ethical concerns with that. I don’t know
if arms control agreements are the right mechanism or not. But,
all countries, not just the United States, are going to have to come
to grips with the introduction of artificial intelligence for use in
military operations. It is extremely powerful, and it’s going to have
to be dealt with.
Senator PETERS. Great.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator REED. On behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize Sen-
ator Duckworth.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I’d like to thank both of the witnesses for appearing before the
Committee today.
I’d like to follow up on what my colleague, Mr. Hawley, touched
on, which is the Indo-Pacific Strategy. I feel very strongly that this
is a part of the world we need to spend more attention on. I have
heard, from both of you, the emphasis on INDOPACOM and our
358

role—and the importance of our role there. While I applaud the De-
partment’s messaging about prioritizing great-power competition in
this region over other activities, I do remain concerned that we’ve
not matched our rhetoric with our actions. How are we able to di-
vert some $7 billion to border wall construction and yet we’re not—
the Pacific region is our main effort? And, you know, Secretary
Esper, I agree with you that IMET is certainly very important. In
fact, I recently met with General Aparit Kongsompong, who is the
Thai Army leader, and he talked very fondly about how his time
that he spent at U.S. training facilities. In fact, he said it was his
joint experience, training at United States facilities, as that of Gen-
eral Andika, from Indonesia, that led them to form a friendship
based on their experience in the United States, that then led to
this recent agreement they just signed, 2 months ago, on informa-
tion-sharing.
But, I think it takes more than IMET. I think you need to put
some MILCON in this. I think we need to look at staffing and re-
sources increasing for the INDOPACOM in order to really deter
Chinese aggression. So, I’d love to hear from both of you as to when
we’re going to see more of a plus-up in this region, beyond just
talking about how great this is.
Secretary ESPER. Senator, I think the—first of all, you know I
agree with the importance of INDOPACOM, and its—because it’s
number-one in our strategy, to say the least. But, if you look at the
simple disposition of forces, INDOPACOM has five times as many
forces as any other theater, over 350,000. The next-closest theater
is 70,000. If you added up every other theater, INDOPACOM would
still be twice as big as all of them, combined. So, we have a lot of
forces in the theater. I think the challenge isn’t necessarily putting
more forces in, it’s making sure that we look at our disposition on
the ground and think, How do we use them more effectively to
grow partners and allies, and how do we exercise with them, et
cetera, et cetera? That’s my quick assessment. I don’t——
Senator DUCKWORTH. I mean, I don’t disagree with you that it’s
not about—it’s not just about the number of troops that are on the
ground, it’s about resourcing INDOPACOM so that they can go
out—I think we need to be—you know, I mean, you’re already talk-
ing about this—more basing agreements.
Secretary ESPER. Right.
Senator DUCKWORTH. I was very impressed with what was done
in South Korea when we didn’t have enough ammunition, and you
guys, took that out of Hyde and plussed them up. But, the reason
that you have more troops is because it’s a larger geographic region
than, say, CENTCOM is. You know, I’ll—maybe AFRICOM would
have more geographic area. But, the geography is different.
General, you were going to——
General MILLEY. Well, the—you’re exactly right, the geography is
completely different, the politics are different, the international pol-
itics, the threats are different, the allies are different. All of that
is different, and you have to factor all of that in. But, in terms of
main effort versus supporting efforts and economy-of-force efforts—
in the NDS, the Central Command area, AFRICOM, and
SOUTHCOM are all designated as economy of force, and you’re fa-
miliar with that term from your military experience, and EUCOM
359

is a supporting effort, and PACOM is, ‘‘the main effort.’’ It’s all part
of a globally integrated level of effort with all the resources the De-
partment of Defense has.
With respect to INDOPACOM, you know, the Secretary men-
tioned 350,000 troops. He’s also got, you know, 200 ships, 7 aircraft
carriers. He’s got three ARG/MEUs. He’s got 1,600 high-perform-
ance aircraft. This is a highly resourced—from a military stand-
point, highly resourced theater. So, it’s not so much the numbers
of the ships, planes, trains, and automobiles sort of thing. It’s how
we use it, where we put it, and what our broader strategy is with
respect to what we think is going to be the most significant adver-
sary for the next 100 years, which is China, and the rise of China,
how we, as a nation, deal with that. Military is one aspect of a
much broader strategy that we’ve got to come to grips with.
But, I do think that INDOPACOM is well resourced, from a de-
partmental standpoint, in terms of military capability, right now.
Senator DUCKWORTH. But, the Chinese are really moving ahead
of us——
General MILLEY. They are.
Senator DUCKWORTH.—when it comes to basing issues there,
and——
General MILLEY. They are.
Senator DUCKWORTH.—we have to have more than a little toe-
hold there in order to——
General MILLEY. Sure.
Senator DUCKWORTH.—ensure freedom of navigation——
General MILLEY. That’s right, and access, basing, over-flight, all
of that stuff plays into it.
Senator DUCKWORTH. So, adjacent to this issue, I want to shift
slightly to the other—if there was a bet on what I—questions I was
going to ask you, I’m sure this was one of the ones that would have
come up, which is logistics. I’m deeply concerned about our ability
to transport and sustain our forces overseas, especially in places
like INDOPACOM. Contested logistics is something I believe we
need to pay far more attention to. This year’s cuts to the tanker
fleet and anemic investment in sealift replacement and mainte-
nance really worry me.
Secretary Esper and General Milley, can you tell me how this
year’s Defense budget request preserves or improves our ability to
transport and sustain our forces in a——
Secretary ESPER. Yeah.
Senator DUCKWORTH.—contested environment? The days that
we’re going not be able to send ships full of what we need without
our enemy trying to attack, take the ship out, are behind us.
Secretary ESPER. Senator, you’re exactly right. I don’t know if
you were here earlier, but I mentioned this. You know, I’m con-
cerned that—two important things that often get overlooked be-
cause they’re not sexy are things like airlift and aerial refueling
and strategic sealift. You know, we’ve invested in two surge ships
this year, but if you—I’ve had a lot of conversations with General
Lyons—we need to do more, and we need to do more, soon. That’s
why we’ve talked a few times about the shipbuilding plan, but one
of the things the shipbuilding plan doesn’t incorporate is strategic
lift, sealift. So, I sent a letter to the committees, and I said, when
360

I look at the shipbuilding plan, I think we should factor in strategic
sealift, because it also competes for budget dollars, and I—it’s a
critical factor. So, between that—I’m very concerned about the
delays in the KC–46. I had the chance to crawl through one about
a week—2 weeks ago, and look at the problems. We—so we’re going
to have to look restoring some—maybe some 10s, some 135s, so we
keep that—at least 479 aircraft going. But, it’s a very capable air-
plane, it’s just going to take some time. But, the—those are critical
things, particularly when you see the distances from CONUS or
Alaska all the way into theater, into INDOPACOM theater, and
then forward basing is another way you offset that, of course.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Yes. You’re right, because it’s not just
about the sealift, it’s—the tanker fleet, as you were mentioning——
Secretary ESPER. Right.
Senator DUCKWORTH.—but it’s also fueling.
Secretary ESPER. Yes, ma’am.
Senator DUCKWORTH. We’ve got to have forward fueling capa-
bility. We can’t just be shipping our fuel there for everything that
sucks gas. Right?
Secretary ESPER. That’s right.
General MILLEY. And you’re right. You’re over—we’re over time,
so I can get you an answer for the record, but——
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, General.
General MILLEY.—you’re absolutely right to be concerned about
the maritime sealift. We’ve given that up, as a nation, for the most
part, over the last many, many years, and the tanker fleet and the
airlift fleet.
On the tankers, though, I just want to be clear again, you know,
we’ve got almost 500 tankers, so, in this budget, there’s 10 KC–10s
and 13 KC–135s. Yes, there’s stress on the force. No question about
it. You’ve heard from General Lyons and others. But, at the same
time, I don’t want people who are watching this, especially in cer-
tain countries, to think that the United States of America cannot
project power overseas, when needed. We can, and we will, if re-
quired.
[The information referred to follows:]
General MILLEY. In an effort to better define future warfighting requirements, the
Secretary of Defense has directed the development of a Joint Warfighting Concept
against peer adversaries in the 2030 timeframe. A subset of this requirement is the
development of a corresponding Joint Concept for Contested Logistics. Strategic Sea-
lift requirements for projecting the Joint Force in contested, all-domain environ-
ments from the Homeland, through the approaches, and to the tactical edge are fun-
damental to the success of any future large-scale military operation. The outcomes
of the Joint Warfighting Concept and Joint Concept for Contested Logistics in De-
cember 2020 will help to inform future Strategic Sealift force composition require-
ments and long-range shipbuilding plans for the Navy and the Secretary of Defense.
In fiscal year 2021, TRANSCOM will invest $26.3 million of RDT&E funding to-
wards Joint Deployment and Distribution challenges in a contested environment.
These challenges include improvements to transportation and sustainment of our
forces through cyber assurance, global posture, transportation capacity and fleet
readiness. They plan to invest $30 million in fiscal year 2022. Additionally, the
USTRANSCOM joint exercise program receives dedicated funding through the Com-
batant Commanders’ Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2)
program. For fiscal year 220, USTRANSCOM is allocated $31.3 million for six joint
exercises.
The Joint Exercise Transportation Program (JETP) is a sub-program of CE2T2
that funds the strategic transportation of personnel and equipment to worldwide
combatant command sponsored joint exercises. This program provides an oppor-
361
tunity to stress strategic transportation and C4I systems and evaluate their readi-
ness and supportability across the full range of military operations. USTRANSCOM
Service Components execute the majority of JETP funding to deploy and re-deploy
units participating in CE2T2-funded joint exercises. In fiscal year 2020 the JETP
budget is $207.3 million.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you.
Senator REED. Gentlemen, let me thank you for your testimony,
and thank you, particularly, for your service.
On behalf of the Chairman, Chairman Inhofe, let me call the ad-
journment of the hearing.
Thank you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES INHOFE
FUNDING LEVELS

1. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the National Defense
Strategy (NDS) Commission and senior Pentagon leadership have all endorsed 3 to
5 percent real annual growth to implement the strategy. Every year since the NDS
was published in 2018, leadership has said the next budget will implement the
NDS. Now we hear it won’t be until fiscal year 2022. Has the U.S. military fully
recovered from lack of funding that existed under the Budget Control Act, particu-
larly from 2013 to 2017?
Secretary ESPER. The Department lost $400 billion in buying power from fiscal
year 2013 through fiscal year 2017. While the Congress has enacted funds for the
Department at levels that reverse the loss in topline, the Department has not fully
recovered from the lost buying power under the Budget Control Act.
General MILLEY. The last four defense budgets have done much to address the
shortfalls resulting from the lost buying power under the Budget Control Act, but
readiness and modernization challenges remain. The Department requires sus-
tained, predictable, adequate, and timely budget enactment to fully recover from the
Budget Control Act and effectively compete in an era of great power competition.

2. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how much money in dol-
lars above inflation do you need over the next 5 years to implement the NDS with
low risk?
Secretary ESPER. Three percent real annual growth over the Defense fiscal year
2021 topline established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 requires an addi-
tional $232 billion over the next 5 years. Five percent real annual growth would re-
quire an additional $395 billion over the next 5 years.
General MILLEY. Three percent real annual growth over the Defense fiscal year
2021 topline established by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 requires an addi-
tional $232 billion over the next 5 years. Five percent real annual growth would re-
quire an additional $395 billion over the next 5 years.
ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM: BALANCING MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL USE

3. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, spectrum is critical to the execution of all
DOD missions from radios to radars—including defense of the Homeland. In your
February 26, 2020, testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), you
commented on mid-band spectrum (3 to 4.2 gigahertz): ‘‘Private sector wants that.
We need that . . . ’’ and ‘‘We’re willing to share it.’’ Why does the military need to
share bandwidth with U.S. 5G companies rather than just moving out of those
bands altogether?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts operational mis-
sions, warfighting exercises, training, and testing in the 3.1–3.55 gigahertz (GHz)
spectrum range using a variety of land, air, and sea weapons systems, and com-
mand and control platforms. These capabilities do not tune to other parts of the
spectrum to accommodate vacating the 3.1–3.55 GHz band. Being that industry
wants this band fast and DOD fully supports U.S. leadership in 5G and the eco-
nomic potential, we are willing to share the band. To accelerate the availability of
this mid-band spectrum for 5G, spectrum sharing is the only viable option. Modi-
fying all the necessary DOD equipment to vacate a band is an undertaking that is
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enormously complex, costly and time-intensive. DOD systems are optimized for the
original frequency band they were developed to operate in and are fully integrated
into the vehicle, ship, or aircraft. DOD originally selected the 3.1–3.55 GHz band
for the operation of certain mission-critical capabilities such as radars for many rea-
sons to include threats, the technical characteristics of this spectrum, regulatory
considerations and more. Today, there are a limited number of bands with similar
physical characteristics for relocation and many of are either already intensely used
or have been identified for study for reallocation. This further underscores that
sharing is the most feasible option.

4. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, do we have the technology to share?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) has the technology today, in
varying stages of development, to enable us to share all or portions of the mid-band
spectrum range. DOD, in partnership with stakeholders across industry and govern-
ment, is already expanding the technological boundaries of sharing, including in the
mid-band 5G spectrum of 3.55–3.65 gigahertz (GHz). This is an important air search
radar spectrum band for the operational Navy. Since 2012, DOD, industry, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration have worked on a sharing solution based on advanced tech-
nology that allows commercial services to share 3.55–3.65 GHz without modifica-
tions to Navy capabilities.
DOD also is assessing, as part of 5G experimentation with industry partners, the
potential for dynamic spectrum sharing to enable co-existence between radar sys-
tems and commercial 5G technology in mid-band spectrum. This is part of an overall
approach the Department has embraced to lean forward with smart technology and
informed policy that protects our mission capabilities while allowing for sharing
with 5G. The shift to a sharing and maneuver focus will align with efforts across
DOD to achieve U.S. military readiness, integration across warfighting domains,
and increased lethality of U.S. forces. DOD is ready to work through the machine
learning and artificial intelligence analysis required to achieve effective machine-to-
machine communications for near-real time sharing. These tools will improve 5G
and enable military operations and 5G and beyond systems to cohabitate in con-
gested spectrum. Overall, information technology modernization will better
deconflict operations and enable more sharing in more bands, including those valu-
able for 5G.
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND (AFRICOM) TROOP LEVELS

5. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you agree that Africa
is key terrain to implement the NDS given the intersection of Russian and Chinese
influence as well as al Qaeda and ISIS threats?
Secretary ESPER. First, I want to clarify that National Defense Strategy (NDS)
implementation is a Department of Defense-wide effort to improve lethality, expand
and establish partnerships, and empower reforms. These efforts drive our engage-
ments and force posture across the world, so yes, it will include parts of Africa as
it is an emerging frontier for global power competition and an area plagued by
transnational threats.
Second, consistent with the NDS, the Department will emphasize relationships as
key to achieving these goals. This means the Department will primarily work by,
with, and through local partners and allies to combat transnational threats and
minimize malign influence of non-African powers. The NDS reinforces partner-cen-
tric strategies and approaches to strengthen our partners’ defense capabilities. The
Department will continue to use a variety of tools to work closely with African and
other international partners to achieve several policy goals including capacity-build-
ing programs, security assistance, military equipment sales, education, and exer-
cises.
General MILLEY. Africa is home to some of the fastest growing economies and pop-
ulations in the world and sits at the crossroads of international commerce and
trade. Africa is also a key nexus for many of the strategic challenges identified in
the National Defense Strategy.
Malign actors’ coercive and exploitative activities undermine and threaten many
African countries’ stability. If left unimpeded, Russia and China threaten to erode
United States influence and access in Africa over time.
Al Qaeda and ISIS linked violent extremist networks are expanding in Africa at
a rapid pace, due in large part to weak governance and disenfranchised populations.
Most VEOs in Africa seek to strike at the United States in the region, and some
aspire to strike the U.S. Homeland.
363
The Department of Defense will remain engaged in Africa because America’s fu-
ture security, prosperity, and strategic access in times of crisis relies upon free,
open, and secure sea and air lines of communication around Africa.
Our efforts in Africa to address priority security challenges and compete with
Russia and China will also require continued investments across the whole-of-gov-
ernment.

6. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, as the threats grow in
Africa, should we be looking at troop increases instead of troop cuts?
Secretary ESPER. The Department is evaluating United States Africa Command’s
force posture through the combatant command review process. The review process
will ensure United States Africa Command is appropriately sized to enable United
States war plans and contingency plans, compete with China and Russia through
a whole-of-government approach, and degrade violent extremist organizations that
have the capability and intent to target the Homeland. United States Africa Com-
mand is conducting a troop-to-task analysis to determine whether an increase or de-
crease is needed to meet the above objectives. These reviews are ongoing.
General MILLEY. The United States Government’s commitment to Africa is dem-
onstrated across the spectrum of national power—including diplomatic, military and
economic efforts.
Persistent United States military presence is not the only measure of the Depart-
ment of Defense’s commitment in Africa, but we will continue to do our part.
DOD’s continued commitment in Africa is demonstrated through its counter-ter-
rorism training and operations, military training exercises, dynamic force employ-
ment, intelligence sharing, crisis response, and emergency humanitarian assistance.
While the results of the United States Africa Command review are not yet final,
I am confident that the command will remain adequately resourced to accomplish
its priority missions.

7. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are you doing to
ensure that AFRICOM has the resources it needs to accomplish its mission and im-
plement the NDS?
Secretary ESPER. The Department is evaluating United States Africa Command’s
force posture through the combatant command review process. The review process
will ensure United States Africa Command is appropriately sized to enable United
States war plans and contingency plans, compete with China and Russia through
a whole-of-government approach, and degrade violent extremist organizations that
have the capability and intent to target the Homeland. United States Africa Com-
mand is conducting a troop-to-task analysis to determine whether an increase or de-
crease is needed to meet the above objectives. These reviews are ongoing.
General MILLEY. The Department of Defense is reviewing activities and resources
across all combatant commands to ensure alignment with the National Defense
Strategy. United States Africa Command has been the first to undergo this review.
The purpose of these reviews is to rebalance and right-size to ensure DOD is
aligned to most effectively meet the priorities of the National Defense Strategy, such
as great power competition and countering violent extremist organizations that
threaten the Homeland.
While the results of the United States Africa Command review are not yet final,
I am confident that the command will remain adequately resourced to accomplish
its priority missions.
PENTAGON BUDGETING REFORM

8. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, the Pentagon still uses systems designed dec-
ades ago to manage its processes—namely, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting
and Execution (PPBE) system for developing its budget. Do you believe the current
Pentagon budgeting system is flexible enough to implement the NDS?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense is reviewing activities and resources
across all combatant commands to ensure alignment with the National Defense
Strategy. United States Africa Command has been the first to undergo this review.
The purpose of these reviews is to rebalance and right-size to ensure DOD is
aligned to most effectively meet the priorities of the National Defense Strategy, such
as great power competition and countering violent extremist organizations that
threaten the Homeland.
While the results of the United States Africa Command review are not yet final,
I am confident that the command will remain adequately resourced to accomplish
its priority missions.
364
9. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, is it time to consider both fundamental and
incremental changes to the PPBE process?
Secretary ESPER. The Department is constantly improving the way it conducts its
PPBE process. This year, I have tasked my Chief Management Officer to conduct
a consolidated program and budget review of the Defense Agencies. This review will
provide a comprehensive review of the Fourth Estate and its contributions to the
National Defense Strategy (NDS). All savings from this process will be invested to
further the full implementation of the NDS for the Department.
CHINA AND POSTURE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

10. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, General Wolters recently told this Com-
mittee that the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) fixed a lot of our posture prob-
lems in Europe. Do you agree we need that same focus now on posture in the Indo-
Pacific?
Secretary ESPER. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding has enabled the
Department to increase our force presence in Europe, improve critical capabilities,
establish pre-positioned equipment sets, and execute readiness-building exercises.
All of these efforts have contributed greatly to United States European Command’s
warfighting capabilities and correcting posture problems in Europe. The United
States must now focus on posture in the Indo-Pacific region and continue our efforts
to broaden our posture across the Indo-Pacific region. Adapting our current posture
that is concentrated in Northeast Asia to a more distributed laydown is an impor-
tant element of our objective of denying adversaries sustained air and sea domi-
nance in the region.

11. Senator INHOFE. General Milley, is the posture we have today in the Indo-Pa-
cific the posture we’ll need in the future to deal with a China that is more and more
aggressive?
General MILLEY. In accordance with the NDS, DOD is focused on adapting to a
battlefield where US operations will be challenged in all domains—air, sea, land,
space, and cyberspace—with increasing speed and reach. If left unaddressed, these
trends would erode our military advantage and challenge our ability to deter aggres-
sion.
To counter these trends, DOD is emphasizing investments in capabilities and pos-
ture to be able to deploy, survive, operate, and maneuver while under attack. These
include: survivable and resilient communications and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems; survivable long-range strike platforms and munitions; cost-
effective missile defenses capable of defeating sophisticated air, cruise, ballistic, and
hypersonic threats; and smaller, more dispersed, geographically diverse and resil-
ient bases that incorporate active and passive defenses, promote interoperability
and cooperation with allies and partners and enhance logistics flexibility and resil-
ience.

12. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, you mentioned in your testimony that fund-
ing like EDI can reduce the willingness of allies to meet burden sharing commit-
ments. Isn’t it true that EDI investments totaling over $20 billion have coincided
with significant increases in defense spending across the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) alliance, including over $100 billion in new defense spending
since 2016?
Secretary ESPER. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) improves the readiness,
responsiveness, lethality, and resiliency of United States forces in Europe in order
to strengthen our deterrence posture and enhance our defense capabilities. It is in-
dicative of the ironclad U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), but I continue to make clear to Allies that EDI, in and of itself, will not
maintain the world’s strongest military alliance. NATO Allies have responded to the
call for increased burden sharing with sustained increases in defense spending. De-
fense spending across European Allies and Canada increased in real terms in 2019
by 4.6 percent, the fifth consecutive year of growth. By the end of 2020, European
Allies will have invested $130 billion more since 2016, and the accumulated increase
by the end of 2024 will be $400 billion.

13. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in your testimony, you
both referred to the number of forces assigned to United States Indo-Pacific Com-
mand (INDOPACOM)—300,000 in 1 instance and 350,000 in another. How many
forces are assigned to INDOPACOM?
Secretary ESPER. There are 300,780 military personnel assigned to U.S. Indo-Pa-
cific Command.
365
General MILLEY. There are 300,780 military.

14. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how many civilian per-
sonnel are assigned to INDOPACOM?
Secretary ESPER. There are 53,972 government civilians & contractors assigned
to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
General MILLEY. There are 53,972 GS & contractor.

15. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, please detail the num-
ber of forces currently assigned to INDOPACOM by location (i.e. in foreign coun-
tries, U.S. states, and U.S. territories).
Secretary ESPER. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command forces are spread across 44 Foreign
Countries, all 50 States and Washington, DC and 4 U.S. Territories.
General MILLEY. Forces are spread across 44 Foreign Countries, all 50 States and
Washington DC and 4 U.S. Territories.

16. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how many forces as-
signed to INDOPACOM are stationed west of the International Date Line and how
many forces assigned to INDOPACOM are stationed east of the International Date
Line?
Secretary ESPER. There are 110,458 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command personnel west
of the International Dateline. There are 244,294 personnel east of the International
Dateline.
General MILLEY. West: 110,458. East: 244,294

17. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in each of the last three
annual DEPORDs/GFMAPs (including the current), how many forces assigned to
INDOPACOM were allocated to other combatant commands (COCOMs)?
Secretary ESPER. [Deleted.]
General MILLEY. [Deleted.]

18. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, please consider the example of denying a
fait accompli in a Taiwan scenario. Given the tyranny of distance you referenced in
your testimony, would you agree that the responsiveness of forces assigned to
INDOPACOM in such a scenario would vary significantly based in part on their lo-
cation in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR)?
Secretary ESPER. The location of U.S. forces within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Com-
mand (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is a critical element of any re-
sponse to a regional crisis or contingency. Our regional force posture has shifted our
approach to warfighting to a posture that is geographically distributed, operation-
ally resilient, and politically sustainable. In particular, the Department’s Global Op-
erating Model is designed to orient activities against the adversary’s theory of vic-
tory—particularly a fait accompli scenario. The mix of activities in the contact and
blunt layers is designed to focus the Department’s military operations, especially in
concert with allies and partners, to prevent adversary activities that may seek to
achieve a fait accompli. Our effective operation in the contact and blunt layers of
the Global Operating Model, as implemented in the USINDOPACOM AOR, is a
combination of combat-credible forward forces deployed to the region (including in
Guam, Korea, and Japan) and U.S. operations conducted at greater distance. Our
responsiveness is also contingent upon the continued prioritization of investments
in the logistics backbone of operations—including prepositioned forward stocks, mu-
nitions, strategic mobility assets, and maintenance.

19. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Esper, as one example, in the context of such sce-
nario, would you consider ships stationed on the West Coast of the United States
to be part of the contact, blunt, or surge layer of the Global Operating Model de-
scribed in the NDS?
Secretary ESPER. Through the layers of the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s
(NDS) Global Operating Model, the Department seeks to identify the general at-
tributes and key functions U.S. forces must be capable of performing to advance
NDS objectives, and specifically the requirement to arrest the erosion of military ad-
vantage against our primary competitors in key theaters. For example, U.S. forces
in the blunt layer must be combat credible and positioned to ensure they can help
delay, degrade, or deny an armed attack by a U.S. competitor for limited objectives.
In the scenario provided, the ship’s capabilities and mission are the critical factors
determining which layer of the Global Operating Model they support.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS
SPECTRUM SHARING

20. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in your HASC testi-
mony on February 26, 2020, you said the Department is willing to share spectrum
with 5G networks in the ‘‘Mid-Band’’ (3 to 4.2 gigahertz). Can you describe some
of the ways that the Department relies on spectrum to support warfighter require-
ments?
Secretary ESPER. Spectrum is imperative to Department of Defense (DOD) oper-
ations. DOD must have the ability to gain and maintain an advantage in the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum when and where it is needed. To its meet national security
and homeland defense missions, DOD relies on spectrum-dependent systems to pro-
vide command and control; voice and data communications; intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR); advanced threat detection and targeting systems;
electronic attack and electronic protection; and battlefield situational awareness and
protection (e.g., air traffic, weather, counter unmanned aerial systems or UAS).
Without spectrum access, DOD is unable to train and equip its forces nor meet oper-
ational mission requirements. DOD has several types of important capabilities in
the 3.1–3.55 GHz frequency range including major weapons systems. These include
shipboard and ground based radars supporting multiple strategic and tactical bal-
listic missile defense missions, systems providing counter-mortar weapons and
counter-air and UAS capabilities for homeland defense and critical site protection,
and airborne command and control. The Department also relies on the use of air-
borne radars in this band to provide intelligence and protection of national security
events.
General MILLEY. To meet national security and homeland defense missions, DOD
relies on spectrum-dependent systems to provide command and control; voice and
data communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); advanced
threat detection and targeting systems; cyber; electronic attack and electronic pro-
tection; and battlefield situational awareness and protection (e.g., air traffic, weath-
er, counter unmanned aerial systems or UAS). Without spectrum access, the Depart-
ment is unable to train and equip its forces nor meet its operational mission re-
quirements.
The White House, DOD, DOC and FCC have formed a task force to develop the
details of a nationwide spectrum sharing solution by August 1, 2020. The collabo-
rative agreement will enable sharing in the 3450–3550 MHz range, providing 100
MHz of nearly contiguous access across the Nation to enable America to lead the
world in 5G development.

21. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are some of the
future spectrum warfighter requirements that will be essential to competing with
Russia and China on a future battlefield?
Secretary ESPER. Military operations will see the integration of all domains (air,
land, sea, space, and cyber) and the widespread use of all domain sensors, radars,
and cloud-based systems leveraging advanced quantum computing, artificial intel-
ligence, and machine learning for near real-time assessment and decision making.
The military will significantly expand the number of autonomous air and ground
systems that operate at extended distances for longer periods of time, providing per-
sistent and high-quality situational awareness, tracking, guidance, and force. Win-
ning in the future battlefield requires the ability to see and strike adversaries first
while preventing adversaries from detecting the Department’s presence.
This will be accomplished by interconnecting our geographically dispersed hetero-
geneous systems, which are often on-the-move, through the effective and efficient
use of spectrum. Future spectrum requirements are shaped by overarching new ca-
pability requirements that include increased operational agility; expanded through-
put via traditional line-of-sight radio frequency and data links that are on plat-
forms; smart and adaptive global distribution networks; expanded space-based capa-
bilities, and increased use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies. In addition, to
keep pace with the rapid dispersion of technology and new concepts of warfare and
competition, the Department is developing Dynamic Spectrum Utilization tools and
methods to allow access to the spectrum regardless of adversary attempts to deny
access.
General MILLEY. Military operations will see the integration of all domains (air,
land, sea, space, and cyber) and the widespread use of sensors, radars, and cloud-
based systems leveraging advanced quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and
machine learning for near real-time assessment and decision making. The military
will significantly expand the number of autonomous air and ground systems that
367
operate at extended distances for longer periods of time, providing persistent and
high-quality situational awareness, tracking, guidance, and force employment. Win-
ning in the future battlefield requires the ability to see and strike adversaries first,
while preventing adversaries from detecting DOD’s presence.
This will be accomplished by interconnecting our geographically dispersed hetero-
geneous systems, which are often on-the-move, through the effective and efficient
use of spectrum. Future spectrum requirements are shaped by next-generation capa-
bilities that include increased operational agility, expanded throughput via tradi-
tional line-of-sight RF and data links that are on platform. Additionally, they in-
clude smart and adaptive global distribution networks, expanded space-based capa-
bilities, and increased use of commercial off-the-shelf technologies. Finally, to keep
pace with the rapid dispersion of technology and new concepts of warfare and com-
petition, we are developing Dynamic Spectrum Utilization tools and methods. These
will allow DOD to maximize the use of available spectrum to exploit battlefield op-
portunities while preventing interference to other authorized users.

22. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what help is needed
from Congress in this area?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) appreciates the Committee’s
continued support of our 5G plans, including our engagement as part of a ‘‘whole-
of-government’’ approach to make the President’s 5G goals a reality. A specific area
in which Congress could assist is spectrum information technology (IT) moderniza-
tion, as proposed in Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
section 214. This provision will modernize the Department’s spectrum IT infrastruc-
ture, standardize modeling and simulation tools, standardize spectrum data, and
allow interoperability between DOD, Federal users and national regulators (Federal
Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications & Information
Administration). This support will accelerate spectrum-repurposing decisions, result-
ing in an improved ability to deconflict operations and enable more sharing, includ-
ing for 5G and beyond. This aligns with the greater reliance on sharing as part of
a ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach enables us to gain flexibility to be resilient
against coercive,
General MILLEY. DOD appreciates SASC’s continued support of our 5G plans, in-
cluding our engagement as part of a ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach to make the
President’s 5G goals a reality. The U.S. has great momentum and SASC’s continued
support of the National Spectrum IT Modernization initiative will enable interoper-
ability between DOD, Federal users and national regulators (Federal Communica-
tions Commission and the National Telecommunications & Information Administra-
tion), accelerate spectrum-repurposing decisions, resulting in an improved ability to
deconflict operations and enable more sharing, including for 5G and beyond. A spe-
cific area in which Congress could assist is to increase funding in DOD’s RDT&E
activities, specifically its recently established Next Generation Information Commu-
nications Technology Program (Early-stage R&D program). This program comprises
a new initiative known as ‘‘5G to Next G.’’ DOD’s current efforts are focused on de-
veloping 5G-enabled military applications and spectrum sharing between national
5G and military systems. The new program would add a focus on technologies be-
yond 5G, working with agencies such as the National Science Foundation and Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology on millimeter-wave technology, multi-
antenna systems, dynamic spatial spectrum reuse, and ‘‘special/spectral/network se-
curity techniques.’’ DOD’s operations have become increasingly dependent on elec-
tromagnetic spectrum access across all domains. To improve national security readi-
ness, effectiveness, and efficiency, Congress must encourage coordination across all
federal agencies. We have lost our edge in this critical domain and need to quickly
restore readiness in the electromagnetic spectrum to ensure we can execute the Na-
tional Defense Strategy.

23. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, if DOD was required
to ‘‘vacate’’ or leave that band of the spectrum instead of sharing, what are the po-
tential dollar costs to the military?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot vacate the spectrum,
because there is no comparable spectrum or technology to which military systems
can transition that is as mission effective as this band. As a consequence, spectrum
sharing is the only viable option at this time to accelerate the availability of this
band for commercial 5G systems. As part of our proactive engagement in ensuring
that mid-band spectrum is available to meet national 5G priorities for the U.S.,
DOD is studying the issue of dollar costs if comparable spectrum were available.
That study is expected to be out later this year.
368
General MILLEY. Currently the DOD cannot vacate this band of spectrum due to
weapons systems and our National Security in the near term. For instance, we have
nearly 100 Aegis ships, each with an Aegis radar at the cost of $1 billion each. We
also have a fleet of AWACs aircraft in this band of spectrum. These two platforms
make up a significant portion of our National and Homeland defense. There are
many other radar weaons systems that would be effected which is why our sharing
strategy is so essential to our National Security and in the vital interest of our 5G
efforts.
I, collaborating directly with the White House Chief of Staff, will co-chair a steer-
ing group to identify a solution that allows commercial industry nationwide 5G ac-
cess while preserving critical DOD readiness and operations. The steering group is
scheduled to present results to the President by August 1, 2020.
24. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, how long would it take
to move to a different area of the spectrum?
Secretary ESPER. Initial estimates for relocation timelines range from well over
a decade to several decades, depending on the cost that would be acceptable and
if comparable replacement spectrum were identified and made available, as required
under current statutory safeguards.
General MILLEY. In the immediate future, the White House has identified access
to 100 MHz of contiguous mid-band spectrum as essential to the U.S. efforts to lead
the world in 5G development. There will be a two-phase sharing plan to expedite
commercial access. The short term solution will be sharing spectrum via adjust-
ments to Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs.) The long term solution will include
identifying comparable spectrum, and making modifications to DOD equipment and/
or operating concepts to improve the sharing environment. The final plan is sched-
uled to be delivered to the White House by August 1, 2020 with an aim to announce
the associated spectrum auction no later than October 1, 2020.
CLOSE COMBAT LETHALITY TASK FORCE

25. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper, one of Secretary Mattis’ signature efforts
was to create the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF). The charter of this
task force recognizes that, after WWII, close combat forces suffered 90 percent of
all combat deaths, despite comprising only 4 percent of the total force. Senator
Duckworth and I offered an amendment that was included in the Senate Report ac-
companying the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), urg-
ing the department to continue its support of this task force and for its direct re-
porting relationship to the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Mattis called this task
force his #2 priority, only behind the NDS. Will you give me your commitment to
continue your direct oversight of this important task force, so that our ground com-
bat forces, from all services, have a champion in its Secretary?
Secretary ESPER. The work of the Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF)
is very important and having been an Infantryman myself the purpose of the task
force is of vital importance to me. That is why I want to ensure this critical effort
continues well into the future.
I am focused on implementing the National Defense Strategy and efforts like the
CCLTF are a key part of ensuring our Nation’s readiness now and in the future.
That is why I have asked the Secretary of the Army to explore how this successful
endeavor can be improved and institutionalized. Our Army provides the majority of
the close combat forces and in order to prevent duplicate efforts across the Depart-
ment, I decided the Department of the Army would be the lead in formalizing the
critical mission of the task force.
DOD CYBER STRATEGY

26. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, one of the five objec-
tives in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy is to deter, pre-empt and defeat malicious
cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure. The National Guard and Reserve
Components are uniquely positioned to respond to cyber incidents of national signifi-
cance, yet they continue to experience difficulty in cyber recruitment and retention.
Can you describe your cyber talent management strategy; any innovative efforts
that DOD is using to recruit and retain National Guard and Reserve cyber forces?
Secretary ESPER. Similar to the Active Component, recruiting and retaining Na-
tional Guard (NG) and Reserve personnel with cyber skills is challenging given the
competition with other sectors and private industry. The Military Departments are
working to attract and retain the best cyber talent by utilizing bonuses, direct com-
missioning, constructive credit, continuing education programs, and assignment in-
369
centive pay. The NG provides servicemembers the opportunity to continue their in-
dustry and government careers and competes to retain personnel with cyber skills.
Continued congressional support for Department of Defense recruiting programs
such as direct commissioning, training and education, retention pay, bonuses, and
other incentives is critically important to recruiting and retaining NG and Reserve
personnel with cyber skills.
General MILLEY. There is a recognized nation-wide shortage of highly skilled cy-
bersecurity professionals, and each of our DOD components, Regular and Reserve,
are competing with external agencies and industry for the same small pool of talent.
The Regular and Reserve components have been out in front addressing this issue
and the National Guard is working to stay fully integrated with the solutions as
we determine are successful methods of recruitment and retention.
I’d like to thank congress for providing enhanced recruiting and retention authori-
ties to both the Regular and Reserve components, and note that officer direct ap-
pointment authority and constructive service credit enhancements have created
more agile military personnel programs. The military pay and incentive system has
agility built into it as well. Continued Congressional support for Reserve Component
(Guard and Reserve) parity with Regular component authorities for recruiting and
retention programs such as direct commissioning, tuition assistance and educational
benefits, retention pay, critical skills bonuses, and Tricare, among others, is criti-
cally important. Our strategy is to leverage all traditional and non-traditional re-
cruiting methods to attract talent and then retain that talent through use of incen-
tives, both monetary and non-monetary.
While I believe we have the authorities we need to successfully recruit and retain
cyber talent, we are closely watching market trends for talent in Artificial Intel-
ligence and Machine Learning; there are early indicators that this may become an
area where additional recruiting and retention authorities and/or special pay au-
thorities are needed.
Examples:
With our Reserve component for example, in addition to traditional recruiting
methods our reserve components have developed programs to leverage officers par-
ticipating in Scholarship and Fellowship Programs. These programs include the
Federal Executive Fellowship, SECDEF Executive Fellows, SECNAV tours, Industry
Fellowships (e.g. Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, JP Morgan Chase), and universities (e.g.
Harvard, MIT, CMU, Stanford). Our professionals build bridges with these officers
to develop leads with promising candidates. We also seek both enlisted and officer
candidates by liaising with regional colleges and universities offering information
technology and cybersecurity certifications and degrees.
Following the Defense Digital Services model, more often today we have software
developers recruiting software developers and engineers recruiting engineers. In
fact, we have a USMC reservist in one of our cyber units who works at Google full
time as an engineer. Reserve component (Guard and Reserve) members are uniquely
positioned in their civilian occupations and industries to recruit similarly talented
and skilled individuals through business cards and LinkedIn profiles.
Also, the National Guard Bureau consistent with their Cyber Strategy laid out in
2018, is establishing Cyber Workforce Forums (CWFs) to bring together representa-
tives from the private sector, academia (including K–12), industry partners, and
public organizations to create innovative solutions and improve management of the
national cyber work force to meet both military and mission partner requirements.
CWFs will be established at a variety of levels including state, regional and national
levels and will necessitate states to facilitate interactions with partners. A robust
and well integrated cyber workforce is a national asset vital for sustaining our econ-
omy by meeting both the Nation’s defense and mission partner cyber security needs.
Not only is our reserve component a cost-effective model, but it’s filled with tre-
mendously talented individuals, the vast majority of whom serve for less pay than
they receive in their civilian positions. Understanding why they do this is key to
both recruiting and retention. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought forth additional
challenges that have highlighted the innovation of our professionals and provided
new examples of agility that will help move us forward.
For example, in April 2020, a Marine Corps Reserve cyber group in the 6th Com-
munication Battalion, Force HQ Group, innovatively redesigned a full drill weekend
to a virtual format in a secure Cloud environment, ensuring every element of train-
ing and mission tasks were completed. They culminated the training event with a
Cyber Operator Competition scenario called Capture the Flag, which was a tremen-
dous success. The feedback from reservists was very positive and has caused us to
re-think some of the ways we’re able to organize reserve training and drills in a
more flexible manner that may also improve retention without expending any addi-
370
tional resources. We’re taking a hard look at this and other examples, to find bench-
mark programs that continue to improve our ability to attract, recruit and retain
talented professionals.
27. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the 2018 DOD Cyber
Strategy refers to the integration of cyber and information operations as a line of
effort. Some services have integrated their cyber forces into new information war-
fare commands. Can you describe the steps DOD has taken to integrate cyber,
space, electromagnetic warfare, and information operations?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes the important de-
velopments on the global threat landscape, particularly involving China’s and Rus-
sia’s emphasis on domination in the information environment. DOD is undertaking
several steps to address these threats effectively and to support the further integra-
tion of our military cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and information oper-
ations. Among these efforts is a focus on designating a Principal Information Oper-
ations Advisor to oversee a cross-functional team, develop or update the DOD infor-
mation operations strategy and conduct the first-ever information operations pos-
ture review, designate Information Operations Joint Providers and Information Op-
erations Joint Force Trainers for the Department, develop and manage a joint lexi-
con for relevant information operations terms, and determine the relevant set of ca-
pabilities for these operations across domains. Other ongoing efforts include improv-
ing DOD organization, such as at the Military Department level; updating DOD doc-
trine, joint planning, and guidance, including by designating information as a joint
function; identifying and addressing any gaps or seams in policies or authorities;
and enhancing the Cyber Mission Force’s ability to conduct integrated operations.
DOD is continuing to assess the effectiveness of its current and planned efforts and
to identify any additional steps that should be considered.
General MILLEY. DOD is undertaking several steps to support further integration
of cyber, electromagnetic spectrum operations, and information operations. Across
the Joint Force, we’re analyzing the successes of the Services, such as the Navy, Air
Force, and Army, who have aligned many commands and organizations to fuse
cyber, space, electromagnetic warfare, and information operations most effectively to
gain and maintain information advantage and to increase lethality. Specifically, the
Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces, the Navy’s 10th Fleet, and the Air Force’s 16th
Air Force are examples of larger optimization and integration efforts. You have also
seen the Department form the U.S. Space Force, and the Space Force will optimize
its forces and organizations to support the Department and the National Defense
Strategy most effectively. We are continuously innovating and seeking to optimize
the warfighting capabilities delivered to the combatant commands. Lastly, my staff
is reviewing the Department’s and the Joint Staff’s organization to determine how
to evolve in this era of Great Power Competition most effectively, and evaluating
the fusion of information warfare internally, across the U.S. Government, and with
our U.S. and international partners.

28. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, does this entail or
should this entail a single organization and command structure across the depart-
ment?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) is open to making adjust-
ments to its organization or resource allocations to enable the necessary integration
of cyber, space, electromagnetic spectrum, and information operations; however, any
such decision is premature pending the results of ongoing DOD assessments, includ-
ing the forthcoming information operations strategy and posture review. Presently,
effective operational integration to enable simultaneous effects from the strategic to
the tactical levels is occurring through established procedures across combatant
commands, leveraging authorities delegated to multiple combatant commanders in
their assigned mission areas. Current OSD and Joint Staff organizations and proc-
esses also regularly provide valuable support to enable this integration.
General MILLEY. The Department recognizes the changing threat environment
and is examining all options. We are driving toward operational integration from
the strategic to the tactical level across combatant commands and leveraging au-
thorities delegated to multiple combatant commanders in their assigned mission
areas. Department of Defense and Joint Staff organizations are assessing ways to
provide support to enable this integration further and simultaneously with the De-
partment configuring a Principal Information Operations advisor and Cross Func-
tional Team. Services are experimenting, innovating, and adapting the concepts to
their own unique operating requirements. We expect our efforts with Joint All Do-
main Command and Control (JADC2) and the associated joint concept of Informa-
tion Advantage to result in a comparative advantage in all-domain operations. We
371
will continue to engage with the combatant commands to identify gaps in informa-
tion warfare capabilities and capacities and to collaborate with our allies and part-
ners to accelerate delivery of effective and affordable solutions.
READINESS AND MODERNIZATION

29. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the personnel in the
Armed Forces and the equipment utilized by those personnel have sustained a sub-
stantial strain from being at war for 20 years. Please speak at the unclassified level
about your modernization and readiness strategy to maintain a lethal force in a con-
tested and disruptive battlefield in alignment with the NDS and subsequently your
agency’s objectives.
Secretary ESPER. Since the release of our National Defense Strategy (NDS), the
Department of Defense (DOD) has invested in new equipment, improved operational
readiness, and modernized our nuclear deterrent forces. For example, DOD is mod-
ernizing all three legs of the nuclear triad, modernizing our space capabilities, in-
vesting in missile defense to protect the Homeland, procuring advanced aircraft, de-
veloping next generation precision guided munitions across the services and mod-
ernizing our electronic warfare systems. DOD also continues to invest in advanced
technologies that will help maintain tactical advantage, such as artificial intel-
ligence, directed energy, and hypersonic weapons. DOD’s fiscal year 2021 budget fo-
cused on the development of these crucial emerging technologies to expand our
warfighting advantages over strategic competitors and enhance our fighting capa-
bilities in the increasingly complex battlefield of the future.
The Navy’s strategy of sea control and implementation of distributed lethality as
an operational and organizational principle for achieving and sustaining sea control
at will is evident with their aggressive strategy of shipbuilding the next generation
of submarines, aircraft carriers, and surface combatants. Specifically, the SSBN–826
Columbia-class submarine, the Navy’s Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine re-
placement; the on-going construction of three CVN–78 Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear
powered aircraft carriers; the DDG–1000-class of guided missile destroyers to pro-
vide offensive, distributed, and precision firepower at long ranges; the SSN–774 Vir-
ginia-class fast-attack submarine to be capable of targeting, controlling, and launch-
ing MK–48 torpedoes and Tomahawk land-attack missiles; the FFG(X) multi-mis-
sion guided missile frigate, to maximize the Navy’s small surface combatant surviv-
ability and capabilities in surface warfare, submarine warfare, electromagnetic ma-
neuver warfare, and air warfare mission areas; and the FREEDOM and INDE-
PENDENCE variants of the Littoral Combat Ship to defeat asymmetric ‘‘anti-ac-
cess’’ threats such as mines, quiet diesel submarines and fast surface craft. Sea con-
trol is the precondition for the Navy’s surface warfare, submarine warfare, and air
warfare operational areas, while distributed lethality reinforces fleet initiatives that
drive collaboration and integration across warfighting domains. The Navy’s distrib-
uted lethality requires increasing the offensive and defensive capability of surface
forces, and guides their deliberate resource investment for modernization and for
the future force, thus providing more capabilities across surface forces and yielding
more options for geographic combatant commanders in peace and war.
The Army’s multi-domain operations uses calibrated force posture, multi-domain
formations, and convergence as three key tenets to eliminate multiple layers of near
peer stand-off in all domains—land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. Their strategy
incorporates cross-domain fires as an evolution of combined arms maneuver, where
the combination of complementary effects complicates an enemy’s ability to act, pro-
ducing an overall effect greater than the sum of the individual parts. Multi-domain
formations deliver cross-domain fire capabilities through surface warfare aviation
platforms such as future vertical lift, ground combat platforms such as Paladin Inte-
grated Management, and integrated air and missile defense systems. Success
against significantly large and lethal near-peer enemy forces, will not rely exclu-
sively on a technological advantage, but also on the superior execution of concurrent
single-domain mission threads with the ability to refocus and execute converging
new multi-domain mission threads with speed and agility. Space and cyberspace do-
mains provide layered offensive and defensive capabilities to increase stand-off and
provide gray-zone/hybrid capabilities between unconventional warfare and conven-
tional surface warfare.
The Joint Force has the necessary capability, capacity, and readiness to contend
with today’s threats at an acceptable level of operational risk, but our adversaries’
demonstrated desire to contest U.S. military advantages will, if left unchecked, in-
crease the risk to our national defense strategic objectives. In order to ensure the
long-term readiness of the Joint Force, we must continue to modernize and expand
our margin of dominance, while balancing the risks to mission success and a serv-
372
ice’s force generation ability. The fiscal year 2021 request reflects an increase in
readiness funding from $114.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 to $130.4 billion, an in-
crease of 14 percent over four years. Focused investment in readiness allowed the
Department to halt readiness declines across the Joint Force and initiate readiness
recovery that has provided demonstrable improvements. The Department is consist-
ently improving readiness reporting to identify leading indicators and systemic
issues preventing accelerated readiness recovery, and improve the linkage between
resources and readiness outcomes to ensure effective allocation of Department fund-
ing. We are strengthening our warfighting approach, improving how we develop,
posture, and employ the Joint Force to implement the NDS most effectively, while
prioritizing modernization, future high-end readiness, and the development of new
operating concepts.
General MILLEY. The NDS provides the framework for the department’s readiness
and modernization strategy to deliver a ready, agile, and capable Joint Force that
can compete, deter, and win across all domains today and in the future. President’s
Budget 2021 funds major readiness accounts to grow operational availability and re-
cover from years of wartime operations and budget instability. We must be able to
adapt quickly to the rapid evolution in advanced technologies to compete and win
against potential adversaries. Our President’s Budget 2021 request targets specific
investments in readiness, modernization, leader development and support to our
people and families to retain overmatch in an era of great power competition.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
COVID–19

30. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, I wrote a letter to you concerning
Coronavirus. Can I get an update on how you’re educating the Force about the risks
associated with COVID–19, communicating DOD’s emergency and preparedness
plan, and how that plan is being executed?
Secretary ESPER. The Department has issued a series of documents that provide
force health protection guidance. This guidance provides information to the force on
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) risk, informs DOD Component plans, and
communicates COVID–19 health protection measures and guides actions on medical
treatment and laboratory diagnostic testing.
• Memorandum (dated January 30, 2020) addresses risk to personnel, individual
prevention and protection measures, healthcare information, patient screening
and isolation information, as well as information on diagnosis, treatment, and
reportable medical events.
• Supplement 1 (dated February 7, 2020) directs identification, restriction of
movement, and monitoring for servicemembers returning from mainland China.
• Supplement 2 (dated February 25, 2020) provides a risk-based framework to
guide commanders on implementing health protection measures based on their
local circumstances. This document allows a tailored response to the local needs
to ensure the protection of our force and their families. These plans can include
preventive hygiene measures, meeting and event cancellations, or access restric-
tions, among other actions.
• Supplement 3 (dated March 10, 2020) provided guidance for use of personal pro-
tective equipment and implementation of non-materiel solutions during the
COVID–19 outbreak (rescinded and superseded by Supplement 7).
• Supplement 4 (dated March 11, 2020) directs and recommends actions for all
DOD travelers in alignment with CDC Travel Health Notices.
• Supplement 5 (dated April 7, 2020) serves as a COVID–19 specific supplement
to DOD policy on patient movement, the DOD Fire and Emergency Services
Program, and public health and medical services as part of defense support of
civil authorities providing best practices for the evaluation, treatment, and
management of COVID–19 and associated patient movement guidance.
• Supplement 6 (dated April 7, 2020) provides laboratory diagnostic testing guid-
ance to protect at-risk populations while maximizing critical testing capability
and enabling optimal public health decision making.
• Supplement 7 (dated April 8, 2020) updates existing COVID–19 guidance for
use of cloth face coverings in addition to personal protective equipment, and
non-pharmaceutical interventions during the COVID–19 outbreak.
• Supplement 8 (dated April 13, 2020) provides guidance for protecting personnel
in workplaces during the response to COVID–19 including restricting workplace
access, collecting information necessary to protect the workplace and provides
373
a series of frequently asked questions and answers concerning Occupational
Safety and Health issues.
HOUSING

31. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, what is the plan to address the three remain-
ing provisions still missing from the Resident Bill of Rights?
Secretary ESPER. The remaining three rights—Maintenance History, Dispute Res-
olution, and Rent Withholding—will require more work, to include additional coordi-
nation, resolution of legal concerns, and determining underlying processes, before
implementation. The Department remains fully committed to continuing to work
with the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies to ensure the
benefits of these rights are fully available to servicemembers and their families re-
siding in MHPI housing. However, implementing these three rights does not lend
themselves to unilateral action by the Department. Agreement needs to be reached
with the MHPI companies and their third party lenders to operationalize these
rights, including making necessary changes to existing MHPI project legal docu-
ments. We are engaging with these parties now to obtain agreement on processes
to implement the three rights.

32. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, is this indicative of ongoing challenges in the
implementation or identification of the most qualified office/individual to work the
mechanics of those missing provisions?
Secretary ESPER. The delay is indicative of ongoing implementation challenges
due to three remaining rights pertaining to legal matters that do not lend them-
selves to unilateral action by the Department. The Department is working to reach
agreement with the Military Housing Privatization Initiative companies and their
third party lenders to operationalize these rights.

33. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, as you retrofit the military housing program,
what are you doing to improve the fundamentals of DOD’s business model in hous-
ing?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken a number of ac-
tions to improve DOD’s business model for providing oversight of our housing pro-
gram, to include:
• Establishing a Chief Housing Officer to provide overall Military Housing Privat-
ization Initiative (MHPI) program oversight.
• Hiring additional housing-related staff to increase oversight and responsiveness
to tenant concerns and increasing training for leadership and housing-related
staff.
• Enhancing installation communication with tenants.
• Implementing measures set out in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Au-
thorization Act, to include; hiring/identifying military tenant advocates; requir-
ing MHPI landlords implement electronic work order systems to improve trans-
parency and tracking of tenant requests for repairs; developing a comprehensive
work order approach to evaluate property management performance and better
incentivize MHPI landlords; and an improved dispute resolution process.
• Implementing a comprehensive work order approach to evaluate property man-
agement performance and better incentivize MHPI landlords.
• Improving policy and processes when residents raise health concerns that may
be related to their housing.
• Reviewing the Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rate setting process to en-
sure BAH rates, which serve as the basis for MHPI housing rents and project
revenue, appropriately reflect the local military housing market rents.

34. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, how are you refocusing DOD and the housing
industry to fix our housing issues?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a dual focus on ensuring
a positive living experience for residents and financially viable projects that deliver
safe, quality, well-maintained housing. During the past year, the Department has
taken a number of actions to address Military Housing Privatization Initiative
(MHPI) housing issues, to include increasing leadership engagement with MHPI
landlords, hiring additional housing-related staff, making work order progress trans-
parent and assessable to residents and housing staff, and increasing leadership and
staff training. In addition, the Department has issued policy requiring that Military
Departments revise performance fee metrics to better incentivize the privatization
projects to improve conditions on the ground; and has required that Military Depart-
ments undertake reviews of their MHPI project business processes, as well as their
374
internal processes, to identify where practices required improvement. Consistent
with the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, in February 2020 the
Department designated a Chief Housing Officer (CHO) to provide oversight of the
MHPI program. The CHO’s responsibilities include leading DOD’s efforts to work
with MHPI landlords to improve housing conditions and address resident concerns;
ensuring implementation the Tenant Bill of Rights and other MHPI requirements
in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA; and monitoring the long-term financial viability of
the MHPI projects.

35. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, how confident are you in the underlying
structure of the proposed Global Household Good Contract (GHC) to coordinate and
shift capacity requirements?
Secretary ESPER. While the Global Household Good Contract (GHC) will not be
in place until the 2021 move season, implementing it offers the Department the op-
portunity to set terms and conditions that favor Department of Defense (DOD) fami-
lies and an avenue to hold industry accountable. It’s important to note that we have
no formal contractual relationship with our disparate industry-base today; in addi-
tion to improving accountability, this construct provides industry with the rationale
to invest in quality capacity to meet DOD’s peak demand. Changing our relationship
with industry is necessary to improve access to—and management of—quality ca-
pacity to meet our peak summer demand and enable DOD to affix the accountability
and responsibility lacking in today’s program. The current disaggregated program
will never deliver the quality our families deserve or the accountability the Congress
demands. Recent studies validate this approach. The Business Case Analysis U.S.
Transportation Command submitted to the Defense Committees in January under-
scores the value of the GHC. I was similarly encouraged by the GAO’s report on
this subject—the GAO made sensible recommendations to improving the program,
but recommended no changes to the Department’s acquisition approach or timeline.

36. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, I have concerns about (1) resiliency, (2) peak
season transition phase, (3) system accountability, and (4) driver recruitment. Are
we prepared to provide quality service to our military families this upcoming PCS
season?
Secretary ESPER. This summer’s permanent change of station (PCS) season will
be particularly challenging due to the outbreak of COVID–19 and the impacts on
the household goods industry. We will continue to execute this season under the ex-
isting framework with the Global Household Goods Contract implementation after
the completion of the peak season. The service personnel and logistics communities
are working closely with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and my
staff to understand demand and capacity. With this understanding, we will appro-
priately review report dates and move schedules to meet service and servicemember
requirements. USTRANSCOM continues to work closely with the moving industry
to understand challenges and communicate the dynamic nature the Department’s
demand signal. With the Stop Move order remaining in place, the normal summer
peak season will be approximately half over before we begin relocations on a large
scale. As we resume travel and relocation, our main priority will be the safety of
our members and their families.
1. Resiliency. The household goods relocation industry has been impacted by the
COVID–19 outbreak with many States restricting operations and a significant
drop in the number of military moves. As the outbreak reduces in severity and
the military resumes moves on a larger scale, there may be some capacity
issues but USTRANSCOM’s engagement with industry indicates that with suf-
ficient lead time and a ramp up period, industry can get ‘back to normal’ capac-
ity levels to support military moves.
2. Peak season transition phase. Once the stop move order is lifted, we expect to
see a short ramp up period and then will have high volumes for several months
due to the high number of moves that have been delayed. USTRANSCOM is
communicating with the moving industry and services on a weekly basis to
provide a consolidated view of Department of Defense demand as well as in-
form the Service’s decisions on prioritizing and staggering PCSs to avoid ex-
ceeding capacity. Due to the late start of the peak season, we expect a higher
number of movers to be moving in the early fall as the backlog is cleared.
3. System accountability. We are committed to ensuring that servicemembers and
their families receive the support they need during the PCS process. Through
our quality assurance inspections, servicemember counseling, and program
management, we will do everything we can to increase the likelihood of a posi-
tive move experience.
375
4. Driver recruitment. The trucking industry as a whole has been significantly
disrupted due to changing demand patterns and an overall decrease in com-
mercial activity. Through timely communication with our industry partners, we
are supporting their efforts to match demand with capacity. We expect indus-
try will be able to react to that demand and deliver near historical capacity.
DOD COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPARENCY

37. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, military families insist that DOD needs to
improve how it educates and communicates with the force. This question extends
beyond communication issues between families and housing companies, it’s also
about improving the culture of DOD, particularly how well it communicates and in-
forms servicemembers and their families. Do I have your commitment to addressing
those concerns?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, you have my commitment to address these concerns. As in-
dicated in my letter to the SASC and HASC on day one, and as a personal chal-
lenge, I added a fourth line of effort of taking care of Service members and their
families as part of our National Defense Strategy. We deliver critical family readi-
ness information that helps our families live their best military lives through the
Department’s flagship program for supporting our people—Military OneSource—and
I commit to continue using this and other platforms to communicate and inform
families.
AFGHANISTAN

38. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, could you please provide an assessment of
how you think the recent peace deal with the Taliban will effect operations, troop
levels, and future United States policy toward Afghanistan?
Secretary ESPER. Since the signing of the United States-Taliban Agreement on
February 29, 2020, the United States has proceeded with a plan to reduce United
States forces in Afghanistan to 8,600 in 135 days. During this time period, the De-
partment of Defense has remained focused on conducting two missions in Afghani-
stan: training, advising, and assisting the Afghan security forces and executing
counterterrorism operations against ISIS–K, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups.
Further implementation of the agreement will occur if the Taliban adhere to the
conditions of the agreement, which will be assessed continually. Consistent with the
2017 South Asia Strategy, the best way to end the war in Afghanistan is a political
settlement between all Afghans. The signing of the United States-Taliban Agree-
ment and the release of the United States-Afghanistan Joint Declaration were the
first steps in this process.
39. Senator TILLIS. Secretary Esper, what risks do we, the United States, assume
in entering into this agreement?
Secretary ESPER. As with all agreements, there are risks. However, the United
States has mitigated the risks to our national security interests in the United
States-Taliban Agreement by embedding conditionality in the agreement. If the
United States assesses that the Taliban is not complying with the terms, we could
nullify the agreement. This could result in a resumption of offensive operations
against the Taliban and halting, or potentially reversing, the withdrawal of U.S.
forces. We continue to urge the Taliban to choose the path to peace.
RUSSIA-TURKEY RELATIONS

40. Senator TILLIS. General Milley, Russia-Turkey relations is in contention over
provocative acts by Moscow against the Turkish military. How does that change the
calculus of capability and capacity in the joint environment, particularly with NATO
forces?
General MILLEY. We deeply regret the loss of Turkish soldiers in Idlib due to pro-
Regime air strikes. Idlib is a unique case. For political reasons, Turkey does not
have air superiority in Idlib—pro-regime forces do. Additionally, this is in many
ways a proxy fight between pro-regime forces and Turkish Supported Opposition.
For these reasons, we cannot draw real conclusions with respect to NATO capability
and capacity from Syria. Russia continues to act as a destabilizing element in Syria
and remains an unreliable partner. The conflict in Syria has highlighted the
untrustworthiness of Russia to the entire NATO alliance.

41. Senator TILLIS. General Milley, what does this mean for regional focus and
strategy?
General MILLEY. Russia has proved to be an unreliable partner for Turkey in sev-
eral regions. In Syria, Russo-Turkish friction reinforces the need for a political reso-
376
lution under the auspices of UNSCR 2254. In Libya, Russian involvement is pro-
longing the conflict and preventing a diplomatic resolution. For Turkey and for our
other Allies and Partners, Moscow’s provocative acts underscore the unreliability of
Russia as a partner. As the global ally and partner of choice, the United States will
work through the UN, with NATO, and in other multilateral and bilateral fora to
counter Russian aggression and malign influence.
LEADER DEVELOPMENT/TALENT MANAGEMENT

42. Senator TILLIS. General Milley, in your testimony, you mentioned the leader-
ship development aspect of maintaining our military competitive advantage. Within
your Talent Management Enterprise, how are you maximizing the human talent in
the joint force?
General MILLEY. The Joints Chiefs and I have an ambitious vision to create a
fully aligned Professional Military Education and Talent Management system that
identifies, develops, and utilizes strategically minded, critically thinking, and cre-
ative joint warfighters skilled in the art of war and the practical and ethical applica-
tion of lethal military power. Our intent is to produce leaders at all levels who can
achieve intellectual overmatch against strategic competitors and adversaries. In the
Talent Management space, this entails rewarding continuous intellectual develop-
ment and growth; holding individuals accountable for academic performance in their
records; targeting those who have performed well academically for follow-on assign-
ments that hone newly acquired skills; and by better matching the cognitive abili-
ties of individuals with appropriate PME opportunities and positions of responsi-
bility.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW INITIATIVE (DPRI)

43. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper, how is your combatant commands review
of INDOPACOM—and as a subset, DPRI—taking into consideration the criteria of
strategic presence, training opportunities, host-nation support, cost, and potential
for growth?
Secretary ESPER. The combatant command review for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(USINDOPACOM) has not yet commenced. The Department shares your apprecia-
tion for the importance of the criteria you outline. These, along with other critical
posture criteria, will be a part of the overall review process calculus, ultimately
guided by the 2018 National Defense Strategy and optimized within political, geo-
graphical, and budgetary constraints, all of which will best position our military
forces to compete, deter, and, if needed, win in this theater.

44. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper, how would you optimize DOD’s force pos-
ture in INDOPACOM?
Secretary ESPER. The 2018 National Defense Strategy recognizes the need to
make investments that will solidify our competitive advantage and modernize how
we operate, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. To that end, the Department con-
tinues to adapt our current posture that is concentrated in Northeast Asia to a pos-
ture that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically
sustainable. The Department also faces key deficits in resilient and agile logistics.
The Department will make investments to prioritize prepositioned forward stocks
and munitions and mobility assets, and will seek partner and allied support, to en-
sure logistics sustainment can be maintained while under persistent multi-domain
attack.

45. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper, what specific changes would you poten-
tially look to make?
Secretary ESPER. The Department seeks to transition from large, unhardened in-
frastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient basing that incorporates active and pas-
sive defenses. The most critical investments for increasing joint force lethality and
resilience in the Indo-Pacific theaters include: survivable and resilient communica-
tions and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; survivable
long-range strike platforms and munitions; and cost-effective missile defenses capa-
ble of engaging sophisticated air, cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic threats. In par-
ticular, the Department will have to make significant investments to maintain and
extend the joint force’s advantages in the undersea, air, space, and cyber domains.
377
MISSILE DEFENSE

46. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what are the strategic
and tactical risks of waiting a decade to fill the twenty empty ground-based inter-
ception (GBI) silos in Missile Field 4 at Fort Greely, Alaska, as you work to field
the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI)?
Secretary ESPER. The United States continues to strengthen its homeland missile
defenses and is pursuing more advanced capabilities to stay ahead of rogue state
threats and reduce the risk of attack. Today, the U.S. is defended by the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system which includes 44 Ground-based Intercep-
tors (GBIs). To improve the current GMD system, the Fiscal Year 2021 budget re-
quest includes funds for: Improvements to existing sensors; a new discrimination
radar in Alaska; and refurbishing the COBRA DANE radar.
The Department of Defense (DOD) is pursuing more advanced capabilities to con-
tinue providing effective protection for the Nation. First, it is modernizing the GMD
system. This effort includes the development of a new interceptor to meet evolving
missile threats—the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI). The Department is plan-
ning to field the NGI beginning in 2028 and will continue delivering new intercep-
tors into the fleet until we meet the appropriate mix of 64 interceptors. Second,
DOD is improving reliability and extending service life of the existing GMD system
until replaced by the NGI by conducting a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
with older GBIs and by continuing Stockpile Reliability Program (SRP) and Service
Life Extension (SLE) testing to inform SLEP upgrade decisions. Third, to strengthen
the defense of the Homeland, especially between now and when NGI becomes oper-
ational late in the decade, DOD is examining options for a layered homeland missile
defense architecture. For example, the Missile Defense Agency will conduct a flight
test later this year of the SM–3 Block IIA against an Intercontinental Ballistic Mis-
sile-class target to determine its potential contribution as an additional layer for the
homeland defense architecture. Within a layered defense architecture, the SM–3 IIA
could offer additional opportunities to defeat missile threats in the late mid-course
phase to complement the existing GBIs. With these efforts, the U. S. will be pos-
tured to effectively meet the evolving missile threats to the Homeland.
General MILLEY. As outlined in the 2019 Missile Defense Review, it is imperative
that U.S. Homeland missile defenses outpace rogue state missile threats. Our mis-
sile defense posture includes active and passive defensive capabilities, as well as of-
fensive options, that together comprise a comprehensive and layered missile defense
architecture. I believe North Korea will continue to develop its intercontinental bal-
listic missile program to hold the U.S. Homeland at risk. Due to the uncertainty
of how that threat will advance over the next decade, we must optimize our invest-
ment strategy to ensure that we can protect the Homeland against these potential
rogue threats not only today, but also well into the future.

47. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the planned NGI
gives the Department the capabilities needed to defend against future rogue nation
threats but not until a decade away in 2030. In addition to fielding the NGI, would
you prefer to see an interim solution—or an earlier version of NGI—fielded years
sooner in order to boost the limited homeland missile defense capability?
Secretary ESPER. The Missile Defense Agency has worked with U.S. Northern
Command and other Department of Defense (DOD) stakeholders to define the re-
quirements for Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) that enable earliest possible field-
ing while still providing the needed capability to defend against the projected
threats to the Homeland in 2030 and beyond. NGI contract incentives have been in-
cluded to incentivize delivery of NGI in less than the 10 years referenced above. To
strengthen the defense of the Homeland between now and when NGI becomes oper-
ational late in the decade, DOD is examining options for a layered homeland missile
defense architecture. Existing defensive systems, to include the Aegis Weapon Sys-
tem using the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missile and the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense system could offer additional opportunities to defeat limited missile
threats and augment the existing Ground-based Midcourse Defense system. Without
sacrificing critical requirements that enable a credible homeland defense capability,
any interim solution to replace the Ground-Based Interceptor would be on a similar
timeline to NGI.
General MILLEY. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system currently
provides effective defense of the United States against rogue threats. We are imple-
menting several measures that will bolster protection of the Homeland to include
improvements to existing sensors, adding a new discrimination radar in Alaska, and
refurbishing the COBRA DANE radar. We are also investigating the feasibility of
further augmenting our current system with additional sensors and weapons that
378
could possibly provide additional engagement opportunities against inbound threats.
A layered architecture of sensors and interceptors, one that potentially includes the
SM3–IIA and/or a modified THAAD interceptor, could complement existing Ground
Based Interceptor capability to provide additional protection of the Homeland
against a rogue nation ICBM attack.

48. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper and General Milley, would you prefer to
see more, but slightly less-capable, interceptors sooner, or more, perfectly-capable
interceptors much later?
Secretary ESPER. The Department has coordinated with U.S. Northern Command
to define the minimum set of Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) requirements to
enable earliest possible fielding of NGI while still providing the needed capability
to defend against the projected threats to the Homeland. Without sacrificing critical
requirements that enable a credible homeland defense capability, any interim solu-
tion to replace the Ground-Based Interceptor would be on a similar timeline to NGI.
General MILLEY. As the 2019 Missile Defense Review directs, I prefer to maintain
a capability that continues to outpace the rogue missile threat against the Home-
land. Ultimately, we must balance cost, schedule, technology, and performance
trade-offs when developing an acquisition strategy with finite resources. That strat-
egy must be able to address projected challenges in both capacity and capability in
order to stay ahead of the threat. We assess that our chosen strategy best balances
those risks over the next decade. It also important to note that our long-term strat-
egy is dependent upon improvements in our terrestrial and space-based sensor port-
folios to maximize our capability to defend against emerging threats in all phases
of flight.
STRATEGIC ARCTIC PORT

49. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper, a provision in the Senate-passed fiscal
year 2020 NDAA allows the Secretary of Defense to designate sites for a Strategic
Arctic Port. What is the status on your decision to designate sites for a Strategic
Arctic Port?
Secretary ESPER. The Department has initiated work on the Strategic Arctic Port
assessment. That evaluation has not yet reached a point where I have been pre-
sented with a recommendation.

50. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper, how are you factoring the emergence of
greater power competition from both Russia and China in the Arctic into your deci-
sion?
Secretary ESPER. The Department applies the guidance contained in the 2018 Na-
tional Defense Strategy and the 2019 Arctic Strategy when evaluating Arctic-related
issues associated with great power competition.
ARCTIC COMMUNICATIONS

51. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper, in testimony this week, General Terrance
O’Shaughnessy stated, ‘‘Over the last year, our commands have worked alongside
the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure that our
warfighting requirements are met, with particular emphasis on improving joint do-
main awareness and communications. In order to reclaim our strategic advantage
in the high north, it is critical that we improve our ability to detect and track sur-
face vessels and aircraft in our Arctic approaches and establish more reliable secure
communications for our joint force warfighters operating in the higher latitudes.’’
What exactly are the military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
doing in this regard and what specific progress are they each making?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently completed a Report
on Arctic Capabilities and Resource Gaps that detailed issues related to domain
awareness and communications.
On Domain Awareness—DOD has the ability to sense and otherwise detect and
track contacts in the region through a number of U.S. military installations and
platforms. These capabilities are further bolstered by cooperation with allies and
partners. DOD is researching options that will support enhanced domain awareness
in the Arctic. For example, the Air Force is working with U.S. allies, partners, and
the private sector to examine mutually beneficial partnerships to address common
space challenges in the Arctic.
On Communications—DOD has the ability to execute core communications re-
quirements. DOD is working with U.S. interagency partners to address communica-
tions challenges in the Arctic, including through the Department of Homeland Secu-
379
rity’s Arctic Domain Awareness Center. Capability requirements in these areas may
change as the Arctic region becomes more accessible.
ARCTIC THREATS

52. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what do you see as
the key threats to U.S. interests and security in the Arctic region?
Secretary ESPER. Both Russia and China pose threats to United States interests
and security in the Arctic. I have provided the Committee an intelligence assess-
ment with additional classified details.
General MILLEY. DOD seeks a secure and stable Arctic region where U.S. national
interests are safeguarded, the U.S. Homeland is defended, and nations work coop-
eratively to address challenges. We currently assess the risk of conflict in the Arctic
as minimal. However, DOD recognizes that Russia and China are actively chal-
lenging the Arctic rules-based order. Russia views itself as a polar great power and
is the largest Arctic nation by landmass, population, and military presence above
the Arctic Circle. It is recognized that Russia could attempt to use its military capa-
bilities to deny access to disputed Arctic waters or resources.
China is attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine
international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic be-
havior globally may be repeated in the Arctic. Moreover, China is increasing its
presence through economic outreach, investments in Arctic states’ strategic sectors,
and scientific activities.
The Arctic is a rapidly evolving security environment in which the Joint Force
must present a credible deterrent to conflict, maintaining its flexibility to respond
promptly and effectively to contingencies in the region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY
IRAN DETERRENCE

53. Senator HAWLEY. General Milley, what is the process used by the Joint Staff
in its role as global integrator for determining the number and composition of U.S.
military forces that can be sent to United States Central Command (CENTCOM)
in a given period of time for the purpose of deterring Iranian aggression without
undermining INDOPACOM’s ability to deter Chinese aggression, EUCOM’s ability
to deter Russian aggression, or both?
General MILLEY. The Global Force Management Process allows me to provide risk
informed military advice to the Secretary of Defense for his decisions. This process
solicits risk inputs from all stakeholders, so as a global integrator, I can fully under-
stand not only the short-term risks but longer term considerations as well.
While the need to send forces to CENTCOM to support operations deterring Ira-
nian aggressions was needed—this is temporal. Our focus is on near-peer competi-
tors, specifically China and Russia. Part of our strategy is Dynamic Force Employ-
ment, which builds readiness over time while enabling rapid response as required.
54. Senator HAWLEY. General Milley, if Iran resumes provocations in the coming
months, how many troops can the United States deploy to the CENTCOM AOR for
the purpose of deterring further Iranian aggression without undermining
INDOPACOM’s ability to deter Chinese aggression, EUCOM’s ability to deter Rus-
sian aggression, or both?
General MILLEY. There are adequate forces in the Central Command Area of Re-
sponsibility to deter Iran. However, if deterrence breaks down, I will analyze the
situation and recommend to the Secretary any necessary actions to achieve the secu-
rity objectives relative to Iran. These decisions may or may not include additional
force allocation. Force posture is but one of the tools the Joint Force leverages to
compete and achieve NDS Priorities. Within the construct of the NDS, the Joint
Staff constantly evaluates the force posture within each combatant command and
is prepared to recommend options for the Secretary based on the global threat situa-
tion, Commander’s request, and Service considerations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED
ADMINISTRATION ANTI-UNION MEMO/DELEGATION TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

55. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, the Administration recently issued a Memo-
randum, blatantly anti-union, purporting to authorize you to exempt the entire De-
partment of Defense, and all its constituent parts, from collective bargaining re-
380
quirements under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. You
testified to the House last week that you neither requested this authority nor knew
it was coming. A significant portion of DOD’s civilian workforce enjoys protections
afforded by their ability to collectively bargain. To clarify again, did you request this
authority, or know about it before you saw the Memorandum?
Secretary ESPER. I did not request this authority. The Presidential Memorandum
delegates the President’s authority to exempt certain agencies and subdivisions
based on critera set forth in the statute. I assure you my approach should I choose
to exercise this authority, will be deliberative, with full application of the statutory
criteria to ensure no employees lose their rights to collective bargaining except
under the narrow conditions set by Congress under the Federal Service Labor-Man-
agement Relations Statute.

56. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, what is your view of the professionalism and
quality of DOD’s civilian workforce?
Secretary ESPER. I have a positive view of the professionalism and quality of the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) civilian workforce. DOD civilian employees are
high performing, and serve as an integral part of our National Defense Strategy.
We cannot accomplish our mission without them.

57. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, do you believe that DOD’s civilian workforce
contributes to the National Defense and enhances national security?
Secretary ESPER. Yes. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) civilian workforce
contributes to the National Defense and enhances national security. DOD civilian
employees are essential for DOD’s warfighting success, working side-by-side with
our military members to protect America from existing and emerging threats across
every operating domain.

58. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, there have been numerous disruptions to
DOD’s civilian workforce over the past decade—including furloughs, multiple pay
freezes, and hiring freezes at all levels. Do you believe these disruptions have
helped or hurt DOD in executing its mission?
Secretary ESPER. While furloughs, pay freezes, and hiring freezes have caused dis-
ruptions to the Department of Defense (DOD) civilian workforce over the past dec-
ade, my experience has been that the Department has effectively managed the
workforce to successfully achieve DOD mission objectives.

59. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, do you believe removing collective bargaining
rights from those who have them now would be a disruption to their employment
and to the execution of DOD’s mission?
Secretary ESPER. An employee whose agency or subdivision is excluded based on
the statutory criteria set forth in the Federal Service Labor Management Relations
Statute would no longer be covered by the federal labor-management relations pro-
gram. However, this will not cause a disruption to the employee’s employment or
the execution of the DOD mission.
TENANT BILL OF RIGHTS FOR PRIVATIZED HOUSING

60. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, last week you finally approved your version
of a Tenant Bill of Rights for families living in privatized housing. Yet you chose
to omit three key tenets required in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. Your accom-
panying statement incorrectly claimed that the three rights related to dispute reso-
lution, maintenance history, and withholding of rent ‘‘were not anticipated by DOD.’’
In fact, back in May of last year, your own department shared with our Com-
mittee a working draft, which included a dispute resolution process and the ability
to withhold rent. In June of last year, you were aware of the right to maintenance
history once the Senate bill became public.
Secretary Esper, is it true that you and DOD were in fact aware of these tenant
rights, had them in your own working drafts, and were certainly aware of them
after the Senate bill was publicly released in June of last year?
Secretary ESPER. The rights set out in the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Au-
thorization Act were far more prescriptive than originally set out in the Senate bill
or incorporated into our working drafts. The requirements for the three remaining
rights raised concerns that the Department is working through in coordination with
the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) companies, given that the
MHPI companies and their third party lenders must agree to incorporate these
rights and procedures into appropriate project legal documents. The Department
will work with Congress as necessary to ensure these rights are provided to MHPI
381
tenants. The Department is working with the MHPI project landlords on an ap-
proach to expedite provision of these remaining rights.

61. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, do you agree that even if these three basic
housing rights are not in your Bill of Rights, that they are still in fact now legal
protections for military families and rights by law as codified by the Fiscal Year
2020 NDAA?
Secretary ESPER. Legislation cannot alter the terms and conditions of previously
executed legal agreements. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI)
companies must agree to incorporate the three remaining rights into existing MHPI
project legal documents and, for the dispute resolution and rent withholding proc-
esses, the MHPI projects’ third party lenders must approve those changes; the three
remaining rights do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the Department.
The Department of Defense is working the MHPI companies and, as necessary, will
work with Congress to ensure the benefits of these rights are fully available to mili-
tary members and their families who are tenants of MHPI housing. In the short
term, the Department is leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to pro-
vide the benefit of these rights to tenants while we work to finalize necessary
changes to the project legal agreements.
JOINT OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

62. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, section 1708 of the Fiscal Year 2020 National
Defense Authorization Act included a requirement that the Secretary of Defense
provide a report to Congress on the implementation of the National Defense Strat-
egy. The report must include an explanation of the joint operational concepts devel-
oped by the Department of Defense; the required force posture changes to imple-
ment the NDS; any necessary adjustments to program budgets; an assessment of
personnel and organizational changes; and the resources necessary to implement
operational concepts.
In addition, the law requires that the Secretary of Defense provide for two inde-
pendent studies on the development of joint operational concepts. A federally funded
research and development center (FFRDC) will perform one study, and an inde-
pendent, non-governmental 501 (c)(3) organization will perform the other study.
The Committee understands that the Department of Defense has not made
progress on fulfilling this congressional mandate.
Secretary Esper, please provide a status update on what actions the Department
has taken to date in order to comply with the reporting requirement in section 1708.
Secretary ESPER. Since the release of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), we
have been making strides in aligning our posture, resources, and personnel with the
NDS priorities. These efforts will be shaped by the development of our new Joint
Warfighting Concept (JWC), which will greatly influence future force development
and design. To date, the Joint Staff and Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy (OUSD(P)) have had several conversations with the House Armed Services
Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee professional staff members on
section 1708. During these conversations, we agreed to provide periodic updates on
the JWC development and NDS implementation beginning in May 2020, and to pro-
vide the final reports in early 2021. OUSD(P) and the Joint Staff have identified
lead components for answering the reporting requirements, and have identified sev-
eral potential federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) and
non-FFRDC think tanks to meet the independent assessment requirements.

63. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, which component within the Department have
you chosen to be the lead for meeting the reporting requirement in section 1708?
Secretary ESPER. We have chosen the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, working in close coordination with the Joint Staff and the other Office of the
Secretary of Defense components, to be the lead component for meeting the section
1708 reporting requirements.

64. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, have you determined which FFRDC and inde-
pendent, non-governmental 501 (c)(3) organization will perform the independent
studies mandated by the law?
Secretary ESPER. We have identified several potential federally funded research
and development centers (FFRDCs) and non-FFRDC think tanks to perform the
independent assessments required by section 1708. We have not yet put any single
organization on contract to perform the assessments while we work with the House
Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee to delineate
more clearly the specifics of the assessment requirements.
382
AFGHANISTAN AGREEMENT

65. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, how is it that the implementation and moni-
toring documents that have been signed and communicated widely to members of
the Taliban are classified Secret?
Secretary ESPER. I defer to the State Department on questions pertaining to nego-
tiations with the Taliban and the associated documents.

66. Senator REED. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the Taliban an-
nouncement of a resumption of violence against our Afghan partners, what expecta-
tions have we communicated to our Afghan Security Force partners with regard to
conducting offensive operations going forward?
Secretary ESPER. We have made clear to the Taliban and our Afghan security
force partners that we will continue to defend Afghan security forces against
Taliban attacks, and Coalition forces continue to support our partners through the
train, advise, and assist mission. Afghan security leaders have directed their forces
to take appropriate measures to prevent and defend against Taliban attacks. Con-
sistent with the United States-Taliban Agreement, the United States will continue
its pause in offensive operations against the Taliban so long as the Taliban adhere
to their end of the deal. If the United States Government assesses that the Taliban
is not complying with the agreement, the Department has the authorities and capa-
bilities to resume offensive operations against the Taliban.
General MILLEY. We have made clear to the Taliban and our Afghan security
force partners that we will continue to defend Afghan security forces against
Taliban attacks and Coalition forces continue to support our partners through the
train, advise, and assist mission. Afghan security leaders have directed their forces
to take appropriate measures to prevent and defend against Taliban attacks. Per
the United States-Taliban agreement, the United States is pausing offensive oper-
ations against the Taliban so long as they adhere to their end of the deal. If the
United States Government assesses that the Taliban are not complying with the
agreement, the Department has the authorities and capabilities to resume offensive
attacks against the Taliban.

67. Senator REED. Secretary Esper and General Milley, what support are U.S. and
coalition military advisors and intelligence professionals authorized to provide for
any such offensive operations?
Secretary ESPER. Under the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, United States
and Coalition forces provide training, advice, and assistance to our Afghan security
force partners, focusing on leadership development and institutional capacity build-
ing, including advising Afghan forces on planning operations and providing enabler
support to those operations. The agreement with the Taliban has not affected the
Department’s authorities used to provide such support. The United States continues
to defend the ANDSF against Taliban offensive attacks.
General MILLEY. Under the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission, United States
and Coalition forces provide training, advising, and assistance to the Afghan Na-
tional Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), focusing on leadership development
and institutional capacity building, including advising Afghan forces on planning op-
erations and providing enabler support to those operations. The agreement with the
Taliban has not resulted in any reduction in authorities for U.S. forces conducting
Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. The United States continues to defend the
ANDSF against Taliban offensive attacks.

68. Senator REED. Secretary Esper and General Milley, given the sizeable air sup-
port we provide Afghan Security Forces, from moving personnel and cargo, to ISR,
to close air support, what commitments have we made to our Afghan partners in
terms of this support going forward?
Secretary ESPER. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in any reduc-
tion in operational authorities for United States Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR–A) to
provide those kinds of combat enabler support. As agreed upon in the United States-
Afghanistan Joint Declaration: ‘‘The United States re-affirms its commitments re-
garding support for the Afghan security forces and other government institutions,
including through ongoing efforts to enhance the ability of Afghan security forces
to deter and respond to internal and external threats, consistent with its commit-
ments under existing security agreements between the two governments. This com-
mitment includes support to Afghan security forces to prevent al Qaeda, ISIS–K,
and other international terrorist groups or individuals from using Afghan soil to
threaten the United States and its allies.’’
383
General MILLEY. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in any reduc-
tion in operational authorities for Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL to provide
those kinds of combat enabler support.

69. Senator REED. Secretary Esper and General Milley, more specifically, when
will we be able to come to their aid and when will we be restricted from doing so
under this agreement?
Secretary ESPER. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in any reduc-
tion in operational authorities for USFOR–A. We have reiterated our commitment
to the ANDSF to defend them from attacks.
General MILLEY. The agreement with the Taliban has not resulted in any reduc-
tion in operational authorities for Operation FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. It is at the
discretion of the Commander USFOR–A to determine when to employ forces to come
to the aid and defense of the ANDSF, and we have reiterated our commitment to
the ANDSF to defend them from attacks.

70. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, what is your understanding as to how the 14-
month withdrawal timeline was reached?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense provided advice on the appropriate
time and conditions for a safe and orderly withdrawal that protect our forces, but
I defer to the State Department on questions pertaining to the specifics of negotia-
tions with the Taliban.

71. Senator REED. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you believe that 14
months is sufficient time to assess the seriousness with which the Taliban will ad-
dress terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, I do. I have provided the Committee with an intelligence
report with additional classified information regarding how the Department intends
to assess this issue.
General MILLEY. We have assessed that 14 months is sufficient to assess the
Taliban’s compliance with the agreement. That period can be extended or halted as
necessary depending on compliance. The United States will closely monitor the
Taliban’s compliance with its counterterrorism commitments under the United
States—Taliban agreement over the next 14 months and beyond.

72. Senator REED. Secretary Esper and General Milley, do you believe coalition
forces will be able to both conduct the rigorous monitoring and verification needed
and also carry out a full scale withdrawal?
Secretary ESPER. The United States Government has developed a robust process
for monitoring implementation of the agreement and verifying Taliban compliance.
The agreement is not based on trust; it is based on whether we can verify Taliban
compliance. This process compiles information and intelligence from United States
Forces-Afghanistan and interagency partners to support monitoring and verification
of the agreement.
General MILLEY. The United States Government has developed a robust process
for monitoring implementation of the agreement and verifying Taliban compliance.
The agreement is not based on trust; it is based on whether we can verify Taliban
compliance. This process compiles information and intelligence from Resolute Sup-
port and across the interagency to support monitoring and verification of the agree-
ment. The process will adjust as forces are drawn down. Monitoring and verification
is not limited to military forces. It is a whole-of-government effort.
ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS

73. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, oversight efforts by the Committee uncovered
that the Department had not properly sought repayment from Saudi Arabia and
UAE for approximately $300 million in aerial refueling support provided by the
United States for operations in Yemen. I understand UAE has fully reimbursed
DOD, but Saudi Arabia still owes approximately $67 million.
Given the accounting errors the Committee uncovered, we asked the GAO to in-
vestigate the Department’s broader provision of reimbursable support around the
world. According to a GAO report released on March 4, the Department has failed
to secure reimbursement for more than $1 billion in support provided to other na-
tions.
What steps will the Department be taking to recover the more than $1 billion it
is owed by foreign partners?
Secretary ESPER. Since ceasing aerial refueling support to the Saudi-led Coalition
operating in Yemen in November 2018, the Department has worked with both Saudi
384
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to recoup the costs for our support. As indi-
cated, the United Arab Emirates has paid in full. Saudi Arabia’s costs for aerial re-
fueling support are divided into two categories: Costs for flight hours and fuel costs.
Saudi Arabia has paid 4 installments totaling $151.2 million for costs for flight
hours in Fiscal Years 2015–2017. However, Saudi Arabia has not yet paid a $6.3
million charge for the flight hours costs for Fiscal Year 2018. Furthermore, Saudi
Arabia has not paid for any of the fuel costs during Fiscal Years 2015–2018 because
we have not yet invoiced Saudi Arabia for any of the fuel costs for Fiscal Years
2015–2018. The Department is preparing invoices for the fuel costs for submission
to Saudi Arabia.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense continues to work with the Military Depart-
ments to close its open ACSA transactions by making final payments and seeking
final reimbursement for Logistic Support, Supplies, and Services provided by the
Military Departments to international partners.

74. Senator REED. Secretary Esper, how is the Department improving its account-
ing practices to ensure such oversights don’t happen again in the future?
Secretary ESPER. The Office of the Secretary of Defense is assessing options to im-
prove the accountability of Military Department execution and reconciliation of
ACSA transactions and will provide me with recommendations for implementing
new accounting oversight procedures.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

75. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Esper, in New Hampshire and across the coun-
try, the DOD civilian workforce proudly supports our Nation’s military and national
security interests. The Department has historically had a productive relationship
working with the labor unions that represent these dedicated employees. However,
a January 29 memo signed by President Trump authorized you to waive the collec-
tive bargaining rights of the nearly 750,000 civilian workers in the Department of
Defense, citing the need for increased flexibility when carrying out DOD’s national
security mission. Do you plan to exercise this authority to exclude Defense civilians
from the right to bargain collectively?
Secretary ESPER. Should I choose to exercise the authority delegated to me by the
Presidential Memorandum, I assure you my approach will be deliberative, with full
application of the statutory criteria to ensure no employees lose their rights to col-
lective bargaining except under the narrow conditions set by Congress under the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

76. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Esper, under what circumstances would this
flexibility be necessary for national security, and do you believe we are experiencing
these circumstances now?
Secretary ESPER. The President has statutory authority to limit the scope of col-
lective bargaining based on national security if specific statutory criteria are met.
Every President, including former President Barack Obama, has exercised the au-
thority to limit these rights since Congress granted Federal employees the right to
collectively bargain. If I decide to exercise this authority as granted by the Presi-
dential Memorandum, I will do so following the criteria under the law and with the
same level of rigor that has been exercised in the past.
If and when this authority is utilized, it will be exercised as outlined in the stat-
ute for those agencies and subdivisions that have a primary function of intelligence,
counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work; and where the provi-
sions of the statute cannot be applied to that organization in a manner consistent
with national security requirements and considerations.

77. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Esper, if implemented, how could this departure
from the long-standing practices and culture at DOD impact our Nation’s military
readiness?
Secretary ESPER. The Department respects the rights of its employees to collec-
tively bargain under the law and is committed to maintaining productive labor-man-
agement relationships with its labor unions, some of which have existed for nearly
100 years and predate the establishment of the Department of Defense. Any deci-
sion to implement the authority granted by the Presidential Memorandum will not
be a departure from our long-standing practice to carefully analyze where collective
bargaining interferes with our national security, following the criteria that Congress
385
has provided for the President. In no way will the Department implement this au-
thority in a manner that negatively impacts our Nation’s military readiness.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
COVID–19 READINESS

78. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, given the rapid spread of the 2019
Novel Coronavirus, I am deeply concerned about actions the Department of Defense
is taking to protect U.S. servicemembers, personnel, and family members stationed
at military installations globally. I am also concerned about the threat to the global
supply chains that support our defense industrial base. Just today, F–35 production
in Japan was halted in Japan due concerns about COVID–19. Last week, I sent a
letter to Under Secretary Donovan to request a briefing on the comprehensive DOD
response to COVID–19 and an assessment of any impact on military readiness. But
I was extremely disappointed—and frankly, horrified—by reporting earlier this
week that indicated you warned American military commanders overseas ‘‘not to
surprise President Trump on the coronavirus.’’ Did you, in fact, direct commanders
not to make any decisions related to COVID–19 that might surprise the White
House or run afoul of President Trump’s messaging on this rapidly spreading dis-
ease?
Secretary ESPER. My direction to military commanders is outlined in the Depart-
ment’s top three priorities for dealing with COVID–19. First, we must protect our
forces and their families. Second, we must maintain mission readiness. Third, we
will continue to support the interagency whole-of-government approach to combating
the virus. I will continue to ensure that commanders have the resources necessary
to achieve the priorities outlined above.

79. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, are you concerned that tying the
hands of commanders will compromise their ability to protect Americans under their
command?
Secretary ESPER. We will continue to empower commanders and take all nec-
essary precautions to ensure that our servicemembers are safe and able to maintain
a high state of readiness. To that end, I signed a memorandum on April 1, 2020
titled, ‘‘Guidance for Commanders on the Implementation of the Risk-Based Re-
sponses to the COVID–19 Pandemic,’’ which empowers leaders at all echelons to
take proactive steps to protect local Service members, civilians, and families. This
includes the option to implement additional Force Protection Health Condition
measures.

80. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, what specific actions will you take if
President Trump—or other Administration officials—make a decision related to
COVID–19 that you fear could jeopardize the health and safety of American
servicemembers and military families?
Secretary ESPER. My top priority is to protect our Service members, civilians, and
their families. Accordingly, I have published comprehensive Force Health Protection
Guidance with eight supplements to date. Additionally, the Department closely fol-
lows Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance in order to combat
and help stop the spread of COVID–19 in the Department of Defense and in our
local communities.

81. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, do commanders across military serv-
ices have all the necessary authorities to best protect servicemembers and military
families?
Secretary ESPER. Yes. COVID–19 is a dynamic and evolving pandemic which re-
quires an equally dynamic response. Between guidance under my signature and
that of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
we’ve set policy guidance across the spectrum of personnel, travel, health, and readi-
ness, among others. We also published a memorandum reiterating processes to en-
sure Child Development Programs are taking appropriate actions to ensure safety
of children. To date, we’ve published 31 guidance memos and are continuing to up-
date, extend or draft new guidance as required.

82. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, does United States Northern Com-
mand (NORTHCOM) have all necessary authorities and resources to continue to
serve as the global integrator for DOD efforts and entities?
386
Secretary ESPER. Yes. The published guidance for the Department provides U.S.
Northern Command with the necessary policy guidance to perform their role as the
Department’s synchronizer for our COVID–19 response efforts.

83. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, I have seen reports that the American
Federation of Teachers has urged the Department of Defense Education Activity
(DODEA) to protect 700 teachers represented by the unions at schools on military
installations globally. What are you doing to implement a comprehensive protocol
to protect all Americans working on military installations threatened by COVID–
19?
Secretary ESPER. All Department of Defense Education Activity schools are now
closed out of an abundance of caution for COVID–19. Our protocol while in session,
and even now that they are closed, is to follow the guidelines from their local mili-
tary commanders. On April 1, 2020 I signed a memorandum titled, ‘‘Guidance for
Commanders on the Implementation of the Risk-Based Responses to the COVID–
19 Pandemic.’’ It states that COVID–19 impacts are different in the many places
the Department operates. As a result, leaders at all echelons are expected to take
proactive steps to protect local Service members, civilians, and families; assure the
readiness of their units consistent with necessary force protection measures; and
provide support to the U.S. Government’s domestic and international responses to
the pandemic. I further directed Commanders to take local force protection meas-
ures suitable to the needs of their organizations, as determined by their assess-
ments and reflective of the health conditions of their surrounding communities and
direction from Centers for Disease Control COVID–19 public health guidance.

84. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, will you provide a briefing to members
of this Committee on specific actions the Department is taking to prepare for
COVID–19—specifically how you will tailor protective guidance for each area of re-
sponsibility, and military installation?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, the DepartmeoD COVID–19 Task Force will prepare a brief
that includes an overview of our preparations and actions to date, to include our
support through U.S. Northern Command to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)-led whole-of-government response, direction, policy, and support to
services / components / commanders / servicemembers and their families, and med-
ical, logistics and engineering support to FEMA and Health and Human Services.

85. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, do Military Treatment Facilities have
all the necessary equipment—including testing kits, supplies, and sterile spaces—
to screen, diagnose, and treat all potential or confirmed COVID–19 cases?
Secretary ESPER. The Department is actively monitoring and ensuring necessary
medical equipment is delivered to the military medical treatment facilities (MTFs)
as the need arises. While currently, there are no shortages for screening, diagnosing
and treating COVID–19 cases at the MTFs, the demand continues to evolve and ex-
pand. Additionally, the support through U.S. Northern Command to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-led whole-of-government response will fur-
ther increase demand for medical equipment and place added stress on the personal
protective equipment supply chain. As a result, we will actively and continuously
monitor and re-assess medical equipment and supplies at the MTFs.
MILITARY HOUSING—TENANT BILL OF RIGHTS

86. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA included
urgently needed reforms to address the military housing scandal—and I would like
to thank Chairman Inhofe and Ranking Member Reed for their leadership in con-
ducting oversight hearings and championing critical provisions. However, we were
all extremely disappointed that your proposed Bill of Rights does not go nearly far
enough to protect our military families—it failed to include tenants’ rights codified
by Congress, and signed into law by the President. This Bill of Rights should have
included three basic items: the right to dispute resolution, the ability to withhold
rent, and access to a home’s maintenance history. I fail to understand why the Bill
of Rights omitted these key provisions—arguably, some of the most important to
protect military families. Why did you inexplicably decide to drop these three crucial
protections for military families, after sharing a draft Bill of Rights with this Com-
mittee that included these key protections back in May 2019?
Secretary ESPER. The rights set out in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA were far more
prescriptive than originally set out in the Senate bill or incorporated into our work-
ing drafts. The requirements for the three remaining rights raised concerns that the
Department is working through in coordination with the Military Housing Privatiza-
387
tion Initiative (MHPI) companies, given that the MHPI companies and their third
party lenders must agree to incorporate these rights and procedures into appro-
priate project legal documents. The Department will work with Congress as nec-
essary to ensure these rights are provided to MHPI tenants. The Department is
working with the MHPI project landlords on an approach to expedite provision of
these remaining rights.

87. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, what legal action will you take in
order to require companies to comply with these protections, as required by law?
Secretary ESPER. I expect the Military Departments to hold the Military Housing
Privatization Initiative (MHPI) landlords accountable for abiding by the terms of
their MHPI legal agreements; this includes the legal requirements for any of the
Tenant Rights covered in the project legal agreements or in the tenant’s rental
agreement lease with the landlord, to include state or local tenant rights specific
to the project’s geographic location. If a project fails to abide by the terms of the
project legal agreements, the existing deal structures provide the mechanisms for
the Military Departments to hold the private-sector MHPI partners accountable.
However, legislation cannot alter the terms and conditions of previously executed
legal agreements and, therefore, the Department of Defense cannot impose a unilat-
eral requirement for the MHPI Landlords to abide by requirements set out in the
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. The Department is diligently working solutions with the
MHPI Landlords to resolve challenges posed by the three remaining tenant rights
so we can expedite implementation of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA requirements.

88. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, can you confirm that—according to
the law—military families have the right to dispute resolution, withhold rent, and
access maintenance history And that private housing companies must legally com-
ply with these requirements?
Secretary ESPER. Legislation cannot alter the terms and conditions of previously
executed legal agreements. The Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI)
companies must agree to incorporate the three remaining rights into existing MHPI
project legal documents and, for the dispute resolution and rent withholding proc-
esses, the MHPI projects’ third party lenders must approve those changes; the three
remaining rights do not lend themselves to unilateral action by the Department.
The Department of Defense is working the MHPI companies and, as necessary, will
work with Congress to ensure the benefits of these rights are fully available to mili-
tary members and their families who are tenants of MHPI housing. In the short
term, the Department is leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to pro-
vide the benefit of these rights to tenants while we work to finalize necessary
changes to the project legal agreements.

89. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, across the services, how many allega-
tions of fraudulent activity by private contractors have been referred to the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) for criminal or civil investigation?
Secretary ESPER. The Air Force Office of Special Investigation has referred one
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) company, Balfour Beatty Commu-
nities (BBC), to the Department of Justice for investigation.

90. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, has DOJ notified you that it has un-
dertaken any civil or criminal investigations in response to your referrals?
Secretary ESPER. No.

91. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, have the services stopped paying in-
centive fees to any contractor suspected of fraud, or referred to DOJ for investiga-
tions into potential fraud?
Secretary ESPER. The Departments of the Air Force and the Navy are withholding
Performance Incentive Fees (PIFs) from all Balfour Beatty Communities (BBC)
projects. In addition, the Air Force is withholding PIFs at four Hunt Military Com-
munity project sites and two Corvias Military Housing project sites. Reviews by the
Army are ongoing but have not identified Military Housing Privatization Initiative
(MHPI) project business anomalies indicative of potential fraud such that would jus-
tify withholding of PIFs.

92. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, given this betrayal of military fami-
lies, how will you work to restore their trust and assure them that your Department
will recommit to ensuring that they have safe housing that is free from health haz-
ards?
388
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) focus has been, and con-
tinues to be, on corrective actions to enhance the Military Housing Privatization Ini-
tiative (MHPI) program, consistent with our commitment to ensure housing privat-
ization projects provide safe, quality, well-maintained housing for military members
and their families, and to rebuild trust with our military families. The recently re-
leased Tenant Bill of Rights and Tenant Responsibilities are visible and important
commitments in DOD’s larger effort to regain resident trust. This is just one of
many completed and ongoing improvements to restore the trust of military families.
Other completed actions include ensuring housing privatization project owners in-
crease transparency and reporting of maintenance and repair work orders; revising
project performance incentive fees; enhancing oversight and leadership engagement
with the housing privatization project owners; increasing government housing staff
and training; and improving leadership communication with residents.
REDUCTION IN SECURITY COOPERATION FUNDING AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES

93. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, in your posture statement, you high-
light that ‘‘The United States’ competitive advantage is not only a result of our
unrivaled warfighters and state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, but also our un-
matched network of alliances and partnerships.’’ I agree completely and believe that
security cooperation and interoperability built through deliberate efforts like EDI
and NATO are essential to fulfilling our NDS. Despite the benefits of partnerships
like this being clear in places like EUCOM, the President’s budget request cuts se-
curity cooperation funding across all the COCOMs, and specifically within EUCOM
by around 40 percent. Additionally, funding for EDI was cut by over $1 billion in
this year’s proposal.
Secretary Esper, are you concerned about these drastic funding cuts and the abil-
ity to credibly deter Russian aggression and support our Eastern European allies?
Secretary ESPER. The Department has a range of security cooperation tools to sup-
port Allies and partners in the United States European Command (USEUCOM)
area of responsibility (AOR). In fiscal year 2021, the ‘‘National Defense Strategy Im-
plementation (NDS–I) Account,’’ previously the DSCA Security Cooperation Account,
was created to reflect the role security cooperation plays in advancing the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) by consolidating multiple funding lines to provide greater
flexibility in executing programs based on NDS objectives. This consolidation will
result in greater efficiencies and cost savings through increased scrutiny combined
with active prioritization of security cooperation programs. In fiscal year 2021, the
Department plans to allocate approximately $286 million of NDS–I Account funds
to building partner capacity efforts in the USEUCOM AOR, which is largely con-
sistent with fiscal year 2020 levels and reflects funding for validated requirements.
Thanks to consistent congressional funding over the last several years, the Euro-
pean Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has reinvigorated United States defense posture in
Europe to deter an increasingly malign Russia. EDI is designed to enhance the ca-
pability and readiness of United States Forces, NATO Allies, and regional partners
for a faster response to any aggression in Europe and to transnational threats by
a regional adversary against the territory of NATO Allies. The Department has
made significant progress in EDI’s five lines of effort: presence, exercises and train-
ing, prepositioning, infrastructure, and building partnership capacity. The planned
reduction in EDI funds from fiscal year 2019 ($6.5 billion) to fiscal year 2021 ($4.5
billion) reflects the substantial progress the Department has made in establishing
needed infrastructure, building Army and Air Force prepositioned equipment sets,
and refining exercise scheduling. The proposed fiscal year 2021 funding levels build
on our prior year investments and effectively deter Russian aggression in Europe
and maintain our EDI-funded rotational force presence across the eastern flank of
NATO. Our European Allies and partners have steadily increased their defense
spending, providing a more effective collective deterrent to Russian aggression, and
they have more equally distributed the burden of European defense among all Allies
and partners.

94. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, how should our allies in Europe and
elsewhere interpret this reduction in security cooperation funding?
Secretary ESPER. Our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) remains ironclad, and our Allies in Europe recognize this in our continued
collective efforts to strengthen the Alliance. Our European Allies and partners do
not see any decrease in United States commitment to Europe and NATO. Instead,
Allies see our continued extensive security cooperation activities with them as a
vital component of the reestablishment of a robust United States presence in Eu-
rope.
389
95. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Esper, how will these proposed cuts to secu-
rity cooperation impact the Department of Defense’s ability to ‘‘strengthen allies and
attract new partners,’’ as you discuss in your posture statement?
Secretary ESPER. The new National Defense Strategy-Implementation account
provides the Department greater flexibility in prioritizing and executing programs
in accordance with National Defense Strategy objectives to build partner capacity
sustainably and holistically. The Department prioritizes these initiatives based on
a strategy-driven process to ensure security cooperation plays a critical role in ad-
vancing the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on strengthening alliances and
attracting new partners.
96. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Milley, how does security cooperation—includ-
ing joint exercises, subject matter exchanges, and other military-to-military engage-
ments—contribute to a strong and peaceful Europe?
General MILLEY. Security Cooperation activities build capability, capacity, and
interoperability with our European allies that ensure we can fight and win against
aggression in Europe. This is clearly demonstrated by the regular joint exercises
that we conduct throughout Europe. These highly visible exercises deter our adver-
saries while simultaneously assuring our most vulnerable allies. Our training with
allies and partners builds the mutual understanding and skills needed for us to
work together, and grows our collective defense capacity, increasing the deterrent
effect. The training effects are reinforced and institutionalized by our mil-to-mil en-
gagements. These engagements build ties at all levels that establish personal rela-
tionships and trust necessary to be successful during a crisis situation. Security Co-
operation activities produce real deterrence effects through actual capabilities and
assures our allies of our commitment to their security. This creates the foundation
of peace and stability in Europe.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO
MISSILE DEFENSE

97. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper, we have established that North Korean
long-range ballistic missiles are a threat to the Homeland—of which Hawaii is part
of. In spite of 4 years of authorizations and 3 years of appropriations from Congress,
and the Department’s own 2019 Missile Defense Review, you have zeroed out the
Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR–H) for fiscal year 2021. The HDR–H con-
tract has been let, the radar is being built. Fiscal year 2020 funds are currently
being obligated for this radar. There are no known operational impediments to the
Missile Defense Agency continuing their process to site the HDR–H. They have sev-
eral sites where they will conduct environmental impact statements as part of that
process. I need a commitment from you that you will not put a stoppage on the fis-
cal year 2020 funding for the HDR–H or terminate that contract.
Secretary ESPER. The Department is committed to continuing work to the extent
possible on Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR–H) efforts with Fiscal Year 2020
funding. As I committed during my testimony, the Department’s priority has been
to identify a suitable site upon which to build the HDR–H, and phasing the program
in line with construction at that site. To this end, in October 2019, the Missile De-
fense Agency (MDA) revisited the viability of fielding the HDR on Department of
Defense property at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) on Kauai, Hawaii,
at locations not previously explored in the HDR–H siting analysis due to potential
operational impacts. In January 2020, MDA conducted additional siting studies at
PMRF and is in the process of analyzing data collected. MDA anticipates making
a site viability determination in third quarter fiscal year 2020, which will allow for
the official inclusion of PMRF into the Environmental Impact Statement. Initial
analysis indicates potential viability of at least one site on PMRF. MDA is con-
tinuing siting analysis, advanced planning surveys and environmental efforts to de-
termine a suitable site, and to minimize further delay if HDR–H is funded beyond
fiscal year 2020.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

98. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper, when you were here for your confirmation
hearing last July, I asked you about your advocacy for accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention in regards to emerging maritime disputes such as the South China
Sea and in the Arctic. You advised that you would review the issue. Now that you’ve
been the Secretary for 8 months, do you support United States accession to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?
390
Secretary ESPER. The United States does not have to be a party to the Convention
on the Law of the Sea to recognize its provisions and exercise the rights and free-
doms under the Convention. Since President Reagan’s 1983 Statement on Ocean’s
Policy, the United States has recognized that the navigation and overflight provi-
sions of the Convention reflect customary international law. The Department’s com-
mitment to the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight is evident in our
practices. The Department’s operations respect international law in all of its oper-
ations, including Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), and we expect oth-
ers to do the same.
DECISION REGARDING OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF C–17 AIRCRAFT

99. Senator HIRONO. General Milley, in the Air Force posture hearing on Tuesday,
the Air Force Chief of Staff mentioned that the decision for all C–17 strategic airlift
assets be assigned operational control to TRANSCOM instead of to the COCOMs.
What was the rationale behind that decision?
General MILLEY. C–17s are a global strategic mobility asset and COCOMs have
agreed that CDRUSTRANSCOM is in the best position to most effectively control
the employment of these assets in support of global priorities. Accordingly,
TRANSCOM’s Operational Control (OPCON) of C–17s allows agile support to all
COCOMs and allows them to perform their mission while allowing TRANSCOM to
support global requirements.
100. Senator HIRONO. General Milley, why weren’t affected Congressional offices
notified?
General MILLEY. It is within the Secretary of Defense’s purview to realign the
Operational Control (OPCON) of forces from one combatant command to another.
It should also be noted that in this instance, the change had no impact on force
structure or basing, matters which often do require Congressional notification.
MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING

101. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper and General Milley, the Military Family
Housing Tenants Bill of Rights was directed in the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA. While
I laud your efforts to put something in place, the bill of rights you signed left out
three of the required items: the right to dispute resolution, the ability to withhold
rent, and access to a home’s maintenance history. Can you explain the rationale and
how you intend to fix the bill of rights as directed by this Congress?
Secretary ESPER. The Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act set
out 18 rights of Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) tenants, 15 of
which can be implemented without additional guidance or with development of poli-
cies, processes, and procedures within the control of the Department of Defense. The
three remaining rights have financial implications and, therefore, can only be imple-
mented if the MHPI project landlords and their third party lenders agree to modify
existing project legal agreements. The Department is working with the project land-
lords on an approach to expedite provision of these remaining rights. For the short
term, the Department is leaning forward to put in place interim procedures to pro-
vide the maximum benefit of these rights to tenants that we can now while working
to finalize necessary changes to the project legal agreements. If we encounter a chal-
lenge that requires assistance from Congress, we will engage with the appropriate
committees quickly.
General MILLEY. The Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA set out 18 rights of Military Hous-
ing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) tenants, 15 of which can be implemented with-
out additional guidance or with development of policies, processes, and procedures
within the control of DOD. The three remaining rights have financial implications
and, therefore, can only be implemented if the MHPI project landlords and their
third-party lenders agree to modify existing project legal agreements. The Depart-
ment is working with the project landlords on an approach to expedite provision of
these remaining rights. For the short term, the Department is leaning forward to
put in place interim procedures to provide the maximum benefit of these rights to
tenants now, while working to finalize necessary changes to the project legal agree-
ments. If we encounter a challenge that requires assistance from Congress, we will
engage with the appropriate committees quickly.
THE CLOSE COMBAT LETHALITY TASK FORCE

102. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in March 2018, then-
Secretary of Defense Mattis established the Close Combat Lethality Task Force
(CCLTF) in an effort to make combat units more lethal. He had concerns about the
erosion of close combat capability relative to threats identified in the NDS. The
391
Task Force recently fielded some new cutting edge capability in regards to training
and night vision for Special Operations Forces and Army soldiers. How will the
CCLTF remain a priority to you and an asset to the entire force if they report to
the Secretary of the Army vice the Secretary of Defense as they support the NDS?
Secretary ESPER. I am focused on implementing the National Defense Strategy
and efforts like the Close Combat Lethality Task Force are a key part of ensuring
our Nation’s readiness now and in the future. That is why I have asked the Sec-
retary of the Army to explore how this successful endeavor can be improved and
institutionalized. Our Army provides the majority of the close combat forces and in
order to prevent duplicate efforts across the Department, I decided the Department
of the Army would be the lead in formalizing the critical mission of the task force.
General MILLEY. As the Secretary has said, the CCLTF is not going away. The
Secretary of the Army is drafting a plan to institutionalize the CCLTF for the de-
partment.
The Secretary of the Army has established and is leading a joint planning team
with the USMC and SOCOM to ensure the work of CCLTF continues to serve the
close combat formations, as it always has in the past.
COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION RENEWAL

103. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper and General Milley, in testimony provided
to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, DOD testified that the De-
partment strongly supports extending Compact financial assistance to the Freely
Associated States, and that failing to do so could weaken the United States’ position
in the Indo-Pacific. I share the Department’s assessment, and want to work with
DOD to ensure that Compact assistance grants are extended past 2023. What im-
pacts on national security does the Department foresee if Compact financial assist-
ance to the Freely Associated States is not extended beyond 2023?
Secretary ESPER. Failure to extend the economic provisions of the Compact Agree-
ments has the potential to create an opening for China and other malign actors to
exploit vulnerable Pacific island countries by replacing the economic and social sup-
port the United States is currently providing. The Compact States provide a stra-
tegic and logistical highway to the Pacific. If lapsed, China could seize the oppor-
tunity to bifurcate our sea lines of communication in the South Pacific, further
weakening our national security interests. Without the financial assistance provided
to these countries through the Compacts, the United States could face a require-
ment to reduce its footprint due to reduced access in places like Kwajalein Atoll or
Palau. These reductions in capabilities would reduce our interoperability with allies
and partners and directly impact operational plans and strategies.
General MILLEY. Extending the economic provisions of the Compacts of Free Asso-
ciation (COFA) remain a priority. Extension demonstrates U.S. commitment to the
Indo-Pacific region and assures the Department of Defense maintains access to the
land, waterways, and airspace of the Freely Associated States. The Freely Associ-
ated States provide a strategic and logistical highway to the Indo-Pacific, vital in
the event of a significant military engagement in the region. While the immigration,
defense, and foreign affairs provisions remain as long as the COFAs are in force,
the economic provisions are due to expire in 2023 for the Republic of the Marshall
Islands and the Federation States of Micronesia and 2024 for Palau. If the economic
provisions expire, there is an opportunity for China, and other malign actors, to ex-
ploit vulnerable Pacific Island Countries. China could extend financial support and
gain influence in absence of United States assistance. This would allow the PRC to
divide United States sea lines of communication in the South Pacific, weakening our
national security interests. Failure to extend the COFAs may require the United
States to reduce its footprint by reducing access in places like Kwajalein Atoll, the
location of our Ronald Reagan Test Center, or the planned construction of the Tac-
tical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar (TACMOR), which provides a High Fre-
quency (HF) radar system for persistent, long-range, detect and track capability of
air and surface targets. These two facilities are key to our military shaping in the
Pacific. Additionally, if lapsed, the U.S. could lose its right to exclude foreign mili-
taries’ access to the Freely Associated States, severely impacting our Nation’s na-
tional security.

104. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper, what steps has DOD taken to date to work
with the Department of State and the Department of the Interior, and the FAS to
renew economic assistance under the Compacts of Free Association?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently working with the
National Security Council staff and interagency counterparts to finalize the negoti-
ating instructions to extend the economic provisions of the Compacts of Free Asso-
392
ciation. DOD representatives from the offices of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy and Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) have met with multiple offices
in the Department of State and the three U.S. Ambassadors to the Freely Associ-
ated States to discuss renewal of economic assistance.
105. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper, has DOD and its interagency partners set
a timeline for Compact renewal prior to the end of Compact economic assistance?
Secretary ESPER. The economic provisions for the Republic of the Marshall Islands
and the Federated States of Micronesia expire in 2023. The economic provisions for
the Republic of Palau expire in 2024. The National Security Council staff has a goal
of completing negotiations as soon as possible. We recognize the important role that
Congress will play in this process and welcome the opportunity to work with Con-
gress to secure long-term U.S. strategic interests in this vital region.
106. Senator HIRONO. Secretary Esper, what additional steps need to be taken by
DOD and its interagency partners before Congress can consider enacting legislation
that would implement the renewal of the Compacts?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense is involved in the National Security
Council staff’s coordinated effort on this issue, along with the Department of the In-
terior, the Office of Management and the Budget, and the Department of State.
Next steps are to finalize negotiating instructions so that the U.S. lead negotiator
can begin negotiations with the Freely Associated States before taking the final
agreement to Congress for vote and final passage.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
SPACE FORCE ORGANIZATION

107. Senator HEINRICH. Secretary Esper, Space Force Vice-Commander, Lt. Gen.
David Thompson, recently indicated that the U.S. Space Force will propose the con-
solidation of current space acquisition organizations under one entity called Space
Systems Command. General Goldfein agreed emphatically that the Space Rapid Ca-
pabilities Office should remain an independent organization during yesterday’s Air
Force posture hearing. What consequences would such a consolidation have on the
organization’s ability to adapt and innovate?
Secretary ESPER. The Department is considering all options to streamline the
Space Force’s acquisition system, but we have not proposed legislative changes to
the Space Rapid Capabilities Office (SpRCO) at this time. The Space Rapid Capa-
bilities Office (SpRCO) was established in statute by Congress. Consistent with cur-
rent law, the SpRCO reports to the Commander, U.S. Space Force (formerly Air
Force Space Command). In the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense Authorization
Act, Congress established the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisi-
tion and Integration who will oversee and direct the SpRCO, along with the Space
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the Space Development Agency (SDA). We
expect this change will go far to improve the integration and synchronization of
space programs.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

108. Senator HEINRICH. Secretary Esper, I was encouraged to see the types of in-
vestments the Fiscal Year 2021 President’s Budget proposed in technologies of the
future like Directed Energy, hypersonics, and Artificial Intelligence. As you know,
investments like these are only of use to our servicemembers in the field if we are
able to transition them out of the laboratories. What kind of investments does the
budget make in our Nation’s test and range infrastructure to speed up the tech
transition process?
Secretary ESPER. It is essential that our training capabilities and our ranges sup-
port live, virtual and constructive (LVC) training with these new systems. For ex-
ample, in fiscal year 2021, the Department has requested funding for spectrum
awareness tools, prototyped an advanced air combat training system, fielded ad-
vanced electronic warfare replicators, and developed an automated spectrum access
management tool largely funded by the Spectrum Access Research and Development
Program. Additionally, the Department plans to field a 5G capability to select loca-
tions providing a virtual reality capability targeting the training audience. Key live
ranges are investing in communication networks and security protocols to digitally
connect ranges providing a larger geographic footprint for hypersonic platforms and
extended range weapons. The Department is developing a training infrastructure
strategy to identify current training gaps with corrective actions that will be re-
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flected in future budgets. fiscal year 2021’s investments coupled with the training
strategy provides the baseline to incorporate new technologies into training.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN
CORONAVIRUS

109. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, in response to the coronavirus, you have
articulated three priorities: to protect our forces and their families, to safeguard our
mission capabilities, and to support the efforts across federal agencies. You have
also stated that NORTHCOM is the global integrator for all DOD efforts to combat
the disease. I understand that you have indicated that DOD civilian and military
leadership, including all the service secretaries and COCOM commanders, have
worked together to ensure the Department is ready for short- and long-term sce-
narios, as well as domestic and international situations. A March 3, 2020, Star and
Stripes report indicates that ‘‘[a]ll Army recruits entering basic training will be
screen for coronavirus, a precaution to curtail the spread of the illness[.]’’ A March
5, 2020, CNN report indicates that ‘‘the coronavirus is now a particular concern for
the US Navy, Air Force and Army who have implemented new screening procedures
as the virus spreads.’’ That report also indicated that the ‘‘Navy [ . . . ] began screen-
ing for the coronavirus in the initial processing of recruits in January’’ and that the
‘‘Air Force is also screening recruits when they leave processing centers before they
enter training.’’ At this time, can you confirm that recruits for each of the military
services are being screened for the coronavirus, and if not, do you believe it is appro-
priate to conduct such screening?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, the Military Departments are ‘‘screening’’ recruits via non-
test based procedures or other methods to reduce the potential that COVID–19 in-
fected recruits will enter the training pipeline. Surveillance testing is being exam-
ined and refined as a test-based method in conjunction with social distancing, re-
striction of movement, and other procedures to achieve this end.

110. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, the most recent unclassified Worldwide
Threat Assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
published in January 2019, observed, ‘‘The growing proximity of humans and ani-
mals has increased the risk of disease transmission. The number of outbreaks has
increased in part because pathogens originally found in animals have spread to
human populations.’’ The DNI also assessed that ‘‘the United States and the world
will remain vulnerable to the next flu pandemic or large-scale outbreak of a con-
tagious disease that could lead to massive rates of death and disability, severely af-
fect the world economy, strain international resources, and increase calls on the
United States for support.’’ Have you performed an assessment of the potential ad-
verse impact to the readiness of U.S. forces in the event of the coronavirus outbreak
being declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO), and if not,
do you plan to conduct such an assessment?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense (DOD) continually monitors and as-
sesses the readiness of our military forces and their ability to support the priorities
outlined in the National Defense Strategy across multiple lines of effort, to include
personnel, training, equipment, and supply. Since the coronavirus outbreak was de-
clared a pandemic by the World Health Organization, DOD has focused on providing
military manpower and equipment—both capacity and capability—to state and local
authorities to help combat COVID–19.
The Department’s participation and leadership in the Nation’s efforts ensure that
we are apprised of the most current information and able to adjust to emergent re-
quirements. I have given the Department three priorities for our focused response
to the pandemic: protecting our people and their families, maintaining military
readiness, and supporting the whole-of-government interagency response. To do this,
we must ensure that we take prudent measures to limit COVID–19’s spread, while
also ensuring the men and women of our All-Volunteer Force are trained and ready
to defend this Nation.

111. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, a March 5, 2020, Stars and Stripes report
indicates, ‘‘[Department of Defense Education Activity-Europe] has canceled the first
two weeks of its upcoming spring sports season due to concerns over the spread of
the coronavirus.’’ I understand that DODEA Schools in Korea, Italy, and Bahrain
have initiated temporary closings. According to DODEA’s website, ‘‘DODEA operates
163 schools in 8 Districts located in 11 countries, 7 states, and 2 territories across
10 time zones.’’ On its coronavirus website, DODEA says, ‘‘[o]ur school nurses and
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staff will be working with students to promote good hygiene and to keep everyone
healthy and safe. We also work with our custodial providers to ensure our schools
receive thorough cleaning every day. Parents are asked for help in reinforcing
healthy practices at home with children.’’ Consistent with your three priorities in
response to the coronavirus, what steps are specific DODEA schools are taking to
protect DODEA students, personnel, and their families from the coronavirus?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense Educational Activity (DODEA) is an
integral part of our mission. Quality education is a key factor in quality of life and
servicemember retention of the most talented members of the force. At this time,
all DODEA schools are closed as a result of Health Protection conditions on the in-
stallations DODEA serves, but the mission of DODEA continues. I am proud to say
that all schools are providing continuity of education in an online environment. As
teachers around the world continue their work online, our facilities and mainte-
nance personnel continue to maintain our schools and DODEA will continue to work
with Commands to ensure that when conditions allow it, schools are ready again
to be central learning environments for our communities.

112. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, what criteria are DODEA using to make
decisions regarding school closures and activity cancellations in response to the
coronavirus?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense Educational Activity (DODEA) has
worked closely with installation commanders and public health officials as well as
our host nation partners to make coordinated decisions about activity cancellations.
These decisions have been based on a combination of Health Protection conditions
on the base, host nation public health guidance and restrictions, and information
about any cases in the community.

113. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, what steps have you taken or do you plan
to take to ensure that disruptions do not negatively affect students’ academic
progress?
Secretary ESPER. From Daegu, South Korea, which was the first Department of
Defense Educational Activity (DODEA) school to close on February 20th, to Guanta-
namo Bay Cuba, which closed on March 25th, all DODEA schools have had con-
tinuity of education plans in place focused on a virtual learning platform within 4
school days of initial closure. DODEA has signed out thousands of computers and
procured and distributed hundreds of internet hotspots for students needing
connectivity. Students meet at least twice weekly with their teachers, and teachers
are hosting office hours and providing assignments to students. Students with dis-
abilities continue to be served in this model in the most comprehensive way pos-
sible, and DODEA has taken special consideration to ensure families are able to re-
main engaged. ‘‘Counselor Watch’’ programs are designed to engage with families
whose students are not accessing learning materials or are otherwise struggling in
this new structure. DODEA teachers and leaders in the field continue to analyze
and adjust the model to ensure student needs are met based on feedback from the
community.

114. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, what effect, if any, has the coronavirus
had on DOD child care centers, and what is DOD’s plan to address situations in
which such facilities must close due to concern about the outbreak?
Secretary ESPER. The impact of coronavirus on Department of Defense child care
programs is very fluid. We have experienced a number of our facilities being closed,
especially at our OCONUS locations. Most of our child care programs that are open
are supporting mission essential personnel only. Installation commanders, working
with local public health professionals and senior leadership, have the authority to
make these decisions based on the local situation. Facilities will reopen as local offi-
cials feel the timing is right to do so.

115. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, in the event that a deployable vaccine to
the coronavirus is developed, can you guarantee that all DOD military, DOD civilian
personnel, and their families will receive a vaccination for free?
Secretary ESPER. If a vaccine for COVID–19 is approved by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the vaccination will be considered a preventive service
and covered at no co-pay or cost-sharing for Department of Defense (DOD) bene-
ficiaries who use network providers and network pharmacies. Health coverage for
civilians that are not eligible DOD beneficiaries is available through the Federal
Employee Health Benefits Program, which has different governing statutes, regula-
tions, policies, and contracts.
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116. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, according to a March 3, 2020, Politico re-
port, the Overseas Federation of Teachers says that teachers at DODEA schools in
Italy and Bahrain that closed due to coronavirus concerns have nonetheless been
required to report to school to supervise students’ online learning. I am concerned
that this puts educators’ health and safety at risk and creates significant childcare
challenges for their families. In areas where DODEA schools are closed, will you
commit to allowing teachers and other school personnel to telework in order to pro-
tect their health and safety?
Secretary ESPER. The Department of Defense Educational Activity (DODEA)
prioritizes the health and safety of all employees. In the beginning of the continuity
operations model in most schools, it was important to provide training and for
teachers to be able to work together in small groups to engage in new online learn-
ing platforms. At that time, all civilian employees were still reporting to work on
installations.

117. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, have DODEA officials sought input from
unions representing DODEA teachers and school staff on decisions related to clo-
sures, telework, and working conditions? Please describe which unions DODEA has
consulted, the nature of DODEA outreach, and the specific feedback obtained from
these stakeholders.
Secretary ESPER. At the headquarters-level, all unions are being sent government/
Department-wide COVID–19 guidance from the Department of Defense, Office of
Personnel Management, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, etc. for infor-
mational purposes. The Department of Defense Educational Activity established a
headquarters labor meeting to better keep national level union officials informed
about component-level responses and policy development regarding operational and
personnel decisions and to allow them to comment on actions taken and planned.
In this regard the following unions were invited to participate in component-level
meetings: Federal Education Association (FEA); Federal Education Association-
Stateside Region (FEASR); Overseas Federation of Teachers (OFT); Antilles Consoli-
dated Education Association (ACEA); American Federation of Government Employ-
ees, Local 1770; American Federation of Government Employees-Consolidated; and
National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE). By way of specific feedback: FEA
and OFT have submitted questions concerning the application of the Authorized De-
parture. At the Regional level and District levels, the unions have been very active
in working with their Management counterparts (Directors for Student Excellence
(DSEs) and Superintendents) to make and sustain the transition to the digital
teaching platform. They have provided invaluable feedback from teachers and
helped in communicating Management decisions to teachers. FEASR met with the
DSEs to deliver a list of issues from teachers whose resolutions were intended to
enhance mission delivery.
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

118. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, based on public reporting, there appears
to have been significant difficulties encountered by DOD personnel tasked with effi-
ciently assessing servicemembers who were exposed to blast during the Iranian mis-
sile strike on Al Assad air base on January 8, 2020, for potential traumatic brain
injuries. Why is the Department not broadly leveraging technologies that quan-
titatively measure and record blast overpressure exposures?
Secretary ESPER. The Department is leveraging technology as much as possible
to assist in evaluating Service members who may be involved in potentially concus-
sive events. We are committed to further implementing our Comprehensive Strategy
for Warfighter Brain Health which has numerous components that support a better
understanding of brain exposures, to include blast overpressure, as well as moni-
toring and mitigating such exposures. As technology has evolved, we are working
towards a blast monitoring program that is able to interface with our information
technology systems in a seamless and secure fashion. The outcome will be a blast
monitoring system that utilizes accurate data to record personnel level exposures
and guides decisions aimed to reduce the effects of blast exposures.

119. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, the Committee understands that such
technologies have been fielded successfully in the combat environment as early as
2011 through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. In your opinion, are
there strategies that Congress and this Committee can undertake to ensure that
these technologies are more rapidly fielded?
Secretary ESPER. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) does
not need any additional authorities at this time to field new technologies. If, in the
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future, DARPA becomes in need of any new authorities, the Department will engage
and discuss with the Congress and the Senate Armed Services Committee on the
best way forward.

120. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, section 734 of the Fiscal Year 2018 NDAA
mandated blast overpressure monitoring for servicemembers at risk of these expo-
sures in training and operations. Can you provide an update on the progress of this
congressionally mandated initiative, including the number and types of units/per-
sonnel that are bring monitoring by the 734 program, the amount and type of data
collected, and any relevant findings related to blast overpressure exposure rates to
date?
Secretary ESPER. We have incorporated the new legislation in the National De-
fense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020; section 717 and section 742
into our longitudinal medical studies of blast overpressure in high overpressure
weapon systems, which focuses on documenting blast overpressure data into a Serv-
ice member’s record as well as being able to retrieve that data when being evaluated
for a potentially concussive event. There have been 58 units representing all the
Services, outfitted with wearable blast gauges that are part of a pilot research sur-
veillance project called CONQUER (COmbat in TraiNing QUerable Exposure Repos-
itory). The types of units include but are not limited to: special operation forces,
snipers, breachers, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel and infantry and
artillery units. We have been able to collect blast overpressure information for
shoulder mounted weapon systems, .50-caliber weapons, indirect fire systems and
multiple breaching charges. We are working towards being able to provide mitiga-
tion strategies through analysis of this data. Additionally we are studying the
health and performance effects from blast overpressure. We will translate this infor-
mation as quickly as possible into our safety and training platforms so that we can
maximize the readiness and effectiveness of our Warfighters.
WHITE SUPREMACY

121. Senator WARREN. Secretary Esper, section 530 of the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA
requires the Secretary of Defense to ‘‘study the feasibility of, in background inves-
tigations and security and suitability screenings of individuals who seek to enlist
in the Armed Forces—(1) screening for extremist and gang-related activity; and (2)
using the following resources of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: (A) The Tattoo
and Graffiti Identification Program and (B) The National Gang Intelligence Center.’’
By no later than June 17, 2020, the Secretary must submit an unclassified report
to Congress with his conclusions on this study. However, there is no explicit require-
ment that DOD include white supremacy extremism in this study. Given the threat
posed by white supremacy extremism to our military and our country, do you be-
lieve that the Department should include white supremacy extremism in its upcom-
ing study on its process for screening recruits to the Armed Forces pursuant to the
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA?
Secretary ESPER. White supremacy extremism is an element of domestic extre-
mism and will be included in our report.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DOUG JONES
SPACE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

122. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, please set forth the new site selection cri-
teria for Space Command headquarters and explain how those criteria differ from
the previous criteria.
Secretary ESPER. The Department of the Air Force is currently working to finalize
screening and evaluation criteria to expand the number of cities and installations
analyzed. The Department of the Air Force will consult with the Defense Commit-
tees on these criteria once I have had the opportunity to review them.

123. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, please explain why any criteria have been
changed in the site selection process for Space Command.
Secretary ESPER. I have asked the Department of the Air Force to take a different
approach by breaking down the selection criteria into its foundational components
and conducting a more holistic and iterative selection process that considers the con-
current establishment of the U.S. Space Force.
397
124. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, please explain the problems with trans-
parency you identified in your hearing testimony which led to your decision to re-
open the site selection process for Space Command.
Secretary ESPER. Based upon feedback I received from members of Congress and
my review of the process, the screening criteria were insufficient and resulted in a
limited number of eligible locations without the data to support the exclusion of
many others. Also, the initial criteria had not considered the impacts caused by the
establishment of U.S. Space Force. Therefore, I asked the Department of the Air
Force to take a different approach.
125. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, please explain in detail the new process and
timeline for the Space Command headquarters site selection.
Secretary ESPER. We will use a revised basing process that leverages best prac-
tices from the Department of the Air Force strategic basing process and the Army’s
recent Futures Command stationing action. This will expand the number of loca-
tions under consideration for the U.S. Space Command, and give eligible installa-
tions and communities an opportunity to provide input based on approved require-
ments and evaluation criteria. The Department of the Air Force will consult with
the Defense Committees on their schedule and revised evaluation and screening cri-
teria this spring. I anticipate a final decision sometime next year.
126. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, you testified that the new process ‘‘would
allow all members to nominate locations’’ for the headquarters of Space Command.
Is that a change to the normal process for basing decisions?
Secretary ESPER. This is a modification to the Department of the Air Force basing
process. Since U.S. Space Command is a combatant command with unique and com-
plex warfighting requirements, I have asked the Department of the Air Force to re-
vise its process for this action in a way that leverages best practices from the De-
partment of the Air Force strategic basing process and the Army’s recent Futures
Command stationing action.

127. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, did the sites previously identified as final-
ists for Space Command headquarters not satisfy the basing criteria and if so, in
what ways?
Secretary ESPER. The six original candidate locations that the Secretary of the Air
Force approved in May of 2019 met all basing criteria laid out in the original basing
decision.
REPORT REGARDING CONDITION OF ROTC FACILITIES AT HBCUS

128. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the report required by
the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA regarding the current condition of facilities used by
units of the Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps at minority-serving institutions
and when can Congress expect the report?
Secretary ESPER. Facilities used for Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) pur-
poses are all fully owned and operated by the universities and colleges that host our
programs. Facility maintenance is managed by the host institution, as laid out in
the Memorandum of Understanding each school signs when an ROTC program is
established, and conditions vary greatly depending on multiple factors. The Depart-
ment is exploring alternative means to meet this congressional reporting require-
ment because it does not have the authority to compel historically black colleges and
universities to provide facility reports. As soon as a viable information source is de-
termined, we will coordinate the data collection and transmit the report.
AIR FORCE PILOT ACADEMY

129. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, is DOD committed to continuing and grow-
ing the Air Force’s Pilot Academy program for JROTC students?
Secretary ESPER. Yes, the Air Force remains committed in Fiscal Year 2021 to
providing funding for 400 scholarships which include 300 Air Force Junior Reserve
Officer Training Corps (+AFJROTC) cadets, 20 Air Force Reserve Officer Training
Corps, 20 Civil Air Patrol, and for the first time, 10 U.S. Air Force Academy cadets
and 50 young people from affinity groups. The affinity group students will compete
for slots through a collaborative effort between AFJROTC, Air Force Recruiting
Service and several nation-wide ‘‘affinity’’ groups such as Women in Aviation (WIA)
and the Organization of Black Airline Pilots (OBAP). In addition, the Flight Acad-
emy is included in Program Objective Memorandum 22 to ensure long-term stability
and growth of this highly successful program. To date, 217 out of 270 (80 percent
success rate) have earned their Private Pilot Certificate and all have earned College
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Credit. This program specifically targets the strategic imperative of a diverse fight-
ing force directly linked to the National Defense Strategy.
REPORT REGARDING DOD CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTERS

130. Senator JONES. Secretary Esper, what is the status of the report the Fiscal
Year 2020 NDAA required to be provided by March 1, 2020, regarding child develop-
ment centers and when can Congress expect that report?
Secretary ESPER. An interim report was provided in February of this year, indi-
cating that a final, comprehensive report would be submitted by June 1, 2020. The
final report combines nine separate child care reports requested by the Congres-
sional Defense and Appropriations committees.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
NAVY POSTURE
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in Room
SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer,
Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, McSally, Scott,
Hawley, Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine,
King, Heinrich, Peters, Duckworth, and Jones.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman INHOFE. Our meeting will come to order.
Let me apologize to my fellow Senators. You know, I had just
gotten back from Iraq, Erbil, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mauri-
tania, felt fine, but I hit the ground here and I got non-contagious
bronchitis. So anyway, it is much better today than it was yester-
day. Much better, much better.
The Committee today will receive testimony on the posture of the
Department of the Navy and the fiscal year 2021.
We welcome our guests today: the Acting Secretary of the Navy,
Tom Modly; Admiral Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations; and David
Berger, Commandant of the Navy. Thanks for coming. Thanks for
your long-term service. We appreciate you very much.
With the alarming speed of modernization of both conventional
and nuclear forces, China and Russia present a credible threat. I
always make reference to this because when we put this together,
this was equal Democrats and Republicans, people who no one
could question their capabilities, and so we have been trying to fol-
low this. So I will make several references to this, as will other
members. The major thing there is that China and Russia have
passed us in areas that we did not want to be passed.
I am encouraged by some of our witnesses’ public statements and
guidance and their subordinates related to reorienting to great
power competition.
(399)
400

Thanks to President Trump’s leadership, we reset defense spend-
ing in 2017, and we are beginning to rebuild the military after
many years of neglect. But the hole is deep and the work has just
begun.
I commend our witnesses for submitting a budget that continues
to trend the funding in the readiness accounts that support today’s
Navy and Marine Corps. However, it is clear to me that the De-
partment of the Navy’s proposed budget is only sufficient to sup-
port a fleet of about 300 ships. That is clearly inadequate to the
355 as we find in the manual I just referred to.
Along these lines, I must also point out that the Department has
yet to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan, which by law was re-
quired to be submitted to Congress with the budget last month.
The absence of this plan makes it impossible to understand how
the Department plans to reach its goal and the national policy of
a 355-ship Navy. We have got to be smart and not hasty as we
modernize our military. I urge each of you to take a long view. Re-
cent history should be our guide because without better acquisition
performance, we will fall behind or further behind, I should say,
China and Russia.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join
you in welcoming Acting Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, and
General Berger to the Committee this morning to testify on the
plans and programs of the Department of the Navy in our review
of the fiscal year 2021 authorization request. I particularly want to
welcome each of you to your first posture hearing before the Com-
mittee. We are grateful for your service, for the service of the men
and women under your command, and for the support of all the
Navy and Marine Corps families. So please express to these won-
derful Americans.
As the leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps, you face signifi-
cant challenges as you strive to balance the need to support ongo-
ing operations and sustain readiness with the need to modernize
and keep the technological edge so critical to military success.
In addition, because significant levels of funding are being trans-
ferred to build the wall on the southern border, you will have fewer
resources for modernization.
The Department of the Navy faces serious readiness problems
caused by deferred maintenance, reduced steaming and flying
hours, and canceled training and deployments. We remember too
well the collisions of the McCain and Fitzgerald and the loss of life
that resulted. I will be interested in hearing about the progress the
Navy is making in continuing to implement changes that will en-
sure such incidents will not happen again.
All areas of our naval forces are maintaining an extremely high
operations tempo. Demand is overwhelming for attack submarines,
air and missile defense cruisers, destroyers, and strike fighter in-
ventories. The Navy is now in its eighth year of operating with
fewer than the legally required 11 aircraft carriers. The Ford is
listed in the Navy inventory, but that carrier is more than 5 years
behind schedule and will not be ready to deploy for many, many
401

months. In addition, during the next decade, the Navy will need to
buy the new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines to replace
the Ohio-class submarines. This is an extremely expensive under-
taking that is on a very tight schedule.
The Navy is using authorities such as multiyear procurement au-
thority to conduct modernization programs more efficiently. Con-
gress has approved multiyear procurement authority for both at-
tack submarines and Aegis destroyers. These vessels represent the
largest inventory shortfall compared to the goals in the 2016 Force
Structure Assessment, with the actual Navy fleet 15 boats below
the attack submarine goal and 14 destroyers below the goal for
large surface combatants.
The Navy just recently signed the multiyear procurement con-
tract for the block 5 of the Virginia-class attack submarine. This
contract provides for buying nine boats of the 5-year period, fiscal
year 2019 through fiscal year 2023. The contract also provides an
option to buy a 10th boat if the Navy has the resources and the
contractors improve performance on the program. Yet, the fiscal
year 2021 budget, which had the best opportunity for funding the
10th boat, did not exercise the option. I am concerned that the win-
dow of opportunity for buying a 10th boat could close if funds are
not provided to the Navy this year to allow them that opportunity.
I see that the number one item on the CNO’s [Chief of Naval Oper-
ations] unfunded priority list is funding for the second Virginia-
class submarine in fiscal year 2021, and I would obviously be inter-
ested in your thoughts on this issue.
Modernizing ground vehicles remains a priority for the Marine
Corps. The amphibious combat vehicle will provide increased force
protection and enhanced lethality to our marines, and it will re-
place the aging inventory of assault amphibious vehicles. The Ma-
rine Corps is also partnering with the Army to develop the joint
light tactical vehicle, or JLTV, to replace the Humvee, and they
have targeted investments in the high mobility artillery rocket sys-
tem, HIMARS, in order to provide marines with ground-based indi-
rect fire support. I would welcome an update from our witnesses
on how they are balancing the procurement of new systems while
upgrading existing platforms to meet current operational needs.
In 2016, Admiral Richardson released a Force Structure Assess-
ment that identified a new force structure goal. We had been prom-
ised a new Force Structure Assessment by the end of 2019 that
would address implementation of the National Defense Strategy,
but that has not arrived. I also understand that the Department
has not provided the 30-year shipbuilding plan as required by law.
I look forward to hearing when the Department will deliver these
important documents.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today, and
I look forward to their testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.
We have opening statements. Your entire statement will be made
a part of the record. We will start with Admiral Gilday. You are
recognized.
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STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral GILDAY. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, dis-
tinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the oppor-
tunity to appear today with Secretary Modly and General Berger.
We are thankful for your enduring support of the Navy and Marine
Corps team.
Today, three carrier strike groups and two amphibious ready
groups, along with 30 percent of our fleet, are deployed forward
around the globe. Our Navy and Marine Corps team needs no per-
mission to operate at sea, and their power does not rest in any sin-
gle location, but rather in our ability to maneuver anytime and
anywhere the seas reach operating across the spectrum of military
operations.
Without question, our sailors remain our most important asset.
We have taken a hard look at what they need to be successful, the
equipment and the training that they need to fight and win, as
well as support required to take care of them and their families.
Over the past 8 months, we have engaged in a deep examination
of these issues.
Our balanced approach in our budget submission this year pro-
vides a Navy ready to fight today while committing to the training
and the maintenance and the modernization to provide a Navy that
is ready to fight tomorrow.
Naval power is critical to implementing the National Defense
Strategy, but naval power is not just a function of fleet size. It is
a combination of the readiness, the lethality, and the capacity of
that fleet. Our number one priority remains the Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarine. This request also heavily invests in our
readiness accounts such as ship and aircraft maintenance and mod-
ernization, in manpower, in live virtual constructive training, in
steaming days, and in flying hours. It invests in new systems to
make our fleet more lethal, including increasing our weapons in-
ventory, filling our magazines, bolstering the range and the speed
of those weapons, exploring directed energy weapons, and incor-
porating new technologies like hypersonics. This request grows our
fleet in size, generating sustainable, capable capacity.
Importantly, naval power is not just determined by what we op-
erate and fight with, but how we operate and fight. We are pur-
suing an integrated approach with the United States Marine Corps
in fleet operations and exercises in war games and in experimen-
tation. The net result we believe is integrated American naval
power.
I could not ask for a better partner, a better shipmate in this en-
deavor than General Berger.
Thank you again for your support which has allowed us to make
significant gains in readiness and lethality already. It also allows
us to answer our nation’s call every day. On behalf of your Active
Duty, Reserve, and civilian sailors and their families who serve our
nation, I thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday,
and General Berger follows:]
403
JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. MODLY, ADMIRAL
MICHAEL M. GILDAY, AND GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Com-
mittee, thank you for your bipartisan efforts to build the strength and readiness of
our integrated naval force. As the nation’s forward-deployed, global maneuverable
team, the entire Department of the Navy (DON)—sailors, marines and civilians—
must be ready to respond as a single unit wherever and whenever there is need.
We must deliver the personnel, platforms, and operational capability necessary to
secure vital sea lanes, stand by our allies, and protect the American people.
Accomplishing this in today’s global strategic environment demands planning,
clear-eyed assessments, and hard choices. We must design a future integrated naval
force structure, advance our intellectual capacity and ethical excellence, and accel-
erate the digital modernization of our force. That’s why this budget prioritizes a
strategy-driven, balanced approach to investment, informed by relentless examina-
tion of our present capabilities and realities. It builds on prior investments while
adjusting fire where necessary to deliver greater efficiency and effectiveness. It sus-
tains the industrial base, and maintains our competitive advantage. Overall, this
budget will deliver a more integrated, survivable, and affordable future force.
Our testimony details the combined perspectives of the DON civilian and military
leadership. We begin with the challenges we face, followed by our overall strategic
vision, then the specific priorities of the Navy and Marine Corps to meet the re-
quirements of this vision and execute the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which
remains the guidepost for all of our decisions. The Department of the Navy sustains
progress along each of the NDS lines of effort through adequate and timely funding
from our partners in Congress. We are proud to work in partnership with this Com-
mittee in defense of our nation, and look forward to that work continuing.
THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

The reemergence of long-term great power competition, the evolving character of
that competition, and the accelerating advancements in technology are spurring a
period of transformation in the strategic environment, requiring us to adapt our in-
tegrated naval force design and operating concepts to new realities. As the National
Defense Strategy states, ‘‘there can be no complacency—we must make difficult
choices and prioritize what is most important.’’
Thus far this century, terrorist groups and rogue states have dominated our per-
ception of the threat environment. These threats were lethal, but did not pose an
existential threat to our national security. China and Russia present a different
challenge, as each continues to develop sophisticated military capabilities backed by
sizable economies. Their investments in surface, air, and undersea platforms have
significantly increased the potential for kinetic conflict, while the leadership of both
nations demonstrate increasing contempt for international law and the rules-based
order that ensures the prosperity and security of all nations.
China’s battle fleet has grown from 262 to 335 surface ships over the last decade,
and China’s commercial shipbuilding grew over 60 percent year over year from
2007–2017. It continues to take coercive actions against its neighbors and violate
international law in the South China Sea. Russia’s irresponsible aggression con-
tinues on NATO’s eastern and northern flanks as well as the Black Sea, the Arabian
Gulf, and the broader Indo-Pacific. China also invests heavily in submarines with
advanced stealth capabilities and the platforms and infrastructure needed to domi-
nate the emerging Arctic.
Meanwhile, warfare has evolved to new battlefields including cyberspace. China
and other dangerous actors like Iran brazenly target the command, control, and
communications (C3) systems and logistics networks on which our integrated naval
force depends. China’s nefarious activity also includes widespread cyber theft of in-
tellectual property and sensitive information targeting our entire government, our
allies, and our industry partners throughout the acquisition and supply chain.
As we prepare for the maturing threat of great power competition, we must re-
main on high alert for the actions of malign regimes such as Iran, and the continual
asymmetric threat to our people, allies, and interests posed by non-state actors such
as ISIS. In a recent example highlighting the impact of our integrated naval force,
5th Fleet and CTF–51/5 responded to crisis earlier this year by securing the United
States Embassy in Baghdad with the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
Force—Crisis Response—Central Command (SPMAGTF–CR–CC) and simulta-
neously coordinated additional naval support in theater. We stand ever-prepared to
respond with every part of our integrated force to instability, terrorist threats, and
rogue states throughout the world.
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Our integrated naval force also has a critical role in preserving the infrastructure
and access that powers the increasingly interconnected and interdependent United
States and global economies. Our nation’s continued prosperity and economic growth
increasingly depend on open and secure access to the sea lanes. Maritime traffic has
increased four-fold over the last two decades, with 90 percent of all global goods
transiting shipping lanes, including new trade routes opening through the Arctic.
Meanwhile, the undersea cables that power the digital economy and the global com-
munications framework represent an overlooked but critical point of vulnerability
for
American interests at home and abroad. Overall, the maritime system is more
heavily used, more stressed, and more contested than ever before—and it has never
been more important.
A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of the National De-
fense Strategy in a changing world. But as we address these external concerns, we
must also confront our business process challenges. These include a shrinking in-
dustrial base and vulnerable supply chain, inefficiencies due to legacy business oper-
ations, and antiquated acquisition processes which together result in increased costs
and delays for both new development and overall maintenance. Despite the best ef-
forts of this Committee, we must also continually prepare for the challenge posed
by funding uncertainty.
Most importantly, we must never forget that our greatest resource is the men and
women who wear the uniform, who comprise our civilian workforce, and the families
that serve alongside them. We are committed to ensuring our sailors, marines, and
civilians are trained and equipped to execute the mission and return home safely,
and that their families are provided with the housing, medical attention, and edu-
cation they need.
As detailed in the following pages, our integrated naval force has made significant
strides in addressing the external and internal challenges we face. But we can never
be satisfied, and will always press forward with a sense of urgency to deliver the
people, the platforms, and the capabilities necessary to protect the American people
and our interests around the world.
MEETING THE CHALLENGE WITH AN AGILE INTEGRATED NAVAL FORCE

To meet these challenges, the NDS requires a dominant, agile, accountable, and
globally positioned integrated naval force. We will plan, resource, and execute the
NDS with specific focus on the following:
Integration
We must transform from our present two-service model into one true expedi-
tionary force in readiness, with the Navy and Marine Corps operating together with
integrated planning, design, training, and execution at every echelon and in every
domain. This priority has been emphasized in messages to the fleet and planning
documents by each member of DON leadership and is a guiding principle for every
aspect of our planning and resourcing.
Velocity
Our integrated naval force must maintain the readiness and lethality to respond
anywhere at any time. We will achieve this through a global operating model that
ensures the continual posture, presence, and readiness of our personnel and plat-
forms. We will dominate the fight to get to the fight, with forward basing, distrib-
uted maritime capability, fully integrated logistics, and continual aviation readiness.
We also must increase the speed at which we do everything across the Department
to match the rapid changes and unpredictability of the future environment.
Collaboration
A primary line of effort in the NDS is to build and maintain a robust constellation
of allies and partners. Our integrated naval force is committed to training, oper-
ating, and learning alongside our allies and partners in every part of the world
through every day interaction and regular operational exercises such as Trident
Juncture, Talisman Saber and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). Afloat and ashore, our
allies and partners are crucial force multipliers and enablers of our global reach,
particularly in evolving regions such as the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic. We must
also break down organizational silos across our own Department and build more col-
laborative relationships with the other Military Departments and the Interagency
to support whole-of-government approaches to security that will become more promi-
nent in the future.
405
Visibility
While cutting edge ISR, cyber, aviation, and undersea assets ensure our global
reach and awareness, there is no substitute for sustained presence and engagement.
Through frequent port visits, stand-in forces, and Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPS), we will continue to demonstrate our enduring commitment to the de-
fense of our people and interests, as well as our readiness and will to stand along-
side our allies and partners. We will also focus on increasing transparency and in-
formation sharing in order to facilitate more rapid, and informed decisions.
Innovation
We will transform the strategic space to our advantage through next generation
research and development, industry partnerships, and naval education. We are em-
bracing the challenge of next generation technology and determined to dominate the
design, development and effective deployment of major technological breakthroughs
such as hypersonic weapons. We are making the key investments and forging the
key partnerships to own the next ‘‘Sputnik Moment.’’ We will become more com-
fortable with trying new ways of doing business, and more forgiving of incremental
failures made in support of change and progress.
Adaptability
Where we cannot change the strategic environment through innovation, we will
adapt to it quickly and efficiently through agile thinking and nimble platforms. This
will allow us to protect our people and interests through unpredictable shifting secu-
rity environments, and ensure the broadest range of options are available to the
Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. We will invest in an adaptable
force structure, foster adaptable approaches to problems, and nurture the develop-
ment of adaptable people comfortable with uncertainty and unpredictability.
Humility
We will address our challenges with a sense of humility, taking full account of
the deficiencies we have, but with confidence that they can be corrected. We will
be realistic in our planning and budgeting to assure we do not trade growth for
readiness. We will not allow ourselves to build a hollow force, but we will be honest
with the Congress and the American people about what we see the areas in which
we need their full support in order to build the integrated naval force that is re-
quired to maintain the nation’s security.
GRAY HULLS: BUILDING AND MAINTAINING THE RIGHT CAPABILITIES

In order to meet the many demands of the global strategic environment and en-
sure our warriors are always prepared to dominate the fight, we must design a fu-
ture integrated naval force structure aligned to the threats we face, both today and
in the future. This budget prioritizes the readiness of those platforms and systems
that will enable the United States to maintain and expand its competitive edge over
all adversaries while we examine ways to grow the fleet in a reasonable timeframe,
all while remaining responsible stewards of American taxpayer dollars.
Divesting from 20th Century Legacy Systems
In keeping with the Department of Defense-wide priority to modernize from low-
value legacy systems to fund combat-overmatch lethality tuned to the challenge of
great power competition, this budget divests from multiple legacy or surge-based ca-
pabilities that do not align with the requirements of the NDS. It shifts capabilities
from a counterinsurgency focus to systems that enable our personnel to exploit posi-
tional advantage and defend key maritime terrain for persistent forward sea control
and denial operations. This budget also aligns with Secretary Esper’s commitment
to become more of a ‘‘fast follower’’ of commercial technology, and to dominate the
future development and employment of artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonics
funding.
Building to a 355 Navy
Thanks to the bipartisan efforts of this Committee, the goal of a 355 ship Navy
is now the law of the land. We will be working with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to develop a consensus perspective on this future force structure through
robust analysis and wargaming and the inclusion of expertise from our academic in-
stitutions (Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University)
and independent naval experts. This process will be iterative and continuous. In
order to meet the nation’s national security needs and remain within budget con-
straints, we must consider how to shift costs away from high-end platforms to a
larger number of smaller, but still highly capable ships. Such a shift will allow
406
broader presence, reduced manning, and longer reach through a significant increase
in hypersonic weapons, greater stealth, and advanced anti-ISR capabilities.
We are also considering how unmanned surface and subsurface platforms should
figure into our force mix. These platforms will not only allow us to distribute and
conceal lethality, but to do so at a reduced cost and greater integration and inter-
dependency with the Joint Force. While some perspectives vary on the ultimate
composition of this future force mix, there is clear agreement that certain new class-
es of ships that currently do not exist today must be designed and built rapidly in
the next ten years. The exact mix will be the subject of continuous evaluation and
analysis, but it will not impede our immediate investment in the development and
initial production of these new vessels.
Fielding a Ready, Relevant, Responsive Integrated Naval Expeditionary Force
A key aspect of our transformation will be a shift to greater naval expeditionary
force capabilities and a restoration of the Fleet Marine Force. The potential for
rapid change in the global environment, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, demands
a rebalance from the current Marine Corps force land and surge based posture to
a more distributed, rapidly deployable and fully integrated force. This budget con-
tinues investment in key Marine Corps development programs such as the Ground
Based Anti-Ship Missile, Ground Based Air Defense, CH–53K helicopter, and F–35B
Joint Strike Fighter, supporting Marine Corps efforts to enhance Long Range/Preci-
sion Fires, Protected Mobility/Enhanced Maneuver, and Air Defense.
Generating Readiness and Sustainability
This budget optimizes Marine Corps readiness to achieve 80 percent serviceability
of reportable expeditionary equipment, and implements the Commandant’s Infra-
structure Reset Strategy so our warriors are always prepared and present to defend
our people, our interests, and our allies. It sustains the shipyards and supporting
industrial base to maximize repair and modernization capacity and minimize turn-
around and downtime. To provide continual presence and readiness for the fleet,
this budget funds 58 days underway while deployed and 24 days underway while
non-deployed per quarter, with an increase of 6.5 percent over last year for ship op-
erations funding. Leveraging private sector best practices through the Naval
Sustainment Strategy, this budget continues to invest in Aircraft Depot Mainte-
nance to achieve the goal of 80 percent mission capable rates for strike fighter air-
craft. This budget also increases the Flying Hour program by 5.8 percent and aligns
the funding for air operations to the mission capable rates to ensure that all squad-
rons deploy combat-ready.
Producing Next Generation Superiority
The Columbia-class submarine program enters the first year of incremental pro-
curement funding for the lead ship, and this budget resources the program for on-
track delivery to meet the first deployment in 2031, with a second ballistic missile
submarine starting in fiscal year 2024 and serial production begins in fiscal year
2026, furthering the recapitalization of our Strategic Nuclear Deterrent.
Additionally, we continue to resource the development of the Fast Frigate, and
Future Large Surface Combatant, both of which will greatly enhance our distributed
capabilities and forward deployed lethality. This budget also continues advanced ca-
pabilities in the F–35B and F–35C Joint Strike Fighter for both the Navy and Ma-
rine Corps. We also maintain investment in weapons development to provide for
longer range and hypersonic weapons, with increasing investments in areas like
Conventional Prompt Strike and our Standard Missile family. Finally, we will look
to Congress for support in our effort to expand training and testing opportunities
through range expansion aboard Naval Air Station Fallon in order to fully develop
and train with these lethal capabilities.
GRAY ZONES: WINNING THE FIGHT BEFORE THE FIGHT

The future battlespace extends well beyond the field of kinetic action. Ensuring
our warriors are the best equipped and prepared in the world starts with accel-
erating our digital modernization across the force, streamlining our business proc-
esses and maintaining the highest level of efficiency. Agile and accountable naval
forces are impossible without agile and accountable business processes that support
them. With the support of this budget submission, the following are just a few of
the reforms we are implementing throughout our integrated naval force to dominate
the future fight, from the E–Ring to the front lines.
407
Executing the Business Operations Plan
The President’s Budget Submission will allow us to accelerate our business proc-
ess modernization across the naval enterprise through the use of advanced digital
tools and technologies to substantially improve performance, speed, accuracy, and
security. The DON Business Operations Plan (BOP) details the steps we are taking
to transform our business operations in alignment with the NDS, with 6, 12, 18,
and 24 month milestones to provide DON leadership the ability to better manage
and monitor progress on the path to a more agile and accountable business enter-
prise. The plan provides clear direction for military and civilian leaders throughout
the DON to maximize investments and effort in alignment with the NDS. It also
provides greater transparency and oversight opportunities for our partners on this
Committee as well as the American people.
Transforming the Digital Enterprise
Information management is a core strategic function of the DoN. Cyber security,
data strategy and analytics, AI, and quantum computing have all combined to cre-
ate massive opportunities—as well as vulnerabilities—across our entire enterprise.
A critical element of mission readiness is the ability of our personnel to have access
to relevant, reliable, and secure global communications and information, at every
echelon and in every domain. In fiscal year 2019 we consolidated information man-
agement functions in a restructured Office of the Chief Information Officer (CIO),
driving transformation and operational capability through the following lines of ef-
fort:
• Modernize DON infrastructure from its current state of fragmented, non-
performant, outdated, and indefensible architectures to a unified, logical, mod-
ern infrastructure capable of delivering an information advantage.
• Innovate operational capabilities through technologies like 5th Generation (5G)
wireless and AI, and accelerate software development through Digital Innova-
tion Centers, leveraging private sector and industry best practices to fuel our
digital transformation.
• Defend networks and assets through continuous active monitoring across the
enterprise to increase cyber situational awareness. We will institute a security
culture where a personal commitment to cybersecurity is required to gain access
to the network. We will transform from a compliance-centered culture to one of
constant readiness, and we will work with our industry partners to secure naval
information wherever it resides.
Managing Finance and Operationalizing the Audit
We have completed the second full scope financial audit of the entire DoN, reveal-
ing more opportunities to improve our financial management and business processes
as well as many other aspects of our enterprise. The financial audit is the lynchpin
to both monitoring and catalyzing improved business operations performance. Our
senior leadership has repeatedly emphasized to all personnel that active participa-
tion in the audit process is not just a financial exercise, but a management tool that
must involve the combined effort of all of our personnel in order to identify ways
to improve our organization’s effectiveness and accountability.
We are on track within the next two years to achieve qualified financial audit
opinion for the Marine Corps, with an unqualified opinion the following year. This
will make the Marine Corps the first military service in the Defense Department
to receive such an opinion in the history of the United States. Achieving this for
the Navy will be more challenging, but we continue to see improvements year to
year. The DON has also conducted a Zero-Based Budget review designed to ensure
alignment of goals and resources, achieve full value for every taxpayer dollar, and
increase transparency in our resource allocation process. Finally, we have imple-
mented Performance-to-Plan reviews that provided a fleet-focused and data-driven
approach, accelerating readiness.
Modernizing Naval Supply Chain and Logistics
Our integrated naval force requires unified logistics operations and secure, reli-
able supply chains in order to maintain the distributed, forward maneuverable force
demanded by the global strategic environment. Through the audit and other reform
efforts, we have identified multiple areas where our supply chain and logistics proc-
esses are disjointed and divided, with areas of poor visibility and accountability that
impact our forward inventory and readiness.
These efforts have also revealed areas where greater integration between the
services is needed and where our multiple supply chains require consolidation and
optimization. We are developing a long-term strategy to address these deficiencies,
beginning with a new modern vision for future integrated naval logistics and supply
408
chain management, and will proceed with executing reforms consistent with this vi-
sion this year.
GRAY MATTER: DEVELOPING OUR PEOPLE

We cannot solely define American seapower by ship counts and high-end systems.
In the end, our core strength will always reside in the gray matter between the ears
of our people as much as it does in the gray hulls out in our fleet. Recruiting, retain-
ing, educating and caring for the best military and civilian force possible has always
been and will always be our greatest edge against all competitors. We will meet this
challenge through transformative investments in education, greater connections
with partners and allies, a competitive human capital strategy, a recommitment to
high quality housing for our naval families, and a determination to eliminate the
scourge of sexual harassment and assault throughout our total force.
Prioritizing Learning as a Strategic Advantage
As stated in the 2018 Education for Seapower (E4S) report, the intellectual capa-
bility of our Navy and Marine Corps team and our ability to operate as a continuous
learning organization will serve as the enduring foundation of our credible deterrent
to war. In the year since the E4S report was completed, we have established the
office of the Chief Learning Officer (CLO) and moved quickly to introduce sweeping
changes in the structure, integration, and prioritization of naval education. These
changes include:
• U.S. Naval Community College—Our highest priority is to create a new United
States Naval Community College (USNCC) that offers advanced, online tech-
nical and analytic education to our enlisted force in critical areas like IT, cyber,
and data science. Free for every sailor and marine, the USNCC will fill a long-
neglected gap in our educational continuum and provide a recruiting and reten-
tion incentive through degree-granting relationships with major four-year public
and private universities across the nation.
• Naval Education Strategy 2020—Our recently released Naval Education Strat-
egy 2020 is the first ever comprehensive education strategy for our integrated
naval force. The strategy will lay out a clear road map to develop a lifelong
learning continuum for our entire force, reform our personnel systems to better
recognize and reward the value of education, and invest in our schools and edu-
cation programs.
• Strategic Education Requirement for Flag and General Officers—The oppor-
tunity to wargame future scenarios and technologies, study naval strategy and
debate alongside peers is vital experience for the leaders who will guide our in-
tegrated force through the future strategic landscape. That is why we are now
requiring in-residence strategic studies graduate education for promotion to
Flag or General Officer rank.
Recruiting, Curating and Retaining the Best Talent
This budget provides the resources to fuel a new human capital strategy to better
access and curate best-in-class talent for our Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian work
force. We developed this strategy leveraging leading private sector business prac-
tices designed for the new economy. Initial pilot programs in support of this strategy
will begin this year. The Navy’s Sailor 2025 initiative and comparable initiatives in
the Marine Corps have contributed to successful recruiting and retention in what
should be a very challenging market.
Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and customer service pro-
grams, we are increasing our responsiveness to the needs of the individual
warfighter and their family, making continued service a viable and attractive op-
tion. We are increasing avenues for civilians with prior service through the Targeted
Reentry Program, and expanding opportunities to serve in meaningful civilian ca-
pacities. We are also increasing opportunities for our personnel to learn, operate,
and innovate alongside partners in the private sector, across the joint force, and
alongside our partners and allies.
Setting Our People Up for Success
Through USMC Global Force Management, we will continue to field an elite Ac-
tive and Reserve Marine force, maintaining a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio while
working towards a necessary 1:3 ratio to preserve constant readiness and avail-
ability of personnel while also reserving time for training, refitting and family sup-
port. This budget increases funding and training for Marine Forces Pacific in sup-
port of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and the NDS. The DON has also im-
plemented over 100 of the recommendations from the Readiness Reform and Over-
sight Council (RROC) in order to maximize opportunities for our personnel to suc-
409
ceed. Among many other changes, we have increased opportunities for shipboard
certification and skills enhancement, while adjusting manning schedules to maxi-
mize safety and improve quality of life and professional effectiveness for our per-
sonnel while underway.
Standing Up for Our Military Families
Our people must be confident that their leadership will look out for their interests
and advocate tirelessly for their safety and well-being. Unfortunately, as Congress
correctly identified last year, we have not always lived up to that responsibility, par-
ticularly with respect to our administration and oversight of the Military Privatized
Housing Initiative (MPHI) program. We are committed to making sure we assess,
monitor, and remediate issues of concern quickly and effectively through active and
engaged leadership and reinforced Department-level oversight to restore the trust
of our residents. Over the past year, Navy and Marine Corps leaders reached out
to all of our sailors, marines, and their families to inquire about on-base housing
concerns and offered home visits to better understand those concerns. We are also
leveraging technologies such as an app for residents to report issues and track their
resolution and an Electronic Data Warehouse that allows leaders at every level the
opportunity to spot trends and issues quickly and effectively. This budget also pro-
vides resources for additional personnel to advocate for resident needs. In total, the
Navy and Marine Corps housing programs are hiring 277 more housing manage-
ment specialists, housing inspectors, quality assurance specialists, and project and
business managers.
Combating Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
We are each determined to eliminate the scourges of sexual assault and sexual
harassment from every part of our force. These behaviors stand as a betrayal of
those who have stepped forward to serve and of every person who wears the uni-
form, military and civilian. Our Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
(SAPRO) is coordinating education, outreach, care and prevention efforts across the
force. We have reached out to university presidents and other civilian education
leaders through our first annual symposium held at the U.S. Naval Academy in
April 2019, as well as regional discussions in New York City in September 2019 and
in Albuquerque, New Mexico in early February 2020. We are examining new pre-
vention and education efforts including a renewed focus on junior enlisted leaders
and the role of alcohol in sexual assault and harassment. We will continue to work
with this Committee to pursue and share the best practices and ideas, relentlessly
pursuing a future where no sailor, marine, or civilian teammate ever has to fear
for their own safety while protecting us all.
Building a Robust Constellation of Partners and Allies
As extraordinary as the people of our integrated naval force are, we recognize that
we cannot meet the global challenge alone. The strategic maritime defense partner-
ships we maintain with our partners and allies around the world extend the reach
and power of our force, but more importantly they underscore the importance of co-
operation and coordination in maintaining the rules-based international order that
enables so much of our global prosperity and security. Our personnel regularly train
and operate alongside their foreign counterparts, test the interoperability of our sys-
tems, and build our collective readiness. Operational exercises, international port
calls, joint Marine force training, aviation training and other interactions all build
the personal contact that generates understanding and respect across national and
functional lines. Our personnel know that through their service they are front-line
diplomats for our nation, promoting through their professionalism and dedication
the connections that strengthen our collective security and cultivate shared ideals
that send the message that the United States is a partner worth having.
U.S. NAVY PRIORITIES

The President’s fiscal year 2021 budget request seeks nearly $160 billion for the
U.S. Navy, an investment that will continue the momentum built since the release
of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The competition articulated in the NDS
will continue for the foreseeable future and demands purposeful action over a long
time horizon. As a result, consistent, sustained, and predictable funding is critical
to ensure that taxpayer investments already made in the Navy are fully realized.
We are grateful for the predictable funding we have received in recent years.
We are proud of our intensely collaborative effort to deliver Integrated American
Naval Power to the people we are sworn to defend. This integration will sustain the
naval forces that our nation demands and our Joint Force expects. This integration
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will also place the United States in the best position to compete and win against
the pacing threats we face.
The guiding principle of the Navy’s portion of this budget request is to deliver de-
cisive naval power, blending readiness, lethality, and capacity together to create a
naval force that is agile and ready to fight today while also committing to the train-
ing, maintenance, and modernization to ensure the Navy can fight and win tomor-
row. This budget submission materially advances the efforts that fall under these
three objectives.
Readiness
The CNO’s initial guidance to the Navy stated, ‘‘Mission One for every Sailor is
a ready Navy...a Navy ready to fight today.’’ The Navy must be able to conduct
prompt and sustained combat at sea, but current readiness also supports the indis-
pensable roles the Navy performs on a daily basis: securing American commerce,
which is more heavily entwined with the seas than ever; telegraphing resolve; and
deterring conflict. These roles are enduring and timeless, but they are also deeply
connected to the priorities articulated in the NDS.
It is important to consider the historical context for this intense focus on readi-
ness. The readiness landscape today differs significantly from twenty years ago. In
2000, the Navy had 318 battle force ships. Today, we have 293 after growing from
a recent minimum of 271 battle force ships a few years ago. However, the number
of deployed ships across the timespan from 2000 to today remained roughly con-
stant. Today, we have 68 battle force ships deployed around the world. Sustaining
this level requires many more than that number to deploy each year.
These demands for naval forces have led us to forward deploy a greater proportion
of the force and significantly increase the length of rotational deployments. The ex-
tended deployment of the Abraham Lincoln is an example of this trend: her 294-
day deployment was the longest for an aircraft carrier since the mid-1970s. While
her extension was the best decision we could offer to support the demand for forces,
it does not come without consequences. When ships, aircraft, and submarines are
deployed longer, they require more maintenance to return to sea as ready as they
were before. Moreover, our statistics show that this relationship is sometimes non-
linear: ‘‘surge’’ deployments and heavier operational use can exponentially increase
the time and cost required to recapitalize these valuable assets.
Our approach to implementing the NDS has already led us to guard readiness
more carefully by ruthlessly prioritizing requests for forces. The growth of the Navy
over the past several years has also increased the denominator in the readiness
equation, relieving some pressure on the force.
Yet there is much more to do, and we are committed to finding and closing readi-
ness gaps. The American taxpayer and the Congress have generously funded ships,
submarines, and aircraft, and we owe it to the people we are sworn to protect and
defend to be good stewards of those investments.
We are committed to funding readiness at the maximum executable level. Presi-
dent’s Budget 2021 makes a strong commitment to current readiness, acknowl-
edging the sustained effort required to mitigate the effects of decades of intensive
use of our ships, aircraft, and submarines. The funding requested for individual ac-
counts such as Ship Depot Maintenance and Aircraft Depot Maintenance have in-
creased over fiscal year 2020 enacted levels, reflecting purposeful choices about
what we need to be ready today.
The Navy is already moving aggressively to ensure these funds are well spent.
No reform is too small. Our relentless pursuit of reform has already paid dividends:
our achievement of 80 percent mission-capable tactical aircraft this past year is one
example. Acknowledging the challenges in depot-level maintenance and moderniza-
tion, the CNO has directed Navy leaders to find the key levers of productivity that
will allow us to deliver depot-level availabilities on time and in full. Although there
is much to do, we are encouraged by the trends we are beginning to see. Our public
shipyard workload has led us to increase hiring, increasing public shipyard end
strength by 16 percent from 2013. We are working aggressively to improve esti-
mates of the length of time our platforms need to be in maintenance, level-load
depot-level maintenance across our network of industrial partners, better integrate
different maintenance organizations within the Navy, and utilize predictive ana-
lytics. In concert with continued discipline in guarding readiness, we believe that
we can deliver our platforms in maintenance on time and in full. We are also grate-
ful for the strong support we received from Congress in our enacted 2020 budget
for a pilot program for private contractor shipyard maintenance in the Pacific, and
request that this pilot continue. We value our close partnership with industry and
recognize that predictability on our part will help incentivize our partners to grow,
providing critical capacity to complement the work in our public shipyards.
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President’s Budget 2021 robustly funds ship and aircraft operations, another es-
sential element of readiness. As previously mentioned, it provides for 58 underway
days per quarter per ship and bolsters flying hours for our aircraft. This directly
contributes to readiness by allowing our sailors to train to complex, high-end naval
warfare scenarios at sea and creating the maritime expertise our nation expects.
While there is no replacement for operating at sea, the Navy is working rapidly to
integrate Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training into the mix. LVC training
allows units at all stages of force generation to maximize training for high-end war-
fare, and prevents the degradation of key warfighting competencies when platforms
are undergoing maintenance.
This budget request also recognizes the truth that we cannot neglect our shore
infrastructure in favor of future force structure or other priorities without an impact
to readiness. This year’s budget requests the largest amount of funds for Navy shore
infrastructure in the past four years, allowing us to create readiness at sea through
increased readiness ashore. Congressional support for this request will also help the
Navy meet its obligations to sailors and their families, increasing the quality of pub-
lic-private venture housing through increased oversight funded by approximately
$35 million each year of the FYDP, addressing perfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS)
contamination with $44 million requested for clean-up programs, and rebuilding
Navy facilities in the wake of recent natural disasters.
Readiness at sea also depends land-based training ranges, especially for aviators
and special warfare operators. These include the Navy’s training center in Fallon,
Nevada. Expansion of this range is critical to maintaining our readiness today as
newer weapons, released from distances much greater than those of just a few years
ago, require a larger safety zone around target areas. Expanding this range will
allow us to send our sailors into combat fully prepared, providing realistic training
and the skills they will need to win. We are committed to work with federal, state,
tribal, and local partners to do so in a way that addresses the concerns of all.
Finally, a ready Navy depends on our true asymmetric advantage: our people.
President’s Budget 2021 increases Active Duty manning to keep our human capital
synchronized with our force structure, raising our end strength by 7,300 sailors.
This reduces gaps and shortfalls at sea, directly contributing to readiness. Manning
ships, aircraft, and submarines at sea remains a top priority, and we will continue
to operate effectively and sustainably over time as the battle fleet grows. The budget
also sustains the suite of efforts under the Sailor 2025 initiative and continues to
transform our Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPT&E) system to
provide auditable, responsive services to our sailors and responsibly reduce costs. It
funds expanded educational efforts to obtain warfighting advantage. Recognizing
our ethical obligation to create a strong, positive environment for our sailors, as well
as the positive effect such an environment has on recruiting and retaining talent,
we are committed to eliminating destructive behaviors such as sexual assault. We
are focused on creating and sustaining a Culture of Excellence, where our sailors
do not merely avoid doing what is wrong, but actively pursue what is right. The
Culture of Excellence program also leverages predictive analytics to intervene before
destructive behaviors occur, breaking the cycle of simply responding to events.
We are witnessing very good trends in recruiting and retention. This has enabled
us to fill gapped billets at sea, reducing them from 6,500 in December 2018 to 4,900
in December 2019. We met our retention goals for all zones in 2019, retaining 76
percent of the force. We’re reforming our recruiting efforts, saving millions of dollars
by processing forms for new accessions using biometric signatures. Our recruiters
are exceeding their goals: 2019 saw the Navy sign the second-largest number of Ac-
tive Duty contracts, 40,756 new accessions, in the last 15 years. In an environment
with low unemployment levels, these statistics are encouraging and demonstrate the
America’s young people see great value in joining the Navy team.
Lethality
Deterring our competitors from malign activity requires fielding a forward-de-
ployed, lethal naval force. Our competitors are heavily investing in technologies
aimed at our naval forces. Across the Navy’s Total Obligation Authority (TOA), the
capability investments directly enhancing current and future lethality comprise ap-
proximately 21 percent of the Navy’s annual budget. This investment can be further
sub-divided into future capability (∼11 percent) and modernization (∼10 percent).
Relative to the entire Navy budget, the value proposition of our modernization in-
vestments are often overlooked when compared with resources applied to major ship
and aircraft procurement accounts. Each dollar is thoughtfully applied to specific
key capabilities based upon a rigorous analysis of iterative wargames, exercises, and
experimentation. Offensive and defensive modernization efforts enable our ships and
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aircraft to operate in the face of today’s advanced anti-ship and anti-aircraft sys-
tems.
In particular, we increased our investments in directed energy and hypersonic
weapons. In terms of directed energy, we request to apply $170.3 million in fiscal
year 2021 to our directed energy programs, which will rapidly advance our ship’s
defensive capabilities. In terms of hypersonics, we request to increase our invest-
ments from $642 million in fiscal year 2020 to $1.4 billion. President’s Budget 2021
continues our focus on developing long-range, offensive fires launched from ships,
submarines, and aircraft, including: Conventional Prompt Strike, the Maritime
Strike Tomahawk, Joint Standoff Weapon Extended Range (JSOW–ER), the Long-
Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and the Standard Missile—(SM-) 6. We are mov-
ing quickly to extend the range of the carrier air wing with the rapid development
of the MQ–25, the Navy’s first unmanned carrier based aircraft. MQ–25 does more
than extending our reach; it lays the foundation for integrating unmanned air power
into our carrier fleet. The combined effects of these modernization efforts extends
the lethal strike range of the CVW into denied areas while enabling the CVN to
operate outside the threat ranges of adversary anti-ship missile threats.
The fiscal year 2021 budget builds on the progress made in fiscal year 2020 to
pursue a networked fleet by investing $82 million ($395 million across the FYDP)
in artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies that improve decision
quality and speed in combat. This networked fleet requires a resilient operational
architecture to integrate our command and control, sensors, shooters, and weapons.
To accomplish this, we will leverage our work on the Navy Tactical Grid to build
the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) alongside our Joint team-
mates. Protecting our networked forces requires building cyber resilience and secu-
rity into our platforms from the beginning. To meet this need, the Navy will fund
$4.17 billion across the FYDP to protect our operations, equipment, and industrial
base from intrusions and ensure we have the means to fight through and recover
from cyber-attacks. Meanwhile, we will integrate our cyber forces more closely with
fleet operations to deliver catastrophic cyber effects as part of an integrated all-do-
main naval force.
These investments all support a highly maneuverable fleet that controls the high-
end fight. Nuclear powered aircraft carriers remain crucial to this effort and the
Carrier Strike Group remains the cornerstone of the Navy’s forward presence, sea
control, and power projection capabilities. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
(CVN), associated air wing (CVW), surface combatants, and sub-surface combatants
represent the most survivable and lethal maritime fighting force in the world, pro-
viding long-range kinetic and non-kinetic effects from distributed mobile platforms
at sea without the need for foreign basing rights. The CVN and embarked CVW are
vital to the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) operating concept, providing
the flexibility and endurance to hold large swaths of land or sea at risk for extended
periods of time. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) represents a generational leap in the air-
craft carrier’s capacity to project power on a global scale. Ford-class carriers are de-
signed to generate a 30 percent higher sortie rate with a 20 percent smaller crew
than a Nimitz-class carrier. This translates to $4 billion savings over the life of the
program generating more decisive naval power. With the successful completion of
CVN 78’s Post Shakedown Availability and subsequent Independent Steaming
Events, finishing our work and delivering this capability to the fleet as quickly and
effectively as possible is one of DON’s highest priorities. The Navy has learned with
each test and is consistently bringing each of the innovative systems online. Ford
is currently undergoing final air compatibility testing, bringing the entire carrier air
wing onboard and progressing towards her maiden deployment. We will continue to
learn, iterate and improve, driving down cost on each subsequent ship of her class.
We are grateful for the Committee’s support of the program with the historic two-
carrier award for CVN 80 and CVN 81 and are confident that the Ford-class will
provide the foundation for highly maneuverable and lethal combat power projection
well into the second half of this century.
Our naval logistics enterprise undergirds the effective employment of our forces
in a dispersed, forward-deployed manner across the spectrum of conflict from daily
operations into sustained major combat operations. Our logistics forces must provide
forward-deployed repair and resupply as well as combat medical services to revive
our forces on station. In addition, we will begin designing two new vessels, the Next
Generation Medium Amphibious Ship and the Next Generation Medium Logistics
Ship that will support our expeditionary forces operating in contested maritime
spaces.
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CAPACITY

To increase America’s naval power, we will continue to build more ships, sub-
marines, and aircraft. There has been a long-standing consensus across the govern-
ment that the Navy needs to grow. We are focused on responsible growth, a rate
of growth that ensures our ability to effectively maintain the fleet and to properly
man, train, and equip that fleet.
We appreciate the strong support from Congress for naval shipbuilding, funding
last year’s request for 12 ships. We reaffirm our commitment to reach the 355-ship
goal in a reasonable and strategically relevant timeline, and to augment a future
355-ship Navy with developmental and unmanned vessels. The pace of growth will
depend on both our ability to find savings within our own topline. While this budget
request slows the growth to 355 slightly to ensure we properly maintain the fleet
we have, we are seeking ways to support increased rates of growth in the coming
years. The challenges extend beyond the shipbuilding accounts, as we must also con-
sider what increases in operations and maintenance accounts will be required to
continue the momentum we have built in regaining readiness. We cannot, and will
not build a hollow force simply to reach the 355 ship number. Because of the rate
of change in technology, we will continue to refine the required number of ships in
an iterative fashion, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, and as informed
by wargaming and experimentation.
The fiscal year 2021 budget requests $21 billion in ship construction for 8 battle
force ships and plans to build 44 battle force ships (plus 17 unmanned ships) over
the FYDP. This procurement includes one Columbia and one Virginia-class sub-
marine each, two Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer, one Guided Missile Frigate,
one LPD Flight II, and two Towing, Salvage, and Rescue ships.
Deterring a nuclear attack on the homeland remains the Navy’s most sacred duty
and our number one acquisition priority. President’s Budget 2021 fully funds the
first year of construction of the lead ship of the Columbia-class ballistic missile sub-
marine. Over the FYDP, we plan to start construction on the second ship of the
class in fiscal year 2024 and, beyond the FYDP, to begin serial production in fiscal
year 2026. The Columbia-class guarantees the most survivable leg of the nuclear
triad remains on patrol into the 2080s, ensuring the secure second-strike capability
that is the foundation of strategic deterrence.
This budget request also supports one additional Virginia-class submarine in fis-
cal year 2021, continuing the Block V multiyear contract awarded in December
2019, which will then procure two per year from fiscal year 2022 through the FYDP.
Additionally, the Guided Missile Frigate [FFG(X)] program is proceeding well, and
will provide the fleet with a lethal small surface combatant that is optimized to-
wards distributed maritime operations. The Navy plans to award the lead ship of
the class in July 2020 and the second ship of the class in fiscal year 2021.
We are committed to experimenting with unmanned systems, moving them be-
yond their current conceptual stage, and continuously assessing how they should be
counted within the battle force. While we do not count unmanned ships at present,
we will continue to procure our large unmanned surface vessel, buying 10 over the
FYDP. These ships are envisioned to host both sensors and weapons. This procure-
ment will transition to SCN funding by fiscal year 2023. We will also procure 6
extra-large unmanned undersea vehicles in the FYDP which will help provide solu-
tions for specific fleet needs.
This budget also procures 277 fixed and rotary wing aircraft (including 121 F–
35C) and 25 unmanned aircraft across the FYDP. We are completing the acquisition
of several type/model/series aircraft and continuing to purchase essential capabili-
ties, such as the advanced early warning provided by the E–2D Advanced Hawkeye
and a new, flexible logistics capability in the CMV–22 Osprey.
We in the Navy are honored to defend American prosperity and American values
around the world every day. We are excited to be working closely with the Marine
Corps to deliver Integrated American Naval Power to perform these critical and
timeless roles. We are conscious that every tax dollar spent to increase readiness,
lethality, and capacity represents more than buying power, but the trust and con-
fidence of the American people. We do not take that trust lightly and will seek every
means to spend those dollars in a deliberate, methodical, and responsible fashion,
maximizing naval power to the fullest extent that those funds enable. Thank you
for your strong support and continued partnership in providing and maintaining a
Navy.
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U.S. MARINE CORPS PRIORITIES

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and distinguished members of the Committee,
this statement is my first report to Congress and represents my assessment of the
current state of the Marine Corps and priorities for the future.
The future operating environment will place heavy demands on our Nation’s
Naval Services, demands that the Marine Corps is not currently organized, trained,
equipped, or postured to meet. Modernizing the Marine Corps for the era of great
power competition will require significant adjustments to long-term Service invest-
ments, new integrated naval warfighting organizations and concepts of employment,
and better training and education for marines; changes that only Congress can help
us realize. The fiscal year 2021 budget puts the Marine Corps on the path toward
modernization, supports irreversible implementation of the National Defense Strat-
egy (NDS), and sustains and builds our readiness to deter, fight, and win.
My top priority as Commandant is to build the Marine Corps that will define inte-
grated American naval power in 2030, even as it must remain ready to confront the
challenges of today. I seek no additional resources for this effort. It is attainable
with a stable budget and sustained by the leadership and oversight of Congress.
Service modernization will require several years of dedicated analysis, wargaming,
and experimentation on a level that we have not experienced in recent memory. We
are committed to this effort and have already begun charting a new course. The Ma-
rine Corps is grateful to the Congress for its leadership and support during previous
periods of modernization and seeks its continued support today.
Before addressing the issues of force design, readiness, resourcing, and the latest
fiscal year 2021 budget submission, it is important that I start with a few comments
on our individual marines and the health of the Corps. I strongly believe that every-
thing we do begins and ends with the individual marine—the heart and soul of our
institution. On any given day, the vast majority of your 225,000 marines, rep-
resenting every state and territory, serve honorably and perform their duties at
home and abroad in an exemplary manner. I am extremely proud to serve alongside
them, and based on my discussions with members of this Committee, I know that
my pride in them is shared. Regrettably, as several high profile incidents have re-
vealed over the past several years, not all within your Marine Corps consistently
adhere to our rigid standards, satisfy my expectations for professional behavior, or
fulfill their obligations as marines. Addressing the corrosive effects of misconduct
and criminality by this small yet destructive minority is a top priority, and I offer
the following observations:
The presence of the malignant individuals and sub-cultures within the institution
produces a well-known and well-documented pattern of misogyny. A 2018 publicized
report commissioned by my predecessor clearly supports these observations as facts.
I have begun the process of exposing and eliminating these malignant subcultures
from our ranks and will seek Congress’ continued assistance to that end.
Eradicating sexual harassment and sexual assault remains a challenge across the
military and the Marine Corps. I acknowledge what many of you already suspect
or know—after many years of trying, and despite our best efforts and intentions,
remedial actions taken to date have not caused the desired outcomes. I seek to ad-
dress this problem head on.
There are some within our ranks who remain hesitant to accept gender-integrated
training at our enlisted recruit depots. I would remind those marines that the Corps
has conducted gender integrated training at Officer Candidates School for more
than two decades, with outstanding results. I have every reason to believe that we
can replicate that model in our enlisted recruit depots, and have already begun mov-
ing forward expeditiously, with the continued support of Congress. I understand the
direction and the effort the Marine Corps must take to comply with the specified
timelines for both MCRD Parris Island and MCRD San Diego in the 2020 NDAA
that will meet the intent of Congress and the needs of the Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps is a warfighting organization. We exist for that one purpose;
to fight and to win. All that we do is standards-based in order to produce a premier
expeditionary warfighting force for the Nation. In some occupational specialties
within our Corps, there are legitimate operationally-derived physical requirements
that every marine must meet. marines who meet these standards, regardless of bio-
logical sex or gender, will face no artificial barriers to their service or advancement.
Appropriately addressing all of these issues becomes even more paramount as we
design a future Marine Corps that is optimized to meet the challenges of 2030 and
beyond. As we consider the skills, education, and capabilities required of the next
generation of marines, we must be able to recruit and sustain a force that draws
from 100 percent of our Nation’s collective reservoir of talent, innovation, creativity,
and patriotism. I take it as a personal responsibility to do everything within my au-
415
thority to ensure that the Marine Corps does not create any artificial barriers to
service or advancement.
Force Design is my top priority as stated in my Commandant’s Planning Guid-
ance. Over the next 3 to 5 months, we will continue to refine and deepen the analyt-
ical depth of our initial planning through an iterative process of wargaming, anal-
ysis, and experimentation. That work will directly support the redesign of our
Corps. Our collective Fleet Marine Forces, as well as our HQMC organization and
many of its processes, to include the existing Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
and Execution (PPBE) process, require a comprehensive overhaul to create the nec-
essary level of naval integration across the Department. Naval integration with the
CNO’s Staff, with the fleets, and within the Department remains a top priority for
me, the CNO, and the Secretary.
Thanks to your continued support, your Marine Corps remains the Nation’s most
ready force. We have made forces available for deployment to meet combatant com-
mander requests around the globe, often on short notice. Those deployed Marine
Units reinforce our commitment to U.S. allies and partners and serve to uphold the
international rules-based order. Wherever deployed globally, your naval expedi-
tionary forces facilitate conventional deterrence, prevent fait accompli scenarios
from developing, and successfully compete against malign maritime gray zone activi-
ties to assure our allies and partners of our continued commitment. This will not
change.
With your support, over the previous two years we have been able to satisfy in-
creased global force management demands, including those made on our legacy
fixed-wing aircraft squadrons.
However, we should be careful not to confuse availability with operational suit-
ability. Readiness must be more than a mere measure of availability. True readi-
ness, which we define as the readiness of a unit to be employed against a peer
threat to achieve decisive tactical and operational outcomes, requires investment in
modern capabilities commensurate with those of the threat. This will require a sig-
nificant shift from our most recent fiscal year 2021 budget submission. I would also
respectfully submit that it may require a reassessment of our existing processes and
metrics for assessing unit readiness—true readiness as described above. Within the
Marine Corps, I am sustaining and reinforcing initiatives started by my prede-
cessors that will increase the realism of pre-deployment training to more closely
align with scenarios identified in the NDS. In addition, following a path that I read-
ily acknowledge has been charted over the course of decades by the Army, we have
added an extensive program of force-on-force training to our long-standing live-fire
combined arms training exercise program.
With these goals in mind, over the coming months, we will make significant
changes to the organization of our Training and Education Command, which will
require the support and consent of civilian leadership for full implementation. Addi-
tionally, it is not lost upon me that our desert training facilities, superbly adapted
as they have been to preparing for the challenges of the last three decades, are less
than ideal for the kind of integrated naval training and experimentation that we
need to prepare for great power competition in contested littoral environments.
Identifying and developing first class littoral training areas will be one of my prior-
ities going forward, for which I will ask your guidance and support.
Regarding this fiscal year 2021 budget submission, I am well aware that our
budget requests since the release of the NDS two years ago have changed only mar-
ginally year-to-year. While the cumulative impact of those marginal changes is in
some cases substantial, many were budgetary actions that merely shifted funding
within existing programs. This is not the kind of substantive change now needed,
nor will it result in the premier naval expeditionary force required to implement the
NDS and realize our evolving naval and joint concepts. In fact, our major programs
of record prior to the formulation and release of the NDS—F–35, CH–53K, MV–22,
ACV, and JLTV—have actually grown. As I stated in my Commandant’s Planning
Guidance, these and other programs—all of which were constructed to support a
long-standing but now obsolescent conception of large-scale amphibious forcible
entry—require a critical review. I expect that review will likely recommend major
revisions and reductions to some of our major programs. We must then reinvest
those resources into capabilities more relevant to the future security and
warfighting environment, many of which we are developing but have yet to procure.
This necessary divestment and subsequent reinvestment process is a complex ef-
fort, and one that prudence dictates be conducted in the most thoughtful and analyt-
ically defensible manner possible. While it may be shocking to some for a Service
Chief to openly criticize existing programs and priorities, our shift to the future is
in no way an indictment of previous decisions or conclusions of those who once sat
at this table or of any who provided oversight in the past. The simple fact that the
416
strategic environment has changed significantly and that we are now in an era of
great power competition, mandates that we must make the necessary adjustments
to our naval warfighting concepts and accompanying investment plans to create true
readiness—operationally relevant and available naval forces that create overmatch
over anticipated adversaries. I understand there are both structural impediments to
change as well as strong interests resisting change; however, as I stated during my
confirmation—I will always provide my best military advice and ultimately defer to
and support the decisions of the civilian leadership within the Department and Con-
gress.
The timing of this fiscal year 2021 budget submission coincides with an inflection
point for the Marine Corps. Subsequent annual submissions will reflect that signifi-
cant change in focus, and indeed I anticipate there will be opportunities even during
the execution of the fiscal year 2020 budget to make in-stride adjustments with the
consent and support of Congress. Simply put, with peer competitors striving to sup-
plant the role of U.S. military forces regionally and globally, we cannot afford to
delay modernization when we see opportunities to make prudent adjustments from
prior plans. If we are to avoid being outpaced, agility in reprogramming becomes
an essential tool to apply where it makes sense to do so.
This budget also supports our assertion that marine forces—operating as part of
an integrated naval force—must seamlessly integrate into and play a complemen-
tary role within a larger joint force. Over the next few years, we must strive to re-
duce duplication of warfighting capabilities to only those areas that make sense
tactically and operationally. Marine Corps contributions should largely be unique,
complementary, and tailorable to the joint mission.
Beyond the issues germane to my role as Commandant of the Marine Corps—to
organize, train, and equip Marine Corps forces in support of the fleets and combat-
ant commanders—I offer the following observations as a senior naval officer and
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Today’s environment of renewed great power competition demands a truly inte-
grated naval force; we no longer enjoy the luxuries of internal Service focus and in-
efficiency that the ‘‘unipolar moment’’ allowed. The imperative now to accelerate
naval integration is driven not by historical example nor traditional bonds between
our naval Services—it is driven by the global environment described in the National
Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Our ability to operate as an inte-
grated naval expeditionary force within contested areas provides the joint force with
an asymmetric advantage, an edge that we must preserve and strengthen in this
era of great power competition.
We need adequate numbers of naval platforms and surface combatants with the
lethality to contribute to sea control and sea denial and appropriate defensive capa-
bilities and sensors to operate in a distributed manner without imposing undue bur-
dens on other platforms. Those platforms must also be affordable from both a pro-
curement and sustainment perspective, as well as generate the kind of availability
needed to meet future force generation requirements. Included in that future fleet
must be adequate numbers of traditional amphibious ships as well as next genera-
tion amphibious ships that will enable the Fleet Commanders to employ the naval
expeditionary force throughout a contested littoral area in a more distributed, le-
thal, and defensible manner.
While our aspirations and expectations are great, I am certain that Congress ex-
pects nothing less from the Marine Corps. With your continued leadership and sup-
port, we will achieve our shared goals and modernize our warfighting capabilities
and culture to best support the Navy, the Joint Force, and the Nation.
CLOSING STATEMENT

On behalf of our entire integrated naval force and every sailor, marine and civil-
ian in the Department of the Navy, the three of us would like to once again thank
the leadership and membership of this Committee for your attention, interest, and
ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. We are also grateful to the
Committee for the recent passage of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Author-
ization Act (NDAA). By passing this legislation you have enabled many of the prior-
ities identified within this document, and you’ve sent a strong signal of support to
our people—and a stern warning to our adversaries.
We also appreciate the funding stability and predictability of the past several
years. This has given our force the agility and flexibility necessary to address
emerging threats and the needs of our integrated naval force, while shifting away
from less beneficial and relevant spending. This stability has saved money for the
American taxpayer. We owe it to them to ensure that every single dollar is invested
in the most effective manner possible to fulfill our sacred oath.
417
We urge the Committee to do everything possible to ensure continued funding sta-
bility so that we may implement the needed reforms and spending priorities dis-
cussed in this document to meet the great power challenge, protect the maritime
commons, and stand in defense of the United States of America. On behalf of the
world’s finest marines and sailors, we thank you for your time and ongoing efforts,
and we look forward to your questions.
Chairman INHOFE. Well, thank you, Admiral.
Secretary Modly, I probably should have started with you, but
you are recognized now.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS B. MODLY, ACTING SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY
Secretary MODLY. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, dis-
tinguished members of this Committee, thank you for your bipar-
tisan efforts on behalf of the sailors, marines, and civilians of the
Department of the Navy.
It is an honor to be here today with Admiral Gilday and General
Berger, both of whom have demonstrated a great commitment to
each other and to each other’s respective naval service as they
worked collaboratively over the last several months to lead our in-
tegrated American naval force. Consistent with that spirit, we have
taken a different approach to the written testimony this year by
submitting one unified document instead of three separate docu-
ments, which you have seen.
Staying ahead in today’s rapidly changing global strategic envi-
ronment demands that our naval forces commit to unified plan-
ning, clear-eyed assessments, and sometimes some very, very hard
choices. In this process, we must harmonize competing priorities,
sustain our critical industrial base, and not allow our maritime
competitive advantage to erode relative to global competitors and,
more accurately stated, aggressive adversaries who wish to hasten
our decline as a global force for liberty and for decency.
In the end, this budget submission is a manifestation of the hard
choices we had to make this year, but it is centrally about the safe-
ty, security, and wellbeing of our sailors, marines, and their fami-
lies. Ultimately I ask that you recognize that in this submission,
we could not make trades that put our sailors and marines on plat-
forms with equipment that are not ready for a fight, if a fight is
what is going to be required of them.
While this budget slows our trajectory to a force of 355 or more
ships, it does not arrest that trajectory. You have my personal as-
surance that we are still deeply committed to building that larger,
more capable, more distributed naval force within the strategically
relevant time frame of no more than 10 years. I look forward to
working with this Committee and the entire Congress in the com-
ing months as we develop some realistic plans to do that.
Our budget also demonstrates a clear commitment to the edu-
cation of our people as we implement the recommendations of the
Education for Seapower Study that I led as the Under Secretary
of the Navy for the last 2 years. We are establishing a naval com-
munity college for our enlisted personnel as part of a bold and uni-
fied naval education strategy that recognizes that the intellectual
and ethical development of our people is critical to our success as
a naval force.
418

We are also stepping up our efforts to meet our solemn commit-
ment to our military families through significantly more engaged
oversight and accountability of our public-private venture housing
program.
Finally, I would like this Committee to understand that as lead-
ers of the Department of the Navy, we are both vocal and united
in our determination to prevent sexual assault and sexual harass-
ment throughout our force. Every sailor, marine, and Navy civilian
deserve individual respect, dignity, and protection from this great
naval institution. We have some work to do in this regard, but you
have my personal commitment that we take it very, very seriously.
We are grateful to the Congress for passing this year’s NDAA
which enables many of the priorities identified within this docu-
ment. In passing this legislation, you have sent a strong signal of
support to our people and a very, very stern warning to our adver-
saries.
We also appreciate the funding stability and the predictability of
the last several years. This has saved money for the American tax-
payer and given our force the agility and flexibility to address
emerging threats while investing in our integrated naval force.
We urge the Committee to do what it can to continue the sta-
bility so that we can implement the reforms and investments re-
quired to meet great power challenges, protect the maritime com-
mons, and defend the United States of America.
Thank you for your time, and we look forward to your questions.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Berger?
GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS
General BERGER. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed, dis-
tinguished members of this Committee, I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to testify on the posture of your Marine Corps and our prior-
ities for the future. I am joined by the Sergeant Major of the Ma-
rine Corps behind me, Sergeant Major Black, and my wife Donna.
I will start by echoing Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday’s
thanks for timely funding, as well as your enduring commitment
to the marines, sailors, and families through efforts like the hurri-
cane recovery, which you authorized, provided for last year, and
your revisions and oversight to our work on the public-private ven-
ture housing program which the Secretary mentioned. Your bipar-
tisan support is critical to ensure that we continue to prioritize
people as our greatest resource.
Thanks to predictable funding over the last few years, the Ma-
rine Corps has made significant progress restoring both availability
and readiness. We are now at an inflexion point. We have to pivot
now toward modernization while sustaining the readiness that this
Committee has worked hard to authorize and resource. This pivot
in my opinion cannot wait until next year or the following. We
must move now or risk overmatch in the future by an adversary,
and that is a risk we will not take.
As the National Defense Strategy directs and Secretary Modly
recently emphasized in his first vector to all hands, we have to pur-
sue urgent change at a significant scale. Marines have always
419

sensed when it is time to move out smartly. We do not hesitate.
This is that time.
Realizing the bold direction of our strategic guidance requires ac-
knowledging that there are fundamental changes in the operating
environment and how we must organize, train, and equip the force.
I am confident that most leaders recognize that significant change
is required, yet the scope and the pace of that change is seemingly
at odds with some historical resource allocations and some of our
major acquisition programs which predate the National Defense
Strategy.
This budget submission marks the beginning of a focused effort
to better align resources that you provide with strategic objectives.
Our future budget submissions will build on those investments
with informed recommendations for force design, modifications, and
adjustments to our programs of record. Together in partnership
with my battle buddy, Admiral Gilday, and under the direction of
Secretary Modly, we are committed to delivering the integrated
naval fleet marine forces your nation requires.
As always, I welcome the opportunity to discuss our findings
along the way, and we will keep each of you and your staffs in-
formed as we progress. As always, we will be frugal with the re-
sources we are given. We will ask for no more than we need. With
Congress’ commitment and support, we will ensure that your ma-
rines continue to have every advantage when we send them into
harm’s way.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, General.
I was going to start off talking about the fact that we do not have
the 30-year shipbuilding plan. I am sure somebody will do that.
There are two things that I wanted to get to, though, and one obvi-
ously is—it would not be unexpected—the USS Gerald Ford. I
think most of us around this table here have been down there,
have walked it, understand it, but we are also fully aware that that
ship—the original plan to deliver the ship was September of 2015.
The ship was going to be delivered fully capable at the cost of $10.5
billion. Now the projected full delivery of the ship would be April
of 2021, the cost being at $13.2 billion.
Secretary Modly, today is your lucky day. You get to make the
next prediction. I would like to have you kind of share with us
where you think it is right now. It is my understanding that a lot
of the things—it is not just the elevators—we talk about those—
but also the catapults, arresting gear, the radar, and I understand
now that the non-skid situation is taken care of from visiting with
you in my office. But kind of go over where we are today, what
your predictions are, and when this is going to happen.
Secretary MODLY. Senator, I appreciate the opportunity to talk
about the Ford. I think the history that you laid out about the Ford
is not a good history, and it is one that we should never allow to
happen again. It is not the way that we should be delivering ships
to the U.S. Navy.
That being said, we are where we are with that ship. One of the
first things I did as the Acting Secretary was to basically put the
fleet on notice that it is all hands on deck to make that ship ready
for sea and ready for a fight, if that is what we needed to do.
420

So, we have taken several proactive steps over the last several
months to get that ship ready. A lot of this work was going on al-
ready, but one of the main things we did is we moved the two-star
admiral who is responsible for the PEO for all carriers. We moved
him to Norfolk to basically be there. It is symbolic but it is more
than symbolic. It requires a lot of attention to detail on many of
the things that were lacking on the ship.
I have been down there twice since I have been the Acting Sec-
retary, once as a surprise on my second day just to see what it is
like, and I did not want any admirals there with me. I walked
around, talked to the crew, got a good sense for where the ship
was. I also rode the ship in after their last short deployment where
they went out and did aircraft compatibility testing.
It has been night and day for me in terms of my perspective and
my perception of what is happening with that ship. They have
made substantial progress on the elevators. The elevators that are
working and certified—I think there are four of those. They have
done thousands and thousands of cycles with those with no prob-
lems. They launched close to a thousand aircraft and recovered
them with no problems on the EMALS [electromagnetic aircraft
launch system] either—so significant progress.
The most encouraging thing to me walking around that ship is
talking to the crew. The crew loves the ship. The way the crew and
how their jobs have changed, several of them coming from the Nim-
itz-class carrier to this carrier—it has completely changed the way
they do their work.
Chairman INHOFE. I understand that, and I also talked to the
crew. Those are their feelings exactly.
I wanted to get one more thing in in my time here. In a recent
interview, you stated, quote, I do not know if we are going to buy
any of the Ford-class after the CVN 81, which would be the fourth
one. We are certainly thinking about the possibility of other class-
es. Can you elaborate on that statement?
Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir. I think we have a duty to look at
what will come after the Ford. The fact that we made a two-carrier
buy for the last two, it gives us some breathing room. It gives us
a few years before we would have to award the next one, which
would be in the 2027–2028 time frame.
Chairman INHOFE. Okay. That answers the question.
General Berger, on the CH–53K, which would be replacing the
CH–53E, we are familiar with the cost of this thing and some of
the overruns. I would kind of like to get an update in this brief pe-
riod of time from you as to where we are, why it is really nec-
essary, and just give us your opinion on that.
General BERGER. Thank you, sir.
The requirement for a heavy lift helicopter remains valid, in fact
probably more valid in the adversaries, the competitors that we
need to face and where you want your forward marines. You have
to have the ability to move that force around and its sustainment
from ship to shore or shore to shore or back to ship again. We have
a valid requirement.
A year ago, the 53–K was in a different spot. We had both tech-
nical, as you know, engineering problems and cost problems. Today
we are in a much better place engineering-wise, technologically. It
421

looks like the 53–E on the outside, but like you know, you pop the
hood, it is a completely different aircraft. Everything from the ex-
haust, gas recirculation, to the other 100-plus engineering chal-
lenges, we have either solved or Sikorsky has a solid path forward.
So I am very confident that the aircraft is on the right trajectory.
Now it is function of cost, as you pointed out, sir, both procurement
and the cost to operate——
Chairman INHOFE. Why does it cost more than an F–35?
General BERGER. Pardon me, sir?
Chairman INHOFE. Never mind. No, I was making a comment
that it costs more than an F–35. When you are talking to the gen-
eral public, they do not know much about your—they know about
the F–35. Go ahead. So why does it cost more than an F–35?
General BERGER. It is a brand-new fly-by-wire aircraft.
Chairman INHOFE. Very good. Thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I indicated in my opening comments, the Navy is critically
short of attack submarines, 15 below the goal established pre-
viously and accepted by the Navy, and 14 destroyers below that ob-
jective.
Admiral Gilday, is there any chance that this demand will lessen
over time or increase?
Admiral GILDAY. Senator, given the pace of the Chinese right
now, I do not think that that threat is going to subside.
I also think, particularly in the undersea, we have an advantage,
a significant advantage, and so we want to maintain that over-
match. We do not want to take our foot off the pedal.
Senator REED. No. I appreciate that.
I think also to, with respect to Russia, their sophistication under-
sea is another challenge. It is not just simply numbers. It is also
more sophisticated vessels. Is that correct?
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir, much more sophisticated. As you know,
the capabilities that we are putting into the Virginia-class, the
block 4’s and the block 5’s, are significant. They are a significant
leap forward for the United States. Our intention is to continue to
press with that technology and improve it.
Senator REED. Now, on the block 5 buy, there was a 9-ship com-
mitment, plus an optional ship. One of the concerns I have is the
window for this option will close very quickly and that this might
be the best year to exercise the option. Can you comment on that?
Because I see pressure not only in the construction of the addi-
tional block 5 vessels but from all we have talked about here be-
fore, the aircraft carriers, everything else, destroyers. This might
be the best year. Is that right?
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. I believe so.
In terms of the workforce, I was just up in Groton at Electric
Boat a week or so ago, and I left that shipyard confident about the
capability of that yard to produce boats at the rate of two a year.
They are planning for the significant increase of the work when the
Columbia build begins in earnest. But that is a passionate, well-
trained workforce up there, and I think that they can handle two
boats a year based on what I have seen.
Senator REED. Thank you very much, Admiral.
422

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Gilday, the chairman alluded to this
issue, but we are still awaiting these two significant reports, the
Force Structure Assessment and also the shipbuilding plan. Based
on Secretary Esper’s testimony yesterday, I believe it is at his desk
literally. We are waiting for that, and when will we get it?
Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir. I am very anxious to get over here
and talk that through with the Committee. Secretary Esper wanted
a little more time to digest it. It is informed by the 2021 budget
but also by the integrated Force Structure Assessment that Admi-
ral Gilday and General Berger put together, and I think he just
wanted more time to understand it. We will bring it over here as
soon as he feels that he is ready to do that.
Senator REED. I think the Committee encouraged him to take
adequate time but not a lot of time. So we hope that will be the
case.
General Berger, you have programs with the Army with respect
to the JLTV, the joint light tactical vehicle. The Army is making
some changes in the program. Are you adjusting to them, or how
are you adjusting to them I should ask.
General BERGER. Senator, I am aware of the adjustments that
they are making. We have not made any changes yet to our pro-
curement, and if we did, it would be based on the Marine Corps’
needs. But we are absolutely tracking the changes, the adjustments
that they are making. So far, sir, I have seen it down in North
Carolina where my son is. It is a phenomenal vehicle.
Senator REED. I have had the chance to look at it at the facility,
and it is much more significantly—well, it is a good vehicle. I will
stop right there.
Secretary Modly, the Committee in the last few years has created
the National Sea-based Deterrence Fund because we understand
the industrial base is significant, and there are problems with the
industrial base for every type of platform. We think that by going
into the industrial base through the prime contractors not only can
we increase quality, protect from cyber intrusion, but also generate
savings from doing the work right the first time.
Can you just briefly comment? I do not have much time.
Secretary MODLY. Senator, I agree. We have had some
vulnerabilities in the supply chain across the entire Navy. It is a
vulnerability that our adversaries have figured out, that is easy for
them to get in, and they can piece information together, and they
get a bigger picture even when a supplier may think that small
piece of information is not relevant. So we are investing heavily in
this. We are developing new strategies for how we do this, how per-
haps we develop capabilities to perhaps create cloud areas for them
that are secure. But it is a big concern of ours and we are address-
ing it.
Senator REED. In addition to that, it is a simple fact that quality
construction at the sub prevents rework at the prime.
Secretary MODLY. Absolutely.
Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Wicker?
Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.
I appreciate the service of all three of you. I know you have had
to deal with a budget number that you did not arrive at yourselves,
423

and I appreciate you doing that difficult task. We hope we can use
our power of the purse here in this Committee and in the Congress
to help you out on that.
I think Ranking Member Reed expressed, with regard to the 30-
year shipbuilding plan, the sentiment of most people on this Com-
mittee that the Secretary should take enough time but not too
much time. So I want to subscribe my views to what he said about
that.
Admiral Gilday, with regard to the submarines, let me make
sure. You said that the threat will not diminish. Actually the
threat is increasing, and you nodded. But that is correct. Right?
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. I agree.
Senator WICKER. That is not only with regard to the specific
question, Admiral, that Senator Reed asked about submarines, but
it is actually across the entire fleet. Is that correct?
Admiral GILDAY. I would agree with that as well, sir.
Senator WICKER. All right. Thank you very, very much.
I appreciate the fact that the NDAA tasked the Navy last year
to review alternative acquisition strategies. The Navy came back
with a report that said significant savings could be achieved by
procuring various combinations of amphibious ships.
So let me ask you, Secretary Modly, and General Berger about
these findings, particularly as they are related to the three LPDs
and the LHA–9. Can you speak to the timeline for awarding the
funding of these ships and what are the benefits of procuring these
four ships together? Let me just get all my questions out there, and
we will see what we can do in less than 3 minutes.
What are the specific capabilities and what is the specific impor-
tance, General Berger, of the amphibious ships that I mentioned?
General BERGER. Sir, the amphibious ships capabilities-wise in
the past, pretty conventional view of what they did in terms of the
Navy, the force projecting the marines ashore. The way that we are
going to need to operate in the future, even more challenging, and
the role of the amphibious ship I think goes up. Why? Because in
order to operate a force inside a contested area, at the unclass
level, inside there, you have got to have the mobility and you need
the ability to sustain that force for a long period of time in austere
conditions and move that force around. Amphibious ships—people
have spoke of them as sort of the Swiss Army knife. They are be-
cause you can move a force from the air, on the water. You got
multiple means to do the job. So I think their value to the naval
force and their value to the joint force goes up in the future.
Secretary MODLY. With respect to business considerations, Sen-
ator, we are looking at all types of options to be able to bundle our
buys of ships in order to drive down the costs, provide more sta-
bility to the industrial base and that supplier base, which extends
far beyond just the shipyards that are doing the primary construc-
tion. So I talked to Secretary Geurts about this this morning about
how we might be doing this particularly in the amphib area, and
we are going to be thinking about that and developing some plans
to do that.
Senator WICKER. Specifically the United States currently has
four DDGs based in Rota, Spain. These platforms provide an ad-
vanced multi-mission defense capability. I think we are getting the
424

right testimony with regard to the need there. Do we need the two
additional DDGs in Rota, Spain? And tell us about the plans to ac-
complish that.
Admiral GILDAY. Senator, we support the two additional DDGs
to Spain. Right now, we are working with United States European
Command. They are putting together their strategic lay-down of
the theater. So, when that is complete, you will be briefed up here
in the Congress, and then in parallel, we will be moving through
the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense coordinating with the Department of State and
then finally the Government of Spain so they can line everything
up to get additional DDGs at some point to Rota. But we are very
supportive right now. Our assessment is that the Spanish want us
there in greater numbers, and certainly the Commander of United
States European Command does.
Senator WICKER. Just briefly, General Wolters has testified that
we actually have the infrastructure there at Rota that is able at
this point to house the two additional destroyers. Is that correct,
Admiral?
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.
Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here, for your service, and thank you,
General Berger, for your wife’s presence here today. Donna’s pres-
ence I think points to the importance of our military families and
the service and sacrifice that they make so that we can be the
greatest and strongest military force in the world.
In that connection, I would just like to mention I did not have
a chance to question General Milley or Secretary Esper yesterday
about the tenant bill of rights for military housing which, frankly,
is somewhat mystifying to me in failing to set forth three of the es-
sential rights that we incorporated in the NDAA last year. I want
to emphasize again the importance of military housing and raising
it to the standards that we think are important. I am going to be
submitting questions in writing to them. I do not want to take time
on it this morning, but any responses in writing you have on that
issue I would certainly welcome.
General Berger, I appreciated your response to Senator Inhofe
about the CH–53K, and I agree with you totally on the importance
of this aircraft. In fact, as you may know, today literally marks the
birthday of Connecticut’s Sikorsky Engineering, which was estab-
lished March 5, 1923. It has provided 97 years of capability for our
nation’s defense, including the CH–53K, which is a marvel of engi-
neering.
I want to suggest that the cost of each aircraft would come down
if the pace of production is increased. If we go from seven to nine,
which I would advocate, the cost per copy would come down. Would
you agree with that point?
General BERGER. I would agree with the math, yes, sir.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday, I want to thank you for your visit to Groton
which was enormously meaningful and inspiring, and your very in-
sightful questions—and I agree with you completely that we have
425

one of the great, passionate, dedicated workforces in any engineer-
ing facility there at Groton.
But I am deeply concerned by the graph that you and I saw of
the worker demands, the production, and employment capabilities
that we are going to see and the troughs, the deep dips in employ-
ment and particularly during 2023 to 2024. I would like to know
what the Navy can do to mitigate those troughs. I know that time
will not permit you to give a full answer, but I am going to ask
for a full briefing. I asked for the charts and some of the under-
lying data while we were there, and I wonder if you could respond
to that point.
Admiral GILDAY. Yes. I would just say with the lack of an addi-
tional submarine in fiscal year 2021, what we would do and we are
doing right now is to take a look with Electric Boat at how we
might be able to put some of their workforce that would otherwise
potentially be furloughed to work whether that be at Portsmouth,
New Hampshire in our facility up there or down at Newport News,
Virginia.
I will tell you this, that we believe that the defense industrial
base, particularly the work that is being done with ships and sub-
marines is absolutely the crown jewel in the defense industrial
base. We want to work very closely to make sure that we do not
hit a trough that we cannot recover from quickly because that in-
dustry just is not very elastic. We lived through this before, and
we have to be more responsive.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. As you know, there has been a furlough
of about 300 workers in the last few months, but that is minuscule
compared to the thousands that we will see going down and then
coming back in terms of the demands on that workforce. So the
lack of that second submarine in 2021 is really going to be
impactful. You are absolutely right. It is the crown jewel, and I
think we are really playing with fire if we fail to make sure that
workforce is sustained.
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Cotton?
Senator COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
General Berger, I want to return to the chairman’s question
about the 53 kilo. Given its costs, can you just tell us in a little
more detail what is the long-term outlook for this helicopter?
General BERGER. Sir, our program of record is 200 aircraft. That
is our requirement, and the two costs, as most folks in here are
really well aware of, are the APOC, the individual cost upfront,
and then the flyaway recurring cost. The math, as outlined accu-
rately before—when we get on schedule for a buy and the learning
curve continues up, then the cost starts to come down. But we have
to close that gap because I owe you an honest answer that this is
an aircraft that we can afford. This is an aircraft that we can sus-
tain over the lifespan of it.
So far, again, the engineering part I am very comfortable with.
Now it is a function of closing the gap to where I can convince you
426

that this is the best use of our resources for an aircraft we defi-
nitely need.
Senator COTTON. So you are saying that you owe us an answer
and you need to convince us. It does not sound like you are yet
fully convinced yourself?
General BERGER. I think there is room still to close the gap, and
Sikorsky agrees as well. The learning that happens on the first of
anything, of course, they are going to drive down the cost just be-
cause they are going to produce it more efficiently and the engi-
neering cost that is going to the first batch of research and engi-
neering models is going to go down.
Senator COTTON. When do you think we might get that answer?
General BERGER. The next contract is due to be awarded I think
in the August-September time frame. We will know then.
Senator COTTON. I want to turn to another item that was in the
President’s budget request, which I found interesting. You are
going to buy Tomahawk missiles this year. Specifically, I see the
Marine Corps in fiscal year 2019 asked for zero Tomahawk mis-
siles. In fiscal year 2020, you asked for zero Tomahawk missiles,
and in fiscal year 2021, you have requested 48 Tomahawk missiles.
I presume you are not planning to launch those off any of your am-
phibious ships. So could you tell us what you plan to do with those
48 Tomahawk missiles?
General BERGER. Yes, sir. Part of the homework that the Navy
and Marine Corps have done over the past 6 months is how we
think we are going to need to operate in the future as an inte-
grated naval force. That means the Marine Corps assumes the role,
which we have not had in the past 20 years, which is how do we
contribute to sea control and sea denial. The Tomahawk missile is
one of the tools that is going to allow us to do that.
Now, it is much like the MQ–9 Reaper for us. It could be the an-
swer. It could be the first step towards a longer-term answer 5, 6,
7 years from now. But what we need is long-range precision fires
for a small unit, a series of units, that can from ship or from shore
hold an adversary’s naval force at risk, and that missile is going
to help us do that.
Senator COTTON. And is it safe to say that this decision is a re-
sult of our withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty that you can explore these options?
General BERGER. I would assume so. I had not linked the two to-
gether. We just knew we need long-range precision fires beyond the
range that we were restricted to before. Yes.
Senator COTTON. And most particularly in the western Pacific,
given China’s long-range precision fires since they were never a
party to that INF Treaty?
General BERGER. Absolutely, yes.
Senator COTTON. Okay. I am glad to see that you are exploring
those options. I am sure a lot of your marines would think it would
be awesome of you launched them from amphibious ships, but
probably not what you have in mind. But obviously, we face a pret-
ty significant fire power gap in the western Pacific given China is
stockpiling thousands of missiles, and it is good to see your service
beginning to address that. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator King?
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Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, in a hearing like this, you always get comments and ques-
tions about things that are left out. I want to start with a com-
pliment, the fact that you have increased the R&D budget, because
we are in not only a competition of forces and ships and troops, but
a competition of innovation. If we are going to stay ahead in terms
of the technology of future conflicts, R&D is going to be critical. Di-
rected energy I think is an enormously important potential part of
our naval force. Hypersonics we have discussed, and I think that
is something we are going to be discussing or I am going to be talk-
ing, Admiral, with you and your staff on in a classified setting. Un-
manned craft. I mean, there is just a lot of new technology that has
to be developed over the next several years, and I compliment the
Secretary and the Department for putting some emphasis on R&D
and innovation.
Now, for the other side of the coin, I am concerned that we are
talking about trying to get to a 350-ship Navy, or actually, Mr. Sec-
retary, I think you have talked about a 390-ship Navy. We are also
talking about developing a new large surface combatant, and yet
in the new FYDP, we are losing four destroyers, which are sort of
the workhorse of the surface combatants. I am worried about a gap.
I am worried about a fall-off not only in shipbuilding but in the in-
dustrial base. Can you speak to that concern?
Secretary MODLY. Senator, thanks for the question. I think one
of problems we have this year is we have sort of a confluence of
bad timing on a lot of different things. We started on this inte-
grated Force Structure Assessment last summer. It was delivered
to me in January, and it sort of came to me after we had already
completed most of the work on the 2021 budget submission.
So what we found in this Force Structure Assessment is that
there is a demand for a 355-plus type of scenario.
Senator KING. And part of that 355 are large surface combatants.
Secretary MODLY. Yes, they are.
Senator KING. Like DDGs.
Secretary MODLY. Yes, they are. Most of everything that we have
right now is going to be part of it, but there are new things that
General Berger alluded to, a new, smaller amphib, a new, smaller
combat support vessel that can help support distributed maritime
operations. Of course, the new frigate will be a key element of that
strategy and in that new force structure, and then the unmanned
platforms, both undersea and on the surface, will be part of that
future force mix. We are just in process of trying to educate and
help the Secretary understand what this might mean, and then we
will move out with a strategy for how we get there. That is a chal-
lenge for us.
But in any scenario, we are talking about a significant expansion
in the size of the fleet, and we are looking at a flat top line, and
that mathematical equation is difficult for us to bridge.
Senator KING. Well, one of the problems is that we are trying to
recapitalize through operating budgets. Any other business in the
world would say a 40-year asset like a Columbia-class submarine
is a capital investment as opposed to a drain on current operating
cash flow. It is the bulge in the process of the modernization and
the rebuilding of the nuclear deterrent that is really causing a lot
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of this squeeze as I see. Admiral, do you agree with that assess-
ment?
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir, I do. The Secretary has challenged us
with finding $8 billion this year in our existing budget so that we
can put that towards not only shipbuilding, but all the other pillars
that support it, the manpower, the weapons, the training, et cetera,
so that we can increase our numbers.
With respect to the legacy ships that we are looking at decom-
missioning, we get to a point, sir, where the return on invest-
ment—we are just not going to get the return with respect to
lethality, and some of these hulls are over 30 years old. So num-
bers are important, but in the end, we would rather have a ready,
capable, lethal fleet over——
Senator KING. Of course. Lethality is the measure not absolute
numbers. I understand that.
By the way, if you are talking about decommissioning ships, give
them a few more years. Then send them to Caribbean and Pacific
where we can interdict some of these drug shipments. We are now
interdicting 25 percent of the drug shipments we know of—we
know of—and 75 percent are going by, even though we know they
are there because of a lack of assets. So, if you got spare ships, Ad-
miral, I know where you might want to send them.
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, we are sending ships to Southern Com-
mand and in discussions right now about what those numbers
ought to look like. In fact, we are deploying two littoral combat
ships this year.
Senator KING. Because that is a war we are in right now and
Americans are dying in that war.
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.
Senator KING. And I sincerely hope you and SOUTHCOM and
the Coast Guard can really get together and make a dent in that
traffic.
I am out of time, General, but perhaps for the record, you could
give me your thinking on the reduction of your end strength by
2,100 marines, given the demands on the Marine Corps. So, I will
look for that. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Rounds?
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
General Berger, there have been reports that the Secretary of
Defense will move the Close Combat Lethality Task Force from an
element the director reports to him to one that reports to the
Army. This is an organization that is examining the full range of
capabilities from material solutions to physiological performance to
improving policies in order to provide the overmatch to the 4 per-
cent of the members of the joint force who have experienced 90 per-
cent of our combat deaths since the end of the Second World War.
This is obviously a joint problem, one that the Army, Special Oper-
ations Command, and the marines need to have full visibility on
and where solutions need to be joint and Department-wide.
Can you provide me with your best professional military advice
on what about this move could work and what about this might not
work for the Marine Corps?
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General BERGER. Sir, I am very familiar with it.
When it was initially stood up and since, it was run by a retired
marine colonel, who I know really well, from Fallujah, Iraq. So for
the Marine Corps, we have been involved in the task force from
day one and still are.
The move to shift it into the Army I am not concerned about. We
work laterally on a lot of programs like the joint light tactical vehi-
cle. It is not an issue at all. But parking it in a service is a good
thing because they know how to run a program. They know how
to resource it, and there are great working relationships between
services already. We remain tied in on that task force. We have
marines as part of that task force within the Army now. That will
continue for all the reasons that you said. That is where the cas-
ualties occur.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, General.
Today in the way that we fight our wars, the electromagnetic
spectrum is essential in terms of how we do battle, and we use
multiple parts of the spectrum. I want to refer to the Secretary’s
HASC testimony on February 26th. Secretary Esper said that the
DOD [Department of Defense] is willing to share—and I emphasize
share—spectrum with 5G networks in the mid-band range of 3 to
4.2 gigahertz.
Secretary Modly, what systems does the Navy have that might
be affected and how could sharing that spectrum space impact
homeland defense? I would like to specifically point out we are
talking about sharing and not vacating that space.
Secretary MODLY. Senator, it would have a profound impact on
our Aegis system, and of course, we cannot abandon that spectrum.
It would have profound negative implications for that system. So
as the Secretary stated, we are willing to share it, but we have to
be very protective of that because it is critical to our ability to de-
fend ourselves as a nation.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I have nothing to more to add to the Sec-
retary’s comments. I completely agree. We need to protect that por-
tion of the spectrum for Aegis for homeland defense.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.
Let me go back a little bit and talk about submarines. We have
talked about building new submarines. I would like an update, if
I could get it, with regard to the mid-life refueling on the sub-
marines, the nuclear attack submarines, that we have right now.
I want to point out—and I have done this in the past—we are talk-
ing about the USS Boise. Now I understand there are three more
that are waiting at dock to be able to sequence into dry dock to be
actually refueled and made available for service again. The need I
believe is still there, and you can correct me if I am wrong, but
with these particular submarines, we still want them. This could
mean that the USS Boise may very well have been out of service
for a period of 8 years waiting for refueling before it is back in op-
eration again.
Can you tell me what we are doing to expedite the process to
bring these submarines back on and where we are at in that proc-
ess?
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Admiral GILDAY. Sir, we are going to begin maintenance on Boise
this May and then we will get under contract for extended mainte-
nance.
At the time that these decisions were made on Boise, we had a
capacity issue in our public yards, and so we started to then send
some of that work to private yards. We are now at the point—and
I know you are aware of this—in the public yards, we have in-
creased that workforce by 10,000 workers in the past 10 years and
some 4,000 in the last 3 years I think, and so we have the capacity
back. We are actually taking one of our availabilities from a private
yard and now moving it back into the public yard.
I do not want to imply that we are out of the woods yet. We are
watching it very closely. I think we are in a better place now than
we were 2 and 3 years ago.
Senator ROUNDS. If I could say, we will not have the same prob-
lem with the next three in line that we had with the Boise?
Admiral GILDAY. We do not anticipate it, sir, but I will go back
and take a look and we will brief you in more detail on what that
lineup looks like and any challenges that we think we may face.
Senator ROUNDS. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Hirono?
Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for visiting Hawaii, and I es-
pecially would like to thank your wife for the time that she spent
with the family of the people who were shot at the shipyard and
also the survivor. Please extend my thanks to her.
Over the past few weeks, I have met with several of your col-
leagues, including Assistant Secretary Geurts—in fact, that was
only 2 days ago I think or yesterday—to discuss the importance of
modernizing our shipyards. Of course, the delay in repair and all
of that was just touched upon by the admiral. I cannot overempha-
size the importance of us continuing to go through with the mod-
ernization plan.
Just to let everybody know, the Pearl Harbor Shipyard, which is
one of the four public shipyards in our country, contributes nearly
$1 billion to Hawaii’s economy every year and employs close to
6,500 personnel, including nearly 1,000 engineers. It is the largest
employer of this kind in Hawaii.
Due to the current inefficient arrangement at the shipyard, it is
necessary that the optimization plan be implemented to provide
much needed updates. I know you are very well aware we need a
new dry dock and a production facility.
Funding the critical shipyard modernization program will require
a significant portion of the Navy’s budget. Does the Navy’s fiscal
year 2021 budget fully fund the shipyard modernization plan so
that it will be implemented on time? And I am talking about the
four shipyards, not just the one in Hawaii.
Secretary MODLY. Yes, Senator. This is a high priority for us in
the Navy, and it is a 20-year commitment of $23 billion I believe
over 20 years. So as long as we are here, we will continue to push
for this. We are sequencing in the work in the most logical possible
way that we can to address the things that you mentioned, which
is how the work flows through the shipyards to make sure that we
431

do not do work now that then we are going to have to take out as
part of the longer-term strategy. So, yes, it is funded. I believe we
are spending almost $600 million on this this year, and that will
continue.
Senator HIRONO. Is $600 million enough to keep to the timelines
that we have for the modernization program?
Secretary MODLY. I believe it is. I think when we looked at this
and we thought about the work and how we would push it through
the four different yards, it made sense to do it in this way. Obvi-
ously, we would love to have more to be able to do more, but we
also had to think about how we do not disrupt the current work
that is in there at the same time.
Senator HIRONO. Now, of course, in Hawaii I would like to see
some concrete actually being poured for the dry dock and the pro-
duction facility sometime soon.
Mr. Secretary, in conversations that I have had with subcontrac-
tors that support our shipbuilding programs, I have heard that the
guidance associated with the cybersecurity maturity modernization
certification, CMMC, has been somewhat confusing making it dif-
ficult for businesses and contractors to comply. What can you tell
me about the current state of the CMMC framework? I am told by
the subs that there are changing requirements that come down the
pike and they do their best to try and comply, but with regard to
the new one, which is the CMMC, what timelines are in place for
educating, certifying, and auditing our defense industrial base,
keeping in mind that there are thousands of suppliers? And I as-
sume that all of them need to provide certification regarding the
security requirements.
Secretary MODLY. Yes, Senator. That is a great question.
If you would allow me to get you specifics on where we are on
the implementation to that, I will do that.
We have elevated our cybersecurity awareness to the highest lev-
els in the Department with a new office there. I am sure they are
monitoring this, and I can get you specific details.
We understand there is pushback from the supplier base, par-
ticularly the smaller subs who see this as an additional cost for
them, and we are trying to figure out ways that we can help them
perhaps create some shared services for them that they could use
at that level. But let me get you a specific answer.
Senator HIRONO. I think that is really important because we
have literally, as I said, thousands and thousands of suppliers. I
know there is always that weak link possibility if we do not provide
them with the kind of support they need to comply.
Last week, Admiral Aquilino—he is the Commander of PAC
Fleet—issued guidance instructing Navy vessels departing from
port visits to remain at sea for at least 14 days before pulling into
another port in order to monitor sailors for coronavirus symptoms.
This week, the 6th Fleet followed suit.
How is the Navy preparing for coronavirus, and how do you an-
ticipate that the virus will impact the Navy’s ability to operate
overseas? Admiral?
Admiral GILDAY. Senator, we are following the Department’s
guidance, which essentially tries to minimize contact, particularly
in those areas where we know there is a heavy concentration of
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coronavirus. It manifests in different ways in different geographic
locations. We are receiving excellent reporting from the World
Health Organization through to CDC and down to the Department
on specific areas. Italy and Bahrain are really good examples. The
Korean Peninsula is another good example. We are trying to be
preemptive and preventative in terms of limiting numbers of large
gatherings as an example. On a day-to-day basis, we are making
decisions on closing DOD schools based on what we are seeing in
terms of caseloads at local hospitals.
All of our medical personnel have been trained in the symptoms,
and if they suspect that somebody does have corona, we test for it
and then we send that off to a lab to be confirmed. But we also
quarantine those people and their families until we ascertain
whether or not they are actually infected.
Senator HIRONO. Do you have test kits?
Admiral GILDAY. No, we do not. We do not yet. But that is not
just a problem for DOD. But I think that we are getting to a better
place in terms of the production to allow us to be able to distribute
those out to the force.
Senator HIRONO. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence
and allowing me to go over. I do have some other questions for the
record. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Ernst?
Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, very much for being here today, and, Sec-
retary, I will start with you.
Many businesses across America depend on predictable ship-
building requirements to maintain a trained workforce and develop
manufacturing lines. You are probably not surprised to learn that
in Iowa we do not build ships. We do not. But my landlocked home
State of Iowa is part of the Navy’s inventory and pipeline of talent,
and Carver Pump, which I love to highlight, and its team of 110
hardworking Iowans supply pumps to almost every Navy ship in
the Active fleet. They are being installed in many ships currently
in production, and in total, Iowa is home to eight submarine indus-
trial base suppliers. So we are very proud of that. While we are not
providing the end product, the finished ship, we do have those sup-
pliers.
I do understand that the Navy must utilize its funds and invest
in assets that reflect the NDS of today, the goals to modernize our
fleet. How are those conversations going with industry to ensure
that their production capabilities can meet the requirements in this
new era of great power competition?
Secretary MODLY. Well, we have an amazing supplier base in the
country, but it is under pressure to some extent, and so we have
to ensure that we are maintaining a steady flow of work through
them. The carrier program alone, if you look at the Ford program
right now, employs almost 60,000 people across the United States
in 46 different States, and so when you think about a program like
that, not just the employment but the type of employment, this is
all high technology. We are bringing in workers, young people,
training them in a trade that they can continue to contribute to
this process over time.
433

We have to be really, really careful when we talk about decisions
in this space because that national asset that they create is the
ship that we see, but the national asset they contribute to is the
national asset of manufacturing capability and high technology
that exists in the country that follows them. So, we have to con-
tinue to worry about that and think about it.
When I go out and speak to industry, what I find more often is
that I find businesses that are not currently doing defense work
that are really interested in doing defense work, and how do we
make it easier for them to do that? And so we are working on that.
Senator ERNST. Right, absolutely, and I do appreciate that.
We look at examples like the Ford. We get very concerned about
that because as Members of Congress, we are watching those tax-
payer dollars. So, we are reliant on industry as well to make the
recommendations to make sure we are producing the necessary re-
quirements for our fleet but get it out in a timely manner, and on
time, on target is always best. But always having those discussions
with industry is important. So thank you for that.
We are all familiar as well, Mr. Secretary, with this Committee’s
concern for the health and wellbeing of all of our service members.
Last year, when Congress passed the NDAA for fiscal year 2020,
we included a provision that directed the Department of Defense
to document blast exposure history in the medical record of all
service members.
We have made significant improvements in this area on how we
are treating, documenting, and understanding the effects and
causes of traumatic brain injuries. The progress is encouraging. We
still have more that we can do and where we can potentially negate
the impact of TBIs.
Can you maybe explain to this Committee what the Department
of the Navy and the Marine Corps is doing to improve the under-
standing and prevention of traumatic brain injuries and specifically
those coming from blast injuries?
Admiral GILDAY. Ma’am, I can say about 80 percent of the TBI
injuries that we see are off-duty related. Because military medicine
has benefited greatly from what we have experienced from Iraq
and Afghanistan, so we are able to return about 85 percent of those
sailors back to work just based on the high proficiency of our med-
ical teams.
Senator ERNST. Very good. I know that in SOF, we are actively
baselining many of their members, which is something that we
would love to do across the conventional forces as well.
General Berger, would you like to address it, please?
General BERGER. Just three quick parts to that.
First, the protect part, the equipment that we wear, the vehicles,
the aircraft, a lot of improvement over the last 3 or 4 years. We
have a lot of room still to go there.
Second is the detection part, which you mentioned. Really dif-
ficult, which relies wholly on baseline up front, which we do as
well. All of us who have been to Iraq and Afghanistan in the last
6–7 years, all baselined. We did not do that the first deployment.
I was not either. You have to do that because you cannot measure
any change from that.
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The last part is the treatment, which the CNO mentioned, and
it cannot stop initially. This is an enduring—the impact of that
could be lifelong. So it is different than some other ailments, some
other issues that we have. We have to treat it as a long-term issue.
Senator ERNST. Thank you very much.
General Berger, you are spot on. It does create complications fur-
ther down the road especially if we are not treating that TBI.
So thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Jones?
Senator JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today and for your
service.
Secretary Modly, I want to ask you about the frigate. You men-
tioned the frigate as a key element in our future ship fleets. I have
got folks down at Austal down in Alabama trying to put together
a great design and compete for that contract, but it seems that the
process timeline has been a little bit of a moving target. Can you
tell us right now where we are in that process and the timeline for
the frigate contract award?
Secretary MODLY. Senator, thanks for the question.
The plan had been to award the contract sometime in the latter
half of this fiscal year. I have asked Secretary Geurts to look at
possibly pulling that forward if everything is done properly and ev-
erything is thoroughly vetted and evaluated, and so he is looking
into that. So there is some possibility that we may pull that award
a little bit sooner.
Senator JONES. All right. Could you let me know if that is the
case?
Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir.
Senator JONES. I noticed in the FYDP that it includes only nine
frigates, although originally there were going to be 10 in the first
block. Does this mean that the total ship procurement is being re-
duced or just the procurement timeline?
Secretary MODLY. No, sir. I think this is part of the discussion
that we have been talking about earlier about the new integrated
Force Structure Assessment and how the frigate plays in that.
Based on current plans and current thinking, this is where we are.
But I anticipate as we look at this in more depth and the Secretary
of Defense can get comfortable with it, we are going to look at ways
to possibly purchase more of these over time. But right now, that
is sort of where we are in terms of our thinking.
Senator JONES. Okay. The total numbers have not changed, just
in this first block. Is that a fair statement?
Secretary MODLY. No, sir. Nothing has changed.
Senator JONES. All right. Thank you.
Sticking with Austal for a minute, I would like to talk a little bit
about the expeditionary fast transport, the EPF. Can you give me
an idea, Admiral Gilday, where those are being used and how they
are being used right now, the EPFs?
Admiral GILDAY. So those ships are great. We put adaptive force
packages on them, and so some of them are highly classified mis-
sions. Others are to move troops or we just used two in an exercise
435

called Pacific Partnership in the Indo-Pacific where we used them
for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
The two that we have in the budget—what we are trying to do
with those ships is to give them the medical capability where they
would actually have a 750-room hospital, as well as 12 operating
rooms. Because of the cubic space that you have in those ships, you
can really do a lot with them, including their flight deck.
Senator JONES. Well, I am asking because you got two in this
budget, but the President just took away one that was set to be
awarded I think in April of this year. It was a $260 million con-
tract again. I am curious as to if that particular ship could have
been used the same way, why was it taken out?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I cannot tell you directly why it was taken
out. I know that those decisions were made at a higher level based
on strategic priorities, and so I just do not have the direct answer
for you on the why.
Senator JONES. All right. I may submit a question because Sec-
retary Esper’s answer was just not satisfactory yesterday, espe-
cially in light of your testimony today, and I want to emphasize
again I just think taking the funds away from our sailors, soldiers,
and airmen is just wrong. It hurts our men and women in uniform,
and it quite frankly hurts my community in Mobile where we are
taking away that because we got a lot of folks down there that are
dependent on Austal and the ships that they build.
Secretary Modly, let me just ask you real quick. You mentioned
last week—I want to just talk about the 355 ships may no longer
be the right number for our force, and you mentioned that it could
be as high as 390. Can you kind of give me some ideas of where
all this is coming from and how you are making those assessments
and what you are looking for?
Secretary MODLY. Well, sir, it is strategy-based. It is based on
the threat, what we see the threat that is emerging, how we would
want to counter that threat not just in terms of a warfighting sce-
nario but in terms of deterrence and presence. That is what is driv-
ing it.
What is driving the change in the numbers is some of the things
that I mentioned earlier in terms of the requirement for a new,
smaller amphib, a new combat support vessel as well, possibly
more frigates, as you mentioned earlier. That is where sort of the
numbers are elevating when we start looking at the difference be-
tween this and the 2016 assessment.
Senator JONES. All right. Are we going to be able to see that 30-
year shipbuilding plan and Force Structure Assessment pretty
soon?
Secretary MODLY. I hope so, sir. I have seen it. I just need to
make sure the Secretary of Defense is comfortable with it.
Senator JONES. Well, I would encourage you to try to get that to
us as soon as possible, please. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Perdue?
Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here.
You know, these concerns and the wringing of the hands about
this budget would have a whole lot more credibility if we had heard
436

that when the three times in the last 50 years we had three Presi-
dents in the late 1970s, in the mid-1990s, and just recently cut our
military spending by 25 percent. That is what this is about. Today
we are trying to recover. You have done a marvelous job in the
Navy and the Marines getting our readiness back. I want to com-
mend you guys for that. Today I want to talk about shipbuilding.
When we get this budget, we are supposed to get a shipbuilding
plan. Secretary Modly, when should we expect that?
Secretary MODLY. Sir, I am hoping to get it over here as soon as
possible, but frankly, it is not my call. I am waiting for the Sec-
retary of Defense to allow us to bring it over.
Senator PERDUE. I understand.
Admiral Kilby, this week, yesterday, as a matter of fact, did a
great job explaining his requirements, Admiral. He talked about
four priorities: Columbia-class, readiness recovery, lethality, and
capabilities we can afford. I respect that.
The question that—I want to highlight the NDS. The 335-ship
number was developed in 2016, prior to the NDS. Is the 355 num-
ber consistent with the NDS requirements put on the Navy and
Marines?
Admiral GILDAY. It is low, sir.
Senator PERDUE. An honest man.
Admiral GILDAY. Thank you, sir.
The short answer. Since the time that that assessment has been
done and if you consider the fact that we are integrating much
more closely with the Marine Corps and within the joint force, you
have to consider not only what we are going to fight with, the capa-
bilities, but also how we are going to fight. That is translated
against a threat that has increasing capability into a larger num-
ber of ships, a larger number of more capable lethal ships.
Senator PERDUE. It has to do with several things. Right? What
is your responsibility against emerging threats. You said that. How
are you going to fight the force, and then what kind of lethality you
have. So you are working on that we are not hamstrung by INF.
We know that China—they out-stick us today. Is that fair?
Admiral GILDAY. In some areas, sir, yes.
Senator PERDUE. Secondly, they have about 350 boats today to
our 296 by my math. I think that is correct. If you look at what
they have said publicly, by 2030 they will have 425, and if that
same gradient goes out, by 2034, which is our planning period be-
hind the current shipbuilding plan, we would be at 355 by 2034.
That is the 2016 plan. That may change in the current ship-
building plan I understand. We have an 80-boat shortage right
now, and we have responsibilities in multiple AORs. They pretty
much have one. Are you concerned that our shipbuilding plan is
not going to be able to do what we need to do over that 15-year
period, particularly against the buildup that we see China—they
deployed more boats in the last 30 months than they have in the
last 30 years. We see their activity. They are telling us what they
are doing.
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. So, it simply really comes down to our
top line, and that is our biggest constraint in terms of growing a
bigger Navy. Since I have been in uniform, the size of the United
States Navy has been dwindling. Over the last few years, we have
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come up in numbers a bit, but not a lot. We believe, based on the
NDS and for all the reasons we just stated, that it is time to rein-
vest in the naval force.
Senator PERDUE. And it would be one thing if we could fund it.
What I am worried about—let us take submarines, for example.
Your number one priority is Columbia-class. I am proud that Geor-
gia hosts one of the two nuclear bases that hosts those. But we lost
in the last decade 17,000 submarine vendors, down to 3,000 ven-
dors. Even if we were to push the money toward this goal to get
to where we need to be, can we rebuild the supply chain fast
enough to accommodate that?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, based on what we know, we think we can.
Based on what we are projecting in terms of submarines, as an ex-
ample in terms of what we are procuring, that vendor infrastruc-
ture is in place to support that.
Senator PERDUE. Can I move on to one other thing? The Air
Force is developing ABMS right now, and it looks like they have
had one demonstration across the services. I think there is another
one coming up in April. How involved is the Navy in looking at this
from the service needs, as well as the data that the Navy will be
creating? Obviously, as I understand this, this is a very classified
development. Can you give us an update about the Navy’s involve-
ment and the Marines’ involvement on that?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, so the problem set is that we have netted
weapons and we have netted platforms and netted C2 nodes, but
we do not have a net. All the services have come together under
a concept called joint all domain C2, and we are putting heat on
it, a Manhattan Project like effort, so that we are not delivering
this in the mid-2030s but in the 2020s. All the Joint Chiefs are fly-
ing out to Nellis in early April to take a look at this together to
make sure we understand how we are going to get after it.
Senator PERDUE. Thank you so much. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Heinrich?
Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman.
Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, I am quite encouraged to
see the priority that the Navy continues to place on hypersonic
weapons. As you know, Sandia National Lab has played a critical
role in developing this technology over a number of years now. How
would you characterize the combined Navy and inter-service effort
to transition hypersonic glide bodies out of the labs?
Secretary MODLY. Well, thank you for that question. I actually
was in Sandi a few months ago and got to see what they are doing
out there, and it is really amazing work. I am actually very encour-
aged about the fact that we are working together with the Air
Force and the Army on this because it is an expensive proposition,
and we need to pool our resources and our brain power to get after
it. So I think that the progress is good.
We have asked for a significant step up in funding this year in
order to do this. As I look at the test schedule, it looks aggressive,
but I think it is doable.
So that is probably all that I can talk about in an open forum.
I would be more than happy to come over and have our team brief
you on how we are doing on that.
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Senator HEINRICH. Would there be value in collocating the devel-
opment and the production of those capabilities so that we could
fully leverage synergies, expertise, and frankly shorten the feed-
back loop in that transition from development to production?
Secretary MODLY. Well, I think anything that we can do that can
accelerate the process of getting these fielded would be important.
I think one of the biggest challenges we have right now is not the
technology and how to develop these missiles, but it is the produc-
tion. How do we get this into scale over time? And that is a chal-
lenge because we do not have an industrial base that can really do
that right now. So, we are looking at ways that can help accelerate
that through some incentives, et cetera to put some funding out
there so that we can accelerate the creation of the industrial capac-
ity to produce at scale.
Senator HEINRICH. Well, I hope you will consider us a partner in
that effort.
I want to switch gears now to the Navy has been conducting live
fire tests of its experimental electromagnetic railgun at White
Sands Missile Range in New Mexico over the past year. But the fis-
cal year 2021 budget includes pretty minimal funding for this capa-
bility. What is the Navy’s plan to continue developing this program
and, for that matter, to mount it on a ship for at-sea testing as
well? Admiral?
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. So the testing is going rather well.
What I would like to do, sir, is come back to you in a classified set-
ting and talk to you in more detail about where we are with that
and where we want to go.
Senator HEINRICH. Okay. In this setting, can you comment on
the resourcing in this particular budget?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, the resourcing right now we think is ade-
quate based on the amount of effort that we have ongoing. So, we
saw more money in the budget last year based on what we needed
to do in terms of R&D, but we are more at a steady state at the
moment going into 2021.
Senator HEINRICH. Okay.
Let us talk Columbia-class for a moment. I think this Committee
understands the importance of that modernization to the nuclear
triad. What are your contingency plans if the Navy does not make
the already very tight timeline for Columbia, and where would you
accept risk?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, that would be best handled in a classified
setting. I will say that we have had those discussions with the Sec-
retary of Defense, and you cannot just consider one leg. You have
to consider the triad and how you balance risk across that triad
based on challenges you would face in the modernization efforts
across each of those legs. We are having those discussions, sir.
Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Tillis?
Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service.
General Berger, I will ask you just one detailed question. I got
a few others hopefully I will have time to get to.
With some of the military construction money—I think it was
somewhere around $40 million—affecting Camp Lejeune as a result
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of the executive order, I understand there were two projects down
there that have been pushed somewhat to the right. Can you give
me the current status of those projects and whether or not we are
in any critical timing in terms of backfilling the funding?
General BERGER. I am familiar with both projects. Both were de-
ferred. We will have to postpone the second radio battalion building
and the second project as well. Right now, not critical, but if they
got pushed farther, then it would become a significant issue.
Senator TILLIS. If I could get just for the record specific dates on
when that really hits the critical path, I would appreciate it. Then-
Secretary Spencer assured me that it was not a challenge now, but
it could be. I would like to know the specific timing. Thank you for
that.
Now, I have got something that would be for Admiral Gilday and
you, General Berger, and maybe the Secretary as the tiebreaker,
and it is the discussion we are having with FRC East [Fleet Readi-
ness Center-East], getting the funding to be best prepared for the
F–35. We have got a bit of a stalemate there. We made some
progress with the security fence with the lift fan facility, but a lot
of the infrastructure is sort of Navy-owned facility, marine require-
ment. Every time I ask a question about who is going to actually
own that and how we are going to get the funding, I get you need
to talk to the Navy or you need to talk to the marines. Do we have
a definitive answer on that and where this sits on the priority list?
Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I can say that FRC—of our three, it is part
of the optimization plan that we have, and we are putting money
against all three of those facilities right now.
With respect to the potential finger-pointing, I would like to get
you a deeper brief on that. The Commandant and I, our staffs can
come together, and if there is an issue, we will definitely resolve
it.
Senator TILLIS. You answered my question before I asked it.
What I would like to do, if we could, is just in a meeting, if we
could get the stakeholders in the room and I can get a definitive
readout, I would appreciate that. So I have your commitment to
making sure that happens.
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.
Senator TILLIS. Thank you very much.
General Berger, you mentioned about some of the review that
you are doing for the acquisition programs review. What is the cur-
rent status of that? When should we see a report out?
General BERGER. We are done the first part of it, Senator. The
next step is for me to explain where we stand with the chair and
Ranking Members of the four Committees here, and I will do that
this weekend next if we can get through the scheduling part of
that.
After that, then we will obviously go broader in terms of explain-
ing the details. But it is important that I explain to those senior
leaders in Congress first what the outcomes are. We are done the
first part.
Senator TILLIS. Okay. Thank you.
Because my time is going to expire here fairly quickly, I am
going to submit some questions for the record about end strength,
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a few other questions. We will just look forward to hearing back
from you.
In my remaining time, I would like to talk about military hous-
ing. We have spent a lot of time and effort to make sure—on the
one hand, we were concerned with the nearly $40 million that is
sliding to the right. On the other hand, we have succeeded in get-
ting billions of dollars down to help with recovery.
What is the status of that recovery, and specifically, how is the
military housing situation? I will let you know and everybody else
that I will be doing another town hall down there to hear directly
from the military families. I think that is very helpful because for
some strange reason, I announce it 6 weeks in advance. All the
service requests tend to be done by the time I get there. But I am
hoping they are beginning to do it on a more consistent basis. So
if I can get an update on both those projects, recovery with respect
to Camp Lejeune broadly and then specifically for military housing.
General BERGER. Camp Lejeune broadly. First of all, the town
halls are—you are spot on. Unannounced is better and you are
going to get unfiltered kind of feedback from families, the way it
should be, the way that we want them to be. So I thank you for
that because it takes time.
On the housing, there are about 520, give or take, empty family
housing units at Camp Lejeune that the private partner owns.
Some of them are reparable; some are not, and that is part of the
discussion that goes on right now, not negotiation, but the dialogue
between the Department and the vendor about what to do about
the 500 vacant houses.
There are about 15 families—I think 15—right now that re-
mained in damaged homes at their choice. We offered to move
them. They elected to stay there. The damage, in other words, from
the hurricane—they were okay because they are going to move any-
way, so they just stayed. So we allowed them the choice either way.
The funding for the last two tranches of supplementals—all of
the, I think, $837 million from last year put on contract. So far, I
think about $157 million this year. We will be able to obligate all
that you provided from the second tranche in this fiscal year. So
I think by the end of this fiscal year, both tranches will be fully
under contract.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Kaine?
Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses for your service.
I wanted to just pick up on a point that Senator Perdue made
a few minutes ago. He expressed some concern about hand-wring-
ing over the budget and said, you know, I wish I had seen concerns
in the past when budgets were being cut, and look, to the extent
that Congress has done bad things in budgets in the past, we need
to own it. My first speech as a Senator in February 2013 was a
speech on the floor saying we should not do the sequester and
budget caps. It is a bad idea.
I think the reason there is hand-wringing now is that Congress
has learned our lesson and we are trying to do good budgets for the
military, and what we are seeing is the drain of billions of dollars
out of the budget for a non-military emergency at the southern bor-
der.
441

Here is what we are doing within 1 year. Within the last year,
the administration took first $6 billion, $3.5 billion from MILCON
and $2.5 billion from other programs, into the counter-drug fund to
use for the wall. So that was $6 billion out of the DOD budget.
The administration has now announced another $3.8 billion that
is being cannibalized out of various accounts, put into the counter-
drug fund. So now that $9.8 billion.
Yesterday Secretary Esper in the hearing announced that there
will likely be another tranche taken from MILCON. It has been re-
ported that would be $3.7 billion, but just round it down and say
that number is too high. It looks like the total within a year will
be $13 billion, more than a billion a month taken out of Congress’
appropriated budget for your needs, for the nation’s needs to use
for a non-military emergency that is not mentioned in the National
Defense Strategy.
Let me just put that into context. What does $13 billion mean
to seapower, to our Navy and Marines’ $13 billion. It is one carrier
or it is four Virginia-class subs. We are arguing about whether
there should be a second sub this year. Thirteen billion bucks in
a year is four subs. It is six destroyers. It is four amphibious as-
sault ships. Senator Hirono asked about the shipyard industrial op-
timization plan. That 20-year plan is $26 billion. So the $13 billion
would be half of the 20-year plan to modernize our shipyards.
Or the other way to look at it is when you all submitted your
budget this year, you submitted the amount of unfunded priorities
you have. That total unfunded priority list for the DOD is $17 bil-
lion. Thirteen billion dollars in 1 year taken for a non-military
emergency when your total unfunded priority list is $17 billion.
I am going to state right now if there is a Democratic President
who tries to take money out of the DOD for a non-military emer-
gency, I am going to say go get it through the appropriators. Do
not ransack the Pentagon’s budget for a non-military emergency. I
stood up against Democratic or Republican Presidents if I thought
they were taking us to war without coming to Congress. I am going
to stand up against the Democratic President who tries to raid the
Pentagon budget for non-military emergencies.
You are here saying we are trying to be focused on the National
Defense Strategy. It is resource-tight environment. It is sort of
hard to take that at face value when we are allowing $13 billion
to walk out the door for a non-military emergency in 1 year.
I want to offer you a compliment, General Berger. You made I
think a challenging call but the right call recently when you an-
nounced that Confederate paraphernalia would be removed from
Marine bases as just a good order and discipline. I saw that an-
nouncement and as a Virginian with a child in the Marines, I ap-
plaud that leadership move.
Secretary Modly, I want to ask you to share a story that you
shared with me with all my colleagues. Secretary Modly was in the
Federated States of Micronesia recently, and this is a story about
United States and China, what we are doing. Micronesia is a really
important asset for us, where it is situated in the Pacific. Just
share what is happening in terms of United States investment
versus Chinese investment from your recent visit, if you would.
Secretary MODLY. Sir, thanks for remembering the story.
442

I was there about a year ago, and I made a trip through several
of the Pacific islands. I went to Micronesia and went to the far side
of the island, and there was a Navy Seabee team there, a great
group, 24 Seabees building a school for the local citizens there.
Very traditional construction, concrete pilings, corrugated steel
roof, plywood sides, making great relationships with the locals.
As you leave this facility and you drive down the street, there is
a big sign. Micronesian Agricultural Center being paid for and built
by the People’s Republic of China, and it just gave me the impres-
sion that in some of these areas where we have traditional long-
term friendships with these nations who want us to be their part-
ners and we are playing small ball.
Senator KAINE. We removed all Peace Corps volunteers from Mi-
cronesia in 2017 and from Palau.
Secretary MODLY. Yes, sir. In the embassy building there, I saw
a bunch of signs for the old Peace Corps, and I said why are these
here? They said, well, we shut down the Peace Corps here. They
had been there since the beginning of the Peace Corps, and people
in Micronesia know Americans because of the Peace Corps.
So it may not extend to the entire Pacific region, but it was an
example to me of particularly how we need to step up our involve-
ment there not just militarily, but in other ways.
Senator KAINE. Thanks for sharing that story.
Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Scott?
Senator SCOTT. Thank you.
F*irst of all, I thank each of you for your service.
Secretary Modly, thank you for engaging with us after the ter-
rorist attack in Pensacola, trying to come up with the right plan
to make sure this does not happen again. I will be talking on the
floor today about the three individuals that lost their lives there,
and it was devastating to them, their families, but also to that base
and that community. But thank you for engaging with the sheriff
and everybody down there.
We had a hearing yesterday. Senator Ernst chaired a hearing on
the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, and we
talked about Pensacola and what can we do differently. My concern
is that we went right back to normal work pretty fast. We talked
about it. Twenty-one students got sent home for a variety of things,
and we are now vetting differently. But should we have a complete
reset of the program so we know it is not going to happen again?
We got 850 Saudi students here and we want to build our relation-
ship with Saudi Arabia. I talked to the Saudi Ambassador and said
the worst thing for you would be if we had another instance like
this soon. I mean, I think the American public would be up in
arms. You cannot keep doing this.
So I am working on a proposal with Senator Ernst that—and I
would like to get you all’s feedback, but how to vet the students,
how to give them the right kind of visa, and make sure we are not
doing programs here that we could do in another country less ex-
pensively and with less risk.
So what do you all think about the fact that we still have—and
we have—what—5,000 students from around the world there. But
my focus right now, because of what happened at Pensacola, is the
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Saudi students. Very few were actually sent back. Are we really
able to do a real vetting process of the ones we still have here? Are
we vetting their families? How safe are our bases?
When I was in the U.S. Navy, I never would have thought that
there would have been any risk on the base I was on.
Secretary MODLY. Senator, thanks for the question.
I think we are doing all we can I think to step up the vetting
process for these students and to have a better sense for not just
vetting them before they come in, but to develop some process in
collaboration with those countries to perform more continuous vet-
ting particularly of social media or some of the things they are
doing that does not require us to do anything illegal to do that. We
can monitor things that are in the public sphere. We just have not
applied the resources to it, and we are looking at a variety of dif-
ferent ways that we can do that.
One of the key elements I think also is part of the purpose of
these programs is to bring these people in and have them under-
stand us as a nation better. I do not think we are doing such a
great job with certain countries in bringing them in, sponsoring
them, having local families getting to know them, particularly with
the Saudi students because there were so many of them. They were
very insulated and not really a part of the broader community, and
so we have to really focus on that as well.
Senator SCOTT. So do you think you will be able to measure? Be-
cause that is what I have been told. I have been told that in many
of these countries, like they said, you know, if it is an Italian stu-
dent, that everybody get to know him and there are long-term rela-
tionships. But I have not talked to anybody in the military to date
that says they have a long-term relationship with somebody that
was a Saudi student. They might have it later if they are in the
position of leadership, but based on the relationship as a Saudi stu-
dent—I mean, I have not talked to anybody in the military that
has one. So it makes you question why are we doing this and hav-
ing this risk.
How are you doing dealing with families that come? Are we vet-
ting them, and are we continuing to vet them when they are here?
Secretary MODLY. I think that is all part of the process that we
are doing in terms of getting a better understanding of who is com-
ing in, what their backgrounds are, and just doing it a little bit
more—a little deeper dive into that than we used to do.
Senator SCOTT. Well, I look forward to working with you. We
have been working with Senator Ernst and some others about com-
ing up with a better way to do it to make sure these bases are safe.
So thank you very much.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Peters?
Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony here today.
General Berger, you have discussed the need for an appropriate
balance between manned and unmanned systems, including incor-
porating unmanned aerial combat vehicles and low-cost attrib-
utable aircraft technologies into the Marine Corps. In a com-
mentary you authored for War on the Rocks in December of 2019,
you listed 11 naval expeditionary capabilities and capacities that
support fleet operations, which the Marine Corps is under-invested
444

in. Notably, that list started off with three different types of un-
manned platforms for every physical domain in which you fight. I
agree with your assessment and know that we will need a mix of
fifth generation manned platforms like the F–35 that provide a
stealth capability, along with an array of sensors teamed with un-
manned systems that can address survivability challenges and fur-
ther confound our adversary’s decision-making through these new
technologies working together.
The Marine Corps stated requirements for the manned F–35 is
certainly a matter of record, but I have not seen your requirements
for lethal unmanned systems. Do you still intend to pursue a large
number of lethal unmanned aerial systems per your Commandant’s
Plan and Guidance and recent public remarks? And if so, can we
expect to see those desired capabilities articulated in the next Ma-
rine Corps aviation plan?
General BERGER. The homework that went behind what are we
going to need in the future that we spoke of before that both the
Navy and the Marine Corps have worked on for the past maybe 8–
9 months drove me towards that conclusion.
Will see it in the next budget, and will we see it in the next
AVPLAN, aviation plan? I do not know. I think yes, but the first
step would be to figure out how you are going to fight and then re-
organize the Marine Corps for that purpose, which we have to do,
which is part of the rounds that I need to make to the senior con-
gressional leadership to explain that part to them. I would hope
that it is in the 2022 and 2023 budget, yes, sir.
Senator PETERS. Great. Thank you.
Secretary Modly, the National Defense Authorization Act for fis-
cal year 2020 requires you as the Secretary of the Navy by January
31st of 2023 to—and I am quoting from the law—publish a military
specification for a fluorine-free fire-fighting agent for use at all
military installations and ensure that such agent is available for
use by not later than October 1st of 2023. I would like to note that
although it is October 1st of 2023, of course, you are free to publish
it before that time, and we would encourage you to do that.
It is my understanding that there are large-scale commercial air-
ports around the world that have adopted PFAS-free fire-fighting
agents already. I recognize the military context is different and it
is essential that we put the safety of our men and women first and
foremost, number one. But I am optimistic the Navy will be able
to find an appropriate solution given what is happening around the
rest of the world.
Could you provide us with an update on the progress towards
publishing that specification and what work has been done to date
on that effort?
Secretary MODLY. I share your optimism on that. I think we will
figure this out. It is a global challenge, as you mentioned, in the
United States specifically as well. All of our fire-fighting civilians,
our fire-fighting folks use this material, and it is a challenge for
us. However, there is a lot of attention in the scientific community
looking at this. Our Office of Naval Research is looking at this, and
I am confident we will come up with an answer on this. So far, we
have not, and so particularly on our ships, we are continuing to use
445

it. But my sense is that we will make progress on this and we will
get an answer.
Senator PETERS. And I am sure you are working with our allies
who are also actually deploying some of these agents. So I appre-
ciate that.
General Berger, last question. For the defense technology and in-
novation industrial base in this country in the remaining seconds
here, what would be your message on the technologies and capabili-
ties to pursue and invest in that you are going to want to require
for the Marine Corps in the future?
General BERGER. First is the how part. I think we need to be bet-
ter listeners than spend a year or two developing a detailed set of
requirements and dump it on industry and then ask them, what do
you think. That collaboration has to start from the very beginning,
and it is much better than it was, I would say, 5 years ago.
What do we need? We need, from the individual marine to the
small unit, things that make them more survivable, more effective
and lethal in a very austere environment without the big logistics
tail behind them, which has been our challenge so far, because we
assume that that logistics tail like the command and control, that
the threat is going to go right after it. They are going to go after
those two aspects of our warfighting capability. So, it has got to be
tools that a marine can use forward, can fix forward, not call a con-
tractor, but he can sustain them forward, he can repair them for-
ward, and that is not so logistically burdensome that it is really
difficult to keep that unit reinforced forward.
Senator PETERS. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Sullivan?
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it was great to see you three at the Army-Navy
game. I was going to comment about the result when Senator Reed
was here, but since he left, I thought I would leave it at that.
General Berger, I want to compliment you on the Commandant’s
Plan and Guidance. I read every word of this. It is outstanding, in-
novative, bold. I want to thank you and your team for the excep-
tional work that you put into that.
One topic I wanted to briefly discuss, General. I have had good
discussions this week both in meetings and then in the hearing
that the Secretary of Defense and Chairman had yesterday on the
force posture that we have in the Asia-Pacific given the National
Defense Strategy, including the DPRI that has been a subject of a
lot of focus of the Marine Corps for I think 2 decades now. They
are very focused on a broader strategic look that can sustain our
force posture and strategy for the next 50 to 100 years, which I
think is important. You may have seen in the NDAA that was just
passed, 2019, there is a provision that says we need to do that as
well. The Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The
marines will be critical in that.
Can you briefly comment on your thoughts on that?
General BERGER. Thanks, Senator.
I do not want to speak for you, but I have heard you speak before
that—and I have said the same—we are postured perfectly out
there for another Korea in 1950.
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Senator SULLIVAN. Or the end of World War II, which is where
our force posture——
General BERGER. That is exactly right. It was an ideal posture
for that, not ideal for what the National Defense Strategy outlines
as the major threats going forward in the Indo-Pacific. So, we have
to adjust it. I do not see any alternative.
Senator SULLIVAN. Well, the Secretary and the Chairman were
very bullish on looking hard at this as well, and I know the Marine
Corps has done some good work on this, and we want to help you—
I mean, not help you, but work with you. This Committee has been
very interested in this issue from Senator McCain to Senator
Inhofe and myself. So, we will look forward to working you on that.
I want to turn to the Arctic. Senator Kaine and I had a Readi-
ness Subcommittee hearing this week, quite a good hearing. I want
to compliment the Navy and the Marines on their recent Arctic ex-
peditionary exercise out at Adak and Seward, difficult training. I
know that was not easy. Crappy weather. But clearly the Arctic
has become a theater of great power competition. I have a slide
that I think some of you have seen. This is the Russian buildup
in the region—and it is not just forces. It is ports and airfields and
infrastructure to have force power projection. We do not really have
much there.
I want to give you sense of questions here, three questions, and
then, Mr. Secretary, maybe you can take this on.
You know, the DOD Arctic strategy says there should be
FONOPs. I do not think we have the capability right now. We have
two icebreakers. One is broken. The Russians have 54. There are
also twice now mandates to look at strategic Arctic ports, which
have kind of been ignored by the Pentagon, and General Neller had
some plans in addition to what was going on in the region with re-
gard to the Marines in the Arctic.
Can the three of you just discuss these? Mr. Secretary, maybe we
will start with you.
Secretary MODLY. Yes, Senator. Thanks.
I recently within the last 2 weeks had a conversation with Sec-
retary McCarthy and Secretary Barrett about how the Navy and
the Army and the Air Force Departments can get together to come
up with a combined strategy in terms of basing, presence, et cetera
to address this Arctic challenge. Clearly your home State would be
critical to this in terms of where it is strategically located. So we
are developing this team now to take a look at this, and obviously,
once we get that assembled, we would love to come over and talk
to you about it.
Senator SULLIVAN. Good. I appreciate your initiative on that. I
got your note. So, thank you very much on that.
Admiral, any thoughts on the FONOPs? We have talked about
this before. I have a—I think I have mentioned it to you in hear-
ings—but a proud history in my family, five uncles and great un-
cles who served in World War II, including my great uncle Tom
who was a lieutenant in the Navy and did three Murmansk runs.
I worry that we do not have that capability right now, no ice-hard-
ened ships.
Of course, this Committee has authorized the purchase of six
polar class icebreakers, which is a start. But without any kind of
447

strategic port—and we do not have anything near the Arctic. The
closest thing is Anchorage. That is 1,500 nautical miles away. We
cannot project power and we need to defend our strategic interests,
particularly the Navy.
What is your thought on that, sir?
Admiral GILDAY. My thought on that is that I think if we are
going to talk about force structure, infrastructure in Alaska, I real-
ly think like DPRI it has got to be a subset of a broader
INDOPACOM strategic lay-down.
Senator SULLIVAN. I agree with that.
Admiral GILDAY. From a joint perspective, we are making the
right decisions.
Then secondly, with respect to operations in the Arctic, ICEX
right now, two United States submarines, one British submarine,
we are just on the tail end of an exercise with the Norwegians—
the Navy and the Marine Corps—as well as another multinational
exercise ongoing. We are seeing an increasing drum beat of oper-
ations in the high north. I think we need to continue that. I think
that FONOPs will be important. I think that the Bering Strait will
become as strategically as important as the Strait of Malacca or
the Strait of Hormuz at some point.
Senator SULLIVAN. Putin certainly thinks so.
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir, based on what is going on with the ice-
cap.
So it is getting more focused, sir. I do think that taking a pause
and looking at it strategically would be a good move.
Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Duckworth?
Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Modly, I want to follow up on a conversation I had
with General Lyons of TRANSCOM last week. When discussing
sealift readiness, he stated that our current readiness level was
lower than where it needed to be, but noted that TRANSCOM is
working to recapitalize sealift capabilities. We agreed that while
sealift is just one of the Navy’s many requirements that you must
balance, it is essential for TRANSCOM to be able to do its job and
help get our forces to the fight when we need it.
General Lyons raised a possibility with me of using the National
Defense Sealift Fund to make progress towards our sealift recapi-
talization goals. But I believe that the Navy has not added any-
thing to that fund since fiscal year 2019. Could you please share
your view on reinvigorating the National Defense Sealift Fund? If
you disagree with that approach, what would be the alternative ap-
proach of prioritizing recapitalization of sealift capabilities?
Secretary MODLY. Senator, I absolutely agree that we have to re-
capitalize our sealift capability. Where the funding comes from is
the challenge for us. This is another one of these pressures that we
have in the Department of the Navy particularly because we are
reaching a point in history where we have to recapitalize our nu-
clear deterrent, at the same time recover from some pretty big
holes in readiness, and also do this, which is to recapitalize our
sealift. So we are making choices. We are making some trades, but
we are going to need some help I think from a budget perspective
448

to be able to do that as aggressively as I think the TRANSCOM
Commander would want us to do.
Senator DUCKWORTH. What do you think about using the fund as
an avenue for——
Secretary MODLY. Senator, I do not that the fund has funding.
I do not know if it is similar to the Strategic Deterrence Fund that
we have as well that is a fund that gives us some authorities but
it does not really have any funding attached to it. So I will have
to get back to you on that specifically in terms of what is there or
what we need to put into it.
Senator DUCKWORTH. Okay. Thank you.
I was disappointed that this year’s budget baseline proposal
omits key investments in sealift and logistics that we should be
prioritizing now, and we sort of talked about this. As you said,
there are a lot of unfunded priorities, but the list of unfunded pri-
orities includes tens of millions of dollars for emergency repairs to
sealift ships identified by TRANSCOM and advanced communica-
tions gear for the military sealift command ships.
Then in your February 18 memo that kicked off the Navy’s stem
to stern comprehensive review, you highlighted naval logistics as
an area that could be, quote, streamlined when searching for bil-
lions of dollars’ worth of savings.
So can you help me reconcile this? How can it be a priority but
then you are talking about this where you can cut? Or am I mis-
understanding what you mean by naval logistics would be stream-
lined? I mean, how do you plan to build up and sustain a growing
fleet of ships without prioritizing a strong logistics network? Who
picks up the slack?
Secretary MODLY. Well, Senator, I think that particular memo
went out to the entire Department of the Navy to look at every pos-
sible way that we can look at doing things better and more effi-
ciently. I do not think anyone would argue that our Department
from a logistics and supply chain is world class with respect to cost,
distribution, the business systems that support it. We have mul-
tiple redundant business systems, and every one of them takes a
budget line every year. So, we have to think about how we can do
this better, more efficiently, more closely approximate some of the
advances that have been made in supply chain management in the
commercial sector over the years, and that is what I was talking
about when I talked about logistics. Logistics demands are going to
keep going up. If we keep doing it the way we are doing it now,
it is going to cost us way too much.
Senator DUCKWORTH. We understood and agreed with that. On
the other hand, we need to make sure that we actually put further
investments in our logistics capabilities. We are not talking with
just sealift but also heavy lift aircraft. We also need to be talking
about how we project fuel forward. Everything that sucks gas
needs fuel. If we are going to be present in the Asia-Pacific region,
then we need to be able to project into the region beyond the first
72 hours, and so that is a real concern that I have.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Hawley?
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
449

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you for your serv-
ice.
General Berger, let me start by saying that I really want to ap-
plaud your decision to refocus the Marine Corps on the sea denial
mission. So thank you for your leadership in that area. Thank you
to you and your staff for keeping Congress informed and on board
with this as you have led the Marines in this new direction. Thank
you very much for that.
Let us talk a little bit about Fort Leonard Wood in my home
State, if we could for a second. General, Admiral Gilday, Fort Leon-
ard Wood has had the opportunity to train many of your marines
and sailors at its engineering, police, and CBRN schools. Can you
give us a sense of how this opportunity for joint training has bene-
fited your respective services both from a training and resource
management standpoint?
Admiral GILDAY. Senator, not in detail except that I have not
heard any problems.
Senator HAWLEY. Well, that is good.
Admiral GILDAY. But I cannot comment on that training.
General BERGER. Just a couple words, sir.
First, the Marine Corps is the smallest service, sir. We do not
own all our schools. Most of our marines go to other service schools.
The benefit in the particular case you are talking about is you
are learning the trade to a military occupation, but it is a trade.
You are learning alongside somebody you are probably going to
serve with later on from another service. So, the benefits are, one,
you do away with the myths. Two, there is some standardization
in how engineers operate, how military police view a problem be-
cause you are operating side by side. You are not in four different
schools doing it.
I think for us there is an economic benefit. We cannot afford our
own school. Two, the standardization thing is great, and three, it
may be the only time, but if not, it is the first time they are going
to operate alongside somebody from another service. So it tamps
down all the myths about them.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Thank you for that. We are, obvi-
ously, very proud of Fort Leonard Wood and the work that they do
there. I am glad that they are serving you well.
General, back to sea denial, can you give us an update on your
rogue fires and ground-based anti-ship missile programs in terms
of where they are now and their timelines for fielding?
General BERGER. Both of the capabilities you speak of in war
games and in simulation have proven—game-changer is probably
an over-the-top characterization, but it definitely changes the cal-
culus of an adversary because right now that capability is some-
thing we do not have, and posed with that, they have to act dif-
ferently.
Rogue fires in particular, on a great glide path. We are investing
in it. Who knows if that is the solution 10 years from now, but we
are going down that path right now.
Ground-launched cruise missiles and everything long-range pre-
cision fires that is in a small enough format that a small marine
unit can embark it, can use it, we are after it. Yes.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good.
450

From an ISR and C2 standpoint, what would you say, General,
are the most important programs for ensuring that Marine Corps
fire units have the targeting data they need to perform the sea de-
nial mission?
General BERGER. Some will say—and I think there is logic to
that—that they are kind of agnostic. I do not care where I get my
fire data solution from or what ISR platform. I just need the data,
and there is truth in that.
On the other hand, we need organic naval ISR so that that expe-
ditionary naval force that is operating either in EUCOM or in the
first island chain or wherever has the means to pick up the targets
forward in an expeditionary manner, and they got to be able to
launch and recover from naval platforms, from shore, and they got
to be small enough, if they are going to be embarked with us, that
we can sustain them. Right now, we have used MQ–9’s for the last
year and a half in Helmand province in Afghanistan as a learning
platform for us, how to close that kill chain organically.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Thank you.
Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, I will come back to you. Admi-
ral Davidson recently testified that about half of his attack sub-
marine requirement—only half—is being met in the Indo-Pacific
and a problem that he forecasts will worsen in the 2020s as our
attack submarines are retired faster than they are being replaced.
Talk to us about this. How is the Navy planning to mitigate the
anticipated shortfall here in the Indo-Pacific in particular?
Admiral GILDAY. Senator, we are buying submarines at the rate
that both Electric Boat and Huntington-Ingalls can produce them.
So we are buying at the maximum output right now with the ex-
ception of the fact that one submarine dropped from the budget in
2021.
It really comes down to a ruthless prioritization. So we are meet-
ing the Secretary of Defense’s direction for the numbers of ready
submarines to get to sea, and we have been doing that. Then it
really comes down to prioritization principally between Russia and
China in terms of how those submarines are then allocated across
the combatant commanders and employed.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me just ask you finally, Mr. Chairman,
aside from growing the submarine force, are there other invest-
ments that are needed to extend our undersea warfare advantage?
Admiral GILDAY. Unmanned, and so we are making great gains
in unmanned under the sea.
Senator HAWLEY. Very good. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
We thank all three of you for the time you spent with us. Excel-
lent testimony.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
451
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
MCAS CHERRY POINT & FRC–EAST

1. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Gilday, there appears to be some disagreement be-
tween the Navy and Marine Corps over who is responsible for paying to upgrade
facilities at FRC–East [Fleet Readiness Center-East]. I am concerned this argument
is delaying progress. Which service is responsible for funding the needed construc-
tion and modernization efforts at FRC–East and how will you lead in the depart-
ment to make sure that the necessary investments are made?
Admiral GILDAY. The Navy is working with the Marine Corps to solve this critical
issue. The Navy’s January 2018 Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) Infrastructure Opti-
mization Plan (IOP) Report to Congress laid out a ten-year ∼$3.5 billion Department
of the Navy (DON) plan for both facility and equipment investments/improvements.
The plan includes future projects for F–35 aircraft heavy maintenance: the mod-
ernization and restoration of two existing facilities at FRC–SW, a maintenance
hangar at FRC–East, Cherry Point, NC, and a second phase project for this hangar.
The Navy’s Strike Fighter procurement plan is a mix of 4th and 5th generation
Strike Fighters to provide complementary capacity and capability from our flight
decks that is needed to meet the threat through the 2030s. The Navy plans to pro-
cure up to 273 F–35C aircraft. The USMC is transitioning to a 100 percent 5th gen-
eration aircraft fleet to support Marine Aviation operational needs. The USMC
plans to procure up to 420 F–35B/C aircraft (F–35B: 353 / F–35C: 67). The Navy
is working with the USMC to evaluate the appropriate service MILCON cost share
based upon utilization and the best timing for these projects within the entire DON
portfolio. In the interim, capacity is being expanded within existing FRC spaces to
conduct required F–35 maintenance. The Department of the Navy is committed to
the success of the F–35 and has funded the F–35 Support Equipment Storage Facil-
ity, F–35 Training and Simulator Facility, F–35 Flight Line Utilities Modernization
Phase II, and F–35B Vertical Lift Fan Test Facility at MCAS Cherry Point.

2. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Gilday, we’ve been at a costly stalemate with FRC–
East, so I’d like to set up a meeting with the primary stakeholders from the Marine
Corps and Navy to finally identify the sticking point on this.
Admiral GILDAY. The DON is optimizing F–35 depot maintenance as evidenced by
the F–35 Lift Fan test facility at Cherry Point, NC. The Navy and Marine Corps
stakeholders are currently meeting to discuss and resolve this issue. Once DON ap-
proves the plan, we will provide the Committee an update. We look forward to the
opportunity to discuss FRC–East and its support to Navy and Marine Corps avia-
tion.
COMMUNICATION SPECTRUM—5G NETWORKS

3. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Gilday, Secretary Esper said, ‘‘DOD is willing to share
spectrum with 5G networks in the ‘‘Mid-Band’’ (3 to 4.2 gigahertz). What systems
does the Navy have that might be affected and how could it impact Homeland de-
fense?
Admiral GILDAY. The Navy uses this frequency range for both Air Defense and
Ballistic Missile Defense in support of maritime operations and homeland defense.
There are at least nineteen USN/USMC capabilities, to include every major capital
ship, that use this band in accordance with current spectrum allocation. We will
work closely with DOD, FCC and industry on a sharing partnership that supports
the Nation’s 5G goals while also ensuring the hundreds of billions of dollars in-
vested in national defense are not wasted. We can provide more details at a higher
classification upon request.

4. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Gilday, if DOD was required to ‘‘vacate’’ or leave that
band of the spectrum instead of sharing, what are the potential dollar costs to the
military?’’ How long would it take to move to a different area of the spectrum?
Admiral GILDAY. Moving capability from one band of the spectrum to another as-
sumes that frequencies can be identified to relocate. There are at least nineteen
USN/USMC capabilities, to include every major capital ship, that use S band and
they are all highly-sophisticated weapon systems that took decades and hundreds
of billions to develop. We would expect many decades and billions of dollars to re-
engineer systems. We will work closely with DOD, FCC and industry on a sharing
partnership that supports the Nation’s 5G goals while also ensuring the hundreds
of billions of dollars invested in national defense are not wasted. We can provide
more details at a higher classification upon request.
452
5. Senator TILLIS. Admiral Gilday, can you describe some of the ways that the
Navy relies on spectrum to support warfighter requirements? What are some of the
future spectrum warfighter requirements that will be essential to competing with
Russia and China on a future battlefield?
Admiral GILDAY. DOD considers the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to be both
a tool for communications, and a weapon to control our adversaries’ use of the EMS.
In other words, spectrum and its use is vital to the defense of our nation and na-
tional interests, and those of our allies. The Combat, Communications, Command
and Control over spectrum is foundational to all aspects of warfighting. The Navy
and Marine Corps use the EMS, from Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) to Extremely
High Frequency (EHF) to detect, track and attack the adversary. The implementa-
tion of EMS via command and control supports our own national interest, and those
of our coalition partners and their forces, to fight, spoof and otherwise manipulate
our adversaries. The criticality of spectrum to Navy/DOD missions cannot be under-
stated. As the United States pursues further sharing arrangements with the com-
mercial world it is essential we have full Congressional support in protecting De-
fense only spectrum in order to ensure national security.
Our Naval Forces’ ability to support diverse operations and crises is dependent
on their ability to use the EMS for offensive and defensive purposes, e.g., intel-
ligence; communications; position, navigation, and timing; sensing; command and
control (C2); cyber, electronic and kinetic attack; air, space and surface ranging; un-
manned air systems (UAS) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs); data trans-
mission and information storage and processing. The Navy and Marine Corps are
deployed globally and rely on the electromagnetic spectrum to remain highly maneu-
verable, flexible, and tactically effective. The ability to access and maneuver in the
EMS is a key enabler and underlying tenet of these concepts. Speed of command
will differentiate between victory and defeat in future engagements by controlling
the precise placement and timing of forces and effects. Using and controlling the
Radio Frequency spectrum is a vital required condition to achieve speed of command
in today’s Information Warfare-dominated word.
MCAS CHERRY POINT & FRC–EAST

6. Senator TILLIS. General Berger, there appears to be some disagreement be-
tween the Navy and Marine Corps over who is responsible for paying to upgrade
facilities at FRC–East. I am concerned this argument is delaying progress. Which
service is responsible for funding the needed construction and modernization efforts
at FRC–East and how will you lead in the department to make sure that the nec-
essary investments are made?
General BERGER. The Navy and Marine Corps are working together to solve this
critical issue. The Navy’s January 2018 Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) Infrastruc-
ture Optimization Plan (IOP) Report to Congress laid out a ten-year ∼$3.5 billion
Department of the Navy (DON) plan for both facility and equipment investments/
improvements. The plan includes two unfunded projects for joint F–35 aircraft
heavy maintenance: a maintenance hangar at FRC–East, Cherry Point, NC, and a
second phase project for this hangar. We are evaluating the appropriate service
MILCON cost share based upon utilization and the best timing for these projects
within the entire DON portfolio. In the interim, capacity is being expanded within
existing FRC spaces to conduct required F–35 maintenance.

7. Senator TILLIS. General Berger, we’ve been at a costly stalemate with FRC–
East, so I’d like to set up a meeting with the primary stakeholders from the Marine
Corps and Navy to finally identify the sticking point on this.
General BERGER. We look forward to the opportunity to discuss FRC East and its
support to Navy and Marine Corps aviation. My incoming Deputy Commandant for
Aviation will be fully prepared to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.
USMC ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

8. Senator TILLIS. General Berger, in your written testimony you state that you’re
going to do a review of major acquisition programs like F–35, JLTV, ACV etc.—and
that you expect that review will likely recommend major revisions and reductions
to some of our major programs. Where are you with that review?
General BERGER. Phase II of our overall Force Design 2030 effort concluded in
March of this year, and those findings and recommendations were publicly released
shortly thereafter. While we will continue to refine some elements of our overall
force with additional integrated planning teams, the vast majority of the focus will
transition to a rigorous wargaming and experimentation phase (phase III) where we
will further test our conclusions and recommendations. Based on the results of those
453
Phase III efforts, we will have a much better understanding of the operationally
suitable cuts that may be required to major acquisition programs such as the F–
35B/C, CH–53K, ACV, and JLTV. Based on our initial findings, all of those capabili-
ties are still required and will make the total force more ready; we simply might
need fewer of them.
9.Senator TILLIS. General Berger, Marine Corps Air Station New River will be the
home of over half of all the new CH–53Ks for the Marine Corps. I believe they just
completed the log demo there and have the pilot training simulators installed as
well. The CH–53E is an established aircraft but it is old and has maintenance chal-
lenges. Given the fact that your requirement for the CH–53K is 200 aircraft and
yet you only have about 140 CH–53Es, how important is it for you and the Marine
Corps to get these new CH–53Ks sooner rather than later?
General BERGER. As noted in my testimony before your Committee, and in your
QFR, the existing program of record is for 200 aircraft. However, that requirement
was anchored on an Active Duty force much larger than today’s force: 202,000 ma-
rines with 27 Active component infantry battalions. Since the requirement for 200
CH–53Ks was initially established over two decades ago, the overall force structure
has been reduced significantly. In 2010, we reduced the force to 24 Active compo-
nent infantry battalions, and as part of Force Design 2030, plan the reduction of
three additional infantry battalions. With only 21 Active component infantry battal-
ions to support, the requirement for heavy-lift helicopters has decreased by three
full squadrons, a total of 48 aircraft. If such a reduction is implemented, then the
resultant 152 aircraft capability will still exceed the current inventory of ∼140 CH–
53Es. More importantly, these aircraft will relieve pressure on surface connectors—
both land and sea—and provide a much needed upgrade to our future naval expedi-
tionary forces—specifically the redesigned Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and
new Marine Littoral Regiment.
USMC BUDGET (PB–21)

10. Senator TILLIS. General Berger, in your written testimony you state that the
timing of this POM (Program Objective Memorandum) submission coincides with an
inflection point for the Marine Corps. Yet, looking over the Marine Corps’ budget
I really don’t see much change. Why isn’t there more significant change in Presi-
dent’s Budget 2021?
General BERGER. The Marine Corps’ President’s Budget 2021 budget request was
submitted prior to the completion of our initial Force Design effort which just con-
cluded in March 2020. The President’s Budget 2022 budget request is informed by
our initial Force Design conclusions as noted in our Force Design 2030 report and
will reflect more significant changes related to new requirements to include capabili-
ties such as Group 5 UAS and other unmanned capabilities.
USMC END STRENGTH

11. Senator TILLIS. General Berger, why didn’t you inform the Congress of your
plans to reduce end strength during the NDAA conference process? The ink on the
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA has barely dried. We had plenty of time to adjust the num-
bers during conference negotiations.
General BERGER. At the time of Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA conference negotiations,
the initial phases of our Force Design effort were underway yet had not been com-
pleted. As such, we were not prepared to provide concrete recommendations for a
reduction in end strength, and needed additional time to ensure that any cut was
grounded in a defensible analytic foundation.

12. Senator TILLIS. General Berger, in light of your plans for fiscal year 2020, why
should we trust the end strength numbers you included in the fiscal year 2021
budget request?
General BERGER. The Marine Corps strives to maintain an open and transparent
dialogue with Congress, providing the most accurate information it can in as timely
a manner as possible. Congress can ‘‘trust’’ our numbers because those are based
on a solid analytic foundation, and informed by rigorous wargaming and experimen-
tation. Over the next ten years, Congress can expect Marine Corps end strength to
align with our ongoing Force Design effort, the initial stages of which were com-
pleted in early 2020. While this effort will be iterative and responsive to the rapidly
evolving security environment, we are confident that further reductions to end
strength will be required to enable investment in future capabilities. Moving for-
ward, we will continue to update Congress on our Force Design progress and any
required organizational changes to enable it.
454
CAMP LEJEUNE TOXIC EXPOSURE

13. Senator TILLIS. General Berger, I understand that the Agency for Toxic Sub-
stances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has identified a number of buildings at
Camp Lejeune that are still threatened by toxic chemical plumes with high detect-
able levels of the cancer causing TCE. During Hurricane Florence, TCE remediation
was temporarily halted due to storm damage at the barracks at HP 57 in Hadnot
Point. HP 57 houses female marines of child bearing age, and TCE is proven to
cause fetal defects if pregnant women are exposed to it. Are there any current ef-
forts underway to move female marines of child bearing age from the HP 57 bar-
racks? If not, what steps are currently underway to ensure that remediation of TCE
in this location does not occur again?
General BERGER. Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Lejeune does not plan to move
female marines from HP57 because effective measures have been implemented to
prevent vapor intrusion (VI). Beginning in 2007, MCB Camp Lejeune conducted a
base-wide VI evaluation, including building HP57, in coordination with the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ). The Marine Corps has shared this infor-
mation with ATSDR for their ongoing MCB Camp Lejeune VI Public Health Assess-
ment. ATSDR has assured us that if they identify any health risks they will imme-
diately notify installation officials. To date, they have not done so. In 2014, testing
indicated elevated contaminant vapors in a mechanical room at HP57. A prompt in-
vestigation determined that the vapors were coming from an uncapped sewer pipe
which was promptly repaired. Since that repair, no air quality tests have detected
TCE vapors from VI above residential indoor air screening levels. As a pre-
cautionary measure, MCB Camp Lejeune installed an active sewer venting system
as a secondary engineering control. Based on historical test results, including test
results prior to the installation of the active sewer venting system, MCB Camp
Lejeune does not expect VI to occur at HP57 even during electrical interruptions as
briefly occurred because of Hurricane Florence. The EPA and NCDEQ both concur
with these primary and secondary engineering controls and agree that this approach
protects human health.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
SOUTHEAST ALASKA ACOUSTIC MEASUREMENT FACILITY

14. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Modly, the Southeast Alaska Acoustic Measure-
ment Facility (SEAFAC) is the Navy’s only West Coast asset for making high fidel-
ity passive acoustic signature measurements. It is my understanding that the ma-
jority of the workforce for this facility does not live—full time—in Ketchikan, Alas-
ka, and instead commutes—at cost to the Navy—to conduct operations at the facil-
ity. What is the Navy’s rationale for this transient workforce and what is the yearly
cost to the Navy?
Secretary MODLY. The SEAFAC Site Director and year-round operations and
maintenance staff are local personnel who live in Ketchikan. The operations and
maintenance crew consists of 16 personnel who work a standard workweek through-
out the entire year at SEAFAC, ensuring the facility is updated, maintained, and
ready to support acoustic tests. In an average year, approximately 10 acoustic trials
are conducted. A typical trial lasts 72 hours, bringing the total average number of
testing days at SEAFAC to approximately 30 days per year. When a test is sched-
uled, a trial analyst team of experts, assembled from across the NAVSEA organiza-
tion, travels to SEAFAC to conduct around-the-clock operations for the duration of
the trial. The trial analyst team consists of subject matter experts in sonar, acous-
tics, signal processing, submarine stealth, and other specialties. Following the test,
the analyst team members return to their home laboratories where the computer
infrastructure, advanced analysis tools, and other communication and support capa-
bilities exist to analyze the data and produce products for the Fleet. The trial ana-
lyst team of subject matter experts is not required at SEAFAC other than during
these tests, and they support similar testing at SEAFAC’s sister facility, the South
TOTO (Tongue of the Ocean) Acoustic Measurement Facility (STAFAC), located in
the Bahamas, for Atlantic Fleet submarines. These experts also support a signifi-
cant amount of work at Navy submarine bases, as well as two primary Navy labora-
tories, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, located at Bethesda, MD,
and Submarine Base Bangor, in Silverdale, WA. The laboratories serve as home
base for the trial analyst team. It is much more cost effective (estimated savings
of $3.7M of travel costs annually) to have a nationally distributed team of experts
455
supporting the Navy globally than to locate them all in Ketchikan, where they are
only required 30 days per year.

15. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary Modly, has the Navy explored the possibility of
local hires in Ketchikan to staff the facility? If so, what was the result? If not, why
not?
Secretary MODLY. The year-round operations and maintenance personnel at
SEAFAC have been local Ketchikan people since SEAFAC’s construction in the
1990s. Throughout the life of SEAFAC, the Navy has been a strong advocate for
using local Ketchikan personnel to a large extent and whenever possible. Contract
actions for support of SEAFAC are always open for submittals from local entities,
and they encourage the use of local personnel.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY
F/A–18 SUPER HORNETS

16. Senator HAWLEY. Secretary Modly, the fiscal year 2021 budget request in-
cludes funding for 24 F/A–18E/F Super Hornets, but eliminates 36 aircraft from fu-
ture years, halting production in fiscal year 2022. As a result, the F/A–18 line could
face a closure decision next year. What is the Navy’s tactical aviation shortfall this
year, and how would it be impacted if the Super Hornet line is closed after this
year?
Secretary MODLY. The strike fighter inventory management modelling accounts
for procurement block III Super Hornets and Joint Strike Fighter, service life modi-
fication of block III Super Hornets, maintenance repair, and projected aircraft utili-
zation based on the optimized fleet response plan. Inventory modeling with Presi-
dent’s Budget 2021 shows a maximum strike fighter shortfall of 58 aircraft in fiscal
year 2021, with continual improvement throughout the future year’s defense pro-
gram. The Department of the Navy is committed to achieving a mix of 4th and 5th
Generation assets by 2030 with the F/A–18E/F and F–35C fleet while developing
Next Generation Air Dominance to replace the F/A–18E/F as it reaches end of serv-
ice life.

17. Senator HAWLEY. Secretary Modly, what is the Navy’s strategy for engaging
our international partners and how that could help extend the F/A–18 production
line?
Secretary MODLY. The Department of Navy (DON) actively engages with our
international partners on F/A–18 opportunities. The DON is currently in formal
strike-fighter competitions with the governments of Canada (88 aircraft), Finland
(64 aircraft), Germany (90 or 45 aircraft), India (57 aircraft) and Switzerland (40
aircraft). Formal international commitments are not expected prior to calendar year
2021, with deliveries in 2024 and beyond.

18. Senator HAWLEY. Secretary Modly, as a complement to new production, the
Navy also invested in the F/A–18E/F Service Life Modification (SLM) program to ex-
tend the Super Hornet fleet and maintain tactical aviation readiness. The SLM pro-
gram will certainly yield positive results to lengthen the service life of aircraft. How-
ever, even successfully remanufactured aircraft inherently increase the average age
of the tactical air force. Additionally, SLM relies on a production line of new Super
Hornets for on-time parts and production expertise. Has the Navy assessed the im-
pact of eliminating new Super Hornets on SLM cost or effectiveness or the long-
term cost of sustaining an increasingly aging fleet, and if so, what is the Navy’s as-
sessment?
Secretary MODLY. The Service Life Modification (SLM) program supports Strike
Fighter Inventory Management while a greater number of 5th generation fighters
join the Fleet. SLM is a standalone contract with dedicated programmatic, engineer-
ing, quality and touch labor resources (i.e. not shared with production), and does
not negatively impact the production line. Production ceasing in fiscal year 2021
may present opportunities to acquire experienced touch labor to augment the SLM
program. The Department of Navy has assessed the cost effectiveness, and recog-
nizes the increased operating and sustainment cost associated with operating aging
fleets. It has divested from legacy Hornets at the operational edge, with the Reserve
component and Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center to follow in 2025.
Currently, the Super Hornet is less expensive to procure and operate than the Joint
Strike Fighter. However, it is expected that the cost per flight hour of 4th and 5th
456
Gen platforms will equalize near the end of the Future Year Defense Program as
a greater number of F–35C are operated in the fleet.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED
PRIVATIZED HOUSING

19. Senator REED. Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger, regard-
ing privatized homes that are ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) compli-
ant, my understanding is that roughly five percent of homes must be made acces-
sible for ADA families. And if ADA families do not have an ADA home when they
move to an installation, they are placed on a waiting list. Also, if a family moves
into an ADA compliant home, they must sign a form saying they will vacate the
home if a family requiring ADA compliance needs one. We have received reports of
military families unable to move into an ADA home, instances of families who have
not moved out when an incoming family requires an ADA home. Are you aware of
any such instances? And if not, can you please look into it and report back to us?
Secretary MODLY. All but one of the Department of the Navy’s (DON) privatized
family housing business agreements include specific Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) compliance language to address alterations for ADA accommodation. In addi-
tion, all projects are required to comply with all Federal, state and municipal laws
and certify compliance each year. The business agreement for Kingsville II does not
currently include ADA language in the business agreement and will be updated
when agreements are updated to incorporate NDAA changes. On Navy installations,
some ADA families have not immediately moved into an ADA compliant home and
have been put on a wait list. They are moved into an ADA home when one becomes
available or when the property manager has modified a home to meet the needs of
the family. CNIC has no record of families (non-ADA) occupying ADA homes failing
to move when given proper notification within the lease agreement by the local
property manager. For Marine Corps installations, Marine Corps Base Hawaii indi-
cated that there have been instances when a non-ADA family was relocated at the
PPV partner’s expense in order to accommodate an ADA family. MCICOM has no
record of this being an issue at any other installation. With the exception of MCB
Hawaii, most Marine Corps installations do not require non-ADA families to sign
a form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a home if it is required for
an ADA family.
Admiral GILDAY. All but one of the Department of the Navy’s (DON) privatized
family housing business agreements include specific Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) compliance language to address alterations for ADA accommodation. In addi-
tion, all projects are required to comply with all Federal, state and municipal laws
and certify compliance each year. The business agreement for Kingsville II does not
currently include ADA language in the business agreement and will be updated
when agreements are updated to incorporate NDAA changes. On Navy installations,
some ADA families have not immediately moved into an ADA compliant home and
have been put on a wait list. They are moved into an ADA home when one becomes
available or when the property manager has modified a home to meet the needs of
the family. CNIC has no record of families (non-ADA) occupying ADA homes failing
to move when given proper notification within the lease agreement by the local
property manager. For Marine Corps installations, Marine Corps Base Hawaii indi-
cated that there have been instances when a non-ADA family was relocated at the
PPV partner’s expense in order to accommodate an ADA family. MCICOM has no
record of this being an issue at any other installation. With the exception of MCB
Hawaii, most Marine Corps installations do not require non-ADA families to sign
a form prior to occupancy stating that they will vacate a home if it is required for
an ADA family.
General BERGER. MCB Hawaii indicated there have been instances when a non-
ADA family was relocated at the PPV partner’s expense in order to accommodate
an ADA family. MCB Hawaii does require that non-ADA families sign a form prior
to occupancy stating that they will vacate a home if it is required for an ADA fam-
ily. This has not been an issue at any of our other installations, thus most Marine
Corps installations do not require non-ADA families to sign a form prior to occu-
pying an ADA home. We will review current policies across our installations and
ensure all are in compliance.
OPERATIONAL ENERGY ALIGNMENT TO NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

20. Senator REED. Secretary Modly, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger, accord-
ing to the Navy’s recently analysis sent to this Committee, a hybrid electric drive
457
(HED) can reduce fuel use as much as 37 percent compared to a ship without one.
Another type of operational energy improvement called stern flaps, save the Navy
$125 million per year. These and other types of operational energy improvements
increase on-station time for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships and can help ad-
dress the tyranny of distance fuel logistics problem in the Pacific. These are all as-
pects of the Navy’s alignment with the National Defense Strategy. Can each of you
please briefly talk about how operational energy improvements increase combat ca-
pability and lethality of the Navy and Marine Corps and what kind of other invest-
ments you all are making for ships and deployed forces?
Secretary MODLY. The Navy’s warfighting strategy, aligned to the NDS, employs
a Distributed Maritime Operations concept that increases the importance of forward
logistics capability, platform endurance, and operational reach. Navy’s operational
energy improvements target technologies that extend energy supplies into contested
environments and optimize energy use. The following investments enhance the
naval operational energy network to enable distributed operations: The MQ–25A is
a CVN-based unmanned aerial tanker that will extend the reach of the carrier
strike group’s air wing Afloat refueling projects, including the Seabased Petroleum
Distribution System (SPDS) and Improved Modular Fuel Delivery System (IMFDS),
will enable a more reliable and robust fuel distribution network, and provide options
for getting fuel over the shore to marines. The Integrated Power and Energy Sys-
tems project is developing the next generation shipboard power and energy architec-
ture and subsystems needed to optimize electrical energy distribution and enable fu-
ture high energy weapons Advanced batteries and fuel cells are enabling more un-
manned capabilities and extending reach and endurance of naval weapons systems
The Mobility Fuels program continues to provide testing and certification capabili-
ties to ensure the Navy has access to reliable sources of fuel worldwide Energy Com-
mand and Control tools, including the Global Energy Information System
(GENISYS), the Replenishment at Sea Planner (RASP), and Maritime Tactical Com-
mand and Control (MTC2), will support tactical and campaign level energy manage-
ment.
Admiral GILDAY. The Navy’s warfighting strategy, aligned to the NDS, employs
a Distributed Maritime Operations concept that increases the importance of forward
logistics capability, platform endurance, and operational reach. Navy’s operational
energy improvements target technologies that extend energy supplies into contested
environments and optimize energy use. The following investments enhance the
naval operational energy network to enable distributed operations:
• The MQ–25A is a CVN-based unmanned aerial tanker that will extend the
reach of the carrier strike group’s air wing.
• Afloat refueling projects, including the Seabased Petroleum Distribution System
(SPDS) and Improved Modular Fuel Delivery System (IMFDS), will enable a
more reliable and robust fuel distribution network, and provide options for get-
ting fuel over the shore to marines.
• The Integrated Power and Energy Systems project is developing the next gen-
eration shipboard power and energy architecture and subsystems needed to op-
timize electrical energy distribution and enable future high energy weapons.
• Advanced batteries and fuel cells are enabling more unmanned capabilities and
extending reach and endurance of naval weapons systems.
• The Mobility Fuels program continues to provide testing and certification capa-
bilities to ensure the Navy has access to reliable sources of fuel worldwide.
• Energy Command and Control tools, including the Global Energy Information
System (GENISYS), the Replenishment at Sea Planner (RASP), and Maritime
Tactical Command and Control (MTC2), will support tactical and campaign
level energy management.
General BERGER. The Marine Corps is investing approximately $51 million in fis-
cal year 2021 to address Operational Energy (OE) challenges, $18 million to in-
crease future warfighting capability, and $33 million to enhance mission effective-
ness of the current force. For example, we are investing in advanced power sources
and new power generation and harvesting methods, with supporting research and
development in renewable energy sources, mobile electric power, new advanced bat-
tery chemistries, and alternative energy sources (e.g. hydrogen fuel cells or alu-
minum based fuels). We are also seeking novel methods to execute bulk fuel dis-
tribution, for example, investing in manned and unmanned systems that expand the
distribution network via low-cost, risk-worthy platforms, while enhancing network
redundancy and inverting the energy cost curve. OE investments reduce both the
footprint and logistics tail required to support forward forces—essential if we are
to realize the potential of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expedi-
tionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).
458
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN
PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD JOINT LAND USE STUDY

21. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard and the town of Kittery, Maine recently unveiled a ‘‘Joint Land Use
Study’’ to address traffic and congestion issues as the shipyard continues to expand.
How is the Navy involved in this process?
Secretary MODLY. The Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Joint
Land Use Study (JLUS) is an opportunity for the Town of Kittery, the Southern
Maine Planning and Development Commission (SMPDC) along with the States of
Maine and New Hampshire, and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) to
strengthen their current partnerships. This includes the ability to understand and
address the issues impacting both the Navy and communities throughout the region,
including traffic congestion. The JLUS also established a blueprint to support mili-
tary readiness, community growth, and economic development. Extensive public out-
reach and engagement occurred throughout the JLUS planning process. The JLUS
is a collaborative community planning effort between PNSY, state and federal offi-
cials, and various community stakeholders. Communication and coordination be-
tween the shipyard and the community are more robust through the study process.
The process encourages them to act as a team to prevent or limit compatibility
issues caused by future shipyard expansion or community growth. Kittery and the
SMPDC sponsored the JLUS with funding support from the U.S. Department of De-
fense, Office of Economic Adjustment.
Admiral GILDAY. The Kittery, Maine, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Joint Land
Use Study (JLUS) is an opportunity for the Town of Kittery, the Southern Maine
Planning and Development Commission (SMPDC) along with the States of Maine
and New Hampshire, and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) to strengthen
their current partnerships. This includes the ability to understand and address the
issues impacting both the Navy and communities throughout the region, including
traffic congestion. The JLUS also established a blueprint to support military readi-
ness, community growth, and economic development. Extensive public outreach and
engagement occurred throughout the JLUS planning process. The JLUS is a collabo-
rative community planning effort between PNSY, state and federal officials, and
various community stakeholders. Communication and coordination between the
shipyard and the community are more robust through the study process. The proc-
ess encourages them to act as a team to prevent or limit compatibility issues caused
by future shipyard expansion or community growth. Kittery and the SMPDC spon-
sored the JLUS with funding support from the U.S. Department of Defense, Office
of Economic Adjustment.

22. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, there is a military
construction (MILCON) project in the fiscal year 2023 budget plan that would ac-
quire the rail spur land near the Route 1 bypass and Route 103 heading towards
the shipyard to temporarily hold supplies for the shipyard and create satellite park-
ing. How will the Navy commit to ensuring the needs at the shipyard are ad-
dressed?
Secretary MODLY. Yes, the Navy has a requirement for the rail spur land near
the Route 1 bypass and Route 103 heading towards the shipyard as a temporary
holding space for supplies and to create satellite parking for the shipyard. No dis-
cussions have taken place between the Town of Kittery or any Joint Land Use Study
committee stakeholders regarding any projects that would support any such initia-
tives. The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) submitted a MILCON P–1170 project
request for fiscal year 2022 that was not programmed. Following internal Navy
processes, the project is being resubmitted for consideration in future Navy pro-
gramming actions. The Navy will ensure the needs at the Shipyard are addressed
through the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). SIOP is using
a digital-twin planning tool to help guide the Navy to final decisions for all projects
needed to support an efficient shipyard configuration. The digital-twin effort at
PNSY will be completed during the second quarter of fiscal year 2021, with an up-
dated Area Development Plan expected to be completed by the third quarter of fiscal
year 2022.
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, the Navy has a requirement for the rail spur land near the
Route 1 bypass and Route 103 heading towards the shipyard as a temporary holding
space for supplies and to create satellite parking for the shipyard. No discussions
have taken place between the Town of Kittery or any Joint Land Use Study com-
mittee stakeholders regarding any projects that would support any such initiatives.
The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) submitted a MILCON P–1170 project re-
459
quest for fiscal year 2022 that was not programmed. Following internal Navy proc-
esses, the project is being resubmitted for consideration in future Navy program-
ming actions. The Navy will ensure the needs at the Shipyard are addressed
through the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). SIOP is using
a digital-twin planning tool to help guide the Navy to final decisions for all projects
needed to support an efficient shipyard configuration. The digital-twin effort at
PNSY will be completed during the second quarter of fiscal year 2021, with an up-
dated Area Development Plan expected to be completed by the third quarter of fiscal
year 2022.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
VIRGINIA-CLASS

23. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, yesterday, Secretary Geurts testified
before the Seapower Subcommittee that the Virginia-class does not have an execu-
tion issue, and there’s no concern about the contractor’s ability to deliver—it is truly
an affordability issue, which is why one Virginia-class submarine is the top priority
on the Navy’s unfunded requirements list. Do you agree with this assessment?
Secretary MODLY. Yes, this was not an execution issue. The construction sched-
ules which had been lagging on Virginia-class submarines are stabilizing, and the
Navy can execute a 2nd ship if it is funded in fiscal year 2021. During the budget
process, strategic decisions had to be made across the entire Navy portfolio to bal-
ance requirements versus the top line budget. A second submarine is the Navy’s
next priority and, for that reason, is at the top of our unfunded priorities list.

24. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, why did the Navy budget request only
include one submarine in fiscal year 2021, exacerbating the shortfall in fast-attack
submarines?
Secretary MODLY. The Navy faces significant budgetary pressures, and funding
for additional fast attack submarines must compete with other important demands,
such as readiness and force level requirements of other classes of ships, including
Columbia. Although SSN force structure remains below the Navy requirement, the
Navy is able to manage force requirements to execute our required missions during
this time, while expanding the industrial base to support growing a larger more le-
thal SSN force structure.

25. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, are you concerned about the potential
harm to the submarine industrial base and workforce if only one Virginia-class sub-
marine is funding?
Secretary MODLY. A healthy industrial base is critical to meeting the shipbuilding
demand outlined in President’s Budget 2021 and the Navy greatly appreciates the
support Congress has given us to stabilize and enhance that industrial base and
shipbuilding programs. The Navy must have a stable industrial base in order to not
only ramp up for the future, but also to sustain the employment and the skill levels
already in place. While it is imperative that the Navy retain and expand our com-
petitive advantage and improve capacity and capability, the Navy faces budgetary
limitations and competing priorities. The industrial base should not be harmed by
funding only one submarine in fiscal year 2021. However, maintaining the two per
year build rate is the most effective way to stabilize the industrial base and increase
SSN capacity. For this reason, the Virginia-class ship is the number one priority
on the Unfunded Priority List. The Virginia-class Submarine (VCS) Block V Multi-
Year Procurement (MYP) contract includes a priced option for one additional SSN
with VPM executable in either fiscal year 2021, fiscal year 2022, or fiscal year 2023.
Additionally, as required by public law 115–232, the contract contains unpriced op-
tions for an additional ship in fiscal year 2022 and fiscal year 2023. The President’s
Budget 2021 request and prior year budgets (fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2020)
include funding to support critical spare materials for a tenth VCS Block V hull.
Funding for these materials early in the MYP is critical to level loading supplier’s
work orders and serves to mitigate many impacts of procuring a single submarine
in fiscal year 2021. If a tenth VCS Block V option is not exercised the material
would be assigned to subsequent SSNs. Additionally, the Navy continues to imple-
ment the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP), which coordinates the key actions re-
quired to accomplish integrated construction across the nuclear shipbuilding enter-
prise, including VCS, Columbia-class, and Ford-class. The IEP includes a substan-
tial focus on meeting labor demands and both shipyards have contributed workforce
460
acquisition and development strategies. The Navy will continue its efforts to sustain
a viable submarine industrial base and its workforce.

26. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Gilday,do you believe that our current pace of
submarine construction is sufficient for the United States to maintain undersea
dominance—particularly with regard to near-peer adversaries Russia and China?
Admiral GILDAY. Yes, it is imperative that the Navy retain and expand our com-
petitive advantage, both in capacity and capability. The Navy will continue to re-
examine our force structure and Shipbuilding plans, improving SSN capacity where
feasible given budgetary limitations and competing priorities. Of particular impor-
tance is to preserve our industrial base and establish an aggressive, forward-look-
ing, competitive posture. Virginia-class submarines use modular construction with
an open architecture to enable capability improvements. Each successive submarine
block continues to include capability enhancements keeping us ahead of the threat
and restoring operational margin.
ELECTRIC BOAT AND GROTON WORK FORCE

27. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, I would like a staff-level brief on
Navy efforts to stabilize the submarine workforce, but specifically I’d like to know:
When do you expect to have a contract in place for Electric Boat workers to help
public shipyards with maintenance or other availabilities to ease the workforce dip?
Secretary MODLY. The Navy is evaluating all contract opportunities and struc-
tures for augmenting the nuclear ship maintenance workforce from private ship-
yards. Therefore, the Navy cannot provide specific information on the number peo-
ple or the specific companies that would be involved. The Navy will reach out to
your staff to schedule a briefing at the earliest opportunity.

28. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, how many workers will this help, and
which public shipyards are participating?
Secretary MODLY. The Navy is evaluating all contact opportunities and structures
for accomplishing the nuclear ship maintenance workload with our private industry
partners. The Navy will reach out to your staff to schedule a briefing at the earliest
opportunity.

29. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, what other policies or authorities are
required in order to ease the trend of furloughs and new hires to stabilize the sub-
marine industrial base workforce?
Secretary MODLY. A skilled, experienced industrial base workforce is key to the
efficient construction and maintenance of submarines. The Navy closely oversees
workload and workforce requirements necessary to meet submarine construction
and maintenance schedules. As Columbia lead ship construction begins this year
and ramps up to serial production in fiscal year 2026, the submarine construction
workforce will need to expand from current levels. There are no new policies or au-
thorities required however. The Columbia program will continue to benefit from au-
thorities in the National Sea Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF) to help level-load the
industrial base and the associated workforce. NSBDF authorities of particular ben-
efit to the workforce include: Economic Order Quantity in support of Multi-Program
Material Procurement, Advance Construction, and Continuous Production which re-
duce construction schedule risk through consistent demand signals and level loading
enabling construction efficiencies & facilities optimization. In addition, Congress has
appropriated $573 million to the Virginia and Columbia programs since fiscal year
2018 for submarine industrial base expansion and risk reduction. These funds are
critical for actively managing supply base risks and aiding with supplier develop-
ment. An additional key enabler for de-risking the workforce and industrial base is
the on-time award of the Build I contract (SSBN 826 and 827). The Department of
Defense has submitted a legislative proposal requesting authority to award the in-
crementally funded Build I contract. In order to exercise the Build, I option on
schedule, the authority to award the incrementally funded contract is required by
October 2020. In the event of a fiscal year 2021 Continuing Resolution, an anomaly
will be required, including new start language and incremental funding authority.
Even with plans to mitigate workload shortfalls and manage green labor, peaks and
valleys will continue to occur in the work force due to submarine construction and
repair schedules. To address these near term ebbs, the Navy has assigned some sub-
marine maintenance availabilities to private shipyards. The Navy will continue to
evaluate future opportunities to help manage the workload in private shipyards and
to ease the workload ramp to Columbia serial production.
461
30. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, what is the plan for maintenance on
the USS John Warner? When do you anticipate this maintenance availability will
be awarded?
Secretary MODLY. The USS John Warner’s Extended Drydocking Selected Re-
stricted Availability is scheduled for accomplishment in fiscal year 2023. As the
Navy continues to balance its workload across the entire industrial base, it will con-
tinue to consider the available capacity within the public and private sectors. The
Navy anticipates making a final decision by the end of the second quarter of cal-
endar year 2021.
CH–53K FUNDING CUTS

31. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Berger, would you support funding for 9 CH–
53Ks in the fiscal year 2021 budget?
General BERGER. We budgeted for 7 aircraft in fiscal year 2021. If ∼$240 million
of additional funding were made available to the Marine Corps, we would prefer to
apply those resources toward higher Service acquisition priorities aligned to Force
Design 2030 such as Group 5 MALE UAS. We remain committed to the HMH pro-
gram as articulated in the Force Design 2030 report, and think that our current
pace for procurement remains appropriate.

32. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Berger, What role does the CH53K play in the
expeditionary advanced basing operations concept of employment, and supporting
distributed maritime operations?
General BERGER. Beyond its traditional role as heavy-lift support, the CH–53K’s
exact function in our emerging naval concepts of Distributed Maritime Operations
(DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) requires additional
study. We aim to advance our understanding of the aircraft’s role in DMO and
EABO during rigorous experimentation and exercises as part of our ongoing Force
Design effort. As noted in our Force Design 2030 report, we are confident that 5
CH–53K squadrons will provide the modern heavy-lift capabilities that our stand-
in naval forces require. We see the CH–53K as one of several key capabilities within
a larger system of naval and joint capabilities whose role is largely dependent upon
the presence or absence of other assets such as surface connectors, as well as the
size and weight of our base firing elements—HIMARs, LW155, or future Rogue
Fires. The CH–53K has the ability to move more fuel, equipment, critical supplies,
and marines at greater distances than any current rotorcraft; thus, should provide
our forward deployed forces with a key capability for maritime gray zone competi-
tion against peer or near-peer adversaries. In addition, it will provide Fleet Com-
manders and ARG/MEU Commanders with a modern capability in support of our
traditional crisis response role. As our EABO experimentation progresses, I will pro-
vide you and the Committee with updates, and look forward to discussing this pro-
gram with you in the near future.
WORK FORCE DEVELOPMENT FUNDING CUTS

33. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, last year the Defense Acquisition
Workforce Development Account appropriated over 400 million for work force devel-
opment across the Department of Defense. Additionally in support of the Columbia
program, 123 million was appropriated for submarine industrial base expansion to
ensure that second and third-tier contractors can meet increased production require-
ments. Can you provide this Committee an update on the funding provided last year
to support supplier and work force development?
Secretary MODLY. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Account funds
the recruitment, training, and retention of Department of Defense personnel. This
fund does not provide funding to support private shipbuilder workforce development.
The fiscal year 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $8 million in the In-
dustrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Support line for submarine workforce de-
velopment. In previous years, the federal government provided assistance to benefit
the submarine industrial base through Department of Labor grants to manufac-
turing workforce development programs. Programs in Connecticut and Rhode Island
leveraged this funding to recruit and train the increasingly green force. Funding ap-
propriated by Congress in fiscal year 2020 will be used to support similar programs.
The fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act and the fiscal year 2020
Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $123 million for submarine industrial
base expansion and risk reduction. Similar to the fiscal year 2019 $225 million pro-
vided, the fiscal year 2020 funding will be applied to developing alternate source
suppliers, developing strategic sourcing suppliers, and improving capacity and capa-
462
bility at existing suppliers. A separate brief will be provided with detailed informa-
tion regarding funding appropriated for submarine supplier development.
34. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Development Account in the fiscal year 2021 budget has been reduced by over 3⁄4
from fiscal year 2020 enacted levels, from 400 million to 92 million. Are you con-
cerned about how this drop in funding will impact the sustainment of the industrial
base and submarine construction schedules?
Secretary MODLY. The successful sustainment of the submarine industrial base
and its associated weapons systems relies on a highly skilled and trained acquisition
workforce, including the supporting personnel assigned to work directly with the ac-
quisition workforce. The acquisition workforce, in coordination with our industry
partners, plays an integral role in supporting and enabling submarine construction
schedule efforts. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Account supports
training and development of the acquisition workforce and is a critical element of
both effective execution of the acquisition programs and ensuring a pipeline of quali-
fied employees. The Navy faces significant budgetary pressures, and funding for
training and development of the acquisition workforce must compete with other im-
portant demands such as readiness. However, the Navy is prioritizing efforts with
the funding that remains to minimize impacts to the industrial base and submarine
construction schedules. We are focusing on attracting talent to the civilian work-
force—targeting critical skill gaps such as STEM and Information Technology—and
continue to leverage section 1111 hiring authorities to hire highly qualified acquisi-
tion and technology experts with a focus on Submarine Supply Chain challenges.
The Navy is also continuing to provide training to improve the understanding be-
tween industry and government relationships. Funding will also be set aside to sup-
port the congressional directives in prior NDAAs such as supporting program man-
ager development, industry exchange programs, and increased experiential learning.
35. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, as you know, Columbia construction
begins this year. What still needs to be done to improve supplier and work force
development?
Secretary MODLY. Since fiscal year 2018, Congress has appropriated $573 million
for submarine industrial base expansion in the Virginia and Columbia funding
lines. The Navy will continue to use these funds to actively manage supply base risk
and aid with supplier development. As Columbia lead ship construction begins this
year and ramps up to serial production in fiscal year 2026, the submarine construc-
tion workforce will need to expand from current levels. The Navy, through the var-
ious program offices, closely oversees workload and workforce requirements nec-
essary to meet construction levels and schedules, including the shipbuilders’ long-
term, coordinated workforce development plans. Key aspects of these plans are to
find a sufficient number of qualified workers and to manage and maximize the effec-
tiveness of green labor. In recent years, the Federal Government has contributed
to state and private investments in manufacturing workforce development pro-
grams. These programs have increased the qualified labor pool for the submarine
industrial base and increased the preparedness of workers as they enter the work-
force. Continued funding of these programs would be beneficial to the Navy and its
partners.

36. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, what is the impact of the Virginia-
class ramp deduction from two to one this year in respect to ensuring we have the
right trained and educated work force?
Secretary MODLY. A healthy industrial base is critical to meeting the shipbuilding
demand outlined in in the fiscal year 2021 budget request, and the Navy greatly
appreciates the support Congress has given us to stabilize and enhance that indus-
trial base and shipbuilding programs. The Navy must have a stable industrial base
and workforce in order to not only ramp up for the future, but also to sustain the
employment and the skill levels already in place. While it is imperative that the
Navy retain and expand our competitive advantage and improve capacity and capa-
bility, the Navy faces budgetary limitations and competing priorities. The industrial
base and workforce should not be harmed by funding only one submarine in fiscal
year 2021 however, maintaining the two per year build rate is the most effective
way to stabilize the industrial base and increase SSN capacity. For this reason, the
Virginia-class ship is the number one priority on the Unfunded Priority List. The
Virginia-class Submarine (VCS) Block V contract was structured to include a priced
option for one additional SSN with VPM executable in either fiscal year 2021, fiscal
year 2022, or fiscal year 2023. Additionally, as required by public law 115–232, the
contract contains unpriced options for an additional ship in fiscal year 2022 and fis-
463
cal year 2023. The President’s fiscal year 2021 budget request and prior year budg-
ets (fiscal year 2018 to fiscal year 2020) include funding to support critical spare
materials for a tenth VCS Block V hull. This material includes non-nuclear CFE
components bought with two-year and one-year AP and non-nuclear EOQ material.
Funding for these materials early in the MYP is critical to level loading supplier’s
work orders and serves to mitigate many impacts of procuring a single submarine
in fiscal year 2021. If a tenth VCS Block V option is not exercised the material
would be assigned to subsequent SSNs. Additionally, the Navy continues to imple-
ment the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP) which coordinates the key actions that
are needed to accomplish integrated construction across the nuclear shipbuilding en-
terprise, including VCS, Columbia-class, and Ford-class. The IEP includes a sub-
stantial focus on meeting labor demands and both shipyards have contributed work-
force acquisition and development strategies. These plans and strategies are tied di-
rectly to long-term submarine construction plans elsewhere in the IEP.

37. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, what implications does this have for
the delivery schedules of both Virginia and Columbia-class over the FYDP?
Secretary MODLY. Procuring one Virginia-class submarine (VCS) in fiscal year
2021 has no impact on the delivery schedules of VCS and Columbia (CLB) over the
FYDP. The shipbuilders are focusing on returning to a two per year VCS rate at
a 6 month cadence. It is expected that VCS Block V construction start and deliveries
would continue at a 6 month cadence independent of whether Block V included nine
or ten submarines. CLB is the Navy’s top acquisition priority and the Navy is work-
ing to ensure that the schedule for the CLB remains on track. The workforce and
facilities being utilized by the CLB program are being established in concert with
those of VCS, with some dedicated CLB portions. As such, any changes in the VCS
program should not impact the CLB program.

38. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, are there any additional policies or
authorities that you need in order to ensure greater stability within the submarine
industrial base and among our submarine workforce?
Secretary MODLY. There are no additional authorities needed to ensure greater
stability within the submarine industrial base and among the submarine workforce.
The Department greatly appreciates the authorities provided in the National Sea-
Based Deterrence Fund and the Congressional support provided in fiscal year 2019
and fiscal year 2020 to expand the industrial base. Both have enabled savings and
efficiencies and supported improving the health of the submarine industrial base.
The Department does need Incremental Funding Authority to execute the Build I
contract for SSBN 826 and SSBN 827, planned to be awarded in October 2020.
REDUCED PROCUREMENT AND FUNDING FOR SHIPBUILDING

39. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, in addition to being concerned about
technological encroachment and competition by our adversaries, I am concerned that
we are self-defeating at our current procurement and funding levels. The Navy’s fis-
cal year 2021 budget requests the procurement of eight new ships, but this figure
includes LPD–31, which Congress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated pro-
curement funding for) in fiscal year 2020. Excluding this ship, the Navy’s proposed
fiscal year 2021 budget requests the procurement of seven new ships rather than
eight, which is less than the 10 ships that the Navy projected it would request
under its fiscal year 2020 budget submission. This number is also significant be-
cause a rate of seven ships is less than the average ship procurement rate that
would be needed over the long run, given current ship service lives, to achieve and
maintain a 355-ship fleet. In funding dollars, the Navy is requesting a total of about
$19.9 billion for its shipbuilding account for fiscal year 2021, about $3.9 billion (16.3
percent) less than the Navy requested for fiscal year 2020. How should this Com-
mittee interpret these trends?
Secretary MODLY. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To get there, the
composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer large platform and more
smaller platforms that are lightly manned, eventually moving to optionally manned.
The fleet needs to have certain compositional characteristics, including distributed
awareness, lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more ag-
gressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then quickly moved
to production. Given the budget topline constraints, the fiscal year 2021 budget
prioritizes a more capable and lethal force over a larger force that would be less
capable, less ready and less lethal. It includes procurement of 44 battle force ships
within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and shows a realistic approach
to planning the future force within projected budgets. The plan remains mindful of
464
the need to keep the shipbuilding industrial base loaded at an effective level that
encourages industry investment in capital improvements, capital expansion, and a
properly sized world-class workforce.

40. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral Gilday, is this drawback in funding and pro-
duction rate an indicator that the 355 ship, and 66 submarines target is no longer
the goal of the U.S. Navy?
Admiral GILDAY. No. The Department of Defense remains committed to building
a Navy of at least 355 ships (inclusive of 66 submarines). With flat budget toplines
that do not increase with inflation, Navy had to prioritize funding the force most
likely to win across the spectrum of conflict versus China and Russia. Risk was
taken in capacity in order to prioritize readiness, lethality, and modernization. The
fiscal year 2021 budget resources capable capacity growth for which attendant re-
quirements to modernize, man, train, and operate can also be resourced.

41. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, can you discuss
what you believe the risk to the shipbuilding industrial base will be due to these
cuts in production and funding?
Secretary MODLY. We tried to be very objective in terms of where we took the re-
sources for the reprogramming, which resulted in some shifts to expected procure-
ment dates. Funds were sourced from fiscal year 2020 dollars that were determined
to be either ahead of need or excess to need, in other words, not requested in the
fiscal year 2020 budget by the Department. The sources were reviewed by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who determined that this reprogramming was
not of significant immediate strategic negative impact to the overall defense of the
United States. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards and the associated
workforce, is absolutely critical to our effort to get to 355 ships. With adequate re-
sources, and with budget predictability and stability, the industrial base has the ca-
pacity and capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years.
Admiral GILDAY. We tried to be very objective in terms of where we took the re-
sources for the reprogramming, which resulted in some shifts to expected procure-
ment dates. Funds were sourced from fiscal year 2020 dollars that were determined
to be either ahead of need or excess to need, in other words, not requested in the
fiscal year 2020 budget by the Department. The sources were reviewed by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who determined that this reprogramming was
not of significant immediate strategic negative impact to the overall defense of the
United States. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards and the associated
workforce, is absolutely critical to our effort to get to 355 ships. With adequate re-
sources, and with budget predictability and stability, the industrial base has the ca-
pacity and capability to support getting to 355 ships in 10 years.

42. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly and Admiral Gilday, what plans do
you have to mitigate the negative impacts to the industrial base?
Secretary MODLY. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To get there, the
composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer large platform and more
smaller platforms that are lightly manned, eventually moving to optionally manned.
The fleet needs to have certain compositional characteristics, including distributed
awareness, lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more ag-
gressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then quickly moved
to production. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards and the associated
workforce, is critical to this effort. With adequate resources, and with budget pre-
dictability and stability, the industrial base has the capacity and capability to sup-
port getting to 355 ships in 10 years.
Admiral GILDAY. The Navy is committed to at least 355 ships. To get there, the
composition of the fleet needs to change to have fewer large platform and more
smaller platforms that are lightly manned, eventually moving to optionally manned.
The fleet needs to have certain compositional characteristics, including distributed
awareness, lethality, survivability, and sustainability, and move to a much more ag-
gressive posture in terms of experimenting and prototyping and then quickly moved
to production. A healthy industrial base, including shipyards and the associated
workforce, is critical to this effort. With adequate resources, and with budget pre-
dictability and stability, the industrial base has the capacity and capability to sup-
port getting to 355 ships in 10 years.

43. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary Modly, can you explain why LPD 31 is ac-
counted for in the fiscal year 2021 budget, despite being authorized and appro-
priated in fiscal year 2020?
465
Secretary MODLY. The Navy is very appreciative of the strong Congressional sup-
port for shipbuilding. LPD 31 is an incrementally funded ship that received Advance
Procurement funding in fiscal year 2019. Congress appropriated the preliminary in-
crement of full funding in fiscal year 2020. The Navy planned to procure LPD 31
in fiscal year 2021, and has requested the preponderance of funding in fiscal year
2021. Therefore, the Navy counted the ship in fiscal year 2021.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN
MARINE CORPS CULTURE

44. Senator WARREN. General Berger, the Marine Corps University’s Center for
Advanced Operational Culture Learning was tasked by your predecessor in July
2017 to conduct a study on Marine Corps culture in the wake of the Marines United
scandal. The final report provided more details on gender bias and leadership in the
Marine Corps and noted that ‘‘[M]any women were unsurprised by the behavior of
those on Marines United because they live out related struggles every day.’’ Have
you read this report in its entirety?
General BERGER. Yes—and as the Committee surely recognized in my official
written statement, per that reports findings, I acknowledged a well-known malig-
nant sub-culture of misogyny within our ranks that must be eradicated.

45. Senator WARREN. General Berger, what conclusions did you draw? What are
the most important takeaways
General BERGER. I believe the most important takeaway is that the Marine Corps
is a learning institution. Seen in context, this Report comprises the response by a
Marine educational institution to a query asked by the Corps itself. While the report
clearly indicated that our culture is flawed and imperfect, I am encouraged that ma-
rines felt free to offer their opinions without fear of repercussion, and with the hope
that the institution would address its cultural challenges. The Corps must be pre-
pared to ask itself whether its norms and culture serve the central purposes of the
organization, including meeting its mission to train marines, and to matriculate
them into a warrior culture that simultaneously exists within a civil society. Marine
culture values honor and courage coupled with decisive action as well as flexibility
in adjusting to any environment. Counter behaviors and cultures need to be called
out, addressed, and eliminated. We continue to work to create the best warriors pre-
pared to do combat for the Nation and who represent the best of the society they
have sworn to defend. We cannot ignore strong signals of change nor be complacent
when it comes to designing and preparing the force for the future. This is the force
that will always adapt and overcome no matter the circumstances. Over the next
12 months, you will observe clear evidence of change within our manpower system
as we modernize it in accordance with a more responsive and suitable talent man-
agement system. Those reforms will further seek to eliminate both conscious and
unconscious bias from the system, further ensuring an equality of opportunity for
all marines.

46. Senator WARREN. General Berger, do you believe that it should be required
reading for all marines? Will you commit to adding the final report to your reading
list?
General BERGER. I believe the report should be required reading for all senior Ma-
rine Corps leaders, both uniformed and civilian, and as a consequence, have directed
as much. As with all of our educational products, the report will be made generally
available to and through our educational system.

47. Senator WARREN. General Berger, the report lists a publication date of 30
March 2018, but it was not published on the CAOCL website until September 2019.
Why was the public release delayed for a year and half?
General BERGER. Regrettably, I cannot comment with any precision as to why a
report published in March 2018 was not immediately released to the public. Our in-
ternal review processes do not always prioritize correctly, nor move as fast as they
should; however, fixing processes like these and fostering an environment of trans-
parency are priorities of mine as Commandant.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE
PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 a.m. in Room
SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator James M. Inhofe
(presiding) Chairman of the Committee.
Committee Members present: Senators Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton,
Ernst, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, Reed, Shaheen,
Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, and Manchin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Chairman INHOFE. Our meeting will come to order.
The Committee meets today to receive the testimony of the
United States Central Command. I would like to welcome our wit-
ness, General Frank McKenzie, Commander of the United States
Central Command.
I want to add that immediately following this morning’s open
hearing, we will move to SVC–217 in the Senate Visitors Center for
a closed session, which will be an opportunity for General
McKenzie to answer some of the questions. You might make a note
of questions that come along that are not appropriately answered
in this setting so that we can do it later.
I would like to begin by recognizing two United States marines,
Gunner Sergeant Diego Pongo and Captain Moises Navas, who
were killed earlier this week during a mission against the ISIS [Is-
lamic State of Iraq and Syria] stronghold in Iraq. I also want to
recognize the two additional Americans who were killed yesterday,
whose names have not yet been released. That was in a rocket at-
tack in Taji. Their loss is a painful reminder that even where we
have been successful, such as in destroying ISIS, the caliphate, we
still have troops in harm’s way. When Senator Rounds and I had
the opportunity to meet with some of our troops 2 weeks ago in vis-
iting Iraq, we had a chance to really talk over some of the things
like this with them.
General, later this month, you will be commemorating your 1-
year anniversary as CENTCOM Commander, and I sure you agree
(467)
468

it has been a tough ride. Since May of 2019, we have seen Iran and
its terrorist proxies escalate their asymmetric aggression against
the United States and our partners throughout the region. In May,
they hit our partners’ oil tankers. In June, they downed an Amer-
ican drone. In September, they attacked Saudi oil facilities, threat-
ening the global energy supply. Throughout this up-tick, President
Trump announced new sanctions on Iran, bolstering protection for
our troops in the region, but he sought to avoid a military esca-
lation and even offered to negotiate with Tehran.
Then in December, Iran’s proxies killed a United States citizen
and attacked the United States embassy in Baghdad. These actions
crossed the President’s redline, which we knew that by his very na-
ture, he is going to adhere to his own redlines, unlike some others
in the past, and the President responded by ordering a strike that
ended up killing Soleimani.
Iran countered by firing ballistic missiles that thankfully missed
our troops in Iraq, though over 100 soldiers sustained concussions.
Since then, the situation seems to have deescalated.
Yet, despite the deployment of approximately 14,000 new troops
to the region to deter Iran, your written testimony says—and I am
quoting from your written testimony, General—quote, ample intel-
ligence exists indicating that Iran’s regime desire to continue ma-
lign operations that threaten lives, and early media reports suggest
that Iran-backed groups were responsible for yesterday’s attack at
Camp Taji.
If the deployment of approximately 14,000 troops in the region
will not deter them, I am sure a good question would be, what will
deter them? We will have ample opportunity to respond to that
question.
I ask because this Committee’s top priority is effective implemen-
tation of the National Defense Strategy, which says to focus on
China and Russia as the central challenge to the United States
prosperity and security and, as you highlight in your written state-
ment, to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR.
Countering Iran is an important aspect of American credibility in
the Middle East, and bolstering American credibility is vital to pre-
venting our partners from looking toward China and Russia for
their security needs.
But every battalion that we send to the Middle East is a bat-
talion that is not being sent to support other priorities in Europe
and the Pacific. Moreover, this ramp-up in the Middle East comes
while other priorities such as counterterrorism and security co-
operation in Africa are being under-sourced.
I hope you will address how these new deployments to the Mid-
dle East are changing Iran’s behavior for the better. Or, if conflict
with Iran remains likely in your view, we would like to know—you
explain to us—what these new deployments are achieving.
With that, I will turn to Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me join you in welcoming General McKenzie back before the Com-
mittee, and we look forward to your testimony and our discussion.
Thank you, General.
469

Let me also join the Chairman in expressing my condolences for
the loss of the three coalition personnel at Camp Taji last evening
and two of whom were reported to be American personnel, and the
death of the two marines conducting operations against ISIS in
Iraq earlier this week. Our thoughts are with their families and
those who were injured in those two incidents.
The agreement between the United States and the Taliban, an-
nounced on February 29th, was a notable step toward bringing our
nation’s longest war to a close. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that it is only a first step, and the path to long-term sta-
bility in Afghanistan will only be found through a negotiated settle-
ment between the Taliban and the Afghan Government. With that
in mind, I am concerned that we are not appropriately leveraging
U.S. and coalition military presence to support a settlement that
protects U.S. security interests primarily and values, including the
hard-fought gains on issues in Afghanistan like women’s rights and
education. By announcing a timetable for the complete withdrawal
of United States and international forces before inter-Afghan nego-
tiations have even begun, I am concerned that we are in some re-
spects undermining the Afghan Government and validating the
Taliban’s longstanding perception that they can wait us out.
Despite the specific timeline contained in the agreement, some in
the administration have said that the 14-month timetable is aspi-
rational and that we will have ample time to assess the Taliban’s
intent and capability to uphold their security commitments. Gen-
eral McKenzie, I hope you will help us better understand how we
intend to monitor and verify Taliban compliance. In particular, do
you believe it will be possible for United States Forces to conduct
the rigorous monitoring and evaluation necessary to ensure that
terrorist threats will not re-emerge in Afghanistan, while simulta-
neously carrying out a full-scale withdrawal?
I would also like to hear more about the commitments we have
made to our Afghan partners and how our efforts to build credible
security forces and institutions will be sustained. The Afghan Secu-
rity Forces have been nearly completely built and funded by United
States and coalition funds. Additionally, until the signing of the
United States-Taliban agreement, the Afghan Security Forces also
received robust advising and enabling support from United States
and coalition forces on the ground and in the air. Even with a
peace agreement, there is little to suggest that the Afghan economy
will, within a foreseeable time frame, provide enough revenue to
fully fund the country’s security forces. Notably, the administra-
tion’s fiscal year 2021 budget request contains funding for Afghan
training and equipping programs that will extend well beyond the
date of the planned departure of the last United States military
personnel. It is important for this Committee to understand the
plan to ensure those resources are invested in sustainable and re-
sponsible ways, especially given the likelihood of increased Taliban
participation in the Afghan Government.
Despite the focus of the National Defense Strategy on a more re-
source sustainable approach to the national security challenges in
CENTCOM, we have deployed more than 14,000 troops to the re-
gion since May in response to malign Iranian activity. While I un-
derstand the need to ensure U.S. personnel, facilities, and key stra-
470

tegic interests are protected, I question the extent to which we can
deter asymmetric attacks by Iran through the deployment of addi-
tional conventional United States military forces to the region. In-
deed, the rocket attack on Camp Taji in Iraq last night, reportedly
carried out by Iranian-backed militia, would seem to challenge the
notion that we have reestablished deterrence with respect to Iran.
Overall, I believe that the administration’s so-called maximum
pressure campaign has isolated us from our allies, given Iran a
pretext to violate constraints placed on its nuclear program by the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and may in fact have in-
creased the likelihood of conflict.
The killing of the leaders of ISIS and al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula were significant counterterrorism operations, and the ad-
ministration should be commended for those operations. But the
Turkish incursion into northern Syria, fallout from the killing of
General Soleimani, and political unrest in Iraq, Lebanon, and else-
where have disrupted our efforts against ISIS. I remain concerned
about the long-term disposition of the more than 10,000 ISIS fight-
ers being held by the Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as the un-
known number of internally displaced people that retain an alle-
giance to ISIS. General McKenzie, I look forward to an update on
CENTCOM’s operations to ensure these groups are not able to re-
emerge.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Reed.
General McKenzie, we will recognize you for your opening state-
ment. As you know, your entire statement will be made a part of
the record.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR., USMC,
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
General MCKENZIE. Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Reed,
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to provide an
operational update and testimony in support of the fiscal year 2021
budget request pertaining to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility
(AOR).
My senior enlisted leader, Fleet Master Chief Jamie Erdell of the
Navy, is also with me here today, seated immediately behind me.
I appreciate very much your remarks about the sacrifices of Cap-
tain Navas and Gunnery Sergeant Pongo, as well as Corporal
Zavala, a marine who was killed in a vehicle rollover during an ex-
ercise in UAE [United Arab Emirates] just a couple of days ago.
Additionally, the two United States servicemembers and the
United Kingdom servicemember who died in the attack at Taji yes-
terday in Iraq—they will be remembered.
Today there are nearly 90,000 men and women serving through-
out the 20 nations comprising United States Central Command, as
well as our headquarters in Tampa. I am proud of their remarkable
dedication and humbled by their personal sacrifice, and it is my
honor to serve with them. They are young Americans in the line
of fire, working to prevent attacks on the Homeland, counter desta-
bilizing regional influence, prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, and ensure the freedom of navigation through
471

international waterways. Your annual and timely passage of both
the National Defense Authorization Act and the Defense appropria-
tions bills honors their courage and sacrifice, and I encourage you
to maintain this tradition.
Keeping a pledge from my confirmation hearing before you here
in December 2018, I appear now and offer you my best military ad-
vice. While my written statement highlights several nations and
areas of interest within the Central Command area of responsi-
bility, my opening statement today will focus on Iran.
The National Defense Strategy directs us to work with partners
to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear weapon and to
neutralize Iranian malign influence. This is no easy task. Iran’s re-
gime is persistent and resilient, growing its arsenal of ballistic mis-
siles despite international condemnation. Iran remains the world’s
largest state sponsor of terrorism. Since May 2019, Iranian proxies
and Shiite militia groups in Iraq have increased attacks on United
States interests and conducted scores of aerial unmanned system
reconnaissance flights near United States and Iraqi security force
bases. The Iranian regime has attacked or seized foreign vessels in
the Gulf, sponsored attacks by Houthi forces from Yemen into
Saudi Arabia, continued the export of lethal aid to destabilizing
groups throughout the region, and in September 2019, carried out
an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS attack against oil facili-
ties in Saudi Arabia.
In early January, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic mis-
siles in a deliberate attack against United States and coalition
forces at two bases in Iraq. This state-sponsored missile strike
crossed the threshold compared to previous attacks and has prob-
ably set a lower bar for future actions by the regime.
Yesterday, hostile forces, most likely Shiite militia groups,
launched more than a dozen rockets at United States and coalition
forces at Camp Taji in Iraq, killing two United States and one Brit-
ish servicemember, as well as wounding several more. While we
are still investigating the attack, I will note that the Iranian proxy
group Kata’ib Hezbollah is the only group known to have pre-
viously conducted an indirect fire attack of this scale against
United States and coalition forces in Iraq.
While periods of decreased tension may provide the illusion of a
return to normalcy, ample intelligence and indeed yesterday’s ac-
tions indicate the Iranian regime’s desire to continue malign activi-
ties that threaten lives, destabilize sovereign nations, threaten
freedom of navigation, regional commerce, global energy supplies,
and the global economy itself.
At CENTCOM, we recognize that so long as the United States
applies diplomatic and economic pressure, the joint force must be
postured to deter Iran from employing the military element of
power to counter our actions. Our presence sends a clear message
about our capabilities and our will to defend partners and U.S. na-
tional interests. Going forward, it is CENTCOM’s objective to pos-
ture forces in the region with the operational depth to achieve a
consistent state of deterrence against Iran and to be adaptable to
future Iranian threats.
The Department’s fiscal year 2021 budget supports CENTCOM’s
ability to keep our forces agile, lethal, and adaptable.
472

As we work with our partners to safeguard our mutual interests,
we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger together. Key
to building and maintaining partnerships is the authorization,
funding, and employment of security assistance programs. Addi-
tionally, the National Guard State Partnership Program cultivates
relationships and improves interoperability with six nations across
the CENTCOM AOR, with more applying for entry this year.
Again, the 2021 budget supports building new partnerships and en-
abling the formation of an enduring Middle East coalition.
As CENTCOM continues ongoing operations, we appreciate the
efforts of our DOD [Department of Defense] civilian leadership. We
acknowledge the teamwork of the interagency, and we thank the
Members of Congress and your staffs, without whose consistent
backing we would be unable to accomplish our mission. In order for
America’s armed forces to sustain all-domain dominance, the De-
partment requires your support, as well as predictable, adequate,
and timely funding.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Committee Members,
thank you again for all you do for our troops and families, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General McKenzie follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR.
INTRODUCTION

When United States Central Command (CENTCOM) formed in the 1980s, the
United States military trained and equipped to fight high-end warfare against the
Soviet Union under conditions of limited communications and the routine employ-
ment of nuclear weapons. Times changed; the wall fell. The United States welcomed
change in Russia while retooling heavy conventional forces to fight an 18-year pro-
tracted global counterterror campaign. Simultaneously the Islamic Republic of Iran,
emerging from its 1979 revolution, embarked on a deliberate and extended cam-
paign of terror and violence across the Middle East, directly engaging or sponsoring
partners in a 40-year-long struggle against the U.S. and our allies.
Today the rise, fall, and rise again of Russia; the continuing asymmetric campaign
of violence and coercion by Iran; and the emergence of China as our pre-eminent
economic and military power competitor signal that while the nature of war is un-
changing, the character of war has evolved. CENTCOM acknowledges our nation
does not have the luxury of a single strategic focus. The Joint Force must posture
globally with the ability to balance multiple priorities and tasks, from combat with
peer competitors to expeditionary counterterrorism operations, understanding that
the nation’s top defense priority must relentlessly focus on adversarial great powers
that possess the power and means to destroy our country.
While Iran lacks the capability to destroy us, its regime’s hatred of the United
States and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cyber reach, and depth and breadth
of its terror networks clearly position it as a priority, although clearly and inargu-
ably not the main one. The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs the United
States to work with partners to deny the Iranian regime all paths to a nuclear
weapon and neutralize Iranian malign activity. While this is only one aspect of the
NDS, it is directive for the Department of Defense and a key task for both
CENTCOM and EUCOM.
The current United States policy of maximum pressure against Iran is supported
by the deterrence provided by our United States force presence, which helps to sta-
bilize the region and acts as a counterbalance against the Iranian regime’s overt
and covert military responses. The ramifications of this policy have led to direct and
indirect Iranian military threats and actions against United States interests in the
region, and similar threats to U.S. national security interests globally. Iran’s lack
of effective economic or diplomatic levers to counter the United States maximum
pressure campaign has caused it to resort to pursuing overt and covert military op-
tions against the U.S. and our partners. The Iranian regime’s strategy seeks to un-
dermine international and regional support for U.S. policies with attacks and
threats against U.S. interests and those of our partners and allies.
473
CENTCOM plans and executes missions across its area of responsibility (AOR),
but embraces a global planning perspective supporting national objectives and the
execution of global military campaigns. Adjustments in U.S. global force posture to
support the NDS compels the U.S. to accept greater risk in the CENTCOM AOR.
We recognize significant future conflicts will be trans-regional, cutting across mul-
tiple global combatant commands, and involving multiple domains. The ongoing
global fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) and other violent extremist organiza-
tions (VEOs) provides a stark example of this threat.
As CENTCOM approaches its missions, acknowledging priorities outlined in the
NDS, we also remain keenly aware that our adversaries in the region retain a will-
ingness to contest our actions. Iran’s regime is not a peer competitor to the United
States, but it does possess the ability to negatively affect global commerce, trade,
and the world’s energy supply. These malign actions, while not posing a direct
threat to the U.S. Homeland, significantly threaten our national interests abroad,
those of our allies and partners, and negatively affects the U.S. military’s long-term
posture as we react to immediate threats. During my year in command, I have ob-
served multiple Congressional engagements to the CENTCOM AOR. Your oversight,
partnership and advocacy, based on first-hand knowledge, lays the foundation for
enduring success.
CENTCOM PRIORITIES

Deterring Iran. The long-term challenges we face in the CENTCOM AOR are the
destabilizing and escalatory actions of the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime’s
quest for nuclear weapons, coupled with its hegemonic ambitions, misbehavior, and
threats to the United States and its regional partners have been consistent elements
of its policy for decades. Deterring Iran from its destructive and destabilizing activi-
ties in the military domain underpins everything we do, and is CENTCOM’s top pri-
ority. Until such a time as the regime in Tehran decides to be a responsible member
of the international community, CENTCOM must work to establish and maintain
military deterrence with Iran, notably within the context of the ongoing economic
and diplomatic maximum pressure campaign.
Since May 2019, Iranian-supported groups in Iraq have attacked United States
interests dozens of times and conducted scores of unmanned aerial system (UAS)
reconnaissance flights near United States and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) bases. The
Iranian regime has attacked or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf, facilitated attacks
by Houthi forces from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued to export lethal aid to
destabilizing groups throughout the region including those aiming to attack Israel,
supported the Assad regime’s brutal conflict against its own people, and carried out
an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS attack in September against Saudi oil fa-
cilities that destabilized international energy markets. In early January, Iran
launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles in a deliberate attack against United
States and Coalition forces in Iraq. This state-sponsored missile attack, in response
to the United States killing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force com-
mander, Qassem Soleimani crossed a threshold compared to previous ‘‘grey-zone’’ at-
tacks and may set a lower bar for future actions by the regime. While periods of
decreased tension may provide the illusion of a return to normalcy, ample intel-
ligence exists indicating the Iranian regime’s desire to continue malign operations
that threaten lives, disrupt the internal matters of sovereign nations, and threaten
freedom of navigation, regional commerce, global energy supplies, and the global
economy.
CENTCOM recognizes that so long as the United States continues to apply diplo-
matic and economic pressure against Iran, the Joint Force must be postured to deter
Iran from using the military element of power to counter our actions. While our
steady-state posture does not require offensive forces in theater to achieve over-
match or unintentionally provoke Iran’s regime, our presence sends a clear and un-
ambiguous signal of our capabilities and, most importantly, the will to defend part-
ners and United States national interests. This exemplifies the concept of deter-
rence.
Deterrence is not a military concept, but a diplomatic and political construct ob-
tained from the effect demonstrated capabilities have on the mind of a potential op-
ponent. Deterrence can be contested—Iran’s regime retains the ability to interfere
with our efforts to deter. Historically, Iran has never doubted the United States ca-
pability to respond, but frustrates our ability to do so by focusing on deniable, hard
to attribute activities. Targeting the Kata’ib Hezbollah group and Soleimani clearly
demonstrated United States will. Our posture—the bases, forces, and activities that
we undertake—maintains the other half of the deterrence equation: capability.
474
Reduction of United States forces in the AOR combined with a perception of
United States disinterest in the Middle East fueled thinking in Iran in the spring
of 2019 that the United States was no longer committed to defending our national
interests in the region. That misperception led directly to the cycle of escalation that
crested in January 2020. In order to maintain the contested deterrence our recent
military actions have re-established, Iran’s regime must continue to see the United
States has enough forward-deployed forces for a credible military capability, that we
are willing to employ that capability for defense of U.S. interests with conviction,
and any decision to contest our actions will not yield a positive outcome.
Deterrence can be difficult to establish and measure, and costly to maintain.
CENTCOM prosecutes numerous missions simultaneously, scattered across the
breadth and depth of the region, all in areas suffused with Iranian-backed forces
continuing their decades-long struggles against us. While the cost of regaining and
maintaining deterrence is expensive, it is less expensive than the deployment of
forces required to fight in full-scale conflict: the failure of deterrence. CENTCOM’s
objective is therefore to posture forces with operational depth in the region to
achieve a sustained state of deterrence against Iran’s regime without undue provo-
cation, and to be adaptable to future Iranian threats while the United States max-
imum pressure campaign continues. In addition to posture, a key part of deterrence
is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). While presence can fluctuate
based on deterrence needs, consistent ISR is necessary to identify subtle changes
that shape posture and ensure we align our presence appropriately.
Negotiated Resolution of the Conflict in Afghanistan. All wars must have a polit-
ical end. Reconciliation between the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Re-
public of Afghanistan represents the best option for bringing the 18-year-long fight
in Afghanistan to a favorable conclusion, while meeting long-term United States se-
curity requirements. CENTCOM efforts support the United States South Asia Strat-
egy and remain fully aligned with the efforts of United States Special Representa-
tive for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.
Our military mission in Afghanistan continues in support of our overriding na-
tional interest: preventing terrorist attacks against the Homeland from Afghanistan
and Central Asia.
Safeguarding this means we must remain focused on retaining a counterterrorism
platform under any of the multiple political eventualities that may take shape.
United States Forces-Afghanistan continues to examine efficiencies in force struc-
ture to reduce our military footprint and reduce costs while maintaining counterter-
rorism pressure on VEOs and provisioning the capability to do so in the future. We
also continue to help the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces develop
and refine their force generation processes for campaign sustainability. Without con-
tinued pressure, groups such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS–K) will regain the
ability to mount or sponsor a transnational terrorist attack within a few years. Your
support to our critical authorities such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Funding,
Commander’s Emergency Response Program, Coalition Support Fund, and others
have remained paramount during this transition.
Maintaining Defeat-ISIS Campaign in Syria and Iraq. Similar to Afghanistan,
most of the United States intelligence community predicts that without sustained
pressure levied against it, ISIS has the potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria
in short order, beyond the current capabilities of the United States to neutralize it
without a capable, partnered ground force. Syria remains a dynamic situation with
multiple parties and agendas involved. The Syrian regime, with support from Rus-
sia and Iran, continues to seek a military victory. We are seeing this play out in
northwest Syria as the Assad regime, Russian, and Iranian campaign of violence
has escalated since
December, resulting in almost one million more displaced persons, innumerable
people injured or killed, with many more in critical need of assistance, and dan-
gerous clashes between our NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian regime. We likewise
see the Assad regime continuing its use of chemical weapons in blatant violation
of its commitments to the Chemical Weapons Convention—deterring this use in the
future remains a CENTCOM priority. In eastern Syria, United States and Coalition
forces under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve
assist with ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS, including safeguarding energy
sources to prevent their seizure by ISIS for revenue generation. Moving forward, we
must continue our support to NATO ally Turkey and our D–ISIS partner force, the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while maintaining deconfliction with Russia,
which, along with the Assad regime, aggressively challenges the Coalition mission
in various ways.
Despite the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains a threat in
Syria, with most of its activity focused on reestablishing networks; assassinating
475
and intimidating local leaders and security forces; and extending its influence in
rural areas throughout eastern Syria and Iraq.
Iraq remains a strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and is key human and
geographic terrain. We remain in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq
(GoI) for one mission: the defeat of ISIS. Hindering our ability to work with the ISF
toward this objective are rogue elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces more
beholden to Iran’s regime than the GoI. Some of these militias smuggle advanced
weapons into Iraq from Iran, not to defend the country from ISIS, but to undermine
existing security and threaten United States and Coalition forces partnered with the
GoI. Given ISIS’ demonstrated tenacity and ability to reconstitute, we cannot afford
to divert focus from the D–ISIS mission, understanding that the territorial defeat
of ISIS does not mean the absence of ISIS. The years ahead will not be bloodless.
Attacks may continue in the form of an insurgency, but the goal is to develop and
enable the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS without
external assistance.
Countering the UAS Threat. In the aggregate, the U.S. maintains air dominance
across the AOR but lacks a comprehensive joint solution to counter the growing Un-
manned Aircraft System (UAS) threat. Inexpensive and easy to proliferate, UASs
provide adversaries the operational ability to surveil, target, and attack U.S. and
partner facilities, providing the means to engage in mass-casualty or large-scale,
critical infrastructure attacks with cheap, off-the-shelf technology while affording
deniability and a disproportionately high return on investment.
CENTCOM employs current systems and tactics to best equip and enable U.S.
Forces to meet this challenge, but the growing threat posed by UASs, coupled with
our lack of dependable, networked capabilities to counter them is the most con-
cerning tactical development in the CENTCOM AOR since the rise of the Impro-
vised Explosive Device (IED). Just as the IED threat galvanized operational, indus-
trial and scientific communities in the U.S. toward the development of solutions like
the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), we are fast approaching a
juncture requiring a similar mobilization to counter the UAS threat. Your support
and funding of Science and Technology is vital to our success in the Great Power
Competition.
Weaponization of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees. The manipu-
lation or co-opting of IDPs and refugees by an adversary to gain a political, military,
or economic advantage is not historically uncommon. However, in vast swaths of
Syria and Iraq the systematic indoctrination of IDP and refugee camp populations
who are hostages to the receipt of ISIS ideology is an alarming development with
potentially generational implications.
There is no known, successful methodology of de-radicalization for hard-core ISIS
believers. This radicalized population currently numbers in the thousands and preys
on the disenfranchised and weak IDP and refugee populations already highly sus-
ceptible to extremist indoctrination. The longer these IDPs remain in refugee camps,
the more likely they are to become radicalized. While there is no military solution
for de-radicalization, the military can set the conditions for stability and security
necessary for these populations to return to their original homes and begin the proc-
ess of regaining power over their own lives. The sheer number of IDPs and refugees
presents a challenge to the timeline along which necessary levels of long-term sta-
bilization can take root.
Also concerning are near- and long-term implications of SDF detention facilities
in Syria and the disposition of foreign-terrorist fighters (FTFs). While CENTCOM
and our coalition partners are working to address and mitigate security challenges
at the facilities, this serves only as a tactical-level band-aid, not a long-term solu-
tion. The United States can mitigate the risks associated with these populations by
facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and providing the
funding required to improve prison infrastructure. Ultimately, the best way to al-
leviate this problem is to reduce the numbers of detainees through repatriation. The
ISIS detainee and IDP populations represent more than 60 nations. While some
countries have made efforts to reclaim their foreign fighters, full resolution requires
a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort. This problem will not go away
by ignoring it, and can only be addressed by the international community working
together to accept its shared responsibilities.
As noted, military solutions do not exist for the issues of de-radicalization and re-
patriation of FTFs. They are international problems requiring international solu-
tions. The longer these conditions persist; the IDP population becomes more and
more ensconced in ISIS philosophy creating a petri dish of future terrorists. Action
now by the international community is imperative to protect our Homeland and our
allies. Left unchecked, these issues are a ticking time bomb with the potential to
spark the resurgence of ISIS, despite the destruction of the physical caliphate we
476
and our allies and partners have worked so hard to accomplish. Your support to in-
crease Special Immigrant Visas in Afghanistan and stabilization funding is much
appreciated by me, our troops, and our partners.
BASING AND POSTURE IN THE CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

Fragile security environments across the AOR reflect a variety of contributing fac-
tors, including heightened ethno-sectarian tensions, economic uncertainty, weak or
corrupt governance, and exploitation by VEOs which have clearly indicated their de-
sire and intent to attack the Homeland, United States interests abroad, and the in-
terests of our partners and allies. At the same time, the AOR is growing increas-
ingly crowded with external nation-states, such as a resurgent Russia and expan-
sionist China, pursuing their own interests and attempting to shift historical alli-
ances. These dynamics necessitate that CENTCOM explore options with regional
partners to posture itself in depth across our AOR to create efficiencies, and in-
crease strategic depth, resiliency and operational agility. With the enactment of the
Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA, Section 1263, I look forward to the posture review and re-
porting back to Congress with the findings.
Over the past year, CENTCOM has re-evaluated its posture, taking action to
close, consolidate, or in some cases expand some of its air, land, and sea bases; as
well as access, basing, and overflight rights with our partners. Some of these actions
represent immediate, near-term adjustments for survivability and to improve our
deterrence capabilities—like the buildup of Prince Sultan Air Base in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. Other decisions are driven by long- term efforts to achieve cost sav-
ings, and increase interoperability or partner burden sharing—like the establish-
ment of CENTCOM Forward-Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This forward deployed ele-
ment assesses requirements and integrates U.S. Forces into an international collec-
tive defense effort.
The Western Sustainment Network is a newly-created logistics system extending
from the Red Sea and Mediterranean Ports to the Arabian Gulf, designed to miti-
gate the potential impact of chokepoint closures at the Bab Al Mandeb and Strait
of Hormuz. To build sustainment depth over the last year, CENTCOM has increased
deployment and redeployment traffic across the Arabian Peninsula, shipped ammu-
nition to Kuwait from the Red Sea, negotiated movement of materiel and supplies
across borders affected by the Gulf Rift, and developed the port of Duqm in Oman.
Developing this operational depth enhances protection of critical infrastructure
while providing reduced cost options for deployment and obviating the need to tran-
sit potentially contested maritime chokepoints. This network increases our agility,
enables Dynamic Force Employment, and reduces deployment timelines in the event
of a contingency, thereby reducing risk and providing additional strategic options.
Taken together, the result is a tailored, responsive basing network, connected by de-
pendable lines of communication with AOR-wide reach, supported by prepositioned
equipment and supplies to facilitate the rapid movement and employment, of U.S.,
allied, and partner forces.
Armed with the knowledge that resources are at a premium, and a pragmatic ap-
preciation that each country is working through its own challenges with economic
and social reforms, CENTCOM supports initiatives that approach defense from a co-
operative perspective. This is the only practical way to approach the problem. The
reality on the ground is that every partner country cannot afford to have their own
Patriot battalion, nor should they; just like every U.S. combatant commander cannot
retain their own heel-to-toe carrier strike group.
The International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), which achieved initial op-
erating capability in November 2019 and full operating capability in January 2020,
provides an instructive example of this kind of regional cooperative effort. Partici-
pating nations include the United States, U.K., Albania, Australia, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, and UAE, working together to support freedom of navigation and maritime
domain awareness in the Strait of Hormuz and assist in attribution of malign ac-
tions in these vital waters. The vessels and aircraft of IMSC member nations pro-
vide vigilance, surveillance, and assurance, supporting the free flow of commerce
through the critical choke points of the region.
In the air domain, CENTCOM operates in an environment where our partners
possess and operate the majority of air and ballistic missile defense capabilities in
the theater. This compels CENTCOM to lead efforts to establish a framework to coa-
lesce and optimize each Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nation’s individual ballistic
missile defense capabilities into a regional, integrated air and missile defense con-
struct to defend against the shared threat posed by Iran and the proxies it controls.
Our GCC partners contribute to interoperability through purchase and use of Pa-
triot, Theater High Altitude Air Defense, and the development of the GCC Ballistic
477
Missile Early Warning System—a collective system of systems across the Arabian
Peninsula designed to establish an effective early warning and supporting architec-
ture to benefit all GCC Partners. The Link-16 system provides a combined, inte-
grated air picture through a shared network of sensors and systems across the AOR
to receive, populate, and share information among partners. CENTCOM builds con-
fidence and proficiency among our partners through combined, distributive IAMD
exercises that leverage virtual and simulated technologies to bridge the geographic
distances across the region.
As we work with our partners along collaborative lines of effort to safeguard our
mutual interests, we do so with the knowledge that we are stronger together, and
our strategic strength has never rested on the volume of materiel we bring to the
fight, but the partnerships and whole-of-government efforts no other country in the
world can match. Key to building and maintaining these partnerships in the region
is the enduring authorization, funding, and combined employment of the Depart-
ment of State’s (State) security assistance (SA) and DOD security cooperation (SC)
and security assistance (SA) programs. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency
administers the Department of State’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, with
our partners’ capabilities, interoperability, and burden sharing. Foreign Military
Sales in CENTCOM totaled nearly $23 billion in 2019, accounting for more than 42
percent of all FMS globally. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)
cultivates relationships and improves interoperability with six nations across the
CENTCOM AOR currently, with more considering entry.
CENTCOM supports the execution of over $2 billion annually in SA funds, con-
sisting of $1.7 billion in Department of State Foreign Military Financing to obtain
articles, services, or training; $265 million in Department of Defense Section 333
funds authorizing the U.S. to help partner nations build capacity; $17 million in De-
partment of State International Military Education and Training (IMET) to improve
interoperability and establish relationships with future leaders; $4 million for the
Counter Threat and Irregular Warfare Fellowship Program; and $3.6 million for the
Wales Initiative Fund (WIF). Taken together, these State and DOD programs help
maintain U.S. influence, improve our posture and interoperability with partners,
and create opportunities to advance U.S. objectives. The State IMET, and DOD WIF
and SPP programs in particular often yield a far greater return on investment com-
pared to the resources allocated against them. On average, over 5,500 students re-
ceive U.S. military education and training through our SA and SC programs annu-
ally.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. must posture itself globally to contend with an array of security chal-
lenges detailed in the NDS. While Iran represents but one of those national security
challenges, deterring the Iranian regime is the primary security challenge for
CENTCOM and critical for ensuring the Department can focus on near peer com-
petition rather than an expansion of conflict in the Middle East. The rapid esca-
lation from grey-zone conflict to open, kinetic strikes between the United States and
Iran in January of this year underscores the immediacy of this threat, and the need
for vigilance paired with the proper capabilities on hand necessary to deter the Ira-
nian regime.
Readiness and capabilities allocated toward this mission are supportive of the
NDS not only with regard to Iran, but also in the context of supporting great power
competition as it manifests itself in the Middle East. As the United States reorients
itself globally, our leadership, presence, and demonstration of commitment to our al-
lies and partners in the region are crucial, now more than ever. We have an oppor-
tunity at this moment in history to establish the foundations of collective, effective
collaborative security apparatuses throughout the region with the U.S. serving not
as the core member, but a contributing member in a burden-sharing construct.
For more than 37 years, the men and women of CENTCOM—about 90,000 uni-
formed military and civilian strong today—have devoted themselves to securing
United States national interests in the Middle East that help protect the Homeland.
They operate in real time, against real enemies. Across 18 years of extended combat
operations, the missions they have executed yielded tangible results. The steadfast-
ness and sacrifice of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, civil-
ians and their respective families—is both humbling and inspirational. Public sup-
port for our mission, troops, and families is precious and not taken for granted. Your
communication with your constituents is key in maintaining public support that
serves as the bedrock and fosters morale, enabling the mission going forward.
As CENTCOM continues to fulfill its ongoing missions, we appreciate the efforts
of our civilian leadership at the Department of Defense, acknowledge the teamwork
478
of the interagency, and thank the members of Congress and their staffs, without
whose consistent and timely support we would be unable to accomplish our mission.
Chairman INHOFE. Thank you, General, very much.
For any of the Members who came in a little bit late, we an-
nounced that we are going to have a closed session immediately fol-
lowing this in SVC–217.
General McKenzie, in the past year, in response to the Iranian
provocations, we have deployed some 14,000 additional troops to
the regions,and you have indicated in your statement that more at-
tacks from Iran are likely. If so, in what sense are these new de-
ployments to the Middle East deterring—what level of deterrence
do they provide? And is there another form of deterrence that
might work?
General MCKENZIE. Chairman, I believe that deterrence is borne
of an appreciation in the mind of the adversary of both capability
and will, and we, over the last few months, have demonstrated
both of that. As a result of that, I believe we have reestablished
a rough form of deterrence, what I would call contested deterrence,
with Iran at the level of state-on-state attacks. By that, I am refer-
ring to things like, obviously, attributable ballistic missile attacks
from Iran launched against United States forces. They have stood
their missiles down. They are no longer—I do not think that is an
imminent threat.
What has not been changed is their continuing desire to operate
through their proxies indirectly against us, and that is a far more
difficult area to deter because they believe they can generate a
measure of non-attribution with those attacks. We would not agree
because we believe eventually we will be able to distill who is be-
hind these attacks going forward. So we are in a period where
state-on-state I believe we have achieved deterrence, but with their
proxy activities—and while they are principally in Iraq, they are
not limited to Iraq, and there are other areas where they are active
as well. That is the period that we are in now with Iran, Mr. Chair-
man.
Chairman INHOFE. I appreciate that.
As it is right now, we have kind of a deal with the Taliban. We
are bringing our troop level down from 12,000 to 8,600, and they,
in turn, have commitments to us. I would have two questions. Are
they keeping their commitments? Does it appear that they are
keeping their commitments to us, and if not, what would be the
next step after our withdrawal down to 8.6?
General MCKENZIE. So, Chairman, obviously my answer will con-
centrate on the military equities because that is what I am knowl-
edgeable about. But I would tell you in terms of what we see the
Taliban doing militarily, they are honoring some, not all of their
commitments.
Let me give you an example. Attacks continue. Attacks continue
at an unacceptably high rate across the country. Those attacks, al-
though at a high rate, are not delivered into city centers, urban
areas, or against coalition forces. Instead, the attacks are largely
generated against Afghanistan outposts, checkpoints, and isolated
combat units. So those attacks continue, and I would say that that
level of attack by the Taliban is not consistent with an organization
that intends to keep its word going forward. However, in other
479

areas they have not attacked into the urban areas. They have not
attacked coalition forces, so we have a pretty good picture of what
the Taliban is doing and is not doing. We have very good ways——
Chairman INHOFE. Well, we have a picture right now, but antici-
pating—let us say they do not keep them and they start going the
other direction. What would be our action at that time?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, so we are on a glide slope to go to 8,600
U.S. Forces with our NATO partners in the country by the middle
of the summer. At that level, we will still be able to pursue all of
our objectives in Afghanistan.
Chairman INHOFE. So if they do not and it becomes obvious they
are not keeping their commitments, we would maintain the 8.6 as
opposed to going any lower.
General MCKENZIE. Chairman, that would be not a military deci-
sion but a policy decision.
Chairman INHOFE. Well, yes.
General MCKENZIE. But we believe that we are going to have
ample opportunity to see if they are going to keep their word. In
some areas they are; in some areas they are not. I am troubled by
these attacks that continue to occur. There are obviously some po-
litical things that have to go forward that I am not the best person
to talk about in terms of the Afghan Government, prisoner re-
leases, and things like that. All of those things have to occur in
order to find a path forward.
Chairman INHOFE. Let us go into Barzani. Senator Rounds and
I had the opportunity to go through not just Iraq but Erbil and go
up and spend time with him. Of course, there are kind of two
groups they deal with—the Kurds are dealing with there, and one
of them—a lot of people were upset and maybe I think misunder-
stood what the President was doing when he was talking about the
Turks coming down into that area.
But as far as the senior—that would be Masoud Barzani—he is
one that a lot of people are saying or trying to project that he has
passed a lot of things to his son and to, I guess, his nephew. It has
been my opinion that he is still in charge, and I am not going to
ask you whether you agree or disagree with that. But I got a very
clear message when we spent most of a day with him up in Erbil,
and he is very satisfied that we are keeping our commitments now.
I really believe he is—I think we need to keep reminding people
how many Kurds have lost their lives working with us.
So would you agree that he is now in pretty good shape with the
United States in terms of our keeping our commitments to him?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, I could not agree with you more. I be-
lieve that is the case. As you know, we have a vision of a unified,
single Iraq going forward and support that, and we believe he is
a key element in that equation going forward.
Chairman INHOFE. We are talking about the senior Barzani.
General MCKENZIE. Sir, we are.
Chairman INHOFE. I agree with you. Thank you.
Senator Reed?
Senator REED. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to clarify a point that the Chairman has raised, the number
that publicly has been released about the increase in forces in
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CENTCOM since approximately last May is about 14,000. Is that
accurate?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, it is a little less than that, and it varies
as carriers come in. You know, when a carrier comes in, you are
bringing 5,000 people in. Today I have actually two aircraft car-
riers in the theater. So the number is artificially a little higher.
The number goes up and down.
Senator REED. But within a range of, say, 1,000 personnel?
General MCKENZIE. I would say it is over 10,000.
Senator REED. I know you are working on attribution of the at-
tack last evening at Camp Taji. Have you finished that attribution?
General MCKENZIE. We are working it very hard right now in my
headquarters as we speak now.
Senator REED. Thank you.
With respect to the agreement between the Taliban and the
United States, looking at the public documents that are available,
there is no reference to a prohibition of violence by the Taliban
against the Afghan Government. There is at least an interpretation
that what they are doing now, attacks against Afghan personnel in
or outside cities, is within the scope of the agreement, that we
would continue to go forward. Is that accurate?
General MCKENZIE. So when I have an opportunity to give advice
on this subject—and I do have an opportunity to advise on this—
I would not consider what the Taliban is doing as consistent with
any path to going forward to come to a final end state agreement
with the current Government of Afghanistan. Those attacks are
going to have to come off considerably.
But we are never going to be a bloodless state in Afghanistan.
As you know, there are pockets in Afghanistan that probably still
think the Russians are there. So it is never going to be perfect, but
we need to get way below where we are now.
Senator REED. There is, though, a possibility that they could, at
least until we withdraw, maintain their CT commitments but con-
tinue active operations against the Afghan Government. In fact, it
could escalate to what would be either a major or a significant civil
war in the country. Would we still be in the position or still be pre-
disposed to depart?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, just speaking looking at the military eq-
uity, it is difficult to see how if the Taliban is still pursuing large-
scale operations against the Afghan Government, against Afghan
Government forces, it would be possible for us to maintain a CT
platform there without a significant presence. It is just hard to see
how you would get to that level.
Going smaller requires integration, requires intra-Afghan dia-
logue and some way forward involving both parties.
Senator REED. Implicit in what has been discussed by the admin-
istration about the arrangement is that the final departure will be
conditions-based. But those conditions have not yet been specified.
Would you decide the conditions, or how will those conditions be es-
tablished?
General MCKENZIE. So what would happen is General Miller
through me—we would report the military conditions on the
ground, and that would be an input into the larger element of that.
But for military conditions, I think again we have got a very clear
481

vision of what is happening there. Taliban attacks against the gov-
ernment would have to go down to a far lower level than they are
now. That would be probably the principal thing. Intra-Afghan dia-
logue should ideally lead to some condition where the Taliban can
never be part of some future Afghan military. That would be a
matter for the Afghans, not for us. But it is hard to see how you
can go forward without some intra-Afghan dialogue that takes you
to that.
Senator REED. Well, just one point is it takes two sides to have
a dialogue, and the current Government of Afghanistan is in some
disarray. You have two individuals claiming that they are presi-
dent. You have dual inaugurations. It is slightly outside your lane,
but that is a complicating factor I think.
General MCKENZIE. Sir, it is.
Senator REED. With respect to our involvement, even with an
intra-Afghan dialogue and even on a sort of an optimistic thing,
you would assume that if there is that dialogue, there will be some
jointness in the government. Taliban elements coming into the gov-
ernment.
It comes down to sustainability over the long run, and as you
well know, their defense budget is about $6 billion a year. We and
our coalition partners provide $4.5 billion a year. If we were to pull
that money or decrease it significantly, their ability just to function
as a military and police force in the nation would probably be gut-
ted. Is that fair?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, I would agree with that assessment.
Senator REED. We are going to be faced—this is the best sce-
nario—with a government that might be Taliban, et cetera not
fully consistent with all of our values and views, and we would still
be asked and need to provide billions of dollars. Is that fair?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, it would. But my advice—and obviously,
many of those things are outside of my competence. My advice
would be are we able to do the thing we are there to do, which is
to prevent the generation of attacks against the United States and
our Homeland and those of our allies from ISIS and al Qaeda, typi-
cally in eastern Afghanistan. Is what you have described going to
yield that result? And that would be the basis for any advice that
I would give.
Senator REED. Thank you very much, General. Thank you for
your service.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Cotton?
Senator COTTON. General, thanks for coming back. This is the
first appearance since your troops killed Qassem Soleimani. I want
to commend you for your role and their role in removing the
world’s worst terrorist mastermind from the face of the earth.
Is it fair to say that Iran’s leaders were somewhat chastened by
the killing of Qassem Soleimani?
General MCKENZIE. I think it is. Just a little earlier, we talked
about capability and will. They have never doubted our capability.
They often doubted our will, and I think that gave them something
to think about.
Senator COTTON. Back in the day in the 2000s, Qassem
Soleimani traveled with extreme operational security. Is that cor-
rect?
482

General MCKENZIE. That is correct.
Senator COTTON. During much of the 20 teens, did he shed that
operational security and travel more openly to the point of posting
pictures of himself on social media?
General MCKENZIE. Well, I think he communicated a lot to a lot
of different people. I would just leave it at that.
Senator COTTON. Suggesting that he felt a degree of impunity to
travel around and wreck havoc against the United States, impunity
that he did not have after all.
Let us stay on Iran, and let us talk about coronavirus in par-
ticular. We obviously know that it has impacted some of the senior
leaders in their regime. We have seen it on television news. Do you
have an assessment of just how extensive it is among Iran’s leader-
ship?
General MCKENZIE. Certainly. You know, we have seen public
admissions of various senior leaders that are ill and a couple that
have actually died. I think it is having an affect on how they make
decisions, and I think it slows them down.
There are a couple pressures on Iranian leadership right now.
One is the outrage after the shoot-down of the aircraft after their
attack on Al-Asad. That coupled with their inability to effectively
respond to the coronavirus is, I think, inducing pressure on and in-
side the leadership. Of course, we watch that very closely. It is a
very opaque state, very hard for us to see in there. But I believe
the numbers are probably significantly under-reported in terms of
coronavirus victims in Iran. So we look at that pretty hard going
forward. Because the permeability and porousness of the borders,
Iran sits in the middle of a theater. So their ability to pass that
infection to other states is very worrisome.
Senator COTTON. I suspect it actually may be the worst outbreak
anywhere in the world, contrary to what Iranian media would say.
Does that presumably apply to Iran’s troops as well, both their reg-
ular military and IRGC troops, if their society is facing this wide-
scale outbreak? Do you assess that their troops are as well?
General MCKENZIE. I would say it is going to have some affect
on the military instrument. We look at it as hard—we can talk a
little bit more about this in closed session, sir, and I would like to
do that. But we watch that very closely.
Senator COTTON. What do you assess to be the impact of the oil
price collapse over the last 4 days on Iran’s Government and its
military capabilities?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, I think it probably hurts them. They are
under grave pressure right now through a variety of economic in-
struments, you know, the sanctions that are applied against them.
I do not think this particularly helps in any way. I think they have
an active policy of trying to find ways to swap tankers around the
do that, which is marginally successful. So I do not think it means
anything good for them. Aside from that, I would just like a little
more time to take a look at it. But I do not think it is a good thing
for Iran.
Senator COTTON. There has been some talk around the world
about providing more humanitarian aid to Iran. Secretary Pompeo
recently called for Iran to release all foreign national prisoners be-
483

fore our Nation provides them humanitarian aid. Do you think that
is a reasonable step?
General MCKENZIE. I defer to the Secretary of State on that one.
Senator COTTON. What about coronavirus among our troops?
What steps are we taking there?
General MCKENZIE. In the theater right now, we have one con-
tractor with symptoms. We have another person who actually
picked it up at the airport after he returned from a trip outside the
theater who is in quarantine as well. So we watch that very, very
closely.
Right now, we believe we have good precautions in place. We
have cut back significantly on intra-theater travel. For example,
someone in—pick a place—Kuwait who wanted to go to UAE
maybe for a weekend of elective liberty—we do not do that any-
more. So that travel is mission-essential only. Just yesterday, we
put some restrictions in going into Bahrain as well from outside
the theater.
So what we are trying to do is maintain isolation so that we pro-
tect the critical functions that we have to do. There are some
things where we just cannot accept the risk of an infection. So we
look very hard at those things and try to maintain good physical
separation.
Senator COTTON. One final question. You say on page 9 of your
written testimony that unmanned aircraft systems are, quote, the
most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM area of op-
erations since the rise of the improvised explosive device. Anyone
who knows what those improvised explosive devices did to our
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan would find that a very troubling
statement.
We have spent billions of dollars in the Department of Defense
on counter-drone systems. I am concerned that we are still under
grave threat to them. But I am also encouraged to see that your
command has been experimenting with so many new and more ef-
fective counter-drone systems. I am worried that they are not wide-
ly fielded yet. So I am just wondering if you could talk to us a little
bit about whether your needs are being met and what this Com-
mittee could do to be more effective on counter-drone systems.
General MCKENZIE. Sir, the Department is working very hard.
As you know, executive sponsorship for this program has gone to
the Army, which I think is good. It will focus it and be even more
responsive to our requirements.
I think the key thing is right now, we are simply at a stage in
the development of these systems, and you see it in the back and
forth of warfare where the advantage is with the operator and with
the offense. We will catch up. It is going to take us a little time
to do that, and really, it is what we would call the group 1 and
group 2’s that concern me the most, the small ones that you can
go and buy at Costco, you know, duck tape a grenade or mortar
bomb to and fly it into an objective. The larger ones—we have ways
to deal with them because they are more like aircraft in a tradi-
tional way, although they are still very concerning.
So we have not yet integrated a solution to this. The Army has
a lot of great ideas, and there are a variety of other good things
out there that are working. We just have not yet managed to bring
484

it all together. We work this every day, and I believe the energy
is there, but we are still solving the dynamic.
Senator COTTON. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here, General, and thank you for your serv-
ice over many, many years.
You have not been here, as has been remarked, since the hearing
on December 4th, 2018. So we are very glad to have you back. A
lot has happened.
Unfortunately, a lot of the information that this Committee re-
ceives is behind closed doors in a classified setting. Reference was
just made to it by the Chairman to follow this meeting. I am very
concerned that the American people, as well as servicemembers
and military families, are lacking the kind of transparency and ac-
countability that they really deserve and that is necessary for the
American people to assess how we are doing in CENTCOM and
other places around the world. I do not know whether you have any
comments on that. But the over-classification, the excessive secrecy
denies the American people the opportunity to know about the
brave and dedicated service of the troops in your command and
what they have accomplished, as well as the challenges going for-
ward.
I might just also say that your testimony today at 15 pages is
considerably shorter than the more than 40 pages of written testi-
mony that your predecessor, General Votel, provided. I am not
judging the quality by the quantity of pages, but I wonder whether
you have any plans to submit additional comments or background
that would elaborate on some of the conclusions, particularly as to
the issue that Senator Cotton just raised which I think is very im-
portant, unmanned aerial aircraft, and the threat they pose, analo-
gous to the IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] which were easy
to make, proliferated in the region, caused more than 50 percent
of the deaths and a major part of our casualties. I can see the same
happening with these off-the-shelf kind of items that similarly pose
a threat of many repeated small-scale attacks on our troops or Af-
ghanistan’s.
Let me just ask you on the issue of transparency, I am at a loss
to know why the annexes to our agreement have not been made
public. Obviously, they are known to the Taliban. Is there any rea-
son why we cannot make them public so the American people can
see them?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, I am going to defer that to the Depart-
ment of State. They are actually the classifying authority in this
case. So I would defer to them.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. In your military opinion, just from a mili-
tary standpoint—I realize there may be other factors—do you see
any obstacle to making them public?
General MCKENZIE. So obviously as I work the military side of
the problem, I have visibility with the annexes. They are useful for
me to have. But I would defer the question to wider publication to
the Secretary of State.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. I know you are deferring the ultimate de-
cision, and I apologize for belaboring this point. But strictly from
485

the readiness, the preparedness, the effectiveness, and the ability
to accomplish missions in the field, I am at a loss to see any reason
why they cannot be made public.
General MCKENZIE. So from a purely military perspective, that
is correct. But there are other issues beyond the military that need
to be considered, and I would not be competent to pass judgment
on that.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you.
Let me ask you in terms of COVID–19 and its impact on Iran,
is it likely that the crippling effect of this disease on certainly the
political structure, the economy, and possibly the military are de-
laying any reprisals for the killing of Soleimani?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, we spent a lot of time talking about that
very point, and the short answer is I just do not know. I would tell
you that totalitarian, authoritarian regimes, when they are under
extreme pressure, typically react by looking to an external threat.
There is very little evidence in the history of warfare of a regime
that has a crippling internal problem that decides to focus on solv-
ing the crippling internal problem that is the source of all their
problems rather than looking for something to unify the masses of
its people against an external target. So I am informed by that
view, and that I think is a possibility.
They are fractured now, and they are having difficulty dealing
with a number of things. So I think it probably makes them, in
terms of decision-making, more dangerous rather than less dan-
gerous. But that is just my assessment. There are competing views
from smarter people than me on Iran.
Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I thank you for that very well in-
formed assessment and appreciate your being here. Thank you,
General.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Hawley?
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being. Thank you for your service.
I want to take this opportunity at the outset to extend again my
sincerest condolences to the families of those four American heroes
and I think a British ally who have given their lives in Iraq since
last Sunday. Thank you for all that you are doing.
Can I come back to this question of deterrence that the chairman
and Senator Reed both raised with you? You mentioned that we
are having some issue with establishing deterrence against asym-
metric aggression. So can I just ask you about the strategy for de-
terring Iranian asymmetric aggression? What is your thinking on
that to date and where are we with it strategically?
General MCKENZIE. So ultimately you want to convince the ulti-
mate source of the aggression that the object they pursue is too
costly to pursue. So when you think about that, you think about
going to the source. So you really look to Iran. Iran needs to under-
stand that we hold them ultimately responsible for SMG [sub-ma-
chine gun] attacks in Iraq. There is a relationship. The Shiite mili-
tia groups in Iraq and other proxies across the region—and there
are other places across the region where they are active—they are
not entities unto themselves. They all have some form of causal re-
lationship with Iran, and so I think the best way to convince Iran
486

to cease giving orders to those activities is to convey to them it is
not going to get them what they want and may, in fact, have sig-
nificant consequences for them.
There is one element that the command and control between
Iran and their Shiite militias groups in Iraq in particular but oth-
ers as well—it is not perfect. It is not 1.0. It is not like our chain
of command where I am pretty confident if I give an order, it is
going to be followed. That is not the way it works, as you know,
with those groups. There is a gap there between intent and execu-
tion. So it is not perfect control. But I think the key thing is if you
want to stop attacks in the gray zone, you need to convince the ul-
timate person behind those attacks that it is not in their long-term
interest to continue them.
Senator HAWLEY. Let me come back to this question about the
pretty sizable conventional force buildup that we have had in
CENTCOM since last May. If that has so far not succeeded in de-
terring these asymmetrical attacks, what in your judgment is it
going to take? Do we need additional, in your judgment, conven-
tional forces? I mean, how do we go about practically reaching this
asymmetrical deterrence question?
General MCKENZIE. So you may ultimately live with a low level
of proxy attacks in the region. You may not be able to completely
do away with that. I would tell you certainly I would believe a red-
line for the United States is going to be the death of U.S.
servicemembers or those of our partners and allies. So that is a
redline.
As you know, there have been a variety of attacks over the last
month where we had no casualties, small, low level attacks. Of
course, the attack yesterday is a tragedy.
I believe that the way to actually deter those in the long term
is to convince the source of those attacks that they are not going
to reach their object through those attacks. Let me give you an ex-
ample.
In Iraq, I think an Iranian goal is to eject the United States from
Iraq as part of a larger view that they want us to leave the theater.
Iraq is a good place to start because there are certain political con-
structs in place there that would aid them. So they were fairly
quiet for a while as they pursued the political track.
Now, I only can talk about the military side of it, but I believe
ultimately we are going to be able to reach a situation with the
Government of Iraq where we remain and will not leave. That is
my judgment, I could be wrong. Again, it is ultimately not a mili-
tary decision. So I think when Iran realizes that—and I think
maybe they have—then their attacks will begin to—they have sort
of laid their attacks low. Now they will begin to pick up a little bit.
Senator HAWLEY. If we are going to have to live with some con-
tinuing asymmetrical threat—that is just part of what it means to
be in the theater. Let us talk about the 14,000 troops or so. You
said maybe it was closer to 10,000 who have been sent to theater
since May. In your judgment, how long should we expect that troop
buildup to need to last in theater? Is this something you think is
going to need to continue on a relatively permanent basis? Give me
your assessment about that.
487

General MCKENZIE. Senator, I think so long as we continue a
maximum pressure campaign against Iran that places diplomatic
and economic pressure against them, it is in our best interest to
convince Iran that activities they carry out in the military do-
main—because that is really the only way they have to operate.
They have no really effective way to operate against us diplomati-
cally or economically. Therefore, there response almost by defini-
tion has to be in the military domain. What these forces do and
what CENTCOM’s objective is is to convince Iran it is not in their
best interest to act out either directly or indirectly through proxies
or by state actions against us to try to reset the balance of the
maximum pressure campaign.
So that gets to your question of how long. My answer would be
so long as the maximum pressure campaign continues.
Senator HAWLEY. Talk to us about the tradeoffs involved here
from a National Defense Strategy perspective where we think
about, again as the Chairman mentioned, about the shift to
INDOPACOM as the pacing theater. We have this threat in
CENTCOM. I mean, what is this going to mean? If we have to sus-
tain the conventional troop buildup in CENTCOM, what will this
mean for other NDS priorities?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, actually the conventional troop buildup
in CENTCOM, to include the ships and airplanes, is a fairly small
fraction of the total United States military. In my last job, I was
the Director of the Joint Staff, and before that, I was the Director
of Strategic Plans and Policy. So I am intimately familiar with the
NDS, and I am a believer in the NDS. I recognize that in the long
term, we need to be postured against China and we need to be pos-
tured against Russia. However, being a global power requires you
to be able to do several things at once, and these are not binary
choices.
Again, we have chosen to execute a maximum pressure campaign
against Iran that was not in the NDS. That came along after the
NDS was written. The NDS actually I believe is analytically broad
enough to accommodate what we are doing against Iran while
maintaining pressure against the real existential threats that we
face.
Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Kaine?
Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thanks, General McKenzie.
Just to follow up on a point with Senator Hawley, did I under-
stand your point to be that Iran really does not believe it has a re-
sponse to the maximum pressure campaign other than a military
response? They do not really have diplomatic pressure levers, and
they do not have an economic pressure level of any kind.
General MCKENZIE. Senator, from where I sit, that is my judg-
ment.
Senator KAINE. So the Iranian activities that are military in na-
ture are directly connected to the maximum pressure campaign. I
would agree with you on that.
One of the activities that interested me was the joint naval drill
by Iran, Russia, and China in the Gulf of Oman recently. Had Iran,
488

Russia, and China done joint exercises of that kind together in the
past, as far as you know?
General MCKENZIE. They have done bilateral exercises. I think
it is the first time they have done an exercise of that nature, al-
though, Senator, it would tell you it is not an exercise in the way
that we would do an exercise with NATO or we would do an exer-
cise in the theater.
Senator KAINE. Not as full scale.
General MCKENZIE. Yes, sir. That would be an understatement
actually.
Senator KAINE. But in CENTCOM and more generally, we
should be very, very attentive to instances where our adversaries
are doing anything in combination.
General MCKENZIE. Senator, you are absolutely right.
Senator KAINE. Many of us on the Committee are about the abil-
ity to handle the mining of the Straits of Hormuz. A couple years
ago in the NDAA, we had an amendment that required the Navy
to halt decommissioning of older Avenger-class minesweepers be-
cause we were worried about this. What is your view of our current
capacity to handle the mining of the straits or to stop scuttling of
ships that would block freedom of navigation through the straits?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, today we have four minesweepers
in the AOR. The British, our coalition partners, have four mine-
sweepers in the AOR, and I have four minesweeping helicopters.
There are a variety of other things that we can employ as well.
Should the straits be mined, it would take us a while to clear
that channel. It would depend on were we clearing them under con-
ditions of drifting mines that were placed out there, which is the
least attributable and probably the most likely way Iran might
choose to act in that waterway, or would it be as a condition of a
larger war, in which case we would not begin to do that clearing
until we could guarantee the safety of these vessels, which are not
really capable of defending themselves? So we have the capability
to clear the strait. The time it would take would be dependent on
the Iranian action that was the precursor for it.
Senator KAINE. I see.
One more question about Iran. I have not seen the answer to
this. Is there an assessment that the coronavirus spike in Iran is
driven by like a lot of back and forth travel between Iran and
China, or what is the assessment about why Iran has become an
epicenter, say, along with Italy outside of China?
General MCKENZIE. There is a lot of travel between Iran and
China. But I would not go beyond that. I am just not enough of an
expert to tell you.
Senator KAINE. Got it. Okay.
A question on Afghanistan. What is your current assessment of
kind of in the mil-to-mil space the helpfulness of Pakistan and us
doing the work we need to do in Afghanistan?
General MCKENZIE. Sure. So I maintain a close relationship with
General Bajwa, the Chief of Army Staff. We talk frequently. I have
been to visit him a couple of times in Pakistan. Their support has
been very important in directing the Taliban to come to negotia-
tions, and their continued support is going to be very important as
we go through this difficult period of deciding is the Taliban actu-
489

ally serious about this and are they going to live up to their com-
mitments.
Senator KAINE. Do you see that level of United States and Paki-
stan cooperation on the mil-to-mil side with the Afghanistan mis-
sion sort of getting better? It has always been good? I mean, how
would you assess it kind of historically?
General MCKENZIE. So we have always had at U.S. Central Com-
mand—and I have about 10 years of experience in this organiza-
tion. We have always seen a relationship with Pakistan as critical.
Whether at the political level, there is turmoil, up and down, we
always try to keep the military channel open. There are good rea-
sons to do that, to prevent fratricide, to prevent miscalculation, and
things like that. So we work very hard to keep that channel open.
Senator KAINE. Let me ask one last question, and it seems like
it is kind of outside of your area of authority. It is about Venezuela,
but it deals with a partner in CENTCOM, the UAE. We do a lot
of work together with UAE. But the UAE together with India, Tur-
key, Russia have assisted the Maduro regime in avoiding United
States sanctions. Have you ever interacted with UAE about their
interaction with the Maduro regime in Venezuela?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, I have not.
Senator KAINE. All right. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Ernst?
Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General McKenzie, thank you so much for your service to our
Nation, and I echo the thoughts and prayers from the rest of my
colleagues on the losses that we have had in the recent week. So
please extend that to those families, if you would, sir.
I do take very seriously Congress’ role in authorizing the use of
military force. We have to ensure that our troops have the correct
authorities to do the missions that we ask them to do. Now, there
has been a lot of debate, not just within this Committee, but with
a number of our colleagues outside of this Committee about repeal-
ing an AUMF and maybe putting a new one in place.
Can you tell us what the operational impact would be of repeal-
ing either the 2001 or 2002 AUMF [Authorized Use of Military
Force]? And in your view, do you believe a new authorization for
the use of military force is necessary to adequately cover down and
conduct operations in your AO?
General MCKENZIE. Ma’am, many of those questions are above
my level of competence. But I would tell you I believe I have the
authorities I need now to execute operations in CENTCOM.
Senator ERNST. Utilizing the current AUMF——
General MCKENZIE. Yes, ma’am.
Senator ERNST.—you are able to operate.
General MCKENZIE. That is correct.
Senator ERNST. Well, I appreciate that. Again, the debate that
we have has been pretty extensive on what we could do with or
without that AUMF. So thank you for that feedback. That is a de-
bate for us, but we do need that input to know whether you are
able to adequately operate.
Moving on to a different topic with our special operators, The
Washington Post had an article on the 5th of March that stated,
quote, a new network of special operations forces will serve as the
490

backbone of a smaller United States military mission in Afghani-
stan. End quote. Of course, the purpose of our special operations
network is to continue rooting out ISIS in that area and apply
pressure to the Taliban if they fail to live up to their end of the
peace agreement.
So what can you tell us about this new special operations net-
work?
General MCKENZIE. Ma’am, I begin by saying I do not think it
is actually new. I think it is the way we have done business for
quite a while in Afghanistan. We have embedded CT forces that op-
erate against that specific mission, have done it for many years,
and it would be the way that we would go forward.
It is important to understand that for special operations forces
to be most effective, they need to operate within a conventional
force structure, and that provides the ecosystem that they use to
move around. If they get in trouble, there is someone that can come
to help them. So we always tend to think in that way, not only
there but in other places across the theater as well. Special oper-
ations forces are vitally important to us, but they exist best when
they are flourished within a network of U.S. conventional forces
and then a host nation force as well.
Senator ERNST. Which, yes, was going to be my next question
about the conventional forces. So I was just trying to understand
within this article what was new about what they were being re-
quired to do.
General MCKENZIE. Ma’am, I often take up with The Washington
Post articles to understand exactly what it is they are saying. In
this case, I do not see anything particularly new.
Senator ERNST. Okay, outstanding.
Of course, then our special operators—will they need to maintain
different strategic locations than where they are now, or will they
largely remain in place?
General MCKENZIE. It will depend on if we go to the force level
that I have been told to go to, 8,600. We have a good lay-down for
that. Going below that level would require guidance to me and it
would depend on the permissiveness of the environment. If you go
lower and go to fewer bases, typically you are going to do it because
the security situation is permissive. You do not have to defend
yourself against Taliban attacks even as you are executing oper-
ations against ISIS and al Qaeda. So it would be strictly dependent
on the overall permissiveness of the situation, and those days are
still ahead of us. We have a variety of ways for looking at that, and
we will look at that very closely as we go ahead.
Senator ERNST. Wonderful. A number of us did travel to Afghani-
stan prior to Thanksgiving, and we were able to visit some of the
commando training with the Afghan forces. Do you feel that they
are now getting to a point where they will be able to nest with
great capability with our special operators on the ground?
General MCKENZIE. We have made great strides with the com-
mando forces in Afghanistan. Your sense is exactly right.
Senator ERNST. Thank you very much, sir. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator King?
Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
491

I have realized that the questions I am about to embark upon are
more policy and that your job is executing policy, but I just want
to get some of your thoughts.
In your testimony on page 4, you said, since May 2019, Iran sup-
ported groups in Iraq, have attacked United States interests dozens
of times, conducted scores of unmanned aerial system reconnais-
sance flights. They have attacked and seized foreign vessel in the
Gulf. You go on to list all the things Iran is doing. I think you testi-
fied in response to Senator Hawley’s question that they are not
being deterred in the asymmetric area, in the proxy area. It has
always been a proxy war. I mean, that is what it has always been.
Here is my problem. In 2017, we left the JCPOA [Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action], which they were abiding by. All intel-
ligence unequivocally said that Iran was in compliance with all the
provisions of the JCPOA. We put on the maximum pressure cam-
paign, but as you have testified, it does not seem to be working be-
cause they are still doing what they were doing before.
The major difference today is—and I do not want to get into clas-
sified material, but Iran is significantly closer to break-out to a
bomb than they were when we left the agreement in—I think it
was 2018. I do not get it. It is exactly what many of us were wor-
ried before the JCPOA. You have got a malign Iran acting irrespon-
sibly throughout the region getting close to a nuclear weapon. Help
me out here. I do not really understand it. They are still doing it,
and we probably will find out that the attack last night was a Shi-
ite militia supported by Iran. I mean, I think that is probably
where the evidence is going to head. I do not have any intelligence
on that, but I am speculating. Give me some thoughts.
General MCKENZIE. Senator, so the maximum pressure cam-
paign, in terms of its effect on the Iranian economy, there are other
people——
Senator KING. Well, there is no question it has had an effect on
the Iranian economy, but it has not had any effect on the activity
we were hoping to deter. You have testified to that.
General MCKENZIE. I would argue actually, as a result of the
buildup in Iranian activity over the course of the summer, the es-
tablishment of the International Maritime Security construct actu-
ally shifts—the Straits of Hormuz are no longer harassed. They are
passing without any problem at all back and forth not because we
are taking actions aimed directly at Iran, but rather because we
and an international coalition are shining a spotlight when that ac-
tivity occurs. So the activity is not occurring.
Senator KING. Interesting you mentioned the international coali-
tion. I completely agree with you, which we blew up when we left
the JCPOA. The international coalition that put that agreement in
place did not agree with our decision. We took it unilaterally, but
that is another discussion.
Again, do you believe that they are being deterred from their
proxy attacks throughout the region?
General MCKENZIE. I believe that we are deterring them from
state-on-state attacks.
Senator KING. But that is not the issue. It has not been a state-
on-state situation. The attacks have always been through proxies.
492

General MCKENZIE. Sir, actually on January the 7th, we had a
clear state-on-state attack.
Senator KING. After we killed Soleimani. Correct? That was the
missile attack.
General MCKENZIE. That is the missile attack.
Senator KING. Yes, okay. But we killed Soleimani and then they
responded. But historically the attacks have always been through
proxies, and my point is they are still doing it. The only difference
is they are also headed toward a nuclear weapon, and I do not get
how that is in the best interest of the United States or the region.
Senator KING. Sir, I understand your argument. Many of those
issues are not CENTCOM issues.
I would tell you that I come back to what I think my military
task is. As the maximum pressure campaign continues, my military
task is to prevent Iran from taking actions directly or indirectly
that would challenge the activities that are ongoing.
Senator KING. I appreciate that, and you are doing an excellent
job. It is a tragedy what happened yesterday and the last week to
our troops. I think everyone here recognizes that.
Just in a few seconds left, is there a plan B if the Taliban does
not abide by this agreement in Afghanistan? In other words, do
they believe that we are going to leave come hell or high water, or
do they still have some worry that we are going to stay there if
they do not act right? Because as you testified, they are doing plen-
ty of attacks right now. I worry that after 17, 18, 19 years, we are
going to end up exactly where we were in 2001 with the Taliban
in charge of the country and open season for terrorists.
General MCKENZIE. Senator, I had the opportunity to give advice
on the plan that we are executing now, and my advice was to pro-
ceed with it. The principal reason that I supported it was the con-
ditionality that is inherent in it. So we are going to have an oppor-
tunity to see what the Taliban do.
Senator KING. Do we know what the conditions are?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, on the military side, I know very clearly
what the conditions——
Senator KING. Do we? Does the American public know?
General MCKENZIE. Sir, I am not sure that I would be the one
to answer that.
Senator KING. Well, thank you for your testimony. I appreciate
it. Again, I understand your job is to execute policy, but you are
the nearest thing we have to a policymaker on this issue here this
morning. I appreciate your candid answers to my questions.
General MCKENZIE. Thank you, sir.
Senator KING. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Cramer?
Senator CRAMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your service and for being here. I too ex-
press my condolences to you and to the families for the loss of your/
our two soldiers and, of course, our friend from the United King-
dom.
General, this year, of course, the Air Force is asking us in their
budget proposal to divest in critical ISR assets and a way to allow
for more room to invest in new technologies and future ISR assets.
I am very aware of the critical role that these ISR assets, some of
493

these legacy assets have played in CENTCOM, including some
from my home State of North Dakota. I would like your take on,
first of all, what the Department of Defense and/or the Air Force
have told you to expect with regard to meeting your ISR obligations
or requirements if this fiscal year 2021 budget is enacted.
General MCKENZIE. Thank you, sir. I actually possess most of the
ISR assets the Department has, and I am cognizant of that. At the
same time, as we were talking just a few minutes ago, as for the
former Director of the Joint Staff and the J–5, I am very much
aware of the need to prepare and turn to face the threat from
China and the threat from Russia. Those are existential threats
and we need to capitalize. We need to invest. We need to move in
that direction.
For me, it actually comes down to a platform, and that platform
is the MQ–9. That is the platform of choice in the CENTCOM AOR.
It is a platform that can gather intelligence. It can strike. It can
do all kinds of things. It is a jack of all trades. I would prefer that
the Air Force not divest of that resource right now to the degree
that they are doing. I acknowledge that the Air Force has some
tough decisions to make as they take a look at the future of the
China threat. The MQ–9 is not necessarily a platform that is useful
in a dense air defense environment. I recognize that. But for right
now and for the threats that to me are much closer actually than
the longer-term threats of China that are deeper and graver, I
favor retaining those assets as long as possible.
Senator CRAMER. I appreciate your answer, and I agree. The
MQ–9 is really quite a remarkable asset. We are just trying to as-
sess the risk and whether the risk is worth it and how we transi-
tion because I also agree that we need to get to another place.
With that in mind, I want to transition then in the discussion to
the Space Force. Of course, we understand that many of the new
technologies we are talking about would be space assets. I am just
wondering, first of all, are you expecting to get some benefit in
CENTCOM from space, ISR assets? I would expect the answer
would be yes. But then the question becomes the gap between here
and there and the risk in the middle of it. Are we preparing to ade-
quately mitigate that risk?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, I use space assets every day, every
hour in U.S. Central Command, and they provide unique capabili-
ties. The total ISR picture is best built when it is complemented
by air-breathing platforms as well. But for all of my life and par-
ticularly in U.S. Central Command, we cannot survive without
space assets.
Senator CRAMER. I think you have answered my questions, in-
cluding a couple that I have not asked yet. So I appreciate that and
appreciate the time and am happy to yield back some time.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Hirono?
Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, as long as we are on the subject of ISR, are your gen-
eral ISR requirements being met?
General MCKENZIE. Yes, they are.
Senator HIRONO. Are you able to leverage the ISR capacity of
partners and allies in the region?
494

General MCKENZIE. I am able to leverage both partners in the
region and partners and allies out of the region that deploy into the
region.
Senator HIRONO. Regarding the peace agreement with the
Taliban, you had testified on March 10th, not too long ago, before
the House Armed Services Committee that the U.S. had not devel-
oped military plans for the full withdrawal. Based on what you tes-
tified today and also how you testified before that you did not have
much confidence that the Taliban would honor its commitments, so
at this rate are we ever going to meet the timeline of complete
withdrawal by the end of the year?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, that will be a condition——
Senator HIRONO. By the end of the year or pretty much in any
foreseeable future.
General MCKENZIE. I am confident we are going to go to 8,600
by the middle of the summer. I think a decision to go below that
level is a political not a military decision. I will have an oppor-
tunity to give a recommendation on that and then will be directed
what to do.
Senator HIRONO. There are not very many indications that the
Taliban is going to stop pursuing its attacks. So as you say, they
would have to decrease those attacks against Afghan forces sub-
stantially before we would go much below the 8,600 troops. It
seems to me that we are going to be in Afghanistan a long, long
time. We certainly cannot predict when we are going to be out of
there, and this war has already cost us $2 trillion, killed more than
3,500 Americans and coalition troops. So this is a really troubling
area of the world. The entire Middle East is.
So you would agree the stability, such as it can be, in the Middle
East is a good thing for the United States.
General MCKENZIE. Senator, I would agree.
Senator HIRONO. Yes. Meanwhile, Senator King had pointed out
that Iran is pursuing its nuclear ambitions and that they could
very well have a nuclear weapon. Would Iran having a nuclear
weapon not add to the instability of the region? Would it not en-
courage other countries in the region to also develop nuclear weap-
ons that would end up being an even more unstable region than
we currently have?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, my understanding of the object of
our policy is to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.
Senator HIRONO. Well, they are going ahead with it from what
we can see, and our departure from JCPOA has only hastened that
situation. I think all around, the impact of our withdrawal from the
JCPOA is certainly being manifested.
I have a question about China and Russia. As they continue to
make significant investments in the area of your responsibility, so
they are cultivating relationships and providing financial support.
In particular, China has invested an estimated $200 billion—$200
billion—in the Middle East in the past 15 years, and both Russia
and China continue to develop relationships with leaders in the re-
gion such as Syrian President Bashar Assad.
What risk does the United States face as Russia and China in-
crease investments and influence in your area of responsibility,
495

knowing full well that Russia and China are our near-peer com-
petitors?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, I think the greatest risk, although
it is in the future, is from China, and you noted very correctly they
are leading with their economics. Although they have established
a significant military presence in Djibouti, their military presence
throughout the rest of the theater is actually quite small. But I
think we are seeing the leading edge of economic in-roads.
I think Russia is a little more complicated. They are not spend-
ing as much money. We see more Russian military deployments,
but I think it is harder for them to sustain, with the exception of
Syria.
Senator HIRONO. So what can we do? What are we doing? Be-
cause China really employs a whole-of-government approach to
what they are doing not only in this area of the world, but clearly
in the Indo-Pacific area. So what are we doing? Are we pursuing
a whole-of-government approach to counter particularly China’s ac-
tivities in both regions?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, again, this is not an area of my par-
ticular expertise. But I believe we are looking at whole-of-govern-
ment responses to China in the AOR and in the bridge really be-
tween CENTCOM and USAFRICOM, which is where their road ac-
tually takes them as well.
Senator HIRONO. That may sound reassuring, but you know, I
really question whether or not we are pursuing the kind of whole-
of-government approach that China is.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Peters?
Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here and your testimony here
today. I would also like to join my colleagues in offering my sincere
condolences to the loved ones and families of those members who
we lost recently.
You have command in a very dangerous region. Over the past
several months, our servicemembers and installations have suf-
fered several rocket attacks. I am concerned about the serious
miscommunication to the American people and, quite frankly, to
the men in uniform and their families about the damage assess-
ment following an attack in January that we had against our facili-
ties. We were initially told that there were no injuries. Then we
were told about a dozen soldiers suffered traumatic brain injuries.
Then several dozen—the latest reports show that more than 100
troops have been diagnosed with a brain injury from this attack,
many of whom were transferred out of country for treatment.
My question to you, sir, is how did this miscommunication occur?
Was CENTCOM forced to give a rushed assessment, or did the
White House make an announcement without having any facts?
General MCKENZIE. Senator, thank you for the question. I actu-
ally would like to talk about that.
I am solely and completely responsible for the first notification
that there were no casualties. I am the officer who gave that report
based on my assessment of what happened at Al-Asad. There was
no pressure on me to give that report. That was we thought in the
immediate hours after the attack because it was not evident to us
496

that there had been concussion injuries. Maybe if we were smarter,
we would have picked up on that, but there were no kinetic inju-
ries. No one was bleeding. No bones were broken. So it was out as-
sessment and the assessment of my commanders on the ground.
But I am the single person who passed that report. So I bear total
responsibility for that with no one else.
So, therefore, after that, concussions presented themselves. TBI
[traumatic brain injury] presented itself. As you know, Senator,
that is not an injury like a broken arm or a broken leg that can
be immediately diagnosed on the spot. These injuries come back
and forth. Sometimes they manifest themselves over time. Some-
times it takes months to do that.
Two things I can tell you. I was never under any pressure from
anyone at any time to shade this reporting. The Secretary of De-
fense never said anything to me about it. The Chairman never said
anything to me about it. The President never said anything to me
about it. We were driven solely by medical diagnosis on scene. So
that is one point.
The second point is I am completely confident that every Amer-
ican service man or woman that was at Al-Asad got the very best
medical treatment that really our system can provide, and so the
numbers changed. So they did as people were presented, as people
were evaluated, I took the trouble to actually dig into what is
called the MACE–2, which is the clinical tool that is given on site
to develop some of the initial indications of are you concussed and
what is it. It is a pretty good tool. I wanted to make sure I under-
stood it fully and the difficulty of administering it.
You are right. One hundred ten people were diagnosed. We evac-
uated 35 of them out of the theater to Landstuhl. A further 28
have come back to the United States. Some people have gone back
to duty. We continue to take a look at that.
I would never minimize the significance of traumatic brain in-
jury. I mean, just the description of the injury itself is concerning.
We still have a lot to learn about it, but I believe that people that
were injured and received injuries of that nature at Al-Asad have
gotten very good medical treatment as a result of it.
Senator PETERS. Well, thank you for that answer, and you have
answered some of my next question. The President said—I think
he said, quote, they had headaches, a couple of other things, but
I would say and I can report it is not very serious. End of quote.
That is what we heard from the President that they had head-
aches.
The question to you. There are hundreds of thousands of U.S.
military veterans that are suffering from TBI, as you are well
aware. Do you agree that those injuries are serious and not merely
headaches?
General MCKENZIE. I believe any injury to the brain is a serious
injury.
Senator PETERS. Thank you.
General, in your written statement, you assert despite the death
of Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains a threat in Syria and most
of its activities focused on reestablishing networks, assassinating
and intimidating local leaders and security forces and extending its
influence in rural areas throughout Syria and Iraq. You state, simi-
497

lar to Afghanistan, most of the United States intelligence commu-
nity predicts that without sustained pressure, ISIS has the poten-
tial to reconstitute itself in both Iraq and Syria.
The President seems to have a different view and says that basi-
cally—well, he takes credit for 100 percent defeat of ISIS and used
that as justification to withdraw troops from Syria back in October
of 2019.
My question to you as commander, because there is inconsistency
in what we are hearing from the President and from you, how do
you navigate between the Department of Defense and the IC’s [In-
telligence Community] very ominous assessment of the ISIS threat
with the President’s more optimistic assessment?
General MCKENZIE. I will tell you based on guidance that I have
been given, which came from the Secretary of Defense, we have
repositioned ourselves in eastern Syria, what we call the Eastern
Syria Security Area, where we are carrying on operations against
ISIS with our SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] partners. Those op-
erations are actually very effective, and I think as long as we main-
tain pressure on them, we will be at a place where it is going to
be difficult for them to generate and deliver external attack plot-
ting, external attack plotting meaning attacks against the United
States or Europe. As long as we have the ability to do that—and
we do have the ability to do that now both with the forces that are
there and the positions that we are in—we are going to be able to
keep that pressure on.
Senator PETERS. Thank you.
Chairman INHOFE. Senator Blackburn?
Senator BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for being here, and I join with others in ex-
pressing our condolences to those last night, the two Americans
and the Brit that we lost in the attacks.
Just to be sure that we have got our notes right, it is not 14,000
troops that were added. It was 10,000?
General MCKENZIE. The number goes up and down based on—
forces flow in and out of the theater all the time. I would say the
number is closer to 10,000. But it is difficult to put a single figure
on it. When a carrier comes in, 5,000 people come in. That is
roughly correct. I would not want to give you a single number.
Senator BLACKBURN. All right. That is fair.
Let us talk a little bit about what you are doing to deter gray
zone attacks. I think that we need to hear a little bit from you on
that, if you will.
General MCKENZIE. Sure. As the maximum pressure campaign
against Iran continues, they are unable to really respond economi-
cally or diplomatically, the two channels that we are using to place
pressure on them. As they seek to find a way to respond, the only
way that is left is the military component. The military compo-
nent—they can do it one of two ways. They can do it directly, a
state attack, and they have done that with the attack on Al-Asad,
or they can do it indirectly, which the proxy attacks, gray zone at-
tacks, as you indicate there.
There is evidence over the course of the summer and the fall that
Iran wanted to pursue those gray zone activities in order to force
us to reconsider the maximum pressure campaign, in order to
498

make us back off from that. Where we are right now is we believe
as a result of the ballistic missile attack on Al-Asad, in the wake
of that, rough state-on-state deterrence has been reestablished and
that Iran does not seem to want to engage in another exchange of
that nature because that would ultimately be a very bad outcome
for them, and I think they recognize that.
However, they are still of the opinion that they can pursue their
objectives through attacks that they would hope would either be
unattributable or be below the level where we will respond. That
poses a very grave danger for them because I am not certain they
do have an exact understanding of what our redlines are and
where we are not going to be pushed. So we see that in Iraq. We
also see it in other places in the theater. But we see it principally
in Iraq because Iran is pursuing a dream of American ejection from
the theater, and they would like for that to begin in Iraq. That is
where we see it most readily.
Senator BLACKBURN. Then let me ask you this. When we are
talking about Iran, do you think they are more bold or less bold
than they were a year ago?
General MCKENZIE. So they were very bold in the late spring/
early summer of 2019, and they were bold because they have never
doubted our capability, but they doubt our will. So additionally in
the spring and summer of 2019, the theater had been significantly
drawn down in terms of capability. So they could observe that
CENTCOM did not possess the forces that it had in the past. So
a confluence of a judgment about our will and a judgment about
our capability led them, to answer your question, to be pretty bold.
I believe they are less bold now probably most significantly im-
pacted by the death of Qassem Soleimani.
Senator BLACKBURN. So then as we talk about their presence in
Iraq and their goal of ejecting us from that theater, then outside
of adding personnel, which I think it is fair to say you do not have
the personnel to add, then what can we do in Iraq that is going
to end up enhancing our force protection? How do we do that so
that we keep Iran in a diminishing posture instead of a bolder pos-
ture?
General MCKENZIE. First of all, you look to the source. If the
source is Iran, to reestablish deterrence, you want to establish the
idea in the mind of the opponent that the object they seek will be
more painful than its attainment. So it is more painful to get there
than it is to actually hold it, and so you do that by being very clear
to them about things that we are going to tolerate and things that
we are going to not tolerate. So that is one path.
The other path at the same time——
Senator BLACKBURN. So in other words, they have to see our will,
or as my kids would say, put the hurt on them.
General MCKENZIE. That is a very good way to state it, ma’am.
Senator BLACKBURN. Yes, okay.
General MCKENZIE. So meanwhile in Iraq, we are in Iraq at the
invitation of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government has re-
sponsibilities to provide protection for us. Actually practically the
best way to get at this problem is to continue to work with our
Iraqi hosts and partners to get after the SMG threat because it
threatens them as well.
499

Senator BLACKBURN. I yield back.
Chairman INHOFE. General McKenzie, excellent testimony. We
appreciate it very much. As we stated at the beginning of this hear-
ing, we are going to go now down to SVC–217 for a closed session.
We will see who shows up.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
LEBANON

1. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of Hezbollah’s
role in the new Lebanese Government?
General MCKENZIE. Hezbollah possesses greater influence in the new government
with a majority representation in the ruling coalition controlling/nominating the
heads of the three major branches of government. Despite wielding this enhanced
influence, Hezbollah almost certainly does not want to face public scrutiny for failed
legislation or policies like the ongoing economic crisis.

2. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, does Hezbollah have more or less influence
than in previous governments?
General MCKENZIE. Hezbollah has more influence in the new government and
parliament compared to the previous government.

3. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is the trend for the opinion of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) among the Lebanese population?
General MCKENZIE. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are the most respected
government entity inside Lebanon, viewed as an apolitical organization. The LAF
are consistently viewed as the sole national defense force. While Hezbollah is a sig-
nificant actor in the security spectrum, it is not considered an alternative to the
LAF as a national defense force.

4. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, is their credibility and favorability as an
institution increasing or decreasing overall?
General MCKENZIE. The Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) institutional credibility is
unchanged in the wake of recent anti-government protests, which favorably show-
cased the LAF’s non-partisan, apolitical standing.

5. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, is their credibility and favorability as an
institution increasing or decreasing vis-á-vis Hezbollah?
General MCKENZIE. The Lebanese population does not typically view Hezbollah
and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as competitors. Hezbollah is widely recog-
nized as a sectarian political and militia entity, while the LAF is seen as a national,
apolitical institution. Lebanese views on Hezbollah or the LAF almost certainly vary
depending on religious sect and political alignment.

6. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the perform-
ance of the Lebanese Armed Forces during the ongoing series of protests against the
government?
General MCKENZIE. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) forms the backbone of
United States influence in Lebanon and hedges against Iranian, Russian, and all
other malevolent interests in the country. The LAF performed well balancing the
safety and security of the protesters as well as their demands to illustrate profes-
sional and neutral behavior, permitting democratic freedom of expression.

7. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the Lebanese
Armed Forces in light of the new Lebanese Government?
General MCKENZIE. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) views itself as apolitical
but prioritizes protecting the Lebanese people against all threats. In December
2019, LAF Chief of Defense (CHOO) Aoun openly opposed the government’s lack of
credible response to the anti-government protests. The CHOO referred to the pro-
tests as a ‘‘revolution of the hungry.’’
500
8. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the LAF and
their ability to maintain end use monitoring of United States assistance?
General MCKENZIE. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) take end use monitoring
responsibilities very seriously and have maintained 100 percent accountability an-
nually. Of the 4,529 items requiring annual inventory in Lebanon, only two were
not physically observed in the past fiscal year. However, these two items were satis-
factorily accounted for through accurate and up to date hand receipts while deployed
at the time of inventory. Additionally, the LAF passed their last Compliance Assist-
ance Visit with a ‘‘satisfactory’’ rating, which is the highest possible rating. The Of-
fice of Defense Cooperation Beirut and the LAF have an excellent relationship, with
unhindered access for end use monitoring at any time.
EGYPT AND SINAI

9. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the Egyptian
Government’s performance against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and
other terrorist organizations in the Sinai?
General MCKENZIE. The Egyptian Armed Forces have contained most of the ISIS–
Sinai and other Violent Extreme Organizations violence in the northeastern Sinai
Peninsula. Cairo has sustained counterterrorism operations despite consistent cas-
ualties, while beginning to implement limited reforms to address societal and eco-
nomic grievances.

10. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the Multi-
national Force and Observers (MFO) and its role in supervising the implementation
of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and working to
prevent any violation of its terms?
General MCKENZIE. For the past 40 years, the Multinational Force and Observers
(MFO) is the only dedicated organization to monitor the Egypt-Israel treaty. Aside
from treaty supervision, MFO’s presence serves to reinforce the commitment of the
international community in maintaining peace. The MFO also allows Egypt and
Israel to discuss shared diplomatic, economic, and security interests in good faith.

11. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the value of
MFO as a platform for communications between Egypt and Israel in the event that
tensions increase between the two countries?
General MCKENZIE. I defer to Ambassador Beecroft, Multinational Force and Ob-
servers’ (MFO) Director General, on MFO’s role in facilitating diplomatic commu-
nications between Egypt and Israel. I do believe that MFO symbolizes the inter-
national community’s support for the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Task
Force Sinai, the United States contribution to MFO, likewise sends a strong signal
of the nation’s support to Egypt and Israel.
SYRIA

12. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the situation
in Idlib?
General MCKENZIE. The cease fire in Idlib continues to hold but remains fragile.
There is evidence that Syria, Russia, and Turkey continue to posture military forces
and deploy additional troops to the area, signaling a potential resumption of hos-
tilities in the future. We remain concerned about the large number of people who
have been displaced in Northwest Syria due to the fighting and significant humani-
tarian need.

13. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, do you see any evidence that Idlib could
be a friction point between Russia and Turkey?
General MCKENZIE. Russia likely seeks to avoid actions that would intentionally
start a conflict with Turkey, preferring to engage diplomatically with Ankara and
avoid a direct confrontation with NATO. Russia almost certainly will look to lever-
age it’s diplomatic, economic, and security relationship with Turkey in order to
maintain the Asad regime’s control over Syrian territory.
YEMEN

14. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your assessment of the Houthi
missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) threat to United States personnel, citi-
zens, and partners in the region?
General MCKENZIE. Houthi missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles pose a signifi-
cant threat to United States interests, citizens, and partners particularly as seen
501
by the targeting of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) civilian critical
infrastructure to include airports.
15. Senator INHOFE. General McKenzie, what is your observation of the impact
of Houthi missile and UAV threats to the utilization of Air and Missile Defense as-
sets by partners in the region such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates
(UAE)?
General MCKENZIE. [Deleted.]
16. Senator INHOFE. If the United States withdrew all support for the Saudi-led
coalition, would the Houthi threat to United States personnel, citizens, and partners
increase or decrease?
General MCKENZIE. [Deleted.]
17. Senator INHOFE. Is it possible for the Houthi missile and UAV systems to be-
come a threat to Israel?
General MCKENZIE. [Deleted.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON
PRISONER RELEASE AND THE TALIBAN

18. Senator COTTON. General McKenzie, why would we want the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to release 5,000 of 15,000 Taliban pris-
oners before we have a complete, confirmed peace deal—especially given the lack
of reduction in violence since the agreement was announced?
General MCKENZIE. The United States has no direct role in the release or re-
integration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-led effort we support the
peace process and confidence building measures necessary to bring about a conclu-
sion to this conflict.

19. Senator COTTON. General McKenzie, what details can you provide about each
of these prisoners. I understand that the response to this question may be classified.
General MCKENZIE. The United States has no direct role in the release or re-
integration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-led effort we support the
peace process and confidence building measures necessary to bring about a conclu-
sion to this conflict.

20. Senator COTTON. General McKenzie, what arrangements do we have to ensure
that prisoners do not support al-Qaeda (AQ) or ISIS after they are released?
General MCKENZIE. The United States has no direct role in the release or re-
integration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-led effort we support the
peace process and confidence building measures necessary to bring about a conclu-
sion to this conflict.

21. Senator COTTON. General McKenzie, would prisoners be monitored after re-
lease, and how?
General MCKENZIE. The United States has no direct role in the release or re-
integration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-led effort we support the
peace process and confidence building measures necessary to bring about a conclu-
sion to this conflict.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
IRAN-DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

22. Senator TILLIS. General McKenzie, you stated, ‘‘The long-term challenges the
United States faces in the CENTCOM (United States Central Command) AOR (area
of responsibility) are the destabilizing and escalatory actions of the Iranian regime.’’
Particularly, ‘‘its hegemonic ambitions, misbehavior, and threat to the United States
and its regional partners.’’ What is a more effective strategy or response to Iran’s
defiance of our current economic and diplomatic strategies to CENTCOM’s ‘‘max-
imum pressure campaign?’’
General MCKENZIE. The Maximum Pressure Campaign is a whole of Government
effort, led by the State Department at the direction of the President and focused
on bringing diplomatic and economic pressure to bear on the Iranian regime; it is
not a United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) campaign. USCENTCOM’s
502
efforts are concentrated on deterring Iran from responding militarily to the diplo-
matic and economic pressure against us or others in the region, and we will main-
tain our support to our regional partners and allies.

23. Senator TILLIS. General McKenzie, you stated, ‘‘Our presence sends a clear
and unambiguous message signal of our capabilities and most importantly, the will
to defend partners and U.S. national interests. This exemplifies the concept of deter-
rence. Deterrence is diplomatic and political construct obtained from the effect dem-
onstrated capabilities have on the mind of a potential opponent.’’ What have we
learned with respect to the ‘‘mind of our opponents’’ in the CENTCOM AOR, such
that we can claim wins in CENTCOM’s current deterrence philosophy?
General MCKENZIE. I believe our resolve to directly respond to strikes by Iranian
proxies against United States personnel and bases and strike against former IRGC–
QF Commander Soleimani demonstrated to Iran our willingness to act in self-de-
fense to defend our interests. Our ability to deter Tehran is dynamic and I remain
concerned further force posture reductions in the region will only embolden the re-
gime to take more aggressive actions in the region.

24. Senator TILLIS. General McKenzie, exactly how clear and unambiguous of a
signal are we sending to our adversaries in the CENTCOM AOR?
General MCKENZIE. Very clear. United States Central Command, as one element
of the broader whole of United States Government approach to preserve and en-
hance the credibility and influence of the United States in the region, continues to
send a clear message to our partners, competitors, and adversaries through con-
sistent synchronization of information and actions including lethal and non-lethal
operations across the U.S. Government. Through focused and integrated efforts to
understand and engage key audiences, we are able to create, strengthen, and pre-
serve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government inter-
ests, policies, plans, and strategic objectives.
REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES & REGIONAL STABILITY

25. Senator TILLIS. General McKenzie, you stated, ‘‘Reduction of United States
Forces in the AOR combined with a perception of United States disinterest in the
Middle East fueled thinking in Iran in the spring of 2019 that the United States
was no longer committed to defensing our national interests in the region. That mis-
conception led directly to the cycle of escalation that created in January 2020. How
would shifting the balance of power in the CENTCOM AOR, by reducing United
States Forces in Afghanistan, impact stability in the region?
General MCKENZIE. I do not see reducing United States Forces in Afghanistan as
negatively affecting stability in the region. First, we have been ordered to conduct
an orderly withdrawal. Second, as we reduce our forces in Afghanistan we maintain
the Counter Terrorism Platform which includes the whole ‘‘ecosystem’’ of enabling
capabilities and factors in a capable Afghan National Security Forces necessary to
continue our mission.
WEAPONIZATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDP) AND REFUGEES

26. Senator TILLIS. General McKenzie, if given the proper resources, what initia-
tive or type of task force would you stand up to develop a comprehensive diplomatic
and international effort to mitigate or respond to the ISIS detainee and IDP hostage
situation?
General MCKENZIE. One of my top priorities is combatting the weaponization of
internally displaced and refugee populations. The greatest concern in terms of po-
tential radicalization is the population being held in the foreign annex of the Al Hol
Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camp. The United States military does not cur-
rently have authority to access Al Hol or the foreign annex. Legally, the Department
of Defense (DoD) can only provide security to facilitate a stable environment in sup-
port of UN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) efforts to sup-
port Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) needs within Syria. USAID is the lead for
this mission with United States Central Command playing a supporting role.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
27. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, The Trump Administration insisted
that the world was safer in the aftermath of the strike on Qassem Soleimani. Re-
ports from earlier this week indicated that the military had begun to drawdown
troops the additional troops deployed to the Middle East just after the strike—indi-
503
cating confidence that immediate tension in the region declined. But yesterday, 2
American servicemembers, and 1 servicemember from a coalition partner nation,
were killed during a rocket attack in northern Iraq that also wounded 12. I under-
stand that investigations are ongoing, but it seems likely that an Iranian-backed
Shiite milita group is responsible for these attacks. This kind of symbolic retribution
from Iranian proxy forces is exactly what many feared. I understand that the Pen-
tagon was in the process of bringing air defense systems and ballistic missile de-
fense systems into Iraq to increase force protection measures against potential at-
tacks by Iran and its proxy forces. Were these force protection measures too late?
General MCKENZIE. In January, an Operational Needs Statement was submitted
for additional Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar systems. The lack of immediate
availability in the Army inventory required a prioritization of the assets already in
theater, resulting in a number of systems that were remissioned from Afghanistan
to Iraq. Some of these systems are still in transit while others have reached initial
operational capability.

28. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, what additional force protection
measures are you considering given the most recent attack?
General MCKENZIE. [Deleted.]

29. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, what other advanced planning is
ongoing to guard against additional strikes?
General MCKENZIE. Over the last few months the U.S. has deployed additional
capability into theater while realigning positioning to protect forces from a range
oflikely threats. Concurrently we are working with our partners and allies to inte-
grate existing assets across the peninsula to provide a more comprehensive defense
of the region.

30. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, we can all understand why addi-
tional United States troops were necessary due to increased tensions after the strike
on Soleimani. But what threat assessment led to the decision to drawdown these
additional troops?
General MCKENZIE. There was no threat assessment that led to the drawdown
nor was there any additional assessment requiring us to maintain greater force
presence, it was a reduction that coincided with the original intent to reduce U.S
troop presence.

31. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, in the aftermath of the Soleimani
strike, there was a symbolic vote within the Iraqi parliament to expel United States
troops.
General McKenzie, how did our military relationship with the Iraqis change in
the aftermath of this strike?
General MCKENZIE. The Coalition’s presence in Iraq is based on formal, diplo-
matic requests and bilateral security agreements with Iraq’s Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs. The Council of Representatives vote has not been implemented, and further
legislation would be required to remove Coalition forces.
[Deleted.]

32. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, where do we stand in terms of our
authority to keep American troops stationed in Iraq?
General MCKENZIE. The authority for the American troop presence in Iraq re-
mains unchanged. United States Forces are in Iraq at the invitation of the Govern-
ment of Iraq, for the purpose of defending the United States, its coalition partners,
and Iraq, from the continuing threat posed by ISIS. We remain focused on ensuring
the lasting defeat of ISIS as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISP) regenerate the capacity
to defeat the threat posed by ISIS. United States Forces continue to conduct oper-
ations pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF),
the 2002 AUMF, and the President’s authority under Article II of the Constitution.
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

33. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, could you provide an update for this
Committee on the status of the servicemembers suffering from Traumatic Brain In-
jury as a result of these attacks?
General MCKENZIE. First, I would like to start out by saying that I am solely and
completely responsible for the first notification that there were no casualties. I am
the officer who gave that report based on my assessment of what happened at Al
Asad. There was no pressure on me to give that report. That was what we thought
504
in the immediate hours after the attack because it was not evident to us that there
had been concussion injuries. You know maybe if we were smarter we would have
picked up on that but there were not kinetic injuries, no one was bleeding, no bones
were broken. So it was our assessment and the assessment of my commanders on
the ground but I am the single person who passed that report. So I bear total re-
sponsibility for that with no one else. Second, to answer your question there were
110 people diagnosed. We evacuated 35 of them out of the theater to Landstuhl. A
further 28 have come back to the United States and 75 servicemembers have re-
turned to full duties within the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.
These servicemembers will be followed through the normal Periodic Health Assess-
ment and Deployment Health Assessment processes. The medical status of the 28
servicemembers evacuated to the U.S. will be followed by their respective service
headquarters.

34. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, what additional resources do you
need for the servicemembers under your command in order to properly detect and
treat traumatic brain injury?
General MCKENZIE. Over the last several years the Department of Defense has
made significant and needed strides in detecting and treating this often unseen in-
jury. We need to continue ongoing research into a number of areas. First, we need
improved capabilities to provide both the initial diagnosis and the ability to objec-
tively return someone to duty. Once injured, diagnosis is currently based on the best
available medical evidence, but still requires significant provider judgement. An ob-
jective test (laboratory test, handheld device, some other solution) would allow com-
manders to know who in the force requires rest or advanced treatment and who is
ready to back to the fight. Improved capabilities to provide our personnel equipment
and bunkers, which help, protect from incurring the injury.
AFGHANISTAN & SO-CALLED ‘‘PEACE AGREEMENT’’

35. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, reports indicate that nationwide vi-
olence—including deadly assaults against Afghan forces—have actually increased
since the so-called ‘‘Peace Agreement’’ between the United States and the Taliban.
According to Afghan officials, the Taliban carried out at least 76 attacks across 24
Afghan provinces in the 4 days after the agreement was signed—and the US has
conducted airstrikes in response. But the drawdown of US troops is already under-
way. Intra-Afghan negotiations between the Afghan Government and the Taliban
were supposed to begin this Tuesday, March 10—but the prisoner exchange, re-
newed violence, and political disputes are proving difficult obstacles to these talks.
And the agreement to remove all troops from Afghanistan within 14 months was
brokered in exchange for a largely undisclosed and ill-defined set of counterter-
rorism actions. Given the uptick in Taliban violence in the aftermath of the peace
agreement, are you concerned about force protection for our troops withdrawing
from Afghanistan?
General MCKENZIE. Yes, I am concerned; therefore, the United States Forces-Af-
ghanistan (USFOR–A) and Resolute Support (RS) started providing layered force
protection to US and NATO bases and personnel in Afghanistan using a combina-
tion of manned and unmanned sensors, ground-based fire support systems, perim-
eter and ground defense area (GDA) patrols, and manned and unmanned combat
air patrols. In addition, local-national partnered forces from the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) provide an outer layer of security to these
facilities.

36. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, what force protection measures are
in place to ensure safety during withdrawal?
General MCKENZIE. [Deleted.]

37. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, administration officials are describ-
ing this withdrawal as ‘‘conditions-based.’’ What conditions would halt, reverse, or
alter the 14-month timeline for withdrawal?
General MCKENZIE. The conditions that would halt, reverse, or alter the 14-month
timeline would include any attacks from the Taliban against United States or Coali-
tion forces; failure of the Taliban to meet the conditions agreed to under the United
States-Taliban Peace Deal; or increases in Taliban violence directed against the Is-
lamic Republic of Afghanistan which are seen as destabilizing to Afghan govern-
ance. Conditions on the ground would include a continued increased level of violence
against Coalition and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF); lack
of lntra-Afghan negotiations; Government of Afghanistan continued instability or a
505
combination of these. It should also be noted that while the Commander on the
ground and I will certainly make a recommendation, it is ultimately a political deci-
sion.

38. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, what metrics are you using to
measure Taliban compliance with the agreement?
General MCKENZIE. There are 14 key points laid out in the United States-Taliban
Peace Deal, and these points will continually be assessed for compliance.

39. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, General Milley has said that he
does not see the renewed violence as a ‘‘deal breaker.’’ What would be a ‘‘deal break-
er’’ for you?
General MCKENZIE. Increased Taliban attacks against the Afghan National De-
fense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are one of the conditions that would halt, re-
verse, or alter the 14-month timeline for withdrawal. The Taliban are trying to
enter Intra-Afghan negotiations from a position of strength in order to push for
maximum concessions from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
during those talks.
Examples of a ‘‘deal breaker’’ would include any attacks from the Taliban against
United States or Coalition forces; failure of the Taliban to meet the conditions
agreed to under the United States-Taliban Peace Deal; or increases in Taliban vio-
lence directed against the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan which are seen as desta-
bilizing to Afghan governance. Conditions on the ground would include a continued
increased level of violence against Coalition and Afghan National Defense and Secu-
rity Forces (ANDSF); lack of lntra-Afghan negotiations; Government of
Afghanistan continued instability or a combination of these. It should also be
noted that while the Commander on the ground and I will certainly make a rec-
ommendation, it is ultimately a political decision.

40. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, the United States-Taliban Agree-
ment stipulated that intra-Afghan talks would begin this Tuesday, March 10. But
talks are not scheduled. Will the United States continue to withdraw troops even
if intra-Afghan negotiations do not occur?
General MCKENZIE. Yes. General Miller has determined that he can complete the
assigned Operation Freedom’s Sentinel and Resolute Support Mission with 8,600
U.S. personnel. NATO and Coalition forces are also drawing down by roughly 25
percent. The current troop level reduction in Afghanistan does not affect our ability
to maintain pressure on the Taliban to uphold the Peace Agreement.

41. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, how is the political uncertainty
within Afghanistan surrounding the presidential election results impacting the secu-
rity and stability within Afghanistan?
General MCKENZIE. The presidential uncertainty does not in itself represent a se-
rious threat to Afghan security. President Ghani’s political opposition has not dem-
onstrated willingness to challenge his victory through violence or large-scale dem-
onstrations, and despite an ethnic component to the political impasse, Afghan secu-
rity forces remain unified and loyal to Kabul. There are no indications of near-term
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ethno-political fracture that the
Taliban or other armed factions might exploit. Heightened political tensions in cer-
tain parts of the country have not demonstrably altered the years-long trends of vio-
lence and insecurity.

42. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, public discussion of the prisoner ex-
change articulated in the peace agreement has been extremely conflicted, and Presi-
dent Ghani has flat-out rejected this exchange. Can you clarify the terms of this
prisoner swap, and whether the United States military will play any role to facili-
tate the exchange?
General MCKENZIE. The United States has no direct role in the release or re-
integration of Taliban fighters. While this is an Afghan-led effort we support the
peace process and confidence building measures necessary to bring about a conclu-
sion to this conflict.

43. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, I read the classified annexes that
accompany the peace agreement. Frankly, I was stunned by the lack of detail. The
deal seems intentionally vague in terms of metrics for compliance and evaluating
success. But I was even more shocked to learn that while these annexes are classi-
fied, and unavailable to the American people, the Taliban have read the secret an-
506
nexes. Why does the Taliban have access to the annexes that accompany the peace
deal, but the American people do not?
General MCKENZIE. United States Central Command was not involved in the
United States-Taliban Peace Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend this
question is referred to the State Department.

44. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, will you work to provide more infor-
mation to the American people about the terms and conditions of this agreement?
General MCKENZIE. The State Department led the United States-Taliban Peace
Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend this question is referred to the State
Department.

45. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, I understand that the Trump Ad-
ministration has decided that the status of women and minorities is ‘‘up to the Af-
ghan people to decide.’’ This seems like an abrupt reversal of almost two decades
of United States policy, and approximately $137 billion invested in Afghanistan re-
construction efforts.
General MCKENZIE. The State Department led the United States-Taliban Peace
Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend this question is referred to the State
Department.

46. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, if women and minorities lose the
rights they have gained—particularly with regard to educating women and girls in
Afghanistan—how will this impact the security and stability of Afghanistan?
General MCKENZIE. United States and EU funding for Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are based on the recognition of the rights of mi-
norities, women, and girls. If GIRoA does not live up to its agreements, there is a
risk of losing foreign assistance and Afghan Security Force Funding, which could
negatively affect Afghan security and stability.

47. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, do you think that future funding for
Afghanistan reconstruction efforts should be conditioned on commitments to protect
the status of women and girls in Afghanistan?
General MCKENZIE. Reconstruction is outside my role as the United States Cen-
tral Command Commander, and therefore I recommend this question is referred to
the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development.

48. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, given that the United States is
withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, will our diplomats and other civilian employ-
ees need additional protection?
General MCKENZIE. While specific questions on embassy security should be re-
ferred to the State Department, United States Central Command is committed in
supporting security request made by the State Department to ensure the safety of
our diplomats and civilian employees as the withdrawal occurs.

49. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, in my questions for the record at
your nomination hearing, I asked you ‘‘how would a precipitous withdrawal of
United States Forces from Afghanistan lead to attacks on the United States Home-
land.’’ You replied: ‘‘Such a withdrawal of forces would be inherently destabilizing
to Afghanistan and the region... Any withdrawal should be conditions-based and en-
able lasting effects to protect the Homeland and our vital national interests.’’ Do you
believe that the current withdrawal of forces is precipitous?
General MCKENZIE. No. I do not believe that the current withdrawal of forces is
precipitous. First, we have not been given guidance to execute a precipitous with-
drawal; we have been ordered to conduct an orderly withdrawal. Second, as we re-
duce our forces in Afghanistan we maintain the forces necessary to pressure the
Taliban should they decide not to abide by the terms of the U.S–Taliban Peace Deal.
Third, we have been closely coordinating with both our Coalition partners and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan during this drawdown so that
neither Afghanistan nor the region is destabilized.

50. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, is the current withdrawal ‘‘condi-
tions-based,’’ with clearly defined conditions?
General MCKENZIE. Yes, the current withdrawal is ‘‘condition-based.’’ The stand-
ard is that Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorist to attack the
United States, period and if any point in time it’s completely conditions based we
stop.
507
51. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, does the current agreement with
the Taliban, and plans for withdrawal, protect our vital national interests and mini-
mize risk of attack on our Homeland?
General MCKENZIE. Yes, the conditions of the withdrawal are that no terrorist or-
ganization can use Afghanistan to conduct attacks on the United States nor can the
country of Afghanistan provide refuge to such organizations or people. As long as
the Taliban meet the conditions outlined in the United States-Taliban Peace Deal,
United States vital national interests will be protected.
SYRIA WITHDRAWAL

52. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, I was ashamed by the abrupt with-
drawal of almost all 1,000 United States troops from Syria in October—even if the
President later partially reversed course to keep some troops in Syria to secure oil
fields to ensure the Kurds could continue earning oil revenue. But this abrupt with-
drawal, and halfway reversal, posed real security risks to Kurdish troops and civil-
ians. To what extent was the Islamic State able to exploit the vulnerabilities during
this chaotic withdrawal period?
General MCKENZIE. There was no noticeable increase in ISIS activity during the
United States withdrawal period, likely due to continued United States and Coali-
tion support to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the SDF’s focus on the D–
ISIS mission.

53. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, how has our military partnership
with the Kurds been compromised since this withdrawal?
General MCKENZIE. The relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
and United States Forces remains strong, especially in executing the D-ISIS fight
despite the challenges by carrying out the partial withdrawal.

54. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, what is the United States’ long-
term strategy in Syria, and how does the current mission to protect oil revenue for
the Kurds contributes to this overarching goal?
General MCKENZIE. The United States is seeking to support our Syrian Demo-
cratic Forces (SDF), in becoming self-sustaining in the counter ISIS fight as we pur-
sue a political solution to the Syria conflict.

55. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, I understand the Kurds are seeking
to negotiate with the Assad regime via Moscow. Are you concerned that the United
States has relinquished our diplomatic influence in shaping a political settlement
in Syria?
General MCKENZIE. Leaving diplomatic efforts to the State Department, United
States Central Command (USCENTCOM) continues to coordinate very closely with
Ambassador Jeffrey on how best to militarily support United States objectives in
Syria broadly and in the Eastern Syria Security Area more specifically.

56. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, in northeastern Syria, there are
prisons and detention camps with thousands of men, women, and children. While
these camps house dangerous terrorists, they also house many innocent women and
children, some of whom were living—against their will—under the ISIS reign of ter-
ror. Humanitarian groups working in Syria report that 94 percent of almost 70,000
detainees (68,744 people) being held at the Al-Hol detention camp are women and
children. How many of the detainees do you believe represent a security threat?
General MCKENZIE. Al-Hol is an IDP camp managed by an NGO called Blumont
through a contract with USAID. Al-Hol and other IDP camps are designed to house
and care for IDPs; they are not detention centers. Al-Hol is separated into several
annexes, one of which houses a more radicalized population. It is our belief that the
greatest security threat emanates from the foreign annex in Al-Hol camp which
holds approximately 9,600 radicalized persons.

57. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, is the US military working to iden-
tify non-combatants, particularly children?
General MCKENZIE. The United States military is not working to identify non-
combatants in the prisons, as these individuals are being held by the Syrian Demo-
cratic Forces and are not under United States control. I recognize the threats posed
in both of these situations which is why we have been working closely with Depart-
ment of State and foreign governments to get detainees and refugees repatriated.
Our forces are providing assistance to the SDF in the form of training and equip-
ment to ensure detainees are held securely and properly treated.
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58. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, how do you think repatriation
should be handled for any non-combatants?
General MCKENZIE. It is in the best interest of all parties to get IDPs and refu-
gees returned to their homes as quickly as the security situation permits. This is
a regional and global problem that will continue to require a whole of USG effort
to work with nations to repatriate their citizens as quickly as possible. As approxi-
mately 85 percent of the population in Al-Hol is Syrian and Iraqi, it is important
to have these populations returned home at the earliest safe opportunity as it will
relieve pressure on the camps as we continue to work the more complicated repatri-
ations.

59. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, is the military facilitating the repa-
triation of women and children to home countries?
General MCKENZIE. United States Central Command continues to support the De-
partment of State in returning foreign fighters and their families to their country
of origin.

60. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, are you concerned with the poten-
tial for increased radicalization within these camps as we have seen before in places
like Iraq?
General MCKENZIE. Yes. Which is why it is so important that we get the people
back to their homes and countries of origin as soon as the security situation permits.
Radicalized ISIS supporters within camps such as Al-Hol in Northeast Syria remain
a threat and a challenge. Many of the camp residents are family members-wives and
children, generally-of ISIS fighters. A large percentage of the children have wit-
nessed-or participated in-acts of violence in support of the ‘‘caliphate.’’
ISIS radicalization efforts will likely continue until residents can be returned to
their homes or countries of origin while the hardcore ISIS cadre, regardless of their
citizenship, are moved to a more secure environment.

61. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, what role is DOD playing to pre-
vent this radicalization?
General MCKENZIE. The Department of Defense is not tasked with the de-
radicalization of civilians. We have demonstrated through our actions a compassion
and kindness in the care and treatment of these populations. I recognize this is a
critical effort to help prevent future fighters. While we are not in the camps, we
help provide training to the SDF who provide security. We provide logistical support
to enable the important work that is going on in the camps in support of United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Committee
of Red Cross (ICRC), and other Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs).
TURKISH USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SYRIA OFFENSIVE

62. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, there were many media reports that
Turkish proxies were deploying munitions loaded with white phosphorus, and that
civilians and children in Ras al-Ain were suffering from chemical burns. The inten-
tional use of this weapon against civilians undeniably constitutes a war crime, and
is particularly alarming given the stated Turkish goals of ‘‘demographic change.’’
Have you been able to confirm these allegations of Turkish deployment of white
phosphorus munitions?
General MCKENZIE. We are unable to confirm or deny the use of white phos-
phorus munitions by Turkish forces at this time.

63. Senator BLUMENTHAL. General McKenzie, have any United States origin de-
fense articles been used in connection with the Turkish offensive in Syria—including
with the use of chemical weapons? Was any such use in violation of the applicable
end use agreements?
General MCKENZIE. [Deleted.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT FROM IRAN

64. Senator HEINRICH. General McKenzie, in the weeks since the Iranian attack
on Al-Asad Air Base in Iraq, you’ve led an effort to increase air and missile defense
capabilities in the region to protect our servicemen and women from the continuing
threat of Iranian missile and drone attack. How are you working with the military
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services to transition proven systems that use directed energy and high-powered
microwave technology to form part of a layered defense against these threats?
General MCKENZIE. The decision to make the Army the Executive Agent (EA) for
Counter UAS (CUAS) is significant. United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM) directly coordinates and supports the EA through ensuring our re-
quirements are captured and resourced as appropriate. USCENTCOM serves on the
EA’ s Board Advisory Council (BAC), currently in the process of down-selecting the
‘‘best of breed’’ systems and capabilities for further investment. Furthermore,
USCENTCOM serves as the operational ‘‘test-bed’’ for counter-unmanned aircraft
system fielding. Specifically, with the application of directed energy and high-pow-
ered microwave technology, USCENTCOM works with the Services to expedite the
validation requirements for the employment of these new systems in an operating
setting.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN
LAW OF WAR

65. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, President Trump threatened to destroy
Iranian sites ‘‘important to . . . the Iranian culture’’ and threatened future retaliation
in ‘‘a disproportionate manner’’ on January 4 and January 5, 2020. The Department
of Defense (DOD) Law of War Manual states that ‘‘[c]ultural property, the areas im-
mediately surrounding it, and appliances in use for its protection should be safe-
guarded and respected.’’ On January 6, 2020, Secretary Esper expressed that the
United States ‘‘follow[s] the laws of armed conflict.’’ Do you agree with the DOD
Law of War Manual and Secretary Esper’s remark?
General MCKENZIE. All United States Central Command operations are conducted
in compliance with United States law, Department of Defense policy, and applicable
international law, including the Law of War.

66. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, with the caveat the United States re-
serves the right of self-defense, does the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF) or the 2002 AUMF against Iraq give United States Central Com-
mand the authority to use military force against the government of Iran?
General MCKENZIE. As stated most recently in the January 27, 2020 Statement
of Administration Policy regarding H.R. 2456, the 2002 Authorization for the Use
of Military Force (AUMF) has long been understood to authorize the use of force
to address threats emanating from Iraq, including threats directed by Iran against
United States Forces in Iraq and Syria. Iran conducts and directs the actions of sev-
eral terrorist groups in Iraq, including Kata’ib Hezbollah. Iran and its proxies con-
tinue to plan and execute attacks against United States, Coalition, and Iraqi forces.
The 2002 AUMF provides critical domestic legal authority for United States Forces
to defend themselves, and our Coalition and Iraqi partners, against threats to, or
stemming from, the territory of Iraq.

67. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, former National Security Advisor and re-
tired Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster recently observed at a public forum
on March 3, 2020, ‘‘I don’t really care what international law said,’’ regarding the
killing of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani and that his killing was ‘‘the
righteous use of violence.’’ In your experience, does the U.S. military regard inter-
national law as something that should generally be adhered to or disregarded?
General MCKENZIE. It is long-standing Department of Defense policy that mem-
bers of the U.S. Forces comply with the Law of War during all armed conflicts, and
in all other military operations. The Law of War is that part of international law
that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities, including all relevant international
law binding upon the United States by treaty or as customary international law.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides criminal sanctions for serious viola-
tions of the Law of War, and other relevant international law binding upon the
United States. U.S. Forces comply with the Law of War and all other related inter-
national law binding upon the United States during the conduct of military oper-
ations as a matter of course, as a trained and disciplined armed force representing
the United States and our values.
IRAN

68. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, recent reports indicated that between
March 11, 2020 and March 13, 2020, two Americans and one coalition servicemem-
ber were killed and other United States personnel were wounded in two separate
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rocket attacks on Camp Taji, Iraq, and that these attacks were supposed to have
been carried out by proxy groups backed by the Iranian Government. In a March
4, 2020, DOD Fiscal Year 2021 budget posture hearing, Secretary Esper and stated
that the killing of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani ‘‘restored deterrence to
a degree.’’ In your view, how has the killing of Soleimani restored deterrence to fur-
ther Iranian malign activities through its proxy forces?
General MCKENZIE. I agree with the Secretary. Our actions have demonstrated
our resolve to confront those that attack and kill Americans. However, I believe Iran
is prepared to engage in escalatory action in Iraq to compel the departure of United
States Forces.
69. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, on December 5, 2019, I asked Lieutenant
General David W. Allvin, USAF, Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy, Joint Staff
the following question for the record: ‘‘Would you say that the threat of Iran devel-
oping a nuclear weapon has increased, decreased, or remained relatively unchanged
since the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA)?’’ On February 24, 2020, he responded: ‘‘The threat of Iran developing a
nuclear weapon clearly remains, based upon their capability and intent. Although
Iran’s recent violations of JCPOA restrictions incrementally increase its capability
to pursue weapons-grade enriched uranium, we have seen no direct evidence to indi-
cate the regime desires to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon.’’ Do you
agree with Lt. Gen. Allvin?
General MCKENZIE. Yes, in my opinion the threat of Iran developing a nuclear
weapon remains largely unchanged since the United States withdrew from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). There is no evidence the Iranian regime de-
sires to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon. Should their decision calculus
change, Tehran very likely retains the expertise and rudimentary production capa-
bilities to restart processes essential to the development of a nuclear device, to in-
clude likely dual-purpose nuclear procurement and research activities.
AFGHANISTAN

70. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, how many United States contractors are
in Afghanistan as of the date of your hearing (March 12, 2020)?
General MCKENZIE. Nine thousand nine hundred seventy-four United States De-
partment of Defense contractors are in Afghanistan. This is the contractor popu-
lation accounted for in SPOT, the Department of Defense’s program of record.

71. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, assuming the Taliban implements its
commitments to the February 29, 2020, United States-Taliban agreement and the
United States withdraws all of its forces along the 14-month timeline outlined in
the agreement, how many United States military contractors will remain in Afghan-
istan?
General MCKENZIE. [Deleted.]

72. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, what impact, if any, does the absence
of the Afghan Government as a party to the United States-Taliban agreement have
on the prospect of the long-term success of the agreement?
General MCKENZIE. The State Department led the United States-Taliban Peace
Deal negotiations, and therefore I recommend that this question be referred to the
State Department because it concerns the substance of Intra-Afghan Negotiations.

73. Senator WARREN. General McKenzie, what is your understanding of the extent
to which the withdrawal of United States Forces depends on the outcome of political
settlement—or lack thereof—between the Afghan Government and the Taliban?
General MCKENZIE. The current United States drawdown is independent of a po-
litical settlement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. Any follow-on
force reductions will not occur until we are ordered to do so.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DOUG JONES
IRAQI SECURITY SELF-SUFFICIENCY

74. Senator JONES. General McKenzie, your posture statement says, ‘‘Given ISIS’
demonstrated tenacity and ability to reconstitute, we cannot afford to divert focus
from the D–ISIS mission, understanding that the territorial defeat of ISIS does not
mean the absence of ISIS. The years ahead will not be bloodless. Attacks may con-
tinue in the form of an insurgency, but the goal is to develop and enable the ability
511
of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS without external assistance.’’
When do you see us achieving this goal of enabling the Iraqi security forces to con-
tain and defeat ISIS on their own?
General MCKENZIE. Until recently, we were on a solid glide path for the Iraqi Se-
curity Forces to independently contain and defeat ISIS by early-to-mid year 2021.
However, significant changes in the operational environment in Iraq created a pause
in training and partnering operations due to a focus shift to force protection, im-
pacts of the COVID–19 pandemic, and disarray of the Iraqi Government have made
it very difficult to identify when we can expect to achieve our Iraqi Security Forces
goals at this time.

75. Senator JONES. General McKenzie, is it realistic to expect the Iraqis to protect
our national security interests when it comes to the ISIS threat?
General MCKENZIE. Yes, I do think it is reasonable to expect the Iraqis to help
meet our national security interests concerning the ISIS threat. They are our secu-
rity partners to help defeat a common enemy, ISIS. However, the current challenges
in the Iraqi Government including lack of a viable Prime Minister Candidate and
Iranian influence in the Council of Representatives is currently hindering Iraqi sup-
port to our broader security interests.
AFGHAN SECURITY SELF-SUFFICIENCY

76. Senator JONES. General McKenzie, do you see the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces being able to handle their own security in the near future, and
if so, when?
General MCKENZIE. Yes. Assuming the Government of the Islamic Republic of Af-
ghanistan and Taliban are able to reach a political settlement, the main threat to
the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces - the Taliban - will be neu-
tralized, and the remaining security threats will primarily consist of Violent Ex-
tremist Organizations such as ISIS–K and criminal organizations.

77. Senator JONES. General McKenzie, if not, what will happen if the United
States pulls all its troops out in 14 months, or on some other time frame, according
to the February 29th agreement with the Taliban?
General MCKENZIE. I do not deal in hypotheticals. Our withdrawal of forces is ul-
timately a political decision that we will execute if and when ordered. As I have
stated previously, any withdrawal of U.S. Forces will be conditions-based to protect
our national interests.

78. Senator JONES. General McKenzie, how will we ensure that Afghanistan never
again is host to terrorist groups who can launch 9/11-style attacks on the United
States, which is our mission in Afghanistan?
General MCKENZIE. First, by verifying that the Taliban fulfill their counter-ter-
rorism commitments contained in the United States-Taliban Peace Deal. Second, by
continuing to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
capabilities so that the ANDSF matures into a sustainable professional force that
is capable of managing terrorist threats within Afghanistan’s borders. Third, by pur-
suing a counter-terrorism partnership and normalized security cooperation relation-
ship with Afghanistan for the foreseeable future.
TALIBAN AGREEMENT

79. Senator JONES. General McKenzie, according to the agreement, if conditions
are met, the U.S. is to withdraw all troops in the next 14 months. You told the
House Armed Services Committee that ‘‘to date, Taliban attacks are higher than we
believe are consistent with an idea to actually carry out this plan. Does the Taliban
leadership have the ability to influence their entire organization in order to comply
with the terms of the agreement?
General MCKENZIE. Yes, I believe the Taliban leadership does have the influence
to effectively command and control its fighters. This was evident during the seven-
day Reduction in Violence (RiV) and previous local cease-fires, when the Taliban
was able to enforce adherence to terms. The recent rise in violence is the result of
a deliberate, publicly announced Taliban plan to resume violence against Afghan
targets while refraining from attacks against Coalition forces. While not conducive
to the eventual withdraw of troops, this resumption in violence should not be seen
as the Taliban’s inability to control its fighters, but as a matter of Taliban policy
to pressure Kabul before and during Intra-Afghan Negotiations.
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IRAN FORCE POSTURE

80. Senator JONES. General McKenzie, your prepared statement says that we
must posture the Joint Force to deter Iran from using its military to counter our
diplomatic and economic sanctions, so long as those are in place. If those sanctions
were to end, what posture would we need to have with regard to Iran, taking into
account the elements of Iran’s policy you listed, including its pursuit of nuclear
weapons, regional ambitions, and threats to the United States and our partners?
General MCKENZIE. U.S. posture in the region will depend upon the conditions
that exist when the sanctions end. If the United States and Iran come to a broader
diplomatic agreement that curbs Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions and malign ac-
tions across the Middle East, then our force posture may require Jess personnel,
military capabilities, and basing. Should sanctions be removed with no fundamental
change in Iranian behavior and/or calculus, or a change in United States strategic
direction for the region, then we will be required to continue retaining sufficient
posture in the region to deter Iranian aggression and assure our partners and allies.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
REQUEST OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2021 AND THE FUTURE YEARS
DEFENSE PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 2020

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.
ARMY POSTURE
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM INHOFE, CHAIRMAN
To receive testimony on the posture of the Department of the
Army in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal
Year 2021.
The Committee is conducting this hearing to receive testimony
on the posture of the U.S. Army and its fiscal year 2021 budget re-
quest.
We welcome the testimony of Ryan McCarthy, Secretary of the
Army, and General James McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army,
on these matters, and thank both for their distinguished service.
Today, our Nation is facing an unprecedented health crisis. The
entire Federal Government—including the Department of Defense
and all of the Services—is working non-stop to halt the spread of
the novel coronavirus and mitigate its effects.
Of great concern to me today is how the Army is handling this
emergency. First and foremost—how are our soldiers and their
families being protected and taken care of?
In addition, I want to better understand the operational effects,
and what steps you are taking to minimize its impact to the na-
tional security missions of the Army.
I commend you both, Secretary Esper, and the entire Depart-
ment for taking every precaution to protect our servicemembers
from COVID–19 so far—and I am confident that you will continue
to prioritize the health and safety of our soldiers, as well as the
success of our missions.
While we are dealing with this enormous and urgent challenge,
we’ve also got to keep an eye on our persistent national security
objectives and challenges.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) directs our Nation’s mili-
tary to address the return of great power competition. This means
we must be prepared to deter and, if necessary, defeat potential
near-peer adversaries like China and Russia.
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For the Army to achieve that goal, our Army must be manned,
trained, and equipped appropriately.
The Army continues to make significant progress in rebuilding
readiness across the force, but there is still much work to be done.
Maximizing readiness, both tactical and strategic, is crucial for our
Nation to maintain peace through strength.
Russia and China have modernized both conventional and nu-
clear forces with alarming speed, and now present a credible re-
gional threat to America and our allies—as well as an increasing
threat around the world. In some areas, they have surpassed us.
It’s past time for action. After 3 years of significant increases in
defense budgets thanks to President Trump, this year’s defense
topline falls well short of the 3 to 5 percent growth recommended
by the National Defense Strategy Commission report. In fact, it
represents a $15 billion decrease in purchasing power. This isn’t
your fault, but you will have to deal with the repercussions.
This will mean homing in on top priorities—like readiness and
modernization. Several of these priorities are housed at Fort Sill in
Oklahoma, including Air and Missile Defense and Long-Range Pre-
cision Fire. In addition, any successful modernization strategy
must focus on results. We cannot allow the past acquisition failures
to be repeated.
The Army recently undertook a second iteration of the detailed
and exhaustive look at every single program to ensure that each
supports the National Defense Strategy—an important task started
by now-Secretary of Defense Esper.
You have made hard decisions to prioritize programs that effec-
tively implement the NDS. This resulted in reallocating funding for
modernization efforts that will help the Army regain a qualitative
and quantitative advantage over our adversaries.
Continuing to make smart and informed choices will require an
open and transparent dialog with Congress along the way. We look
forward to working with you to make our shared modernization vi-
sion a reality as the Army reinvents itself to become a 21st century
fighting force prepared for the more lethal and dynamic battlefields
that define today’s reality.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, RANKING
MEMBER
Our Nation is in the grips of an extraordinary and unprece-
dented crisis due to the novel coronavirus pandemic and the spread
of COVID–19. Right now our most immediate concern is ensuring
the public’s safety by practicing social distancing and promoting
vigorous personal hygiene, while taking care of those that have
tested positive for the disease. At the same time, Congress must
continue to do our job, and I thank the Chairman for ensuring this
Committee performs its oversight function while we safeguard the
health of the witnesses, our staff, the general public, and the Mem-
bers of this Committee.
In addition, I want to express the condolences of this Committee
on the death of a defense contractor from COVID–19, as well as ev-
eryone who has lost a loved one during this pandemic. We are also
keeping the servicemembers, dependents, civilians, and contractors
who have been diagnosed with COVID–19, as well as all Americans
515

suffering from this disease, in our thoughts and prayers. As a Na-
tion, we must do everything we can to stop the spread of COVID–
19 and protect families, workers, and businesses.
Before turning to the Army’s Fiscal Year 2021 budget request, I
want to commend the Army for their efforts to assist in the re-
sponse to the novel coronavirus pandemic. The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers is assisting the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) with the planning and construction of alternative medical
facilities in New York. The Corps is also supporting planning mis-
sions for the New England region, Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Balti-
more. In addition, the National Guard soldiers who have been
called up for duty by the Governors have been instrumental in our
response. They have provided logistics and transportation, support
for medical-testing facilities and State emergency operations cen-
ters, and special help with disinfecting and cleaning missions. Fur-
thermore, the Department of Defense announced that 16 of the
military’s laboratories, many of which are Army medical facilities,
will begin coronavirus testing for civilians. Finally, the Army has
issued orders to hospital centers at Fort Carson, Fort Campbell,
and Fort Hood to deploy units to Seattle and New York in order
to provide medical support to civil authorities. On behalf the Com-
mittee, we thank you.
While the Department of Defense, and the Army in particular,
has been a strategic resource during the novel coronavirus out-
break, there are policy decisions that need to be immediately revis-
ited. First, this pandemic will not be stopped by a wall on our
Southern border. Right now our hospitals are contending with a
shortage of ICU [intensive care unit] beds and will soon be at pa-
tient capacity in some areas. Our healthcare workers are in dire
need of personal protective equipment for their own safety, and
hospitals lack respirators and ventilators to treat patients. And yet,
earlier this week the Army awarded a $524 million contract to re-
place additional sections of the border wall.
To continue to funnel billions of dollars and military manpower
to this project instead of providing resources to health care pro-
viders, first responders, and State and local governments as thou-
sands of Americans fall ill and need urgent and immediate life-sav-
ing acute care is unconscionable. President Trump must imme-
diately reorient all resources that have been diverted to the wall
and make them available for Covid–19 support efforts.
In addition, the Army has a long history of scientific excellence
concerning biological agents, and much of that work occurs at the
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick. However, in recent years the Depart-
ment of Defense has not prioritized this incredibly critical mission,
and in fact has cut funding for the program in the Fiscal Year 2021
budget. We need to understand immediately what the Army plans
do to ensure USAMRIID remains a world class institute, with a
particular focus on how the Army plans to bring the new High Con-
tainment Laboratory, which is one of the world’s most advanced fa-
cilities for dangerous pathogen research, on line in the quickest
and safest manner possible.
The President’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2021 includes
$178 billion in funding for the Army. Of that amount, $150.3 bil-
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lion is for base budget requirements, $2.8 billion for base budget
requirements included in the Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO) account, and $24.9 billion for traditional OCO activities. The
Army is reorienting budget resources to align with the National
Defense Strategy (NDS) and the national security challenges facing
our country. For the second consecutive year, senior Army leader-
ship scrutinized existing programs to determine which ones sup-
ported the Army’s modernization priorities, and which programs
should be reduced or canceled so that savings could be reinvested
for other priorities. While this Committee may not agree with every
budget decision made by the Army, and we will be closely scruti-
nizing their budget request, the Army did make tough decisions to
prioritize funding for the future fight.
However, implementing the NDS requires more than a realloca-
tion of budget resources to engage in strategic competition against
China and Russia. It will also require that the Army train for full
spectrum operations and develop new warfighting concepts, as well
as ensuring our soldiers have the equipment necessary for a high
end fight.
To support this effort, Army Futures Command, and the eight
cross functional teams tasked with overseeing the Army’s major
modernization priorities, have transformed the processes by which
warfighting capability is delivered to our soldiers. The Army has
ramped up efforts to mature technology and build experimental
prototypes, as well as conduct soldier touch points to provide feed-
back on the effectiveness of these new systems in the field. The
Army is pursuing this overhaul of its acquisition process to ensure
we keep pace with our near peer competitors by delivering cutting
edge capabilities to the warfighter on an expeditated timeline.
The fiscal year 2021 budget request funds 19 combat training
center (CTC) rotations for brigade combat teams. These rotations
are critical to ensuring our soldiers are properly trained and ready
to fight. However, we will likely see significant negative impacts to
readiness levels as training exercises are postponed due to the
COVID–19 crisis. The Army has already made the decision to can-
cel three CTC rotations as a result of COVID–19, and they are cur-
rently evaluating future schedules. The safety of our troops must
remain our highest priority, and the Committee will be closely
monitoring this situation in the weeks and months ahead.
Finally, the President’s Budget requests an across-the-board pay
raise of 3 percent for all military personnel. However, the President
has decided that civilians should only receive a 1 percent pay raise,
and the budget freezes significant locality adjustments for civilians
that would otherwise be due them under existing statute. At a time
when we need civilians the most, this budget request sends the
message that their work and contributions to our national defense
are not valued, and it hinders the Army’s ability to recruit the very
best civilian workforce we need. If this pandemic has taught us
anything it is the need for a strong and competent Federal work-
force—which the President’s budget does not support.
Again, I want to thank the Chairman and our witnesses for their
willingness to participate in this unusual hearing method during
these unprecedented time. I look forward to working closely with
the Army as we move forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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[The joint prepared statement by Secretary Ryan D. McCarthy
and General James McConville to follow:]
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[Paper Hearing Questions for the record with answers supplied
follow:]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
BUDGET AND SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (NDS)

1. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McCarthy, because the NDS Commission advocates
3 to 5 percent real growth per year to implement the NDS while the Fiscal Year
2021 Budget Request represents a $15 billion reduction in purchasing power, where
were you forced to assume risk?
Secretary MCCARTHY. If there was the 3 to 5 percent real budget growth as rec-
ommended in the NDS in the fiscal year 2021 topline, the Army would have been
able to increase its investments in the critical legacy systems required to fight and
win in the future against Russia or China. As there was a reduction in real buying
power in fiscal year 2021, the Army chose to fully fund our next generation mod-
ernization priorities at the cost of investing as we would have liked in those critical
legacy platforms. For example, the Army reduced Joint Light Tactical Vehicle pro-
curement by $1.3 billion over the FYDP which results in HMMWV’s being in forma-
tions longer than if we had 3 to 5 percent real budget growth. We also reduced in-
vestment in the Army Tactical Missile System Service Life Extension program by
∼$600 million to shift resources to the Precision Strike Missile, which will replace
the ATACMS round with enhanced performance. Additionally, the Army delayed
procurement of the Enhanced Heavy Equipment Transporter (EHET) which means
we’ll be dependent on less capable heavy equipment movers for a longer period of
time. In order to prioritize modernization investments, the Army assumed risk in
endstrength by slowing the rate of growth toward our objective force endstrength
levels. The Army must grow to both meet current combatant commander demand
and resource the new structure required to fight and win in the future.
READINESS CONCERNS

2. Senator INHOFE. General McConville, in the effort to meet NDS requirements,
the Army successfully achieved in 2019 one of its stated 2023 readiness objectives
by having 66 percent of regular Army BCTs brigade combat teams] ready to ‘‘fight
tonight,’’ allowing the Army to transition its focus from BCT readiness to ‘‘strategic
readiness.’’ How does this budget invest in strategic readiness while also maintain-
ing 66 percent of regular Army BCTs and their supporting elements at the right
readiness levels?
General MCCONVILLE. In fiscal year 2021, Army will maintain its current tactical
readiness levels and seek to improve its strategic readiness. The Army training
focus at the tactical level is on building highly trained and cohesive teams that are
disciplined and fit. We are increasing our focus on individual and small unit readi-
ness. Home Station Training and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation levels of
effort are consistent with recent years that enabled Army to achieve and maintain
readiness goals. The Army fiscal year 2021 budget request supports 24 CTC rota-
tions and home station training IAW Army training strategy. The Army is seeking
to improve its global posture at the strategic level by positioning formations and
equipment (APS) in key strategic locations to deter adversaries and assure partners;
investing in its Organic Industrial Base (OIB); improving mobilization through
MFGI investments and exercises; building proficiency through repetition in deploy-
ing/redeploying operations with Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) and Emergency
Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs), sustaining its generating and operating
forces; aligning APS & LOGCAP to NDS priorities; and, investing in the industrial
base.
MODERNIZATION EFFORTS (FORT SILL FOCUSED)

3. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McCarthy, because the U.S. Army’s surface-to-sur-
face fires are currently outranged and outgunned by many similar Russian and Chi-
nese systems, the Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) Cross Functional Team is
working on programs to address these shortcomings. How will the Extended Range
Cannon Artillery and the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) programs help the joint
force implement the NDS and regain a comparative advantage over Russian and
Chinese competitors?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) system in-
cludes improving the self-propelled howitzer, projectiles, supercharge propellant,
and course correcting fuzes for accurate fires at 70KM, almost twice the range of
our current howitzers. These improvements will provide the division commander
533
with a deep fires capability to shape the close fight in large scale combat operations,
enabling combined arms overmatch. Fiscal year 2021 is an essential year to order
long lead time parts to support final prototype development and building for deliv-
ery to the first battalion in fiscal year 2023. ERCA Prototype 0 is assembled and
executed a successful live fire demonstration on March 6th, achieving 65KM in
range with target hits. We continue efforts to achieve the 70KM range.
The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is the Long Range Precision Fires Army mod-
ernization priority program to replace the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
PrSM will be fired from existing launcher platforms with greater range, lethality,
survivability, and at a lower cost than ATACMS. PrSM will allow the operational
force to neutralize enemy integrated air defense systems and long range artillery
to enable cross domain maneuver. The accelerated program delivers a base missile
with a range greater than 500KM in fiscal year 2023 (compared to the ATAMCS
range of 160 KM), followed by technology spirals for emitting multi-domain targets,
enhanced lethality, and extended range. PrSM has executed two successful flight
tests since December, achieving target hits at 240KM and 180KM; the next flight
test is planned for 30 April.
4. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McCarthy, the Army currently lacks a reliable
cruise missile defense capability which leaves the joint force vulnerable in some the-
aters. What is the Army’s plan to defend against more advanced threats, such as
hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles, in the future?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The best defense against hypersonic and supersonic cruise
missiles is to have robust offensive and defensive capabilities. From an offensive
perspective, we are placing significant emphasis and investment into our own
hypersonic capability. The current schedule of delivering a road mobile prototype
hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023 remains in place. From a defensive perspec-
tive, we must also attack the munition once launched. The Missile Defense Agency
is exploring defenses against hypersonic threats, and we are evaluating Patriot
against the supersonic cruise missile threats. Supersonic threats are also an Indi-
rect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC) objective requirement, while subsonic remains
a threshold requirement.
5. Senator INHOFE. General McConville, the Army is procuring two Iron Dome
batteries in fiscal year 2020 as an interim solution for cruise missile defense. What
efforts are underway to integrate the batteries into the Air & Missile Defense net-
work and what is the plan for the associated force structure?
General MCCONVILLE. The Iron Dome is a combat proven system and the Army
will field two interim, stand alone, batteries. Moving forward, the Army will hold
a competition for an enduring solution, which is compatible with Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS), and allows all of industry to par-
ticipate in a shoot off and best value competition. The Army is also going to a lay-
ered defense for air and missile defense. We see in the future the ability to tie every
sensor to every shooter—multiple radars tied into the IBCS, which will be able to
apply the appropriate shooter as a response based on the threat. That response
could be a missile, a kinetic projectile, or high powered microwaves and directed en-
ergy systems. Based on the specific solution, the Army will design and develop the
appropriate force structure

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER
MODERNIZATION

6. Senator WICKER. Secretary McCarthy, what steps are you taking to produce
tangible results that will accelerate or enable greater defensive and offensive capa-
bilities for directed energy weapons in the next 3 to 5 years?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army is pursuing a variety of Directed Energy (DE)
weapons, including high energy lasers and high power microwaves for maneuver
unit and semi-fixed/fixed support. DE provides defensive capability against rocket,
artillery, mortar, UAS, and rotary/fixed wing threats. The Army is prototyping a
50kW-class laser for a platoon of Stryker vehicles to be delivered no later than fiscal
year 2022 for Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) and transition into
a program of record. We are prototyping a 300kW-class laser in the new Indirect
Fire Protection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL) for fixed and semi-fixed
locations. Directed Energy S&T efforts are funded through fiscal year 2022 to in-
form IFPC-HEL prototyping fielding in fiscal year 2024. The Army is also teaming
with USAF for High Power Microwave (HPM) as electronic warfare paired with
HEL for semi-fixed /fixed base support with prototyping by fiscal year 2024.
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7. Senator WICKER. Secretary McCarthy, a recent study by the Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies (CSIS) titled, ‘‘Assessing the Affordability of the
Army’s Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Portfolio’’ stated that affordability of the two FVL
programs was feasible but would require strict program management and oversite.
What is the Army doing to ensure continued affordability of the two programs?
Secretary MCCARTHY. AFC, in consultation with ASA(ALT), are committed to re-
quirements stability and preventing requirements creep. This team approach will
identify appropriate trade space to ensure requirements are both achievable and af-
fordable. The Army is conducting ‘‘fly before we buy’’ prototyping efforts such as the
successful Joint Multi Role Technology Demonstrator, Future Attack Reconnais-
sance Aircraft Competitive Prototype, the Future Tactical UAS demonstration, and
Air Launched Effects early experimentation and prototyping. All four of these efforts
will fly an air vehicle before we go final on requirements to ensure we have effective
weapon systems. These efforts reduce risk, promote competition, and produce well
informed, realistic, achievable, and affordable requirements. We have also reduced
requirements creep by developing and implementing an Army Futures Command
(AFC), Commanding General (CG) approved requirements prioritization method-
ology and scoring forum. This best practice has allowed the AFC CG to see how all
in-development and in-progress requirements align to critical Army Senior Leader
criteria and guidance. The results of this scoring shape the Army Capabilities Inte-
gration and Development System/Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC)
calendar for the Chief of Staff of the Army, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and
AFC CG AROC decisions.
CYBER

8. Senator WICKER. General McConville, does the consolidation of capabilities
under Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) mean that cyberspace operations will be
prioritized over other information capabilities, and if all of the information-related
activities are already being utilized by commanders in the field, why consolidate the
capabilities in one command?
General MCCONVILLE. No. The Army will deliver trained and ready forces with
capabilities and capacity balanced to mission need. The consolidation of mission and
capability is going to drive a Total Force for MDO including Information Warfare,
of which Cyberspace Operations, Electronic Warfare, along with other capabilities,
are subsets. Cyberspace operations and the employment of Cyber Operating Forces
will remain a core mission for the command.
INFORMATION WARFARE

9. Senator WICKER. General McConville, do you feel that overtly announcing a
move toward information warfare, which you have stated is key in the competition
phase prior to conflict, overly militarizes the information element of national power,
and does this send a negative signal to adversaries, which will then cause escalation
of information warfare against, most-likely, non-military targets in the United
States?
General MCCONVILLE. I do not. Russia and China are already contesting inter-
national norms and U.S. interests in Cyberspace and the Information Environment.
Deliberately leveraging information and aspects of information inherent to military
operations in concert with information efforts of other Federal Government depart-
ments and agencies adds to the effectiveness of the overall governmental effort. Our
adversaries leverage information capabilities against U.S. military and non-military
targets to seek advantage over the U.S. or limit our ability to counter their oper-
ations. Stating our intent to develop this capability establishes a check on adver-
saries’ bold use of information against military and non-military targets.
STRATEGIC SEALIFT

10. Senator WICKER. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the U.S. Gov-
ernment’s current approach to strategic sealift has yielded an aging and inactive
government fleet that depends on a shrinking pool of merchant mariners and ships
that have trouble getting underway. I’m concerned that a resilient maritime logis-
tics strategy doesn’t exist. Given that 90 percent of Army and Marine Corps equip-
ment will travel by sea to a major conflict, is there sufficient sealift available now,
and for the foreseeable future, to support combatant commander operational plans
(OPLANS) per the National Defense Strategy?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The present assessment is that
the current strategic sealift fleet is sufficient to meet the current demand, but by
2024, it will be inadequate without recapitalization efforts. USTRANSCOM and the
Navy are using a three-pronged strategy to recapitalize: (1) service life extensions
535
when cost effective; (2) acquiring used vessels with congressional approval; and (3)
building new vessels.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DEB FISCHER
PARTNER TRAINING

11. Senator FISCHER. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, do you believe
that the current mix of armored, infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams is ap-
propriately balanced between the Active Army and Army National Guard, and are
there missions or platforms you believe should be shifted between the Active, Re-
serve, and Army National Guard to make the total force more aligned with the Na-
tional Defense Strategy?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The current mixture of brigade
combat teams between the Regular Army and Army National Guard is appro-
priately balanced to support the National Defense Strategy. When balancing brigade
combat teams across components, the Army considers responsiveness to meet Com-
batant Commander requirements along with Title 10 and Title 32 Defense Support
to Civil Authorities.
12. Senator FISCHER. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army re-
cently announced the deployment of the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade to
Africa, the first such deployment to the continent. National Guard units are simi-
larly conducting partner training in Africa, including units from the Nebraska Na-
tional Guard partnered with Rwanda through the State Partnership Program. How
is the Army working to enhance its partner training capacity to provide a better al-
ternative to similar efforts by Russia and China?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. In Africa, the U.S. Army actively
seeks to build partner networks through military and medical exercises, security co-
operation, engagements including the African Land Forces Summit, and the State
Partnership Program. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program includes 14
other African nations partnered with U.S. States in addition to the Nebraska Na-
tional Guard’s partnership with Rwanda. The Army supports six U.S. DOD-directed
operations in Africa and is deploying the 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade
(SFAB) to assume the train, advise, and assist mission with our partners. The Army
is also reviewing an increase in ally and partner Invitational-Professional Military
Education (I-PME) participation by 10 percent for fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year
2022, and up to 50 percent over fiscal year 2022to fiscal year 2025, and continues
to utilize the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) to strengthen rela-
tionships and build capacity globally as a means to compete with Russia and China.
MODERNIZATION

13. Senator FISCHER. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what are your
biggest modernization priorities, and what lessons have you learned from past Army
acquisition efforts and from the other services that you are incorporating into your
own modernization efforts?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is 2 years into a major
transformation to ensure we are prepared for future conflict—we are finishing what
we started. The Army’s modernization efforts are a continuation of its fiscal year
2019/fiscal year 2020 efforts. Fiscal year 2021 marks a pivotal year for Army mod-
ernization as we have matured our processes and established momentum across all
6 modernization priorities: Long Range Precision Fires, Next Generation Combat
Vehicle, Future Vertical Lift, the Network, Air and Missile Defense, and Soldier
Lethality. Army modernization is a holistic approach—changing doctrine for how we
fight and equipping our formations with the best equipment possible—but also orga-
nizing and training the force differently, leading and managing people differently,
and ensuring Army facilities and infrastructure support these changes. The estab-
lishment of Army Futures Command is enabling the Army to set priorities, effi-
ciently resource, synchronize the execution of modernization efforts, and assess
progress set forth by the framework within the published Army Modernization
Strategy.
The Army learned many lessons from past acquisition efforts. Three major lessons
are: (1) the Army must understand and orient on the future threat; (2) the Army
must understand what is technologically feasible for design and materiel solutions
before developing a timeline; and (3) the Army must clearly prioritize desired capa-
bilities and avoid requirements creep throughout the acquisition process. Addition-
ally, we learned that joint programs are usually most successful when the require-
ments from the different services are common (i.e., JLTV)
536
14. Senator FISCHER. Secretary McCarthy, you were recently quoted saying that,
‘‘as long as we can continue to work under these conditions, we can continue to pro-
ceed’’ with the Army’s modernization priorities. How much of an impact do you be-
lieve COVID–19 will have on the readiness and modernization of the Army?
Secretary MCCARTHY. It is too early to determine the full extent of the impact
COVID–19 will have on readiness and modernization, though we expect COVID–19
will impact several, if not many, programs. We are working with our industrial base
partners to determine their ability to perform within the current COVID–19 envi-
ronment, and we are assessing effects on the Army’s ability to test, field, and train
on systems. Whenever possible, we are seeking solutions to mitigate effects to pre-
serve the readiness of the force. The health and safety of the workforce and soldiers
is the Army’s paramount concern.
15. Senator FISCHER. General McConville, you were recently quoted saying that
some high-priority tests will continue while ‘‘other ones will slow down.’’ How are
the decisions being made on which programs will proceed apace and which ones will
be postponed amidst the pandemic?
General MCCONVILLE. The Army is closely monitoring the pandemic to ensure the
health and well-being of our soldiers, civilians, families, and their communities.
Army Futures Command is coordinating with ASA(ALT) and Army Test and Eval-
uation Command to determine which tests are most critical to meet current readi-
ness requirements and critical developmental milestones. We are also working close-
ly with FORSCOM to ensure necessary Soldier involvement in these events. Our
current assessment, which will change as conditions change, is that 9 events will
be canceled, 65 postponed, and 42 will continue as scheduled. In all cases, the deci-
sion to continue or delay an event is made by commanders and senior leaders at
the 4-star or Assistant Secretary-level after considering the risk as part of a cost-
benefit analysis.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TOM COTTON
CORONAVIRUS PHASE IV

16. Senator COTTON. Secretary McCarthy, does coronavirus make your Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) look any different, and where can we target more procurement
dollars to best support both the National Defense Strategy and sustainment/recov-
ery of the defense industrial base?
Secretary MCCARTHY. It is too early to tell the long term impacts of COVID–19
and any adjustments that would need to be made to our UFR list. The Commands
and the Army Staff are conducting a review and are updating the requirements as
necessary.
CORONAVIRUS AND DEFENDER-EUROPE 20

17. Senator COTTON. General McConville, coronavirus diminished DEFENDER-
Europe 20—how can you backfill the training and deterrence value of that exercise,
and what do you need from us to do it?
General MCCONVILLE. The purpose of DEFENDER-Europe 20 was to build stra-
tegic readiness by deploying a combat credible force to Europe in support of NATO
and the U.S. National Defense Strategy. The exercise was modified in response to
COVID–19, but the Army was still able to exercise its ability to coordinate large-
scale movements with Allies and partners. Since January, the Army deployed ap-
proximately 6,000 soldiers from the United States to Europe including a division
headquarters and an armored brigade combat team. It has moved approximately
9,000 vehicles and pieces of equipment from Army Prepositioned Stocks and ap-
proximately 3,000 pieces of equipment via sea from the United States. In coordina-
tion with Allies and partners, it also completed movement of soldiers and equipment
from multiple ports to training areas in Germany and Poland. The Army plans to
continue its planned DEFENDER series exercises in Europe and the Pacific during
fiscal year 2021 and beyond.
COUNTER UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS (CUAS)

18. Senator COTTON. Secretary McCarthy, the Department of Defense has spent
millions in research, development, test & engineering (RDT&E) in search of solu-
tions that already exist in the private sector. Have you explored commercial, off-the-
shelf capabilities like kinetic intercept for CUAS, and will you commit to using a
commercial solution if an effective one exists for CUAS?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Yes, we have and will continue to explore both commercial
off the shelf and the development of systems based on new or emerging technologies.
537
Filling a capability gap is a process. We first look at if there are Tactics, Tech-
niques, and Procedures that can close the gap, and if none are adequate to fill the
gap, we look to commercial off-the-shelf materiel solutions. If no commercial solution
can address the gaps, we look to materiel solutions from other government or non-
developmental items that can be modified to meet our needs. Our last resort is initi-
ating a full development program. In that vein, we have fielded commercially viable
capabilities. The Drone Defender; Mobile Low, Slow Unmanned Aircraft Integrated
Defense System (MLIDS); and Coyote systems are all examples of urgently fielded
commercial CUAS systems.
OPTIONALLY MANNED FIGHTING VEHICLE (OMFV)

19. Senator COTTON. General McConville, I understand the Army made a difficult
decision to pause OMFV, and that you don’t want adherence to a fielding date to
drive poor decisions in development, as well as the need for industry to have inputs
into what timeline is possible, but when do your troops need this very necessary ca-
pability?
General MCCONVILLE. The bottom line is that our troops need this as quickly as
we can deliver the transformational capabilities they deserve. The Army remains
committed to OMFV as Next Generation Combat Vehicles are our second highest
modernization priority. We will field the Bradley replacement to support a Multi-
Domain Operationally Ready force. Fortunately, we learned early in the process of
developing the OMFV that industry could not deliver the requirements needed in
the time we wanted. AFC published broad vehicle characteristics at industry’s re-
quest, to allow for industry innovation and trade-space. These characteristics will
be refined through a series of industry engagements, digital design competitions,
and soldier touch points to inform and sharpen the OMFV prototypes for testing,
before we establish the final vehicle requirements. This approach will enable us to
explore the solution space in an environment of rapid and inexpensive learning,
leading to requirements verification through physical prototypes, Soldier input, and
testing.
LONG-RANGE PRECISION FIRES

20. Senator COTTON. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, your opening
statement highlights funding requests and capabilities for long-range precision fires.
What is your vision for their integration into units inside and outside of Anti-Access/
Area Denial (A2/AD), as well as where you expect them to be postured in peacetime
to support strategic deterrence?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We see these long range preci-
sion fires layered from the tactical to strategic level, and postured both CONUS and
OCONUS to provide adequate response and deterrence value. Extended Range Can-
non Artillery (ERCA) will provide the division commander with a deep fires capa-
bility to shape the close fight, while the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) allows the
operational force to neutralize enemy integrated air defense systems and long range
artillery to enable cross domain maneuver, and the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon
(LRHW) allows us to penetrate across the world in minutes instead of hours. These
capabilities will be in traditional Army formations as well as Multi-Domain Task
Forces that will have long range precision effects that can operate below the level
of armed conflict, and long range precision fires for use during armed conflict.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MIKE ROUNDS
COVID–19 AND U.S. LEADERSHIP

21. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in your open-
ing statement, you said that the ‘‘Army must continue to compete for and retain al-
lies and partners, as our adversaries will attempt to do the same.’’ The COVID–19
response requires almost unthinkable resources and a supreme commitment to the
American people. However, the Army still must execute its many missions, even
while supporting our citizens at home and expending great effort to protect our sol-
diers wherever they serve.
I was concerned to see a Reuters story this week that stated the Russian military
will send medical support to Italy and am curious to know what efforts the U.S.
Army has taken—or is planning to take—to help our allies, even while the over-
whelming majority of this government provides for the American people at home.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We continue to provide an as-
sessment to the SECDEF of available assets and capabilities that may be available
to support our domestic or overseas responses. The commanders of USFK,
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USAREUR and USARAF have all demonstrated tremendous partnership in sharing
information and force protections techniques with their host nations to control the
spread of the virus within their areas of operations. We are in contact with our al-
lied counterparts to discuss a coordinated response.
STRATEGIC READINESS

22. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I had a very
enjoyable and illuminating meeting with Lieutenant General Christopher Cavoli,
USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe, on March 4. The DEFENDER-Eu-
rope 20 exercise, has been greatly curtailed, but one of its primary objectives is to
demonstrate and learn lessons about the Army’s strategic readiness to deploy capa-
bilities, despite the presence of contested domains, and provide these capabilities to
the right place at the right time. Can you discuss your assessment of the Army’s
current strategic readiness posture—and describe to the American people what is
needed, and why it is needed, as the United States engages in a great power com-
petition that characterizes the current and future operating environments?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Army strategic readiness incor-
porates assessments across manning, equipping, sustaining, training, installations,
and capacity and capability to meet the requirements of the NDS. Army strategic
readiness begins with a responsive force posture, the ability to mobilize and project
power into contested environments, and the ability to sustain forces in large-scale
combat operations. The Army’s ability to continually generate and project ready for-
mations (at scale) for the combatant commander is critical to the defense of our Na-
tion and our interests worldwide. Recent events in the Middle East demonstrated
how necessary strategic readiness is to allow the Army to be globally responsive
with ready units. As the United States engages in great power competition, the
Army must assure current and future readiness by: (1) balancing current global de-
mand; (2) preparing forces for potential conflict; and, (3) modernizing the force to
respond to future adversaries.
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY’S CIVIL WORKS RESPONSIBILITIES

23. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary McCarthy, I want to thank you for the good job
the Corps of Engineers has done managing the Missouri River, over the last year,
under some very difficult conditions. I commend the outgoing Chief of Engineers,
Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, for his energetic leadership across the Corps’
many mission sets—including the current COVID–19 response, and Major General
Scott Spellmon, for leading the Civil Works mission. Nevertheless, I would like your
commitment to continue robust oversight of the Corps of Engineers—and to assur-
ing that major progress on the snowpack monitoring system deployment is made
this year. We are a nation facing many challenges right now, but a large portion
of the safety, security, and economic well-being of the Missouri River basin states
depends on you executing your Civil Works responsibilities in an exemplary man-
ner. In addition to your commitment, I would appreciate it if you could describe the
importance of this mission to your overall responsibilities as Secretary of the Army.
Secretary MCCARTHY. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is committed to exe-
cuting the snowpack monitoring efforts in the Upper Missouri River Basin. The
Corps is working closely with several State partners, including Montana, Wyoming,
and South Dakota, on initial equipment purchases. The Corps is also working close-
ly with a larger five-State region, including Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Nebraska, to identify existing sites in the Mesonet environ-
mental monitoring network for initial retrofits. Enhancing the Corps’ and State
partners’ understanding of the extent and magnitude of the snowpack is important
to safety, livelihood, and economic well-being of this region, and is a critical mission
for the Corps and the Army Civil Works program.
TITLE 32 AND THE COVID–19 RESPONSE

24. Senator ROUNDS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, it is vital dur-
ing this time of the COVID–19 crisis that there be a great deal of uniformity in how
our National Guard is activated across the Nation. There have been calls by numer-
ous Governors advocating that these activations be made in a 502f status, so the
activation is funded with Federal dollars, with the Governors retaining command
and control. Our States do not possess the resources to address this unimaginable
crisis without that kind of support from the Federal Government. Can you describe
your perspective on this matter and how you will approach advising the President
of the United States?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army National Guard
(ARNG) has tremendous capabilities to support their states and Governors during
539
crises. 32 USC 502(f) allows Governors to employ the ARNG with Federal funding.
This is important as many states do not have the resources to fully mobilize their
National Guard forces.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JONI ERNST
ARMY INTEGRATED VISUAL AUGMENTATION SYSTEM

25. Senator ERNST. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army is
planning to invest $906 million in the development and fielding of the Integrated
Visual Augmentation System (IVAS) giving our soldiers tactical advantage over our
adversaries on the battlefield and establishing deterrence through superior tech-
nology. What is your assessment of the progress of the program, and is it meeting
your requirements?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The IVAS program is progressing
exceptionally well. The partnership between the Army and Microsoft, and the speed
with which engineers make refinement based on soldier feedback, has allowed us
to take the IVAS program from Middle Tier Acquisition/Rapid Prototyping in No-
vember 2018 to delivering four capability sets within the next 27 months.
26. Senator ERNST. General McConville, when will our soldiers start to receive
and begin large-scale operational testing of IVAS?
General MCCONVILLE. The Army has scheduled Touch Points to provide an oppor-
tunity for soldiers to use the equipment in real world training and provide feedback
to the engineers and developers. The IVAS Soldier Touch Point 3 is scheduled for
fiscal year 2020 and Soldier Touch Point 4 is scheduled for the spring fiscal year
2021. We will begin fielding IVAS to units in fiscal year 2021 to enable large-scale
operational testing. Temporary closure of engineering and production facilities for
the prototype systems, due to local responses to COVID–19, may cause delays. The
initial fielding dates may shift from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2022. We cannot
assess the full impact until we know when the facilities will reopen.
MODERNIZATION

27. Senator ERNST. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, China and Rus-
sia are reaching parity with us in areas like field artillery and air defense artillery.
I commend Futures Command for looking at ways to modernize, but want to empha-
size the need to ensure our current systems are maintained and ready to support
the warfighter. For example, some components of our field artillery systems—such
as the breech on a howitzer—are legacy systems. How are you ensuring the required
hardware and software updates, availability of parts, and ease of maintenance as
you move forward with the artillery modernization process?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We will continue investments in
upgrading and sustaining key systems in the near term—such as our in howitzer
fleet—to fill gaps until the technology is ready for our next generation systems. We
made a conscious decision as part of the Paladin Integrated Management program
to first replace the chassis to allow the system to keep pace with the Bradley and
Abrams tank, without changing the turret, gun or breach. We are pursuing two
lines of effort to further modernize the howitzer. The first is extending the range
thru upgrading propellant, such as the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS)
Charge 5, which we have found adversely affects the reliability of the Paladin
breech. We have initiated upgrades to the currently fielded Paladin breeches that
are in the A6 fleet and testing shows that the capability addresses the issues caused
by the MACS Charge 5, with excellent results. In concert with these fixes, we are
stocking up on breech parts at the unit level to minimize down-time for readily re-
placeable components. The second line of effort involves upgrades to the turret gun
and breech via the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program. The com-
bination of ERCA and upgrades to the breech will go far in establishing higher reli-
ability as well as increasing standoff for our artillery systems.
28. Senator ERNST. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, new systems
like the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program have switched from a tradi-
tional hydraulic system to electric/high voltage. This requires highly trained contrac-
tors to make repairs on high level maintenance, not the typical soldier. How will
you ensure the timely deployability and maintenance of modern systems writ-large
when our warfighters are down range?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army fields most major sys-
tems with validated maintenance manuals and appropriate levels of maintenance
(usually field level and depot level). Soldiers performing field level maintenance re-
ceive necessary training for the maintenance tasks they can perform at the unit
540
level, frequently with assistance from Field Service Representatives. In cases where
a capability is urgently fielded and organic maintenance expertise is not yet in
place, the Army often employs Contractor Logistic Support.
While the M109A7 has moved from a hydraulically operated turret to an elec-
tronically operated one, the performance of our soldier operators and maintainers
has not diminished. Our soldiers who operate the howitzer continue to excel and ex-
ceed standards for their performance with the system. Maintainers have not missed
a beat in maintaining the system, on the rare occasions when maintenance is re-
quired. Universally, comments from the 3 ABCTs fielded to date have shown noth-
ing but praise for the electronic components of the howitzer.
HYPERSONIC TESTING

29. Senator ERNST. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, on March 19,
DOD announced that the Army and Navy conducted a joint test of the Common-
Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kauai, Ha-
waii. The successful test marks a significant progress in the development of
hypersonic technology and a step forward in the Army achieving long range preci-
sion fires. Can you provide an update on the Army’s development on hypersonics,
specifically on development timelines and key testing milestones?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is on track to deliver
a road mobile prototype hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023 as part of the Joint
Service Conventional Prompt Strike program. The fiscal year 2021 budget request
fully funds the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon effort and the long-lead items nec-
essary for the prototype and all associated flight tests, as well as initial unit fielding
and training.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR THOM TILLIS
FORCE MODERNIZATION AND END STRENGTH

30. Senator TILLIS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Marine
Corps has seemingly continued business as usual during this time (COVID–19 Con-
tainment Phase). The Marine Corps Commandant announced his plans to move for-
ward with force modernization by cutting infantry battalions, downsizing artillery
batteries, and divesting of tanks, which inevitably shifts to the Army. Is the Army
prepared or positioned to pick up those ground force capability gaps in its modern-
ized force layout and how will this impact recruitment goals or demands for soldiers
to fill ground combat arms military occupational specialties (MOSs) in the Army and
the Army’s end strength needs?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army designs its force size,
structure, and capabilities to meet the requirements asked of us by the NDS, the
CJCS, and Combatant Commanders. The Army will need to conduct a detailed as-
sessment of the Marine Corps plan to determine capability and capacity mix across
the services. The outcome of that assessment and associated decisions would inform
possible changes to our recruitment goals and end-strength requirements.
STRATEGIC POWER PROJECTION AND READINESS

31. Senator TILLIS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, at Fort Bragg,
a recent Army audit found its airfields as being the poorest infrastructure in the
Army. These infrastructures serve as primary training air fields for USASOC
[United States Army Special Operations Command], JSOC [Joint Special Operations
Command], and others, including the Immediate Response Force. Is the Army ade-
quately funding power projection and installation readiness, which also extends to
rail, stationing requirements, and facility issues that undermine training and readi-
ness?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Our fiscal year 2021 budget sub-
mission addresses several strategic readiness requirements. The budget helps the
Army increase Army power projection capabilities to support combatant commander
and Dynamic Force Employment requirements. The Army has also designated 14x
installations as Secondary Contingent Deployment Locations and 4x Mobilization
Force Generation Installations being utilized; and we are working with the National
Guard Bureau to improve states’ pre-mobilization and unit movement support capa-
bilities.
Specifically, at Fort Bragg, since 2011 the Army has invested over $115 million
to repair runways, aprons and airfield lighting systems at Pope Army Airfield
(PAAF). In fiscal year 2020 we have an approved project of $25 million for airfield
lighting repair and in the fiscal year 2021 budget, we plan to spend $65 million to
541
repair the PAAF runway and Taxiways. Army Materiel Command is currently re-
viewing the full scope of additional requirements in support of this critical Power
Projection platform as part of our comprehensive Facilities Investment Strategy.
PERSONNEL AND FAMILY READINESS

32. Senator TILLIS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, last month, in
previous posture hearings, I announced my plans to show up unannounced at mili-
tary installations for a progress report on PPV [public-private venture] housing re-
pairs and outstanding issues. Have you personally visited PPV housing units on any
Army installation this year and can I get your help in ensuring Army families have
quality/safe housing and not subjected to unhealthy living conditions?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We have personally visited hous-
ing on Ft Bragg, Ft Carson, Fort Stewart, Fort Campbell, Fort Meade, Fort Hood,
Fort Bliss, Fort Drum, Ft Belvoir and Hawaii, and you have our commitment that
we will do everything within our power to ensure our People have safe, quality
housing. The Army has implemented several fiscal year 2020 NDAA provisions and
all require close coordination with privatized companies. The Army has imple-
mented the requirement for a reliable, accessible online work order system;
timelines for repair; and incentive fee policies; and are developing action plans for
the remainder. The Army is also incorporating the fiscal year 2020 NDAA provisions
into our Army Housing Campaign Plan to establish priorities for implementation
and oversight.
DOD CORONAVIRUS TASK FORCE

33. Senator TILLIS. Secretary McCarthy, how is the DOD Coronavirus Taskforce
taking steps to disseminate information through all service branches down to the
unit level, and are you encountering any difficulties in enforcing consistency in re-
sponding to the COVID–19 threat?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Senior leaders across the Department of Defense commu-
nicate multiple times a day to synchronize our response to COVID–19. Throughout
the Army, we have multiple senior leader touch points and are publishing orders
from HQDA down to the unit level. A key factor in mitigating the spread of the
virus is ensuring personnel have the most up-to-date information on appropriate
measures to prevent the further spread of COVID–19. The Department, Com-
manders, and leaders at all levels are taking positive action to educate the force and
implement appropriate force protection measures.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS TILLIS AND MCSALLY
34. Senators TILLIS and MCSALLY. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
COVID–19 is a threat to the well-being of our troops and their families. During the
March 24, 2020 DOD COVID–19 virtual town hall, it was recommended that
servicemembers in the middle of a permanent change of duty station (PCS) should
request their commanders put them into an awaiting transportation status, so they
receive per diem and preserve their TLA/TLE [temporary lodging allowance/tem-
porary lodging expense] entitlement. How are you handling the ‘‘stop move order’’
for all non-essential travel to limit the spread of the virus, and what measures are
being taken to provide for servicemembers and their families caught up in the PCS
process to avoid financial hardships?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. In response to the challenges sol-
diers and their families are facing during the stop movement order, the Army is ad-
hering to DOD’s guidance for non-essential travel.
Additionally, the Army, with DOD’s support, has implemented a series of new en-
titlements. These new authorities are aimed at minimizing, to the greatest extent
possible, the financial impacts of this unprecedented situation. These include Hard-
ship Duty Pay for Restriction of Movement, (HDP-ROM), Isolation Allowance, tem-
porary duty status, advanced PCS allowances, and Army Emergency Relief (AER)
loans. Further, to provide soldiers the utmost support and flexibility, if a soldier is
scheduled to PCS during this time and experiences hardship due to COVID19, they
can request an extension—for up to 1 year—at their current duty station.
542
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
THE FUTURE ARMY—RECRUITING

35. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in your joint
testimony you mention ‘‘the Army has overhauled its Recruiting and Marketing en-
terprise, exceeding revised end strength goals in fiscal year 2019, while simulta-
neously retaining quality soldiers.’’ How is COVID–19 affecting the current recruit-
ing efforts and what specific precautions do you have in place to protect recruiters
as well as applicants?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. U.S. Army Recruiting Command
is taking precautions to protect the health of the force and minimize exposure to
coronavirus disease. As of March 18th, all recruiting stations within U.S. Army Re-
cruiting Command are shifting to mobile and virtual Operations with the public to
limit in-person contacts. These precautions allow our recruiting force the ability to
continue to make solid contacts with those interested in joining the Army while pro-
tecting both the recruiters and the applicants. Recruiters remain accessible to those
interested in a career with the U.S. Army by communicating through text, phone
calls, direct messages, or video chat rather than face-to-face. Contracts/leads have
decreased, but we do not attribute this to the shift to virtual recruiting. Many of
our leads are generated from Recruiters attending events and larger gatherings and
conducting high school visits. Due to COVID 19, all events have been canceled and
we no longer have access to schools due to closures. Contract/leads from virtual re-
cruiting, however, have increased.
Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, USAREC was on pace to achieve its fiscal year
2020 accessions mission including a Delayed Entry Pool for fiscal year 2021 of
13,500. In an effort to protect the recruiting force and the Army’s training base,
USAREC has a goal to ship to half of the Army’s training capacity. The determina-
tion of which future soldier will ship is dependent on the level of risk in the area
in which each future soldier resides. As more and more areas become restricted,
USAREC continues to analyze each individual situation in an effort to determine
a safe to ship status. All Future Soldiers are being prescreened at 15 days, 72 hours
and 24 hours prior to shipment for symptoms and potential exposure to COVID–
19 to mitigate the spread of the disease. Additionally, they are screened again upon
arrival at the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS). Depending on the
level of risk in certain areas of country, recruiters are working with the Future Sol-
diers to either complete all necessary steps and MEPS processing so the Future Sol-
dier can ship to basic training or the recruiter is working with the Future Soldier
to reschedule them to ship at a later date. We are shipping from 218 stations.
USAREC does not ship a certain number each month. Recruiting ebbs and flows
based on the time of year. We typically see our highest number of shippers in June,
July, and August, which have not yet been impacted by COVID 19. Prior to COVID
19, USAREC was on track to ship 5,897 in March. We actually shipped 5,157. In
order to minimize risk and exposure, our goal for April and May is to ship to half
of the training capacity’s base.
ARMY FORCE POSTURE/STRUCTURE

36. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, to address
potential great power threats, what types of force structure(s) are required for the
Army to deter and, if necessary, defeat a near-peer competitor like Russia and how
is the Army changing its force posture to better support United States Indo-Pacific
Command’s (USINDOPACOM) efforts to compete with an increasingly aggressive
and modernized Chinese military and how are these two efforts complementary and
how are they different?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army will calibrate its force
posture, develop new organizations, and field new capabilities to provide the nec-
essary support to USINDOPACOM in order to deter competitors in the region.
FORT WAINWRIGHT SUICIDE RESPONSE

37. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as you know
Fort Wainwright is located in Fairbanks, Alaska and has experienced a concerning
number of suicides over the last 18 months. What specific initiatives and projects
have you taken this year and in coming years to enhance the morale, welfare, and
recreation of soldiers stationed along the Arctic’s front lines, especially at Fort
Wainwright and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson? Please provide separately to my
office the specifics for each initiative, the schedule for delivery, and the anticipated
impact or benefit on morale, welfare, and recreation of soldiers.
543
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army established a Quality
of Life Task Force to coordinate and synchronize the development and implementa-
tion of policies/projects to enhance the quality of life of our soldiers and families.
Specific to Alaska, we have established an intensive outpatient behavioral health
program, approved Remote and Austere Conditions Assignment Incentive Pay (RAC-
AIP), improved transportation and shuttle services, established more predictable
training schedules, improved junior leader development on the risk reduction tools
and engaging behavior skills training, and refreshed MWR facilities. We are also
taking actions to increase effective command messaging, improve barracks living
conditions, increase indoor recreational facilities for soldiers and families, and im-
prove the dining facilities (hours, quality of food). As circumstances permit, I am
prepared to brief you on specifics regarding scheduled delivery of each initiative.
LONG-RANGE PRECISION FIRE TESTING

38. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as technology
for long-range precision fire weaponry increases, the size of test ranges will also
need to increase. How long do you think it will be until the current Army long-range
precision fire ranges are outpaced by the range requirements of the weaponry being
tested and to what extent are you considering JPARC-with it over 1 million cubic
miles of training space—as a potential testing site for long-range precision fire
weapons, to include hypersonics? Please elaborate.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army uses the Pacific Mis-
sile Range Facility in Hawaii and the Reagan Test Site in the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands for initial testing of developmental capabilities. Test demand at some
point will exceed the capacity of these two ranges to handle the workload which will
require additional ranges to support this mission. The Defense Test Resource Man-
agement Center is conducting a study to determine alternate options for all the
Services including JPARC
MULTI-DOMAIN TASK FORCE (MDTF)

39. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, with the
world-class training opportunities offered by the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Com-
plex (JPARC) and the strategic platform offered for expeditionary forces such as the
4th Brigade Combat Team 25th infantry in Alaska, would you say that Alaska is
a prime candidate for the stand-up of the U.S. Army’s third Multi Domain Task
Force? Why or why not? Please expand.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is analyzing potential
locations across the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility to station the third Multi
Domain Task Force (MDTF) in support of INDOPACOM and USARPAC operational
requirements. MDTF #3 will activate in 2022 and will serve as the second MDTF
in support of INDOPACOM.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID PERDUE
SQUAD X ROBOTICS—FORT BENNING

40. Senator PERDUE. General McConville and Secretary McCarthy, since 2018, the
U.S. Army and Marine Corps have worked with industry to enhance unit interoper-
ability with unmanned systems and artificial intelligence (AI) through Squad X ex-
periments, allowing Army and Marine Corps squad units to better utilize the capa-
bilities of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)
to track and engage hostile forces. While Squad X experiments have shown remark-
able progress in developing these capabilities, monthly, large-scale experiments in-
corporating Army and Marine Corps leadership are necessary to ultimately field
these capabilities on the battlefield. Collocating the unmatched resources and capa-
bilities of the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence with these squad-level robotics
experiments will provide a long-term asymmetrical advantage for our warfighters
and allow for the rapid build-test-build of AI capabilities that will greatly enhance
small unit lethality. Additionally, overcoming advances our potential adversaries
have made in their own squad-level robotics and AI development is crucial, and the
Maneuver Center of Excellence is uniquely suited as an ideal location to develop
and integrate the future of infantry squad-level robotics and AI capabilities. What
role do the Squad X experiments play in increasing the lethality, maneuverability,
and survivability of the squad unit, and how could collocating industry innovators
with the warfighter at the Maneuver Center of Excellence best enable the future
development of AI-supported robotics for Army squad units?
544
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is aggressively pur-
suing manned-unmanned teaming and artificial intelligence (AI) through a number
of promising programs and experiments. These programs and experiments link the
Army to academic and industry leaders across America to capitalize on best-of-breed
innovation in those fields. Examples include the Army AI Task Force (TF) and Na-
tional Robotics Engineering Center at Carnegie Mellon University; Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; and the University of Texas. Experiments like Squad X en-
able capability developers and Soldiers to explore new solutions in four key areas:
precision engagement; non-kinetic engagement; squad sensing and threat detection;
and squad autonomy. Co-location of industry and academic innovators with
warfighters can help accelerate the development of operationally relevant solutions
to soldiers and units.
ADVANCED BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

41. Senator PERDUE. General McConville, as you know, the new Advanced Battle
Management System (ABMS) conducted its first demonstration of capabilities in De-
cember, and the system is scheduled to hold another demonstration in June. You
recently called ABMS ‘‘Air Centric’’ and not a universal solution to the problem of
sharing data between platforms, units, and services. Additionally, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Eric Wesley, the Chief of the Army’s Futures and Concepts Center, recently
said, ‘‘ABMS cannot be the sole solution, because it doesn’t account for, in some
cases, the scale or the unique requirements of all the other services.’’ You have also
noted that waiting for a future Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) sys-
tem cannot mean setting aside current systems completely. How can upcoming
ABMS field demonstrations address questions of scalability and the Army’s unique
needs for such a network that you and other senior Army leaders have voiced?
General MCCONVILLE. The goal is to allow us to see, understand, and act faster
than our adversaries and to leverage the rest of the Joint Force to achieve over-
match. You will see a continuous series of experiments culminating in annual dem-
onstrations to iterate, learn, and improve upon the previous year’s outcome. Joint
All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) is an effort—actually a growing commit-
ment—by the Joint community to develop a 21st Century command and control ca-
pability that optimizes the contributions of the elements of the Joint Force, as well
as those of our multinational partners. We are working closely with our sister Serv-
ices and the Joint Staff to identify and achieve its full potential.
JOINT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM (JSTARS)

42. Senator PERDUE. General McConville, JSTARS aircraft continue to be active
in executing the National Defense Strategy around the world. JSTARS aircraft were
deployed for 18 straight years in the United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) in support of overseas contingency op-
erations. Following an increase in tensions with Iran in January, JSTARS aircraft
returned to the USCENTCOM AOR. A JSTARS unit manned by the 116th Air Con-
trol Wing, based out of Robins Air Force Base, also forward-deployed to Germany
this past fall. How does the forward deployment of JSTARS support Army readiness
and lethality in response to regional and global threats?
General MCCONVILLE. The Army utilizes a wide range of Ground Moving Target
Indicator (GMTI)/Synthetic Aperture RADAR (SAR) collection platforms and sensors
to determine patterns of life, perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield, de-
fine the operational environment, and evaluate the threats in support of ground
forces. The specific platform and sensor tasked depends on the mission, terrain,
weather, region, and factors such as platform/sensor specifications and the Joint
Commander’s priorities. The combatant commanders’ ability to access GMTI capa-
bility is integral to react to a dynamic and changing operating environment. This
capability to collect GMTI data deep into enemy territory provides collection to sup-
port the combatant commanders’ Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).
DEMOLITION OF OLD MARTIN ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

43. Senator PERDUE. Secretary McCarthy, the old Martin Community Hospital
(MACH) and associated facilities were replaced with a new hospital in 2014. In fis-
cal year 2015, Fort Benning included the old MACH facilities in their project for
Army Installation Command’s (IMCOM’s) Facility Reduction Program (FRP). How-
ever, funding was redirected from the FRP for other Army priorities, and the old
MACH has yet to be demolished. How would including the old MACH in the FRP
allow for the most efficient use of Army resources while also providing better service
to the soldiers and community at Fort Benning, and what resources and authorities
545
does the Army need to complete demolition of the hospital and recapitalize the sur-
rounding land for the base’s use?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Removal of the old MACH would clear a prime location that
lies in the heart of the community hub of Fort Benning between the new hospital
and the Commissary/PX/Dental Clinic. This location was identified in the garrison’s
master plan as the site of a transportation center that would link traffic and com-
muters from off post with an internal transportation system to circulate in the im-
mediate vicinity as well as links to the primary cantonment areas. This hub would
facilitate carpooling and relieve crowded traffic conditions along Marne Rd and
across the entire Garrison. Once the old MACH is removed, the bulk of the work
required would be ground work and paving. The Army has all the authorities/clear-
ances needed to demolish the old MACH. The rough order of magnitude for demoli-
tion is $14 million to $20 million.
PORT OF SAVANNAH

44. Senator PERDUE. General McConville, the U.S. Department of Transportation
recently announced the awarding of an additional $34.6 million grant for critical in-
frastructure improvements at the Port of Savannah, building on the President’s
budget request of $93.6 million in Federal funding in support of the Savannah Har-
bor Expansion Project. The Port of Savannah is the third largest container port in
North America and is a strategic seaport within the National Port Readiness Net-
work. Your posture statement cites our Nation’s ports as Strategic Power Projection
platforms that are key components in maintaining the Army’s strategic readiness.
To what extent does the expansion of major commercial ports like the Port of Savan-
nah improve the Army’s readiness, and support the Army’s mission, by quickly
transporting large U.S. troop formations in times of war and national emergency?
General MCCONVILLE. The ability to project the force rapidly and at scale and sus-
tain the force during conflicts are key measures of our strategic readiness. Sufficient
ports for national defense enable the Army’s ability to deploy in time to meet com-
batant commander requirements. I understand the Savannah Harbor Expansion
Project will increase the shipping channel depth to accommodate the large container
vessels transiting the Panama Canal. DOD will continue to rely on the Large, Me-
dium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off vessels from the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command
and Fast Sealift Ship vessels from the Maritime Administration’s Reserve Fleet. The
current channel depth is sufficient for these vessels. The Army is very closely linked
with USTRANSCOM and their periodic assessments of the existing Strategic Sea-
ports, and their current assessment is that we have sufficient seaport capacity on
each coast (East/West/Gulf) to meet the Army’s rapid deployment needs

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTHA MCSALLY
COVID–19

45. Senator MCSALLY. General McConville, given the Army’s mission to organize,
train, and equip soldiers, what efforts is the service taking to ensure it completes
this vital mission while simultaneously working to combat the spread of COVID–
19 within its ranks and do you foresee any impacts to readiness as a result of efforts
to combat COVID–19 within the force?
General MCCONVILLE. It is too early to measure any significant impact to readi-
ness, but the longer the pandemic lasts, the greater the possibility there will be a
degradation in readiness. In an effort to protect the force, we have migrated to vir-
tual recruiting efforts to sustain the Army’s end-strength. Although modified for
health protection measures, we are continuing initial entry training, and Com-
manders at all levels are assessing their local conditions and modifying training to
minimize risk to our force while maximizing our readiness.
FAMILY READINESS—CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTERS

46. Senator MCSALLY. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I appreciate
the value you placed on people being the greatest strength of the U.S. Army. I agree
with the Army People Strategy that the ‘‘People First’’ philosophy is critical when
assessing readiness. In your statement, you assessed 5 Quality of Life priorities
which included improving and adequately resourcing Child and Youth Services.
When looking at this particular priority and family readiness, what was the process
for assessing Child Development Centers (CDCs), specifically, how did you assess
the current conditions or maintenance needs of each CDC and how did you assess
the capability of the CDC to meet the demands and readiness needs of each commu-
nity?
546
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The quality of life for our sol-
diers, their families, and our civilian workforce is of utmost importance. Child and
Youth Services, which incorporates our CDCs, is one of the five pillars of our Qual-
ity of Life campaign plan. As such, I’m prioritizing funding for our CDCs over the
next 5 years. GEN Perna and Army Material Command hosted a Facility Invest-
ment Strategy Wargame in January to assess the condition of every Army facility,
to include all 184 of our CDCs. We are now prioritizing these CDCs for renovation
and increased maintenance (if needed). We’ve also identified those locations that
need new CDC facilities due to deterioration or increased soldier and family de-
mand. AMC is developing a plan to fix all of our CDC challenges over the next 10
years; we look forward to presenting that plan to Congress during upcoming ses-
sions.
GREAT POWER COMPETITION

47. Senator MCSALLY. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, you mention
deterrence a few times in your statement—that the Army must ‘‘compete with and
deter near-peer competitors’’ or ‘‘deter highly capable adversaries’’. With the rise of
emerging technologies such as AI, 5G, quantum information systems, biotech-
nologies etc, what does deterrence look like under great power competition, and how
is the Army utilizing these technologies to create new deterrence mechanisms?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The strength of the NATO Alli-
ance and our partners in Europe, our ability to integrate and conduct combined op-
erations, and the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy significant forces in support of
our Allies is the bedrock of our deterrence strategy. The Army conducts frequent ro-
tation of forces in support of INDOPACOM and elements of our Multi-Domain Task
Force will be incorporated into the Defender Pacific exercises to demonstrate U.S.
capability and commitment to deterrence in the region. The Army is also planning
to employ modernized capabilities such as those that you highlighted, as well as
Long Range Precision Fires and Air and Missile Defense, in the Western Pacific to
reinforce deterrence of Chinese aggression and coercion of regional states.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SCOTT
EFFICIENCIES

48. Senator SCOTT. Secretary McCarthy, the Department of the Army under Sec-
retary Mark Esper made great strides in becoming more efficient and redirect
spending for new priorities. What more do you see that can be done and what are
the lessons learned that could be shared across the Pentagon?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army continues to aggressively pursue reforms focus-
ing on the divestment of lower priority programs and investment in higher prior-
ities. Secretary Esper has worked with all the Military Services to establish a simi-
lar process focused on prioritizing spending. The Night Court process is being estab-
lished across the other Services as well as other Department of Defense Agencies.
The first 2 years of Army ‘‘Night Court’’ program reviews were driven top-down, re-
sulting in over $30 billion realigned to our priorities; for the fiscal year 2021 budget,
program managers led these fiscal reviews in a bottom up approach, resulting in
another almost ∼$10 billion realigned over the FYDP to Army modernization and
readiness priorities. We are also improving the way we do business—ex. the Com-
mand Accountability and Execution Review (CAER) shifted the culture toward com-
mander and senior leader involvement in the stewardship of their fiscal resources,
resulting in reduced O&M deobligations by 37 percent compared to historical norms,
reducing lost purchasing power.
COVID–19

49. Senator SCOTT. Secretary McCarthy, as training continues, what precautions
is the Army taking to prevent servicemembers from contracting the Coronavirus, as
it continues to plague our country?
Secretary MCCARTHY. We continue to train, but the Army has suspended or scaled
back military exercises to include DEFENDER-Europe 20 and combat training cen-
ter rotations, implemented travel restrictions and quarantine policies, enhanced
screening procedures for new recruits reporting to and processing thru basic train-
ing, and published screening and prevention guidance to include social distancing
guidelines, management of movements, and workforce limitations.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN
JOINT WARFIGHTING CONCEPT

50. Senator BLACKBURN. General McConville, the idea of Multi-Domain Oper-
ations (MDO), is still largely driven from within each service. How is the Army sup-
porting a more Pentagon-wide approach that would pull together each military
branch and develop tools that function across all services and is interoperability a
consideration?
General MCCONVILLE. The Army is nested with the Joint Staff on the develop-
ment of the Joint All Domain Operations concept and well as the development of
the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system architecture. Each
service has a portion the concept development and all efforts are nested and coordi-
nated thru the Joint Staff.
MULTI-DOMAIN TASK FORCE

51. Senator BLACKBURN. General McConville, in October 2019, you mentioned
support for Admiral Philip Davidson’s request for the stationing of two Multi-Do-
main Task Forces (MDTF) in USINDOPACOM, which were then listed on
USINDOPACOM’s Unfunded Priorities List for fiscal year 2021. When considering
near-peer competition, where will the MDTFs mentioned in your posture statement
be geographically focused and when can we expect to see them stood up?
General MCCONVILLE. The Army plans on three MDTFs, two focused on
INDOPACOM and one on EUCOM. The first INDOPACOM focused MDTF will be
activated by the end of fiscal year 2020 and the second will be activated by fiscal
year 2023. The EUCOM MDTF is currently undergoing the OSD process for consid-
eration of stationing units overseas.
52. Senator BLACKBURN. Secretary McCarthy, I’ve had multiple conversations
with military leaders about the importance of Multi-Domain Task Forces, but this
year we saw them on USINDOPACOM’s unfunded priorities list. What specific, tan-
gible investments will we see in fiscal year 2021 that the Army is delivering to stra-
tegic readiness, and are you building out a short, medium, and long-range plan?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army is investing to improve its global posture by posi-
tioning formations and equipment (APS) in key strategic locations to deter adver-
saries and assure partners; investing in its Organic Industrial Base (OIB); improv-
ing mobilization through MFGI investments and exercises; building proficiency
through repetition in deploying/redeploying operations with Dynamic Force Employ-
ment (DFE) and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises (EDREs); sustaining
its generating and operating forces; and aligning APS & LOGCAP to NDS priorities.
In fiscal year 2021, Army is investing in site surveys and studies to refine the short,
medium, and long range plans for expanding Multi-Domain capabilities in
USINDOPACOM out through 2030.
EQUIPMENT

53. Senator BLACKBURN. Secretary McCarthy, last year I had the opportunity to
visit National Guard soldiers from the 278th Armored Cavalry Regiment serving a
9 month deployment in Poland and Ukraine. They were at times the most forward
deployed unit of our total force if a conflict were to break out against Russia, but
I often heard from these soldiers that their equipment was outdated and difficult
to maintain. How are we ensuring that we maintain deployable and interoperable
equipment and force structure across the Active and Reserve components?
Secretary MCCARTHY. As the Army fields modernized equipment, the priority will
be to those forces expected to make contact with an adversary first—regardless of
component. Nevertheless, there are plans to continue to provide the Army National
Guard with modernized equipment in parallel or before the Active Component. Ex-
amples of systems being fielded to the National Guard in parallel or before the Ac-
tive Component include the AH–64E Apache to replace older model Apaches, UH–
60M Black Hawk helicopters to replace older UH–60A models, the Next Gen Squad
Weapon to replace some M4 rifles, IVAS to replace some of their current night vi-
sion devices, Stryker double-V hull A1s to replace flat bottom hull Strykers, the
M1A2 SEP V3 and V2 Abrams tanks to replace older M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks, and
the Soldier Borne Sensor and Short Range Reconnaissance UAVs to add capability
at the small unit level.
SPACE

54. Senator BLACKBURN. Secretary McCarthy, with the recent creation of the
Army Satellite Operations Brigade, we see that the United States Army Space and
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Missile Defense Command (USASMDC) is making deliberate efforts to reorganize
the force to support United States Space Command (USSPACECOM). What should
we expect to see next from USASMDC, and how specifically does support of the
newest combatant command fit in with Army’s modernization priorities?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army has emerged as the largest integrator of space
capabilities in the DOD, and currently leverages space capabilities to enable ground
combat operations. As the Army continuously updates its doctrine, organizational
designs, training, and capabilities to conduct multi-domain operations, the employ-
ment of organic army space capabilities will be a decisive factor in competition, cri-
sis, or conflict. We are working the merger with US Space Force and will divest as-
sets over time. However, we must retain necessary organic space-related capabilities
to balance space capabilities across the force and limit operational risk.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY
COVID–19

55. Senator HAWLEY. Secretary McCarthy, on March 12, a Chinese Foreign Min-
istry spokesman tweeted, ‘‘It might be [sic] U.S. Army who brought the epidemic
to Wuhan.’’ How do you respond to the allegation that the U.S. Army may have been
responsible for delivering the novel coronavirus to the Chinese city of Wuhan?
Secretary MCCARTHY. There is no logical response to such an irrational accusa-
tion.
GENERAL LEONARD WOOD ARMY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

56. Senator HAWLEY. Secretary McCarthy, on January 16, 2020, I asked now-
Under Secretary of the Army James McPherson about the Army’s plans to rectify
personnel shortages at the General Leonard Wood Army Community Hospital
(GLWACH) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Mr. McPherson said that those per-
sonnel shortages were a result of the mishandling of personnel transfers by the
Army and assured me that GLWACH would be ‘‘fully staffed again’’ by this coming
summer. Can you confirm that the Army is still on track to have GLWACH fully
staffed by this summer?
Secretary MCCARTHY. MEDCOM will ensure GLWACH is staffed to required
staffing levels pending any impact due to long-term COVID–19 pandemic response,
to include in place stop-move policies.
ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM

57. Senator HAWLEY. General McConville, the Army budget supports outfitting
just four of the Army’s 16 armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) of M1 Abrams
tanks with Active Protection System (APS) kits to defeat threats like rocket-pro-
pelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). What is the level
of risk assumed by not outfitting the remaining ABCTs, as well as the Army’s
Strykers, with APS kits, and what would be the impact on the Total Army Force’s
survivability if it received additional APS kits?
General MCCONVILLE. We have procured five brigades of installation kits and four
brigades of Trophy Active Protection Systems (APS) for the Abrams tank. All sys-
tems will be installed by third quarter, fiscal year 2021, after which the Army has
decision points for future APS systems. We are evaluating off-the-shelf systems such
as Iron Fist-Light for Bradley and continuing to look for appropriate solutions for
Stryker. While additional APS sets would improve survivability, our future APS
buys must be able to evolve with the threat and available technology. The Army will
continue to request funding to proceed with technology maturation that addresses
those future capabilities.
INDO-PACIFIC THEATER

58. Senator HAWLEY. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the National
Defense Strategy says that the Department of Defense will maintain combat-cred-
ible forward forces in order to deter enemy aggression, or if deterrence fails, blunt
the enemy’s attack until war-winning surge forces arrive. Secretary McCarthy, you
seemed to allude to this directive in your recent remarks that ‘‘[a]ccess and presence
are critical in order to deter conflict . . . being on the ground matters.’’ What are the
Army’s most important posture requirements for the Indo-Pacific theater, and how
will meeting those requirements support the Army’s ability to blunt Chinese aggres-
sion, if deterrence fails?
549
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army has an important role
in the greater Indo-Pacific theater and requires access, presence, and posture to
deter and defeat great power competitors in the INDOPACOM theater. The Indo-
Pacific theater is a land force centric environment within a larger maritime theater
where most of the regional militaries are land force centric. The Army can most ef-
fectively advance national interests and contribute to regional stability and the
peaceful resolution of conflicts by establishing regional security partnerships in the
South China Sea and Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army envisions a robust and resil-
ient presence through and with regional security partners and allies to deter aggres-
sion and set the conditions for the Joint Force to flow forces in the event of a crisis.
If deterrence fails, the U.S. Army will be postured though expeditionary basing to
rapidly transition to conflict, all the while providing theater-level protection and
sustainment capabilities for the Joint Force in combat.
59. Senator HAWLEY. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army’s
concept document, ‘‘The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations—2028,’’ includes
the following passage: ‘‘Russia has increased its investments in anti-access and area
denial capabilities and systems intended to deny the Joint Force entry into a con-
tested area and set the conditions for a fait accompli attack.’’ The multi-domain op-
erations concept document subsequently defines a ‘‘fait accompli’’ as an ‘‘attack . . .
intended to achieve military and political objectives rapidly and then to quickly con-
solidate those gains so that any attempt to reverse the action by the U.S. would en-
tail unacceptable cost and risk.’’ It concludes that in order to ‘‘provide a credible de-
terrent,’’ Army forces must demonstrate the ‘‘[a]bility to immediately deny a fait
accompli attack.’’ While the MDO concept document focuses on the threat of a Rus-
sian fait accompli, the Department of Defense’s ‘‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’’ warns
of the threat of a fait accompli in the Indo-Pacific theater, as well. With that in
mind, would you agree that China is investing in systems intended to deny the Joint
Force entry into a contested area and set the conditions for a fait accompli attack,
and if so, would you agree that in order to provide a credible deterrent against
China, Army forces must demonstrate the ability to immediately deny a Chinese fait
accompli attack?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Yes, it is clear that China is in-
vesting in weapon systems and force posture actions intended to increase their anti-
access/area denial capabilities in the Pacific and deterrence is a critical component
of our National Defense Strategy. The Army’s Multi-Domain Operations concept was
developed and matured over the course of several years as a result of significant
analytical efforts to include wargames, exercises, and experiments. The Army is now
applying the existing Multi-Domain Operations concept to the China scenario. As
we do so, we will consider the capabilities and concepts of operations of potential
adversaries and well as the operational environment. The Army will conduct a simi-
larly detailed and robust analysis for the Asia-Pacific region as we have done for
Europe and adapt our concepts as necessary.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED
U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE

60. Senator REED. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in my opening
statement, I raised concerns that the Department of Defense has not prioritized the
mission performed by U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID), and in fact, the Department has cut funding to the program.
USAMRIID is at the forefront in research on COVID–19, and this Committee needs
to understand immediately what the Army plans do to ensure USAMRIID remains
a world class institute.
I understand you have restricted funds for research in the current High Contain-
ment Facility at Fort Detrick. What are you doing to expeditiously fix this problem,
and what specific actions is the Army taking in order to bring the New High Con-
tainment Facility at Fort Detrick online in order to replace the aging one?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army implemented an effec-
tive and responsive plan of action and milestones that returned USAMRIID to full
operating capabilities in a timely manner. USAMRIID is now at Full Operational
Capability (FOC). All work objectives in Biosafety Level (BSL)–2, BSL–3 and BSL–
4 Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP)-registered space will commence to include
priority work associated with multiple other DOD agencies and Cooperative and De-
velopment Research Agreement (CRADA) partners. Simultaneously, the Army con-
ducted an extensive review of our medical research capabilities and is in the process
550
of implementing changes that will facilitate the availability of these capabilities in
the future.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND BORDER WALL CONTRACTS

61. Senator REED. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as I mentioned
in my opening statement, this week the Army awarded a $524 million contract for
the Tucson Sector Barrier Wall Replacement Project. The United States is grappling
with a global pandemic and COVID–19 infections have been in reported in all 50
States. Many of the hospital systems across our country may soon be at capacity,
and a border wall with Mexico would not have stopped the spread of the novel
coronavirus. Please explain why the Army is not redirecting all border wall funding
toward COVID–19 support efforts?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Border Security remains an Ad-
ministration priority and supporting this effort remains a directed mission for the
Army. COVID–19 has caused all nations to reexamine their border policies as part
of medically advised efforts to limit spread. As you have seen, the Army is aggres-
sively responding to the COVID–19 crisis on a daily basis. As new requirements ap-
pear, the Army continues to coordinate closely with OSD to identify the best funding
solution to address all mission requirements.
U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY AND COVID–19

62. Senator REED. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the U.S. Military
Academy (USMA) has decided to extend the delay of the return of cadets to West
Point until further notice due to the COVID–19 crisis. The cadets are currently at-
tending virtual classes and using remote learning platforms. Has USMA or senior
Army leadership made any decision yet on whether or not the cadets will be allowed
to return to finish the academic year?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We have not yet made a decision.
LTG Williams is using a deliberate planning process with guidance from Army Sen-
ior Leaders to make decisions about the return of the Corps of Cadets, remainder
of the academic year, graduation, the impacts to Cadet Summer Training, and en-
trance of the Class of 2024. The planning process weighs risk to the Academy Mis-
sion and risk to protecting the entire West Point Team. Right now, the Corps of Ca-
dets continues to conduct remote education to minimize disruption to the academic
year. We will continue to keep you informed as the situation and our planning ef-
forts develop.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

63. Senator REED. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE) continues the planning and conversion of existing
buildings into alternate medical care facilities, is USACE considering acquiring
modular capabilities that exist within the industrial base, such as field hospital
structures and medical shelters that are rapidly deployable to areas that may not
have existing large capacity buildings?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. In support of FEMA Mission As-
signments and as the COVID–19 situation develops, USACE is working with FEMA
and Health and Human Services to rapidly respond to emerging needs. As part of
this effort and the anticipated need to supply large scale temporary facilities to com-
munities where suitable existing buildings might not be available, USACE has con-
ducted market research to identify available modular facility manufacturers and to
gain an understanding of their capabilities, manufacturing capacity and projected
delivery timelines. These facilities could be contracted for by USACE or elsewhere
within DOD as well as directly by FEMA or local Governments.
CLOSE COMBAT LETHALITY TASK FORCE

64. Senator REED. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, former Secretary
of Defense James Mattis established the Close Combat Lethality Task Force
(CCLTF) during his tenure to dramatically improve the effectiveness and surviv-
ability of close combat formations through a combination of materiel and non-mate-
riel means, including innovations in recruitment, retention, training, concepts of op-
eration, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and equipment. The CCLTF was des-
ignated as a direct report to the Secretary of Defense and as a Cross Functional
Team (CFT) under section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
for fiscal year 2017.
Secretary Esper recently decided to reassign the CCLTF to the Army, ending its
designation as a CFT under section 911. While the Army has indicated that they
551
remain committed to the vision and success of the CCLTF, it remains to be seen
if the Army will pursue both material and non-material initiatives to enable close
combat lethality and survivability.
What are your intentions regarding enduring support for the non-materiel initia-
tives to greatly improve close combat lethality and survivability?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army will continue to de-
velop, evaluate, recommend, and implement improvements to U.S. Squad-level in-
fantry combat formations in order to ensure close combat overmatch against pacing
threats, and strengthen the combat, lethality, survivability, resiliency, and readi-
ness of infantry squads. This includes determining which material/non-material
functions can transition from the CCLTF and to what command/agency. We will ac-
complish this analysis with the input of all stakeholders (USA, USMC, SOCOM,
TRADOC, AFC, FORSCOM, and Congress). This will ensure we develop an execut-
able plan that does not impede the progress made by the CCLTF and supporting
agencies. Army and Marine efforts have been integrated since the inception of the
Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) and we plan to continue that model
as the Army takes the lead. Both services will stay involved in the development and
testing of new doctrine and concepts, as well as systems like the Integrated Visual
Augmentation System and the Next Generation Squad Weapon.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN
COVID–19

65. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as you are
aware, there is an urgent need for assistance in combatting the spread of COVID–
19 across New Hampshire and across our Nation. Could you discuss what the Army
is doing to fight the spread of this virus, and what the Army is doing to help treat
patients infected with COVID–19, including the use of field hospitals?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. As of 13 April, the U.S. Army is
postured to support and decisively responding to requests for assistance. U.S. Army
North has established its Joint Force Land Component Command headquarters in
support of NORTHCOM and activated its ten Defense Coordinating Elements and
four regional Task Force Headquarters in response to a request from FEMA. The
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have received 48 FEMA mission assign-
ments totaling over $1.7 billion to provide initial planning and engineering support
to address possible medical facility shortages in the U.S. due to the COVID–19 pan-
demic. USACE, and their more than 15,000 personnel engaged in the effort, has
completed over 1,000 Alternate Care Facility (ACF) site assessments and have 25
ACFs on contract across 14 states to include the Javits Center in New York and
the Detroit Convention Center. More than 24,000 National Guard Soldiers have
been activated in all states to provide support to State and local governments by
delivering food and supplies, assisting at COVID–19 testing stations, and cleaning
public buildings. Finally, the Army has deployed three hospitals to support known
hot spots in New York and Washington, and deployed 14 Urban Augmentation Med-
ical Task Forces (UAMTFs) providing critical capabilities and capacity that will ease
the burden of the regional health systems.
COLD REGIONS RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING LAB

66. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the U.S.
Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab in Hanover, New Hampshire, is
a leader in solving strategically important problems faced when operating in cold
weather environments such as the Artic. Could you discuss what the Army is doing
in response to the 2019 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy Published in in June
2019?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army has and continues to
maintain a significant footprint in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. In ensuring our
Nation’s defense, the Army trains, performs exercises, and operates in extreme cold
weather environments to continue to meet its mission and the challenges of a
changing region.
We agree that the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab
(CRREL) in Hanover, New Hampshire, is a leader in solving strategically important
problems faced when operating in cold weather environments such as the Artic.
CRREL continues to support the Army and the Nation in meeting the challenges
we face in performing and sustaining operations and in maintaining a well-trained
and ready force. We are asking them to focus on obtaining an awareness of the Arc-
tic domain and sustaining all operations.
552
The Army executes six Arctic exercises annually: Vigilant Shield and Arctic Edge;
Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Guard; and Vibrant Response and Guardian Response.
The Army is exploring funding options for cold weather clothing and equipment in
the Fiscal Year Defense Program to support the five brigades that train for cold
weather operations.
GUARD AND RESERVE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

67. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, according to
the 2014 Readiness Center Transformation Master Plan the National Guard needs
over $1 billion dollars annually over the next 15 years in order to meet 80 percent
of the space requirements and increase their condition to fair. Could you please ex-
plain why our Army Reserve and National Guard facilities are continually funded
disproportionately less than our Active Component and well below the amount re-
quired to adequately update them?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Over the last 3 fiscal years the
ARNG portion as a percentage of the MILCON budget has increased from 11.9 per-
cent in the fiscal year 2019 enacted to 27.2 percent in fiscal year 2021 budget re-
quest. While this level of funding falls short of the $1 billion requirement laid out
in the Army National Guard (ARNG) 2014 Readiness Center Transformation Master
Plan it does, to the maximum extent possible in the current MILCON budget envi-
ronment, allow the ARNG to program for the replacement of its highest priority
Readiness Center projects. In regards to the U.S. Army Reserves, they also had an
increase in requested funding when you compare the fiscal year 2019 enacted to the
fiscal year 21 budget request (5 percent to 7.5 percent of the MILCON budget).
ACTIVE DUTY AND RESERVE FORCE STRUCTURE

68. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, could you ex-
plain why there is disparity between Active Duty and Reserve Component force
structure? I understand, for example, that an Active Duty HIMARS (High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System) battery consists of 27 systems, while a Reserve battery has
only 16.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The difference is based on mod-
ernization priorities and available systems. For example, all Active and Reserve
Component Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rocket artillery battalions will
consist of 27 systems by fiscal year 2026. As we modernize the Army, some units
will be fielded with fewer or different systems until procurement of modernized sys-
tems become available. This is not just a difference between components, we have
different mixes within each component while we are changing organizational de-
signs and modernizing the Total Force.
BORDER WALL FUNDING

69. Senator SHAHEEN. Secretary McCarthy, last year the Department of Defense
realigned $6 billion from its budget toward constructing a border wall along the
United States’ southern border with Mexico. More recently, the administration in-
formed Congress that it was going to divert another $3.8 billion from the Pentagon
to the border wall from various programs essential to supporting the National De-
fense Strategy. Can you discuss the impact of raiding military construction projects
and various equipment and weapons systems accounts on the Army and its ability
to support the NDS?
Secretary MCCARTHY. I agree with the CJCS assessment that there is no signifi-
cant, immediate, strategic negative impact to the overall defense of the United
States of America.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT FOR COVID–19

70. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary McCarthy, I know that the Walter Reed
Army Institute of Research has extensive experience studying both severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS) and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), two high-
profile coronaviruses that caused deadly outbreaks. Can you speak to how you are
leveraging this experience to support your civilian counterparts, and elaborate on
any additional interagency efforts by U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
Command to support COVID–19 treatment and vaccine development?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Medical Research and Development Command (MRDC) and
its subordinate commands are working across a broad coalition of civilian entities
553
and other Federal agencies to research, develop, and acquires treatments and vac-
cines. A few examples follow:
a. MRDC is working closely with the Vaccine Research Center/National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID; Dr. Fauci) on shared vaccine concepts
for COVID–19 including standardized test and evaluation parameters in both ani-
mal models and clinical trials;
b. NIAID, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA),
and WRAIR are in discussion about tech insertion of vaccine and monoclonal anti-
body countermeasures developed by others into our combined test and evaluation
competencies to speed the fielding of effective capabilities for prevention and treat-
ment;
c. MRDC is working closely with Harvard Medical School/Mass Gen Hospital/Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical center on rapid animal model evaluation of COVID–19
medical countermeasures to prevent and treat COVID–19;
d. MRDC has an agreement in place with Gilead for access to Remdesivir under
an expanded access protocol to make investigational treatment available for
servicemembers in locations where access to clinical trials is not feasible. Indication
is for servicemembers with severe COVID–19 infection;
e. MRDC has multiple cooperative research and development agreements in place
and in process for development, testing, and evaluation of prevention, treatment,
and diagnostic technologies emerging from industry, academia and USG partners.
Key areas include therapeutic screening, vaccine human safety studies, improved
rapid, high-throughput diagnostics tests, and point of care diagnostics.
f. MRDC coordinates Medical Countermeasure (MCM) Research and Development
(R&D) efforts through the U.S. Interagency MCM Task Force, led by HHS-BARDA.
COVID–19 AND ARMY READINESS: TRAVEL SUSPENSION

71. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in recent
guidance issued by the U.S. Army, you made the decision to suspend movement and
delay travel of soldiers stationed in Italy and Korea, both of which have been identi-
fied by the Center for Disease Control as alert level three for COVID–19. Just yes-
terday, Secretary Esper issued a stop movement order to halt all travel and move-
ment abroad for up to 60 days. How do you plan to keep these soldiers and their
families healthy while mitigating any readiness degradation given these travel delay
orders?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The No. 1 priority in this crisis
is protecting our people. Although the stop move order will have effects on our force,
it will significantly reduce the risk of infection or spread of the virus. We have ad-
justed numerous personnel policies and entitlements to ensure our soldiers and
their families have the information, pay, and resources to get through this pan-
demic. Although we have curtailed training and exercises, Commanders at all levels
will conduct training based within the published Army and CDC guidance to main-
tain our readiness.
MILITARY EXERCISE AND TRAINING CANCELATIONS

72. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army
recently canceled several major joint exercises in both USINDOPACOM and
USEUCOM and rebranded them ‘‘combined command post exercises.’’ How does the
canceling of these exercises impact the Army’s ability to provide strategic deterrence
to combatant commanders, and what metrics are you using to decide what training
must continue, and what can be postponed?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. At the operational and strategic
levels the Army has moved very quickly to respond to COVID–19 in order to protect
both the force and the Nation. The Army will continue to prioritize force protection
in the current environment. Doing so will preserve current readiness and our ability
to respond in crisis. We will continue to evaluate the need to scale back planned
training based on a rigorous analysis of the risk to force. Commanders at all levels
are assessing their local conditions and modifying training to minimize risk to our
force while maximizing our readiness. Additionally, the Army has initiated planning
on how to adjust our planned training and exercises through the remainder of the
year when the conditions exist to execute. The longer the pandemic lasts, the great-
er the possibility there will be an impact to readiness, but to what degree is yet
to be determined. As regular GFMAP rotations are postponed we are consuming
readiness by not utilizing the BCTs/units that are/were prepared to deploy. The
length of the delay in deployments for GFMAP rotations will determine—unit spe-
cific—what is needed to refresh training on prior to deployment.
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COVID–19 AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS

73. Senator BLUMENTHAL. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, given the
cancelation of major joint exercises for the near future, what actions are you taking
to ensure we maintain strong strategic military-to-military partnerships across the
globe?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. While a number of major exer-
cises have been canceled in the near-term, we remain committed to strengthening
our partnerships, and building capacity and capability in the mid-and long-term. We
are exploring positive actions allowing us to test our concept of Dynamic Force Em-
ployment. The Total Army is in continuous contact with allies and partners at mul-
tiple levels, and will continue to reassure them of our commitment. As the Army
continues to support the U.S. Government response to COVID–19, Army Senior
Leaders are in regular contact with allies and partners through phone calls and
email to keep lines of communication open, share best practices and lessons learned,
and discuss any impacts on strategic readiness. The Army has also directed the
Multinational Fusion Cell within HQDA to seek COVID–19 SITREPs from their re-
spective countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, S. Korea,
and New Zealand) and exchanges on the impact and actions being taken by their
Armies.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS BLUMENTHAL AND WARREN
COVID–19 AND ARMY READINESS

74. Senators BLUMENTHAL and WARREN. General McConville, recent guidance
issued by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) provided specific recommendations
to effectively execute social distancing, and many U.S. cities have issued shelter-in-
place orders to mitigate the spread of COVID–19. What guidance are you providing
to your commanders to implement social distancing and other protective measures
as recommended by the CDC in order to prevent the spread of COVID–19?
General MCCONVILLE. The Army has followed CDC and the Commander in Chief’s
guidance with respect to social distancing. This information was provided to the
force via three Army Orders/FRAGOs (#7 published on 14 Mar, #8 published on 15
Mar and # 11 published on 20 Mar). Additionally, the Army directed installations,
camps, and posts to increase their Health Protection (HPCON) to protect our sol-
diers and their families, our civilians, and contractors and ensure we can continue
our mission by minimizing the spread of COVID–19.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO
CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE

75. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army Gar-
rison in Hawaii now has four diagnosed cases of COVID–19. Two individuals are
assigned to Tripler Army Medical Center and cases on the island continue to in-
crease every day. How have the Army, Army National Guard, and Tripler Army
Medical Center prepared to respond to an uptick in coronavirus cases and assist the
local civilian response?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The U.S. Army Pacific is taking
all necessary actions to mitigate the spread of COVID–19 in our formations through
(but not limited to): maximizing telework, social distancing, reducing in-person
meetings to six-persons or less and maximizing the use of video-teleconferencing,
physical training is on an individual basis to prevent large groups of soldiers gath-
ering in one place, and enforcing all post travel quarantine standards. In the last
48 hours, USARPAC, acting as the INDOPACOM TJFLCC, has issued our base De-
fense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA) in support of FEMA as the Lead Federal
Agency (LFA) for the COVID–19 response. The order includes directives for the
INDOPACOM service components to begin planning to provide support to FEMA,
including but not limited, to medical resources and sea and air lift. The Hawaii
based Defense Coordinating Officer is in constant coordination with FEMA on
emerging requirements. Today, the TJFLCC supported FEMA with a rotary wing
mission to Maui that transported a team from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
to execute site surveys for potential alternate medical care facilities. Over the next
72 hours, TJFLCC is collecting and validating names for the Title 10 DDSC and
staff that will support the Dual Status Commander once designated.
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The Governor of Hawaii named Hawaii National Guard’s Adjutant General, MG
Kenneth S. Hara, as the overall incident Commander. MG Hara is also the Hawaii
Emergency Management Director, and is in direct coordination with all levels of
government in planning, coordinating, and responding to COVID–19 in the State of
Hawaii. The Hawaii National Guard’s (HING) Joint Staff has stood up a Joint Oper-
ations Center to manage the HING’s response and is preparing to stand up the
HING Joint Task Force and a Dual Status Command, if required. Currently, the
HING has 146 soldiers and airmen on State Active Duty supporting contingency
planning and operational planning (medical support, security, traffic control) and
conducting Joint Reception Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (JRSOI).
This includes a Ready Reaction Force and one (1) heavy lift aviation asset currently
on standby, prepared to support the State as directed.
Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) continues coronavirus preparedness and re-
sponse efforts through close coordination with all military medical facilities on Oahu
and the local community as an Active member in the Healthcare Association of Ha-
waii and statewide Emergency Management System. TAMC provides drive thru
screening and testing on Fort Shafter Flats (Monday-Saturday) to improve access
to care. TAMC’s drive thru screening and testing eases the demand on TAMC’s
emergency Department. TAMC continues operational bed expansion planning to
maximize capacity. The military medical facilities in the Hawaii Military Health
system are identifying, credentialing, and training military medical professionals
across the Joint
Force with critical care and emergency medicine training to support an expected
increased inpatient demand. TAMC and Regional Health Command—Pacific
healthcare facility planners—are identifying military facilities on Oahu that can be
repurposed for expanded COVID–19 patient treatment areas.
ARMY ROLE IN THE PACIFIC

76. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as you con-
tinue to pivot the Army toward the National Defense Strategy defined by great
power competition, it is important for the United States to project strength, reassure
our allies, and build partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in response to
Chinese and North Korean activity. Your Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request specifi-
cally notes the importance of funding multi-lateral exercises to meet the goal of
strengthening alliances and partnerships. What is the current status of targeted
multi-lateral exercises in the Indo-Pacific region given the coronavirus pandemic?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. U.S. and partner nation re-
sponses to COVID–19 have unfortunately required the cancellation or postponement
of a number of near-term exercises with our partners. Exercise TIGER LIGHTNING
with Bangladesh has been postponed, as has a South Korean Army rotation to the
National Training Center. Exercise COBRA GOLD with Thailand was completed
prior to the declaration of the COVID–19 pandemic. Planning conferences for exer-
cises KEEN EDGE / ORIENT SHIED and YAMA SAKURA with Japan will con-
tinue on in a digital format. We remain in regular and close contact with our Indo-
Pacific allies and partners on future exercises, as well as the broader U.S. commit-
ment to the region.
MILITARY HOUSING

77. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy, you mention in your posture statement
that you have ‘‘brought Army leadership back into the housing equation, empow-
ering tenants and holding partners accountable.’’ Our people deserve safe, high
quality housing. How is Army leadership working with privatized companies to pro-
vide safe, quality housing to our military families?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army and its leaders are fully engaged. The Quality
of Life (QOL) for our soldiers, families, and civilians is my top priority; safe and
quality housing is integral to QOL efforts. Under the direction of GEN Perna at U.S.
Army Materiel Command, the Army has taken the following steps to provide safe,
quality housing to our military families:
• We are holding the privatized housing companies to account. We revised their
Incentive Fee structure to place increased emphasis on maintenance quality,
maintenance response times, and resident satisfaction.
• We’ve established processes to review all privatized housing company invest-
ment proposals, to ensure the right amount of money is being applied to fix the
right problems (example—upgrading HVAC systems to prevent mold growth
rather than just focusing on mold remediation).
• Finally, we’ve increased our holistic analysis of the financial conditions of all
seven privatized companies to ensure they have the capital to either fix or fully
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renovate aging inventories. We are working with the administration to clarify
OMB scoring rules, which would allow the Residential Community Initiative
(RCI) companies access to more capital.
• In 2020, RCI Companies will invest $429 million in their inventories across our
installations, building 106 new homes and renovating more than 1,100. More
than $1B in RCI development funding is programmed through 2024.
CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTERS

78. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I note the re-
quest for $65 million for new childcare facilities and playgrounds at Schofield Bar-
racks and Fort Shafter in Hawaii in the Army’s Unfunded Priority List—since this
is a readiness issue, I would have preferred to see them in the actual budget re-
quest. Access to safe, affordable childcare is an important quality of life issue for
families. I added a provision to the Fiscal Year 2020 NDAA to significantly reduce
the lengthy hiring process for qualified childcare providers on military installations
by expanding direct hire authority. Has the streamlined direct hiring process for
childcare providers been effective without sacrificing any of the quality and back-
ground checks for applicants?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The direct hire authority author-
ized in the 2020 NDAA pertained to General Schedule (GS) employees. Almost 100
percent of Army child and youth staff are non-appropriated fund (NAF) employees.
Current Army policy gives Garrison commanders direct recruitment authority for
NAF positions, and may delegate that authority to any level of management deemed
appropriate. The Army uses this authority to fill positions with highly qualified
child care staff more efficiently than other recruitment systems. Since 2018, on-
board staffing increased from 79 percent to 86 percent (Oct 19) and is holding
steady. An online NAF transfer system, the Child and Youth Employee Assistance
Tool (CEAT), was launched in October 2019 to assist military spouses and civilian
direct child care staff by allowing them to request a non-completive transfer at the
same grade level/pay when PCSing to a new duty location. This tool reduces trans-
fer time by 2 weeks. CEAT has placed 140 military spouses and 107 NAF civilian
staff since October 2019. The tool is being expanded to include all CYS staff (CY,
and NF–3 and below pay bands) by Oct 20.
WOMEN IN MILITARY SERVICE TO AMERICA MEMORIAL

79. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Fiscal Year
2020 NDAA conference report directed the Secretary of the Army to establish a
memorandum of understanding with the Women in Military Service for America
Memorial Foundation, Inc., to define responsibilities and allocate resources for the
operation and maintenance of the Women in Military Service for America Memorial
and surrounding grounds. What progress has been made on this memorandum and
are there any limiting factors?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. ANC and WIMSA have held mul-
tiple meetings over the last 3 months to develop the MOU as directed by the NDAA.
A draft License agreement is currently being staffed to formalize WIMSA’s occu-
pancy on Federal land. Once this license is complete, the parties will finalize the
MOU. These documents will establish and define each parties’ responsibilities for
operations and maintenance for the memorial.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ANGUS S. KING, JR.
ACQUISITION REFORM

80. Senator KING. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in your testimony
on soldier lethality you referenced a departure from the traditional requirements
process as you develop the Integrated Visual Augmentation System. While I am en-
couraged by the approach, what oversight have you built in to ensure that the Army
avoids requirement creep with this evolving strategy?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. IVAS is one of the signature ef-
forts under the Soldier Lethality Cross Functional Team (SL-CFT). The SL-CFT con-
ducts quarterly touchpoints with the Secretary and Undersecretary of the Army,
Chief and Vice Chief of Staff, the Army Acquisition Executive, the Commander of
Army Futures Command, as well as the commanders of the other Army Major Com-
mands. During those routine touchpoints, the SL-CFT Director and Program Execu-
tive Officer Soldier present any recommended requirements adjustments for Army
Senior Leader decision. This rigorous process prevents requirements creep and en-
sures any changes to this high-priority program are approved at the appropriate
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level. We are ensuring IVAS meets the right requirements by deliberately running
each IVAS Capability Set (CS) through Soldier Touch Points (STP). Soldier Touch
Points (STPs) are designed to test and validate fight first capabilities in a tactical
field environment. Each CS has multiple STPs where soldiers provide feedback on
form, function and capability as they execute their tactical missions. Army Senior
Leaders review the feedback from the STPs when making decisions on capability
trades in order to impose rigor and accountability in the requirements decision-
making process.
PERSONNEL

81. Senator KING. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, while I support
your efforts in talent management and talent-based recruiting I would like to under-
stand the Army’s plan to target areas around the country to keep it a force that
is representative of the United States as a whole? For example, with the many base
closures in the New England region over the last 30 years much of the region has
lost its connection to the military and has been a significant reduction in military
accessions from that area and I would like to see that changed.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. In October 2018 the Army began
a process to prioritize our recruiting efforts and synchronize the Army’s focus in
twenty-two cities across the country to improve our connection to the country, and
increase the diversity of the force by going into areas that we had not previously
emphasized. Led by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, we selected these
twenty-two cities based upon their high population of qualified military applicants
and low propensity to serve. The Focus 22 cities in the northeast region of the U.S.
are Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore. Over the past 18
months, the Army has conducted hundreds of accessions events in these Focus 22
cities varying from key leader engagements with civic leaders, Meet Your Army
events, teaming up with the NFL, MLB, and college sports, and participation in
community events. We are supporting these accessions events with Army bands,
drill teams, marksmanship units, and the Golden Knights, and more recently with
our newly developed ‘e-Sports’ and functional fitness teams. The collaboration of
multiple Army organizations and the renewed focus to prioritize these communities
has resulted in the Army reconnecting with the communities in these Focus 22 cit-
ies, which is contributing to meeting our accessions goals.
82. Senator KING. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what plans does
the Army have to combat the increasing numbers of Active and veteran suicides?
Also, please summarize the standard process a soldier goes through when
transitioning from Active Duty to veteran status, how that process helps the service-
member prepare for civilian life to include dealing with the mental and emotional
stress of the transition, and where you think that process needs to improve.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. One suicide is one too many. We
are committed to significantly reducing suicides in the Army. We enhanced manda-
tory suicide prevention training for every soldier and Army civilian. We invested in
resilience training and performance enhancement capabilities, which are available
to each member of the Army Team. We also developed visibility tools to provide
leaders with insight to develop targeted prevention and intervention plans to both
identify and assist at-risk soldiers. All soldiers are required to attend the Transition
Assistance Programs’ initial counseling NLT 12 months prior to their end of service
date. In that 12 month period, they are assessed and determine (with the help of
trained counselors) their best transition plan and career track to help them achieve
their individual goals. They then follow that plan through a series of counseling
gates like resume and budget development. Finally, NLT 3 months prior to their
end of service date, they sit with a counselor and conduct a final review of their
transition preparation. If the soldier does not feel prepared for their transition off
of Active Duty, or their Commander/counselor does not think they are prepared for
their transition, the soldier receives a ‘warm hand-off’ to the Veteran’s Administra-
tions (VA) or Department of Labor (DOL). On average, about 100,000 soldiers a year
go through this process. The hand-off to the VA/DOL is where can improve the most
by confirming the hand-off and later obtaining a report on transition.
MISSILE DEFENSE

83. Senator KING. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what is the
Army’s strategy for developing the air and missile defense capabilities required to
defend U.S. Forces against the increasing threat posed by cruise missiles and short
and medium range ballistic missiles, also, how does the Army plan to address and
defend against the emerging theater-level hypersonic weapon threats? Iran’s attacks
558
against the Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia last September and against U.S.
Forces in Iraq in January should serve as a wake-up call for those threats.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The best defense against
hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles is to have robust offensive and defensive
capabilities. From an offensive perspective, we are placing significant emphasis and
investment into our own hypersonic capability. The current schedule of delivering
a road mobile prototype hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023 remains in place. We
must also attack the munition once launched. The Missile Defense Agency is explor-
ing defenses against hypersonic threats, and we are evaluating Patriot against the
supersonic cruise missile threats. Supersonic threats are also an Indirect Fire Pro-
tection Capability (IFPC) objective requirement, while subsonic remains a threshold
requirement.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH
ARMY TEST RANGE INFRASTRUCTURE

84. Senator HEINRICH. Secretary McCarthy, I was encouraged to see the types of
investments the Fiscal Year 2021 President’s Budget proposed in Army moderniza-
tion in technologies of the future like directed energy, hypersonics, and artificial in-
telligence. As you know, investments like these are only of use to our
servicemembers in the field if we are able to transition them out of the laboratories.
What kind of investments does the Army’s budget make in our Nation’s test and
range infrastructure to speed up the tech transition process?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Investments in Army test and range infrastructure are fully
aligned to meet the demands of Army Modernization and enable the rapid transition
of new technologies from the lab to the battlefield. Investments are underway in
critical test range infrastructure, such as wireless and fiber optic networks. Major
families of range instrumentation, including radar, telemetry, and optics, are being
modernized to support hypersonics and long-range fires testing. New instrumenta-
tion and targets for directed energy testing are being built. Computing resources,
tools, and techniques for testing artificial intelligence systems are being developed.
Commensurate investments are underway to support all Army Modernization prior-
ities.
ARMY LONG RANGE PRECISION FIRES

85. Senator HEINRICH. Secretary McCarthy, over the past few years, the Army has
tested capabilities for Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) at White Sands Missile
Range. As you know, LRPFs are a critical part of the 2018 National Security Strat-
egy’s modernization goals. Of the $1.7 billion in funding proposed in fiscal year 2021
for LRPFs, is any funding dedicated to testing and sustaining testing infrastructure
or is this funding all research and development (R&D) and procurement and is the
$1.7 billion sufficient to meet the Army’s modernization timeline?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Yes, I believe the $1.7 billion submitted as part of the
President’s budget to support the Long Range Precision Fires (LRPF) portfolio is
sufficient to meet the Army’s modernization timelines. Funding in the fiscal year
2021 budget requests does support tests and infrastructure activities across the
LRPF portfolio. For example, $7.1 million is allocated to support Precision Strike
Missile Engineering Development Flight Tests that are currently scheduled to occur
in 3QFY21.
ARMY DIRECTED ENERGY-MANEUVER SHORT RANGE AIR DEFENSE

86. Senator HEINRICH. Secretary McCarthy, the Army is testing its Directed En-
ergy-Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (DE-MSHORAD) at White Sands Missile
Range. How does DE-MSHORAD fit into the Army’s overall directed energy pro-
gram and what is the timeline for fielding this capability?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Yes, DE-MSHORAD is part of the Army strategy for Air
Defense support to maneuver units. The DE-MSHORAD capability is intended to
protect Divisions and Brigade Combat Teams from Unmanned Aerial Systems, ro-
tary-wing aircraft, and Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar threats. The Army is
leveraging past S&T investments and the progression of the Multi-Mission High En-
ergy Laser (MMHEL) Technology Maturation Initiative to rapidly prototype DE-
MSHORAD systems and field to a platoon in 4QTRFY22. DE-MSHORAD is one of
three directed energy efforts the Army is pursuing. The second is Indirect Fire Pro-
tection Capability-High Energy Laser (IFPC-HEL), which will provide a 300 kW-
class laser system by fiscal year 2024. Finally, the third is the IFPC-High Powered
559
Microwave, which uses electrical pulses designed to disable/destroy electrical compo-
nents of threat equipment, also to be delivered by fiscal year 2024.
87. Senator HEINRICH. Secretary McCarthy, what can this Committee do to better
support the Army’s Directed Energy programs?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army is pursuing a variety of Directed Energy (DE)
weapons, including both lasers and High Power Microwave (HPM) systems, to ad-
dress near-peer threats as part of its modernization strategy. The Army has made
Directed Energy a modernization priority in the Department and we would ask Con-
gress to support our fiscal year 2021 budget request for all associated efforts. The
Army Fiscal Year 2021 President’s Budget Request for DE includes: DE-Maneuver
Short Range Air Defense (DE-MSHORAD) demonstration for a down select in our
competitive approach in fiscal year 2021 and the funds for three additional 50 kW-
class lasers integrated onto Strykers to be delivered to a platoon (four vehicles) in
fiscal year 2022; and the Indirect Fire Protection Capability-HEL (IFPC-HEL) fund-
ing for 300 kW-class laser system design, integration, and demonstration in fiscal
year 2022.
MILCON CANCELLATION

88. Senator HEINRICH. Secretary McCarthy, I am encouraged by the Army’s in-
vestment R&D and procurement for next-generation weapon systems, but remained
concerned that we are not sustaining the test infrastructure needed to rapidly field
these capabilities.
In fiscal year 2020, $40 million in military construction funding for an informa-
tion systems facility at White Sands Missile Range was redirected to fund the Presi-
dent’s ineffective border wall. Funding for that facility was not included in the Fis-
cal Year 2021 President’s Budget. What is the plan to fund this critical facility?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army continues to work with the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense on a viable strategy to fund all the military construction project
that were deferred; this includes the information systems facility project at White
Sands Missile Range.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN
COVID–19

89. Senator WARREN. General McConville, the Army has reportedly moved to vir-
tual recruiting exclusively in order to protect recruiters and recruits from poten-
tially COVID–19. What is your best assessment of the impact this will have on the
Army’s monthly recruiting goals?
General MCCONVILLE. As COVID–19 continues to impact the country, we are con-
tinuously assessing the environment to ensure we are making the necessary adjust-
ment. USAREC was already focused on virtual recruiting as that is where today’s
youth market lives. Prior to COVID–19, digital and social media have been the top
lead generating tools, producing 50,000 leads ahead of last year.
Army recruiters post career opportunities using online job postings, which has
made it one of the largest lead production platforms. Virtual recruiting has pro-
duced a 40 percent increase in contracts from this time in fiscal year 2019 to fiscal
year 2020. Further, 63 percent of all virtual recruiting contracts are quality appli-
cants. While we are still analyzing virtual recruiting in today’s environment, we are
optimistic that we have put the conditions in place to ensure continued success in
recruiting the force.
In order to set conditions for when recruiting can turn to normal operations,
USAREC recruiters will virtually process applicants using a ‘‘soft contract’’ method-
ology.
Recruiters will gather leads using 100 percent Virtual Prospecting to identify in-
terested applicants. Once the applicant is contacted, if the applicant expresses an
interest in receiving more information on career opportunities with the U.S. Army,
the Recruiter will conduct a virtual Army interview (Facetime or Skype) to provide
them more information. If the applicant is still interested the recruiter will admin-
ister the Pending Internet Computerized Adaptive Test (PiCAT), which is a Virtual
ASVAB. The PiCAT score is now valid for 45 days increased from 30 days due to
COVID–19.
If the applicant achieves a PiCAT score that enables them to enlist, the recruiter
will begin working with the applicant to virtually obtain all required documents.
Further, recruiters now have the ability to virtual witness signing of Parental Con-
sent Forms. The applicant will complete the Career Explorer app thus allowing Re-
cruiters to build the applicant’s record virtually. The recruiter will then generate a
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Temporary Reservation that guarantees the applicant their MOS and incentives for
45 days, which was increased from 7 days due to COVID–19. The applicant will
then be considered a ‘‘soft contract.’’ The determination of when to continue appli-
cant processing is dependent on the level of risk in the area in which the applicant
resides. Once an area is determined to be safe to continue processing, the applicant
will be taken to a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPs), which is part of
Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM), to continue processing of the
Physical and Enlistment Contract. Once an applicant has been cleared by MEPs,
the applicant will be given a report date for reporting to Basic Combat Training.
The goal of the ‘‘soft contract’’ process is to enable USAREC to complete 90 per-
cent of the applicant processing virtually to ensure the safety of the applicant and
our recruiters. Further, we will be able to inform MEPCOM of ‘‘soft contract’’ appli-
cant totals, so when recruiting operations return to normal, the processing will be
in place to efficiently and effectively move applicants through the final stages of en-
listment.
90. Senator WARREN. General McConville, what are the Army’s contingency plans
should it fail to meet its monthly recruiting goals?
General MCCONVILLE. In order to protect the Nation, we must first protect our
force. We are prioritizing the health of the Army over any accessions goal. Army
end strength is the cumulative product of accessions, retention, and attrition. If we
are short on monthly recruiting (accessions) goals, we can adjust retention and attri-
tion. For example, we are offering enlisted servicemembers the option to extend
their current contract for a period of 3 months to 11 months under the Response
to COVID Outbreak Extension (RCOE) policy. This new policy not only takes care
of soldiers in a time of uncertainty, but we also expect it to bolster the Army’s oper-
ating strength in the coming months. In addition, we are working to reduce soldier
attrition from basic training.
91. Senator WARREN. General McConville, when do you expect to know if these
contingency plans will need to be executed?
General MCCONVILLE. We are already starting to execute some of these contin-
gency plans, partly because we know that retention and attrition management are
crucial to maintaining the force that the Nation needs. We also monitor accessions
results on a monthly basis. We will continue to evaluate the need for and potential
timing of other personnel-related policies and levers that we may need to pull.
92. Senator WARREN. General McConville, are recruits being tested for COVID–
19 before or after shipping out to basic training and what steps is the Army taking
to ensure that the disease is not spreading amongst recruits and staff at recruit
training facilities?
General MCCONVILLE. The Army is only shipping new recruits from areas of the
country that are not high-risk; have been pre-screened; and exhibit no signs of
COVID–19 to Army Training Centers. Trainees are continuously screened at each
stage of the reception and transport process and then throughout their training.
Upon arrival at an Army Training Center, trainees are screened before in-processing
and enter into the 14-day restriction-of-movement / limited contact protocol where
they complete administrative tasks and socially distanced academic training. Army
Training Centers have implemented measures to maximize social distancing, limit
the potential for spreading, and reduce risk. These measures include: filling classes
to less than 50 percent to maximize social distancing; adjusting POIs to reduce
close-proximity training (e.g., combatives training is postponed); reducing the size
of groups (e.g., on bus transportation, in barracks and classrooms, etc.); maximizing
the use of outdoor locations; modifying dining facility procedures; and continuously
monitoring drill sergeants, cadre, and trainees for health issues and temperatures.
Additionally, family days are canceled and graduations are closed to the public.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GARY C. PETERS
PER-AND POLYFLUOROALKYL SUBSTANCES (PFAS)

93. Senator PETERS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army is re-
sponsible for multiple PFAS contaminationsites in Michigan, including at Camp
Grayling and the Grand Ledge Army Aviation Support Facility. How is the Army
working to address PFAS contamination that it is responsible for, including how is
the Army cooperating with State and local governments and impacted communities?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army has initiated response
actions to assess the source and potential impacts of PFAS under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) at both
Camp Grayling and Grand Ledge Army Aviation Support Facility (Grand Ledge).
561
Drinking water has been sampled both on and off installation at Camp Grayling.
There are 17 drinking water wells above the EPA lifetime health advisory (HA) of
70 parts per trillion, where the Army is providing bottled water and is in the proc-
ess of providing whole-house filtration systems or connection to public drinking
water systems. The Army has been collaborating with State and local health depart-
ments, Michigan’s environmental regulator (Environment, Great Lakes and Energy
(EGLE)), and the local county and city governments to coordinate Camp Grayling
actions. The Army is meeting regularly with these stakeholders who freely share in-
formation among organizations, and with the general public through a series of joint
public meetings. The Army is working closely with EGLE in an ongoing investiga-
tion to assess if PFAS from Army Guard activities at Grand Ledge has reached
drinking water wells. Sampling has occurred both on and off the installation. There
have been no drinking water wells found to exceed the lifetime HA on or around
Grand Ledge.
OPTIONALLY MANNED FIGHTING VEHICLE

94. Senator PETERS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, a January 16,
2020, the Army canceled the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program.
This was the Army’s third attempt to replace the Bradley. OMFV is part of the Next
Generation Combat Program, the Army’s second modernization priority. What addi-
tional requirements or characteristics do you expect of OMFV that weren’t included
in the original program and what do you expect to be different in submissions from
industry?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. OMFV characteristics will be re-
fined through a series of industry engagements, digital design competitions, and sol-
dier touch points to inform and sharpen OMFV final prototypes for testing yielding
requirements for production. This approach will enable us to explore the solution
space in an environment of rapid and inexpensive learning leading to verification
through physical prototypes, soldier input, and testing. These encounters are also
intended to challenge biases and confirm state-of-the-art technologies available to
support the ABCT commander on the modern battlefield. This approach will deliver
innovation, maximize competition, and ultimately produce a vehicle that will domi-
nate in multi-domain operations for generations. We are not releasing a prescribed
set of requirements—we are describing the problem set and giving industry the free-
dom to be creative and innovative in its approach.
ADVANCED COMBAT ENGINE

95. Senator PETERS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in December
2019 the Army held a demonstration of the Advanced Powertrain Demonstrator, in-
cluding the Advanced Combat Engine, at the Ground Vehicle Systems Center in
Warren, Michigan. This demonstrator is developing capabilities which may be inte-
grated into future systems the Army is developing, including those under the pur-
view of the Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team. Can you
please describe the need for the Army to improve its existing powertrain options,
including the capability advantage offered by the Advanced Combat Engine over ex-
isting engines or commercial-off-the-shelf options?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army began development of
an Advanced Combat Powertrain in 2015 based upon a market survey and analysis
that showed available combat powertrains are not sufficient to meet anticipated re-
quirements and that engines developed for commercial applications were not suffi-
cient for military operating conditions without further development. Specifically, a
gap in the market existed for combat vehicle platforms in the 45–60 ton weight
range. Additional power was needed within the restricted under armor volume of
combat vehicles to maintain pace with the force and provide electrical power to sup-
port protection, lethality, and communications systems. The Advanced Combat
Powertrain, including the Advanced Combat Engine, has the objectives to improve
the power density by 1.5 to 2.0x, increase fuel efficiency by 25 percent, increase elec-
trical power available by 10x, increase mobility (range by an additional 100 miles,
speed on grades by 50 percent and accelerate 30 percent faster), and improved ther-
mal management, with the Bradley powertrain as the baseline.
ARMY IN USINDOPACOM

96. Senator PETERS. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army has
begun expanding its role in the USINDOPACOM. Recently, Secretary McCarthy an-
nounced ‘‘five-month extended rotations to countries like Thailand, the Philippines
and Papua New Guinea’’ and the first deployment of a Security Forces Assistance
Brigade to USINDOPACOM. What long-term role do you envision for the U.S. Army
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in USINDOPACOM and what is the risk of an expanded role for the U.S Army in
USINDOPACOM including the impact of shifting Army resources from more land-
centric theatres like Europe and the Middle East?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army has an important role
in the greater Indo-Pacific region based on the ideas of all-domain warfare and great
power competition. The Indo-Pacific theater is a land force centric environment
within a larger maritime theater where most of the regional militaries are land
force centric. The Army can most effectively advance national interests and con-
tribute to regional stability and the peaceful resolution of conflicts by establishing
regional security partnerships in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. The
Army is currently exercising with regional security partners and plans to employ
security force assistance formations. The Army must demonstrate the ability to con-
verge warfighting capabilities across domains at scale to prevail in adversarial com-
petition. The Army will globally posture forces in support of strategic priorities and
joint force requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATORS PETERS AND MANCHIN
COVID–19 RESPONSE

97. Senators PETERS and MANCHIN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville,
there are more than 10,000 National Guard servicemembers responding to COVID–
19, as of March 25, 2020. Guardsmen in several States have been moved to federally
supported Title 32 orders. How is the Army ensuring that frontline National Guard
servicemembers responding to this national emergency have access to the personal
protective equipment (PPE) necessary to safely and effectively carry out their
COVID–19 response mission and what is the Army’s plan to ensure National Guard
servicemembers who may have been exposed to the virus have access to unique
healthcare service which may be required because of this virus?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We are concerned about the
health and well-being of all of our soldiers. Our soldiers are executing missions in
support of FEMA and HHS in coordination with their respective State Departments
of Health. As a supporting entity to both HHS and FEMA, ARNG soldiers are being
provided PPE by HHS in accordance with CDC guidelines. For the few states that
are using CSTs to execute certain missions, those personnel have specialized PPE
optimized for CBRNE environments. We have issued directives to Commanders to
ensure that no soldiers are being asked to conduct any mission for which they are
not properly equipped.
ARNG soldiers that are federally funded under 502(f) authorities, while serving
under the State orders and guidance are authorized and would receive medical care
through Tricare. Army National Guard soldiers responding in a State Active Duty
(SAD) must submit a State Workman’s Compensation claim for medical care.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOE MANCHIN III
COVID–19

98. Senator MANCHIN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, we are all
disappointed that key parts of DEFENDER-Europe 20 are being postponed or can-
celed due to COVID–19. Do you have any data at this time about both the financial
and readiness impacts caused by these cancellations and postponements?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is moving very quickly
to respond to the COVID–19 to protect both the force and the Nation. Due to parts
of Defender and other events being postponed or canceled, we have funds that have
not been executed. We are working to understand the financial impact once the ac-
counting is complete. We have not seen significant impact to readiness yet, but are
concerned the longer the pandemic lasts the greater the possibility there will be a
degradation. We are continuing to train at lower levels and Commanders at all lev-
els are assessing their local conditions and modifying training to minimize risk to
our force while maximizing our readiness.
INTEGRATED PERSONNEL AND PAY SYSTEM—ARMY (IPPS-A)

99. Senator MANCHIN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the advanced
testimony sent to this committee places an emphasis on the people that make up
the Army. IPPS-A is one effort that is discussed as a way for the Army to refocus
on its people. The IPPS-A fielding plan begins with the National Guard before mov-
ing on to the other components. With any type of app or software that stores per-
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sonal data, it is vulnerable to cybersecurity issues. What measures are being taken
by the Army and your partners to ensure the cybersecurity of this program?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Integrated Personnel and
Pay System—Army (IPPS-A) Increment II has instituted both Army and Joint
measures across its system design, development, testing, deployment, and
sustainment lifecycles to continuously assess, test, and validate the cybersecurity
controls implemented to protect the system. These measures are tested by the Sys-
tems Integrator (CACI), the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and
DOD’s Director Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). There are many Cyber-
security approvals, certifications, and tests that have been performed on the IPPS-
A Increment II system. The IPPS-A Cybersecurity Strategy, Incident Response
Team, Continuity of Operations Plan and the Cybersecurity service provider ensures
that IPPS-A Increment II is employing a secure, defense-in-depth posture through
the integration of people, technology, and operations.
REPROGRAMMING

100. Senator MANCHIN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Na-
tional Guard is playing an ever-growing and vital role in the COVID–19 response.
This is in addition to their already significant contributions to national security
alongside their Active and Reserve Component counterparts. Many Members of Con-
gress were frustrated by the recent reprogramming action which moved funds to go
to the wall because of its significant impact to the Guard, particularly the National
Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. Do you believe that the reprogramming of
the $3.8 billion overall, and specifically the $600 million in Army-impacted NGREA
[National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account] funds, will affect the Army’s abil-
ity to respond to the current crisis while continuing to safeguard our Nation’s secu-
rity?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. No, it will not impact the Army’s
current ability to respond to the COVID–19 crisis or safeguard our Nation’s security.
Congress has provided funding for our National Guard forces in the recent supple-
mental package which will enable the National Guard to respond to the current cri-
sis.
CONCURRENT AND PROPORTIONAL FIELDING

101. Senator MANCHIN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, according to
the testimony received by this committee prior to this hearing, readiness has been
and still is the Army’s top priority. Programs such as the UH–60M Black Hawk Hel-
icopter, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, AH–64E Apache Helicopter, and many fu-
ture programs and efforts are examples of ways the Army is working to do this
while refocusing on great power competition. The National Guard represents ap-
proximately one-quarter of the total Army forces, both uniformed and civilian, and
one-third of the total uniformed soldiers in the Army. The National Guard and Re-
serves combined represent over half of the Army’s forces. When the National Guard
and Reserve represent such a significant portion the Army’s forces and capabilities
and often perform the same missions, side-by-side with the Active Component, do
you feel that they should be organized, equipped, and manned in the same manner
as their Active Component counterparts?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army National Guard and
Reserves are critical components of the Total Army Force. As the Army fields mod-
ernized equipment, the priority will be to those forces expected to make contact with
an adversary first—regardless of component. Nevertheless, there are plans to con-
tinue to provide the Army National Guard with modernized equipment in parallel
or before the Active Component. Examples of systems being fielded to the National
Guard in parallel or before the Active Component include the AH–64E Apache to
replace older model Apaches, UH–60M Black Hawk helicopters to replace older UH–
60A models, the Next Gen Squad Weapon to replace some M4 rifles, IVAS to replace
some of their current night vision devices, Stryker double-V hull A1s to replace flat
bottom hull Strykers, the M1A2 SEP V3 and V2 Abrams tanks to replace older
M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks, and the Soldier Borne Sensor and Short Range Recon-
naissance UAVs to add capability at the small unit level.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TAMMY DUCKWORTH
FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT

102. Senator DUCKWORTH. Secretary McCarthy, Congress recently added $76 mil-
lion to the fiscal year 2020 appropriations bill for the Future Long-Range Assault
564
Aircraft (FLRAA) program to reduce risk and accelerate delivery of the platform.
Both platforms chosen in the recent downselect, the V–280 Valor and SB–1 Defiant,
have significant test flight data from the technology demonstrator phase available
for use. In your view, does the Army have enough flight data on these two platforms
to alter or accelerate the competitive demonstration and risk reduction (CDRR)
phase in order to field this platform earlier than projected and if additional re-
sources were available, could the program absorb them in a productive manner this
year?
Secretary MCCARTHY. As you identified, the Army recently awarded two Competi-
tive Demonstration and Risk Reduction (CD&R) OTA agreements, and initiated
Phase I with fiscal year 2020 funding. Under these OTA’s, the Army will be working
with industry to refine the requirements and conceptual designs, through a digital
engineering approach. This work with industry is vital to understanding the per-
formance, cost, affordability, schedule risks, and trades needed to successfully exe-
cute the FLRAA program. The program is currently on schedule and the Army is
not looking to accelerate it.
NATIONAL GUARD FULL-TIME SUPPORT

103. Senator DUCKWORTH. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, as of
March 24, 2020, the National Guard activated over 9,000 Guardsman in support of
COVID–19 efforts in the United States. I’ve long been concerned about Guard readi-
ness and continue to be so as activation levels continue to rise. It is my under-
standing that full-time support (FTS) levels in the Air National Guard are around
80 percent yet the Army National Guard FTS level is only at 64 percent. Given the
importance of the Army National Guard’s role in supporting the Total Force, and
in particular their critical role during the COVID–19 crisis, would you support an
increase in Guard FTS billets meets at least 80 percent of their validated require-
ments?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We are committed to maintain-
ing readiness in the ARNG. We are tracking the status of ARNG FTS levels and
the impact of FTS funding to ARNG readiness. This is an area we will review in
our fiscal year 2022 budget.
COVID–19 QUARANTINE

104. Senator DUCKWORTH. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, I read
several news article last week documenting the experiences of soldiers going
through COVID–19 quarantine at Fort Bliss and Fort Bragg upon return from de-
ployments to Afghanistan. I have to be frank, the descriptions I have read are not
what I would expect from the Army. I get the sense that the Army’s return from
deployment quarantine planning was rushed and shoddy and may have com-
promised soldier safety and added to the worries of families awaiting the return of
their loved ones. Will you commit to looking into reports that aspects of the return
quarantine have been inadequately planned and haphazardly executed and commu-
nicating back to the Committee what you have found and how you plan to correct
any deficiencies?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We have looked into all of these
reports and have taken immediate action. In these cases, the commands imme-
diately investigated and took corrective actions to remedy any deficiencies. Although
we stood these facilities up quickly in response to the Army’s order to house Active,
National Guard, and US Army Reserve soldiers redeploying from Level 2 and 3
countries, we can assure you that the safety and comfort of our soldiers is our para-
mount concern. This does not absolve our Commanders of ensuring the health and
welfare of our soldiers. In the case of Fort Bliss, the sites selected for our initial
quarantine housing are three standard Army barracks on main Fort Bliss plus two
training areas frequently used for post-mobilization training. Soldiers are housed in
the barracks buildings; each room is 17’ by 15’ in size, and hosts 4 soldiers. These
4 soldiers share a common area with kitchenette and bathroom (8 1/2’ x 15’) with
4 soldiers in an adjoining 17’ by 15’ room. Soldiers are housed with other soldiers
arriving on the same day and are separated from soldiers with different quarantine
start dates to avoid commingling the distinct quarantine cohorts. The soldiers are
allowed to move among their quarantine cohort, but we maintain each quarantine
site in a manner designed to protect the safety of the force during their quarantine
period. The command at the 1st Armored Division has made several improvements
to our quarantine locations, including additional fitness facilities, Morale, Welfare,
and Recreation (MWR), and Army and Air Force Exchange (AAFES) services. We
encourage soldiers to raise concerns about their living conditions to the chain of
command.
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INDO-PACIFIC

105. Senator DUCKWORTH. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army
has made efforts in the last several months to bolster our military presence in the
Indo-Pacific region. As you both look at the INDOPACIFIC region I would like to
hear from each of you what your thoughts are on opportunities in the region. In
the next year, what region, sub-region, or country should the Army’s primary focus
be on to further build partnerships and strengthen the position of free nations in
the region.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The U.S. Army is very committed
to strengthening alliances and attracting new partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
Since January 2020, we have been actively working to strengthen Army-to-Army re-
lations with Indonesia and Thailand, and will continue to build on the success of
recent engagements over the coming year. The U.S. Army is also committed to con-
tinuing our close relationship with the Philippine Army through engagements and
exercises. Building partnerships is South Asia is also a priority of the Army, par-
ticularly with India and Bangladesh where we are working to expand the scope and
scale of our exercises, and build interoperability and capacity through education,
training, and security assistance. The Army will also maintain strong relationships
with traditional allies and partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand,
and Singapore) by enhancing interoperability and modernizing together through
high-end exercises, security assistance, and armaments cooperation.
MOBILE LONG RANGE FIRES

106. Senator DUCKWORTH. General McConville, I recently reviewed an Urgent
Needs Statement from the 173d Airborne Brigade out of Italy. As you know the
173d is one of our premier light infantry units and, given its position in Europe,
would likely be one of the first to respond to any crisis in Europe. They are
outgunned and outranged against their potential Russian opponents and have re-
quested the fielding of a light, wheeled mobile 105mm howitzer system. As I under-
stand it, this request has not been acted on pending an Army wide review of long
range precision fires systems. While I understand the need for measured decision-
making regarding equipment it baffles me that when such a system is currently
available the Army doesn’t seem to be moving rapidly to field it to our forward de-
ployed units who are in great need of more lethal and mobile fire support. Can you
commit to me that you will take a look at this needs statement and consider the
rapid fielding of such a system? I think it is critical that when we have the tools
available we should get them into the warfighter’s hands.
General MCCONVILLE. Yes, we review all urgent needs statement and you have
our commitment to look into the specifics of this request.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DOUG JONES
ARMY COMBAT FITNESS TEST

107. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the services
were congressionally mandated to become gender integrated, and I believe the Army
has made great progress in incorporating women into the ranks. I am concerned,
however, that the Army’s new Combat Fitness Test may have an unintended effect
on women soldiers. The gender and age neutral physical standards don’t account for
the different advantages of pound for pound strength that mostly men benefit from,
though the Army does take that into account at other times, such as when calcu-
lating combat load. How is the Army going to ensure that the new fitness standards
don’t reverse the gains the Army is making in gender integration?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army Combat Fitness Test
(ACFT) is a predictor of a soldier’s readiness for the demands of the modern battle-
field. The assessment requires all soldiers, males and females, to meet basic min-
imum physical standards. These standards ensure that all soldiers are best pre-
pared to survive and win on a gender-neutral battlefield. The ACFT drives balanced
and focused physical training that will reduce overuse injuries and unplanned attri-
tion. All research protocols to develop the ACFT reflected the Army’s male to female
ratio. An appropriate number of males and females, corresponding to the Army
ratio, participated in ACFT event validation. Although the biological sex differences
between males and females are unequivocal, there is no physiological reason any
soldier cannot pass the ACFT at the Black, Gray, or Gold level with appropriate
time, motivation, and training. Soldiers are improving their performance over time,
with many soldiers, regardless of gender, achieving passing scores on each event of
566
the ACFT at BCT and AIT. These results stem from appropriate physical training
time and proper instruction. Army Senior Leaders will utilize the next year to deter-
mine how ACFT performance impacts personnel policies and we are conducting nu-
merous internal training studies to optimize training opportunities for soldiers.
PEOPLE

108. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in your opening
statement submitted for the record, you stated that, ‘‘One example of investments
into our people are the five focused Quality of Life priorities, which include housing,
both family and barracks, transforming healthcare, improving and adequately
resourcing Child and Youth Services.’’ In examining your budget documents, I no-
ticed that while the total military child population and required child care spaces
increased from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2021, your request funds fewer Child
Development Service spaces, resulting in a drop of 9 percent (78 percent in fiscal
year 2020 to 69 percent in fiscal year 2021) of children able to access care. Can you
explain how you are ‘‘improving and adequately resourcing Child and Youth Serv-
ices’’ if you are funding them at lower levels in fiscal year 2021?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is taking steps to
focus on investments in our people in various ways, to include utilizing the Un-
funded Priority List (Unfunded Requirements) process authorized by Congress
which includes three Child Development Centers in both Hawaii and Alaska. While
the Army programs and builds increased capacity, the Army intends to retain a
higher percentage of child care professionals by increasing pay to be competitive
with civilian care providers and providing support through the Army Fee Assistance
program which already covers 14,000 children. While the Army appreciates the $50
million support from Congress to support Child and Youth Services in the fiscal
year 2020 Enacted Budget, we were not able to adjust the request in time to effect
the Fiscal Year 2021 President’s Budget. Additional emphasis is underway in the
POM 22–26 development to improve and resource Child and Youth Services.
DEPOTS

109. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in your opening
statement submitted for the record, you stated: ‘‘Moreover, the Army’s Organic In-
dustrial Base (OIB)—26 depots, arsenals and ammunition plants—manufacture, re-
pair, upgrade and modernize the Army’s equipment, and are absolutely critical to
both Strategic and Tactical Readiness. We are optimizing the OIB to three primary
end states: support current unit readiness across the force; maintain the ability to
meet wartime surge requirements; and modernize and retool to sustain the next
generation of Army equipment. Through implementation of Repair Cycle Float, a
new methodology that links OIB production and workload to Army readiness, we
will fundamentally change and improve the way we resource and manage these crit-
ical facilities.’’ Anniston Army Depot is in Alabama. They have expressed to me a
concern that they will soon have no workload to repair M1 tank turrets or conduct
full assembly of the tank. What is the Army doing to ensure full weapon system
repair and upgrade skills are workloaded and retained?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Our depot workload is a balance
of modernization and sustainment requirements that meet the National Defense
Strategy priorities. The current workload allows the Army to meet near-term readi-
ness goals and the Organic Industrial Base to remain postured to surge in support
of any contingency. We have the correct skills and workload to meet the Army’s
readiness requirements at Anniston Army Depot. OIB Sites have programs in place
to cross-train personnel across multiple platforms, which enable us to maximize uti-
lization of our current force, balance and retain skill sets and meet workload re-
quirements, and ensure a breadth and depth of technical expertise is readily avail-
able. The skills required across our OIB sites are very dynamic and AMC is continu-
ously evaluating them against the current force and future force requirements.
The Army will continue to address weapons system repair and upgrade capability
at the depots by requesting and obtaining access to technical data as weapon sys-
tems are upgraded and modernized. The Army will also continue to engage in Pub-
lic-Private-Partnering agreements with the Original Equipment Manufacturers to
ensure that the required skills sets are maintained at the depots and to maximize
the capabilities with our long-standing industry partners.
ARMY AVIATION

110. Senator JONES. General McConville, the Army continues to report a critical
shortage of pilots and stated that it will increase the pilot training throughput in
fiscal year 2021. Do you have sufficient funds in the fiscal year 2020 President’s
567
Budget level to allow you to set the conditions in terms of additional instructor pi-
lots and increased maintenance capability to accept additional students in fiscal
year 2021?
General MCCONVILLE. Congress fully supported the requested aviation training
budget for fiscal year 2020. The requested aviation training budget in fiscal year
2020 is not sufficient to increase the throughput of Aviator training. The Army is
in the process of funding the final $122.6 million of an overall $331 million UFR.
$171 million was funded in fiscal year 2019, $37.4 million was saved thru AH–64
modernization efforts at the training base, and the remainder will be funded in fis-
cal year 2020. This additional funding will enable the training base at Ft. Rucker
to meet the required throughput of 1272 initial entry Aviators, and 1555 graduate
Aviators to meet Army requirements. The increased throughput at the training base
coupled with multiple retention efforts will address the current pilot shortage. We
continue to assess the impacts of COVID–19 on our training infrastructure and abil-
ity to move students to training.
MISSILE DEFENSE

111. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, gentlemen,
Alabama is the arguably the home of Army missile defense. Lieutenant General
Daniel Karbler, USA met with my office just a couple weeks ago, and I’m excited
with the progress the Space and Missile Defense Command is making in developing
new systems and working to integrate them into existing formations across the
Army. I am, however, concerned with the Army’s missile defense capacity. According
to your budget request, you are asking for $202 million to convert two Patriot bat-
talions to the new Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System
(IBCS). I know that our Air Defenders are the most deployed units in the Depart-
ment. Can you speak to the impact that this transition will have upon the oper-
ations tempo (OPTEMPO) for the rest of the Patriot units?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The impact of IBCS moderniza-
tion on the OPTEMPO of the Patriot Force in fiscal year 2023 and beyond will de-
pend on the Geographic Combatant Commander demand for CONUS-Based Patriot
Forces. This Patriot Force consists of 11 CONUS-Based Battalions and 4 Forward
Stationed Battalions. The Army planned for 2 Patriot Battalions in IBCS mod-
ernization while supporting up to 2 Battalions Forward Deployed. If the deployed
steady State exceeds 2 Battalions, an impact to modernization and Deploy to Dwell
will occur.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN
INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE (IAMD)

1. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army has
indicated that air and missile defense is a top modernization priority. What IAMD
efforts are underway and how are they progressing?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army Integrated Air & Mis-
sile Defense system performed well in Collective Training, which concluded earlier
this month. Due to COVID–19 impacts, 3d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery’s up-
coming Limited User Test (LUT) has been slightly extended to ensure the health
and safety of our soldiers, but should not impact the Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation (IOT&E) scheduled 4QFY20. The baseline program integrates Sentinel
radar and Patriot components and provides the open architecture upon which the
Army will continue to expand, as a key contributor to Joint All-Domain Command
& Control (JADC2). We are updating and finalizing the current software version
prior to the LUT start date to ensure a successful test event. Finally, the Army is
prioritizing follow-on weapon and sensor integration after the baseline Initial Oper-
ational Capability in 2022. Those will be formally documented in a Capabilities De-
velopment Document Update (for Increment 3).

2. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, can you up-
date us on the Indirect Fire Protection Capability/Iron Dome way ahead?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army will receive the first
battery of Iron Dome in December 2020 and the second battery in February 2021.
Once we receive those two batteries, we will begin the required training of the sol-
diers who will man and operate them. Simultaneously, we will attempt to integrate
the Iron Dome Systems into our Integrated Battle Command Systems (IBCS). Based
on the technical data we have received, we believe that full integration of Iron Dome
568
into the IBCS architecture will be challenging. We expect that we will end up with
two very capable, but standalone, batteries. It is anticipated that the two Iron Dome
Batteries will achieve full operational capability by the end of 4QFY21. The Army
is currently executing a competitive solicitation for the Enduring Indirect Fire Pro-
tection Capability Increment Two solution (IFPC Inc 2). The IFPC Inc 2 solicitation
is open to all competitors to conduct U.S. Government and vendor models & simula-
tions, hardware-in-the-loop activities, and a live-fire shoot-off demonstration in
3QFY21. As stated in our report to Congress on February 25, 2020, we do not intend
to buy more stand-alone weapon systems that cannot be fully integrated with our
Joint Air and Missile Defense capabilities. As such, I am prioritizing the use of the
Fiscal Year 2021 funding toward achieving an enduring, integrated capability as
quickly as possible.
ARCTIC THREATS

3. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, what do you
see as the key threats to U.S. interests and security in the Arctic region, and what
will the Army do specifically—as a part of the joint force—to help provide options
to the President to help counter these threats?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Russia and China constitute the
primary competitors to U.S. interests and security in the Arctic. Russia likely will
continue its aggressive efforts to deny others access and/or presence in the Arctic
region, both militarily and commercially. Russia seeks to secure Arctic mineral re-
sources, control the Northern Sea Route, and extend the range of its strategic de-
fenses. China, a self-declared ‘‘near-Arctic’’ State, is also keenly interested in the
Arctic for its natural resources, possible shipping shortcuts, and scientific endeavors
focused on global climate change. Beijing considers the Arctic an area of shared
international interests versus one defined by the sovereignty of Arctic littoral states,
thus allowing Beijing open access. As part of the joint force, the Army, in support
of the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, participates in exercises and ensures
it has major combat units ready for a variety of contingencies in the Artic. The
Army provides forces for 12 Arctic exercises, many of which are conducted with al-
lies, including three exercises that are conducted in Alaska: ARCTIC PEGASUS,
ARCTIC EAGLE, and ARCTIC EDGE. The Army will continue to partner with the
Joint Force to implement the Arctic Strategy and build the readiness needed to win
in the Arctic.
JOINT PACIFIC ALASKA RANGE COMPLEX (JPARC)

4. Senator SULLIVAN. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, current and
past military leaders have referred to JPARC as a ‘‘crown jewel’’ of training ranges
due to its expansive space, varied terrain, and nearly limitless training potential.
What are your own personal views on JPARC and what specific steps could be un-
dertaken to maximize the utilization and training of this world-class training range?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Joint Pacific Alaska Range
Complex (JPARC) provides training capabilities for multiple components and serv-
ices to use for a variety of training from individual to pre-rotational Mission Readi-
ness Exercises, to Joint All Domain Operations (JADO) coordinated by US INDO-
PACOM. A broad concept to maximize the use of the JPARC would be to provide
joint funding for large scale exercises in Alaska. This concept would provide the
Joint Force with a training environment of sufficient scale and scope to exercise
multi-domain opportunities by linking USN vessels, USAF 5th GEN fighters, and
Army assets to achieve cross-domain effects in Cyber, Electronic warfare, space, of-
fensive counter-air, and Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF). These exercises would
improve the Joint Force’s abilities to operate, fight, and achieve a decisive edge the
MDO environment; would replicate future combat operational environments; and
enable a highly trained Joint Force capable of presenting multiple-dilemmas to our
Nation’s adversaries in competition, crisis, and conflict.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO
ARMY MISSILE DEFENSE

5. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, the Army has
made a concerted effort to integrate its missile defense capabilities. As the Army
moves toward greater reliance on networks, it’s clear that competitors will seek to
disrupt, degrade, and defeat those networks. What is being done to mitigate those
problems?
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Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is pursuing a network
modernization strategy, aligning internal science and technology efforts, and ensur-
ing that the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS will be designed to meet and
maintain Cybersecurity defense standards. The network modernization strategy will
deliver assured network transport, with multiple communication pathways, includ-
ing leveraging military and commercial satellite services, increasing bandwidth and
range through military and commercial satellite and terrestrial networks, incor-
porating more secure modems, updating gateway architecture, and integrating se-
cure waveforms. The alignment is informing industry research and development ef-
forts through threat-based market research and establishing cooperative research
and development agreements to share threat data, while also driving network solu-
tions to counter those threats. Finally, we are conducting biennial survivability and
resilience exercises with the Air and Missile Defense architecture to ensure that we
understand and correct potential and emerging cyber, electronic warfare, and posi-
tion, navigation, and timing vulnerabilities.

6. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, with a move-
ment toward distributed operations, how can we ensure our forces are protected by
air defense?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Air and missile defense (AMD)
during distributed operations presents an inherently Joint challenge that requires
contributions from all Services. The Army’s AMD contribution primarily consists of
THAAD, AN/TPY–2, Patriot, Avenger, as well as Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and
Mortar (C-RAM) units. The Army will field M-SHORAD and interim Indirect Fire
Protection Capability (IFPC) in the FY21 to further expand Army AMD capability
and capacity to support the Joint fight. The Army will field the IAMD Battle Com-
mand System (IBCS) in FY22 to improve interdependent AMD operations enabling
tailorable and scalable force packages. Additionally, we utilize passive defense meas-
ures to mitigate the consequences of enemy attacks, as well as employ attack oper-
ations to attrit threat capability and capacity. Integration with Joint and Coalition
forces is imperative to protect our forces and we will continue to work with our Al-
lies and partners to support the AMD requirements of distributed operations.

7. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, how much are
you conferring with the other Services on working out disparities in common oper-
ating picture issues?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. We routinely confer with our
Service partners to resolve technical and operational Common Operating Picture
(COP) issues at all levels—action officer to department headquarters. Global Com-
mand & Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) continues as the primary program of record
providing the aggregated standard COP across Combatant Commands (CCMD) and
the Joint Force. Near-term, we are increasing shared understanding of any potential
COP issues by leveraging experimentation and routine touchpoints, such as the re-
cently completed FY20 Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Experi-
ments #1 and #2, Joint Warfighting Assessments, monthly Joint Staff (JS) led
JADC2 Cross Functional Team CFT) engagements, and developing Joint Concepts
for Command and Control (JCC2) in support of Multi Domain Operations.
CLOSE COMBAT LETHALITY TASK FORCE

8. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy, in March 2018, then-Secretary James N.
Mattis established the Close Combat Lethality Task Force in an effort to make com-
bat units more lethal. He had concerns about the erosion of close combat capability
relative to threats identified in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Can you tell
me what the status of the close combat lethality task force is and if these efforts
will continue in support of the NDS?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Close Combat Lethality Task Force (CCLTF) will con-
tinue efforts to develop, evaluate, recommend, and implement improvements to U.S.
squad-level Infantry combat formations and Special Operations Force equivalents,
to ensure close combat overmatch against pacing threats, and strengthen the com-
bat lethality, survivability, resiliency, and readiness of our close combat forces. The
Army is working closely with our partners in the Marine Corps and Special Oper-
ations Command to plan for governance and procedures that maintain the joint pur-
pose of the CCLTF and ensure we continue to make advances in close combat
lethality so that our close combat forces are well prepared to support the National
Defense Strategy.
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9. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy, has a decision been made on whether the
close combat lethality task force will report to the Army?
Secretary MCCARTHY. Yes, on March 27th the Secretary of Defense delegated the
authority for the CCLTF to the Army. We have initiated planning to ensure we con-
tinue to support our close combat forces. The Army is currently drafting a frame-
work to establish a tri-service governance board between the U.S. Army, the USMC,
and USSOCOM to provide oversight, guidance, and prioritization for initiatives sup-
porting our men and women at the tip of the spear and build on the successes of
the CCLTF. Concurrently, we are preparing an Army Execute Order that will posi-
tion the CCLTF in an Army organization with optimal functional alignment for in-
ternal command and control, and assign roles and responsibilities for Army staff,
commands, and organizations.
READINESS

10. Senator HIRONO. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, how have you
managed to create a balance between protecting the force from COVID–19 and read-
iness?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. The Army is carefully and delib-
erately balancing force protection with efforts to sustain readiness. We have initi-
ated a planning process that frames the Army’s actions, which include responding,
recovering, and restoring capabilities. The Army has followed the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Commander in Chief’s guidance with
respect to social distancing and other protocols. The Army provided this information
to the force via Army Orders that have been published and updated since the crisis
began. Additionally, the Army directed installations, camps, and posts to increase
their Health Protection (HPCON) to protect our soldiers and their families, our DA
civilians, and Contractors, and ensure we can continue our mission by minimizing
the spread of COVID–19. It is too early to measure any significant impact to readi-
ness, but the longer the pandemic lasts, the greater the possibility there could be
a degradation to readiness. In an effort to protect the force, we have migrated to
virtual recruiting to sustain the Army’s end-strength. Although modified for health
protection measures, we are continuing initial entry training, and Commanders at
all levels are assessing their local conditions and modifying training to minimize
risk to our force while maximizing our readiness.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DOUG JONES
DEFENSE HEALTH AGENCY

11. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy, do you think that continuing with the
planned Defense Health Agency transition is prudent during the current COVID–
19 health crisis? Please explain.
Secretary MCCARTHY. No, I do not think we should continue with the planned
transition during the current health crisis. Our Military Treatment Facilities and
other medical structures are an integral part of our Army and are key to our ability
to respond to national requirements. Effective alignment of authorities, roles, and
responsibilities is necessary to allow for an optimal response. The Army was able
to rapidly respond to the COVID–19 pandemic because of our unique medical struc-
ture. We have committed our ready medical personnel, Public Health Center, Army
Medical Command, Medical Research and Development Command, as well as other
medical capabilities to treatment, detection, and prevention efforts in support of the
national response to the COVID–19 pandemic. The COVID–19 pandemic highlights
that removing these key medical structures away from normal Service command
and control alignment, will fracture our ability to respond.
DEPOTS

12. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in your response
to my paper hearing question regarding Army depots, your response did not address
how the Anniston Depot, which is designated as the Center of Industrial and Tech-
nical Excellence for combat vehicles (except Bradley), will retain the turret, full as-
sembly, and full tank test skills without full overhaul and repair of the M1 Abrams
tank. Will you ensure this is accomplished via the public-private-partnering?
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. Yes, we will ensure the Anniston
Army Depot (ANAD) will retain the turret, full assembly, and full tank test skills
thru public-private-partnering. ANAD will continue to overhaul, repair, and fully as-
semble the M1 Abrams tanks to preserve skills and support fleet readiness. This
will be accomplished thru public-private partnerships (P3), to include General Dy-
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namics Land Systems (GDLS) and Honeywell, who have an enduring residence at
ANAD. Under the P3 with GDLS, for example, the Repair Cycle Float (RCF) pro-
gram is underway with PM Abrams M1A2 SEPv3modernization. To further ensure
workforce skills retention, PM Abrams’ modernization is ongoing at ANAD and ex-
pected to continue through FY26.
SPACE FORCE

13. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy, in your response to Senator Blackburn’s
question about space, you stated, ‘‘We are working the merger with US Space Force
and will divest assets over time. However, we must retain necessary organic space-
related capabilities to balance space capabilities across the force and limit oper-
ational risk.’’ I understand that you can only speak for the Army, but can you ex-
plain what types of personnel/capabilities/units/equipment you are retaining, wheth-
er you plan to retain those indefinitely or just until the United States Space Force
is fully established, and whether the other branches are taking a similar position?
Secretary MCCARTHY. The Army intends to permanently retain our cadre of Army
space professionals who understand both traditional Army operations and space,
and who integrate appropriate space-enabled capabilities into Army plans, oper-
ations, concepts, and doctrine. We will also retain space-enabled capabilities inte-
grated throughout Army formations, as they are essential to effective combat oper-
ations on land, and will continue to evolve these service-unique assets to enable
multi-domain operations in the future. The Army will transfer identified capabilities
on a schedule that ensures sustainment of the associated operational missions. We
believe the Navy has taken a similar approach regarding retention of space exper-
tise and service-unique, space-enabled capabilities currently integrated in Navy sys-
tems.
U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID)

14. Senator JONES. Secretary McCarthy and General McConville, in your response
to Senator Reed’s question regarding USAMRIID, you mentioned that ‘‘Simulta-
neously, the Army conducted an extensive review of our medical research capabili-
ties and is in the process of implementing changes that will facilitate the avail-
ability of these capabilities in the future.’’ Please provide specifics about the changes
you referenced and what this committee can do to assist the implementation.
Secretary MCCARTHY and General MCCONVILLE. In February 2020, Army Futures
Command (AFC) and U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command
(USAMRDC) collaborated to develop initial options to optimize structure for both
USAMRIID and U.S. Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD)
based on core mission, functions, and capabilities all tied to resources to enable
their missions. In support of this effort, key Army Staff agencies enable the opti-
mized structure of USAMRDC, specifically focusing on USAMRIID and USAMRICD,
inclusive of their workforce, mission, and facilities. The Army is working to identify
a core funding plan in balance with external customers; pursuing a comprehensive
Health Affairs Medical Research and Response strategy to inform core roles and
functions; and identifying future medical research structures with potential near-
termmitigations. The Army needs relief from the statutory requirement to transition
Medical Research and Development to the Defense Health Agency, however, to
achieve optimization.
SUICIDE

15. Senator JONES. General McConville, I was intrigued by your response to Sen-
ator King’s question regarding soldier and veteran suicide. You gave quite a thor-
ough description of the transition process. Do you think the system for preventing
suicide for soldiers, transitioning soldiers, and veterans needs to be improved? If so,
how?
General MCCONVILLE. While we continue to invest in research and look to new
or improved initiatives to increase individual resilience, coping, and communication
skills, we must keep soldiers connected while in the Army and maintain that con-
nection through the soldier’s transition into Veterans Organizations’ behavioral as-
sets. Soldiers live in squads; squads are the building blocks of the Army’s forma-
tions. If you drew a triangle and at the points are ‘‘Leader,’’ ‘‘Family,’’ and ‘‘Peers,’’
this is the framework for how we need to get after the problem. In the Army’s initia-
tive ‘‘This is My Squad,’’ units focus on the positive aspects of a soldier’s life and
a greater emphasis on a collectivist culture, or a culture where the group is
prioritized over the individual. By shifting soldiers’ focus to shared experiences, they
can form the unity needed to solve personal crises and combat misconduct. By en-
gaging with fellow soldiers, squad leaders can also better detect personal dilemmas
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and crises. Leaders will interact with the soldiers in their squads and they will
know those soldiers, their families, and their peers. By knowing our soldiers better,
ourCommand Teams and Leaders can develop and adjust programs as required to
prevent this unnecessary loss of life. Discussing and recognizing all lives are worth
living should be part of initial entry training, in uniform, and especially during
transition.

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