Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, January 4, 2019 to January 3, 2021 — Senate Report 117-2
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This is Senate Report 117-2 of the 117th Congress, 1st Session, a Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, covering the period January 4, 2019 to January 3, 2021, ordered to be printed March 23, 2021. The preface states that the Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate this report on its activities from January 4, 2019, to January 3, 2021, and that most of the Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be discussed publicly. It lists Mark R. Warner as Chairman and Marco Rubio as Vice Chairman in the current membership, and the earlier composition with Richard Burr as Chairman. The contents list legislation, oversight activities, hearings, and investigations and reviews.
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“Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, January 4, 2019 to January 3, 2021 — Senate Report 117-2.”
Original at www.govinfo.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/crpt-crpt-117srpt2-crpt-117srpt2/
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1
117TH CONGRESS REPORT
" SENATE !
1st Session 117–2
R E P O R T
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COVERING THE PERIOD
JANUARY 4, 2019
TO
JANUARY 3, 2021
MARCH 23, 2021.—Ordered to be printed
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
19–010 WASHINGTON : 2021
E:\Seals\Congress.#13
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado TOM COTTON, Arkansas
ROBERT P. CASEY, Pennsylvania JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York BEN SASSE, Nebraska
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio Member
MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
MICHAEL CASEY, Staff Director
CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, Minority Staff Director
KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk
During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence was as follows:
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Acting Chairman
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine RON WYDEN, Oregon
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
JOHN CORNYN, Texas KAMALA HARRIS, California
BEN SASSE, Nebraska MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado
MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio Member
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member
CHRISTOPHER A. JOYNER, Staff Director
MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director
KELSEY STROUD BAILEY, Chief Clerk
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(II)
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PREFACE
The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate this
report on its activities from January 4, 2019, to January 3, 2021.
This report also includes references to activities underway at the
conclusion of the 116th Congress that the Committee expects to
continue into the future.
Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Con-
gress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of carrying
out oversight of the programs and activities of the Intelligence
Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the Committee’s
oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be discussed pub-
licly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods. Nevertheless, the
Select Committee on Intelligence has submitted activities reports
on a biennial basis since 1977 to provide the American public with
information about its intelligence oversight activities. We submit
this report to the Senate, in observance of this practice.
We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the
Committee in the 116th Congress. In particular, we take special
note of a colleague who completed her service on the Committee.
Senator Harris served on the Committee from the 115th Congress
until she retired from the U.S. Senate on January 18, 2021, in
order to assume the office of Vice President of the United States.
Her commitment to the important work of the Committee has
helped to ensure a strong IC and a secure nation. We are grateful
for her contributions.
We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all members
of the Committee’s staff during the 116th Congress. Their vigi-
lance, professionalism, and perseverance in the face of unprece-
dented public health challenges were essential to the Committee’s
fulfillment of its oversight obligations.
MARK R. WARNER,
Chairman.
MARCO RUBIO,
Vice Chairman.
(III)
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CONTENTS
Page
Preface ...................................................................................................................... III
I. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1
II. Legislation ...................................................................................................... 2
A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 ............................................................................................................ 2
B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 ............................. 4
III. Oversight Activities ....................................................................................... 5
A. Hearings .................................................................................................... 5
1. Worldwide Threats Hearing ................................................................. 5
2. Russia ..................................................................................................... 6
3. Afghanistan ........................................................................................... 7
4. Western Hemisphere/Latin America ................................................... 7
5. Iran ......................................................................................................... 7
6. Asia-Pacific Region ................................................................................ 7
7. Middle East and North Africa .............................................................. 8
B. Investigations and Reviews ..................................................................... 9
1. Investigation of Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Inter-
ference in the 2016 U.S. Election ......................................................... 9
C. Intelligence Community Issues ............................................................... 10
1. Defense Intelligence Enterprise .......................................................... 10
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Reau-
thorization Act of 2017 .......................................................................... 10
3. USA FREEDOM Act ............................................................................ 10
4. IC Intelligence Analysis ....................................................................... 11
5. Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology (5G) ................... 12
6. Counterterrorism .................................................................................. 13
7. Cyber Domain ....................................................................................... 13
8. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) ..................... 14
9. Covert Action ........................................................................................ 14
10. Space .................................................................................................... 15
D. Other Matters ........................................................................................... 15
1. Classification and Declassification ...................................................... 15
2. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern ............................... 16
3. Inspectors General ............................................................................... 16
4. Committee Audits and Projects Team ................................................ 16
5. Personnel Vetting Reform .................................................................... 17
6. Technical Advisory Group (TAG) ........................................................ 18
7. IC Response to COVID–19 .................................................................. 18
IV. Nominations ................................................................................................... 19
A. William R. Evanina .................................................................................. 19
B. Christopher Scolese .................................................................................. 20
C. John L. Ratcliffe ....................................................................................... 20
D. Peter Michael Thomson ........................................................................... 20
E. Christopher C. Miller ............................................................................... 20
F. Patrick Hovakimian ................................................................................. 21
G. Allen Robert Souza .................................................................................. 21
V. Support to the Senate .................................................................................... 21
VI. Appendix ......................................................................................................... 21
A. Summary of Committee Actions ............................................................. 21
1. Number of meetings ............................................................................. 21
2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee ........................... 22
3. Bills referred to the Committee .......................................................... 22
4. Committee publications ....................................................................... 22
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117TH CONGRESS REPORT
" SENATE !
1st Session 117–2
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
MARCH 23, 2021.—Ordered to be printed
Mr. WARNER, from the Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
I. INTRODUCTION
The activities of the Committee during the 116th Congress in-
cluded passage of critical enabling legislation, confirmation of ap-
pointees to key intelligence leadership posts, inquiries on the per-
formance and activities of the Intelligence Community (IC), and
completion of the Committee’s investigation of Russian interference
in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
As detailed in Part II of this report, the Committee’s paramount
legislative priority in the 116th Congress was enactment of the
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Au-
thorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Years (FY) 2018, 2019, and 2020,
and the IAA for FY 2021.
The Committee also dedicated considerable effort to completing
and publishing a comprehensive, five-volume report on Russia’s in-
terference in the 2016 presidential election. The investigation un-
derlying this report comprised witness interviews, hearings, staff
briefings, site visits, and frequent interactions with IC leadership
and personnel from across the counterintelligence enterprise.
Notably, the COVID–19 global pandemic had a direct impact on
the Committee during the second session of the 116th Congress.
The Committee adapted to the coronavirus during 2020,
prioritizing protection of public health, while continuing to perform
its critical oversight mission. While most Senate offices shifted to
mostly or fully remote operations, the Committee did not have that
option because of the requirements for physical access to classified
spaces and communications networks to perform its oversight of
sensitive intelligence activities.
Despite the challenges that the pandemic posed, the Committee
committed to a schedule that physically separated staff while con-
tinuing to meet its oversight obligations—passing authorizing legis-
lation, conducting regular hearings, processing presidential nomi-
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nations, and meeting routinely with representatives of the IC to
conduct oversight. Member events complied with Office of the At-
tending Physician guidelines. Staff were provided greater informa-
tion technology tools to enhance their ability to work remotely.
Staff were also given additional access to secure Senate office space
to conduct their work.
II. LEGISLATION
A. DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTEL-
LIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND
2020
In the 116th Congress, the Committee emphasized the continued
enactment of annual intelligence authorization acts as a primary
means of its oversight. During the prior term, the individual Intel-
ligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 were not
enacted. The Committee re-introduced the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018 and 2019 (S. 245) on January 28, 2019. (Messrs. Nelson
and Pollard were staff members of the House and Senate intel-
ligence committees, respectively, who had recently passed away.)
The Senate did not act on that bill. Therefore, at the start of the
116th Congress, the Committee continued to work with the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and pursue passage of
an Intelligence Authorization Act that covered Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020.
The intelligence entities covered by the annual budget reviews
included: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Reconnais-
sance Office (NRO); the intelligence capabilities of the military
services and the U.S. Coast Guard; and, the intelligence-related
components of the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), as well as
the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Secu-
rity, and the Drug Enforcement Administration.
As part of its budget review, the Committee received testimony
from senior IC officials in closed hearings. Committee budget mon-
itors evaluated classified budget justifications submitted by the Ex-
ecutive Branch. Based on those reviews, the Committee prepared
a classified annex to its annual authorization bill and report. This
annex contained a classified schedule of authorizations and classi-
fied direction to IC elements.
The Committee also reviewed the Administration’s legislative
proposals for the bill, which included new or amended legislative
authority requested by the IC.
The Committee passed the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018,
2019, and 2020, reported the bill (S.1589) on May 22, 2019, and
subsequently issued an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 116–47) on
June 11, 2019. The full Senate passed the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 as Divisions F and G of the Senate-
passed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 on
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June 27, 2019 (S.1790), by a vote of 86–8.
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3
The House of Representatives passed the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (H.R. 3494) on July 17, 2019, by
a vote of 397–31. The Committee proceeded to work with the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other congres-
sional committees on a final version of the legislation.
Subsequently, the Senate and House intelligence committees in-
cluded the joint Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 as Division E of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2020 (S. 1790). The House passed S. 1790 on December
11, 2019, by a vote of 377–48. The Senate passed S. 1790 on De-
cember 17, 2019, by a vote of 86–8. The President signed S. 1790
into law on December 20, 2019 (Public Law 116–92).
As enacted, the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020 authorizes fiscal year 2020 funding for intelligence and intel-
ligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and includes
a classified schedule of authorizations and a classified annex.1 It
also retroactively authorized funding for fiscal years 2018 and
2019. The Act contained a number of legislative provisions, includ-
ing:
• A provision that seeks to deter foreign influence in U.S.
elections and counter aggression from Russia and other foreign
actors by increasing capabilities to detect Russian activities,
including active measures campaigns and illicit financial trans-
actions;
• A provision requiring assessments of Russian cyber
threats and influence campaigns, and facilitating information
sharing among state, local, and Federal officials;
• A provision creating an independent Social Media Data
and Threat Analysis Center to support the IC’s role in coun-
tering Russian propaganda;
• A requirement for the DNI to designate a national coun-
terintelligence (CI) officer within the National Counterintel-
ligence Security Center (NCSC) to lead election security-re-
lated CI matters;
• A provision requiring ongoing notifications of travel by cer-
tain Russian Federation personnel in the U.S. and any poten-
tial active measures campaigns conducted by those individuals;
• A provision requiring reporting on Chinese influence cam-
paigns directed at Taiwan, including United States actions to
disrupt such operations, as well as reporting on surveillance
technologies;
• A provision requiring a plan for reducing the security
clearance background investigation backlog;
• A requirement for a DNI-led task force to protect IC sup-
ply chains from foreign CI risks from Russia, China, and other
adversaries;
• A provision requiring the IC to account for foreign threats
to our infrastructure before entering into foreign intelligence
sharing agreements;
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1 The Act deemed as authorized the funds already appropriated for fiscal years 2019 and 2019.
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• A provision increasing pay scales for IC employees with
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) ex-
pertise in cyber missions;
• A provision intended to improve retention and recruiting
for underrepresented populations;
• A requirement for the DNI to establish an advisory council
to incorporate climate security analysis across IC components,
and to facilitate coordination with non-IC agencies;
• A provision establishing a pilot program with the National
Labs and energy sector to partner with covered entities and
protect against security vulnerabilities;
• A provision establishing requirements to strengthen the
oversight function performed by the IC Inspector General and
promote consistency in IC whistleblower processes and proce-
dures; and
• A requirement for ODNI, FBI, and DHS to conduct a stra-
tegic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism, consistent
with U.S. Person protections.
B. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2021
In early 2020, the Committee began consideration of the Presi-
dent’s request for funding levels and legislative authority for fiscal
year 2021. The Committee’s budget monitors evaluated the re-
quests submitted by the Executive Branch. Committee staff re-
ceived a number of briefings, and the Committee conducted classi-
fied budget hearings.
The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (S. 3905) on June 8, 2020, and subsequently re-
ported an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 116–233) on June 17, 2020.
The Committee subsequently incorporated its Intelligence Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 as Division F of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (S. 4049), which
passed the Senate on July 23, 2020, by a vote of 86–14.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence passed
its version of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(H.R. 7856) on July 31, 2020, and then reported the bill to the full
House and issued an accompanying report (H. Rpt. 116–595) on Oc-
tober 30, 2020. The Committee proceeded to work with the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other congres-
sional committees on a final version of the legislation.
The product of the two committees’ efforts, the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, was incorporated as Division
W of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L.
116–260). The Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2021 passed the House on December 21, 2020, in two separate
measures by votes of 359–53 and 327–85, and passed the Senate
that same day as a consolidated measure by a vote of 92–6. The
President signed the consolidated bill into law on December 27,
2020.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 author-
ized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
across the U.S. Government and included a classified schedule of
authorizations and a classified annex. The Act as incorporated in
the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2021 ensures
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accountability and integrity from our IC agencies, which undertake
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our most sensitive intelligence programs and activities, and con-
tained a number of legislative provisions, including:
• A provision requiring assessments on risks to national se-
curity from consumer genetic testing, and mitigation efforts
being taken in response by the IC and DoD;
• A provision requiring complex, extensive assessments of
current U.S. critical technologies and their requisite supply
chains;
• A provision intended to afford IC agencies the tools and re-
sources their respective workforce hiring and retention objec-
tives require;
• A provision requiring reporting on intelligence sharing
with ‘‘Five Eyes’’ foreign partners that have or intend to use
adversary telecommunications or cybersecurity equipment;
• A provision requiring reporting on foreign governments’
use of commercially-available cyber intrusion and surveillance
technology;
• Provisions requiring reporting on Chinese Community
Party (CCP) corruption, CCP influence operations against tech-
nology sectors, and potential CCP information suppression and/
or exploitation relative to COVID–19;
• A provision requiring reporting on Russian and Eastern
European oligarchs’ corruption and illegal activities; and
• Provisions intended to strengthen open source information
capabilities across the IC, in part by requiring IC strategies for
coordinated collection and analysis of open source information.
III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES
A. HEARINGS
1. Worldwide Threats Hearing
Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to re-
view the Intelligence Community’s assessment of the current and
projected national security threats to the United States. There was
only one year (1999) when the Committee did not hold a Worldwide
Threats hearing. It is one of the few open hearings that the Com-
mittee has regularly conducted to share the work of the IC with
the public. These ‘‘Worldwide Threats’’ hearings cover national se-
curity concerns in all geographic regions, as well as transnational
threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and
weapons of mass destruction.
On January 29, 2019, the Committee held an open Worldwide
Threats hearing on the current and projected threats to the United
States. The lead witness before the Committee was DNI Daniel R.
Coats. He was joined at the witness table by the Honorable Gina
Haspel, Director of the CIA; the Honorable Christopher Wray, Di-
rector of the FBI; General Paul Nakasone, Director of the NSA;
Lieutenant General Robert Ashley, Director of the DIA; and Mr.
Robert Cardillo, Director of the NGA. The open hearing was fol-
lowed by a closed hearing session with the Committee. Director
Coats’ unclassified prepared statement for the record is available
in the Hearings section of the Committee’s website and the record
of the open hearing is printed as S. Hrg. 116–75. A video recording
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of the full hearing can also be found on the Committee’s website.
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At the hearing, Director Coats identified election security as a
top priority for the IC, adding the IC’s assessment that ‘‘foreign ac-
tors will view the 2020 U.S. elections as an opportunity to advance
their interests.’’ He also noted the IC’s expectation that foreign ac-
tors would ‘‘refine their capabilities and add new tactics as they
learn from each other’s experiences and efforts in previous elec-
tions.’’
Director Coats also explained the principal ‘‘state actor’’ threats
facing the United States in terms of a ‘‘big four,’’ comprising China,
Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Director Coats highlighted China’s
exercise of its intelligence and influence apparatus to shape inter-
national views and gain advantages, in furtherance of Beijing’s in-
tent to ‘‘diminish U.S. influence and extend its own economic, polit-
ical, and military reach.’’ On the subject of Russia, Director Coats
indicated that Moscow was escalating its campaign to ‘‘divide West-
ern political and security institutions and undermine the post-
World War II international order,’’ in part, by waging an ‘‘informa-
tion war against democracies, and [using] social media to attempt
to divide our societies.’’ Regarding North Korea, Director Coats
noted that the regime had ‘‘halted its provocative behavior related
to its WMD program,’’ however tempering the observation with the
assessment that Pyongyang ‘‘will seek to retain its WMD capabili-
ties and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and
production capabilities because its leaders ultimately view nuclear
weapons as critical to regime survival.’’ Director Haspel later added
that the North Korean regime ‘‘is committed to developing a long-
range nuclear armed missile that would pose a direct threat to the
United States.’’
While the Committee repeatedly engaged with the IC to arrange
for a Worldwide Threats Hearing to be held in the second session
of the 116th Congress, scheduling conflicts, sustained assertions of
witness unavailability, and an apparent general reluctance by Ad-
ministration officials to appear before the Committee to discuss
publicly intelligence threat assessments prevented the Committee
from holding a Worldwide Threats Hearing in 2020.
2. Russia
During the 116th Congress, the Committee focused extensively
on the Russian threat to U.S. national security. In addition to its
report on Russian active measures campaigns and interference in
the 2016 U.S. election, the Committee continued robust oversight
of intelligence relating to the threat posed by Russia’s other malign
activities around the world. These threats include Russia’s tradi-
tional and cyber espionage; its continued reliance on misinforma-
tion and disinformation to target global audiences and interfere
with elections and democratic processes in the United States and
around the world; the buildup of its conventional, strategic, and
asymmetric arsenals; its increasingly assertive military deploy-
ments on its periphery and to wider regions, including the Middle
East, Africa, and Latin America; its use of mercenary groups and
private military and security corporations such as the Vagner
Group; its support of like-minded authoritarian regimes; and its
use of corruption and criminal networks to further its strategic
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goals. The Committee held a number of closed hearings on these
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and other issues to assess the IC’s posture to warn of, analyze, un-
derstand, expose, and counter the Russian threat.
3. Afghanistan
The IC’s contribution to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan has been
a constant focus of the Committee since 2001. As the U.S. neared
the 20-year mark of its latest involvement in Afghanistan, the
Committee continued its oversight—through hearings, briefings,
roundtables, and pre-pandemic staff travel to the region—on the
IC’s operations and analysis in support of U.S. policy. Following
the signing of the February 29, 2020, U.S.-Taliban agreement, the
Committee focused on the IC’s collection on Taliban adherence to
its stated commitments, as well as the IC’s coordination with DOD
and State Department plans for an eventual drawdown of the U.S.
presence.
4. Western Hemisphere/Latin America
The Committee focused its efforts on monitoring the ongoing cri-
sis in Venezuela, travelling to meet with allies in the region to
deepen bilateral engagement, and maintaining an awareness of
elections in several key Latin American countries. The Committee
continued to monitor illicit trafficking; narcotics production; the
threat posed by violent transnational criminal organizations to the
United States and the stability of the region; the military and in-
telligence activities of U.S. adversaries in Latin America, including
an increase in Chinese and Russian engagements; and the mystery
illnesses (including brain injuries) contracted by U.S. Government
personnel in Havana, Cuba, and elsewhere, which are likely the re-
sult of a directed energy attack by a foreign adversary. Oversight
activities included numerous staff and Member briefings, addi-
tional hearings, and visits to the region.
5. Iran
The Committee held a number of hearings on Iran with the pur-
pose of overseeing the IC’s ability to collect intelligence and provide
assessments to policymakers on Iran’s intentions and evolving ca-
pabilities in areas such as its nuclear program, role in the Middle
East, and support to terrorist groups. In addition to hearings, the
Committee consistently held briefings related to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram and its destabilizing activities in the region and beyond. Over
the course of significant developments related to Iran, the Com-
mittee examined U.S. security and that of U.S. allies and partners
in the region, monitored reporting on evolving threats, and probed
the adequacy of the IC’s posture to defend against those threats.
Committee members and staff also engaged officials from partner
countries on dynamics related to Iran.
6. Asia-Pacific Region
The Asia-Pacific region was the focus of considerable Committee
time and attention throughout the 116th Congress. Intended to fa-
cilitate a continual evaluation of the IC’s collection posture and
analytic capabilities relative to the national security threats ema-
nating from the region, the Committee traveled to the region, held
numerous Member and staff briefings, and dedicated nine Com-
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mittee hearings to China, North Korea, regional geopolitical dy-
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namics, and counterintelligence related topics. The Committee also
received briefings and reports on the region from the National In-
telligence Council, CIA, the Defense Department, the State Depart-
ment, and nongovernmental organizations.
These activities were central to the Committee fulfilling its over-
sight mandate to ensure the IC duly informs the national-level pol-
icymaking process. In particular, the Committee’s efforts on North
Korea focused on political-military issues related to WMD pro-
grams and denuclearization. On China, the Committee spent con-
siderable time reviewing Beijing’s increasingly globalized activities,
relentless pursuit of illicit technology transfer, targeted human
rights abuses and repression, and lack of transparency on the ini-
tial outbreak and response to the COVID 19 outbreak.
The Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee
also provided over a dozen classified and unclassified briefings—in
partnership with the DNI, Principal Deputy DNI and top counter-
intelligence leaders at the National Counterintelligence and Secu-
rity Center, FBI, and DHS—to the private sector on strategic eco-
nomic and technological threats stemming from Beijing. Committee
staff also convened meetings between the IC elements’ top privacy
and civil liberties officers, human resource leaders, security offi-
cials, and representatives of ethnic heritage groups to address alle-
gations of bias and profiling in security and law enforcement prac-
tices that may have occurred as an inadvertent result of efforts to
counter China’s aggression.
7. Middle East and North Africa
The Committee continued to focus on developments in the Middle
East during the 116th Congress. The Committee held multiple
hearings, hosted many briefings, and monitored events that bore on
the security of the United States, our allies, and our partners. The
Committee also analyzed the resources the IC devoted to under-
standing those developments and delivering advantage to U.S. deci-
sion-makers. In Syria and Iraq, Iran’s paramilitary activity, Russia
and Turkey’s military deployments, Assad’s war crimes, and recidi-
vism among Islamic Statefighters risk extending and deepening the
conflict. Yemen remains at risk of humanitarian catastrophe, and
conflict involving Iranian supported Houthi forces, Yemeni govern-
ment forces, and the Saudi-led military intervention is exacer-
bating the country’s instability. Iran also directed or supported at-
tacks against its neighbors, and proliferated advanced weapons
throughout the region, undermining the stability and security of
other nations. Committee Members and staff traveled throughout
the region and met with U.S. partners to better understand and
consider options related to many of these challenges.
Committee Members and staff also monitored events in North Af-
rica with implications for U.S. security and that of our allies and
partners in the region and adjacent regions through a series of
hearings, briefings, and travel. The war in Libya remains a stale-
mate threatening the health and livelihoods of the Libyan people
as well as the security of Libya’s neighbors—risks that are elevated
by the presence and involvement of Russian military and contract
security elements. The political situation in several other North Af-
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ernments continue to evolve following the Arab Spring, and foreign
governments seek to undermine these countries’ sovereignty.
B. INVESTIGATIONS AND REVIEWS
1. Investigation of Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Inter-
ference in the 2016 U.S. Election
On January 24, 2017, the Committee began a bipartisan inves-
tigation into Russian interference in the U.S. elections. Unlike pre-
vious Committee investigations, there was no separate vote to ini-
tiate it; the investigation was considered a part of the Committee’s
regular oversight responsibilities. During the following 43 months,
the Committee interviewed over 200 witnesses, reviewed over a
million pages of documents, and held open and closed hearings on:
election security; social media and disinformation; a review of the
January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment covering Rus-
sian activities; and the U.S. Government’s response to Russia’s ef-
forts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. elections. The Committee’s ef-
forts were distinctive for their investigative scope, authority,
breadth, and depth, particularly in contrast to two other related in-
vestigations occurring in parallel. One was begun by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in January 2017 to in-
vestigate Russian interference in the 2016 elections, an effort that
concluded in March 2018.
The other began on May 17, 2017, when the Department of Jus-
tice appointed former FBI Director Robert Mueller as a Special
Counsel to investigate potential criminal activity surrounding Rus-
sian interference in the 2016 elections. The overlap among these
reviews led to the Department of Justice resisting some Committee
investigative activity and led to complications for witnesses to com-
ply with the Committee inquiry.
The Committee interviewed then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions,
former FBI Director James B. Comey, several high-ranking Obama
administration cabinet officials, as well as members of President
Trump’s family, campaign, and business enterprise in order to as-
certain the nature and extent of Russian influence activity in the
2016 U.S. elections. The Committee’s investigation involved several
novel legal and constitutional issues, including the first successful
use of a congressional subpoena to obtain non-content subscriber
information from telecommunications and social media companies.
While the Committee was successful in obtaining voluntary testi-
mony and document production from a vast majority of its wit-
nesses, the Committee was required to issue multiple subpoenas to
compel certain witnesses’ testimony. The Committee’s commitment
to bipartisanship throughout the course of its investigation was in-
tegral to obtaining witness cooperation and access to documents
held by the Executive Branch.
Given the large and complex nature of the investigation, the
Committee adopted and released its Report, Russian Active Meas-
ures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election (S. Rep.
116–290), in five volumes, the last of which was issued in August
2020. These volumes covered Russian efforts against election infra-
structure (Volume 1), Russia’s use of social media (Volume 2), the
U.S. Government’s response to the Russian efforts (Volume 3), a re-
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view of the Intelligence Community Assessment covering the Rus-
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sian activities (Volume 4), and counterintelligence threats and
vulnerabilities related to Russia (Volume 5). The Committee adopt-
ed each volume of its Report with broad bipartisan support and si-
multaneously adopted publicly releasable versions of each volume,
posted on the Committee website. The Committee’s final unclassi-
fied Report totals 1,346 pages, and stands to date as the most com-
plete account of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.
C. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ISSUES
1. Defense Intelligence Enterprise
The Committee’s oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
(DIE) included travel to embassies and military bases, meetings
with defense attaches, and numerous staff briefings. The Com-
mittee also held six hearings related to the DIE, its support to bal-
listic missile defense, and its view of global threats. DIE experts
also provided critical analytic threat updates at numerous hearing.
In particular, the Committee’s oversight efforts focused on: DIA’s
development of the Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-Repository
System, a major system acquisition project; the DIE’s integration
of machine learning and artificial intelligence; refreshing the IT
technology platform known as the Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS) modernization; the transition
from an IT concept of operation from network protection to data
protection; reviewing defense intelligence support to federal law en-
forcement for First Amendment activities; DIE capabilities against
hard target threats; defense and military counterintelligence re-
form efforts; reviewing the DIE’s open source intelligence strategy
and investments profile; and COVID–19 response and workforce re-
constitution plans.
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Reau-
thorization Act of 2017
The Committee continued to monitor implementation of the FISA
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (S. 139, P.L. 115–118),
as enacted on January 19, 2018, particularly the critical intel-
ligence authorities against foreign targets, as set forth in Title VII
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 2008 (most notably
against foreigners located abroad under Section 702). The Com-
mittee sought to ensure enhanced transparency and privacy protec-
tions for Americans and individuals in the United States.
3. USA FREEDOM Act
The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 included four foreign intel-
ligence legal authorities that were set to expire on December 15,
2019. Those authorities included: (1) business records collection; (2)
call detail records collection; (3) lone wolf targeting; and (4) roving
wiretap surveillance. On November 21, 2019, Congress extended
these authorities to March 15, 2020, as part of the Further Con-
tinuing Appropriations Act, 2020, and Further Health Extenders Act
of 2019 (H.R. 3055, P.L, 116 69). Also on November21, 2019, then-
Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner introduced the Pro-
tecting Against International Terrorism Act of 2019 (S.2939), which
extended all aforementioned authorities for eight years, with the
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exception of call detail records. (The Senate did not act on S. 2939.)
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On March 11, 2020, the House of Representatives passed the
USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020 (H.R. 6172) by a vote
of 278–136. The bill extended the business records, lone wolf, and
roving authorities through December 1, 2023, while repealing the
call detail records collection authority. The bill also required FISA
application accuracy reviews, expanded notifications of the use of
business records in legal proceedings, limited business records re-
tention periods (with certain exceptions), included penalties for
FISA abuse, expanded amicus curiae participation in certain For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters, and required addi-
tional compliance and oversight.
On March 16, 2020, the Senate passed a bill to provide a 77–day
extension of certain authorities for foreign intelligence and inter-
national terrorism investigations (S. 3501), which extended the
business records, lone wolf, and roving authorities through May 30,
2020 (retroactive to March 14, 2020). (The House of Representa-
tives did not act on this bill.)
On May 13, 2020, the Senate proceeded to consider H.R. 6172.
Pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement requiring a 60-vote
threshold, the Senate voted on three amendments: (1)an amend-
ment cosponsored by Senators Lee and Leahy to expand the amici’s
authorities and access (agreed to by a vote of 77–19); (2) an amend-
ment cosponsored by Senators Daines and Wyden to preclude the
use of business records authorities to obtain Internet web browsing
and search history information (not agreed to by a vote of 59–37);
and (3) an amendment sponsored by Senator Paul that precluded
targeting United States persons via FISA’s electronic surveillance,
physical searches, business records collections, and other foreign
intelligence tools (not agreed to by a vote of 11–85). On May 14,
2020, the Senate passed H.R. 6172, as amended, by a vote of 80–
16.
On May 28, 2020, by a vote of 284–122, the House of Representa-
tives passed a motion to disagree with the Senate amendments and
request a conference. Neither chamber has taken further action on
the USA FREEDOM Reauthorization Act of 2020.
4. IC Intelligence Analysis
The Committee conducted oversight of the IC’s analytic enter-
prise during the 116th Congress, with an emphasis on analytic ob-
jectivity and duplication. Committee staff engaged with ODNI,
CIA, and other agencies responsible for analytic production to en-
sure that IC analysis was meeting customer demands, devoid of
politicization and compliant with standards for objectivity, and
properly resourced. Committee staff held many engagements with
the IC to better understand and reduce analytic duplication, while
recognizing the virtue in analytic redundancy to promote diversity
of perspective. The Committee also engaged with the IC on hiring
and retention for hard-to-fill analytic positions. These topics were
interwoven through multiple hearings during the 116th Congress.
The most prominent hearing showcasing IC analysis, the annual
Worldwide Threats Hearing, occurred in 2019, but not in 2020, due
to the ODNI’s reluctance to engage publicly with Congress on IC
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threat assessments, as discussed in Section III.A.1. of this Report.
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5. Fifth-Generation Telecommunications Technology (5G)
The Committee investigated the significant national security im-
plications posed by 5G telecommunications technology. Part of the
challenge is the paucity of 5G equipment vendors, especially those
that do not have a nexus with the Chinese Communist Party. The
Committee convened several meetings with the leadership of sev-
eral executive branch agencies and telecommunications companies
to discuss the United States’ strategy for 5G and opportunities to
mitigate the related national security vulnerabilities.
The Committee also engaged with Five Eyes nations and other
allies to develop and examine multi-national efforts to mitigate po-
tential national security vulnerabilities. Recognizing that the
United States must provide secure, competitive alternatives to
Huawei’s and ZTE’s 5G technology, on June 8, 2020, the Com-
mittee included a provision in its Committee-reported Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (IAA), S. 3905, to establish:
• A Communications Technology Security and Innovation
Fund to support the development and deployment of open
standards-based compatible, interoperable equipment for fifth-
generation wireless networks to create a more secure and di-
verse telecommunications vendor market; and
• A Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund to sup-
port the adoption of secure and trusted communications tech-
nologies in key markets globally.
The Committee subsequently introduced an amendment to the
Senate National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
(NDAA) (S.4049) that established:
• A Public Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund for the
NTIA Administrator (in consultation with other relevant agen-
cies) to make grants that will support 5G research and its com-
mercial application; and
• A Multilateral Telecommunications Security Fund for the
Secretary of State (in consultation with other relevant agen-
cies) to deploy funds, contingent on foreign government part-
ners’ agreement to participate in development and adoption of
secure 5G technologies.
The Committee’s amendment was incorporated into an NDAA
Manager’s Amendment, and passed as part of the Senate NDAA on
July 23, 2020.
The provision was considered in the NDAA conference with other
relevant Senate and House committees of jurisdiction. The NDAA
conference report included a 5G provision that established the Pub-
lic Wireless Supply Chain Innovation Fund and the Multilateral
Telecommunications Security Fund, both of which the Committee
will work to fund from future congressional appropriations. The
provision further requires multiple reports to Congress for each re-
spective fund.
The NDAA conference report passed the House and the Senate
on December 8, 2020, and December 11, 2020 (H.R. 6395). The
President vetoed the NDAA on December 23, 2020. On December
28, 2020, the House passed the NDAA over the President’s veto by
a vote of 322–87. On January 1, 2020, the Senate passed the
NDAA over the President’s veto by a vote of 81–13. The NDAA,
with the aforementioned 5G provision, was enacted as Public Law
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Number 116–283.
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6. Counterterrorism
During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its over-
sight of the IC’s counterterrorism efforts. This was done through a
range of activities, including Committee hearings and roundtables,
as well as staff-level briefings and engagement with the IC. In
2019, the Committee traveled overseas and visited multiple facili-
ties to see firsthand the IC’s counterterrorism efforts and evaluate
plans, resources, and authorities.
SSCI authorized counterterrorism budgets and legal authorities
accordingly based on this oversight. As the counterterrorism threat
continued to evolve—both domestically and abroad—the Committee
conducted multiple oversight meetings to ensure that the IC’s au-
thorities and resources align with this threat. This includes track-
ing transnational threats like racially and ethnically motivated vio-
lent extremist groups, as well as al-Qa’ida, ISIS core, and their
global affiliates.
7. Cyber Domain
During the 116th Congress, Committee staff continued to mon-
itor the IC’s efforts to identify and track foreign cyber actors that
pose threats to the United States and its allies. The establishment
of the Cybersecurity Directorate at the National Security Agency
aligns intelligence and information security resources under the
Deputy National Manager for National Security Systems. The
Committee conducted vigorous oversight of the establishment of
this new organization to ensure its mission and resources are ap-
propriate to advance the cybersecurity of the nation, without com-
promising NSA’s commitment to its intelligence mission.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence also created
the Cyber Executive, a new position that consolidates the National
Intelligence Manager for Cyber, the Cyber Threat Intelligence Inte-
gration Center, and the Intelligence Community’s Security Center
under a single responsible official. The Committee anticipates ongo-
ing engagement with this new executive to bolster the cyber threat
intelligence mission.
The Cyberspace Solarium Commission, established by section
1652 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115–232), delivered its final report on March
11, 2020, which contained a series of findings and recommenda-
tions to bolster the nation’s cyber posture. The commission’s report
provided a series of legislative proposals that the Committee used
as a basis to enhance the nation’s cyber posture. One such proposal
was the establishment of a National Cyber Director within the Ex-
ecutive Office of the President to coordinate the government’s cyber
activities, with the caveat that the National Cyber Director may
not direct intelligence activities or resources and cannot modify
classification of intelligence information.
The Committee also conducted oversight of the IC’s activities to
identify and track foreign cyber actors. However, the Committee
faced difficulties in conducting effective oversight of joint cyber ac-
tivities involving U.S. Cyber Command and the Intelligence Com-
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8. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
The Committee staff conducted close oversight of ODNI as it un-
derwent a number of personnel, organizational, and policy changes
during the 116th Congress. A number of forced resignations (of
DNI Dan Coats, Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) Sue Gordon, Act-
ing DNI and Director of the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) Joe Maguire, Intelligence Community Inspector General
Michael Atkinson, and Chief Operating Officer Deirdre Walsh),
along with use of a novel position of ‘‘Principal Executive’’ to per-
form the duties of the PDDNI, created instability and leadership
gaps that demanded close attention to ensure the DNI’s statutory
functions could still be performed. The DNI’s unwillingness to tes-
tify at the Committee’s annual worldwide threats hearing was em-
blematic of the turbulence. At the close of the 116th Congress, four
of the six ODNI positions subject to Senate confirmation—PDDNI,
General Counsel, IC Inspector General, and Director of NCTC—
were being fulfilled by ‘‘acting’’ officials or personnel ‘‘performing
the duties of’’ that position, which required specific attention to en-
sure those offices’ missions were being fulfilled.
Committee staff held several briefings on organizational changes
adopted by Acting DNI Ric Grenell and DNI John Ratcliffe, to in-
clude moving from four deputy DNIs to two; creating a new Direc-
tor’s Adviser for Military Affairs; establishing ‘‘executives’’’ for
space, cyber, election threats, and economic security and financial
intelligence; and altering the grade structure of the ODNI. Com-
mittee staff also scrutinized the impact of two Executive Orders—
13950 on combating race and sex stereotyping, and 13957 regard-
ing a new Schedule F in the excepted civil service—to ensure the
ODNI could maintain a workforce ethos of inclusiveness and a com-
mitment to objectivity.
Finally, the Committee closely reviewed a number of ODNI pol-
icy and programmatic initiatives. Staff closely monitored workforce
initiatives to recruit, hire, develop, and retain a quality, diverse,
and trusted workforce. Staff studied ODNI’s use of the Staff Re-
serve program to make temporary hires to ensure this program
complied with, and did not circumvent, Office of Personnel Manage-
ment guidelines. Staff continued quarterly briefings on the IC In-
formation Technology Enterprise. Lastly, staff ensured ODNI was
appropriately supporting the Biden-Harris transition once the Gen-
eral Services Administration ascertained the 2020 presidential elec-
tion.
9. Covert Action
The Committee conducted vigorous oversight of covert action pro-
grams throughout the 116th Congress. The Committee’s rules re-
quire the Committee’s Staff Director to ‘‘ensure that covert action
programs of the United States government receive appropriate con-
sideration once a quarter.’’ In accordance with this rule, the Com-
mittee receives a written report every quarter on each covert action
that is being carried out under a presidential finding. Committee
staff reviews these reports and meets with IC personnel to discuss
their substance and pose additional questions. The Committee also
holds periodic hearings and briefings on covert action programs,
and receives written reviews of covert actions from the CIA Inspec-
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Further, under section 3093 of the National Security Act, the
DNI and the heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the
United States Government involved in a covert action are required
to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and cur-
rently informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of,
are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States. Upon receiving such notifica-
tions, the Committee reviews the details of each and receives brief-
ings to fully understand the issues.
The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs are
consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are con-
ducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.
10. Space
During the 116th Congress, the Committee continued its over-
sight of the IC’s role in the space domain. The Committee’s ongoing
efforts to ensure reliable and resilient access to, and operation in,
space to provide intelligence support took on greater urgency in
light of an increasingly hostile space environment. Committee over-
sight has been key in tracking growing requirements to improve
the speed and quality of data delivered to the warfighter and other
government customers, which is resulting in shifting roles and re-
sponsibilities among IC elements.
As Congress drafted legislation to establish the U.S. Space Force,
the Committee supported preserving the NRO as a separate entity
in the DoD, recognizing its key role in the national intelligence en-
terprise beyond its contributions to the DoD mission. The Com-
mittee continues to advocate for effective collaboration between
NRO and the range of stakeholders in DoD.
The Committee held hearings and briefings on space launch ca-
pabilities, NRO’s evolving approach to a ‘‘hybrid’’ space architec-
ture, and adversary threats in space. The Committee also exam-
ined key budget and cross-cutting technology issues, such as artifi-
cial intelligence and cloud computing, and continued to encourage
the NRO to capitalize on the ongoing revolution in the space sector,
which has yielded reductions in the cost of launch, new kinds of
sensors, smaller satellites, and more sophisticated data analytics
and services.
In addition to hearings, the Committee and its staff engaged fre-
quently on overhead architecture topics with the NRO, NGA,
ODNI, and other IC and government officials, and conducted site
visits to government facilities and commercial companies to meet
with government officials and industry leaders. The Committee
also closely monitored the establishment of the U.S. Space Force as
the 18th and newest element of the IC to ensure it meets the
standards set for all IC elements.
D. OTHER MATTERS
1. Classification and Declassification
The Committee continued its oversight of the government’s clas-
sification and declassification systems to ensure that classified in-
formation is handled appropriately and that it is released to the
public when the requirements for classification are no longer met.
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The Committee has exclusive oversight of the Office of the Director
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of National Intelligence, which has statutory responsibilities for
protecting sources and methods, as well as for developing, imple-
menting, and overseeing security clearance policies and procedures
as the federal government’s Security Executive Agent. The staff
met a number of times with the Information Security Oversight Of-
fice (ISOO) at the National Archives and Records Administration,
which serves as the policy oversight mechanism for Executive
Order 13526, ‘‘Classified National Security Information,’’ and Exec-
utive Order 12829, ‘‘National Industrial Security Program.’’ It also
met with classification offices across the IC.
The Committee also met several times with the Public Interest
Declassification Board (PIDB) to discuss the Board’s recommenda-
tions related to the modernizing technology to make classification
and declassification system more effective and efficient and cre-
ating a government-wide executive agent (specifically the Director
of National Intelligence) for declassification. The Committee held a
public hearing on declassification reform on September 9, 2020,
with witnesses from the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence, and a member of the PIDB. The Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 permanently reauthorized the PIDB,
first authorized in the IAA for Fiscal Year 2000.
2. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern
The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls, fac-
similes, mail, and email communications from self-identified whis-
tleblowers on matters they believe to be of urgent concern. Com-
mittee staff reviewed and, where warranted, investigated those
complaints. The Committee also receives formal whistleblower com-
plaints from IC inspectors general deemed to be of urgent concern.
Among these matters was a complaint concerning a phone call be-
tween former President Trump and the President of Ukraine,
which ultimately became the basis of a presidential impeachment
trial. The Committee held a hearing and conducted witness inter-
views of the IC IG and other IC officials in furtherance of its re-
view of the IC’s handling of the complaint.
3. Inspectors General
The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and over-
sight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC. Regular over-
sight consisted of reviews of agency Semiannual Reports and An-
nual Work Plans, as well as specific audits and reviews.
4. Committee Audits and Projects Team
The Committee’s rules stipulate that within its staff there ‘‘shall
be an element with the capability to perform audits of programs
and activities undertaken by departments and agencies with intel-
ligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of persons
qualified by training and/or experience to carry out such functions
in accordance with accepted auditing standards.’’ This function was
distributed to Committee professional staff during the 113th Con-
gress. During the 116th Congress, the Committee reconstituted
this effort under its ‘‘Audits and Projects Team.’’ The Committee
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of IC-related matters and assist the Committee with its oversight
obligations.
In order to institutionalize its work, the Audits and Projects
Team designed a robust and standardized process for selecting and
conducting its studies, audits, reviews, and investigations. The
Committee also assigned the Audits and Projects Team the respon-
sibility for managing the relationship with the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO), to include overseeing the development
and execution of reviews that the Committee assigns to GAO.
The Audits and Projects Team began two on-going, Committee-
authorized projects during the 116th Congress. The first is a les-
sons-learned review of a compartmented IC acquisition program.
The final report will offer recommendations to improve acquisition
and contracting processes to ensure acquisitions meet expectations
for costs, schedule, and performance. The second is an organiza-
tional assessment of a component within the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence. The final report will make recommenda-
tions regarding this component’s resources, organizational struc-
ture, and authorities.
5. Personnel Vetting Reform
The Committee continued its close oversight of reform to the gov-
ernment’s personnel vetting enterprise, consistent with its inclu-
sion as part of the President’s Management Agenda and the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office’s identification of the security clear-
ance process as ‘‘high risk.’’ The personnel vetting framework has
remained largely unchanged since 1947, and signs of its ineffective-
ness, inefficiency, and fragility have grown. Insider threats such as
Edward Snowden, timelines for granting clearances exceeding in
some cases two years, and the inability to capitalize on modern
technology to access publicly available information have demanded
action.
Toward this end, the Committee held a closed hearing on this
topic in January 2020 with the principal members of the inter-
agency Performance Accountability Council (PAC) who lead the ex-
ecutive branch reform effort. Committee staff continued holding
quarterly briefings for the eight House and Senate committees of
jurisdiction with these PAC members, as well as separate briefings
with individual agencies. Such oversight led to significant progress
in reducing the backlog in background investigation to a ‘‘healthy’’
steady state of roughly 220,000 (from a peak of 725,000), and re-
turning to timelines for processing SECRET and TOP SECRET
clearances nearly to the standards established in the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Committee staff
have engaged closely with the cleared industry community as well,
to include presentations at conferences. The Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 contained an entire title comprised
of a dozen provisions to support and enable this success. The Com-
mittee worked closely with the Office of the Director of National In-
telligence as the government’s statutory Security Executive Agent
and the Office of Personnel Management as the government’s Suit-
ability, Fitness, and Credentialing Executive Agent in their devel-
opment of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative to modernize per-
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agility in personnel vetting practices during the COVID–19 global
pandemic.
The Committee looks forward to overseeing executive branch
plans for a singular framework for determining trust for security,
suitability, fitness, and credentialing to enable workforce mobility;
a reduced number of tiers in this framework to simplify the sys-
tem’s complexity; use of a behavioral model for personnel trust-
worthiness that reflects today’s threats and workforce patterns of
life; and use of continuous vetting model for identifying personnel
risk over time, rather than time-based periodic reinvestigations.
6. Technical Advisory Group (TAG)
During the 116th Congress, the Committee maintained its rela-
tionship with the TAG, an external group of experts that the Com-
mittee consults for substantive technical advice. Most notably, the
TAG’s researchers and experts in social network analysis, social
media political content and hate speech, disinformation, and algo-
rithms were instrumental to the Committee’s understanding of
Russia’s 2016 use of social media to conduct an information war-
fare campaign designed to spread disinformation and societal divi-
sion in the United States. The efforts of these TAG researchers led
to the release of two public reports on this information warfare
campaign, furnishing the Committee, social media companies, U.S.
law enforcement, international partners, fellow researchers and
academics, and the American public with an enhanced under-
standing of how Russia-based actors, at the direction of the Rus-
sian government, carried out a sustained campaign of information
warfare aimed at influencing how the United States’ citizens think
about themselves, their government, and their fellow Americans.
The TAG’s findings were foundational to the Committee’s inves-
tigation of Russia’s activities and feature prominently in Volume 2:
Russia’s Use of Social Media.
7. IC Response to COVID–19
The Committee exercised close oversight of the IC’s adaptation to
the coronavirus pandemic to ensure public health while continuing
to perform its important national security mission. The Committee
closely monitored IC agencies’ implementation of public health
measures, as well as their rates of infections, to ensure the safety
of the workforce. It also encouraged maximal application of the
flexibility for remote work allowed by the Office of Personnel Man-
agement and Office of Management and Budget, consistent with
the needs for security. The Committee encouraged use of this pub-
lic health crisis as a moment to reconsider what Intelligence Com-
munity work could be performed in spaces that might not be
deemed a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), on
unclassified networks, and even by personnel not all fully cleared
to the TOP SECRET/SCI level. Such new thinking could revolu-
tionize where work could be done across the United States; it could
also significantly expand the population of personnel talent the IC
could draw on and enable operation beyond the Washington Metro-
politan area, which is of particular interest in areas of rapidly
evolving technology such as cybersecurity.
The Committee also closely monitored the impact of COVID on
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the industrial base that supports the IC. It worked closely with
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other committees on the development, passage, and enactment of
Section 3610 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act, which allowed IC industrial partners to seek reimbursement
under their contracts for activities that allowed them to remain in
a ‘‘ready state.’’ The Committee supported the two extensions of
this authority that occurred during the 116th Congress.
IV. NOMINATIONS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee received seven nomi-
nations from President Donald J. Trump.
Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th Congress (as amended) and
a 2009 unanimous consent agreement govern referrals of nomina-
tions to the Committee. S. Res. 445, which amended S.Res.400 in
2004, required all nominations to positions in the IC requiring the
Senate’s advice and consent be reported by the Select Committee
on Intelligence, even when they are positions within departments
that are primarily under the jurisdiction of other Senate commit-
tees, though the committee overseeing the given department or
agency may hold hearings and interviews on the nomination. Not-
withstanding that general guidance, the resolution directed the As-
sistant Attorney General for National Security be reported by the
Judiciary Committee, but referred to the Select Intelligence Com-
mittee. In the wake of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014, which made the directors and inspectors general of the
NRO and the NSA Senate-confirmed positions, the Senate adopted
S. Res. 470, July 7, 2014. This resolution directed that if the nomi-
nee were a civilian, the Select Intelligence Committee would report
the nomination and refer it to the Armed Services Committee, and
if the nominee were a member of the Armed Forces on active duty,
the reverse.
A unanimous consent agreement of January 7, 2009, refers all
nominations for inspectors general to the committees of primary ju-
risdiction and then sequentially to the Senate Committee on Home-
land Security and Governmental Affairs. Under this consent agree-
ment, the nominations for the NRO and NSA Inspectors General
are also referred to the Homeland Security and Governmental Af-
fairs Committee. The exception to this consent agreement is the In-
spector General for the CIA, which is considered exclusively by the
Select Intelligence Committee.
The following nominations were referred to the Committee dur-
ing the 116th Congress:
A. WILLIAM R. EVANINA, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER AT THE OFFICE OF THE DI-
RECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
On January 16, 2019, President Trump nominated William R.
Evanina to be the Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center. At that time, Mr. Evanina was serving in that
same position. (President Trump previously nominated Mr.
Evanina to this position on February 5, 2018. The full Senate did
not act on that nomination.)
The Committee reported the nomination favorably on February
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28, 2019. The Senate invoked cloture on the nomination on May 6,
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2020 by a vote of 83–7. The Senate approved the nomination on
May 6, 2020 by a vote of 84–7.
B. DR. CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
On February 12, 2019, President Trump nominated Dr. Chris-
topher J. Scolese to be the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office. At that time, Dr. Scolese was serving as Director of the
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.
Upon primary referral, the Committee held a hearing on May 1,
2019, and reported the nomination favorably on May 9, 2019. Upon
sequential referral, Senate Committee on Armed Service held a
nomination hearing on June 4, 2019. Following the hearing, the
Senate Committee on Armed Services reported the nomination fa-
vorably on June 10, 2019. The Senate approved the nomination by
voice vote on June 27, 2019.
C. JOHN L. RATCLIFFE, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
On March 2, 2020, President Trump nominated John L. Ratcliffe
be the Director of National Intelligence. At that time, Mr. Ratcliffe
was serving as a United States Representative from Texas.
The Committee held a nomination hearing on May 5, 2020. Fol-
lowing the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination favor-
ably on May 19, 2020. Pursuant to the Senate’s unanimous consent
agreement on May 20, 2020, the Senate debated and approved the
nomination on May 21, 2020 by a vote of 49–44.
D. PETER MICHAEL THOMSON, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
On April 6, 2020, President Trump nominated Peter Michael
Thomson to be the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency. At that time, Mr.Thomson was a partner at the law firm
of Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann LLP.
The Committee held a nomination hearing on June 24, 2020. Fol-
lowing the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination favor-
ably on July 1, 2020.
E. CHRISTOPHER C. MILLER, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTER-
TERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL IN-
TELLIGENCE
On May 4, 2020, President Trump nominated Christopher C. Mil-
ler to be the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. At
that time, Mr. Miller was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Special Operations and Combatting Terrorism at the De-
fense Department.
The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 22, 2020. Fol-
lowing the hearing, the Committee reported the nomination favor-
ably on July 29, 2020. The Senate approved the nomination by
voice vote on August 6, 2020.
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F. PATRICK HOVAKIMIAN, GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
On May 21, 2020, President Trump nominated Patrick
Hovakimian to be the General Counsel of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence. At that time, Mr. Hovakimian was serving
as an Associate Deputy Attorney General at the Department of
Justice. The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 22,
2020.
G. ALLEN ROBERT SOUZA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY, AT THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NA-
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE
On September 23, 2020, President Trump nominated Allen Rob-
ert Souza to be the Inspector General of the Intelligence Commu-
nity. At that time, Mr. Souza was serving as the Principal Deputy
Senior Director for Intelligence Programs at the National Security
Council.
V. SUPPORT TO SENATE
Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the Committee
in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an important
role in assuring that the IC provides ‘‘informed and timely intel-
ligence necessary for the executive and legislative branches to
make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of
the Nation.’’ The Committee fulfills this responsibility by providing
access to IC information and officials to the U.S. Senate.
The Committee facilitated access to IC information for members
and staff outside the Committee by inviting them to participate in
briefings and hearings on issues of shared jurisdiction or interest.
The Committee also provided intelligence briefings by its profes-
sional staff to Members outside the Committee and assisted Mem-
bers in resolving issues with intelligence agencies.
VI. APPENDIX
A. SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS
1. Number of meetings
During the 116th Congress, the Committee held a total of 102
on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and hearings, and
numerous off-the-record briefings. These included multiple witness
interviews, staff briefings to Committee members, hearings, and
business meetings in furtherance of the Committee’s investigation
of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. There
were 86 oversight hearings, including nine hearings on the IC
budget and six on election security, and open confirmation hearings
for four administration nominees. Of these 86 hearings, 5 were
open to the public and 81 were closed to protect classified informa-
tion pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee also held 13 busi-
ness meetings including mark-ups of legislation. Additionally, the
Committee staff conducted multiple on-the-record briefings and
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interviews and numerous off-the-record briefings.
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2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee
S. 245—Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
S. Res. 51—An original resolution authorizing expenditures by
the Select Committee on Intelligence.
S. 1589—Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.
S. 3905—Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.
3. Bills referred to the Committee
S. 314—Modernizing the Trusted Workforce for the 21st Century
Act of 2019.
S. 544—A bill to require the Director of National Intelligence to
submit to Congress a report on the death of Jamal Khashoggi, and
for other purposes.
H.R. 1404—Vladimir Putin Transparency Act.
S. 838—A bill to protect integrity, fairness, and objectivity in de-
cisions regarding access to classified information, and for other pur-
poses.
H.R. 3494—Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard In-
telligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.
S. 2316—Manufacturing, Investment, and Controls Review for
Computer Hardware, Intellectual Property, and Supply Act of 2019.
S. 2493—Combatting Foreign Influence Act of 2019.
S. 2528—A bill to require the Director of National Intelligence to
submit to Congress a report on the purpose, scope, and means of
expanded Chinese influence in international organizations, and for
other purposes.
S. 3142—Increasing Efficiency of All United States-Based Ter-
rorism Information Sharing Act of 2019.
S. 3153—A bill to prohibit the sharing of United States intel-
ligence with countries that permit the operation of Huawei fifth
generation telecommunications technology within their borders.
S. Res. 666—A resolution honoring the faithful and unwavering
service of Civil Air Transport and Air America to the United
States.
4. Committee publications
Report 116–20—Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence
covering the period January 3, 2017–January 3, 2019.
Report 116–47—Report to accompany the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 together with Additional Views (S.
1589).
Report 116–233—Report to accompany the Intelligence Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 together with Minority Views (S.
3905).
Report 116–290—Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence
on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the
2016 U.S. Election together with Additional Views—November 10,
2020.
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