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Home Source documents Defendant Mirza Reazuddin’s Appeal of Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order and Request for Immediate Release with Conditions — United States v. Mirza Michael Reazuddin, No. 23 CR 67 (Dkt. 22, W.D. Mo.)

Defendant Mirza Reazuddin’s Appeal of Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order and Request for Immediate Release with Conditions — United States v. Mirza Michael Reazuddin, No. 23 CR 67 (Dkt. 22, W.D. Mo.)

Summary

Mirza Michael Reazuddin asks the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri in No. 23 CR 67 to vacate Magistrate Judge Morris's detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) and release Mr. Reazuddin on conditions. The motion says Mr. Reazuddin was arrested in the Northern District of Georgia on April 25, 2023 on an indictment charging wire fraud and monetary transactions in criminally derived property, and that Magistrate Judge Morris denied a renewed detention hearing after finding that no release conditions would reasonably assure Mr. Reazuddin's appearance. It argues that detention as a serious risk of flight is appropriate only in “extreme and unusual circumstances” and cites court data showing the government recommends detention in 77% of cases nationwide and 67% in that District. It proposes conditions including GPS monitoring and was served by ECF on July 12, 2023.

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                       IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
                                 WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                      )
                                               )
                       Plaintiff,              )       No. 23 CR 67
                                               )
               v.                              )       Judge Beth Phillips
                                               )
MIRZA MICHAEL REAZUDDIN,                       )
                                               )
                       Defendant.              )


     DEFENDANT MIRZA REAZUDDIN’S APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
     DETENTION ORDER AND REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE WITH
                           CONDITIONS

       Defendant Mirza Reazuddin (“Mr. Reazuddin”), by and through his undersigned counsel,

respectfully moves this Honorable Court to vacate Magistrate Judge Morris’s detention order

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) and order Mr. Reazuddin released from custody pursuant to the

Bail Reform Act (BRA) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.                   Data from the

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts show that there is an exaggerated concern over risk of

flight in our system, and that the vast majority of released defendants do not flee. In this case, the

government has not met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that no set of

release conditions can reasonably assure Mr. Reazuddin’s appearance in court. Even if the Court

had concerns about potential flight, a location-monitoring condition would effectively address

those concerns.     Accordingly, Mr. Reazuddin must be released on bond immediately with

appropriate conditions of release. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(a)–(c). This appeal arises under 18

U.S.C. § 3145(b), which provides for de novo review of a magistrate judge’s detention order. In

support of this appeal, Mr. Reazuddin states as follows:




                                                   1
                      I.   FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Mr. Reazuddin was arrested in the Northern District of Georgia on April 25, 2023 pursuant

to a warrant issued with the indictment in this case charging him with under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and

18 USC § 1957 of wire fraud and engaging in monetary transfer of criminally derived property,

respectively. ECF No. 1. Mr. Reazuddin is the only defendant charged in the indictment.

       In the Northern District of Georgia, the government sought detention on the basis that Mr.

Reazuddin is supposedly a serious risk of obstruction and that he was a danger to the community.

It did not argue that any presumption in favor of detention applied, or that Mr. Reazuddin posed a

risk of flight. However, the government later argued in its response to Mr. Reazuddin’s motion for

a renewed bond hearing in this district that he is a risk of flight as well as a risk for obstruction.

After a detention hearing in the Northern District of Georgia, the Court ordered Mr. Reazuddin

detained based on a series of proffers and arguments made by the government that were not

disclosed to Mr. Reazuddin before the hearing, and which Mr. Reazuddin had no opportunity to

discuss with his counsel and meaningfully refute during the hearing.

       The U.S. Marshals transported Mr. Reazuddin to this District where Mr. Reazuddin

promptly moved for pretrial release. ECF No. 14. Both sides were provided a copy of the

transcript from the hearing in the Northern District of Georgia. The government filed a response

brief which was followed by a reply by Mr. Reazuddin. ECF Nos. 15 & 18.

       Interestingly enough, the government never refuted Mr. Reazuddin’s argument that he

should have a renewed detention hearing based on new information that was not available during

the initial bond hearing. Rather, the government agreed that given the new information referenced

in Mr. Reazuddin’s request that the hearing “should be reopened.” Despite the government’s




                                                  2
concession on the issue, the Court denied Mr. Reazuddin’s request for a renewed detention hearing.

ECF No. 35.

       Specifically, Magistrate Judge Morris concluded that the government had established by a

preponderance of evidence that “no release conditions exist that would reasonably assure” Mr.

Reazuddin’s appearance. Id. at 2. Magistrate Judge Morris specifically emphasized that Mr.

Reazuddin was given an opportunity to address the government’s claims, that the information from

the initial hearing remains unchanged, and that the addition of the third party custodian or Mr.

Reazuddin’s worsening medical condition does not alleviate the Court’s concerns.

                                         II. ARGUMENT

       A. Detaining a Defendant as a “Serious Risk of Flight” Is Appropriate Only in
          “Extreme and Unusual Circumstances.”

       The BRA’s legislative history makes clear that detention based on serious risk of flight is

only appropriate under “extreme and unusual circumstances.”1 For example, the case relied on in

the legislative history as extreme and unusual enough to justify detention on the grounds of serious

risk of flight involved a defendant who was a fugitive and serial impersonator, had failed to appear

in the past, and had recently transferred over a million dollars to Bermuda. See Abrahams, 575

F.2d at 4. The government must demonstrate that the risk of flight in a particular case rises to the

level of extreme or unusual, and no such showing has been made here. In addition, a defendant


1
  See Bail Reform Act of 1983: Rep. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 48 (1983)
(“Under subsection f(2), a pretrial Detention Hearing may be held upon motion of the attorney
for the government or upon the judicial officer’s own motion in three types of cases. . . . [T]hose
[types] involving . . . a serious risk that the defendant will flee . . . reflect the scope of current
case law that recognizes the appropriateness of denial of release in such cases.”) (emphasis
added) (citing United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1978)—which held that only a
“rare case of extreme and unusual circumstances . . . justifies pretrial detention”—as representing
the “current case law”); see also Gavino v. McMahon, 499 F.2d 1191, 1995 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding that in a noncapital case the defendant is guaranteed the right to pretrial release except
in “extreme and unusual circumstances”); United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1281 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding that bail can only be denied “in the exceptional case”).

                                                  3
should not be detained as a “serious risk” of flight when the risk of nonappearance can be mitigated

by conditions of release. The only defendants who qualify for detention under § 3142(f)(2) are

those who are “[t]rue flight risks”—defendants the government can prove are likely to willfully

flee the jurisdiction with the intention of thwarting the judicial process.

       B. Mr. Reazuddin Is Not a Serious Flight Risk and Conditions of Release Will
          Reasonably Assure His Appearance.

       Mr. Reazuddin is a citizen of the United States and has lived in Missouri since 2012. He is

66 years old. He is in the midst of a divorce from his current spouse but he has an ex-wife who he

still communicates with in Illinois as well as 3 adult children. One of his daughters is a practicing

physician and another daughter is in her final year of medical school. His son is autistic and lives

in Illinois with his mother due to requiring 24/7 monitoring, and Mr. Reazuddin makes regular

trips to Chicago and stays for 3-4 days at a time. He does not have a passport and his travel was

primarily to Chicago and Atlanta, where he has another residence.

       Mr. Reazuddin is in the midst of a divorce with his wife and as a result does not have other

immediate family in the Missouri area. As such, he has secured a third party custodian, Rafee

Kidwai, that is willing to appear before the Court and be admonished as to the requirements of

being a third party custodian. This is a changed circumstance since the original detention hearing

in the Northern District of Georgia. Mr. Kidwai has known Mr. Reazuddin for 10 years through

family and friends. He is also one of the caretakers for Mr. Reazuddin’s autistic son. He lives in

Naperville, Illinois and is willing to provide Mr. Reazuddin a home at his residence to be able to

adequately monitor him and his activities. Furthermore, Mr. Reazuddin’s ex wife lives in the

Chicagoland area and has been supportive of him while he is in custody.

       Upon information and belief, Mr. Reazuddin has only two prior convictions, both of which

were 25 years ago. The government and Pretrial Services have proffered no evidence or argument



                                                  4
that Mr. Reazuddin has ever failed to appear in connection with that case or any other court

proceeding. This supports the conclusion that he is not a serious flight risk. See, e.g., United

States v. Williams, 1988 WL 23780, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1988) (defendant who made regular

state court appearances in the past deemed not a serious flight risk). The government references

outstanding warrants but presents no evidence that Mr. Reazuddin was aware of those warrants or

deliberately failed to take care of them.

       Given the family ties he has in the State of Illinois as well as the fact that he has been living

in Missouri for over 10 years, the following conditions of release under § 3142(c)(1)(B)

recommended by Pretrial Services, and any other conditions the Court deems necessary, will

reasonably assure Mr. Reazuddin’s appearance in court:

       •      placing Mr. Reazuddin in custody of a third-party custodian – his friend Rafee

              Kidwai who will be vetted by Pretrial Services and approved as a custodian -- “who

              agrees to assume supervision and to report any violation of a release condition to the

              court” (§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(i));

       •      maintaining or actively seeking employment (§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(ii));

       •      following restrictions on “personal associations, place of abode, or travel,” which

              here would limit travel to the Western District of Missouri and the Northern District

              of Illinois (§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(iv));2

       •      surrendering all passports to Pretrial Services and not obtaining any new ones or

              other international travel documents ((§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv));

       •      reporting on a “regular basis” to Pretrial Services ((§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(vi)); and


2
 While Mr. Reazuddin does not agree it is necessary nor has Pretrial Services recommended it,
Mr. Reazuddin’s location could also be subject to electronic or GPS monitoring if the Court
deemed it necessary.

                                                    5
       •      remaining standard conditions of release recommended by Pretrial Services (e.g., no

              firearms or unlawful drugs, reporting law enforcement contacts, drug testing and

              treatment if deemed appropriate, etc.) ((§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv)).

       C. The Government’s Proffered Facts and Argument Do Not Satisfy the
          Government’s Burden.

       The government’s proffered facts and arguments are not persuasive and fail to meet the

government’s burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions of

release can reasonably assure Mr. Reazuddin’s appearance. The government’s arguments fall into

three basic categories: (i) Mr. Reazuddin is a risk of flight, (ii) Mr. Reazuddin is a danger to the

community, and (3) a hodge podge of other facts regarding a domestic battery warrant in state

court. None of these arguments individually or combined justify Mr. Reazuddin’s pretrial

detention.

               1. Mr. Reazuddin’s is Not a Risk of Flight, Obstruction, or a Danger

       The government suggests Mr. Reazuddin is a serious flight risk because he was supposedly

hiding in the trunk of his car when federal agents raised his home, and because he supposedly tried

to flee after getting engaged in a verbal altercation with his wife. Both situations are

mischaracterized and not adequately addressed at the initial detention hearing.

       One reference to support the inference of attempting to flee was to an alleged disguise that

Mr. Reazuddin was wearing when he was arrested, when in actuality it was a hairpiece he has worn

for over 20 years, as well as the attire he had on which was improperly described. Upon learning

Mr. Reazuddin’s hair was a hairpiece, the agent’s knee jerk reaction was to assume it was a

disguise meant to throw off law enforcement. Mr. Reazuddin lost his hair over 20 years ago due

to a medical condition. He weighed nearly 300 pounds and went on an unhealthy weight loss

journey which caused complications resulting in hair loss. Since then he has worn a hairpiece, and



                                                 6
many people, including family members, have not seen him without it. Any allegation that this

was an intentional act on Mr. Reazuddin to evade law enforcement is pure fiction. During the

initial hearing, the government argued that he had his hairpiece on so “he was aware they were

there.” The insinuation is that the hairpiece was meant to throw them off and was worn purely to

attempt to flee which is completely unsubstantiated. The government was aware or should have

been aware that that hairpiece was not worn just because agents were present because they were

in possession of Mr. Reazuddin’s California driver’s license provided in initial discovery which

showed Mr. Reazuddin with his hairpiece on a license issued on May 17, 2022.

       Moreover, when Mr. Reazuddin was arrested, he was in his own home. He had no idea

federal agents were in pursuit and certainly did not concoct a plan to fool them. Him wearing a

hairpiece while in his home is indicative of him being someone that always wore a hairpiece,

including in the privacy of his own home. A similar conclusion was reached when he was

supposedly found “hiding” in the trunk of his car. Again, when the agents went to arrest him, they

arrived completely by surprise. He had been in the back of his car to push the back seat in to have

more room to place a television in the trunk. There is no evidence to support the Government’s

conclusion, especially since part of their reliance on the escape theory is that he was disguising

himself with a wig, which turned out to be a hairpiece that he has worn for 20 years. Nothing in

the facts can point to how long he had been in the trunk, and whether or not he went into the trunk

knowing agents were in pursuit.

       The government also references Mr. Reazuddin allegedly fleeing after a heated encounter

with his wife and that he left for the purpose of avoiding arrest. The Government told the Court

that in response to the incident on December 19, police were called and he “fled” out the back.

Based on that proffer, the Court specifically asked defense counsel to address “the two instances




                                                7
of flight.” After being questioned by the Court, the Government made several concessions. The

first was that they were not sure whether or not he was running or walking, and also clarified their

claim that Mr. Reazuddin left when police arrived, noting that he left when while the reporting

party was still on the phone with 911. Mr. Reazuddin correctly assessed the situation he was

involved in and left before a seemingly heated situation got even worse. There was no evidence

offered as to when during the 911 call Mr. Reazuddin left, whether or not he knew 911 was being

called or that police were even on the way.

       Finally, as addressed in his initial motion for release and reply brief, Mr. Reazuddin is not

a danger to the community based on an unadjudicated charge, particularly one where he was given

a personal recognizance bond by the very court where the charge is pending. In determining the

bond, that court would factor in someone’s criminal history, risk of flight, as well as assess whether

they are a danger and impose conditions to assure safety as well as future appearances in court.

There were no conditions such as electronic home monitoring, a high bond, or any other condition

placed on Mr. Reazuddin.

       The government has failed at the threshold to proffer facts (i) that Mr. Reazuddin actually

would flee prosecution despite his close ties to Missouri and Illinois – which would involve

forfeiting any bond, subjecting his Rafee Kidwai to negative consequences as his custodian, and

forever abandoning his nuclear family he has been demonstrably close – and (ii) that he has the

wherewithal to leave the United States without a passport.

       Furthermore, the Government also relies on the strength of their case as an argument as to

why Mr. Reazuddin should be detained. ECF No. 15 at 5. But the weight of the evidence against

the defendant, particularly in a case like this, is the least important factor bearing on detention.

See, e.g., United States v. Radick, No. 05 CR 798-2, 2006 WL 436116, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 17,




                                                  8
2006) (“The charge, at this stage, is an accusation. The weight of the evidence against him is the

“least important of the various factors.” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Caro, 2005

WL 8160735, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2005) (same). Even if strong evidence of certain criminal

behavior could theoretically bear on the issue of flight (e.g., if the charged conduct involved

international travel under an assumed identity – this is not one of those cases. Mr. Reazuddin is

alleged to have improperly received PPP loans. Supposedly strong evidence of that conduct has

no bearing at all on whether Mr. Reazuddin would appear in Court if released on appropriate

conditions.

       D. Statistics Demonstrating It Is Extremely Rare for Defendants on Bond to Flee
          Confirm that the Government Has Not Met Its Burden Here.

       Official Court statistics show that when release increases, flight does not. This Court

should be guided by Administrative Office (AO) statistics showing that nearly everyone released

pending federal trial appears in court. In fact, in 2019, 99% of released federal defendants

nationwide appeared for court as required.3 Significantly, this near-perfect compliance rate is seen

equally in federal districts with very high release rates and those with very low release rates.4

       The bond statistics for this District likewise strongly suggest that Mr. Reazuddin should be

released. In this District, released federal defendants appeared for court 99.45% of the time in

2019 (i.e., 1260 cases in release status with only 7 failures to appear). See Table H-15. Yet,


3
  AO Table H-15 (“Table H-15”) (Dec. 31, 2019), available at Mot. for Bond, United States v.
Rodriguez, No. 19-CR-77 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 2, 2020), ECF No. 41, Ex. 1, archived at
https://perma.cc/LYG4-AX4H (showing a nationwide failure-to-appear rate of 1.2%).
4
  The data showing near-perfect compliance on bond is illustrated in the chart, “Federal Clients
on Bond Rarely Flee or Recidivate.” The districts with the highest and lowest release rates were
identified using the version of AO Table H-14A for the 12-month period ending December 31,
2019. See AO Table H-14A (Dec. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/32XF-2S42. The failure-to-appear
rate for these districts was calculated using App 1, AO Table H-15. With regard to flight, the ten
federal districts with the lowest release rates (average 26.00%) have an average failure-to-appear
rate of 1.37%, while the ten districts with the highest release rates (average 65.58%) have an
even lower failure-to appear rate of 0.87%.

                                                  9
despite the statistically low risk of flight that defendants like Mr. Reazuddin pose, the government

recommends detention in 77% of cases nationwide and in 67% of cases in this District. See AO

Table     H-3,      https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_h3_0930.2019.pdf.

Clearly the government’s detention requests are not tailored to the low risk of flight that defendants

in this District and elsewhere pose.

        Mr. Reazuddin must be released on conditions because the government has not established

that he would be among the approximately 1% of defendants who fail to appear in court. In

addition, the government’s concerns could all be effectively addressed by the proposed conditions

of release, including GPS monitoring if deemed necessary by the Court. Continuing to detain Mr.

Reazuddin on this record would violate his constitutionally protected liberty interest.

                                       III.   CONCLUSION


        For these reasons, Mr. Reazuddin respectfully asks this Court to vacate the detention order

and order him released on conditions this Court deems appropriate under §§ 3142(a)–(c).


                                               Respectfully submitted,

                                               /s/Sami Azhari
                                               Sami Azhari

                                               Attorney for Mirza Reazuddin
Azhari LLC
134 N. Lasalle Street
Suite 444
Chicago, IL 60602
Ph: (312) 626-2871
Email: sazhari@azharillc.com




                                                 10
                                CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned states that, on July 12, 2023, he caused the above to be served on
counsel of record by way of ECF filing.

                                            Respectfully submitted,

                                            /s/Sami Azhari
                                            Sami Azhari

                                            Attorney for Mirza Reazuddin




                                               11


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