Senate Report 117–1 — Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2021
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Senate Report 117–1, 1st Session, titled Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during the 116th Congress, ordered to be printed March 1, 2021. The report states that it reviews the legislative and oversight activities of the Committee and Subcommittees during the 116th Congress. Its contents list highlights on border and immigration security, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, terrorism, DHS reforms and COVID–19 response, and reducing waste, fraud and abuse. It states that Senator Ron Johnson was Chairman of the Committee during that Congress and that the Committee approved 104 bills, not including bills to name United States Post Offices, and had 50 hearings and roundtables.
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117th CONGRESS REPORT
" SENATE !
1st Session 117–1
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
AND ITS
SUBCOMMITTEES
FOR THE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
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MARCH 1, 2021.—Ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
19–010 WASHINGTON : 2021
congress.#13
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
DAVID M. WEINBERG, Staff Director
PAMELA THIESSEN, Minority Staff Director
LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
DURING THE 116TH CONGRESS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
RICK SCOTT, Florida KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
SUBCOMMITTEES OF THE 116TH CONGRESS
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio, Chairman
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
RAND PAUL, Kentucky, Chairman
RICK SCOTT, Florida MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
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REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND FEDERAL MANAGEMENT
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MITT ROMNEY, Utah THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
RICK SCOTT, Florida JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
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CONTENTS
----
Page
I. Highlights of Activities .................................................................................. 1
A. Border and Immigration Security ....................................................... 2
B. Cybersecurity ........................................................................................ 5
C. Critical Infrastructure .......................................................................... 7
D. Terrorism .............................................................................................. 11
E. DHS Reforms and COVID–19 Response ............................................. 13
F. Oversight of Federal Agencies & Government Programs .................. 17
G. Reducing Waste, Fraud and Abuse ..................................................... 22
II. Committee Jurisdiction ................................................................................. 25
III. Bills and Resolutions Referred and Considered .......................................... 28
IV. Hearings ......................................................................................................... 28
V. Reports, Prints, and GAO Reports ............................................................... 43
VI. Official Communications ............................................................................... 60
VII. Legislative Actions ......................................................................................... 60
Measures Enacted Into Law ..................................................................... 61
Postal Naming Bills .................................................................................. 65
VIII. Activities of the Subcommittees ................................................................... 70
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS (PSI)
I. Historical Background ................................................................................... 70
A. Subcommittee Jurisdiction .................................................................. 70
B. Subcommittee Investigations ............................................................... 72
II. Subcommittee Hearings during the 116th Congress .................................. 78
III. Legislation Activities during the 116th Congress ....................................... 80
IV. Reports, Prints, and Studies ......................................................................... 82
V. GAO Reports .................................................................................................. 121
FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (FSO)
I. Authority ........................................................................................................ 123
II. Activity ........................................................................................................... 123
III. Legislation ...................................................................................................... 129
IV. GAO Reports .................................................................................................. 132
REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND FEDERAL MANAGEMENT (RAFM)
I. Authority ........................................................................................................ 135
II. Activity ........................................................................................................... 135
III. Legislation ...................................................................................................... 138
IV. GAO Reports .................................................................................................. 141
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117th CONGRESS SENATE REPORT
" !
1st Session 117–1
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
DURING THE 116TH CONGRESS
MARCH 1, 2021—Ordered to be printed
Mr. PETERS, from the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, submitted the following
REPORT
This report reviews the legislative and oversight activities of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and
its Subcommittees during the 116th Congress. These activities
were conducted pursuant to the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, as amended; by Rule XXV(k) of the Standing Rules of the
Senate; and by additional authorizing resolutions of the Senate.
See Section II, ‘‘Committee Jurisdiction,’’ for details.
Senator Ron Johnson was Chairman of the Committee during the
116th Congress; Senator Gary C. Peters was the Ranking Member.
Major activities of the Committee during the 116th Congress in-
cluded oversight and legislation involving border and immigration
security; cybersecurity; protecting critical infrastructure; combat-
ting terrorism; efficient functioning of the Department of Homeland
Security, including oversight of COVID–19 pandemic preparedness
and response; the Committee’s oversight of Federal programs; regu-
latory reform; and reducing waste, fraud and abuse in Federal
spending. Discussion of these major activities appears in Section I
below; additional information on these and other measures appears
in Section VII, ‘‘Legislative Actions.’’
Extensive information about the Committee’s history, hearings,
legislation, documents, Subcommittees, and other matters is avail-
able at the Web site, http://hsgac.senate.gov/.
I. HIGHLIGHTS OF ACTIVITIES
In the 116th Congress, the Committee carried out its mission
statement ‘‘to enhance the economic and national security of Amer-
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ica and promote more efficient, effective, and accountable govern-
ment.’’ The Committee approved 104 bills, not including bills to
name United States Post Offices, 51 of which were passed by the
United States Senate, and 37 of which were ultimately signed into
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law. The Committee also held 50 hearings and roundtables and
confirmed 30 nominees. Priority areas for the Committee’s work
are discussed below.
A. BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY
Legal loopholes continue to create an incentive for people to
make the dangerous journey to the United States. This Congress,
the Committee continued to lay out the reality of the challenges
the nation faces securing the southwest border, and worked with
Members of the Committee and the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS, or the Department) to find bipartisan solutions to ad-
dress the humanitarian crisis occurring along the southwest bor-
der. Continuing the Committee’s emphasis on border security, the
Committee held more than 35 bipartisan staff briefings; took staff
delegation trips to various locations across the southwest border,
Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala; convened seven hearings fo-
cused on border security; and used what we learned to inform pro-
posals to improve border security including Operation Safe Return.
Below are highlights from some of the hearings.
At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By the
Numbers, the Committee heard directly from border security ex-
perts.1 The hearing highlighted the border security and humani-
tarian crisis at the southwest border. Witnesses spoke about the
changing trends in illegal border crossings and how the exploi-
tation of legal loopholes overwhelmed the personnel and resources
at the border.
At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Per-
spectives from the Frontline, Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Drug Enforcement
Agency, and Health and Human Services (HHS) frontline employ-
ees told the Committee about the migration crisis at the southwest
border and compared apprehension data to prior trends.2 CBP and
ICE employees testified about the components’ need for additional
resources to keep up with the surge in unaccompanied alien chil-
dren and family unit apprehensions.
At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The
Exploitation of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and In-
voluntary Servitude, the Committee heard testimony from ICE,
U.S. Border Patrol, and Office of Field Operations about the dif-
ferent aspects and phases of exploitation, including the current
trends, and costs associated with human smuggling and trafficking
across the southwest border. The Committee heard directly from
the agencies that encountered cases of smuggling, trafficking, and
involuntary servitude, including the case of a three-year-old boy
who was abandoned in a cornfield between Mexico and Texas, with
just his name and phone number written on his shoes.3 The hear-
ing highlighted how illegal immigrants, including MS13 gang mem-
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1 Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By the Numbers: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
2 Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Perspectives from the Frontline: Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
3 Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Exploitation of Migrants through
Smuggling, Trafficking, and Involuntary Servitude: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs,116th Cong. (2019).
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bers, fraudulently use unrelated children to gain entry into the
United States.
On July 17, 2019, the Committee held a roundtable titled, Un-
precedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan Pol-
icy Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Coun-
cil. The roundtable was an important discussion about the Home-
land Security Advisory Council’s bipartisan assessment of the mi-
gration crisis and policy recommendations for mitigating the flow
and preventing similar crises in the future.4
At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What
is required to Improve Conditions, Acting Commissioner Mark Mor-
gan explained the need for additional aid for transportation, tem-
porary facilities, and additional beds to address the border crisis.
Then-DHS Acting Inspector General Jennifer Costello explained
the findings of a Management Alert issued on July 2, 2019.5 The
Committee discussed how CBP was forced to hold crowds of mi-
grants in temporary facilities while migrants waited to be trans-
ferred to a more long-term ICE facility, resulting in prolonged wait
times and overcrowding.
At Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The
Year in Review, the Committee highlighted the shift in migrant de-
mographics from single males from Mexico to families and children
from Central America. Witnesses provided testimony on the Trump
administration’s actions over the past year to curb illegal immigra-
tion, including the Migrant Protection Protocol, the Flores Settle-
ment Agreement Rule, the Third Country Asylum Rule, regional
cooperation from Mexico, and Agreements with Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and El Salvador. The hearing noted how in Fiscal Year
2019, 977,509 individuals were apprehended or found to be inad-
missible by CBP at the southwest border.6
At CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing
the Agency, Acting Commissioner Mark Morgan testified about how
CBP is using the Title 42 public health authorities to prohibit the
entry of migrants crossing the border in response to the
COVID–19 pandemic. The hearing examined how CBP has ad-
justed its processes and enforcement actions while continuing to
enable lawful trade, travel, and migration. The Acting Commis-
sioner indicated that the tactics of illegal crossing has changed and
smugglers are now using concealment techniques, such as dan-
gerously confining migrants in tractor-trailers, to enter illegally
through ports of entry.7
Chairman Johnson released a majority staff report, titled Judi-
cial Rulings Ending the Obama Administration’s Family Detention
Policy: Implications for Illegal Immigration and Border Security.
The report highlighted the staggering increase of family unit illegal
border crossings since the 2015 court reinterpretation of the Flores
Settlement Agreement and how the ruling entices migrant families
4 Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan Policy Recommendations
from the Homeland Security Advisory Council: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
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5 Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What Is Required to Improve Condi-
tions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong.
(2019).
6 Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Year in Review: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
7 CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the Agency: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
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to make the dangerous journey to the United States because they
know they will be released. The report noted how the Flores rein-
terpretation, combined with limited detention facilities, has forced
ICE to release families. In fiscal year 2015, when the courts rein-
terpreted the Flores Settlement Agreement, CBP apprehended
39,838 family units. At the end of fiscal year 2018, CBP appre-
hended a total of 107,212 family units.8
The Chairman released a majority staff report, titled How the
U.S. Immigration System Encourages Child Marriages. Chairman
Johnson drew attention to loopholes in Federal immigration law
that can be used to force children to marry for the purpose of re-
ceiving an immigration benefit. The report presented findings from
a yearlong bipartisan inquiry with then- Ranking Member Claire
McCaskill. The report noted that the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) approved immigration petitions for
8,686 spouses and fiancés in marriages involving minors from
FY2007 to FY2017.9 In 95 percent of the cases, the younger person
was a girl.10 Additionally, the report highlighted that USCIS ap-
proved 149 petitions involving a minor with an adult spouse or
fiancé who was more than 40 years old.11
The Committee approved eight bills related to securing our bor-
ders. Those bills included the Securing America’s Ports of Entry Act
of 2019, requiring CBP to hire 600 additional Office of Field Oper-
ations officers per year until CBP’s staffing needs are met. To en-
sure the borders are secure between the ports, the Committee also
approved the Securing America’s Borders Act of 2019, to require
CBP to hire at least 600 Border Patrol agents above attrition levels
each year. Two other bills approved by the Committee strengthen
CBP strategy and policies regarding opioid exposure and detection
at Ports of Entry.12 The Committee considered and approved two
additional bipartisan bills that would encourage technological ad-
vancements and planning, including by requiring DHS to perform
a thorough analysis of border security gaps and needs along the
southwest border.13
During the height of the crisis at the southwest border, Chair-
man Johnson worked with executive agencies to develop a stream-
lined process aimed at quickly and fairly processing family units
with asylum claims. Chairman Johnson and colleagues detailed
this process in a letter sent to President Trump requesting the im-
plementation of their Operation Safe Return proposal as a pilot
program.14 Operation Safe Return became the basis for two expe-
dited processing programs, Prompt Asylum Claim Review (known
as PACR) and Humanitarian Asylum Review Process (known as
HARP). CBP Acting Commissioner Mark Morgan testified before
the Committee that these programs bring a ‘‘whole-of-Government
8 Majority Staff Rpt., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Judicial Rulings
Ending the Obama Admin.’s Family Det. Policy: Implications for Illegal Immigration and Border
Security, 116th Cong. (2019).
9 Majority Staff Rpt., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, How the U.S. Im-
migration Sys. Encourages Child Marriages, 116th Cong., (2019).
10 Id.
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11 Id.
12 DHS Opioid Detection Resilience Act, H.R. 4761, 116th Cong. (2019); Synthetic Opioid Ex-
posure Prevention and Training Act, H.R. 4739, 116th Cong. (2019).
13 Securing America’s Ports Act, H.R. 5273, 116th Cong. (2019); Southwest Border Security
Technology Improvement Act, S. 4224, 116th Cong. (2020).
14 Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
to President Donald J. Trump (July 17, 2019) (on file with author).
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approach to the border’’ and allow processing to be more effective
and efficient.15
B. CYBERSECURITY
The United States continues to face an evolving cyber threat
landscape. According to IBM Security, the average total cost of a
data breach in the United States, which has the current highest
country average, is $8.64 million.16 DHS, notably the newly estab-
lished Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
provides capabilities and resources to support and secure Federal
civilian government networks and critical networks within the pri-
vate sector.17
Last Congress, the Committee moved legislation to establish
CISA through restructuring and renaming the Department’s
former National Protection and Programs Directorate.18 The Com-
mittee continued its oversight of CISA during the 116th Congress,
sending a bipartisan request to the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) to review and ensure CISA’s organizational
structure can effectively carry out its statutory responsibilities.19
In addition, Committee staff received multiple bipartisan briefings
from CISA on its reorganization efforts.20
The Committee held a number of cybersecurity roundtables and
hearings. On May 15, 2019, the Committee held a member meeting
with private sector critical infrastructure providers and cybersecu-
rity companies to explore Federal agency challenges in providing
effective support and resources to the private sector.21 The Com-
mittee learned that to effectively assist the private sector, the Fed-
eral Government needs to find new methods of imposing cost to
deter adversaries from using cyber means to achieve their goals.22
On October 31, 2019, the Committee held a hearing, Supply
Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G, to examine the
national security and economic challenges in competing with Chi-
nese-supported telecommunications companies in the race towards
5G (5th generation) wireless networks in the U.S. and globally.23
According to Committee testimony, Chinese companies own 36 per-
cent of all 5G wireless standard-essential patents, compared to only
14 percent held in the United States.24 Additionally, the U.S. has
no domestic manufacturer of key 5G equipment.25 Candid testi-
15 CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the Agency: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
16 IBM Security, 2020 Cost of a Data Breach Report, https://www.ibm.com/security/digital-as-
sets/cost-data-breach-report/#/.
17 Dep’t of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Cybersecu-
rity Division Mission and Vision, https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-division.
18 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–278 (115th
Cong.).
19 Letter from S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs to U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office (May 29, 2019) (CISA Review) (on file with Comm. staff).
20 See, e.g., Comm. Majority and Minority Staff Briefing (CISA Reorg) (Sept. 3, 2019); Comm.
Majority and Minority Staff Briefing (CISA 2020) (Dec. 12, 2019); Comm. Majority and Minority
Staff Briefing (CISA Central) (June 10, 2020).
21 HSGAC Member Meeting, Cybersecurity Roles and Responsibilities: Private Sector Perspec-
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tives (May 15, 2019).
22 Id.
23 Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
supply-chain-security-global-competitiveness-and-5g.
24 Id. (Testimony of Jessica Rosenworcel).
25 Id.
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mony from four Federal agencies raised concerns about the nation’s
ability to compete with China on the deployment of 5G and in glob-
al Information Communications Technology marketplaces.26
On February 11, 2020, the Committee held a hearing, What
States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and Do:
A Roadmap for EffectiveCybersecurity.27 The purpose of this hear-
ing was to examine how state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
governments and critical infrastructure owners and operators can
mitigate and protect against persistent cybersecurity threats.28
This hearing also examined the current threat environment, in-
cluding ransomware.29 During the hearing, CISA’s then-director,
Christopher Krebs, discussed the voluntary services provided to
SLTTs, such as vulnerability scanning, malware analysis, and tech-
nical expertise.30 He also discussed the rise in ransomware attacks,
which in 2019, ‘‘impacted at least 966 government agencies, edu-
cational establishments and healthcare providers at a potential
cost of $7.5 billion.’’31 State officials from Texas and Michigan also
discussed responding to cyber events, including ransomware at-
tacks, and how CISA can better collaborate and assist SLTT gov-
ernments.32
On May 13, 2020, the Committee held another hearing, Evolving
the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing the Cyber-
space Solarium Commission Report.33 The purpose of this hearing
was to discuss the findings and recommendations of the Commis-
sion’s report, and build consensus around a possible path forward
to enact its key recommendations.34 One chief finding reviewed by
the Committee was that the Federal Government has a unique un-
derstanding of threat actors and vulnerabilities in the nation’s crit-
ical infrastructure, but there are limits to systemically identify,
warn, and assist those that are vulnerable.35 As a result, the Com-
mission recommended granting CISA the authority to issue admin-
istrative subpoenas to support threat and vulnerability mitigation
activities.36
Throughout the Congress, the Committee worked to understand
legal constraints around information sharing and the dissemination
of information technology vulnerabilities to at risk entities. CISA
briefed the Committee on the need to identify and warn the na-
tion’s critical infrastructure owners and operators of potentially
26 Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
supply-chain-security-global-competitiveness-and-5g.
27 What States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and Do: A Roadmap for
Effective Cybersecurity, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Af-
fairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. Testimony of Christopher Krebs.
31 Id. Testimony of Christopher Krebs.
32 What States, Locals, and the Business Community Should Know and Do: A Roadmap for
Effective Cybersecurity, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Af-
fairs, 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony of Amanda Crawford, Executive Director, Department of
Information Resources, State of Texas); see also Testimony of Christopher DeRusha, Chief Secu-
rity Officer, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Office, State of Michigan.
33 Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing the Cyberspace Solarium
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Commission Report: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/evolving-the-us-cybersecurity-strategy-and-pos-
ture-reviewing-the-cyberspace-solarium-commission-report.
34 Id.
35 U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report, 100 (March 2020), https://www.solarium.gov/
report.
36 Id.
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vulnerable technologies.37 The Committee then worked with stake-
holders to find consensus, and approved legislation authorizing
CISA to issue administrative subpoenas to alert U.S. critical infra-
structure owners and operators about potential cybersecurity
vulnerabilities identified by the agency.38 The legislation was en-
acted in the FY2021 NDAA.39
The Committee considered and passed approximately 15 addi-
tional cybersecurity bills during the 116th Congress. The Com-
mittee views these pieces of legislation as important efforts to gen-
erate efficient use of Federal resources to improve the security of
Federal and non-Federal networks. This includes legislation to bet-
ter coordinate Federal resources and information to assist State
and local cybersecurity efforts;40 legislation to establish a Cyberse-
curity Advisory Committee within CISA;41 legislation to facilitate
use of the .gov domain by State and local governments;42 legisla-
tion to authorize DHS’ hunt and incident response teams;43 and
legislation to create a security acquisitions cycle for Internet of
Things devices procured by Federal agencies.44
C. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Our nation’s critical infrastructure has been deemed ‘‘so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such sys-
tems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, na-
tional economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.’’45 These vital sectors are primarily
owned and operated by the private sector.46 CISA assists a variety
of stakeholders, including Federal departments and agencies, busi-
nesses, and State, local, tribal and territorial governments, in
strengthening the nation’s critical infrastructure against cyber and
physical threats.47
Electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) and geomagnetic disturbances
(GMDs) are both classified as low probability/high impact events.48
If an EMP or substantial GMD were to occur, they could inflict sig-
nificant damage on the nation’s critical infrastructure. Through the
Committee’s oversight last Congress, the Committee found that
Federal mitigation efforts to address these threats has been inad-
equate. As a result, one of the first hearings the Committee held
during the 116th Congress, Perspectives on Protecting the Electric
Grid from an Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance,
37 Comm. Majority and Minority Classified Staff Briefing (CISA Legislative Proposal) (June
13, 2019).
38 S. 3045, Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and Notification Act of 2020 (116th.
Cong).
39 FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 116–283 (116th Cong.) (2021).
40 S. 3207, Cybersecurity State Coordinator Act of 2020 (116th Cong). See also S.1846, State
and Local Government Cybersecurity Act of 2019 (116th Cong.).
41 S. 4024, Cybersecurity Advisory Committee Authorization Act of 2020 (116th Cong.).
42 S. 2749, DOTGOV Act of 2019 (116th Cong.) (enacted in larger legislation in January 2021).
43 S. 315, DHS Cyber Hunt and Incident Response Teams Act of 2019 (116th Cong.).
44 S. 734, Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019 (116th Cong.) (enacted
in larger legislation in January 2021).
45 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Direc-
tive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013), available at https://
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obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-in-
frastructure-security-and-resil.
46 Dep’t of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Critical In-
frastructure Sector Partnerships. https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships.
47 Dep’t of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Infrastruc-
ture Security. https://www.cisa.gov/infrastructure-security.
48 Comm. staff briefing by the U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Feb. 7, 2019).
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examined different viewpoints from eleven representatives from the
public, private, and nonprofit sectors on potential EMP and GMD
mitigation solutions to protect the U.S. electric grid.49 During the
hearing, witnesses were asked about actionable and achievable
goals to mitigate against EMPs and GMDs.50
On March 26, 2019, the Trump Administration took effective ac-
tion to start moving the Federal Government toward EMP and
GMD mitigation efforts through issuing Executive Order 13865,
Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic Pulses.51
Through recommendations from the Committee’s hearing, and
working with witnesses on potential action items, Chairman John-
son determined that Congress should codify portions of the Execu-
tive Order to ensure agencies comply with its requirements and
provide congressional stakeholders valuable information to oversee
and support the development of appropriate mitigation solutions.
Toward that end, he sponsored a bipartisan amendment to the
FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act that was adopted by
unanimous consent in the Senate-passed bill52 and ultimately en-
acted.53 The language requires the administration to coordinate
and evaluate relevant vulnerabilities; assess mitigation solutions
and harden approaches; and develop, update and implement spe-
cific benchmarks and plans.54 Codifying these requirements will
not only help protect our nation’s critical infrastructure from the
potentially catastrophic effects of EMPs and GMDs, but also from
other national security threats, such as cyberattacks and natural
disasters.
The Committee continued its oversight of the Department’s
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 au-
thorized DHS to regulate high-risk chemical facilities to prevent
terrorists from acquiring or utilizing certain chemicals for an at-
tack.55 DHS manages the CFATS program under CISA’s Infra-
structure Security Division.56 Through CFATS, DHS sets standards
and regulates security for approximately 3,299 chemical facilities
nationwide.57
CISA focuses ‘‘around raising awareness among the broader com-
munity on the need for critical infrastructure security and resil-
ience and enhancing their current efforts. Public-private partner-
ships are vital to this effort as everyone has a role in securing the
nation’s critical infrastructure.’’58 These types of public-private
49 Roundtable: Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an Electromagnetic Pulse or
Geomagnetic Disturbance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Af-
fairs, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/perspectives-on-protecting-the-
electric-grid-from-an-electromagnetic-pulse-or-geomagnetic-disturbance.
50 Id.
51 Exec. Order No. 13865, 84 Fed. Reg. 12041 (March 26, 2019).
52 S. 1790, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Section 6006 (116th Con-
gress).
53 Id. at Section 1740 (116th Congress) (Pub. Law 116–92).
54 Id.
55 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109–295, § 550, 120 Stat.
1355, 1388–1389 (2006). See also Frank Gottron, Cong. Research Serv., IF10853, Chemical Fa-
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cility Anti-Terrorism Standards (2020), available at http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IF10853.
56 CISA Chemical Security, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security
Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/cisa-chemical-security (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
57 CFATS Monthly Statistics, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security
Agency, https://www.cisa.gov/cfats-monthly-statistics (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
58 Dep’t of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Infrastruc-
ture Security. https://www.cisa.gov/infrastructure-security.
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9
partnerships are naturally intended to be non-regulatory.59 How-
ever, the CFATS program is one of three regulatory programs at
DHS and the only one under CISA.60 The Committee examined a
number of regulatory reforms to evolve the CFATS program, in-
cluding opportunities to streamline and harmonize the program’s
regulatory requirements61 and determine whether CFATS effec-
tively reduces risk.62
Chairman Johnson and Senator Mike Enzi sent letters to DHS
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) requesting information regarding the CFATS program’s reg-
ulation of explosive materials.63 DHS documents confirmed that
ATF was opposed to the inclusion of 18 U.S.C Chapter 40 regulated
explosives being included in the CFATS program.64 Moreover, GAO
is in the final stages of a report started at the request of the Com-
mittee to examine potential fragmentation, overlap and duplication
with CFATS and other regulatory regimes.65 Although the report
is not yet complete, GAO has confirmed during staff briefings that
there is duplication between regulations and elements of the
CFATS program and other Federal regulatory regimes, including
ATF.66
On June 4, 2019, the Committee held a roundtable, Sensibly Re-
forming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program,
to examine the effectiveness of the CFATS program and identify
areas for improvement.67 A number of industry witnesses discussed
the challenges of being regulated by multiple Federal and state
agencies, and explained how their regulatory regimes overlap with
CFATS in various capacities.68 In addition, GAO testified that the
59 U.S. Congressional Research Service. Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy
Considerations for Congress (R45809; July 8, 2019).
60 Id. (‘‘The Homeland Security Act created an organization—DHS—with wide-ranging respon-
sibilities, but relatively narrow regulatory mandates. The Transportation Security Administra-
tion has (but does not exercise) regulatory oversight over oil and gas pipeline security. The
Coast Guard regulates certain aspects of port security—a mission that long predates the trans-
fer of the service to DHS under the Homeland Security Act. Finally, CISA directly regulates
certain chemical facilities under the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards program to
prevent terrorist exploitation of the chemical industry.’’)
61 See, e.g., Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong.
(2019); Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to Sec’y Kirstjen Nielsen
(Mar. 29, 2019) (CFATS overlap with ATF regulations) (on file with HSGAC staff); Letter from
Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to Thomas Brandon, Dir., Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (Mar. 29, 2019) (CFATS overlap with ATF regulations) (on
file with HSGAC staff); Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Sen.
Gary Peters to Sec’y Kirstjen Nielsen (Mar. 22, 2019) (Status of DHS’s CFATS program audit)
(on file with HSGAC staff).
62 Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs (statement of Nathan
Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland Sec. & Justice Team, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office),
116th Cong. (2019). See also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–18–538, Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection (2018), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/693817.pdf.
63 Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen. Mike Enzi to Sec’y Kirstjen Nielsen (Mar.
29, 2019) (on file with HSGAC staff). See also Letter from Chairman Sen. Ron Johnson and Sen.
Mike Enzi to Thomas Brandon, Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (Mar.
29, 2019) (on file with HSGAC staff).
64 Id.
65 Letter from S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs to U.S. Government Ac-
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countability Office (Aug. 20, 2019) (on file with Comm. staff).
66 Comm. staff briefing U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Sept. 3, 2020).
67 Roundtable: Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/sensibly-reforming-the-chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards-
program.
68 Id.
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10
CFATS program still does not evaluate or measure vulnerability re-
duction.69
On March 5, 2020, Chairman Johnson introduced S.3416, Pro-
tecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act
of 2020.70 This legislation had a number of proposed reforms to
provide regulatory relief to industry, including exempting duplica-
tive explosive materials regulated by ATF, and additional metrics
to help the program evaluate and measure risk reduction.71 How-
ever, the Committee could not reach bipartisan consensus to reform
CFATS. As a result, the CFATS program was reauthorized without
changes for three years and is set to expire on July 27, 2023.72
The Committee also conducted oversight of the Department’s Na-
tional Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center’s (NISAC)
COVID–19 response. The NISAC is housed in CISA’s National Risk
Management Center, and responsible for conducting simulation,
modeling, and analysis of cyber and physical risks to the nation’s
sixteen critical infrastructure sectors.73 This includes a number of
pandemic analyses, such as the 2007 H5N1 bird flu, 2009 H1N1 in-
fluenza, 2014 Ebola virus disease, and 2016 Zika virus disease.74
In March 2020, news reports circulated that the NISAC ceased its
pandemic work in 2017.75 This was confirmed during a bipartisan
Committee staff phone call with department officials on April 15,
2020.76 As a result, Department officials had issues locating these
prior pandemic analyses at the start of the COVID–19 pandemic.77
If readily available when needed, the past pandemic modeling, sim-
ulation, and analyses conducted by the NISAC could have assisted
the Federal Government’s response. To that end, Chairman John-
son introduced S. 4157, National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center Pandemic Modeling Act of 2020, to clarify the
NISAC’s authority and capabilities, and ensure the proper entities
receive information on current projects and priorities, prior work,
69 Id. (Statement of Nathan Anderson, Acting Director, Homeland Sec. & Justice Team, U.S.
Gov’t Accountability Office).
70 S. 3416, Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2020
(116th Cong.).
71 Id.
72 S. 4148, A bill to extend the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program of the
Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 116–150 (116th Cong.).
73 James Platt, U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, National Risk Manage-
ment Center (June 2019), https://www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/meetings/2019-06/platt.pdf
(referring to NISAC slide). See also About the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/about-national-infrastructure-sim-
ulation-and-analysis-center (last published June 27, 2016).
74 Call from Majority and Minority Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, to Bob Kolasky, Director, National Risk Management Center, and sup-
porting staff, National Risk Management Center and National Infrastructure Simulation and
Analysis Center (April 15, 2020, 11:00 AM) (notes on file with Committee Majority staff).
75 Daniel Lippman, DHS Wound Down Pandemic Models Before Coronavirus Struck, POLIT-
ICO (Mar. 24, 2020, 8:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/24/dhs-pandemic-
coronavirus-146884; see also Kayla Epstein, A Bureaucratic Fight Halted a Vital Department of
Homeland Security Program that Helped Model Pandemics in 2017, Bus. Insider (Mar. 25, 2020,
11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-dhs-reportedly-shut-down-pandemic-
modeling-program-in-2017-2020-3.
76 Call from Majority and Minority Staff, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, to Bob Kolasky, Director, National Risk Management Center, and sup-
porting staff, National Risk Management Center and National Infrastructure Simulation and
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Analysis Center (April 15, 2020, 11:00 AM) (notes on file with Committee Majority staff).
77 Daniel Lippman, DHS Wound Down Pandemic Models Before Coronavirus Struck, POLIT-
ICO (Mar. 24, 2020, 8:47 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/24/dhs-pandemic-
coronavirus-146884; see also Kayla Epstein, A Bureaucratic Fight Halted a Vital Department of
Homeland Security Program that Helped Model Pandemics in 2017, Bus. Insider (Mar. 25, 2020,
11:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-dhs-reportedly-shut-down-pandemic-
modeling-program-in-2017-2020-3.
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and specific pandemic information.78 The legislation was cospon-
sored by Ranking Member Peters and Senator Margaret Wood Has-
san, and was reported favorably by the Committee at the July 22,
2020 business meeting.79
Finally, throughout the 116th Congress, the Committee con-
ducted oversight of CISA’s efforts to provide voluntary election se-
curity assistance to State and local government officials. This in-
cludes more than 50 staff and member meetings, briefings, and
document reviews on various election security topics.80 The Com-
mittee also held a February 2020 hearing, What States, Locals and
the Business Community Should Know and Do: A Roadmap for Ef-
fective Cybersecurity, in which election security was discussed.81
Christopher Krebs, then-Director of CISA, discussed how the agen-
cy assists State and local governments to address concerns and re-
sources provided to protect election infrastructure in preparation
for the 2020 election.82 Director Krebs also discussed the current
risks in elections, including vulnerabilities within voter files and
voter registration databases.83
D. TERRORISM
In recent years, the United States has seen a shifting terrorist
threat landscape. Although the threat of international terrorism
and homegrown violent extremism continues, there has been a rise
in domestic terrorism. To combat the threats facing the United
States, the Federal Government has had to adapt its counterter-
rorism efforts to address emerging and evolving trends. It has been
increasingly evident that the counterterrorism practices of years’
past may not address the full scope of threats facing the United
States. The threat of domestic terrorism requires dedicated atten-
tion and proper resource allocation. In recognition of this, the Com-
mittee engaged in bipartisan oversight aimed at evaluating how
the Federal Government addresses, prioritizes and allocates for the
full spectrum of terrorist threats. Specifically, the Committee ex-
amined the Federal Government’s efforts to counter domestic ter-
rorism while balancing the broad range of threats to the homeland.
On May 8, 2019, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Peters
sent letters to DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting documents and infor-
mation on their respective efforts.84 The Committee found that
there was no consistent or unified system for understanding, track-
ing, and reporting on domestic terrorism across agencies. The Com-
mittee also found that the agencies have been engaged in inter-
78 S. 4157, National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center Pandemic Modeling Act
of 2020 (116th Cong.).
79 Id.
80 Summary of election meetings attended by Chairman Ron Johnson, 116th Congress. On file
with Committee Majority staff.
81 What States, Locals and the Business Community Should Know and Do: A Roadmap for
Effective Cybersecurity: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Af-
fairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/what-states-locals-and-the-business-com-
munity-should-know-and-do-a-roadmap-for-effective-cybersecurity.
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82 Id. Statement of Christopher Krebs, Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.).
83 Id.
84 Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs
Senate Comm. and Senator Gary C. Peters, Ranking Member of Homeland Sec. and Govern-
mental Affairs Senate Comm., to Hon. William Barr, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May
8, 2019) (on file with author).
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agency communication and conduct ongoing outreach to SLTT law
enforcement agencies.
The Committee held three hearings and one roundtable to exam-
ine the shifting terrorist threat landscape and heard testimony
from both terrorism subject matter experts from various research
institutions and Federal Government officials from DHS, the FBI,
and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).85 The Commit-
tee’s first hearing on terrorism threats in the 116th Congress was
the first hearing in the Committee’s history to focus solely on do-
mestic terrorism.
Based on the findings of the May 8, 2019 letter and the multiple
hearings, Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Peters intro-
duced the Terrorism Reporting and Classifying Act of 2019 (TRAC
Act), which would establish a unified database and reporting re-
quirements for DHS, the FBI, and NCTC to better track and un-
derstand domestic terrorism in the broader terrorism threat land-
scape.86 Chairman Johnson and Ranking Member Peters were suc-
cessful in getting much of the language from the TRAC Act into the
2019 National Defense Authorization Act, enacted in December
2019. The law now requires DHS, the FBI and NCTC to establish
joint definitions and interpretations of terrorism-related termi-
nology, establish unified tracking systems for incidents of domestic
terrorism, submit joint, annual reports to Congress, and make the
reports public.
Foreign fighters continue to pose a threat to the homeland, as
they travel overseas to train and participate in terrorist activities.
In 2019, the Committee approved and Congress enacted the Ter-
rorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Exercise Act of 2019.87 The Act
requires DHS to conduct exercises to improve detection of terrorist
and foreign fighter travel. By building on DHS’ national exercise
framework, this legislation will improve collaboration among key
partners and stakeholders in counterterrorism and travel.
The Committee approved six other bills to help the U.S. improve
its ability to counter terrorist attacks and harden soft targets.
Those bills include the DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment
Program Act of 2019, to codify the DHS Office of Intelligence and
Analysis’ intelligence rotational assignment program which im-
proves coordination and communication with intra-agency part-
ners;88 the Luke and Alex School Safety Act of 2019, to establish
a Federal Clearinghouse on School Safety Best Practices for use by
State and local educational and law enforcement agencies, institu-
tions of higher education, health professionals, and the public;89
the Protecting Faith-Based and Nonprofit Organizations From Ter-
rorism Act of 2019, which requires the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) to extend its Nonprofit Grant Program to eli-
gible nonprofits at risk of terrorist attacks to improve target hard-
ening and other security measures;90 the Counter Threats Advisory
85 Countering Domestic Terrorism: Examining the Evolving Threat: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019), Threats to the Home-
land: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong.
TKELLEY on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE REPORTS
(2019), Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Govern-
mental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
86 S. 3118, (116th Cong.).
87 H.R. 1590 (116th Cong.).
88 H.R. 2066 (116th Cong.).
89 S. 2779 (116th Cong.).
90 H.R. 1539 (116th Cong.).
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13
Board Act of 2019, which authorizes DHS to establish an advisory
board tasked with evaluating the current threat environment and
DHS’ ability to counter such threats;91 the DHS Overseas Personnel
Enhancement Act of 2019, which requires DHS to annually brief
congressional homeland security committees on the work of DHS
personnel serving overseas, including challenges to counterter-
rorism missions;92 and the Reporting Efficiently to Proper Officials
in Response to Terrorism Act of 2019, which requires Federal agen-
cies to submit a report to Congress in the year following an inves-
tigation of an act of terrorism.93
E. DHS REFORMS AND COVID–19 RESPONSE
The Committee has primary responsibility for overseeing and au-
thorizing DHS. This Congress, the Committee built on the signifi-
cant actions it took in the 115th Congress to improve the Depart-
ment’s management and operations. Specifically, the Committee ex-
ercised its oversight authority through hearings, legislation, and
briefings in an effort to improve the execution of DHS’s manage-
ment functions and operational capabilities. Since its establishment
more than 17 years ago, DHS faced arguably some of its greatest
challenges in 2020 with the onset of the COVID–19 pandemic and
the rise of civil unrest throughout the United States.
1. COVID–19 OVERSIGHT
On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization was in-
formed that there was a cluster of atypical pneumonia cases in
Wuhan, China.94 This abnormal activity was later determined to be
the spread of a novel coronavirus known as SARS–CoV–2, the se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome that causes the COVID–19 dis-
ease. By January 21, 2020, the first-known case of COVID–19 in
the United States was confirmed in Seattle, Washington. As the
worldwide transmission of the virus accelerated, the Secretary of
HHS, Alex Azar, declared a Public Health Emergency.95
On February 12, 2020, the Committee held a roundtable to dis-
cuss our nation’s state of preparedness for a global pandemic.96
One of the participants, Dr. Scott Gottlieb, discussed the insecurity
of the U.S. medical supply chain and how the overreliance on a for-
eign nation, such as China, can leave our nation in a vulnerable
position while trying to acquire critical drugs and personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE) during a global health crisis.97 This was par-
ticularly concerning to the Committee given previous studies indi-
cating that 72 percent of the U.S. active pharmaceutical ingredient
supply that is necessary to finish critical drugs was manufactured
outside of the U.S., with China accounting for 13 percent of that
91 S. 411 (116th Cong.).
92 H.R. 2590 (116th Cong.).
93 S. 2513 (116th Cong.).
94 1AWorld Health Organization, Coronavirus disease (COVID–19) outbreak, https://
www.who.int/westernpacific/emergencies/novel-coronavirus.
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95 Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel
Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020) https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-
public-health-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html.
96 Are We Prepared? Protecting the U.S. from Global Pandemics, Roundtable Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/are-we-prepared-protecting-the-us-from-global-pandemics.
97 Id. (statement of Dr. Scott Gottlieb).
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14
capacity.98 Following the roundtable, the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Committee requested that the Secretaries of DHS
and HHS inform the American public about our existing
vulnerabilities, actions that have been taken to address the poten-
tial shortages, and how DHS and FEMA are protecting their work-
force and the American people should COVID–19 become a health
crisis in the U.S.99
The Committee held a hearing with the HHS Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Senior Official Per-
forming the Duties of Deputy Secretary at DHS.100 In that hearing,
the HHS ASPR told the Committee that the Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS), the Federal resource to ‘‘supplement State and
local supplies during public health emergencies’’, held 35 million
N95 respirators.101 Given the concerns that a pandemic was mate-
rializing, these levels seemed insufficient to address a nationwide
public health emergency, with one Committee member stating, ‘‘[i]t
strikes me that we should have substantially more.’’102
On March 13, 2020, President Trump invoked section 501(b) of
the Stafford Act to extend Federal assistance to all States, tribes,
territories, and the District of Columbia.103 Given the anticipation
of a shortage of critical drugs and PPE, the Committee focused on
examining the Federal Government’s procurement and distribution
strategies to understand what authorities and practices they were
exercising to meet the demand of States across the country.104 Dur-
ing this hearing, FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Ad-
miral John Polowczyk described the Federal Government’s ingenu-
ities, such as Project Airbridge, which expedited the shipping of
critical supplies to our nation’s ‘‘hotspot’’ areas to address supply
shortages.105 Members of the Committee recommended the Senate,
‘‘reexamine what our domestic manufacturing (is) for those supplies
that we were in such a desperate moment that we had to be able
to move via an air bridge from Asia? Why aren’t we producing
those domestically and what can we do to create more domestic
supply?’’106
To understand the concern of domestic manufacturing and sup-
ply, but also examine what the Federal Government could improve
98 Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director—Center for Drug Evaluations and Research, U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee Energy
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health (October 30, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
congressional-testimony/safeguarding-pharmaceutical-supply-chains-global-economy-10302019
99 S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Letter to HHS & DHS (Feb. 27,
2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/200228—Letter—HHS—DHS—
Coronavirus.pdf.
100 The Federal Interagency Response to the Coronavirus and Preparing for Future Global
Pandemics, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th
Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-federal-interagency-response-to-the-coronavirus-
and-preparing-for-future-global-pandemics.
101 Strategic National Stockpile, Off. of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness & Response,
https://www.phe.gov/about/sns/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Jan. 7, 2021); The Federal Inter-
agency Response to the Coronavirus and Preparing for Future Global Pandemics, Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020) (Statement of Dr.
Robert Kadlec), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-federal-interagency-response-to-the-
coronavirus-and-preparing-for-future-global-pandemics.
102 Id. (Statement of Sen. Mitt Romney).
103 Federal Emergency Management Agency, COVID–19 Emergency Declaration, Mar. 13,
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2020, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210121/covid-19-emergency-declaration.
104 Evaluating the Federal Government’s Procurement and Distribution Strategies in Response
to the COVID–19 Pandemic, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/evaluating-the-federal-governments-
procurement-and-distribution-strategies-in-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic.
105 Id. (Statement of Peter T. Gaynor and John Polowcyzk).
106 Id. (Statement of Sen. James Lankford).
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15
upon, the Committee held a hearing on the SNS.107 During the
hearing, Chairman Ron Johnson asserted that supply and demand
challenges precipitated from ‘‘a lack of clarity and understanding of
exactly what the SNS’s role is, and what it should be.’’108 The
Chairman further stated that, ‘‘[w]e are paying the price for this
lack of articulation and clarity during the current pandemic.’’109 To
address these challenges, the Chairman introduced S. 4204, the
Federal Emergency Pandemic Response Act (FEPRA), and S. 4210,
the Securing Healthcare and Response Equipment (SHARE) Act.
FEPRA requires the Office of Management and Budget to convene
an interagency task force to evaluate the components of the SNS.
As part of that evaluation, it requires the interagency taskforce to
identify the current inventory levels of the SNS, what the levels
should be so they are sufficient to address the needs of a pandemic,
where the stockpiles should be located, and whether or not the cur-
rent SNS name aligns with the mission determined by the task
force. SHARE gives DHS the authority to share critical supplies
with HHS to distribute out of the SNS if the Secretary of DHS has
determined that their supplies exceed what is necessary to protect
their own workforce. The Committee considered FEPRA and
SHARE during their July 22, 2020 business meeting and reported
the bills out of Committee favorably.110
To better prepare DHS for any future pandemic, the Committee
passed the National Response Framework Improvement Act of
2020.111 This legislation would require the Administrator of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assess the ef-
fectiveness of the National Response Framework during the
COVID–19 pandemic and develop a report that includes its find-
ings and recommendations for improvement.112 Incorporating the
recommendations into the National Response Framework could
bring much needed reforms to the way DHS and its partner agen-
cies respond to pandemics going forward.
On July 28, 2020, at the Oversight of COVID–19 Financial Relief
Packages hearing, several private sector witnesses testified about
how the various financial relief packages enacted by Congress had
been used. The witnesses also discussed reforms and oversight still
needed, as well as unintended consequences from certain provisions
in the enacted financial relief packages.113
In response to concerns from medical doctors throughout the
country treating COVID–19 patients, Chairman Johnson also fo-
cused attention on the unfortunate lack of Federal efforts to de-
velop early treatment options for COVID–19, and social media’s ac-
tions to keep information about potential early treatments from the
public. On August 18, 2020, Senators Johnson, Lee and Cruz sent
a letter to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) request-
ing information regarding the FDA’s Emergency Use Authorization
107 The Role of the Strategic National Stockpile in Pandemic Response, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/the-role-of-the-strategic-national-stockpile-in-pandemic-response.
108 Id. (Statement of Chairman Ron Johnson).
109 Id.
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110 Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th
Cong.(2020) https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/07/15/2020/business-meeting-.
111 S. 4153 (116th Cong.).
112 Id.
113 Oversight of COVID–19 Financial Relief Packages: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Home-
land Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/oversight-
of-covid-19-financial-relief-packages.
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16
(EUA) decisions. The letter stressed the importance of allowing
physicians to ‘‘make the best medical and treatment decisions for
their patients, use their ‘‘off-label’ prescription rights, and have full
access to FDA approved drugs.’’114
On November 19 and December 8, 2020, the Committee held a
two-part hearing on these concerns, titled Early Outpatient Treat-
ment—An Essential Part of a COVID–19 Solution. These hearings
asked medical practitioners to address how they provided early out-
patient treatment for COVID–19 patients in the absence of guid-
ance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and treatment
protocols they had developed. The physicians discussed their expe-
riences using widely available, low-cost drugs to prevent disease
progression and hospitalization.115
On November 23, 2020, Senators Johnson, Lee and Cruz sent a
follow up letter to the FDA to reiterate the requests in the August
18, 2020 letter that had gone unanswered and to stress the impor-
tance of early outpatient treatment for COVID–19.116
Following the December 8th hearing, Senators Johnson and Paul
sent a letter to the National Institute of Health (NIH) highlighting
a promising early treatment—ivermectin—that was discussed in
the hearing. The letter asked NIH to examine recent studies of
ivermectin and provide an update on early outpatient treatments
that are currently under NIH review.117 On February 11, 2021, the
NIH updated its COVID–19 Treatment Guidelines to a neutral po-
sition while further studies gather additional data on its effective-
ness as a treatment for COVID–19.118
2. OTHER DHS OVERSIGHT
To enhance and reform DHS’s relationship with its SLTT part-
ners, the Committee passed legislation providing DHS with the au-
thority to collaborate and share information. The DHS Field En-
gagement Accountability Act, approved by the Committee and en-
acted in 2020, enables DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis to
work with fusion centers, which play an important role in counter-
intelligence and counterterrorism efforts.119 This legislation refines
DHS’s information sharing apparatus and improves its ability to
mitigate and prevent threats to the homeland.120 Additionally, the
Committee held a hearing on August 6, 2020, to examine DHS’ ef-
forts to protect Federal property and personnel during protests
114 Letter from Sens. Johnson, Lee, Cruz to Stephen Hahn, FDA Commissioner (Aug. 18,
2020), available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-lee-cruz-call-for-
explanation-into-fdas-emergency-use-authorization-decisions-.
115 Early Outpatient Treatment—An Essential Part of a COVID–19 Solution, Part I: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/early-outpatient-treatment-an-essential-part-of-a-covid-19-solu-
tion; Early Outpatient Treatment—An Essential Part of a COVID–19 Solution, Part II: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/early-outpatient-treatment-an-essential-part-of-a-covid-19-solution-part-ii.
116 Letter from Sens. Johnson, Lee, Cruz to Stephen Hahn, FDA Commissioner (Nov. 23, 2020)
(on file with Comm. staff).
117 Letter from Sens. Johnson, Paul to Francis S. Collins, NIH Director (Dec. 10, 2020), https://
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www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/40-317—
Comm.%20Homeland%20Security%20%20Gov.%20Affairs%2012-10-2020.pdf.
118 NIH, COVID–19 Treatment Guidelines, Ivermectin, https://
www.covid19treatmentguidelines.nih.gov/antiviral-therapy/ivermectin/ (last updated Feb. 11,
2021).
119 Pub. L. No. 116–116 (116th Cong.).
120 Id.
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17
across the country, and particularly in Portland, Oregon.121 Acting
Secretary Wolf testified and described the events surrounding the
deployment of DHS law enforcement and personnel as well as the
authorities DHS used to carry out its protective mission and coordi-
nate with state and local officials in these efforts.
In July 2020, the Committee passed The Department of Home-
land Security Mentor-Protégé Program Act of 2019.122 This legisla-
tion provides statutory authority to the DHS Mentor-Protégé pro-
gram, which has been in place since2003.123 The program allows
small businesses (referred to as ‘‘protégé’’ firms) to seek guidance
from large businesses (referred to as ‘‘mentor’’ firms) who tradi-
tional obtain contracts from the Department on best to compete for
prime contracts with DHS.
Finally, during this Congress, HSGAC worked tirelessly to en-
sure DHS obtained adequate funding to continue to carry out its
mission. The Committee held hearings entitled Resources and Au-
thorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland
124 in March 2020, and Resources Needed to Protect and Secure
the Homeland125 in May 2019 to examine the needs of the DHS
workforce and affirm Chairman Johnson’s continued support of pro-
viding DHS with the resources and authorities required to protect
the homeland. On September 9, 2019, the Committee held a field
hearing at the National September 11 Memorial & Museum in New
York City. The hearing, titled 18 Years Later: The State of Home-
land Security after 9/11, brought together three former Secretaries
of Homeland Security for a wide-ranging discussion of the Depart-
ments history, current and future challenges, and
F. OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
The Committee is also responsible for investigating ‘‘the effi-
ciency and economy of operations of all branches of the
Government[.]’’126 In the 116th Congress, the Committee continued
to carry out its oversight responsibilities over the Federal bureauc-
racy to help foster a professional, nonpartisan, and accountable
government. The Committee’s oversight jurisdiction stretches
across all facets of the executive branch. Pursuant to this expan-
sive authority, the Committee conducted oversight of numerous
Federal departments and agencies, ranging from DHS, the FBI,
and the Department of State. The Committee maintains a whistle-
blower hotline for Federal employees to disclose waste, fraud,
abuse, and misconduct. This section includes a summary of some
of the most consequential oversight projects this Congress, but is
not a complete list of all the work conducted.
In March 2019, the Committee learned that an employee at a
West Virginia facility of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives Agency (ATF) stole firearms and firearm parts that
121 Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments to Recent Protests: Hearing before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
122 H.R. 4727 (116th. Cong.).
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123 Page 24, Small Business Mentor-Protégé Programs, CRS Report, available at https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/R41722.pdf.
124 Resources and Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland: Hearing before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
125 Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019).
126 S. Res. 70, Sec. 12(e)(1)(A).
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18
were slated for destruction, including service weapons for Federal
agents. The Committee also learned that these stolen firearms
were not only sold illegally, but also that at least one of those fire-
arms was found at a crime scene. The Committee pursued this
issue as the responsible individuals were prosecuted and as ATF
began take corrective action to prevent similar misconduct from oc-
curring in the future.127
The Committee also continued oversight of the consequences of
different immigration policies. In May 2019, Chairman Johnson
wrote to the DHS, the Attorney General of Maryland, and the Ex-
ecutive for Prince George’s County, about the decision to instruct
local law enforcement not to comply with detainer requests by ICE
agents for illegal aliens who were arrested. Earlier that month,
local authorities in Prince George’s county ignored an ICE detainer
request and released two MS–13 gang members, who soon after
brutally murdered a 14-year old girl.128
In January 2020, Chairman Johnson, joined by 14 other sen-
ators, wrote to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) about an inspec-
tor general report that taxpayers improperly claimed $72 million in
tax credits for electric vehicles.129 The report also found that the
IRS did not have an effective process to identify and prevent these
erroneous claims. Notably, the inspector general first identified this
issue in 2011—and $33 million in improperly claimed credits—yet
the problem only worsened. The Committee highlighted this infor-
mation as Congress was considering a potential $16 billion expan-
sion to this tax credit program.
The Committee continued to conduct oversight of the FBI and re-
ports that senior FBI officials exhibited political bias while as-
signed to high-profile, politically-oriented cases. Together with
Chairman Chuck Grassley of the Finance Committee, Chairman
Johnson sent numerous requests for information to the FBI, the
DOJ, the Department of State, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency, among others, as part
of their continued oversight of the FBI’s investigation of alleged col-
lusion between the Trump campaign and Russia.130 On December
127 Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to
Thomas Brandon, Deputy Dir., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (Mar. 12,
2019).
128 Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to
Brian Frosh, Attorney General, State of Maryland (May 28, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Secretary,
Dep’t of Homeland Security (May 28, 2019).
129 Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, et al.,
to Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (Jan. 27, 2020).
130 E.g., Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govern-
mental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney
General, Dep’t of Justice (April 25, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fi-
nance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (May 6, 2019);
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles
Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary of State, Dep’t of State
(May 9, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Af-
fairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal
Bureau of Investigation (May 9, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Secu-
rity & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Steve
TKELLEY on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE REPORTS
Linick, Inspector General, Dep’t of State (Sept. 12, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 17, 2019); Letter from Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grass-
ley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (Oct. 2, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Secu-
rity & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Chris-
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19
18, 2019, the committee convened a hearing, titled DOJ OIG FISA
Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings, during which the DOJ
Inspector General presented the findings from his review of the
FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane investigation of Trump campaign offi-
cials. At that hearing, the Inspector General testified that he iden-
tified evidence of political bias by certain FBI officials and that he
topher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 16, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (Oct. 23, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov-
ernmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attor-
ney General, Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 29, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, to David S. Ferriero, Archivist, National Archives and Records
Admin. (Oct. 31, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govern-
mental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney
General, Dep’t of Justice, & Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Dec. 13,
2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep’t
of Justice (Jan. 28, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govern-
mental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting
Dir. Of Nat’l Intelligence (Apr. 2, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Secu-
rity & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Chris-
topher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Apr. 16, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. Of Nat’l Intelligence & William Barr, Attor-
ney General, Dep’t of Justice (May 12, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Wil-
liam Barr, Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice (May 18, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. Of Nat’l Intelligence (May 19, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grass-
ley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. Of Nat’l Intelligence (May
22, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs,
& Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep’t of
State (June 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govern-
mental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Steve Mnuchin, Sec-
retary, Dep’t of Treasury (June 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Se-
curity & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Mi-
chael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep’t of State (July 2, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fi-
nance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep’t of State (July 7, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Finance, to Gina Haspel, Dir., Central Intelligence Agency (July 28, 2020); Ron John-
son, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to John Ratcliffe, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Jul. 28, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grass-
ley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, &
Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Jul. 28, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chair-
man, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep’t of State (Jul. 28, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Aug. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Af-
fairs, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 9, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to Michael Horowitz, In-
spector General, Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Home-
land Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance,
to John Ratcliffe, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Sept.. 11, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 2, 2020); Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Gina Haspel, Dir., Central Intelligence Agency (Oct. 7,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau
of Investigation (Oct. 12, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security &
Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Mark Esper,
Secretary, Dep’t of Defense (Oct. 14, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland
TKELLEY on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE REPORTS
Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to John
Ratcliffe, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, & Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Oct. 14, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Af-
fairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General,
Dep’t of Justice, & Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 30, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to William Barr,
Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 2, 2020).
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20
could not find a satisfactory explanation for 17 significant errors
and omissions by the FBI officials conducting the investigation.131
In 2020, Chairman Johnson received and publicly released de-
classified records related to the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane inves-
tigation, including intelligence reporting the FBI received that cer-
tain parts of the Steele dossier were the product of a Russian
disinformation campaign.132 On June 4, 2020, the Committee au-
thorized Chairman Johnson to issue several subpoenas for records
and testimony related to this investigation; Chairman Johnson
issued a subpoena for records to the FBI, and subpoenas for
records and testimony to former State Department official Jona-
than Winer and Stefan Halper. On October 23, 2020, along with
the Finance Committee, Chairman Johnson issued a majority staff
report, titled Don’t Brief the Trump Team: How the GSA and the
FBI Secretly Shared Trump Transition Team Records, which de-
scribed how the GSA violated the terms of its memorandum of un-
derstanding with the Trump transition team to secretly preserve
and share transition records with the FBI and Office of the Special
Counsel.133
On December 3, 2020, Chairman Johnson held a capstone hear-
ing, titled Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch
and Media Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane.134
The hearing focused largely on the misconduct of the FBI during
its investigation of the Trump campaign and it addressed the dif-
ficulty Chairman Johnson experienced throughout his tenure at-
tempting to receive meaningful compliance from executive agencies
and former government officials. Chairman Johnson released two
timelines in conjunction with this hearing highlighting key events
during the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and relevant findings
from the Chairman’s oversight work.135
In November 2019, the Committee initiated a joint investigation
with the Finance Committee into actual or apparent conflicts of in-
terest between then-Vice President Biden and U.S. foreign policy
toward Ukraine in light of Hunter Biden’s position on the board of
directors of a Ukrainian natural gas firm that was under investiga-
tion for corruption. This conduct was placed at issue during the
2019 impeachment proceedings in the House against President
Trump. As part of the investigation, Chairman Johnson sent nu-
131 DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings, S. Comm. on Homeland Secu-
rity & Governmental Affairs (Dec. 18, 2019).
132 Letter from Richard Grenell, Acting Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Ron Johnson, Chairman
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/ig-footnotes-serious-prob-
lems-with-dossier-sources-didnt-stop-fbis-page-surveillance; Letter from Richard Grenell, Acting
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Ron Johnson, Chairman (May 13, 2020), https://
www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-05-
13%20ODNI%20to%20CEG%20RHJ%20(Unmasking).pdf; Press Release, Johnson, Grassley re-
lease FBI, DOJ, State Department records related to the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane Investigation
(Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/johnson-grassley-release-fbi-
doj-state-department-records-related-to-the-fbis-crossfire-hurricane-investigation
133 Don’t Brief the Trump Team: How the GSA and FBI Secretly Shared Trump Transition
Team Records, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on
Finance (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020-10-
23%20Committee%20Report%20-%20GSA%20&%20Trump%20Transition.pdf.
134 Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch and Media Suppression: The Case
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Study of Crossfire Hurricane, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (Dec.
3, 2020).
135 Timeline: Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch and Media Suppression:
The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Af-
fairs (Dec. 3, 2020); Timeline of Key Events Related to Crossfire Hurricane Investigation, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Dec. 3,
2020).
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21
merous requests for information to the Department of State and
the National Archives, among other agencies,136 and conducted sev-
eral transcribed interviews of relevant witnesses.137 Chairman
Johnson also served a subpoena for records on Blue Star Strate-
gies, a consulting firm representing Burisma, which the Committee
authorized. On September 23, 2020, the majority issued a staff re-
port, titled Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on
U.S. Government Policy and Related Concerns, summarizing its
findings.138 On November 18, 2020, the majority issued a supple-
mental report based on additional information that came to light
on this topic.139
On April 16, 2020, Chairman Johnson initiated an investigation
of the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). Specifically,
this inquiry focused on I&A’s overt human intelligence collection
program and its counter-intelligence program. On August 6, 2020,
the Committee held an oversight hearing, titled Oversight of DHS
136 E.g., Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs,
& Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep’t
of Justice (Sept. 27, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govern-
mental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Atkinson, In-
spector General of the Intelligence Community (Sept. 30, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Charles Grassley, Chair-
man, S. Comm. on Finance, & Mike Lee, U.S. Senator, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community (Oct. 2, 2019); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fi-
nance, & Mike Lee, U.S. Senator, to Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (Oct. 16, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov-
ernmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo,
Secretary, Dep’t of State (Nov. 6, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Secu-
rity & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to David
S. Ferriero, Archivist, National Archives and Records Administration (Nov. 21, 2019); Ron John-
son, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to William Barr, Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice & Chris-
topher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Nov. 22, 2019); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Finance, to Karen Tramontano, CEO, Blue Star Strategies (Dec. 3, 2019); Ron John-
son, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to James M. Murray, Dir., U.S. Secret Service (Feb. 5, 2020);
Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles
Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Pompeo, Secretary, Dep’t of State (Apr.
30, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs,
& Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (Sept. 15, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security
& Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Peter Kadzik,
Vedable (Oct. 17, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govern-
mental Affairs, to Christopher Wray, Dir., Federal Bureau of Investigation (Oct. 17, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grass-
ley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to James M. Murray, Dir., U.S. Secret Service (Oct. 20,
2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, &
Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Tony Bobulinski (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron
Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grass-
ley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to James Gilliar (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman,
S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Finance, to James Biden (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fi-
nance, to Benjamin Klubs, et al, (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Home-
land Security & Governmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance,
to Rob Walker (Oct. 21, 2020); Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov-
ernmental Affairs, & Charles Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance, to Michael Horowitz,
Inspector General, Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 21, 2020).
137 See Interview transcripts, available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/hunter-biden-
burisma-and-corruption-the-impact-on-us-government-policy-and-related-con-
cerns?peek=H8DPK9jMv5%2FLz%2F2Jz1eN6dDBxADb117R%2Fnn5y%2B5qKcnHqg29.
TKELLEY on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE REPORTS
138 Hunter Biden, Burisma, and Corruption: The Impact on U.S. Government Policy and Re-
lated Concerns, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and S. Comm. on
Finance (Sept. 23, 2020), HTTPS://WWW.HSGAC.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HSGAC—Finance—
Report—FINAL.pdf.
139 Majority Staff Report Supplemental, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and S. Comm. on Finance (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
2020–11–18%20HSGAC%20-%20Finance%20Joint%20Report%20Supplemental.pdf.
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22
Personnel Deployments at Recent Protests, which included the de-
ployment of I&A personnel.
Chairman Johnson also continued his oversight of the Trump Ad-
ministration’s tariffs, which created financial burdens for many
businesses across the country. Chairman Johnson requested up-
dated information and data from the Commerce Department about
the effects of tariffs on U.S. businesses.140 Chairman Johnson also
sought to understand how the Commerce Department determined
which applicants qualified for exclusions from the tariffs. In addi-
tion, Chairman Johnson requested material from major domestic
steel and aluminum producers to better understand how the tariffs
were affecting producers and consumers.141
Chairman Johnson also examined allegations of irregularities in
the 2020 election, including holding a hearing on December 16,
2020, in an effort to ‘‘restore confidence in the integrity of our vot-
ing system’’ and ‘‘resolve suspicions with full transparency and
public awareness.’’142
G. REDUCING WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE
The Committee passed nearly 50 pieces of legislation that aim to
reduce waste, fraud and abuse in the Federal Government. The fol-
lowing is a brief summary of some of those highlights.
The 116th Congress saw unprecedented packages of Federal
spending in response to the COVID–19 pandemic and the associ-
ated stay-at-home orders and business closings. The $2 trillion
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act)
contained a provision negotiated by Chairman Johnson and Rank-
ing Member Peters to provide oversight of this massive influx of
Federal spending.143 The CARES Act established the Pandemic Re-
sponse Accountability Committee (PRAC) within the Council of In-
spectors General on Integrity and Efficiency in order to provide
needed oversight to the pandemic spending programs to ensure tax
dollars are not wasted.144
The COVID–19 pandemic also presented unique challenges and
opportunities for the Unites States Postal Service (USPS). In the
initial weeks of the pandemic, USPS saw drastic reductions in mail
volume and revenue.145 Based on these weeks of crisis, USPS pro-
jected it would run out of liquidity in just a few months.146 In re-
140 Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to Wilbur R. Ross, Secretary, Dep’t of Commerce
(Aug. 30, 2018).
141 Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affs., to Roger Newport, Chief Executive Officer, AK Steel
Holding Corp. (Aug. 27, 2018); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Rank-
ing Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affs., to Michael Bless, Presi-
dent, Chief Executive Officer, and Director, Century Aluminum Co. (Aug. 27, 2018); Letter from
Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Secu-
rity & Governmental Affairs, to John Ferriola, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, and Presi-
dent, Nucor Corp. (Aug. 27, 2018); Letter from Ron Johnson, Chairman, & Claire McCaskill,
Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, to David Burritt,
President and Chief Executive Officer, United States Steel Corp. (Aug. 27, 2018).
142 Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govern-
mental Affairs (Dec. 16, 2020) (statement of Chairman Johnson).
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143 Pub. L. No. 116–136 (116th Cong.).
144 Id.
145 Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs
Senate Comm., Congressman Jim Jordan, Ranking Member of Oversight House Comm., and
Congressman Jody Hice, Ranking member of Government Operations, House Comm., to the
Honorable Megan Brennan, Postmaster General., U.S. Postal Service (June 8, 2020).
146 Id.
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23
sponse to the initial USPS projections, the Committee negotiated
another provision in the CARES Act—one that would allow USPS
to borrow up to $10 billion from the U.S. Treasury to cover
COVID–19 related costs.147 However, USPS’s financial situation
improved quickly thereafter due to an unprecedented increase in
package volume.148 While USPS did have some increased costs due
to overtime, sick leave, and transportation costs, its overall revenue
was $4.4 billion higher from March 2020 through December 2020
compared to the same weeks in 2019.149 As such, USPS did not ac-
cess the loan during the 116th Congress.
The Committee held a hearing on USPS’ finances and operations
during the COVID–19 pandemic and the then-upcoming 2020 elec-
tions.150 The hearing addressed the better-than-expected financial
condition of USPS and examined changes made by the Postmaster
General shortly after he was sworn in.151 The hearing debunked
conspiracy theories regarding the removal of blue drop boxes and
the removal of sorting equipment at some postal facilities.152
The Committee also worked in the 116th Congress to address the
growth in annual improper payments—sums paid out by the Fed-
eral Government to the wrong person, in the wrong amount, for the
wrong reason, or without sufficient documentation. From 2017 to
2019, the annual improper payment total increased from $141 bil-
lion to $175 billion.153 The Committee passed and the President
signed the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, which reor-
ganizes and streamlines Federal improper payments laws, improv-
ing transparency and agency compliance.154 It takes several im-
proper payments laws from the last decade and consolidates them
into one section of the U.S. Code and clarifies inconsistencies with-
in those laws.155 The Committee also approved legislation requir-
ing Federal agencies to make budget justification material readily
available to the public, improving Federal transparency.156
The first hearing the Committee held in the 116th Congress was
a field hearing at St. Thomas More Catholic School, to examine the
success of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship program, the only fed-
erally-funded school voucher program.157 Witnesses included the
Hon. Tim Scott, Senator from North Carolina, school administra-
tors, and a recent alumnus of the program.158 The Committee also
secured a reauthorization of the program through 2023 and ex-
tended the requirement that schools become accredited, due to com-
147 Pub. L. No. 116–136 (116th Cong.).
148 Letter from Senator Ron Johnson, Chairman of Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs
Senate Comm., Congressman Jim Jordan, Ranking Member of Oversight House Comm., and
Congressman Jody Hice, Ranking member of Government Operations, House Comm., to the
Honorable Megan Brennan, Postmaster General., U.S. Postal Service (June 8, 2020).
149 Data from USPS on file with the Comm. staff.
150 Examining the Finances and Operations of the United States Postal Service During
COVID–19 and Upcoming Elections: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Govern-
mental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–18–377, Improper Payments: Actions and Guidance
Could Help Address Issues and Inconsistencies in Estimation Processes (May 31, 2018); Gov’t
Accountability Office, GAO–20–344, Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies’ Estimates of FY 2019
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Improper Payments (Mar. 2, 2020).
154 Pub. L. No. 116–117 (116th Cong.).
155 Id.
156 S. 2560 (116th Cong.).
157 Opportunity to SOAR: 15 years of School Choice in D.C.: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020).
158 Id.
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24
plications arising from the closure of schools due to the COVID–19
pandemic.159
The Committee also passed the Fair Chance to Compete for Jobs
Act for the third time. The legislation requires that Federal agen-
cies and contractors wait until making a conditional offer to a po-
tential employee before asking them about their criminal history.
The legislation was included as a part of the 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act, signed into law by the President.160
With the potential for a Presidential transition in 2021, the Com-
mittee reviewed the 2016 Presidential transition and found that
there were certain issues related to the roles and responsibilities
of the General Services Administration (GSA) and presidential
transition teams.161 The Committee passed, and the President
signed, the Presidential Transition Enhancement Act, which clari-
fied these roles and responsibilities.162
Also of note, the Committee spent considerable time and bipar-
tisan effort on two major pieces of legislation that, although ap-
proved by HSGAC with overwhelming support, were not enacted
this Congress. The first, S. 1877, the Prevent Government Shut-
downs Act of 2019, seeks to end costly and disruptive government
shutdowns during a lapse in appropriations by providing for an
automatic appropriation at current levels and incentives for Con-
gress to pass regular appropriations while automatic appropria-
tions are in place. The legislation limits official travel of Members
of Congress and senior Executive Branch officials and holds Mem-
bers’ pay in escrow during a period of automatic appropriations. It
also requires daily quorum calls and prohibits business from being
in order on the Senate and House floor other than appropriations
bills.163 The bill was approved by the Committee on June 19, 2019
by a vote of 10–2164, and later modified slightly in the form of a
new bipartisan bill placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar in
August 2020.165
The second, S. 764, ARTICLE ONE Act, seeks to reclaim certain
emergency authorities that Congress has ceded to the President
over time. The bill would invert the process for congressional re-
view of a national emergency declared by the President, with the
exception of emergencies declared pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, to ensure that Congress approves
of the emergency if a President wants it to continue for more than
30 days.166 The bill was approved by the Committee on July 24,
2019, by voice vote.167 The Chairman hopes that work on both of
these important pieces of legislation will continue in the next Con-
gress.
159 Pub. L. No. 116–94 (116th Cong.).
160 Pub. L. No. 116–283 (116th Cong.).
161 S. Rept. 116–13.
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162 Pub. L. No. 116–121 (116th Cong.).
163 S. 1877, Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2019 (116th Cong.); S. Rept. 116–158
(116th Cong.).
164 S. Rept. 116–158.
165 S. 4461, Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2020 (116th Cong.).
166 S. 764, ARTICLE ONE Act (116th Cong.); S. Rept. 116–159 (116th Cong.).
167 S. Rept. 116–159.
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25
II. COMMITTEE JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Committee (which was renamed the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs when the
109th Congress convened) derives from the Rules of the Senate and
Senate Resolutions:
RULE XXV
********
(k)(1) Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which committee
shall be referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, me-
morials, and other matters relating to the following subjects:
1. Archives of the United States.
2. Budget and accounting measures, other than appropriations,
except as provided in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
3. Census and collection of statistics, including economic and so-
cial statistics.
4. Congressional organization, except for any part of the matter
that amends the rules or orders of the Senate.
5. Federal Civil Service.
6. Government information.
7. Intergovernmental relations.
8. Municipal affairs of the District of Columbia, except appro-
priations therefor.
9. Organization and management of United States nuclear ex-
port policy.
10. Organization and reorganization of the executive branch of
the Government.
11. Postal Service.
12. Status of officers and employees of the United States, includ-
ing their classification, compensation, and benefits.
(2) Such committee shall have the duty of——
(A) receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General
of the United States and of submitting such recommendations to
the Senate as it deems necessary or desirable in connection with
the subject matter of such reports;
(B) studying the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all
agencies and departments of the Government;
(C) evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legis-
lative and executive branches of the Government; and
(D) studying the intergovernmental relationships between the
United States and the States and municipalities, and between the
United States and international organizations of which the United
States is a member.
SENATE RESOLUTION 70, 116TH CONGRESS
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS.
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Sec. 12. (a) * * *
********
(d) INVESTIGATIONS——
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26
(1) IN GENERAL—The committee, or any duly authorized sub-
committee of the committee, is authorized to study or inves-
tigate——
(A) the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches of the
Government including the possible existence of fraud, misfeasance,
malfeasance, collusion, mismanagement, incompetence, corruption,
or unethical practices, waste, extravagance, conflicts of interest,
and the improper expenditure of Government funds in transactions,
contracts, and, activities of the Government or of Government offi-
cials and employees and any and all such improper practices be-
tween Government personnel and corporations, individuals, compa-
nies, or persons affiliated therewith, doing business with the Gov-
ernment; and the compliance or noncompliance of such corpora-
tions, companies, or individuals or other entities with the rules,
regulations, and laws governing the various governmental agencies
and its relationships with the public;
(B) the extent to which criminal or other improper practices or
activities are, or have been, engaged in the field of labor-manage-
ment relations or in groups or organizations of employees or em-
ployers, to the detriment of interests of the public, employers, or
employees, and to determine whether any changes are required in
the laws of the United States in order to protect such interests
against the occurrence of such practices or activities;
(C) organized criminal activity which may operate in or other-
wise utilize the facilities of interstate or international commerce in
furtherance of any transactions and the manner and extent to
which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or corporations, or
other entities by whom such utilization is being made, and further,
to study and investigate the manner in which and the extent to
which persons engaged in organized criminal activity have infil-
trated lawful business enterprise, and to study the adequacy of
Federal laws to prevent the operations of organized crime in inter-
state or international commerce; and to determine whether any
changes are required in the laws of the United States in order to
protect the public against such practices or activities;
(D) all other aspects of crime and lawlessness within the United
States which have an impact upon or affect the national health,
welfare, and safety; including but not limited to investment fraud
schemes, commodity and security fraud, computer fraud, and the
use of offshore banking and corporate facilities to carry out crimi-
nal objectives;
(E) the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches and
functions of the government with particular reference to——
(i) the effectiveness of present national security methods, staff-
ing, and processes as tested against the requirements imposed by
the rapidly mounting complexity of national security problems;
(ii) the capacity of present national security staffing, methods,
and processes to make full use of the Nation’s resources of knowl-
edge and talents;
(iii) the adequacy of present intergovernmental relations between
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the United States and international organizations principally con-
cerned with national security of which the United States is a mem-
ber; and
(iv) legislative and other proposals to improve these methods,
processes, and relationships;
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27
(F) the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and
departments of the government involved in the control and man-
agement of energy shortages including, but not limited to, their
performance with respect to——
(i) the collection and dissemination of accurate statistics on fuel
demand and supply;
(ii) the implementation of effective energy conservation meas-
ures;
(iii) the pricing of energy in all forms;
(iv) coordination of energy programs with State and local govern-
ment;
(v) control of exports of scarce fuels;
(vi) the management of tax, import, pricing, and other policies af-
fecting energy supplies;
(vii) maintenance of the independent sector of the petroleum in-
dustry as a strong competitive force;
(viii) the allocation of fuels in short supply by public and private
entities;
(ix) the management of energy supplies owned or controlled by
the Government;
(x) relations with other oil producing and consuming countries;
(xi) the monitoring of compliance by governments, corporations,
or individuals with the laws and regulations governing the alloca-
tion, conservation, or pricing of energy supplies; and
(xii) research into the discovery and development of alternative
energy supplies; and
(G) the efficiency and economy of all branches and functions of
government with particular references to the operations and man-
agement of Federal regulatory policies and programs.
(2) EXTENT OF INQUIRIES.—In carrying out the duties pro-
vided in paragraph (1), the inquiries of this committee or any sub-
committee of the committee shall not be construed to be limited to
the records, functions, and operations of any particular branch of
the Government and may extend to the records and activities of
any persons, corporation, or other entity.
(3) SPECIAL COMMITTEE AUTHORITY.—For the purposes of
this subsection, the committee, or any duly authorized sub-
committee of the committee, or its chairman, or any other member
of the committee or subcommittee designated by the chairman is
authorized, in its, his or her, or their discretion——
(A) to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of wit-
nesses and production of correspondence, books, papers, and docu-
ments;
(B) to hold hearings;
(C) to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recess,
and adjournment periods of the Senate;
(D) to administer oaths; and
(E) to take testimony, either orally or by sworn Statement, or, in
the case of staff members of the Committee and the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, by deposition in accordance with
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the Committee Rules of Procedure.
(4) AUTHORITY OF OTHER COMMITTEES.—Nothing con-
tained in this subsection shall affect or impair the exercise of any
other standing committee of the Senate of any power, or the dis-
charge by such committee of any duty, conferred or imposed upon
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28
it by the Standing Rules of the Senate or by the Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1946.
(5) SUBPOENA AUTHORITY.—All subpoenas and related legal
processes of the committee and its subcommittee authorized under
S. Res. 62, agreed to February 28, 2017 (115th Congress) are au-
thorized to continue.
III. BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS REFERRED AND CONSIDERED
During the 116th Congress, 409 Senate bills and 136 House bills
were referred to the Committee for consideration. In addition, 10
Senate Resolutions and 2 Senate Concurrent Resolutions were re-
ferred to the Committee.
The Committee reported 138 bills; an additional 44 measures
were discharged.
Of the legislation received by the Committee, 79 measures be-
came public laws, including 64 postal naming bills.
IV. HEARINGS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee held 50 hearings on
legislation, oversight issues, and nominations. Hearing titles and
dates follow.
The Committee also held 16 scheduled business meetings.
Lists of hearings with copies of Statements by Members and wit-
nesses, with archives going back to 1997, are online at the Commit-
tee’s Website, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/.
The Opportunity to SOAR: 15 Years of School Choice in D.C. Feb-
ruary 26, 2019. (S. Hearing. 116–27)
The purpose of this two-panel field hearing was to mark the 15th
year anniversary of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program and
discuss its future with the SOAR Reauthorization Act of 2019. The
witnesses addressed how the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Pro-
gram benefits students and parents educationally, financially, and
socially as it prepared them for the future. The witnesses also ad-
dressed past obstacles the program had to overcome, highlighting
times administrators, parents, and advocates of the program sup-
ported the students’ education.
Witnesses: Hon. Tim Scott, U.S. Senate; K. Marguerite Conley,
Former Executive Director, Consortium of Catholic Academies;
Yisehak Abraham, Alumnus, D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Pro-
gram; Gerald Smith, Principal, St. Thomas More Catholic School.
Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an Electro-
magnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance. February 27,
2019. (S. Hearing. 116–78)
The purpose of this roundtable is to hear differing perspectives
from key stakeholders on electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and geo-
magnetic disturbance (GMD) risks and mitigation solutions. The
witnesses discussed current activities to predict and prepare for the
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consequences of an EMP or GMD and how the United States can
improve its efforts. Witnesses also discussed the Department of
Homeland Security’s EMP strategy that was submitted to Congress
last year, and how government agencies and private sector organi-
zations are working together to secure our nation’s electrical grid
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29
from an EMP or GMD. Finally, the witnesses discussed the poten-
tial costs associated with hardening the nation’s electrical grid and
possible technical solutions, and recommendations on authorities
needed to prepare and protect the United States for an EMP or
GMD event.
Witnesses: Hon. Karen Evans, Assistant Secretary for Cybersecu-
rity, Energy Security, & Emergency Response, U.S. Department of
Energy; Brian Harrell, Assistant Director, Infrastructure Security
Division, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Nathan Ander-
son, Acting Director, Homeland Security & Justice Team, U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office; Joseph McClelland, Director, Office
of Energy Infrastructure Security, Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission; Scott Aaronson, Vice President for Security and Prepared-
ness, Edison Electric Institute; Randy Horton, PH.D., Senior Pro-
gram Manager, Grid Operations and Planning, Electric Power, Re-
search Institute; David Roop, Director, Electric, Transmission Op-
erations & Reliability, Dominion Energy; James Vespalec, Director,
Asset Planning and Engineering, American Transmission Com-
pany; George Baker, PH.D., Professor Emeritus, James Madison
University; Justin Kasper, PH.D., Associate Professor of Space
Science and Engineering, University of Michigan; Caitlin
Durkovich, Director, Toffler Associates
Nomination of Joseph V. Cuffari to be Inspector General, U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security. March 5, 2019. (S. Hearing
116–28)
This one-panel hearing considered the nomination of Joseph V.
Cuffari, to be Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity. Mr. Cuffari was introduced by Senator Martha McSally.
High Risk List 2019: Recommendations to Reduce Risk of Waste,
Fraud, and Mismanagement in Federal Programs. March 6,
2019. (S. Hearing 116–43)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Government Ac-
countability Office’s 2019 update of the High Risk List. The witness
discussed agencies that required significant congressional atten-
tion, particularly in the legislative jurisdiction of the Homeland Se-
curity and Governmental Affairs Committee.
Witnesses: Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the
United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied
by Cathleen Berrick, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Nikki
Clowers, Managing Director, Health Care Team, U.S. Government
Accountability Office; Elizabeth Curda, Director, Education, Work-
force, & Income Security Team, U.S. Government Accountability
Office; Mark Gaffigan, Managing Director, Natural Resources and
Environment Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Nick
Marinos, Director, Information Technology and Cybersecurity
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Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Chris Mihm, Man-
aging Director, Strategic Issues Team, U.S. Government Account-
ability Office.
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30
A Path to Sustainability: Recommendations From The President’s
Task Force on the United States Postal Service. March 12,
2019. (S. Hearing 116–97)
The purpose of this hearing was to address the unsustainable fi-
nancial path of the Postal Service and to provide recommendations
to promote the Nation’s commerce and communication without
shifting additional cost to taxpayers. The witnesses addressed the
findings of the President’s Task Force and summarized rec-
ommendations to improve the relationship between the Postal
Service and the Federal Government, the Postal Service’s Uni-
versal Service Obligation, its obligations to employees and retirees,
and the workforce needs of the Postal Service.
Witnesses: Gary Grippo, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public
Finance, U.S. Department of the Treasury; Hon. Robert G. Taub,
Chairman, Postal Regulatory Commission; Hon. David C. Williams,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors, U.S. Postal Service; Hon. Mar-
garet Weichert, Deputy Director for Management, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, Acting Director, Office of Personnel Manage-
ment.
Nominations of Ron A. Bloom and Roman Martinez IV to be Gov-
ernors, U.S. Postal Service, James A. Crowell IV and Jason
Park to be Associate Judges, Superior Court of the District of
Columbia. April 2, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–60)
This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Ron A.
Bloom and Roman Martinez IV to be Governors, U.S. Postal Serv-
ice & James A. Crowell IV and Jason Park to be Associate Judges,
Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: By The
Numbers. April 4, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine U.S. southern border
migration, apprehension, and drug flow data, and to compare re-
cent data to historical trends. The witnesses discussed their experi-
ences and expertise in immigration, migration, and border security
policy. The witnesses also addressed challenges facing the Southern
Border, Mexico, and the Northern Triangle and suggested potential
solutions to fix our broken immigration system.
Witnesses: Mark Morgan, Former Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol
(2016–2017), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security; John Daniel Davidson, Senior Cor-
respondent, The Federalist; Andrew Selee, Ph.D., President, Migra-
tion Policy Institute.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Perspectives
from the Frontline. April 9, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine U.S. southern border
migration, apprehension, and drug flow data, and to compare re-
cent data to historical trends. The witnesses discussed their front-
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line experiences serving in U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
Homeland Security Investigations, Health and Human Services,
and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Witnesses addressed the chang-
ing nature of migration, the flow of drugs, and human smuggling
and trafficking operations across the southwest border.
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Witnesses: Rodolfo Karisch, Rio Grande Valley Sector Chief Pa-
trol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randy Howe, Execu-
tive Director for Operations, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity; Timothy Tubbs, Deputy Special Agent in Charge- Laredo,
Texas, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Greg Cherundolo, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Agency,
U.S. Department of Justice; and Commander Jonathan White,
Ph.D., USPHS, Senior Advisor, Office of Emergency Management
and Medical Operations, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Pre-
paredness and Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services.
Nominations of Hon. Dale Cabaniss to be Director, Office of Per-
sonal Management, and Michael E. Wooten, ED.D., to be Ad-
ministrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Office of
Management and Budget. May 7, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–61)
This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Hon. Dale
Cabaniss to be Director, Office of Personal Management; and Mi-
chael E. Wooten, Ed.D., to be Administrator, Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy, Office of Management and Budget. Ms. Cabaniss
was introduced by Senator John Boozman. Dr. Wooten was intro-
duced by former Representative Tom Davis.
Resources Needed to Protect and Secure the Homeland. May 23,
2019. (S. Hearing 116–189)
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the Department of
Homeland Security’s budget request and legislative priorities for
Fiscal Year 2020. The witness addressed the need for additional re-
sources and authorities to secure and protect the homeland, and
also how the Department’s budget request meets the current and
future homeland security needs of the nation.
Witness: Hon. Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary, U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security.
Sensibly Reforming the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Stand-
ards Program. June 4, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–79)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine potential reforms to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program as the Committee
worked toward a reauthorization. The witnesses discussed their ex-
periences with the program, including recommendations for overall
program improvement, maturation of the program, and opportuni-
ties to streamline and harmonize CFATS program regulatory re-
quirements.
Witnesses: Brian Harrell, Assistant Director for Infrastructure
Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Nathan Anderson, Acting Direc-
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tor, Homeland Security & Justice Team, U.S. Government Account-
ability Office; Matthew Fridley, Safety, Regulatory and Security
Manager, Brenntag North America, Timothy O’Brien, President,
Detotec North America; William Erny, Senior Director, American
Chemistry Council; Andrew Wright, Vice President, Legislative Af-
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32
fairs, International Liquid Terminals Association; John Morawetz,
Health and Safety Representative, International Chemical Workers
Union Council, United Food & Commercial Workers International
Union.
Nominations of Chad F. Wolf to be Under Secretary for Strategy,
Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Jef-
frey C. Byard to be Administrator, Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Troy D.
Edgar to be Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Home-
land Security; John M. Barger to be a Governor, U.S. Postal
Service; and B. Chad Bungard to be a Member, Merit Systems
Protection Board. June 12, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–63)
This one-panel hearing considered the nominations of Chad F.
Wolf to be Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Jeffrey C. Byard to be Adminis-
trator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, Mr. Byard was introduced by Senator Rich-
ard C. Shelby; Troy D. Edgar to be Chief Financial Officer, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; John M. Barger to be a Gov-
ernor, U.S. Postal Service; and B. Chad Bungard to be a Member,
Merit Systems Protection Board.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Exploi-
tation of Migrants through Smuggling, Trafficking, and Invol-
untary Servitude. June 26, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing, the third in a series addressing the
ongoing humanitarian and national security crisis at the U.S.
southern border, was to examine different ways in which individ-
uals or organizations seek to exploit migrants attempting to enter
the United States. The witnesses discussed different aspects and
phases of this exploitation, including the current trends, tactics,
and costs associated with human smuggling and trafficking across
the southwest border. Witnesses also discussed how human smug-
gling can become human trafficking or involuntary servitude when
migrants are forced to pay off debts related to their unlawful entry
into the U.S and explained concrete examples of these different
forms of exploitation. Including how this exploitation benefits
transnational criminal organizations, human trafficking and
human smuggling operations, and their work to thwart them.
Witnesses: Brian S. Hastings, Chief, Law Enforcement Oper-
ations Directorate, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Randy Howe,
Executive Director for Operations, Office of Field Operations, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity; Gregory Nevano, Assistant Director for Investigative Pro-
grams, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
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Nominations of Ann C. Fisher and Ashley E. Poling to be Commis-
sioners, Postal Regulatory Commission; Catherine Bird to be
General Counsel, Federal Labor Relations Authority; and
Rainey R. Brandt and Shana Frost Matini to be Associate
Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. July 16,
2019. (S. Hearing 116–69)
The purpose of this hearing considered the nominations of Ann
C. Fisher and Ashley E. Poling to be Commissioners, Postal Regu-
latory Commission; Catherine Bird to be General Counsel, Federal
Labor Relations Authority; and Rainey R. Brandt and Shana Frost
Matini to be Associate Judges, Superior Court of the District of Co-
lumbia.
2020 Census: Conducting a Secure and Accurate Count. July 16,
2019. (S. Hearing 116–136)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the U.S. Census Bu-
reau’s work towards the 2020 Census. The witnesses discussed how
the Bureau is working to mitigate key risks to the 2020 Census,
upholding strong privacy protections for individual responses, and
deploying strong cybersecurity measures for the unprecedented dig-
ital census environment.
Witnesses: Hon. Steven Dillingham, PH.D., Director, U.S. Census
Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce; Robert Goldenkoff, Direc-
tor of Strategic Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office;
Nicholas Marinos, Director of Information Technology & Cybersecu-
rity, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: Bipartisan
Policy Recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory
Council. July 17, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the current migra-
tion crisis at the southern border and recommendations by the
Homeland Security Advisory Council to address it. The witnesses
discussed the Emergency Interim Report the Council issued on
April 16, 2019.
Witnesses: Hon. Karen Tandy, Chair, Customs and Border Pro-
tection Families and Children Care Panel, Homeland Security Ad-
visory Council; Jayson Ahern, Vice Chair, Customs and Border Pro-
tection Families and Children Care Panel, Homeland Security Ad-
visory Council; Sharon W. Cooper, MD FAAP, Member, Customs
and Border Protection Families and Children Care Panel, Home-
land Security Advisory Council; Leon Fresco, Member, Customs
and Border Protection Families and Children Care Panel, Home-
land Security Advisory Council.
Examining State and Federal Recommendations for Enhancing
School Safety Against Targeted Violence. July 24, 2019. (S.
Hearing 116–117)
The purpose of this hearing was to provide the public with an
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understanding of the current state of school security, mitigation,
and prevention best practices, as well as state and Federal rec-
ommendations. The witnesses discussed their advocacy on behalf of
school hardening and research on school safety measures and
school-based prevention. The witnesses also suggested ways to ef-
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34
fect non-political, efficacious, and proven measures for enhancing
safe environments at American schools.
Witnesses: Max Schachter, Founder & Chief Executive Officer,
Safe Schools for Alex; Tom Hoyer, Treasurer, Stand with Park-
land—The National Association of Families for Safe Schools; Hon.
Bob Gualtieri, Chair, Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Pub-
lic Safety Commission and Sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida;
Deborah Temkin, Ph.D., Senior Program Area Director, Education
Child Trends.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What Is Re-
quired to Improve Conditions? July 30, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the conditions at
Customs and Border Protection detention centers along the south-
ern border, CBP’s efforts to ensure the safety and care of all indi-
viduals in its custody, and what actions Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch needed to take to help address the unprecedented flow
of families and unaccompanied alien children that have led to over-
crowding at CBP facilities. The witnesses discussed the findings
following the Department of Homeland Security Office of the In-
spector General’s visits to CBP detention centers and the provided
recommendations to address the various challenges.
Witnesses: Mark Morgan, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Jennifer L. Costello, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.
18 Years Later: The State of Homeland Security after 9/11. Sep-
tember 9, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–397)
The purpose of this field hearing, held at the National September
11th Memorial & Museum in New York City, New York, was to
evaluate how the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has
evolved to address an ever-changing threat landscape in the years
since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The witnesses pro-
vided frank assessments of the greatest threats to our homeland
security, how well they believe the Department is handling these
challenges, and recommendations for how DHS can improve. The
witnesses’ recommendations included both how DHS can better le-
verage its existing relationships with public and private sector
partners to anticipate, adapt, and respond to persistent and emerg-
ing threats, and how Congress can better position the Department
to address these threats.
Witnesses: Hon. Michael Chertoff, Former Secretary (2005–2009),
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Hon. Janet A. Napolitano,
Former Secretary (2009–2013), U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity; Hon. Jeh C. Johnson, Former Secretary (2013–2017), U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
Countering Domestic Terrorism: Examining the Evolving Threat.
September 25, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–154)
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The purpose of this hearing was to examine the evolving threat
posed by domestic terrorism and how the Federal Government is
combatting that threat. The hearing addressed current trends
across the domestic terrorism threat landscape, the available data
used to make threat assessments and resource allocation decisions,
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35
the posture of the relevant government agencies for addressing the
threat, and the identification of possible challenges the government
faces. The witness discussed their various experiences assessing do-
mestic terrorism threats, the status of data collection and threat
tracking, and evaluated the ability and efforts of the Federal Gov-
ernment to combat domestic terrorism.
Witnesses: William Braniff, Director, National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and Professor
of the Practice, University of Maryland; Clinton Watts, Distin-
guished Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Robert
M. Chesney, James A. Baker III Chair in the Rule of Law and
World Affairs and Director, Robert Strauss Center for International
Security and Law, University of Texas Law School; George Selim,
Senior Vice President for National Programs, Anti-Defamation
League.
Nominations of Joshua A. Deahl to be an Associate Judge, District
of Columbia Court of Appeals; Deborah J. Israel to be an Asso-
ciate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia; Andrea
L. Hertzfeld to be an Associate Judge, Superior Court of the
District of Columbia; and Robert A. Dixon to be United States
Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
October 22, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–156)
The purpose of this hearing considered the nominations of Josh-
ua A. Deahl to be an Associate Judge, District of Columbia Court
of Appeals; Deborah J. Israel to be an Associate Judge, Superior
Court of the District of Columbia; Andrea L. Hertzfeld to be an As-
sociate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia; and Rob-
ert A. Dixon to be United States Marshal for the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia.
Supply Chain Security, Global Competitiveness, and 5G. October
31, 2019. (S. Hearing 116185)
The purpose of this hearing was to better understand the Admin-
istration’s ongoing work managing risks and threats to the nation’s
information telecommunications technology (ICT) supply chain as
the nation transitions to the 5th generation mobile network (5G).
The witnesses highlighted the nature and severity of the threats
posed by foreign-owned and operated ICT across the nation’s 5G in-
frastructure, as well as the importance of 5G to U.S. innovation
and global economic competitiveness. Additionally, witnesses de-
scribed the structure of the interagency group working on 5G
issues, including who is in charge of the interagency effort.
Witnesses: Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Director, Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Diane Rinaldo, Acting Assistant Secretary, National Tele-
communications and Information Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce; Robert L. Strayer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Cyber and International Communications and Information Policy,
U.S. Department of State; Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commis-
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sioner, Federal Communications Commission.
Threats to the Homeland. November 5, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to update the public under-
standing of prevailing threats to the security of the United States
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36
of America. Witnesses highlighted the most pressing domestic and
foreign threats faced by the United States determined by their re-
spective organizations, and also discussed what efforts they are
taking to counter these major threats to the homeland.
Witnesses: Hon. David J. Glawe, Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Hon. Chris-
topher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Russell
Travers, Acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center.
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: The Year in
Review. November 13, 2019.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the unprecedented
migration flow at our southern border during fiscal year 2019. Wit-
nesses discussed the administrations efforts to curb the unprece-
dented number of individuals attempting to illegally enter the
country. The discussion highlighted data regarding migration pat-
terns, apprehensions, asylum claims, detention facilities, and drug
flows in an attempt to find potential solutions to fix our broken im-
migration system.
Witnesses: Mark A. Morgan, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Derek N.
Benner, Acting Deputy Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, James
McHenry, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S.
Department of Justice.
Nomination of Hon. Peter T. Gaynor to be Administrator, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. November 14, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–188)
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination of
Hon. Peter T. Gaynor to be Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The
nominee was introduced by Senator Jack Reed.
Nomination of Paul J. Ray to be Administrator, Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget.
December 4, 2019. (S. Hearing 116–187)
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination of
Paul J. Ray to be Administrator, Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget. The nominee was
introduced by Senator Marsha Blackburn.
DOJ OIG FISA Report: Methodology, Scope, and Findings. Decem-
ber 18, 2019. (S. Hearing 116396)
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Department of
Justice Office of the Inspector General’s report titled, ‘‘Review of
Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI’s Crossfire
Hurricane Investigation,’’ released on December 9, 2019. The wit-
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ness explained the contours of his work, the findings regarding the
FBI’s basis for seeking warrants, and other relevant examinations
conducted during the investigation.
Witness: Hon. Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S. De-
partment of Justice.
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Examining the Root Causes of America’s Unsustainable Fiscal Path.
January 28, 2020. (S. Hearing 116–186)
The purpose of this hearing was to lay out the reality of Amer-
ica’s long-term financial situation, including the root causes of the
current fiscal challenges of Federal trust funds. Witnesses dis-
cussed these long-term issues related to government spending in-
cluding Senator Mitt Romney’s bill, S. 2733, The TRUST Act.
Witnesses: Douglas Holtz-Eakin, PH.D., President, American Ac-
tion Form; Charles P. Blahous III, PH.D., J. Fish and Lillian F.
Smith Chair and Senior Research Strategist, Mercatus Center,
George Mason University; Brian Riedl, Senior Fellow, Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research; Henry J. Aaron, PH.D., Bruce and
Virginia MacLaury Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution.
What States, Locals and the Business Community Should Know
and Do: A Roadmap for Effective Cybersecurity. February 11,
2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine how State, local,
tribal, and territorial governments and critical infrastructure own-
ers/operators can mitigate and protect against persistent cybersecu-
rity threats. This hearing also examined the current threat envi-
ronment, including ransomware attacks, and threats from state ac-
tors like Iran, China, and Russia. In addition, the witnesses ad-
dressed Federal and State responses, and recommendations for im-
provement.
Witnesses: Hon. Christopher C. Krebs, Director, Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; Amanda Crawford, Executive Director, Department of In-
formation Resources, State of Texas; Christopher DeRusha, Chief
Security Officer, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Of-
fice, State of Michigan.
Are We Prepared? Protecting the U.S. from Global Pandemics. Feb-
ruary 12, 2020.
The purpose of this roundtable hearing, the first in a series of
committee hearings on the Coronavirus, was to examine the na-
tion’s level of preparedness against pandemic threats, particularly
in the context of the Coronavirus outbreak that originated in
Wuhan, China. Witnesses discussed their views on the actions
taken by the U.S. government to combat the spread of the
Coronavirus, and if additional resources were needed. Witnesses
also discussed how the U.S. government coordinates with both rel-
evant Federal agencies and State, local, and tribal entities to pre-
pare for, respond to, and limit the spread of infectious diseases.
Witnesses: Nikki Clowers, Managing Director, Health Care
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Julie L. Gerberding,
MD, Former Director (2002–2009) of the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention at the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services; Hon. Scott Gottlieb, MD, Former Commissioner (2017–
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2019) of the Food and Drug Administration at the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services; Luciana Borio, MDFormer Director
for Medical and Biodefense Preparedness (2017–2019) at the Na-
tional Security Council; Asha M. George, Dr.PH, Executive Direc-
tor, Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense.
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Resources and Authorities Needed to Protect and Secure the Home-
land. March 4, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the Department of
Homeland Security’s budget request and legislative priorities for
Fiscal Year 2021. The witness addressed the need for additional re-
sources and authorities to protect and secure the homeland, and
also how the Department’s budget request meets the current and
future homeland security needs for the nation.
Witness: Hon. Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
The Federal Interagency Response to the Coronavirus and Pre-
paring for Future Global Pandemics. March 5, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the interagency re-
sponse to global pandemic outbreaks, such as the Coronavirus Dis-
ease 2019 (COVID–19), that posed public health threats to the U.S.
homeland. Witnesses provided updates on the COVID–19 outbreak,
and the actions taken by their departments to combat the spread
of the virus. The witnesses also discussed coordination efforts with
other relevant Federal agencies and relevant international partners
to detect, contain, and mitigate the spread of pandemic diseases.
Finally, witnesses discussed lessons learned from previous infec-
tious disease outbreaks, such as the 2014 West African Ebola out-
break and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of
2003, and included new structures put in place to respond to
pandemics affecting the nation.
Witnesses: Hon. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, Senior Official Per-
forming the Duties of the Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; The Honorable Robert Kadlec, M.D., Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services.
Roundtable—COVID–19: How New Information Should Drive Pol-
icy. May 6, 2020.
The purpose of this remote roundtable was to examine new data
pertaining to the Coronavirus (COVID–19) Pandemic of 2020. The
witnesses discussed the development of testing methods and treat-
ment for coronavirus cases, the effectiveness of current precautions
such as state lockdowns and social distancing, how to mitigate the
spread of and hospitalizations due to the coronavirus, and plans to
reopen the American economy.
Witnesses: Scott W. Atlas, M.D., David and Joan Traitel Senior
Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; David L. Katz,
M.D., M.P.H., President, True Health Initiative; Pierre Kory, M.D.,
M.P.A., Critical Care Service Chief, Associate Professor of Medi-
cine, University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health;
John P.A. Ioannidis, M.D., C.F. Rehnborg Professor in Disease Pre-
vention, School of Medicine, Stanford University; Avik Roy, Presi-
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dent, Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity; Tom
Inglesby, M.D., Director, Center for Health Security, Bloomberg
School of Public Health, John Hopkins University.
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Evolving the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy and Posture: Reviewing
the Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report. May 13, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss and evaluate the find-
ings and recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commis-
sion’s March 2020 report. The witnesses highlighted the Commis-
sion’s recommendations aimed at improving the resilience of the
homeland from cybersecurity threats, particularly those rec-
ommendations that strengthen the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity’s ability to mitigate such threats. Additionally, the witnesses
described the details of the need for government reforms, namely
the need to improve the role of Sector Specific Agencies and to es-
tablish the Office of the National Cyber Director.
Witnesses: Hon. Angus S. King, JR., Co-Chair, Cyberspace Solar-
ium Commission; Hon. Mike Gallagher, Co-Chair, Cyberspace So-
larium Commission; Hon. Suzanne E. Spaulding, Commissioner,
Cyberspace Solarium Commission; Thomas A. Fanning, Commis-
sioner, Cyberspace Solarium Commission.
Nominations of Hon. Russell Vought to be Director, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, and Craig E. Leen to be Inspector Gen-
eral, Office of Personnel Management. June 2, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations of
Hon. Russell Vought to be Director, Office of Management and
Budget, and Craig E. Leen to be Inspector General, Office of Per-
sonnel Management.
Nominations of Donald L. Moak and William Zollars to be Gov-
ernors, United States Postal Service, and The Honorable Mark
A. Robbins, Carl E. Ross, and Elizabeth J. Shapiro to be Asso-
ciate Judges, Superior Court of the District of Columbia. June
3, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations of
Donald L. Moak and William Zollars to be Governors, United
States Postal Service, and The Honorable Mark A. Robbins, Carl
E. Ross, and Elizabeth J. Shapiro to be Associate Judges, Superior
Court of the District of Columbia.
Evaluating the Federal Government’s Procurement and Distribution
Strategies in Response to the COVID–19 Pandemic. June 9,
2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine how the Federal
Government developed and executed procurement and distribution
strategies in order to provide our nation the requisite diagnostic
testing, personal protective equipment (PPE), drug supplies, other
medically-necessary equipment, and resources in response to the
COVID–19 pandemic. The witnesses addressed their agency’s roles
in the evaluation of the nation’s need for and current supply of
diagnostics testing, PPE, and other medically-necessary equipment
and how that data informs their distribution strategies. The wit-
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nesses also discussed data and analyses used to determine the cur-
rent and future need for these critical resources, activities estab-
lished to expedite procurement, and distribution of these resources
to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments in response to the
pandemic.
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Witnesses: Hon. Peter T. Gaynor, Administrator, Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity; Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, Vice Director of Logistics, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense; Hon. Brett Giroir,
M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services.
The Role of the Strategic National Stockpile in Pandemic Response.
June 24, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the mission of the
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and the role it played in the
Federal Government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic. Wit-
nesses discussed how the Federal Government makes decisions af-
fecting the SNS’s inventory, and the challenges of balancing its
multiple preparedness missions with available resources. Witnesses
also discussed how the Federal Government could improve its ap-
proach to restocking the SNS following disasters and crises. Fi-
nally, witnesses addressed the role state, local, tribal, and terri-
torial (SLTT) governments play in responding to pandemics, and
provided recommendations for how the Federal and SLTT govern-
ments can better enhance their stockpiling capabilities in response
to future pandemics.
Witnesses: Julie L. Gerberding, M.D., Former Director (2002–
2009) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services; Daniel M. Gerstein,
PH.D., Senior Policy Researcher, RAND Corporation; W. Gregory
Burel, Former Director (2007–2020) of the Strategic National
Stockpile at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Andrew Phelps, Director, Oregon Office of Emergency Management
on behalf of the National Emergency Management Association.
CBP Oversight: Examining the Evolving Challenges Facing the
Agency. June 25, 2020.
This hearing highlighted the top concerns and challenges U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) faces during a public health
emergency, as well as the adaptations it has made to safeguard the
nation while enabling lawful and essential trade, travel, and mi-
gration. The witness discussed the effectiveness of the specific ac-
tions CBP has taken to confront COVID–19, including CBP’s mass
migration strategies and the effects on CBP’s front-line workforce.
The witness also addressed specific programs including processing
under Title 42 health authorities; the Migrant Protection Protocols;
Prompt Asylum Claim Review; Humanitarian Asylum Review Proc-
ess; Asylum Cooperative Agreements; and Electronic Nationality
Verification.
Witness: Mark Morgan, Chief Operating Officer and Senior Offi-
cial Performing the Duties of the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Nomination of Hon. Derek T. Kan to be Deputy Director, Office of
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Management and Budget. June 30, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination of
Hon. Derek T. Kan to be Deputy Director, Office of Management
and Budget.
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41
Oversight of COVID–19 Financial Relief Packages. July 28, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the COVID–19 finan-
cial relief packages. The witnesses provided evaluations on the ef-
fectiveness of the packages programs and highlighted any pro-
grams that required additional oversight. The witnesses also ad-
dressed oversight and other controls they believed Congress should
consider as it debated the authorization of additional programs and
the appropriation of additional funding.
Witnesses: Hon. Phil Gramm, Former Senator from the State of
Texas, and Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute;
Danielle Brian, Executive Director, Project on Government Over-
sight; Maya MacGuineas, President, Committee for a Responsible
Federal Budget; Veronique De Rugy, Ph.D., Senior Research Fel-
low, Mercatus Center, George Mason University; Hon. Neil
Barofsky, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLP, Former Special Inspector
General (2008–2011) Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Oversight of DHS Personnel Deployments to Recent Protests. August
6, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the Department of
Homeland Security’s (DHS) actions to protect Federal property and
personnel during the protests in cities across the country, and in
particular in Portland, Oregon. The witness described the events
leading to the Department’s deployment of law enforcement offi-
cers, the number and component agencies from which these officers
were deployed, the authorities that DHS relied on to conduct its op-
erations, coordination with state and local officials, and any rel-
evant data the Department collected during the protests. Addition-
ally, the witness discussed the role DHS’s law enforcement officers
will play in Operation Legend, announced by the President on July
8, 2020.
Witness: Hon. Chad F. Wolf, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
Examining the Finances and Operations of the United States
Postal Service During COVID–19 and Upcoming Elections. August
21, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine the finances and op-
erations of the United States Postal Service (USPS), particularly in
light of the unprecedented COVID–19 pandemic; recent operational
changes at USPS; and the upcoming elections.
Witness: Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal
Service.
Nominations of John Gibbs to be Director, Office of Personnel Man-
agement, and Hon. John M. Barger, Hon. Christopher B.
Burnham, and Frank Dunlevy to be Members, Federal Retire-
ment Thrift Investment Board. September 9, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nominations of
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John Gibbs to be Director, Office of Personnel Management, and
Hon. John M. Barger, Hon. Christopher B. Burnham, and Frank
Dunlevy to be Members, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment
Board.
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Nomination of Hon. Chad F. Wolf to be Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security. September 23, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to consider the nomination of
Hon. Chad F. Wolf to be Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
Threats to the Homeland. September 24, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to update the public under-
standing of prevailing threats to the security of the United States
of America. The witnesses discussed the most pressing domestic
and foreign threats faced by the United States and what efforts
were taken to counter them.
Witnesses: Hon. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; Hon. Christopher Mil-
ler, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence; Kenneth Cuccinelli, Senior Official Per-
forming the Duties of the Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.
Early Outpatient Treatment: An Essential Part of a COVID–19
Solution. November 19, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to assess the current state of the
COVID–19 pandemic and examine efforts to develop early thera-
peutic treatments for COVID–19 outpatients. The witnesses dis-
cussed the research and development of early outpatient medical
treatments for COVID–19, as well as the review and approval of
such treatments by the Food and Drug Administration under its
Emergency Use Authorization program. Witnesses also provided
recommendations on what is most effective in treating COVID–19
outpatients.
Witnesses: Peter A. McCullough, M.D., M.P.H., Vice Chief of In-
ternal Medicine, Baylor University Medical Center; Harvey Risch,
M.D., PH.D., Professor of Epidemiology, Yale School of Medicine;
George C. Fareed, M.D., Medical Director and Family Medicine
Specialist, Pioneers Medical Center; Ashish K. Jha, M.D., M.P.H.,
Dean of the School of Public Health, Brown University.
Congressional Oversight in the Face of Executive Branch and Media
Suppression: The Case Study of Crossfire Hurricane. December
3rd, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine misconduct by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), Department of Justice, and
other Federal agencies; the executive branch’s responsiveness to
congressional oversight of that misconduct; and the media’s cov-
erage of that misconduct, with a particular focus on the FBI’s
Crossfire Hurricane investigation. The witnesses offered any
unique insight into those matters based on their previous work.
Witnesses: Sharyl Attkisson, Investigative Journalist; Kevin R.
Brock, Former Assistant Director for Intelligence, Federal Bureau
of Investigation; Lee Smith, Investigative Journalist & Author.
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Early Outpatient Treatment: An Essential Part of a COVID–19
Solution, Part II. December 8, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to assess the state of the
COVID–19 pandemic and efforts to develop early therapeutic treat-
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43
ments for COVID–19 patients for whom hospitalization is not re-
quired. The witnesses discussed the research and development of
early outpatient medical treatments for COVID–19, as well as the
review and approval of such treatments by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration under its Emergency Use Authorization program. Wit-
nesses shared lessons learned and provided recommendations for
how to provide more effective outpatient treatment to COVID–19
patients.
Witnesses: Ramin Oskoui, M.D., Vice President of Medical Staff,
Sibley Memorial Hospital and Chief Executive Officer, Foxhall Car-
diology; Jean-Jacques Rajter, M.D., Pulmonologist, Broward Health
Medical Center; Pierre Kory, M.D., Associate Professor of Medicine,
St. Luke’s Aurora Medical Center; Armand Balboni, M.D., PH.D.,
Chief Executive Director, Appili Therapeutics Inc.; Jane M. Orient,
M.D., Executive Director, Association of American Physicians and
Surgeons; Jayanta Bhattacharya, M.D., PH.D., Professor of Medi-
cine, Stanford University, and Senior Fellow Stanford Institute for
Economic Policy Research, Stanford University.
Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election. December 16, 2020.
The purpose of this hearing was to examine perceived irregular-
ities in the 2020 election. The witnesses shared their insight on the
2020 Presidential Election, and its outcome.
Witnesses: Hon. Kenneth W. Starr, Testifying in Personal Capac-
ity; Hon. Donald Palmer, Commissioner, U.S. Election Assistance
Commission; James R. Troupis, Attorney, Troupis Law Firm; Hon.
Francis X. Ryan, State Representative, Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania; Jesse R. Binnall, Partner, Harvey & Binnall, PLLC; Hon.
Christopher C. Krebs, Former Director (2018–2020) Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
V. REPORTS, PRINTS, AND GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee prepared and issued
103 reports and 2 Committee Prints on the following topics. Re-
ports issued by Subcommittees are listed in their respective sec-
tions of this document.
COMMITTEE REPORTS
Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs and its Subcommittees for the One Hundred Six-
teenth Congress.
To authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to work with
Cybersecurity Consortia for training, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116–5, re. S. 333.
To increase access to agency guidance documents. S. 116–12, re.
S. 380.
To amend the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to improve the
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orderly transfer of the executive power during presidential transi-
tions. S. Rept. 116–13, re. S. 394.
To require each agency, in providing notice of a rule making, to
include a link to a 100 word plain language summary of the pro-
posed rule. S. Rept. 116 14, re. S. 395
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To establish a Federal rotational cyber workforce program for the
Federal cyber workforce. S. Rept. 116–15, re. S. 406
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the De-
partment of Homeland Security to develop an engagement strategy
with fusion centers, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–16, re.
H.R. 504.
Activities of the Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs. Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs United States Senate and its Subcommittees
for the One Hundred and Fifteenth Congress. S. Rept. 116–17.
To authorize Cyber Hunt and incident response teams at the De-
partment of Homeland Security, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116–27, re. S. 315.
To require the Director of the Government Publishing Office to
establish and maintain a website accessible to the public that al-
lows the public to obtain electronic copies of all congressionally
mandated reports in one place, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116–31, re. S. 195.
To save taxpayer money and improve the efficiency and speed of
intragovernmental correspondence, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116–32, re. S. 196.
To prohibit Federal agencies and Federal contractors from re-
questing that an applicant for employment disclose criminal history
record information before the applicant has received a conditional
offer, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–33, re. S. 387.
To improve efforts to identify and reduce government-wide im-
proper payments, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–35, re.
S. 375.
To accompany S. Con. Res. 15. S. Rept. 116–43, re. S. Con. Res.
15.
To require an exercise related to terrorist and foreign fighter
travel, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–44, re. H.R. 1590.
To require the collection of voluntary feedback on services pro-
vided by agencies, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–46, re.
S. 1275.
To amend the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Im-
provement Act of 2012, including making changes to the Do Not
Pay Initiative, for improved detection, prevention, and recovery of
improper payments to deceased individuals, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–49, re. S. 1333.
To require the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
to issue guidance on electronic consent forms, and for other pur-
poses. S. Rept. 116–50, re. H.R. 1079.
To amend the Act of August 25, 1958, commonly known as the
‘‘Former Presidents Act of 1958,’’ with respect to the monetary al-
lowance payable to a former President, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116–53, re. S. 580.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to improve the effective-
ness of major rules accomplishing their regulatory objectives by
promoting retrospective review, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
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116–55, re. S. 1420.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to prevent fraud by rep-
resentative payees. S. Rept. 116–56, re. S. 1430.
To amend Title 44, United States code, to modernize the Federal
Register, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–57, re. H.R. 1654.
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To establish a counterterrorism advisory board, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116–59, re. S. 411.
To amend Section 327 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act to clarify that national urban search
and rescue response system task forces may include Federal em-
ployees. S. Rept. 116–60, re. S. 1521.
To amend the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
of 2006 to incorporate the recommendations made by the Govern-
ment Accountability Office relating to advance contracts, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116–84, re. S. 979.
To prohibit contracting with persons that have business oper-
ations with the Maduro regime and other purposes. S. Rept.
116–85, re. S. 1151.
To repeal the Multi-State Plan Program. S. Rept. 116–86, re. S.
1378.
To manage supply chain risk through counterintelligence train-
ing, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–87, re. S. 1388.
To require agencies to publish an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking for major rules. S. Rept. 116–88, re. S. 1419.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide funding
to secure nonprofit facilities from terrorist attacks, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116–89, re. S. 1539.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide for en-
gagements with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–90, re. S. 1846.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish in the
Department of Homeland Security an unmanned aircraft systems
coordinator, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–91, re. S. 1867.
To require the disclosure of ownership of high-security space
leased to accommodate a Federal agency, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–92, re. S. 1869.
To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to publish an an-
nual report on the use of deepfake technology, and for other pur-
poses. S. Rept. 116–93, re. S. 2065.
To increase the number of Customs and Border Protection agri-
culture specialists and support staff in the Office of Field Oper-
ations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and for other pur-
poses. S. Rept. 116–94, re. S. 2107.
To require the Administrator of General Services to issue guid-
ance to clarify that Federal agencies may pay by charge card for
the charging of Federal electric motor vehicles, and for other pur-
poses. S. Rept. 116–95, re. S. 2193.
To modernize Federal grant reporting, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116–96, re. H.R. 150.
To require a Department of Homeland Security Overseas Per-
sonnel Enhancement Plan, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–97,
re. H.R. 2590.
To amend the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 to authorize
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certain polygraph waiver authority, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–99, re. S. 731.
To prohibit the use of reverse auctions for design and construc-
tion services procurements, and for other purposes. S. Rept
116–100, re. S. 1434.
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To leverage Federal Government procurement power to encour-
age increased cybersecurity for internet of things devices, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116–112, re. S. 734.
To require the Comptroller General of the United States to ana-
lyze certain legislation in order to prevent duplication of an overlap
with existing Federal programs, and initiatives. S. Rept. 116–113,
re. S. 2183.
To amend Section 3116 of Title 5 United States Code, to clarify
the applicability of the appointment limitations for students ap-
pointed under the expedited hiring authority for post-secondary
students. S. Rept. 116–129, re. S. 2169.
To amend Title 5, United States Code, to appropriately limit the
authority to award bonuses to Federal employees. S. Rept.116–152,
re. S. 2119.
To allow members of Congress to opt out of the Federal Employ-
ees Retirement System, and allow members who opt out of the Fed-
eral Employees Retirement System to continue to participate in the
Thrift Savings Plan. S. Rept. 116–153, re. S. 439.
To provide taxpayers with an improved understanding of govern-
ment programs through the disclosure of cost, performance, and
areas of duplication among them, leverage existing data to achieve
a functional Federal program inventory, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–154, re. S. 2177.
To amend Title 40, United States Code, to require the Adminis-
trator of General Services to procure the most life-cycle cost effec-
tive and energy efficient lighting products and to issue guidance on
the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of those products, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116–157, re. S. 1874.
To establish procedures ad consequences in the event of a failure
to complete regular appropriations. S. Rept. 116–158, re. S. 1877.
To provide for congressional approval of national emergency dec-
larations, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–159, re. S. 764.
To provide for joint reports by relevant Federal agencies to Con-
gress regarding incidents of terrorism, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–175, re. S. 2513.
To amend the Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimina-
tion and Retaliation Act of 2002 to strengthen Federal antidiscrimi-
nation laws enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission and expand accountability within the Federal Government,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–176, re. H.R. 135.
To provide requirements for the .gov domain, and for other pur-
poses. S. Rept. 116–192, re. S. 2749.
To establish the Federal clearinghouse on school safety best prac-
tices and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–193, re. S. 2779.
To direct the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency to develop guidance for firefighters and other emer-
gency response personnel on best practices to protect them from ex-
posure to PFAS and to limit and prevent the release of PFAS into
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the environment, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–211, re.
S. 2353.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize the
Operation Stonegarden Grant Program, and for other purposes. S.
Rept. 116–212, re. S. 2750.
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To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require an an-
nual report on the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement.
S. Rept. 116–213, re. H.R. 495.
To require the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
to submit to Congress an annual report on projects that are over
budget and behind schedule, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–
220, re. S. 565.
To amend the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency
Act of 2006, to require the budget justifications and appropriation
requests of agencies be made publicly available. S. Rept. 116–221,
re. S. 2560.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish chem-
ical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence and informa-
tion sharing functions of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of Homeland Security and to require dissemination
of information analyzed by the Department to entities with respon-
sibilities relating to Homeland Security, and for other purposes.
S. 116–222, re. H.R. 1589.
To authorize an Artificial Intelligence Center of Excellence with-
in the General Services Administration, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–225, re. S. 1363.
To eliminate or modify certain Federal agency reporting require-
ments, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–226, re. S. 2769.
To require the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency to establish a cybersecurity state coordinator in
each state, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–227, re. S. 3207.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish the In-
telligence Rotational Assignment Program in the Department of
Homeland Security, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–228, re.
H.R. 2066.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to protect U.S.
Customs and Border Protection officers, agents, and other per-
sonnel, and canines against potential synthetic opioid exposure,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–229, re. H.R. 4739.
To strengthen employee cost savings suggestions programs with-
in the Federal Government. S. Rept. 116–231, re. S. 2618.
To require a review of Department of Homeland Security Trusted
Traveler Programs, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–237, re.
H.R. 3675.
To amend the Fast Act to improve the Federal permitting proc-
ess, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–241, re. S. 1976.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2012 to protect United
States critical infrastructure by ensuring that the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency has the legal tools it needs to
notify private and public sector entities put at risk by cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in the networks and systems that control critical as-
sets of the United States. S. Rept. 116–242, re. S. 3045.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to provide for the halt in
pension payments for members of Congress sentenced for certain
offenses and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–243, re. S. 3332.
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To ensure U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers, agents,
and other personnel have adequate synthetic opioid detection
equipment, that the Department of Homeland Security has a proc-
ess to update synthetic opioid detection capability, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116–244, re. H.R. 4761.
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To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act to allow the Administrator of the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency to provide capitalization grants to
states to establish revolving funds to provide hazard mitigation as-
sistance to reduce risks from disasters and natural hazards, and
other related environmental harm. S. Rept. 116–249, re. S. 3418.
To prohibit certain individuals from downloading or using Tiktok
on any device issued by the United States or a government corpora-
tion. S. Rept. 116–250, re. S. 3455.
To increase the number of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Office of Field Operations officers and support staff and to require
reports that identify staffing, infrastructure, and equipment needed
to enhance security at ports of entry. S. Rept. 116–264, re. S. 1004.
To establish in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency of the Department of Homeland Security a cybersecurity
advisory committee. S. Rept. 116–265, re. S. 4024.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to expand the au-
thority of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–266, re. S. 4157.
To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan
to increase to 100 percent the rates of scanning of commercial and
passenger vehicles entering the United States at land ports of
entry along the border using large-scale non-intrusive inspection
systems to enhance border security, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–267, re. H.R. 5273.
To ban the Federal procurement of certain drones and other un-
manned aircraft systems, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–268,
re. S. 2502.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to make permanent the
authority of the United States Patent and Trademark Office to con-
duct a Telework Travel Expenses Program. S. Rept. 116–276, re. S.
4138.
To establish a program to facilitate the adoption of modern tech-
nology by executive agencies, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–
277, re. S. 4200.
To modify the government wide Financial Management Plan, and
for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–278, S. 3287.
To establish an interagency task force to analyze preparedness
for national pandemics, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–279,
re. S. 4204.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to make certain
improvements in the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of
the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–280, re. H.R. 4713.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish Na-
tional Urban Security Technology, and for other purposes. S. Rept.
116–285, re. H.R. 542.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish a
Homeland Intelligence Doctrine for the Department of Homeland
Security, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–286, re. H.R. 2589.
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To amend he Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish a men-
tor-protégé program, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–287, re.
H.R. 4727.
To require a guidance clarity statement on certain agency guid-
ance, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–297, re. S. 3412.
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To amend Chapter 8 of Title 5 United States code, to require
Federal agencies to submit to the Comptroller General of the
United States a report on rules that are revoked, suspended, re-
placed, amended, or otherwise made ineffective. S. Rept. 116–298,
re. S. 4222.
To amend Title 5, United States code, to require the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management to establish and maintain a
public directory of the individuals occupying government policy and
supporting positions, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–302, re.
S. 3896.
To modernize the Real ID Act of 2005, and for other purposes.
S. Rept. 116–303, re. S. 4133.
To amend Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States code, to provide
that major rules of the executive branch shall have no force or ef-
fect unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted into law.
S. Rept. 116–311, re. S. 92.
To require the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion to annually hire at least 600 new Border Patrol agents, to re-
port quarterly to Congress on the status of the Border Patrol work-
force, and to conduct a comprehensive staffing analysis. S. Rept.
116–312, re. S. 2162.
To prohibit agencies from using Federal funds for publicity or
propaganda purposes, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–313, re.
S. 2722.
To establish the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations of
the United States to facilitate the fullest cooperation, coordination,
and mutual accountability among all levels of government, and for
other purposes. S. Rept. 116–314, re. S. 2967.
To promote innovative acquisition techniques and procurement
strategies, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–315, re. S. 3038.
To establish an Office of Equal Rights and Community Inclusion
at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and for other pur-
poses. S. Rept. 116–316, re. S. 3658.
To strengthen the security and integrity of the United States sci-
entific and research enterprise. S. Rept. 116–317, re. S. 3997.
To require the Federal Emergency Management Agency to evalu-
ate the national response framework based on lessons learned from
the COVID–19 pandemic, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–318,
re. S. 4153.
To examine the extent of the reliance of the United States on for-
eign producers for personal protective equipment during the
COVID–19 pandemic and produce recommendations to secure the
supply chain of personal protective equipment. S. Rept. 116–319,
re. S. 4158.
To repeal Section 692 of the Post-Katrina Emergency Manage-
ment Reform Act of 2020. S. Rept. 116–320, re. S. 4165.
To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to authorize the
transfer of certain equipment during a public health emergency,
and for other purposes. S. Rept. 116–321, re. S. 4210.
To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to assess tech-
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nology needs along the southern border and develop a strategy for
bridging such gaps. S. Rept. 116–322, re. S. 4224.
To amend the implementing recommendations of the 9/11 Com-
mission Act of 2007 to clarify certain allowable uses of funds for
public transportation security assistance grants and establish peri-
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50
ods of performance for such grants, and other purposes. S. Rept.
116–323, re. H.R. 1313.
To waive the imposition of a civil fine for certain first-time pa-
perwork violations by small business concerns. S. Rept. 116–326,
re. S. 2757.
To amend the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, to pro-
vide for regulatory impact analyses for certain rules, and for other
purposes. S. Rept. 116–333, re. S. 4077.
COMMITTEE PRINTS
The Committee issued the following Committee Prints during the
116th Congress:
Rules of Procedure. Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs. (Printed. 40 pp. S. Prt. 116–10)
Rules of Procedure. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. (Print-
ed. 23 pp. S. Prt. 116–11)
GAO REPORTS
Also during the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) issued 205 reports at the request of the Committee.
GAO reports requested by the Subcommittees appear in their re-
spective sections. Reports are listed here by title, GAO number,
and release date.
Federal Protective Service: DHS Should Take Additional Steps
To Evaluate Organizational Placement. GAO–19–122. January 8,
2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Improved Covert Testing But Needs To
Conduct More Risk-Informed Tests And Address Vulnerabilities.
GAO–19–154C. January 10, 2019.
Improper Payments: Selected Agencies Need Improvements In
Their Assessments To Better Determine And Document Risk Sus-
ceptibility. GAO–19–112. January 10, 2019.
K–12 Education: Challenges To Assessing Program Performance
And Recent Efforts To Address Them. GAO–19–266R. January 31,
2019.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Status Of FEMA Public Assistance
Funding And Implementation. GAO–19–253. February 25, 2019.
Department Of Energy: Performance Evaluations Could Better
Assess Management And Operating Contractor Costs. GAO–19–5.
February 26, 2019.
Oral Presentation On Electromagnetic Events. February 27,
2019. High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed To Achieve
Greater Progress On High-Risk Areas. GAO–19–393T. March 6,
2019.
Department Of Energy Contracting: Actions Needed To Strength-
en Subcontract Oversight. GAO–19–107. March 12, 2019.
Foot-And-Mouth Disease: USDA’s Efforts To Prepare For A Po-
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tential Outbreak Could Be Strengthened. GAO–19–103. March 12,
2019.
Cybersecurity Workforce: Agencies Need To Accurately Cat-
egorize Positions To Effectively Identify Critical Staffing Needs.
GAO–19–144. March 12, 2019.
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Federal Ethics Programs: Government-Wide Political Appointee
Data And Some Ethics Oversight Procedures At Interior And SBA
Could Be Improved. GAO–19–249. March 14, 2019.
Grants Management: Agency Action Required To Ensure Grant-
ees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO–19–282. March
14, 2019.
U.S. Ports Of Entry: Update On CBP Public-Private Partnership
Programs. GAO–19–263R. March 14, 2019.
Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status Of FEMA Funding, Oversight,
And Recovery Challenges. GAO–19–256. March 14, 2019.
Huracanes De Puerto Rico: Estado De Financiamiento De Fema,
Supervision Y Desafios De Recuperacion (Spanish Highlights).
GAO–19–331. March 14, 2019.
Border Security: DHS Should Improve The Quality Of Unlawful
Border Entry Information And Other Metric Reporting.
GAO–19–305. March 21, 2019
Data Act: OMB Needs To Formalize Data Governance For Re-
porting Federal Spending. GAO–19–284. March 22, 2019.
Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring Of Block Grant Funds Is
Needed. GAO–19–232. March 25, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of
The Fiscal Service’s Information System Controls.
GAO–19–301RSU. March 26, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of
The Fiscal Service’s Information System Controls. GAO–19–302R.
March 26, 2019.
Management Report: Areas For Improvement In The Federal Re-
serve Banks’ Information System Controls. GAO–19–303RSU.
March 26, 2019.
Management Report: Areas For Improvement In The Federal Re-
serve Banks’ Information System Controls. GAO–19–304R. March
26, 2019.
Federal Workforce: Key Talent Management Strategies For
Agencies To Better Meet Their Missions. GAO–19–181. March 28,
2019.
Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource Challenges
But Needs Performance Measures To Assess Security Between
Ports Of Entry. GAO–19–194SU. March 28, 2019.
Department Of Defense Consolidated Financial Statements FY
2018 Audit Oversight. March 28, 2019.
Financial Audit: Fiscal Years 2018 And 2017 Consolidated Fi-
nancial Statements Of The U.S. Government. GAO–19–294R.
March 28, 2019.
Financial Audit: Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Govern-
ment’s FY 2018 Financial Statements. March 28, 2019.
Financial Audit: 2018 Statement Of Long-Term Fiscal Projec-
tions Audit. March 28, 2019.
Financial Audit: Fiscal Year 2018 Statements Of Social Insur-
ance For The Consolidated Financial Statements Audit. March 28,
2019.
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2018 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations On Lobbyists’ Compli-
ance With Disclosure Requirements. GAO–19–357. March 29, 2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Improved Covert Testing But Needs To
Conduct More Risk-Informed Tests And Address Vulnerabilities.
GAO–19–374. April 4, 2019.
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Data Center Optimization: Additional Agency Actions Needed To
Meet OMB Goals. GAO–19–241. April 11, 2019.
2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support For Electricity Grid
Restoration In The U.S. Virgin Islands And Puerto Rico.
GAO–19–296. April 18, 2019.
2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed To Improve The Use
Of Post-Disaster Contracts To Support Response And Recovery.
GAO–19–281. April 24, 2019.
Data Act: Pilot Effectively Tested Approaches For Reducing Re-
porting Burden For Grants But Not For Contracts. GAO–19–299.
April 30, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service’s Internal Control Over Financial Report-
ing. GAO–19–412R. May 9, 2019.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations
To Its Program To Secure Key Cities. GAO–19–327. May 13, 2019.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed To Better Support In-
dividuals Who Are Older Or Have Disabilities. GAO–19–318. May
14, 2019.
Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service’s Fiscal Year 2018
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO–19–185. May 15, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of
The Fiscal Service’s Information System Controls Related To The
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO–19–463RSU. May 15, 2019.
2019 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities To Reduce Frag-
mentation, Overlap, And Duplication And Achieve Billions In Fi-
nancial Benefits. GAO–19–285SP. May 21, 2019.
Congressional Award Foundation: Review Of The Audit Of The
Financial Statements For Fiscal Year 2018. GAO–19–472R. May
21, 2019.
U. S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed To Fully Address
Protective Mission Panel Recommendations. GAO–19–415. May 22,
2019.
Federal Real Property: GSA Needs To Strengthen Oversight Of
Its Delegated Leasing Program. GAO–19–405. June 3, 2019.
Oral Presentation On Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Stand-
ards Program. June 4, 2019.
Land Ports Of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies And Enhance
Analysis Of Inspections. GAO–19–400SU. June 13, 2019.
Committee On Foreign Investment In The United States: Se-
lected Transactions Involving Real Estate May Share Certain Na-
tional Security Risks, But Dispositions Can Vary Due To Case-Spe-
cific Factors. GAO–19–417C. June 14, 2019.
Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource Challenges
But Needs Performance Measures To Assess Security Between
Ports Of Entry. GAO–19–470. June 26, 2019.
2017 Disaster Relief Oversight: Strategy Needed To Ensure
Agencies’ Internal Control Plans Provide Sufficient Information.
GAO–19–479. June 28, 2019.
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2020 Census: Actions Needed To Address Key Risks To A Suc-
cessful Enumeration. GAO–19–588T. July 16, 2019.
Data Act: Customer Agencies’ Experiences Working With Shared
Service Providers For Data Submissions. GAO–19–537. July 18,
2019.
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Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service’s Information System Security Controls.
GAO–19–473RSU. July 18, 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service’s Information System Security Controls.
GAO–19–474R. July 18, 2019.
Cybersecurity: Agencies Need To Fully Establish Risk Manage-
ment Programs And Address Challenges. GAO–19–384. July 25,
2019.
Federal Vehicle Fleets: Agencies Have Continued To Incorporate
Alternative Fuel Vehicles Into Fleets, But Challenges Remain.
GAO–19–397. July 26, 2019.
Federal Information Security: Agencies And OMB Need To
Strengthen Policies And Practices. GAO–19–545. July 26, 2019.
Land Ports Of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies And Enhance
Analysis Of Inspections. GAO–19–658. August 6, 2019.
Substantial Progress In Federal Financial Management Has
Been Made; Significant Challenges Remain. August 15 2019.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In Controls Over
The Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Consolidated Financial
Statements. GAO–19–624. September 4, 2019.
U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State And USAID Allocated Over
$700 Million To Support Criminal Justice, Border Security, And
Related Efforts From Fiscal Year 2014 Through 2018.
GAO–19–647. September 10, 2019.
Disaster Response: Federal Assistance And Selected States And
Territory Efforts To Identify Deaths From 2017 Hurricanes.
GAO–19–486. September 13, 2019.
Disaster Response: FEMA And The American Red Cross Need To
Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations Are Included In Coordination
And Planning. GAO–19–526. September 19, 2019.
Respuesta A Desastres: Fema Y La Cruz Roja Americana
Necesitan Asegurar Que Las Organizaciones Claves Del Cuidado
En Masa Sean Incluidas En La Coordinacion Y El Planeamiento.
GAO–19–708. September 19, 2019.
Disaster Response: HHS Should Address Deficiencies High-
lighted By Recent Hurricanes In The U.S. Virgin Islands And Puer-
to Rico. GAO–19–592. September 20, 2019.
U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer Benefits,
But Additional Actions Are Needed To Prioritize Resources.
GAO–19–560SU. September 26, 2019.
Federal Contracting: Information On Federal Agencies’ Use Of
The Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Process. GAO–19–691.
September 26, 2019.
International Aviation Security: TSA Should Improve Industry
Coordination And Its Security Directive And Emergency Amend-
ment Review Process. GAO–20–7. October 3, 2019.
Puerto Rico Electricity Grid Recovery: Better Information And
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Enhanced Coordination Is Needed To Address Challenges.
GAO–20–14. October 8, 2019.
Recuperacion De La Red Electrica En Puerto Rico: Se Necesita
Mejor Informacion Y Coordinacion Para Enfrentar Desafios.
GAO–20–143. October 8, 2019.
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Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions To Ad-
dress Unique Response And Recovery Challenges. GAO–20–5. Octo-
ber 9, 2019.
Highway Emergency Relief: Federal Highway Administration
Should Enhance Accountability Over Project Decisions.
GAO–20–32. October 17, 2019.
2020 Census: Status Update On Early Operations.
GAO–20–111R. October 31, 2019.
Government Watchlists. GAO–20–247C. November 7, 2019.
Agreed-Upon Procedures: FY 2019 Excise Tax Distributions To
The Airport And Airway And Highway Trust Funds.
GAO–20–138R. November 7, 2019.
Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service’s FY 2019 And FY
2018 Schedules Of Federal Debt. GAO–20–117. November 8, 2019.
Financial Audit: IRS’s FY 2019 And FY 2018 Financial State-
ments. GAO–20–159. November 8, 2019.
Data Act: Quality Of Data Submissions Has Improved But Fur-
ther Action Is Needed To Disclose Known Data Limitations.
GAO–20–75. November 8, 2019.
Emergency Transportation Relief: Federal Transit Administra-
tion And Fema Took Actions To Coordinate, But Steps Are Needed
To Address Risk Of Duplicate Funding. GAO–20–85. November 13,
2019.
Financial Audit: Securities And Exchange Commission’s FY 2019
And FY 2018 Financial Statements. GAO–20–204R. November 15,
2019.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could Strength-
en FEMA’s Key Disaster Recovery Efforts. GAO–20–54. November
19, 2019.
Transportation Security: DHS Should Communicate The Na-
tional Strategy’s Alignment With Related Strategies To Guide Fed-
eral Efforts. GAO–20–88. November 19, 2019.
Surface Transportation: TSA Should Improve Coordination Pro-
cedures For Its Security Training Program. GAO–20–185. Novem-
ber 20, 2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Coordinates With Stakeholders On
Changes To Screening Rules But Could Clarify Its Review Proc-
esses And Better Measure Effectiveness. GAO–20–72. November
20, 2019.
Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces’ Workforce
Needs Could Improve Efficiency And Reduce Potential Overlap Or
Gaps In Capabilities. GAO–20–33. November 21, 2019.
Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening Technologies
Continue To Meet Detection Requirements After Deployment.
GAO–20–56. December 5, 2019.
Cloud Computing Security: Agencies Increased Their Use Of The
Federal Authorization Program, But Improved Oversight And Im-
plementation Are Needed. GAO–20–126. December 12, 2019.
Technology Modernization Fund: OMB And GSA Need To Im-
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prove Fee Collection And Clarify Cost Estimating Guidance For
Awarded Projects. GAO–20–3. December 12, 2019.
Improving Program Management: Key Actions Taken, But Fur-
ther Efforts Needed To Strengthen Standards, Expand Reviews,
And Address High-Risk Areas. GAO–20–44. December 13, 2019.
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U.S. Postal Service: Offering Nonpostal Services Through Its De-
livery Network Would Likely Present Benefits And Limitations.
GAO–20–190. December 17, 2019.
Drug Control: The Office Of National Drug Control Policy Should
Develop Key Planning Elements To Meet Statutory Requirements.
GAO–20–124. December 18, 2019.
International Mail: Progress Made In Using Electronic Data To
Detect Illegal Opioid Shipments, But Additional Steps Remain.
GAO–20–231RSU. December 18, 2019.
International Mail: Progress Made In Using Electronic Data To
Detect Illegal Opioid Shipments, But Additional Steps Remain.
GAO–20–229R. December 18, 2019.
Wildland Fire: Federal Agencies’ Efforts To Reduce Wildland
Fuels And Lower Risk To Communities And Ecosystems.
GAO–20–52. December 19, 2019.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Outcomes Have Improved But
Actions Needed To Enhance Oversight Of Schedule Goals.
GAO–20–170SP. December 19, 2019.
Federal Property: GSA Guidance Needed To Help Agencies Iden-
tify Unneeded Property In Warehouses. GAO–20–228. December
20, 2019.
2020 Census: Changes Planned To Improve Data Quality.
GAO–20–282. December 20, 2019.
U.S. Postal Service: Additional Guidance Needed To Assess Ef-
fect Of Changes To Employee Compensation. GAO–20–140. Janu-
ary 17, 2020.
U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer Benefits,
But Additional Actions Are Needed To Prioritize Resources.
GAO–20–239. January 22, 2020.
State Department: Additional Steps Are Needed To Identify Po-
tential Barriers To Diversity. GAO–20–237. January 27, 2020.
U.S. Ports Of Entry: Update On CBP Public-Private Partnership
Programs. GAO–20–255R. January 30, 2020.
DOD Financial Management: Impact Of Financial Audit Defi-
ciencies On DOD’s Mission Critical Assets. February 4, 2020.
Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions Needed To
Strengthen Project Cost Estimation And Awareness Of Program
Guidance. GAO–20–221. February 5, 2020.
Briefing On Civilian Agency Suggestions For Changes In Stat-
utes To Reduce Facility Energy Costs And Use. February 5, 2020.
Recuperacion De Desastres En Puerto Rico: Acciones De Fema
Son Necesarias Para Fortalecer La Calculacion De Costos De
Proyectos Y El Conocimiento De Las Directrices Del Programa.
GAO–20–381. February 5, 2020.
Emergency Alerting: Agencies Need To Address Pending Applica-
tions And Monitor Industry Progress On System Improvements.
GAO–20–294. February 6, 2020.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken Steps
To Address Workforce Issues, But Additional Actions Needed.
GAO–20–125. February 12, 2020.
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2020 Census: Initial Enumeration Underway But Readiness For
Upcoming Operations Is Mixed. GAO–20–368R. February 12, 2020.
Aviation Security: TSA Updated Screener Training To Address
Risks, But Should Enhance Processes To Monitor Compliance.
GAO–20–219. February 13, 2020.
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Southwest Border: Actions Needed To Improve DHS Processing
Of Families And Coordination Between DHS And HHS. GAO–20–
245. February 19, 2020.
National Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would Enhance
Likelihood Of Effective Implementation. GAO–20–273. February
19, 2020.
Immigration: Actions Needed To Strengthen USCIS’s Oversight
And Data Quality Of Credible And Reasonable Fear Screenings.
GAO–20–250. February 19, 2020.
Southwest Border: Actions Needed To Address Fragmentation In
DHS’s Processes For Apprehended Family Members. GAO–20–274.
February 19, 2020.
Preliminary Observations On DHS CFATS And ATF Similarities
And Differences. February 24, 2020.
Department Of Defense FY 2019 Audit Summary Memo. Feb-
ruary 27, 2020.
International Mail: Stakeholders’ Views On Possible Changes To
Inbound Mail Regarding Customs Fees And Opioid Detection Ef-
forts. GAO–20–340R. February 27, 2020.
Financial Audit: FY 2019 Statements Of Social Insurance For
The Consolidated Financial Statements Audit. February 27, 2020.
Financial Audit: FY 2019 Statement Of Long-Term Fiscal Projec-
tions Audit. February 27, 2020.
Financial Audit: FY 2019 And FY 2018 Consolidated Financial
Statements Of The U.S. Government. GAO–20–315R. February 27,
2020.
Financial Audit: Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Govern-
ment’s FY 2019 Financial Statements. February 27 2020.
Data Center Optimization: Agencies Report Progress, But Over-
sight And Cybersecurity Risks Need To Be Addressed.
GAO–20–279. March 5, 2020.
U.S. Postal Service: Expanding Non-postal Products And Services
At Retail Facilities Could Result In Benefits But May Have Lim-
ited Viability. GAO–20–354. March 10, 2020.
2020 Census: Bureau Generally Followed Its Plan For In-Field
Address Canvassing. GAO–20–415. March 12, 2020.
2019 Lobbying Disclosure: Observations On Lobbyists’ Compli-
ance With Disclosure Requirements. GAO–20–449. March 31, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of
The Fiscal Service’s Information System Controls Related To The
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO–20–398rsu. March 31, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of
The Fiscal Service’s Information System Controls Related To The
Schedules Of The General Fund. GAO–20–399r. March 31, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of
The Fiscal Service’s Information System Controls Related To The
Schedule Of Federal Debt. GAO–20–375rsu. March 31, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In The Bureau Of
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The Fiscal Service’s Information System Controls Related To The
Schedule Of Federal Debt. GAO–20–376r. March 31, 2020.
Payment Integrity: Selected Agencies Should Improve Efforts To
Evaluate Effectiveness Of Corrective Actions To Reduce Improper
Payments. GAO–20–336. April 1, 2020.
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Passenger Rail Security: TSA Engages With Stakeholders But
Could Better Identify And Share Standards And Key Practices.
GAO–20–404. April 3, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service’s Internal Control Over Financial Report-
ing. GAO–20–480r. May 1, 2020.
FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed To Address Deploy-
ment And Staff Development Challenges. GAO–20–360. May 4,
2020.
National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed To Address
Gaps In The Nation’s Emergency Management Capabilities.
GAO–20–297. May 4, 2020.
National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve Commu-
nity Oversight And Data Sharing. GAO–20–396. May 5, 2020.
U.S. Postal Service: Congressional Action Is Essential To Enable
A Sustainable Business Model. GAO–20–385. May 7, 2020.
DHS Service Contracts: Increased Oversight Needed To Reduce
The Risk Associated With Contractors Performing Certain Func-
tions. GAO–20–417, May 7, 2020.
U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State Department Could Improve Its
Monitoring Of Merida Initiative Projects. GAO–20–388. May 12,
2020.
2020 Census: Update On The Census Bureau’s Implementation
Of Partnership And Outreach Activities. GAO–20–496. May 13,
2020.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service’s Information System Security Controls.
GAO–20–410RSU. May 13, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Are Needed To Enhance The
Internal Revenue Service’s Information System Security Controls.
GAO–20–411R. May 13, 2020.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed To Enhance
DHS Oversight Of Cybersecurity At High-Risk Chemical Facilities.
GAO–20–453. May 14, 2020.
2020 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities To Reduce Frag-
mentation, Overlap, And Duplication And Achieve Billions In Fi-
nancial Benefits. GAO–20–440SP. May 19, 2020.
Congressional Award Foundation: Review Of The Audit Of The
Financial Statements For Fiscal Year 2019. GAO–20–539R. May
21, 2020.
Cybersecurity: Selected Federal Agencies Need To Coordinate On
Requirements And Assessments Of States. GAO–20–123. May 27,
2020.
Department Of Homeland Security: Assessment Of Air And Ma-
rine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs Across
All DHS Marine Operations. GAO–20–420SU. May 27, 2020.
Whistleblowers: Office Of Special Counsel Should Require Infor-
mation On The Probationary Status Of Whistleblowers. GAO–20–
436. May 28, 2020.
2020 Census: COVID–19 Presents Delays And Risks To Census
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Count. GAO–20–551R. June 9, 2020.
June 2020—2020 Census Briefing. June 10, 2020.
Air Force: Enhanced Enterprise Risk Management And Internal
Control Assessments Could Improve Accountability Over Mission-
Critical Assets. GAO–20–332. June 18, 2020.
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USAID: Mixed Progress In Increasing Diversity, And Actions
Needed To Consistently Meet EEO Requirements. GAO–20–477.
June 23, 2020.
COVID–19: Opportunities To Improve Federal Response And Re-
covery Efforts. GAO–20–625. June 25, 2020.
COVID–19: Opportunities To Improve Federal Response And Re-
covery Efforts. GAO–20–659T. June 26, 2020.
DATA ACT: OIGs Reported That Quality Of Agency-Submitted
Data Varied, And Most Recommended Improvements. GAO–20–
540. July 9, 2020
National Bio And Agro-Defense Facility: DHS And USDA Are
Working To Transfer Ownership And Prepare For Operations, But
Critical Steps Remain. GAO–20–331. July 10, 2020.
Medicaid: Primer On Financing Arrangements. GAO–20–571R.
July 14, 2020.
Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Steps To Im-
prove Its Surface Inspector Program, But Lacks Performance Tar-
gets. GAO–20–558. July 27, 2020.
COVID–19 Contracting: Observations On Federal Contracting In
Response To The Pandemic. GAO–20–632. July 29, 2020.
COVID–19: Data Quality And Considerations For Modeling And
Analysis. GAO–20–635SP. July 30, 2020.
Federal Financial Management: Substantial Progress Made Since
Enactment Of The 1990 CFO Act; Refinements Would Yield Added
Benefits. GAO–20–566. August 6, 2020.
Cybersecurity: DHS And Selected Agencies Need To Address
Shortcomings In Implementation Of Network Monitoring Program.
GAO–20–598. August 18, 2020.
Management Report: Improvements Needed In Controls Over
The Processes Used To Prepare The U.S. Consolidated Financial
Statements. GAO–20–586. August 25, 2020.
2020 Census: Recent Decision To Compress Census Timeframes
Poses Additional Risks To An Accurate Count. GAO–20–671R. Au-
gust 27, 2020.
Time And Attendance: Agencies Generally Compiled Data On
Misconduct, And Reported Using Various Internal Controls For
Monitoring. GAO–20–640. August 31, 2020.
COVID–19: Brief Update On Initial Federal Response To The
Pandemic. GAO–20–708. August 31, 2020.
Facial Recognition: CBP And TSA Are Taking Steps To Imple-
ment Programs, But CBP Should Address Privacy And System Per-
formance Issues. GAO–20–568. September 2, 2020.
COVID–19 Contracting: Observations On Contractor Paid Leave
Reimbursement Guidance And Use. GAO–20–662. September 3,
2020.
VA Police: Actions Needed To Improve Data Completeness And
Accuracy On Use Of Force Incidents At Medical Centers. GAO–20–
599. September 8, 2020.
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Defense Real Property: DOD–Wide Strategy Needed To Address
Control Issues And Improve Reliability Of Records. GAO–20–615.
September 9, 2020.
Natural Disasters: Economic Effects Of Hurricanes Katrina,
Sandy, Harvey, And Irma. GAO–20–633r. September 10, 2020.
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Senior Executive Service: Opportunities For Selected Agencies To
Improve Their Career Reassignment Processes. GAO–20–559. Sep-
tember 16, 2020.
Agriculture Spending: Opportunities Exist For USDA To Identify
Successes And Challenges Of The Farmers To Families Food Box
Program To Inform Future Efforts. GAO–20–711r. September 16,
2020.
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID–19. Sep-
tember 17, 2020.
COVID–19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened By Timely
And Concerted Actions. GAO–20–701. September 21, 2020.
Cybersecurity: Clarity Of Leadership Urgently Needed To Fully
Implement The National Strategy. GAO–20–629. September 22,
2020.
Department Of Homeland Security: Assessment Of Air And Ma-
rine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs Across
All DHS Marine Operations. GAO–20–663. September 24, 2020.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions To
Strengthen Fraud Risk Management For Public Assistance Emer-
gency Work Grants. GAO–20–604. September 29, 2020.
Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed To Strengthen
FEMA’S Individuals And Households Program. GAO–20–503. Sep-
tember 30, 2020.
Supplemental Material For GAO–20–503: FEMA Individuals And
Households Program Applicant Data 2016–2018. GAO–20–675sp.
September 30, 2020.
Supplemental Material For GAO–20–503: Select Disaster Profiles
For FEMA’s Individuals And Households Program 2016–2018.
GAO–20–674sp. September 30, 2020.
Open Data: Agencies Need Guidance To Establish Comprehen-
sive Data Inventories; Information On Their Progress Is Limited.
GAO–21–29. October 8, 2020.
DOD Financial Management: Continued Efforts Needed To Cor-
rect Material Weaknesses Identified In Financial Statement Au-
dits. GAO–21–157. October 13, 2020.
Information And Communications Technology: Federal Agencies
Need To Take Urgent Action To Manage Supply Chain Risks
(Louo). GAO–21–164su. October 27, 2020.
Ongoing Cybersecurity Risks To The 2020 Census (No Slides).
October 29, 2020.
TSA Acquisitions: TSA Needs To Establish Metrics And Evaluate
Third Party Testing Outcomes For Screening Technologies. GAO–
21–50. October 29, 2020.
FY 2020 Excise Tax: Agreed-Upon Procedures Related To Dis-
tributions To Trust Funds. GAO–21–163R. November 6, 2020.
Financial Audit: Bureau Of The Fiscal Service’s FY 2020 And FY
2019 Schedules Of Federal Debt. GAO–21–124. November 9, 2020.
Financial Audit: IRS’s FY 2020 And FY 2019 Financial State-
ments. GAO–21–162. November 10, 2020.
Financial Audit: Securities And Exchange Commission’s FY 2020
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And FY6 2019 Financial Statements. GAO–21–192R. November 16,
2020.
U.S. Assistance To Mexico: State And USAID Should Strengthen
Risk Management For Programs Under The Merida Initiative.
GAO–21–112SU. November 17, 2020.
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Puerto Rico Electricity: FEMA And HUD Have Not Approved
Long-Term Projects And Need To Implement Recommendations To
Address Uncertainties And Enhance Resilience. GAO–21–54. No-
vember 17, 2020.
COVID–19: Federal Efforts Accelerate Vaccine And Therapeutic
Development, But More Transparency Needed On Emergency Use
Authorizations. GAO–21–207. November 17, 2020.
Distance Learning: Challenges Providing Services To K–12
English Learners And Students With Disabilities During COVID–
19. GAO–21–43. November 19, 2020.
Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist To Increase Trans-
parency And Identify Future Actions To Mitigate Medical Supply
Chain Issues. GAO–21–108. November 19, 2020.
Disaster Response: Agencies Should Assess Contracting Work-
force Needs And Purchase Card Fraud Risk. GAO–21–42. Novem-
ber 24, 2020.
Federal Buying Power: OMB Can Further Advance Category
Management Initiative By Focusing On Requirements, Data, And
Training. GAO–21–40. November 30, 2020.
COVID–19: Urgent Actions Needed To Better Ensure An Effec-
tive Federal Response. GAO–21–191. November 30, 2020.
Medicaid: CMS Needs More Information On States’ Financing
And Payment Arrangements To Improve Oversight. GAO–21–98.
December 7, 2020.
2020 Census: The Bureau Concluded Field Work But Uncer-
tainty About Data Quality, Accuracy, And Protection Remains.
GAO–21–206R. December 9, 2020.
Financial Assistance: Lessons Learned From Cares Act Loan Pro-
gram For Aviation And Other Eligible Businesses. GAO–21–198.
December 10, 2020.
Ongoing Monitoring Of It Systems Implementation For The 2020
Census (No Slides). December 14, 2020.
Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data And Guidance Would Aid
FEMA Activation Decisions. GAO–21–116. December 15, 2020.
Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need To Take Urgent
Action To Manage Supply Chain Risks (Public). GAO–21–171. De-
cember 15, 2020.
Data Governance: Agencies Made Progress In Establishing Gov-
ernance, But Need To Address Key Milestones. GAO–21–152. De-
cember 16, 2020.
Rural Hospital Closures: Affected Residents Had Reduced Access
To Health Care Services. GAO–21–93. December 22, 2020.
VI. OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS
During the 116th Congress, 774 official communications were re-
ferred to the Committee. Of these, 760 were Executive Communica-
tions, and 14 were Petitions or Memorials. Of the official commu-
nications, 316 dealt with the District of Columbia.
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VII. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
During the 116th Congress, the Committee reported significant
legislation that was approved by Congress and signed by the Presi-
dent.
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The following are brief legislative histories of measures to the
Committee and, in some cases, drafted by the Committee, which (1)
became public law or (2) were favorable reported from the Com-
mittee and passed by the Senate, but did not become law. In addi-
tion to the measures listed below, the Committee received during
the 116th Congress numerous legislative proposals that were not
considered or reported, or that were reported but not passed by the
Senate. Additional information on these measures appears in the
Committee’s Legislative Calendar for the 116th Congress.
A. MEASURES ENACTED INTO LAW
The following measures considered by the Committee were en-
acted into Public Law. The descriptions following the signing date
of each measure note selected provisions of the text, and are not
intended to serve as section-by-section summaries.
H.R. 639.—To amend section 327 of the Robert T. Stafford Dis-
aster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to clarify that National
Urban Search and Rescue Response System task forces may in-
clude Federal employees. (Public Law 116–48). August 22, 2019.
This bill amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act to specify that National Urban Search
and Rescue Response System task forces may include Federal em-
ployees.
H.R.1079.—Creating Advanced Streamlined Electronic Services
for Constituents Act of 2019. (Public Law 116–50). August 22,
2019.
This bill directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
require each Federal agency to accept electronic identity proofing
and authentication processes that allow an individual, under the
Privacy Act, to access the individual’s records or to provide prior
written consent for the disclosure of the individual’s records. The
OMB must (1) create a template for electronic consent and access
forms, and (2) require each agency to accept such forms from any
individual properly identity proofed and authenticated.
H.R.1590.—Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Exercise Act of
2019. (Public Law 116–64). October 9, 2019.
This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security to de-
velop and conduct an exercise related to the detection and preven-
tion of terrorist and foreign fighter travel. The bill requires the na-
tional exercise program (a program to test and evaluate the na-
tional preparedness goal, National Incident Management System,
National Response Plan, and other related plans and strategies) to
include emerging threats.
H.R.150.—Grant Reporting Efficiency and Agreements Trans-
parency Act of 2019. (Public Law 116–103). December 30 2019.
This bill requires the establishment and use of data standards
for information reported by recipients of Federal grants. The bill
requires the Office of Management and Budget, jointly with the ex-
ecutive department that issues the most Federal grant awards, to
(1) establish government-wide data standards for information re-
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ported by grant recipients, (2) issue guidance directing Federal
agencies to apply those standards, and (3) require the publication
of recipient-reported data collected from all agencies on a single
public website. Each agency shall ensure its awards use the data
standards for future information collection requests.
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H.R.2476.—Securing American Nonprofit Organizations Against
Terrorism Act of 2019. (Public Law 116–108). January 24, 2020.
This bill establishes in the Department of Homeland Security a
Nonprofit Security Grant Program, under which the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA) shall make grants to eligible
nonprofit organizations (tax-exempt organizations and those deter-
mined to be at risk of a terrorist attack) for target hardening and
other security enhancements to protect against terrorist attacks.
H.R.504.—DHS Field Engagement Accountability Act. (Public
Law 116–116). March 2, 2020.
This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to develop and update at least once every five years a strategy for
DHS engagement with fusion centers. The term ‘‘fusion center’’
means a collaborative effort of two or more government agencies
that combines resources, expertise, or information to maximize the
ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend,
and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. The Office of Intel-
ligence and Analysis of DHS shall provide personnel and support
to fusion centers, publish performance metrics for DHS field per-
sonnel assigned to fusion centers, and develop and implement
training for fusion center personnel. DHS intelligence and informa-
tion components shall develop policies and metrics to ensure effec-
tive use of the unclassified Homeland Security Information Sharing
Network and shall assess and implement enhancements to improve
such network.
S.375.—Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. (Public Law
116–117). March 2, 2020.
This bill reorganizes and revises several existing improper pay-
ments statutes, which establish requirements for Federal agencies
to cut down on improper payments made by the Federal Govern-
ment. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may establish
one or more pilot programs to test potential accountability mecha-
nisms for compliance with requirements regarding improper pay-
ments and the elimination of improper payments. The bill requires
the OMB to update its plan for improving the death data main-
tained by the Social Security Administration and improving Fed-
eral agency use of death data. The bill establishes an interagency
working group on payment integrity.
S.394.—Presidential Transition Enhancement Act of 2019. (Pub-
lic Law 116–121). March 3, 2020.
This bill makes changes intended to smooth the transfer of exec-
utive power during presidential transitions. The bill provides for
the detailing of legislative branch employees on a reimbursable
basis to office staffs designated by the President-elect or Vice Presi-
dent-elect with the consent of the supervising Member of Congress.
The bill extends support provided by the General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA) to the President- and Vice President-elect for up to
60 days after the inauguration. By September 1 of a year during
which a presidential election occurs, the GSA shall enter into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with each eligible can-
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didate, which shall include the conditions for administrative sup-
port services and facilities. To the maximum extent practicable, an
MOU shall be based on MOUs relating to previous presidential
transitions. Each MOU shall include an agreement that the eligible
candidate will implement and enforce an ethics plan to guide the
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conduct of the transition beginning on the date on which such can-
didate becomes President-elect. The plan shall be published on the
GSA website. By September 15 of a year during which a presi-
dential election occurs, each agency shall ensure that a succession
plan is in place for each senior non-career position in the agency.
S.2107.—Protecting America’s Food and Agriculture Act of 2019.
(Public Law 116–122). March 3, 2020.
This bill authorizes U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
every fiscal year, to hire, train, and assign 240 new agricultural
specialists until the total number of specialists equals and sustains
the requirements identified each year in the Agriculture Resource
Allocation Model. The CBP may also hire, train, and assign support
staff to assist the specialists and specified levels of agricultural ca-
nine teams. In calculating the number of specialists needed at each
port of entry through the Agriculture Resource Allocation Model,
the Office of Field Operations of the CBP must (1) rely on data col-
lected regarding the inspections and other activities conducted at
each such port of entry; and (2) consider volume from seasonal
surges, other projected changes in commercial and passenger vol-
umes, the most current commercial forecasts, and other relevant
information. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) must
conduct a review of the efforts of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity, the Department of Agriculture, and other Federal agencies
to address risks to the agricultural supply. The GAO must analyze
(1) interagency coordination and the distribution of responsibilities
among Federal agencies with respect to the inspection of agricul-
tural commodities entering the United States; (2) the effectiveness
of such inspection responsibilities among Federal agencies; and (3)
the training provided to, and working conditions of, CBP Agri-
culture Specialists.
S. 2193.—CHARGE Act. (Public Law 116–160). October 1, 2020.
This bill requires the General Services Administration to issue
(1) guidance to clarify that Federal agencies may use a charge card
to pay to charge Federal electric motor vehicles at commercial
charging stations, and (2) a charge card for such payments to each
agency for each of the agency’s electric motor vehicles.
H.R.4761.—DHS Opioid Detection Resilience Act of 2019. (Public
Law 116–254). December 23, 2020.
This bill establishes new requirements related to the detection of
illicit narcotics at ports of entry. Specifically, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) must implement a strategy to ensure
chemical screening devices are able to identify narcotics at purity
levels equal to or less than 10 percent, or provide an alternate
method for identifying narcotics at lower purity levels. The CBP
must also test new chemical screening devices at various purity
levels before it commits to their acquisition. Additionally, the De-
partment of Homeland Security must implement a plan for the
long-term development of a centralized spectral database for chem-
ical screening devices.
S. 979.—Federal Advance Contracts Enhancement Act (FACE)
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Act. (Public Law 116–272). December 31, 2020.
This bill directs the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to report to Congress on advance contracts. Advance con-
tracts are established prior to disasters to provide life-sustaining
goods and services in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The
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report must include (1) information required in the initial report on
recurring disaster response requirements; and (2) an updated strat-
egy that defines the objectives of advance contracts, how such con-
tracts contribute to FEMA disaster response operations, how to
maximize the award of advance contracts to small business con-
cerns, and whether and how such contracts should be prioritized in
relation to new post-disaster contract awards. The bill sets forth
additional duties of FEMA with respect to advance contracts, in-
cluding requiring FEMA to (1) update and implement guidance for
its program office and acquisition personnel to identify acquisition
planning time frames and considerations across the entire acquisi-
tion planning process, and (2) communicate the purpose and use of
a master acquisition planning schedule.
S.1869.—Secure Federal Leases from Espionage and Suspicious
Entanglements (LEASEs) Act. (Public Law 116–276). December 31,
2020
(Sec. 3) This bill instructs the General Services Administration
(GSA), the Architect of the Capitol, or any Federal agency (other
than the Department of Defense and the intelligence community)
that has independent statutory leasing authority (Federal lessee),
before entering into a lease agreement or approving a novation
agreement with an entity involving a change of ownership under
a lease that will be used for high-security leased space, to require
the entity to identify the immediate or highest-level owner of the
space and disclose whether that owner is a foreign person or entity,
including the country associated with the ownership entity. A Fed-
eral lessee shall require the entity to (1) provide such identification
and disclosure when first submitting a proposal in response to a so-
licitation for offers issued by the Federal lessee; and (2) update
such information annually, including the list of the immediate or
highest-level owners of that entity or the information required to
be provided related to each such owner. (Sec. 4) The GSA shall de-
velop a government-wide plan for identifying all immediate, high-
est-level, or beneficial owners of high-security leased spaces before
entering into a lease agreement to accommodate a Federal tenant.
(Sec. 5) The bill provides a rule for language in a lease agreement
(concerning restriction of access to high-security space) between a
Federal lessee and an entity to accommodate an agency in a build-
ing or improvement used for high-security leased space.
S.3418.—Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk Mitiga-
tion (STORM) Act. (Public Law 116–284). January 1, 2021.
This bill authorizes the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to enter into agreements with any state or Indian tribal
government to make capitalization grants for the establishment of
hazard mitigation revolving loan funds. Such funds shall provide
funding assistance to local governments to carry out projects to re-
duce disaster risk in order to decrease the loss of life and property,
the cost of insurance claims, and Federal disaster payments. FEMA
shall not be liable for any claim based on the exercise or perform-
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ance of, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary func-
tion or duty by FEMA or by a FEMA employee in carrying out this
bill.
H.R.5273.—Securing America’s Ports Act. (Public Law 116–299).
January 5, 2021.
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65
This bill requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
to report to Congress a plan to expeditiously scan all commercial
and passenger vehicles entering the United States at a land port
of entry using large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems, such as
X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems, or similar technology. The
plan shall include elements such as (1) an inventory of such sys-
tems currently in use, (2) the estimated costs of achieving a 100
percent scanning rate, and (3) the anticipated impact that increas-
ing the scanning rate will have on wait times at land ports of
entry. DHS shall periodically report to Congress on the progress in
implementing the plan. DHS shall also research and develop tech-
nology enhancements to inspection areas at land ports of entry.
B. POSTAL NAMING BILLS
H.R. 540—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 770 Ayrault Road in Fairport, New York, as the
‘‘Louise and Bob Slaughter Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–42). Au-
gust 21, 2019.
H.R. 828—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 25 Route 111 in Smithtown, New York, as the
‘‘Congressman Bill Carney Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–43). Au-
gust 21 2019.
H.R. 829—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 1450 Montauk Highway in Mastic, New York, as
the ‘‘Army Specialist Thomas J. Wilwerth Post Office Building’’.
(Public Law 116–44). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 1198—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 404 South Boulder Highway in Henderson, Ne-
vada, as the ‘‘Henderson Veterans Memorial Post Office Building’’.
(Public Law 116–45). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 1449—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 3033 203rd Street in Olympia Fields, Illinois, as
the ‘‘Captain Robert L. Martin Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–46).
August 21, 2019.
H.R. 3305—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 2509 George Mason Drive in Virginia Beach, Vir-
ginia, as the ‘‘Ryan Keith Cox Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–47). August 21, 2019.
H.R. 1250—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 11158 Highway 146 North in Hardin, Texas, as
the ‘‘Lucas Lowe Memorial Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–55). Au-
gust 23, 2019.
S. 1196—A bill to designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 1715 Linnerud Drive in Sun Prairie, Wis-
consin, as the ‘‘Fire Captain Cory Barr Post Office Building’’. (Pub-
lic Law 116–66). October 31, 2019.
H.R. 887—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 877 East 1200 South in Orem, Utah, as the
‘‘Jerry C. Washburn Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–79).
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December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1252—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 6531 Van Nuys Boulevard in Van Nuys, Cali-
fornia, as the ‘‘Marilyn Monroe Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–80).
December 12, 2019.
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H.R. 1253—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 13507 Van Nuys Boulevard in Pacoima, Cali-
fornia, as the ‘‘Ritchie Valens Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–81). December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1526—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 200 Israel Road Southeast in Tumwater, Wash-
ington, as the ‘‘Eva G. Hewitt Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–82).
December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1844—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 66 Grove Court in Elgin, Illinois, as the ‘‘Cor-
poral Alex Martinez Memorial Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–83). December 12, 2019.
H.R. 1972—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 1100 West Kent Avenue in Missoula, Montana,
as the ‘‘Jeannette Rankin Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–
84). December 13, 2019.
H.R. 2151—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 7722 South Main Street in Pine Plains, New
York, as the ‘‘Senior Chief Petty Officer Shannon M. Kent Post Of-
fice’’. (Public Law 116–85). December 13, 2019.
H.R. 2325—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 100 Calle Alondra in San Juan, Puerto Rico, as
the ‘‘65th Infantry Regiment Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–86). December 13, 2019.
H.R. 3144—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 8520 Michigan Avenue in Whittier, California, as
the ‘‘Jose Ramos Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–89). De-
cember 13, 2019.
H.R. 3314—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 1750 McCulloch Boulevard North in Lake
Havasu City, Arizona, as the ‘‘Lake Havasu City Combat Veterans
Memorial Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–90). December 13,
2019.
H.R. 1833—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 35 Tulip Avenue in Floral Park, New York, as
the ‘‘Lieutenant Michael R. Davidson Post Office Building’’. (Public
Law 116–196). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 3207—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 114 Mill Street in Hookstown, Pennsylvania, as
the ‘‘Staff Sergeant Dylan Elchin Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–197). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 3317—To permit the Scipio A. Jones Post Office in Little
Rock, Arkansas, to accept and display a portrait of Scipio A. Jones,
and for other purposes. (Public Law 116–198). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 3329—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 5186 Benito Street in Montclair, California, as
the ‘‘Paul Eaton Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–199). De-
cember 3, 2020.
H.R. 4794—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
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Service located at 8320 13th Avenue in Brooklyn, New York, as the
‘‘Mother Frances Xavier Cabrini Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–201). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 4981—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 2505 Derita Avenue in Charlotte, North Caro-
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lina, as the ‘‘Julius L. Chambers Civil Rights Memorial Post Of-
fice’’. (Public Law 116–202). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 5037—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 3703 North Main Street in Farmville, North
Carolina, as the ‘‘Walter B. Jones, Jr. Post Office’’. (Public Law
116–203). December 3, 2020.
H.R. 4975—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 1201 Sycamore Square Drive in Midlothian, Vir-
ginia, as the ‘‘Dorothy Braden Bruce Post Office Building’’. (Public
Law 116–218). December 17, 2020.
H.R. 5062—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 9930 Conroy Windermere Road in Windermere,
Florida, as the ‘‘Officer Robert German Post Office Building’’. (Pub-
lic Law 116–219). December 17, 2020.
H.R. 5307—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 115 Nicol Avenue in Thomasville, Alabama, as
the ‘‘Postmaster Robert Ingram Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–220).
December 17, 2020.
H.R. 2246—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 201 West Cherokee Street in Brookhaven, Mis-
sissippi, as the ‘‘Deputy Donald William Durr, Corporal Zach Moak,
and Patrolman James White Memorial Post Office Building’’. (Pub-
lic Law 116–227). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 2454—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 123 East Sharpfish Street in Rosebud, South Da-
kota, as the ‘‘Ben Reifel Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–
228). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 2969—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 1401 1st Street North in Winter Haven, Florida,
as the ‘‘Althea Margaret Daily Mills Post Office Building’’. (Public
Law 116–229). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3005—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 13308 Midland Road in Poway, California, as the
‘‘Ray Chavez Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–230). Decem-
ber 21, 2020.
H.R. 3275—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 340 Wetmore Avenue in Grand River, Ohio, as
the ‘‘Lance Corporal Andy ’Ace’ Nowacki Post Office’’. (Public Law
116–231). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3680—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 415 North Main Street in Henning, Tennessee,
as the ‘‘Paula Croom Robinson and Judy Spray Memorial Post Of-
fice Building’’. (Public Law 116–232) December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3847—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 117 West Poythress Street in Hopewell, Virginia,
as the ‘‘Reverend Curtis West Harris Post Office Building’’. (Public
Law 116–233). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 3870—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 511 West 165th Street in New York, New York,
as the ‘‘Normandia Maldonado Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
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116–234). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4034—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 602 Pacific Avenue in Bremerton, Washington,
as the ‘‘John Henry Turpin Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–
235). December 21, 2020.
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H.R. 4200—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 321 South 1st Street in Montrose, Colorado, as
the ‘‘Sergeant David Kinterknecht Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–
236). December 21 2020.
H.R. 4279—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 445 Main Street in Laceyville, Pennsylvania, as
the ‘‘Melinda Gene Piccotti Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–237). De-
cember 21, 2020.
H.R. 4672—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 21701 Stevens Creek Boulevard in Cupertino,
California, as the ‘‘Petty Officer 2nd Class (SEAL) Matthew G.
Axelson Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–238). December 21,
2020.
H.R. 4725—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 8585 Criterion Drive in Colorado Springs, Colo-
rado, as the ‘‘Chaplain (Capt.) Dale Goetz Memorial Post Office
Building’’. (Public Law 116–239). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4785—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 1305 U.S. Highway 90 West in Castroville,
Texas, as the ‘‘Lance Corporal Rhonald Dain Rairdan Post Office’’.
(Public Law 116–240). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4875—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 2201 E. Maple Street in North Canton, Ohio, as
the ‘‘Lance Cpl. Stacy ’Annie’ Dryden Post Office’’. (Public Law
116–241). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 4971—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 15 East Market Street in Leesburg, Virginia, as
the ‘‘Norman Duncan Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–242).
December 21, 2020.
H.R. 5317—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 315 Addicks Howell Road in Houston, Texas, as
the ‘‘Deputy Sandeep Singh Dhaliwal Post Office Building’’. (Public
Law 116–243). December 21, 2020.
H.R. 5954—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 108 West Maple Street in Holly, Michigan, as the
‘‘Holly Veterans Memorial Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–244). De-
cember 21, 2020.
S. 3257—A bill to designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 311 West Wisconsin Avenue in Toma-
hawk, Wisconsin, as the ‘‘Einar ’Sarge’ H. Ingman, Jr. Post Office
Building’’. (Public Law 116–264). December 30, 2020.
S. 3461—A bill to designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 2600 Wesley Street in Greenville, Texas,
as the ‘‘Audie Murphy Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–265).
December 30, 2020.
S. 3462—A bill to designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 909 West Holiday Drive in Fate, Texas,
as the ‘‘Ralph Hall Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–266). December
30, 2020.
S. 4126—A bill to designate the facility of the United States
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Postal Service located at 104 East Main Street in Port Washington,
Wisconsin, as the ‘‘Joseph G. Demler Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–
267). December 30, 2020.
S. 4684—A bill to designate the facility of the United States
Postal Service located at 440 Arapahoe Street in Thermopolis, Wyo-
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ming, as the ‘‘Robert L. Brown Post Office’’. (Public Law 116–268).
December 30, 2020.
H.R. 3976—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 12711 East Jefferson Avenue in Detroit, Michi-
gan, as the ‘‘Aretha Franklin Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–293). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 4988—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 14 Walnut Street in Bordentown, New Jersey, as
the ‘‘Clara Barton Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–296).
January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5123—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 476 East Main Street in Galesburg, Illinois, as
the ‘‘Senior Airman Daniel Miller Post Office Building’’. (Public
Law 116–298). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5451—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 599 East Genesse Street in Fayetteville, New
York, as the ‘‘George H. Bacel Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–300). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5597—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 305 Northwest 5th Street in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, as the ‘‘Clara Luper Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–303). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5972—Mary Ann Shadd Cary Post Office Dedication Act.
(Public Law 116–306). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 5983—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 4150 Chicago Avenue in Riverside, California, as
the ‘‘Woodie Rucker-Hughes Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–307). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 6161—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 1585 Yanceyville Street, Greensboro, North
Carolina, as the ‘‘J. Howard Coble Post Office Building’’. (Public
Law 116–310). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 6418—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 509 Fairhope Avenue in Fairhope, Alabama, as
the ‘‘William ’Jack’ Jackson Edwards III Post Office Building’’.
(Public Law 116–312). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 7088—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 111 James Street in Reidsville, Georgia, as the
‘‘Senator Jack Hill Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–314).
January 5, 2021.
H.R. 7502—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 101 South 16th Street in Clarinda, Iowa, as the
‘‘Jessie Field Shambaugh Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–
319). January 5, 2021.
H.R. 7810—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 3519 East Walnut Street in Pearland, Texas, as
the ‘‘Tom Reid Post Office Building’’. (Public Law 116–320). Janu-
ary 5, 2021.
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H.R. 8611—To designate the facility of the United States Postal
Service located at 4755 Southeast Dixie Highway in Port Salerno,
Florida, as the ‘‘Joseph Bullock Post Office Building’’. (Public Law
116–322). January 5, 2021.
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VIII. ACTIVITIES OF THE SUBCOMMITTEES
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
CHAIRMAN: ROBERT PORTMAN
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER: THOMAS R. CARPER
The following is the Activities Report of the Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations for the 116th Congress.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. SUBCOMMITTEE JURISDICTION
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was originally
authorized by Senate Resolution 189 on January 28, 1948. At its
creation in 1948, the Subcommittee was part of the Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments. The Subcommittee’s
records and broad investigative jurisdiction over government oper-
ations and national security issues, however, actually antedate its
creation, since it was given custody of the jurisdiction of the former
Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program
(the so-called ‘‘War Investigating Committee’’ or ‘‘Truman Com-
mittee’’), chaired by Senator Harry S. Truman during the Second
World War and charged with exposing waste, fraud, and abuse in
the war effort and war profiteering. Today, the Subcommittee is
part of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs.1
The Subcommittee has had eleven chairmen: Senators Homer
Ferguson of Michigan (1948), Clyde R. Hoey of North Carolina
(1949–1952), Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin (1953–1954), John
L. McClellan of Arkansas (1955–1972), Henry M. Jackson of
Washington (1973–1978), Sam Nunn of Georgia (1979–1980
and 1987–1994), William V. Roth of Delaware (1981–1986 and
1995–1996), Susan M. Collins of Maine (1997–2001); Norman B.
Coleman of Minnesota (2003–2007); Carl Levin of Michigan (2001–
2002 and 2007–2014); and Robert J. Portman of Ohio (2015-
present).
Until 1957, the Subcommittee’s jurisdiction focused principally
on waste, inefficiency, impropriety, and illegality in government op-
erations. Its jurisdiction then expanded over time, today encom-
passing investigations within the broad ambit of the parent com-
mittee’s responsibility for matters relating to the efficiency and
economy of operations of all branches of the government, including
matters related to: (a) waste, fraud, abuse, malfeasance, and uneth-
ical practices in government contracting and operations; (b) orga-
nized criminal activities affecting interstate or international com-
merce; (c) criminal activity affecting the national health, welfare,
or safety, including investment fraud, commodity and securities
fraud, computer fraud, and offshore abuses; (d) criminality or im-
proper practices in labor-management relations; (e) the effective-
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1 In 1952, the parent committee’s name was changed to the Committee on Government Oper-
ations. It was changed again in early 1977, to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, and
again in 2005, to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, its present
title.
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71
ness of present national security methods, staffing and procedures,
and U.S. relationships with international organizations concerned
with national security; (f) energy shortages, energy pricing, man-
agement of government-owned or controlled energy supplies; and
relationships with oil producing and consuming countries; and (g)
the operations and management of Federal regulatory policies and
programs. While retaining the status of a subcommittee of a stand-
ing committee, the Subcommittee has long exercised its authority
on an independent basis, selecting its own staff, issuing its own
subpoenas, and determining its own investigatory agenda.
The Subcommittee acquired its sweeping jurisdiction in several
successive stages. In 1957—based on information developed by the
Subcommittee—the Senate passed a Resolution establishing a Se-
lect Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management
Field. Chaired by Senator McClellan, who also chaired the Sub-
committee at that time, the Select Committee was composed of
eight Senators—four of whom were drawn from the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations and four from the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare. The Select Committee operated for 3
years, sharing office space, personnel, and other facilities with the
Permanent Subcommittee. Upon its expiration in early 1960, the
Select Committee’s jurisdiction and files were transferred to the
Permanent Subcommittee, greatly enlarging the latter body’s inves-
tigative authority in the labor-management area.
The Subcommittee’s jurisdiction expanded further during the
1960s and 1970s. In 1961, for example, it received authority to
make inquiries into matters pertaining to organized crime and, in
1963, held the famous Valachi hearings examining the inner work-
ings of the Italian Mafia. In 1967, following a summer of riots and
other civil disturbances, the Senate approved a Resolution directing
the Subcommittee to investigate the causes of this disorder and to
recommend corrective action. In January 1973, the Subcommittee
acquired its national security mandate when it merged with the
National Security Subcommittee. With this merger, the Sub-
committee’s jurisdiction was broadened to include inquiries con-
cerning the adequacy of national security staffing and procedures,
relations with international organizations, technology transfer
issues, and related matters. In 1974, in reaction to the gasoline
shortages precipitated by the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, the
Subcommittee acquired jurisdiction to investigate the control and
management of energy resources and supplies as well as energy
pricing issues.
In 1997, the full Committee on Governmental Affairs was
charged by the Senate to conduct a special examination into illegal
or improper activities in connection with Federal election cam-
paigns during the 1996 election cycle. The Permanent Sub-
committee provided substantial resources and assistance to this in-
vestigation, contributing to a greater public understanding of what
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happened, to subsequent criminal and civil legal actions taken
against wrongdoers, and to enactment of campaign finance reforms
in 2001.
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In 1998, the Subcommittee marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
Truman Committee’s conversion into a permanent subcommittee of
the U.S. Senate.2 Since then, the Subcommittee has developed par-
ticular expertise in complex financial matters, examining the col-
lapse of Enron Corporation in 2001, the key causes of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, structured finance abuses, financial fraud, unfair
credit practices, money laundering, commodity speculation, and a
wide range of offshore and tax haven abuses. It has also focused
on issues involving health care fraud, foreign corruption, and
waste, fraud and abuse in government programs. In the half-cen-
tury of its existence, the Subcommittee’s many successful investiga-
tions have made clear to the Senate the importance of retaining a
standing investigatory body devoted to keeping government not
only efficient and effective, but also honest and accountable.
B. SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATIONS
Armed with its broad jurisdictional mandate, the Subcommittee
has conducted investigations into a wide variety of topics of public
concern, ranging from financial misconduct, to commodities specu-
lation, predatory lending, and tax evasion. Over the years, the Sub-
committee has also conducted investigations into criminal wrong-
doing, including money laundering, the narcotics trade, child por-
nography, labor racketeering, human trafficking, the opioid crisis,
and organized crime activities. In addition, the Subcommittee has
investigated a wide range of allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse
in government programs and consumer protection issues, address-
ing problems ranging from unfair credit card practices to health
care fraud. In the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee held seven
hearings and issued eleven reports on a wide range of issues.
(1) Historical Highlights
The Subcommittee’s investigatory record as a permanent Senate
body began under the Chairmanship of Republican Senator Homer
Ferguson and his Chief Counsel (and future Attorney General and
Secretary of State) William P. Rogers, as the Subcommittee inher-
ited the Truman Committee’s role in investigating fraud and waste
in U.S. Government operations. This investigative work became
particularly colorful under the chairmanship of Senator Clyde
Hoey, a North Carolina Democrat who took the chair from Senator
Ferguson after the 1948 elections. Under Senator Hoey’s leader-
ship, the Subcommittee won national attention for its investigation
of the so-called ‘‘five percenters,’’ notorious Washington lobbyists
who charged their clients five percent of the profits from any Fed-
eral contracts they obtained on the client’s behalf. Given the Sub-
committee’s jurisdictional inheritance from the Truman Committee,
it is perhaps ironic that the ‘‘five percenters’’ investigation raised
2 This anniversary also marked the first date upon which internal Subcommittee records gen-
erally began to become available to the public. Unlike most standing committees of the Senate
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whose previously unpublished records open after a period of 20 years has elapsed, the Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations, as an investigatory body, may close its records for 50
years to protect personal privacy and the integrity of the investigatory process. With this 50th
anniversary, the Subcommittee’s earliest records, housed in the Center for Legislative Archives
at the National Archives and Records Administration, began to open seriatim. The records of
the predecessor committee—the Truman Committee—were opened by Senator Nunn in 1980.
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73
allegations of bribery and influence-peddling that reached right
into the White House and implicated members of President Tru-
man’s staff. In any event, the fledgling Subcommittee was off to a
rapid start.
What began as colorful soon became contentious. When Repub-
licans returned to the Majority in the Senate in 1953, Wisconsin’s
junior Senator, Joseph R. McCarthy, became the Subcommittee’s
Chairman. Two years earlier, as Ranking Minority Member, Sen-
ator McCarthy had arranged for another Republican Senator, Mar-
garet Chase Smith of Maine, to be removed from the Sub-
committee. Senator Smith’s offense, in Senator McCarthy’s eyes,
was her issuance of a ‘‘Declaration of Conscience’’ repudiating those
who made unfounded charges and used character assassination
against their political opponents. Although Senator Smith had
carefully declined to name any specific offender, her remarks were
universally recognized as criticism of Senator McCarthy’s accusa-
tions that communists had infiltrated the State Department and
other government agencies. Senator McCarthy retaliated by engi-
neering Senator Smith’s removal, replacing her with the newly-
elected Senator from California, Richard Nixon.
Upon becoming Subcommittee Chairman, Senator McCarthy
staged a series of highly publicized anti-Communist investigations,
culminating in an inquiry into Communism within the U.S. Army,
which became known as the Army-McCarthy hearings. During the
latter portion of those hearings, in which the parent Committee ex-
amined the Wisconsin Senator’s attacks on the Army, Senator
McCarthy recused himself, leaving South Dakota Senator Karl
Mundt to serve as Acting Chairman of the Subcommittee. Gavel-
to-gavel television coverage of the hearings helped turn the tide
against Senator McCarthy by raising public concern about his
treatment of witnesses and cavalier use of evidence. In December
1954, the Senate censured Senator McCarthy for unbecoming con-
duct. In the following year, the Subcommittee adopted new rules of
procedure that better protected the rights of witnesses. The Sub-
committee also strengthened the rules ensuring the right of both
parties on the Subcommittee to appoint staff, initiate and approve
investigations, and review all information in the Subcommittee’s
possession.
In 1955, Senator John McClellan of Arkansas began 18 years of
service as Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions. Senator McClellan appointed a young Robert F. Kennedy as
the Subcommittee’s Chief Counsel. That same year, Members of the
Subcommittee were joined by Members of the Senate Labor and
Public Welfare Committee on a special committee to investigate
labor racketeering. Chaired by Senator McClellan and staffed by
Robert Kennedy and other Subcommittee staff members, this spe-
cial committee directed much of its attention to criminal influence
over the Teamsters Union, most famously calling Teamsters’ lead-
ers Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa to testify. The televised hearings
of the special committee also introduced Senators Barry Goldwater
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and John F. Kennedy to the nation, as well as led to passage of
the Landrum-Griffin Labor Act.
After the special committee completed its work, the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations continued to investigate organized
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74
crime. In 1962, the Subcommittee held hearings during which Jo-
seph Valachi outlined the activities of La Cosa Nostra, or the
Mafia. Former Subcommittee staffer Robert Kennedy—who
had by then become Attorney General in his brother’s Administra-
tion—used this information to prosecute prominent mob leaders
and their accomplices. The Subcommittee’s investigations also led
to passage of major legislation against organized crime, most nota-
bly the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
provisions of the Crime Control Act of 1970. Under Chairman
McClellan, the Subcommittee also investigated fraud in the pur-
chase of military uniforms, corruption in the Department of Agri-
culture’s grain storage program, securities fraud, and civil dis-
orders and acts of terrorism. In addition, from 1962 to 1970, the
Subcommittee conducted an extensive probe of political inter-
ference in the awarding of government contracts for the Pentagon’s
ill-fated TFX (‘‘tactical fighter, experimental’’) aircraft. In 1968, the
Subcommittee also examined charges of corruption in U.S. service-
men’s clubs in Vietnam and elsewhere around the world.
In 1973, Senator Henry ‘‘Scoop’’ Jackson, a Democrat from
Washington, replaced Senator McClellan as the Subcommittee’s
Chairman. During his tenure, recalled Chief Clerk Ruth Young
Watt—who served in this position from the Subcommittee’s found-
ing until her retirement in 1979—Ranking Minority Member
Charles Percy, an Illinois Republican, became more active on the
Subcommittee than Chairman Jackson, who was often distracted
by his Chairmanship of the Interior Committee and his active role
on the Armed Services Committee.3 Senator Percy also worked
closely with Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn, a Subcommittee mem-
ber who subsequently succeeded Senator Jackson as Subcommittee
Chairman in 1979. As Chairman, Senator Nunn continued the Sub-
committee’s investigations into the role of organized crime in labor-
management relations and also investigated pension fraud.
Regular reversals of political fortunes in the Senate during the
1980s and 1990s saw Senator Nunn trade the chairmanship three
times with Delaware Republican William Roth. Senator Nunn
served from 1979 to 1980 and again from 1987 to 1995, while Sen-
ator Roth served from 1981 to 1986, and again from 1995 to 1996.
These 15 years saw a strengthening of the Subcommittee’s bipar-
tisan tradition in which investigations were initiated by either the
Majority or Minority and fully supported by the entire Sub-
committee. For his part, Senator Roth led a wide range of inves-
tigations into commodity investment fraud, offshore banking
schemes, money laundering, and child pornography. Senator Nunn
led inquiries into Federal drug policy, the global spread of chemical
and biological weapons, abuses in Federal student aid programs,
computer security, airline safety, and health care fraud. Senator
Nunn also appointed the Subcommittee’s first female counsel, Elea-
nore Hill, who served as Chief Counsel to the Minority from 1982
to 1986 and then as Chief Counsel from 1987 to 1995.
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3 It had not been uncommon in the Subcommittee’s history for the Chairman and Ranking Mi-
nority Member to work together closely despite partisan differences, but Senator Percy was un-
usually active while in the Minority—a role that included his chairing an investigation of the
hearing aid industry.
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Strong bipartisan traditions continued in the 105th Congress
when, in January 1997, Republican Senator Susan Collins of Maine
became the first woman to chair the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. Senator John Glenn of Ohio became the Ranking
Minority Member, while also serving as Ranking Minority Member
of the full Committee. Two years later, in the 106th Congress, after
Senator Glenn’s retirement, Michigan Democrat Carl Levin suc-
ceeded him as the Subcommittee’s Ranking Minority Member. Dur-
ing Senator Collins’ chairmanship, the Subcommittee conducted in-
vestigations into issues affecting Americans in their day-to-day
lives, including mortgage fraud, deceptive mailings and sweep-
stakes promotions, phony credentials obtained through the Inter-
net, day trading of securities, and securities fraud on the Internet.
Senator Levin initiated an investigation into money laundering. At
his request, in 1999, the Subcommittee held hearings on money
laundering issues affecting private banking services provided to
wealthy individuals, and, in 2001, on how major U.S. banks pro-
viding correspondent accounts to offshore banks were being used to
advance money laundering and other criminal schemes.
During the 107th Congress, both Senator Collins and Senator
Levin chaired the Subcommittee. Senator Collins served as chair-
man until June 2001, when the Senate Majority changed hands; at
that point, Senator Levin assumed the chairmanship and Senator
Collins, in turn, became the Ranking Minority Member. In her first
six months chairing the Subcommittee at the start of the 107th
Congress, Senator Collins held hearings examining issues related
to cross border fraud, the improper operation of tissue banks, and
Federal programs designed to fight diabetes. When Senator Levin
assumed the chairmanship, as his first major effort, the Sub-
committee initiated an 18-month bipartisan investigation into the
Enron Corporation, which had collapsed into bankruptcy. As part
of that investigation, the Subcommittee reviewed over 2 million
pages of documents, conducted more than 100 interviews, held four
hearings, and issued three bipartisan reports focusing on the role
played by Enron’s Board of Directors, Enron’s use of tax shelters
and structured financial instruments, and how major U.S. financial
institutions contributed to Enron’s accounting deceptions, corporate
abuses, and ultimate collapse. The Subcommittee’s investigative
work contributed to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which en-
acted accounting and corporate reforms in July 2002. In addition,
Senator Levin continued the money laundering investigation initi-
ated while he was the Ranking Minority Member, and the Sub-
committee’s work contributed to enactment of major reforms
strengthening U.S. anti-money laundering laws in the 2001 USA
PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act). Also during the 107th Congress, the
Subcommittee opened new investigations into offshore tax abuses,
border security, and abusive practices related to the pricing of gas-
oline and other fuels.
In January 2003, at the start of the 108th Congress, after the
Senate Majority party again changed hands, Senator Collins was
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elevated to Chairman of the full Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs, and Republican Senator Norman Coleman of Minnesota be-
came Chairman of the Subcommittee. Over the next two years,
Senator Coleman held hearings on topics of national and global
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76
concern including illegal file sharing on peer-to-peer networks, abu-
sive practices in the credit counseling industry, the dangers of pur-
chasing pharmaceuticals over the Internet, SARS preparedness,
border security, and how former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
had abused the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program. At the re-
quest of Senator Levin, then Ranking Minority Member, the Sub-
committee examined how some U.S. accounting firms, banks, in-
vestment firms, and tax lawyers were designing, promoting, and
implementing abusive tax shelters across the country. Also at Sen-
ator Levin’s request, the Subcommittee investigated how some U.S.
financial institutions were failing to comply with anti-money laun-
dering controls mandated by the Patriot Act, using as a case his-
tory Riggs Bank accounts involving Augusto Pinochet, the former
President of Chile, and Equatorial Guinea, an oil-rich country in
Africa.
During the 109th Congress, Senator Coleman held additional
hearings on abuses associated with the United Nation’s Oil-for-
Food Program, and initiated a series of hearings on Federal con-
tractors who were paid with taxpayer dollars but failed to meet
their own tax obligations, resulting in billions of dollars in unpaid
taxes. He also held hearings on border security issues, securing the
global supply chain, Federal travel abuses, abusive tax refund
loans, and unfair energy pricing. At Senator Levin’s request, the
Subcommittee held hearings on offshore tax abuses responsible for
$100 billion in unpaid taxes each year, and on U.S. vulnerabilities
caused by States forming 2 million companies each year with hid-
den owners.
During the 110th Congress, in January 2007, after the Senate
majority shifted, Senator Levin once again became Subcommittee
Chairman, while Senator Coleman became the Ranking Minority
Member. Senator Levin chaired the Subcommittee for the next
seven years. He focused the Subcommittee on investigations into
complex financial and tax matters, including unfair credit card
practices, executive stock option abuses, excessive speculation in
the natural gas and crude oil markets, and offshore tax abuses in-
volving tax haven banks and non-U.S. persons dodging payment of
U.S. taxes on U.S. stock dividends. The Subcommittee’s work con-
tributed to enactment of two landmark bills, the Credit Card Ac-
countability Responsibility and Disclosure Act (Credit CARD Act),
which reformed credit card practices, and the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA), which tackled the problem of hidden off-
shore bank accounts used by U.S. persons to dodge U.S. taxes. At
the request of Senator Coleman, the Subcommittee also conducted
bipartisan investigations into Medicare and Medicaid health care
providers who cheat on their taxes, fraudulent Medicare claims in-
volving deceased doctors or inappropriate diagnosis codes, U.S.
dirty bomb vulnerabilities, Federal payroll tax abuses, abusive
practices involving transit benefits, and problems involving the
United Nations Development Program.
During the 111th Congress, Senator Levin continued as Sub-
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committee Chairman, while Senator Tom Coburn joined the Sub-
committee as its Ranking Minority Member. Under their leader-
ship, the Subcommittee dedicated much of its resources to a bipar-
tisan investigation into key causes of the 2008 financial crisis, look-
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77
ing in particular at the role of high-risk home loans, regulatory
failures, inflated credit ratings, and high-risk, conflicts-ridden fi-
nancial products designed and sold by investment banks. The Sub-
committee held four hearings and released thousands of docu-
ments. The Subcommittee’s work contributed to passage of another
landmark financial reform bill, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. In addition, the Sub-
committee held hearings on excessive speculation in the wheat
market, tax haven banks that helped U.S. clients evade U.S. taxes,
how to keep foreign corruption out of the United States, and Social
Security disability fraud.
During the 112th Congress, Senator Levin and Senator Coburn
continued in their respective roles as Chairman and Ranking Mi-
nority Member of the Subcommittee. In a series of bipartisan inves-
tigations, the Subcommittee examined how a global banking giant,
HSBC, exposed the U.S. financial system to an array of money
laundering, drug trafficking, and terrorist financing risks due to
poor anti-money laundering controls; how two U.S. multinational
corporations, Microsoft and Hewlett Packard engaged in offshore
tax abuses; and how excessive commodity speculation by mutual
funds and others were taking place without Dodd-Frank safeguards
such as position limits being put into effect. At the request of Sen-
ator Coburn, the Subcommittee also conducted bipartisan inves-
tigations into problems with Social Security disability determina-
tions that, due to poor procedures, perfunctory hearings, and poor
quality decisions, resulted in over one in five disability cases con-
taining errors or inadequate justifications; how Department of
Homeland Security State and local intelligence fusion centers failed
to yield significant, useful information to support Federal counter-
terrorism efforts; and how certain Federal contractors that received
taxpayer dollars through stimulus funding failed to pay their Fed-
eral taxes.
During the 113th Congress, Senator Levin continued as Chair-
man, while Senator John McCain joined the Subcommittee as its
Ranking Minority Member. They continued to strengthen the Sub-
committee’s strong bipartisan traditions, conducting all investiga-
tions in a bipartisan manner. During the 113th Congress, the Sub-
committee held eight hearings and released ten reports on a vari-
ety of investigations. The investigations examined high risk credit
derivatives trades at JPMorgan; hidden offshore accounts opened
for U.S. clients by Credit Suisse in Switzerland; corporate tax
avoidance in case studies involving Apple, Caterpillar, and a struc-
tured financial product known as basket options; online advertising
abuses; conflicts of interest affecting the stock market and high
speed trading; IRS processing of 501(c)(4) applications; defense ac-
quisition reforms; and bank involvement with physical commod-
ities. At the end of the 113th Congress, Senator Levin retired from
the Senate.
(2) More Recent Investigations
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During the 114th Congress, Senator Rob Portman became Sub-
committee Chairman with Senator Claire McCaskill serving as
Ranking Minority Member. Under the Chairman and Ranking
Member’s leadership, the Subcommittee held six hearings and
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78
issued eight reports addressing range of public policy concerns. In-
vestigations examined the impact of the U.S. corporate tax code on
cross-border mergers acquisitions; online sex trafficking; the Fed-
eral Government’s efforts to protect unaccompanied migrant chil-
dren from human trafficking; consumer protection in the cable and
satellite television industry; terrorist networks’ use of the Internet
and social media to radicalize and recruit; the U.S. State Depart-
ment’s oversight of a grantee involved in political activities in
Israel; and efforts by Medicare and private health insurance sys-
tems to combat the opioid epidemic. The Subcommittee also initi-
ated the first successful civil contempt proceedings to enforce a
Senate subpoena in twenty years. The Subcommittee’s long-term
investigation of online sex trafficking culminated in a final report
and hearing on January 10, 2017, at the start of the 115th Con-
gress.
During the 115th Congress Senator Portman continued as Chair-
man while Senator Tom Carper became the Subcommittee’s Rank-
ing Minority Member. Under the Chairman and Ranking Member’s
leadership, the Subcommittee held six hearings and issued six re-
ports. The Subcommittee examined the opioid crisis, including the
price increase of an opioid overdose reversal drug and the cost to
Federal healthcare programs and Chinese online drug sellers ship-
ping illicit opioids to the United States through international mail;
the Federal Government’s efforts to protect unaccompanied alien
children; Federal agency compliance with the Digital Accountability
and Transparency Act; Federal infrastructure permitting; and
Backpage.com’s knowing facilitation of online sex trafficking.
II. SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS DURING THE 116TH
CONGRESS
During the 116th Congress, Senator Rob Portman remained Sub-
committee Chairman with Senator Tom Carper serving as Ranking
Minority Member.
China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System. February 28, 2019.
(S. Hrg. 116–30)
The Subcommittee’s first hearing and report of the 116th Con-
gress was held in conjunction with the release of the Subcommit-
tee’s report titled ‘‘China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System.’’
The hearing examined the findings and recommendations in the
Subcommittee’s report.
The hearing featured one panels of witnesses including Jason
Bair, Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office; Walter Douglas, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of State; Hon. Jennifer Zimdahl Galt, Principal Deputy As-
sistant Secretary, Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs, U.S.
Department of State; and Hon. Mitchell M. Zais, Ph.D., Deputy
Secretary of Education, U.S. Department of Education.
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Examining Private Sector Data Breaches. March 7, 2019. (S. Hrg.
116–40)
The Subcommittee’s second hearing was held in conjunction with
the release of the Subcommittee’s report titled ‘‘How Equifax Ne-
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79
glected Cybersecurity and Suffered a Devastating Data Breach’’
and examined the findings and recommendations of the report. The
Subcommittee also received testimony regarding a data breach an-
nounced by Marriott in November 2018 that exposed more than
380 million guest records, including passport and credit card num-
bers.
The hearing featured testimony from two panels of witnesses.
The first panel included Mark W. Begor, Chief Executive Officer,
Equifax, Inc.; and Arne M. Sorenson, President and Chief Execu-
tive Officer, Marriott International, Inc. The second panel was com-
prised of: Alicia Puente Cackley, Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office;
Andrew Smith, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, U.S. Fed-
eral Trade Commission; and John M. Gilligan, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Center for Internet Security.
Oversight of Federal Infrastructure Permitting and FAST–41. May
2, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116–44)
The Subcommittee’s third hearing reviewed activities of the Fed-
eral Permitting Improvement Steering Council, which was estab-
lished to improve coordination between Federal permitting agencies
and help large projects navigate the permitting process.
The Subcommittee heard from one panel of witnesses. The panel
included Alexander Herrgott, Executive Director, Federal Permit-
ting Improvement Steering Council; Laura Abram, Director, Project
Execution and Public Affairs, First Solar; Michael Knisley, Execu-
tive Secretary-Treasurer, Ohio State Building and Construction
Trades Council; Joseph M. Johnson, Ph.D., Executive Director,
Federal Regulatory Process Review and Analysis, Environment,
Technology, and Regulatory Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce;
and Raul E. Garcia, Senior Legislative Counsel, Policy and Legisla-
tion Department, Earthjustice.
Joint Hearing with the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and
Federal Management: Review of E–Rulemaking Comment Sys-
tems. October 24, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116–114)
The Subcommittee held a joint hearing with the Subcommittee
on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Management after reviewing
Federal agency systems for receiving, reviewing, and publicizing
comments on proposed regulations and found the systems were
abused, creating some public distrust in the rulewriting process, as
well as additional work for Federal employees. The Subcommittee
also released a report in conjunction with the hearing titled
‘‘Abuses of the Federal Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process.’’
The Subcommittee heard from one panel of witnesses comprised
of Elizabeth Angerman, Principal Deputy Associate Administrator,
Office of Government-Wide Policy, U.S. General Services Adminis-
tration; Dominic Mancini, Acting Director, Office of Information
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and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget; Ashley
Boizelle, Deputy General Counsel, Federal Communications Com-
mission; and Seto J. Bagdoyan, Director, Forensic Audits and In-
vestigative Service, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
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80
Securing the U.S. Research Enterprise from China’s Talent Recruit-
ment Plans. November 19, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116–286)
The Subcommittee’s fifth hearing was held in conjunction with
the release of the Subcommittee’s report titled ‘‘Threats to the U.S
Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans.’’ The hear-
ing examined the report’s findings and recommendations.
One panel of witnesses testified at the hearing including John
Brown, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence Division, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; Rebecca L.
Keiser, Ph.D., Office Head, Office of International Science and En-
gineering, National Science Foundation; Michael S. Lauer, MD,
Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National Institutes of
Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; The Hon-
orable Christopher Fall, Ph.D., Director, Office of Science, U.S. De-
partment of Energy; and Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Visa Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. De-
partment of State.
Continuity of Senate Operations and Remote Voting in Times of
Crisis. April 30, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116–297)
The roundtable considered the Subcommittee’s memorandum on
the continuity of Senate operations and remove voting in times of
crisis.
At the roundtable, the Subcommittee heard from one panel of
participants including Martin B. Gold, Partner, Capitol Counsel,
LLC; Lorelei Kelly, Director of Congressional Modernization, Beeck
Center for Social Impact and Innovation, Georgetown University;
and Joshua C. Huder, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, the Government Af-
fairs Institute, Georgetown University.
Combatting the Opioid Crisis: Oversight of the Implementation of
the STOP Act. December 10, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116–)
The Subcommittee’s seventh hearing examined the implementa-
tion of the Synthetics Trafficking & Overdose Prevention (STOP)
Act, which became law in 2018. The STOP Act requires advance
electronic data on all inbound international packages, including
packages coming from China. Starting January 1, 2021, the STOP
Act requires the Postal Service to refuse any inbound international
packages without advance electronic data. The deadline was later
pushed until March 15, 2021.
One panel of witnesses testified at the hearing including Eric F.
Green, Director of Specialized and Technical Agencies, Bureau of
International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State;
Robert Cintron, Vice President, Logistics, United States Postal
Service; and Thomas F. Overacker, Executive Director, Cargo and
Conveyance Security, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
III. LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES DURING THE 116TH
CONGRESS
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The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations does not have
legislative authority, but because its investigations play an impor-
tant role in bringing issues to the attention of Congress and the
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81
public, the Subcommittee’s work contributes to the development of
legislative initiatives. The Subcommittee’s activity during the
116th Congress was no exception, with Subcommittee hearings and
Members playing prominent roles in several legislative initiatives.
A. Safeguarding American Innovation Act (S. 3997)
Senators Portman and Carper introduced the Safeguarding
American Innovation Act (SAIA) on June 18, 2020. The legislation
was based on two Subcommittee reports: (1) China’s Impact on the
U.S. Education System and (2) Threats to the U.S. Research Enter-
prise: China’s Talent Recruitment Plans. The legislation included
provisions that would:
• Amend Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §212(3)A to
provide State Department the authority to deny visas to cer-
tain foreign nationals seeking access to sensitive tech-
nologies when providing them a visa is not in the national
interest.
• Revise 22 USC §2452 to require certain visa sponsors to dis-
close to the State Department what sensitive technologies
foreign researchers will access and what appropriate safe-
guards they have to prevent foreign nationals’ unauthorized
access to sensitive technologies.
• Require Federal grant-making agencies to share information
about grantees under investigation; create a U.S. govern-
ment wide database of Federal grantees; and standardize the
grant application process.
• Revise Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to
require universities to report any foreign gift of $50,000 or
more and allow the Department of Education to fine univer-
sities that repeatedly fail to disclose these gifts.
• Make grant application fraud a crime under 18 USC.
SAIA was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered SAIA on July 22,
2020 and reported out favorably by unanimous consent. SAIA was
also sponsored by Sens. Barrasso, Blackburn, Braun, Coons, Cortex
Masto, Hassan, Hawley, Manchin, Risch, Rubio, R. Scott, Shaheen,
Tillis, Grassley, Johnson, McSally, Lankford, and Romney.
B. To amend the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, Fiscal Year
1979, relating to the conduct of knowledge diplomacy (S. 3996)
This legislation was introduced by Senators Portman and Carper
on June 18, 2020 based on the Subcommittee’s report titled
‘‘Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruit-
ment Plans’’ The legislation would authorize State Department to
negotiate and manage U.S. scientific partnerships that are in the
U.S. national interest, assist allies in securing their research enter-
prises from hostile governments, and report these efforts to Con-
gress.
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The legislation was referred to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions and also cosponsored by Sens. Barrasso, Blackburn, Braun,
Coons, Cortez Masto, Hassan, Hawley, Manchin, Risch, Rubio, R.
Scott, Shaheen, and Tillis.
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IV. REPORTS, PRINTS, AND STUDIES
In connection with its investigations, the Subcommittee often
issues lengthy and detailed reports. During the 116th Congress,
the Subcommittee released eleven such reports, listed below.
A. China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System, February 27,
2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staff of
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and released
in conjunction with the Subcommittee’s hearing on February
28, 2019)
At the start of the 116th Congress, Subcommittee staff released
a 93-page bipartisan report culminating its investigation into Con-
fucius Institutes on American colleges and universities. The Sub-
committee staff report found that Confucius Institutes are con-
trolled, funded, and often staffed by the Chinese government. The
report also detailed China’s one-sided treatment of U.S. schools and
key State Department programs in China, and documents the lack
of oversight by the Departments of State and Education of U.S.
Confucius Institutes. Below is a summary of the findings of the
staff report.
When China sought to market itself to students around the
world, it looked to its past. Confucius, the ancient Chinese philoso-
pher, is synonymous with morality, justice, and honesty. The Chi-
nese government capitalized on this rich legacy and began estab-
lishing Confucius Institutes on college campuses around the world
in 2004, including the first in the United States at the University
of Maryland. Today, there are more than 100 Confucius Institutes
in the United States, the most of any country.
The Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes and provides
Chinese teachers to teach language classes to students and non-
student community members. In addition to Chinese language
classes, Confucius Institutes host cultural events, including Chi-
nese New Year celebrations, cooking classes, speakers, and dance
and music performances. These selective events depict China as ap-
proachable and compassionate; rarely are events critical or con-
troversial. The Chinese government also funds and provides lan-
guage instructors for Confucius Classrooms, which offer classes for
kindergarten through 12th grade students. Confucius Classrooms
are currently in 519 elementary, middle, and high schools in the
United States. Continued expansion of the program is a priority for
China.
Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can com-
promise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves all
teachers, events, and speakers. Some U.S. schools contractually
agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply. The Chinese
teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government pledging they
will not damage the national interests of China. Such limitations
attempt to export China’s censorship of political debate and pre-
vent discussion of potentially politically sensitive topics. Indeed,
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U.S. school officials told the Subcommittee that Confucius Insti-
tutes were not the place to discuss controversial topics like the
independence of Taiwan or the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989. As one U.S. school administrator explained to the Sub-
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committee, when something is ‘‘funded by the Chinese government,
you know what you’re getting.’’
Confucius Institutes exist as one part of China’s broader, long-
term strategy. Through Confucius Institutes, the Chinese govern-
ment is attempting to change the impression in the United States
and around the world that China is an economic and security
threat. Confucius Institutes’ soft power encourages complacency to-
wards China’s pervasive, long-term initiatives against both govern-
ment critics at home and businesses and academic institutions
abroad. Those long-term initiatives include it’s Made in China 2025
plan, a push to lead the world in certain advanced technology man-
ufacturing. The Thousand Talents program is another state-run
initiative designed to recruit Chinese researchers in the United
States to return to China for significant financial gain—bringing
with them the knowledge gained at U.S. universities and compa-
nies.
Contracting with the Chinese Government. The Chinese govern-
ment runs the Confucius Institute program out of the Ministry of
Education’s Office of Chinese Language Council International,
known as ‘‘Hanban.’’ Each U.S. school signs a contract with
Hanban establishing the terms of hosting a Confucius Institute.
Contracts reviewed by the Subcommittee generally contain provi-
sions that state both Chinese and U.S. laws apply; limit public dis-
closure of the contract; and terminate the contract if the U.S.
school take actions that ‘‘severely harm the image or reputation’’ of
the Confucius Institute.
The Chinese director and teachers at each Confucius Institute
also sign contracts with Hanban. The contract with Hanban makes
clear a Chinese director or teacher will be terminated if they ‘‘vio-
late Chinese laws;’’ ‘‘engage in activities detrimental to national in-
terests;’’ or ‘‘participate in illegal organizations.’’ In fact, the con-
tract states the Chinese director and teachers must ‘‘conscien-
tiously safeguard national interests’’ and report to the Chinese Em-
bassy within one month of arrival in the United States.
Resources Provided by Hanban. U.S. schools that contract with
Hanban receive substantial funding and resources to establish the
Confucius Institute on campus. At the outset, Hanban typically
provides a U.S. school between $100,000 and $200,000 in start-up
costs, around 3,000 books, and other materials. Hanban also selects
and provides a Chinese director and teachers at no cost to the U.S.
school. While school officials have the opportunity to interview can-
didates for these positions, there is little-to-no transparency into
how the Chinese government selects the individuals that schools
must choose from. Nor did U.S. school officials interviewed by the
Subcommittee know if candidates would meet the school’s hiring
standards. Hanban requires director and teacher candidates to
pass English proficiency tests and undergo a psychological exam to
determine adaptability to living and teaching in the United States.
Beyond that, U.S. schools’ understanding of the selection process
was limited, at best.
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Expansion to Kindergarten through 12th Grade. China did not
stop at expanding at university and college campuses. The next
phase of Confucius Institutes involved funding teachers for Confu-
cius Classrooms in K–12 grade school. There are currently 519
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Confucius Classrooms operating in the United States with expan-
sion of this program a top priority for China. In the United States,
a Confucius Institute receives funding and instructors directly from
Hanban and passes it to the K–12 grade school to support affiliated
Confucius Classrooms.
The Cost of Confucius Institutes. The investment by China in
U.S. Confucius Institutes is substantial. Since 2006, the Sub-
committee determined China directly provided over $158 million in
funding to U.S. schools for Confucius Institutes. A number of U.S.
schools, however, failed to properly report this funding as required
by law. The Department of Education requires all postsecondary
schools to report 3 foreign gifts of $250,000 or more from a single
source within a calendar year of receiving them. Despite that legal
requirement, nearly 70 percent of U.S. schools that received more
than $250,000 from Hanban failed to properly report that amount
to the Department of Education.
The Department of Education last issued guidance to U.S.
schools on foreign gift reporting requirements in 2004, the same
year the first Confucius Institute opened in the United States. As
China opened over 100 additional Confucius Institutes in the
United States over the last 15 years, the Department of Education
remained silent.
Visa Failures. The State Department is responsible for issuing
visas to any Chinese director or teacher entering the United States
to work at a Confucius Institute. Some U.S. schools have struggled
to comply with the requirements of the Exchange Visitor Visa (or
‘‘J–1’’). In 2018, the State Department revoked 32 J–1 Professor
and Research Scholar visas for Confucius Institute teachers who
were not conducting research, but instead were teaching at K–12
schools. The State Department also found evidence that one Confu-
cius Institute Chinese director improperly coached the teachers to
discuss their research during interviews with State Department in-
vestigators.
China’s Lack of Reciprocity. In response to the growing popu-
larity of Confucius Institutes in the United States, the State De-
partment initiated a public diplomacy program in China. Between
2010 and the issuance of the Subcommittee’s report, the State De-
partment had provided $5.1 million in grant funding for 29 ‘‘Amer-
ican Cultural Centers’’ or ACCs in China. Through the ACC pro-
gram, a U.S. school partners with a Chinese school, much like a
Confucius Institute. The U.S. school then uses the grant funds to
create a space on the campus of the Chinese partner school to ‘‘en-
able Chinese audiences to better understand the United States, its
culture, society, government, language, law, economic center, and
values.’’ ACCs are notably different from Confucius Institutes, how-
ever, as the State Department does not pay or vet instructors or
directors; provide books or materials; or veto proposed events. Even
so, the Chinese government stifled the establishment of the ACC
program from the start.
In all, the State Department provided 29 U.S. schools with grant
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funds to establish ACCs with a partner Chinese schools. For some
U.S schools, roadblocks to opening their ACCs appeared imme-
diately. For example, after extensive negotiations, one Chinese
school refused to open a proposed ACC, stating it didn’t see a need
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85
to move forward. An official from the U.S. school seeking to open
the ACC, however, believed China’s Ministry of Education told the
partner school not to proceed with the contract. This official wrote
in an email to his colleagues, ‘‘This is a typical Chinese political eu-
phemism. Obviously, [the Chinese University] was instructed by
[the Ministry of Education] not to proceed with our proposal.’’ The
U.S. school returned the grant funds to the State Department.
The ACCs that did open found they needed permission from their
Chinese host schools to hold most cultural events. One Chinese
host school refused to allow its ACC to host a play about the life
of Muhammad Ali. Another denied approval for a lecture series on
policy issues facing Americans. One U.S. school official who staffed
an ACC told the Subcommittee that members of the local Com-
munist Party often participated in the approval process. Another
U.S. school official left the ACC after two sessions of extensive
questioning by Chinese police officers regarding her involvement
with the ACC and the State Department. When the U.S. school of-
ficial returned to the United States, a colleague told her that Chi-
nese police interrogation of school officials was common and that
she was now just ‘‘part of the club.’’
In all, the State Department documented over 80 instances in
the past four years where the Chinese government directly inter-
fered with U.S. diplomacy efforts in China. Interference with State
Department officials or events took a number of forms. One exam-
ple involved a Chinese official telling a U.S. official an ACC no
longer existed; the U.S. official easily confirmed the continued ex-
istence of the ACC through its U.S. partner school. One U.S. offi-
cial was told she applied too late to attend the opening of an ACC
after submitting the request a month before. In other instances,
the Chinese school canceled approved events, sometimes as late as
the night before.
In December 2017, the State Department Inspector General
found the ACC mission was largely ineffective. In October 2018,
the State Department ended all ACC program grant funding in
order to conduct an internal assessment of the program. At the
time of the issuance of the Subcommittee’s report, the Department
indicated that it had no plans for future ACC grants.
The Need for Transparency and Reciprocity. Schools in the
United States—from kindergarten to college—have provided a level
of access to the Chinese government that the Chinese government
has refused to provide to the United States. That level of access
can stifle academic freedom and provide students and others ex-
posed to Confucius Institute programming with an incomplete pic-
ture of Chinese government actions and policies that run counter
to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Absent full transparency re-
garding how Confucius Institutes operate and full reciprocity for
U.S. cultural outreach efforts on college campuses in China, Confu-
cius Institutes should not continue in the United States.
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Findings and recommendations from this investigation were in-
corporated into S. 3997, Safeguarding American Innovation Act.
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B. How Equifax Neglected Cybersecurity and Suffered A Devastated
Data Breach, March 6, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority
and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations and released in conjunction with the Subcommittee’s
hearing on March 7, 2019)
In March 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 67-page bipartisan
report detailing the repeated failures over years on the part of
Equifax, one of the nation’s largest consumer reporting agencies,
that led to a devastating data breach in 2017. As a result of poor
cybersecurity practices, Equifax failed to adequately protect the
sensitive information of more than 145 million Americans, includ-
ing Social Security numbers and driver’s license and passport infor-
mation. A summary of the staff report is found below.
The effects of data breaches are often long-lasting and chal-
lenging to reverse. Victims who have had their sensitive personal
or financial information stolen by hackers can be left with years of
expense and hassle. No type of entity or sector of the economy has
been immune to data breaches. In 2018 alone, Google+, Facebook,
Ticketfly, T–Mobile, Orbitz, Saks, Lord & Taylor, and Marriott all
announced significant breaches. The importance of protecting per-
sonally identifiable information (‘‘PII’’) grows with every successive
data breach.
Consumers and businesses are well aware of the need to safe-
guard items like driver’s licenses, credit cards, and financial
records that criminals can use to their advantage. Consumers also
understand the need to protect information like online passwords,
pin numbers, and Social Security numbers. But a consumer taking
appropriate care of this information may not be enough to keep PII
out of the hands of criminal hackers. In the modern world, busi-
nesses collect and compile data about their customers and potential
customers. Without proper precautions, this information can be
stored or transmitted in ways that leave it vulnerable to theft.
The information collected by consumer reporting agencies
(‘‘CRAs’’) to compile credit reports is one example of PII that must
be protected. This information includes a consumer’s name, nick-
names, date of birth, Social Security number, telephone numbers,
and current and former addresses. Credit reports also typically in-
clude a list of all open and closed credit accounts, account balances,
account payment histories, and the names of creditors. The infor-
mation tells the story of a consumer’s financial life and can deter-
mine whether they can rent an apartment, buy a car, or qualify for
a home loan. If stolen, criminals can use it to do significant finan-
cial harm. The steps CRAs take to safeguard consumers’ credit his-
tories are extremely important. If that information is compromised,
consumers should know to be on heightened alert to monitor their
finances and mitigate any potential damage.
In 2017, one of the largest CRAs, Equifax Inc. (‘‘Equifax’’) an-
nounced that it had suffered a data breach that involved the PII
of over 145 million Americans. The Subcommittee investigated the
causes of this breach to identify ways to prevent future incidents
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of this scope. The Subcommittee also reviewed the efforts of
Equifax’s two largest competitors, Experian plc (‘‘Experian’’) and
TransUnion LLC (‘‘TransUnion’’), in responding to the vulnerability
that ultimately led to the Equifax data breach. Highlights of the
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Subcommittee’s investigative results, including findings and rec-
ommendations, are provided below.
Equifax Failed to Prioritize Cybersecurity. Equifax had no stand-
alone written corporate policy governing the patching of known
cyber vulnerabilities until 2015. After implementing this policy,
Equifax conducted an audit of its patch management efforts, which
identified a backlog of over 8,500 known vulnerabilities that had
not been patched. This included more than 1,000 vulnerabilities
the auditors deemed critical, high, or medium risks that were
found on systems that could be accessed by individuals from out-
side of Equifax’s information technology (‘‘IT’’) networks. The audit
report concluded, among other things, that Equifax did not abide
by the schedule for addressing vulnerabilities mandated by its own
patching policy. It also found that the company had a reactive ap-
proach to installing patches and used what the auditors called an
‘‘honor system’’ for patching that failed to ensure that patches were
installed. The audit report also noted that Equifax lacked a com-
prehensive IT asset inventory, meaning it lacked a complete under-
standing of the assets it owned. This made it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for Equifax to know if vulnerabilities existed on its networks.
If a vulnerability cannot be found, it cannot be patched.
Equifax never conducted another audit after the 2015 audit and
left several of the issues identified in the 2015 audit report
unaddressed in the months leading up to the 2017 data breach.
Equifax Could Not Follow Its Own Policies in Patching the Vul-
nerability That Ultimately Caused the Breach. Equifax’s patching
policy required the company’s IT department to patch critical
vulnerabilities within 48 hours. The company’s security staff
learned of a critical vulnerability in certain versions of Apache
Struts—a widely-used piece of web application software—on March
8, 2017, from the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team at
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The National Institute
of Standards and Technology gave the vulnerability the highest
criticality score possible; it was widely known that the vulnerability
was easy to exploit. Equifax employees circulated news of the vul-
nerability through an internal alert the next day that went to a list
of more than 400 company employees.
Equifax held monthly meetings to discuss cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, but senior managers did not routinely attend these
meetings and follow-up was limited. The Apache Struts vulner-
ability was discussed during the March 2017 and April 2017 meet-
ings, but not discussed at any subsequent monthly meetings. The
Subcommittee interviewed the leadership of the Equifax IT and se-
curity staffs and learned that none of them regularly attended
these monthly meetings or specifically recalled attending the
March 2017 meeting. In addition, the Chief Information Officer
(‘‘CIO’’), who oversaw the IT department during 2017, referred to
patching as a ‘‘lower level responsibility that was six levels down’’
from him.
Equifax Failed to Locate and Patch Apache Struts. The Equifax
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developer who was aware of Equifax’s use of Apache Struts soft-
ware was not included in the 400-person email distribution list
used to circulate information on the vulnerability. The developer’s
manager, however, was on the distribution list and received the
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alert, but failed to forward it to the developer or anyone on the de-
veloper’s team. As a result, the key developer never received the
alert. Equifax added application owners to the list after the breach.
The Subcommittee also learned that Equifax developers were in-
dividually responsible for subscribing to push notifications from
software vendors about security vulnerabilities. The developer who
knew of the company’s use of Apache Struts software was not sub-
scribed to notifications from Apache and did not receive any alerts
about the vulnerability.
On March 14, 2017—nearly a week after the Apache Struts vul-
nerability was disclosed—Equifax added new rules to the com-
pany’s intrusion prevention system intended to help it thwart ef-
forts to exploit the vulnerability. With these new protections in
place, Equifax believed it had the ability to identify and block ex-
ploit attempts and did block several attempts the same day the
rules were installed.
None of Equifax’s subsequent scans identified the vulnerable
version of Apache Struts running on Equifax’s network. And since
Equifax lacked a comprehensive inventory of its IT assets, it did
not know that the vulnerable version of Apache Struts remained on
its system.
Equifax Left Itself Open to Attack Due to Poor Cybersecurity Prac-
tices. Equifax was unable to detect attackers entering its networks
because it failed to take the steps necessary to see incoming mali-
cious traffic online.
Website owners install Secure Sockets Layer (‘‘SSL’’) certificates
to protect and encrypt online interactions with their servers. If an
SSL certificate expires, transactions are no longer protected. As
part of an IT management effort unrelated to the Apache Struts
vulnerability, Equifax installed dozens of new SSL certificates on
the night of July 29, 2017, to replace certificates that had expired.
This included a new certificate for the expired SSL certificate for
its online dispute portal. The SSL certificate needed to be up-to-
date to properly monitor the online dispute portal, but had expired
eight months earlier in November 2016. Almost immediately after
updating the SSL certificate, company employees observed sus-
picious internet traffic from its online dispute portal that they were
able to trace to an IP address in China, a country where Equifax
does not operate. After blocking the IP address, Equifax observed
similar traffic the following day to another IP address that ap-
peared to be connected to a Chinese entity and decided to take the
online dispute portal offline. Equifax later determined that the
hackers first gained access to Equifax’s system through the online
dispute portal on May 13, 2017, meaning the hackers had 78 days
to maneuver undetected.
Equifax confirmed to the Subcommittee that the Apache Struts
vulnerability facilitated the data breach that began in May 2017.
The Damage Done by the Hackers Could Have Been Minimized.
Once inside Equifax’s online dispute portal, the hackers also
accessed other Equifax databases as they searched for other sys-
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tems containing PII. They eventually found a data repository that
also contained unencrypted usernames and passwords that allowed
the hackers to access additional Equifax databases. The informa-
tion accessed primarily included names, Social Security numbers,
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birth dates, addresses, and, in some instances, driver’s license and
credit card numbers.
The usernames and passwords the hackers found were saved on
a file share by Equifax employees. Equifax told the Subcommittee
that it decided to structure its networks this way in an effort to
support efficient business operations.
In addition, Equifax did not have basic tools in place to detect
and identify changes to files, a protection which would have gen-
erated real-time alerts and detected the unauthorized changes the
hackers were making.
Equifax Waited Six Weeks Before Notifying the Public It Was
Breached. Equifax employees discovered the suspicious activity
that was later determined to be a data breach on July 29, 2017.
Equifax’s then-Chief Executive Officer, Richard Smith, learned of
the breach on July 31 and that consumer PII maintained by
Equifax had likely been stolen on August 15, 2017. Mr. Smith wait-
ed until August 22 to begin notifying members of Equifax’s Board
of Directors. Equifax publicly announced the data breach on Sep-
tember 7, six weeks after learning of it and nearly four months
after the hackers entered Equifax’s networks. Because Equifax was
unaware of all the assets it owned, unable to patch the Apache
Struts vulnerability, and unable to detect attacks on key portions
of its network, for months consumers were unaware that criminals
had obtained their most sensitive personal and financial informa-
tion and that they should take steps to protect themselves from
fraud. Equifax officials say the company chose to notify the public
only after determining every single individual impacted by the
breach.
There is no national uniform standard requiring a private entity
to notify affected individuals in the event of a data breach. Instead,
all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and several U.S. territories
have enacted their own legislation requiring public disclosure of se-
curity breaches of PII. Some states require notification after any
breach of non-encrypted personal information, while others require
notification only if the breach is likely to cause ‘‘substantial harm’’
to individuals. Some states require companies to notify affected in-
dividuals within a set number of days, while others simply require
private entities to provide notice ‘‘without unreasonable delay.’’
This creates a patchwork of uncertainty for companies and con-
sumers responding to data breaches. For example, Target, one of
the largest retail chains in the United States, notified the public
seven days after learning that it suffered a data breach. By con-
trast, Yahoo! suffered data breaches in 2013 and 2014, but did not
disclose them until 2016 and 2017, respectively.
Equifax Executives Believe They Did All They Could to Prevent
the Breach. The Subcommittee interviewed current and former
Equifax employees from the information security and IT depart-
ments. Their responses varied, but most said they believe that the
security team’s actions were an appropriate response to the Apache
Struts vulnerability. The Director of Global Threats and Vulner-
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ability Management from 2014 to 2017 said ‘‘security wasn’t first’’
at Equifax before the data breach, but that the data breach ‘‘made
everyone focus on it more.’’ The former Countermeasures Manager
in place from 2016 to 2017 said he believes the response to the vul-
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nerability was ‘‘not only defensible, but justifiable.’’ The CIO at
Equifax from 2010 to 2017 oversaw the company employees respon-
sible for installing patches but said he was never made aware of
the Apache Struts vulnerability and does not understand why the
vulnerability ‘‘was not caught.’’ He does not think Equifax could
have done anything differently.
TransUnion and Experian Avoided a Breach. TransUnion and
Experian received the same information as the public and Equifax
regarding the Apache Struts vulnerability, but the approach that
each company took to cybersecurity was different from Equifax’s.
Both companies had deployed software to verify the installation of
security patches, ran scans more frequently, and maintained an IT
asset inventory. In response to the Apache Struts vulnerability,
TransUnion began patching vulnerable versions of the software
within days. Experian retained a software security firm in March
2017 to conduct targeted vulnerability scans of Apache Struts
vulnerabilities. After finding an Experian server was running a
vulnerable version, Experian took the server offline and began
patching it. There is no indication that TransUnion or Experian
were attacked by hackers seeking to exploit the Apache Struts vul-
nerability.
Equifax Failed to Preserve Key Internal Chat Records. Equifax
was unable to produce potentially responsive documents related to
the data breach because the company failed to take steps to pre-
serve records created on an internal chat platform. Equifax’s docu-
ment retention policy requires the company to preserve several
types of documents for different periods of time. In general,
Equifax employees are required to preserve all business records,
unless they are considered ‘‘disposable’’ under the policy. The policy
also gives the Equifax legal department the authority to halt the
disposal of any records that are subject to a legal hold due to litiga-
tion or a government investigation.
During its investigation, the Subcommittee learned that Equifax
employees conducted substantive discussions of the discovery and
mitigation of the data breach using Microsoft Lync, an instant mes-
saging product. Equifax’s policy was that records of these chats
were disposable. As such, Equifax maintained the default setting
on the chat platform not to archive chats. After discovering the
data breach on July 29, 2017, Equifax did not issue a legal hold
for related documents until August 22, 2017. Despite the legal
hold, Equifax did not change the default setting on the Lync plat-
form and begin archiving chats until September 15, 2017. As a re-
sult, the Subcommittee does not have a complete record of docu-
ments concerning the breach.
C. Federal Cybersecurity: America’s Data at Risk, June 25, 2019
(Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations)
In June 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 95-page bipartisan
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report reviewing Federal Government agencies’ compliance with
basic cybersecurity standards found in the Federal Information Se-
curity Management Act. A summary of the staff report is found
below.
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Federal Government agencies are the frequent target of cyberse-
curity attacks. From 2006 to 2015, the number of cyber incidents
reported by Federal agencies increased by more than 1,300 percent.
In 2017 alone, Federal agencies reported 35,277 cyber incidents.
The Government Accountability Office (‘‘GAO’’) has included cyber-
security on its ‘‘high risk’’ list every year since 1997.
No agency is immune to attack and the list of Federal agencies
compromised by hackers continues to grow. In the past five years,
agencies reporting data breaches include the United States Postal
Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and even the White House.
One of the largest breaches of government information occurred in
2015 when a hacker ex-filtrated over 22 million security clearance
files from the Office of Personnel Management (‘‘OPM’’). Those files
contained extensive personal and potentially comprising informa-
tion. We may never know the full impact on our national security
of the OPM breach.
The number of data breaches agencies have reported in recent
years is not surprising given the current cybersecurity posture of
the Federal Government. A recent report by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (‘‘OMB’’) made clear that agencies ‘‘do not under-
stand and do not have the resources to combat the current threat
environment.’’ This is especially concerning given the information
agencies must collect and hold. This report documents the extent
to which the Federal Government is the target of cybersecurity at-
tacks, how key Federal agencies have failed to address
vulnerabilities in their IT infrastructure, and how these failures
have left America’s sensitive personal information unsafe and vul-
nerable to theft.
Federal agencies hold sensitive information. The Federal Govern-
ment holds extensive amounts of highly personal information on
most Americans. For example, the Department of Education col-
lects financial data on students and parents applying for college
loans. Disabled Americans prove they are entitled to disability ben-
efits from the Social Security Administration by providing years of
health records documenting medical issues. Prospective home-
owners provide payroll and savings information to the Department
of Housing and Urban Development to qualify for home loans. The
Department of Homeland Security maintains travel records on citi-
zens traveling abroad and returning to the United States.
Federal agencies also hold information pertaining to national se-
curity and other vital government functions, some of which could
be dangerous in the wrong hands. The Department of State holds
and vets visa information for foreign nationals applying to come to
the United States. The Department of Transportation certifies air-
craft through the review of aircraft design, flight test information,
and maintenance and operational suitability. The Department of
Agriculture maintains information on hazardous pathogens and
toxins that could threaten animals or plants.
Protecting this information from cybersecurity attacks could not
be more important.
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Congress required OMB and agencies to secure Federal networks.
In 2002, Congress recognized the importance of protecting informa-
tion held by the government by passing the Federal Information
Security Management Act. That law put OMB in charge of Federal
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cybersecurity, required agencies to provide cybersecurity training
for employees, and mandated agencies develop procedures for iden-
tifying, reporting, and responding to cyber incidents. Twelve years
later, in 2014, Congress updated the law through the Federal Infor-
mation SecurityModernization Act (‘‘FISMA’’). The new law re-
affirmed OMB’s ultimate authority over Federal cybersecurity and
its responsibility for guiding and overseeing agencies’ individual cy-
bersecurity efforts. It also directed the Department of Homeland
Security (‘‘DHS’’) to ‘‘administer the implementation of agency
[cyber] security policies and practices.’’ This includes activities re-
lated to monitoring Federal networks and detecting and preventing
attacks aimed at Federal agencies. DHS also develops directives
implementing OMB cybersecurity policies. These directives man-
date that Federal agencies take certain actions to protect informa-
tion and systems from emerging cybersecurity threats. In doing so,
DHS consults with the National Institute of Science and Tech-
nology’s (‘‘NIST’’) to ensure its directives are consistent with NIST’s
cybersecurity framework. That framework ‘‘is a risk-based ap-
proach to managing cybersecurity risk’’ with five core functions es-
sential to an effective approach to cybersecurity:
(1) Identify (develop the organizational understanding to man-
age cybersecurity);
(2) Protect (develop and implement the appropriate cybersecu-
rity safeguards);
(3) Detect (develop and implement the appropriate activities to
identify a cybersecurity event);
(4) Respond (develop and implement the appropriate activities
to take action in response to the detection of a cybersecurity event);
and
(5) Recover (develop and implement the appropriate activities to
maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities im-
paired due to a cybersecurity event).
Congress also tasked each agency’s Inspector General (‘‘IG’’) to
annually audit compliance with basic cybersecurity standards
based on the NIST cybersecurity framework. The Subcommittee re-
viewed the past ten years of audits for DHS and seven other agen-
cies: (1) the Department of State (‘‘State’’); (2) the Department of
Transportation (‘‘DOT’’); (3) the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (‘‘HUD’’); (4) the Department of Agriculture
(‘‘USDA’’); (5) the Department of Health and Human Services
(‘‘HHS’’); (6) the Department of Education (‘‘Education’’); and (7)
the Social Security Administration (‘‘SSA’’). These seven agencies
were cited by OMB as having the lowest ratings with regard to cy-
bersecurity practices based on NIST’s cybersecurity framework in
fiscal year 2017.
Agencies currently fail to comply with basic cybersecurity stand-
ards. During the Subcommittee’s review, a number of concerning
trends emerged regarding the eight agencies’ failure to comply with
basic NIST cybersecurity standards. In the most recent audits at
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the time, the IGs found that seven of the eight agencies reviewed
by the Subcommittee failed to properly protect personally identifi-
able information (‘‘PII’’). Five of the eight agencies did not maintain
a comprehensive and accurate list of information technology (‘‘IT’’)
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assets. Without a list of the agency’s IT assets, the agency does not
know all of the applications operating on its network. If the agency
does not know the application is on its network, it cannot secure
the application. Six of the eight agencies failed to install security
patches. Vendors issue security patches to secure vulnerabilities.
Hackers exploit these vulnerabilities during data breaches. De-
pending on the vulnerability and abilities of the hacker, the vulner-
ability may allow access to the agency’s network. Multiple agencies,
across multiple years, failed to ensure systems had valid authori-
ties to operate. An authority to operate certifies that the system is
in proper working order, including an analysis and acceptance of
any risk the system may contain. All of the agencies used legacy
systems that were costly and difficult to secure. Legacy systems are
systems a vendor no longer supports or issues updates to patch cy-
bersecurity vulnerabilities.
The IG audits identified several highly concerning issues at cer-
tain agencies. For example, the Education IG found that since
2011, the agency was unable to prevent unauthorized outside de-
vices from easily connecting to the agency’s network. In its 2018
audit, the IG found the agency had managed to restrict unauthor-
ized access to 90 seconds, but explained that this was enough time
for a malicious actor to ‘‘launch an attack or gain intermittent ac-
cess to internal network resources that could lead to’’ exposing the
agency’s data. This is concerning because that agency holds PII on
millions of Americans.
Agencies historically failed to comply with cybersecurity stand-
ards. The failures cited above are not new. Inspectors General have
cited many of these same vulnerabilities for the past decade. The
IGs identified several common historical failures at the eight agen-
cies reviewed by the Subcommittee:
Protection of PII. Several agencies failed to properly protect the
PII entrusted to their care. These agencies included State, DOT,
HUD, Education, and SSA. The HUD IG has noted this issue in
nine of the last eleven audits.
Comprehensive list of IT assets. The IGs identified a persistent
issue with agencies failing to maintain an accurate and comprehen-
sive inventory of its IT assets. In the last decade, IGs identified
this as a recurrent problem for State, DOT, HUD, HHS, and SSA.
Remediation of cyber vulnerabilities. Over the past decade, IGs
for all eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee found each
agency failed to timely remediate cyber vulnerabilities and apply
security patches. For example, the HUD and State IGs identified
the failure to patch security vulnerabilities seven of the last ten an-
nual audits. HHS and Education cybersecurity audits highlighted
failures to apply security patches eight out of ten years. For the
last nine years, USDA failed to timely apply patches. Both DHS
and DOT failed to properly apply security patches for the last ten
consecutive years.
Authority to operate. The IGs identified multiple agencies that
failed to ensure systems had valid authorities to operate. These in-
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cluded DHS, DOT, HUD, USDA, HHS, and Education. For exam-
ple, HHS systems lacked valid authorities to operate for the last
nine consecutive audits. Additionally, the DHS IG determined that
DHS operated systems without valid authorities in seven of the
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94
last ten audits. As stated, DHS is the agency in charge of securing
the networks of all other government agencies.
Overreliance on legacy systems. The extensive use of legacy sys-
tems was also a common issue identified by IGs. All eight agencies
examined by the Subcommittee relied on legacy systems. For exam-
ple, the DHS IG noted the use of unsupported operating systems
for at least the last four years, including Windows XP and Win-
dows 2003.
The President’s 2019 budget request addressed the risks associ-
ated with agencies’ reliance on:
[A]ging legacy systems, [which] pose efficiency, cybersecurity,
and mission risk issues, such as ever-rising costs to maintain them
and an inability to meet current or expected mission requirements.
Legacy systems may also operate with known security
vulnerabilities that are either technically difficult or prohibitively
expensive to address and thus may hinder agencies’ ability to com-
ply with critical cybersecurity statutory and policy requirements.
OMB also recently confirmed the risks legacy systems pose. In
May 2018, OMB published the Federal Cybersecurity Risk Deter-
mination Report and Action Plan. OMB explained that the two
most substantial issues contributing to agency risk were the ‘‘abun-
dance of legacy information technology, which is difficult and ex-
pensive to protect, as well as shortages of experienced and capable
cybersecurity personnel.’’ That report found that 71 of 96 agencies
surveyed (or 74 percent) had cybersecurity programs at risk.
Twelve of those 71 agencies had programs at high risk.
Chief Information Officer. In an effort to prioritize agency cyber-
security, Congress established the position of Chief Information Of-
ficer (‘‘CIO’’) in 1996. Since then, Congress has increased the re-
sponsibilities of agency CIOs several times. The most recent at-
tempts were included in FISMA and the Federal Information Tech-
nology Acquisition Reform Act, which gave CIOs plenary govern-
ance over an agency’s IT budget and priorities. Despite these au-
thorities, agencies still struggle with empowering the CIO. In Au-
gust 2018, GAO found that none of the 24 major agencies—includ-
ing the eight examined by the Subcommittee—properly addressed
the role of CIO as Congress directed. These 24 agencies included
the eight agencies reviewed by the Subcommittee in this report.
Given the sustained vulnerabilities identified by numerous In-
spectors General, the Subcommittee finds that the Federal Govern-
ment has not fully achieved its legislative mandate under FISMA
and is failing to implement basic cybersecurity standards necessary
to protect America’s sensitive data.
D. The True Cost of Government Shutdowns, September 17, 2019
(Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations)
On September 17, 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 180-page
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bipartisan report regarding the cost to American taxpayers of the
last three government shutdowns and the resulting impacts on the
economy and core government functions. A summary of the find-
ings of the staff report is found below.
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The Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse. Specifi-
cally, Congress has the sole responsibility to raise revenue and ap-
propriate money to fund the Federal Government. When Congress
and the President fail to reach agreement on legislation to appro-
priate funds, affected Federal agencies shut down and suspend
most activities. During this time, Federal law prevents most Fed-
eral employees from working and most are sent home without pay.
In recent shutdowns, however, the spending legislation ultimately
agreed upon by Congress and the President provided back pay for
Federal employees. As such, the American taxpayer funded fur-
loughed Federal employees’ salaries for the duration of each shut-
down, even when employees were not permitted to go to work.
This report documents the cost to the American taxpayer of the
last three government shutdowns. Federal workers were fur-
loughed and unable to work for 54 days during those three govern-
ment shutdowns. The Subcommittee surveyed 26 Federal agencies
and found the last three government shutdowns cost taxpayers
nearly $4 billion—at least $3.7 billion in back pay to furloughed
Federal workers, and at least $338 million in other costs associated
with the shutdowns, including extra administrative work, lost rev-
enue, and late fees on interest payments. Agencies reported to the
Subcommittee that the combined total of furlough days during all
three shutdowns was about 14,859,144, representing an estimated
56,938 years of lost productivity for those agency employees. These
figures, however, do not include data from some of the largest gov-
ernment agencies, which were unable to provide complete shut-
down cost estimates to the Subcommittee, including the Depart-
ments of Defense, Agriculture, Justice, and Commerce and the En-
vironmental Protection Agency.
This report also documents the impacts that shutdowns have on
important core government functions.
Congress created a process to pass appropriations to fund the
Federal Government. Under the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 1974, the budget process begins the first
Monday in February with the President sending the House of Rep-
resentatives and Senate Budget Committees a proposed budget.
This proposed budget is the President’s recommendation for fund-
ing the government the following fiscal year, which begins October
1. The Budget Committees consider that request and develop their
own budget proposal. The full House and Senate are then required
to pass a formal budget resolution outlining topline spending levels
by April 15. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees
then pass and send appropriations bills to the full House and Sen-
ate for consideration; the process divides funding for the entire gov-
ernment into 12 separate bills. Each of the 12 regular appropria-
tions bills must pass both chambers, and the two chambers work
out any differences in the bills in conference. Once the House and
Senate pass the same versions of an appropriations bill, Congress
sends the bill to the President for signature.
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Congress designed this process to orderly fund the Federal Gov-
ernment as it determines what programs to fund and the funding
allocated to each program. This process also allows the President
to make recommendations for program funding levels and permits
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96
agencies to plan for the year ahead. Today, that orderly process is
rarely followed.
The Federal Government routinely operates on temporary con-
tinuing resolutions. Ideally, Congress and the President complete
the budget process before the end of the fiscal year and enact all
12 appropriations bills before October 1. Since 1997, however, some
or all of the executive branch has operated under a continuing reso-
lution or ‘‘CR.’’ A CR provides temporary funding when Congress
is unable to pass a comprehensive budget. Since 1997, Congress
has passed 117 CRs to temporarily fund the government—often
passing multiple CRs each fiscal year. The CRs have ranged in du-
ration from one day to the entire fiscal year.
When Congress cannot pass the 12 appropriations bills or a CR,
the portion of the government without appropriated funding shuts
down. In the last five years, this has occurred three times resulting
in three government shutdowns: 16 days in October 2013; 3 days
in January 2018; and most recently, 35 days from December 2018
to January 2019.
Rather than saving taxpayer money, shutdowns produce signifi-
cant costs to the American taxpayer. While Federal workers are not
paid during a shutdown, Congress routinely provides full back pay
to those workers when it ultimately passes appropriations. The
government pays Federal workers for the time they were fur-
loughed and unable to work due to the shutdown. However, the
American taxpayer incurs significant lost productivity costs due to
the furlough. Federal agencies reported they were unable to per-
form important functions during the shutdowns, including:
Investigations of bad actors who were potentially breaking Fed-
eral laws were suspended, including investigations by the Depart-
ments of Justice and Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, and the Federal Trade Commission. Investigators were
unable to pursue leads, develop evidence of crimes, or bring en-
forcement actions against individuals and corporate entities for bad
acts.
• The Department of Justice canceled approximately 60,000
immigration hearings for non-detained aliens scheduled to
take place during the FY 2019 shutdown. This delay likely
extended the current two-year wait time for individuals wait-
ing for a hearing to determine their immigration status.
• The Consumer Product Safety Commission (‘‘CPSC’’) tabled
any outstanding decisions regarding the recall of potentially
dangerous consumer products, leaving potentially dangerous
products on the market and available to consumers. No re-
calls were posted on the CPSC website during the FY 2019
shutdown. A recall notice posted on February 5, 2019 after
the shutdown noted that a drill posing a shock hazard to
consumers was ‘‘previously announced independently on Jan-
uary 10, 2019 by the firm due to the government furlough.’’
• National Parks, including Yellowstone National Park and
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Grand Canyon National Park, were either closed or unat-
tended. Park visitors either had no access to parks or en-
countered unattended parks with overflowing trashcans. The
lack of park attendants and rangers left sensitive habitats
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97
vulnerable to damage. Nor were park rangers on site to help
lost or injured park visitors.
• The Smithsonian Institution closed museums during certain
shutdowns. Tourists could not see any of the world-renowned
paintings in the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C.
Nor were they able to access other popular destinations like
the National Museum of American History and the National
Air and Space Museum. With its museums closed, the
Smithsonian also lost significant revenue from its on-site
shops, theaters, and dining facilities.
Some agencies could not determine the cost of the shutdown. The
Subcommittee based its cost estimate of nearly $4 billion on the in-
formation provided by 26 Federal agencies. Some agencies, how-
ever, were unable to provide one or more categories of the re-
quested financial information. For example, the Departments of
Defense, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, and the Environmental
Protection Agency did not know the amount paid to employees in
back pay following certain shutdowns. Other agencies were unable
to provide information about other costs associated with shutdown
impacts such as extra administrative work, lost revenue, project
delays, and late payment fees. Therefore, certain shutdown costs
from those agencies are not included in the Subcommittee’s esti-
mate.
The cost of a shutdown to the national economy. Shutting down
the government also affects the national economy. The Congres-
sional Budget Office (‘‘CBO’’) determined the most recent partial
shutdown ‘‘delayed approximately $18 billion in Federal discre-
tionary spending for compensation and purchases of goods and
services and suspended some Federal services.’’ As a result of this
reduced spending, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that
the shutdown reduced real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2018 and
the first quarter of 2019 to what it would have been otherwise by
$3 billion and $8 billion, respectively. CBO explained that real
GDP should have grown at a significantly faster rate if the shut-
down had been averted. Specifically, CBO quantified the effect of
the partial shutdown on the rate of annualized real GDP growth
at 0.4 percent in the first quarter of 2019, finding that quarterly
real GDP growth would have been 3.5 percent instead of the 3.1
percent that actually occurred.
E. Abuses of the Federal Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process,
October 24, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minor-
ity Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
and released in conjunction with the Subcommittee’s hearing
on October 24, 2019)
In October 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 33-page bipar-
tisan report examining that documents abuses of the Federal Gov-
ernment’s online regulatory comment systems and the govern-
ment’s lack of sufficient response to those abuses. A summary of
the findings of the report is found below.
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Federal agencies depend on relevant, substantive information
from a wide variety of parties to assist them in developing and up-
dating Federal regulations. This information includes comments
submitted by members of the public, businesses, non-profit organi-
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zations, and academics. This process, known as ‘‘notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking,’’ transitioned from paper to the internet in the
early 2000s. As a result, the public has more opportunity than ever
to engage in the Federal rulemaking process by reviewing elec-
tronic regulatory dockets and submitting comments through portals
like Regulations.gov and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s (‘‘FCC’’) Electronic Comment Filing System (‘‘ECFS’’).
Like many popular news and social media websites, the Federal
Government’s commenting systems have at times become fora for
profane, threatening, and abusive commentary. Recent high-profile
agency dockets have hosted profanity and threats directed at agen-
cy officials and comments submitted falsely under another person’s
identity. They have even been disrupted by commenters submitting
voluminous materials with the seeming intention of overloading the
system and disrupting the comment period. The Federal agencies
that host these platforms have not yet found ways to cope with
these abuses, which reduces the effectiveness of the notice-and-
comment process; costs taxpayer funds to mitigate; allows identity
theft-related crimes to go unaddressed; and leaves the rulemaking
process vulnerable to disruptive activity.
After the FCC received nearly 24 million comments in the course
of just one rulemaking proceeding in 2017 and its website crashed
due to the volume of comments submitted simultaneously, the Sub-
committee initiated a review of Federal commenting systems to un-
derstand their flaws and develop recommendations to improve
them.
In February 2021, the General Services Administration (GSA)
announced that it plans to adopt many of the recommendations
made in the report. For example, the staff report found that Fed-
eral agencies did not have a means to prevent people from using
false identities to post comments or using bots to facilitate abusive
mass comment campaigns to overwhelm comment systems or gen-
erate the appearance of a grassroots response to a proposed regula-
tion. The report recommended implementing CAPTCHA-like tech-
nologies on regulatory comment systems and developing ways to
prevent people from submitting comments under false identities.
GSA announced it is implementing reCAPTCHA and an Applica-
tion Programming Interface to increase security around large com-
ment campaigns.
F. Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China’s Talent Recruit-
ment Plans, November 18, 2019 (Report Prepared by the Ma-
jority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations and released in conjunction with the Sub-
committee’s hearing on November 19, 2019)
In November 2019, Subcommittee staff released a 105-page bi-
partisan report documenting how American taxpayers have been
unwittingly funding the rise of China’s economy and military over
the last two decades while Federal agencies have done little to stop
it. A summary of the report’s findings is found below.
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American taxpayers contribute over $150 billion each year to sci-
entific research in the United States. Through entities like the Na-
tional Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health and
the Department of Energy’s National Labs, taxpayers fund innova-
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99
tions that contribute to our national security and profoundly
change the way we live. America built this successful research en-
terprise on certain values: reciprocity, integrity, merit-based com-
petition, and transparency. These values foster a free exchange of
ideas, encourage the most rigorous research results to flourish, and
ensure that researchers receive the benefit of their intellectual cap-
ital. The open nature of research in America is manifest; we en-
courage our researchers and scientists to ‘‘stand on the shoulders
of giants.’’ In turn, America attracts the best and brightest. Foreign
researchers and scholars travel to the United States just to partici-
pate in the advancement of science and technology.
Some countries, however, seek to exploit America’s openness to
advance their own national interests. The most aggressive of them
has been China. China primarily does this through its more than
200 talent recruitment plans—the most prominent of which is the
Thousand Talents Plan. Launched in 2008, the Thousand Talents
Plan incentivizes individuals engaged in research and development
in the United States to transmit the knowledge and research they
gain here to China in exchange for salaries, research funding, lab
space, and other incentives. China unfairly uses the American re-
search and expertise it obtains for its own economic and military
gain. In recent years, Federal agencies have discovered talent re-
cruitment plan members who downloaded sensitive electronic re-
search files before leaving to return to China, submitted false infor-
mation when applying for grant funds, and willfully failed to dis-
close receiving money from the Chinese government on U.S. grant
applications.
This report exposed how American taxpayer funded research has
contributed to China’s global rise over the last 20 years. During
that time, China openly recruited U.S.-based researchers, sci-
entists, and experts in the public and private sector to provide
China with knowledge and intellectual capital in exchange for mon-
etary gain and other benefits. At the same time, the Federal Gov-
ernment’s grant-making agencies did little to prevent this from
happening, nor did the FBI and other Federal agencies develop a
coordinated response to mitigate the threat.These failures continue
to undermine the integrity of the American research enterprise and
endanger our national security.
China aims to be the world’s leader in science and technology
(‘‘S&T’’) by 2050. To achieve its S&T goals, China has implemented
a whole-of-government campaign to recruit talent and foreign ex-
perts from around the world. China’s campaign is well financed.
According to an analysis by the FBI, China has pledged to spend
15 percent of its gross domestic product on improving human re-
sources from 2008 to 2020. That amounts to an investment of more
than $2 trillion. For the Chinese government, international sci-
entific collaboration is not about advancing science, it is to advance
China’s national security interests.
China’s Talent Recruitment Plans. Foreign trained scientists and
experts provide China access to know-how, expertise, and foreign
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technology—all necessary for China’s economic development and
military modernization. While China has created and manages
more than 200 talent recruitment plans, this report focuses on the
Thousand Talents Plan. China designed the Thousand Talents Plan
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to recruit 2,000 high-quality overseas talents, including scientists,
engineers, entrepreneurs, and finance experts. The plan provides
salaries, research funding, lab space, and other incentives to lure
experts into researching for China. According to one report, by
2017, China dramatically exceeded its recruitment goal, having re-
cruited more than 7,000 ‘‘high-end professionals,’’ including several
Nobel laureates.
The Chinese Communist Party (the ‘‘Party’’) plays a lead role in
administering the Thousand Talents Plan. The Party recognized
the need to control overseas talent recruitment efforts to ensure
the program served its priorities. The Party created a ‘‘complex sys-
tem of administration and oversight to coordinate its recruitment
efforts.’’ The Party is able to ‘‘exert exceptional’’ levels of control
over the Thousand Talents Plan and other talent recruitment
plans. To ensure control, Thousand Talents Plan members sign le-
gally binding contracts.
Contracting with the Chinese Government. Thousand Talent Plan
members sign legally binding contracts with Chinese institutions,
like universities and research institutions. The contracts can
incentivize members to lie on grant applications to U.S. grant-mak-
ing agencies, set up ‘‘shadow labs’’ in China working on research
identical to their U.S. research, and, in some cases, transfer U.S.
scientists’ hard-earned intellectual capital. Some of the contracts
also contain nondisclosure provisions and require the Chinese gov-
ernment’s permission to terminate the agreement, giving the Chi-
nese government significant leverage over talent recruitment plan
members. These provisions are in stark contrast to the U.S. re-
search community’s basic norms, values, and principles. Annexed
to this report are Chinese talent recruitment plan contracts that il-
lustrate exactly what talent recruitment plan members agree to
when they become members.
Case Examples. This report included selected examples from U.S.
grantmaking agencies involving Chinese talent recruitment plan
members. For example, talent recruitment plan members removed
30,000 electronic files before leaving for China, submitted false in-
formation when applying for grant funds, filed a patent based on
U.S. government-funded research, and hired other Chinese talent
recruitment plan members to work on U.S. national security topics.
One Chinese talent recruitment plan member stole proprietary de-
fense information related toU.S. military jet engines, and others
have contractually agreed to give Chinese institutions intellectual
property rights that overlapped with research conducted at U.S. in-
stitutions. Case examples provided by several Federal agencies
were included with the report.
Talent Plans Go Underground. Following public testimony and
U.S. government scrutiny, the Chinese government started deleting
online references to the Thousand Talents Plan in October 2018.
For example, China deleted news articles featuring Thousand Tal-
ents Plan members, Chinese universities stopped promoting the
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program on their websites, and the official Thousand Talent Plan
site deleted the names of scientists participating in the program.
The Chinese government has also instructed talent recruitment or-
ganizations that ‘‘the phrase ‘Thousand Talents Plan’ should not
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101
appear in written circulars/notices.’’ Despite this censorship, Chi-
na’s talent recruitment plans continue.
The Subcommittee reviewed seven Federal agencies’ efforts to
mitigate the threat that Chinese talent recruitment plans pose to
the U.S. research enterprise, including U.S.-funded research. While
China has a strategic plan to acquire knowledge and intellectual
property from researchers, scientists, and the U.S. private sector,
the U.S. government does not have a comprehensive strategy to
combat this threat.
The National Science Foundation (‘‘NSF’’) funds approximately
27 percent of all federally funded basic research at U.S. colleges
and universities, leading to 12,000 annual awards to more than
40,000 recipients. In light of Chinese talent recruitment plan mem-
bers’ misappropriation of NSF funding, NSF has taken several
steps—albeit insufficient ones—to mitigate this risk. As of July
2019, NSF policy prohibits Federal employees from participating in
foreign talent recruitment plans, but the policy does not apply to
NSF-funded researchers. These NSF-funded researchers are the in-
dividuals mostly likely to be members of foreign talent recruitment
plans. The NSF also does not vet grantees before awarding them
funding. Instead, NSF relies on sponsoring institutions to vet and
conduct due diligence on potential grantees. NSF has no dedicated
staff to ensure compliance with NSF grant terms.
The National Institutes of Health (‘‘NIH’’) invests over $31 billion
annually in medical research through 50,000 competitive grants to
more than 300,000 researchers. NIH has recently found instances
of talent recruitment plan members committing grant fraud and
transferring intellectual capital and property. It also found possible
malign foreign influence in its peer review process. NIH has at-
tempted to address these issues, but significant gaps in NIH’s
grant integrity process remain. Much like the NSF, NIH relies on
institutions to solicit and review disclosures of financial conflicts by
its employees participating in NIH-funded research. Unlike the
NSF, the NIH has a Division of Grants Compliance and Oversight
that conducts site visits at institutions to advance compliance and
provide oversight. The number of oversight visits to institutions
has fallen from 28 in 2012 to only three last year. NIH officials re-
main concerned that China’s talent recruitment plans are more
pervasive than what they have uncovered to date.
The Department of Energy (‘‘Energy’’) is the largest Federal spon-
sor of basic research in the physical sciences. Energy awards $6.6
billion in grants and contracts annually that support over 25,000
researchers at over 300 institutions and National Labs. Energy’s
research funding and prominent role in advanced research and de-
velopment make it particularly attractive to the Chinese govern-
ment. Energy has recently identified Thousand Talent Plan mem-
bers working on sensitive research at National Labs and Thousand
Talent Plan members with security clearances. Energy has been
slow to address vulnerabilities surrounding the openness of its Na-
tional Labs and its scientific collaboration with the 35,000 foreign
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nationals who conduct research at the National Labs each year.
For example, in December 2018, Energy began requiring all foreign
nationals’ curricula vitae be included in Foreign Visits and Assign-
ments requests to Energy facilities as well as in the Foreign Access
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Central Tracking System database. Despite 30-year old Federal
regulations prohibiting U.S. government employees from receiving
foreign compensation, Energy clarified only this year that employ-
ees and contractors are prohibited from participating in foreign tal-
ent recruitment plans.
The State Department (‘‘State’’) issues nonimmigrant visas
(‘‘NIV’’) to foreign nationals seeking to visit the United States to
study, work, or conduct research. It is on the front line in the U.S.
government efforts to protect against intellectual property theft
and illicit technology transfers. While State has a process to review
NIV applicants attempting to violate export control laws, State’s
authority to deny visas is limited. State’s review process leads to
less than five percent of reviewed applicants being denied a visa.
Nor does State systematically track visa applicants linked to Chi-
na’s talent recruitment plans, even though some applicants linked
to Chinese talent recruitment plans have engaged in intellectual
property theft.
The Department of Commerce’s (‘‘Commerce’’) Bureau of Industry
and Security conducts assessments of defense-related technologies
and ‘‘administers export controls of dual-use items which have both
military and commercial applications.’’ Commerce is also respon-
sible for issuing deemed export licenses to firms that employ or
host foreign nationals seeking to work on controlled technology
projects. The Subcommittee found that Commerce rarely denies an
application for a deemed export license. Commerce’s denial rate in
2018 for deemed export licenses was only 1.1 percent. Commerce
officials told the Subcommittee that it has not revoked a deemed
export license in the past five years, despite the recent listing of
new entities on Commerce’s Entity List that require additional
scrutiny. Commerce issued deemed export licenses to Chinese na-
tionals who participated in talent recruitment plans, had ties to
Huawei, and were affiliated with other concerning entities.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘‘FBI’’) protects the United
States from foreign intelligence operations and espionage. The FBI,
however, has recognized that it was ‘‘was slow to recognize the
threat of the Chinese Talent Plans.’’ It was not until mid-2018,
however, that FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. took control
of the FBI’s response to the threat. Moreover, after collecting infor-
mation on suspected talent plan participants, the FBI waited near-
ly two years to coordinate and provide those details to Federal
grant-making agencies. This delay likely prevented the Federal
Government from identifying talent recruitment plan members who
engaged in illegal or unethical grant practices or the unauthorized
transfer of technology. The FBI has yet to develop an effective, na-
tionwide strategy to warn universities, government laboratories,
and the broader public of the risks of foreign talent recruitment
plans.
The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(‘‘OSTP’’) has formal authority to convene all research funding
agencies on matters of policy through the National Science and
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Technology Council. OSTP formally established a joint committee
in May 2019 to begin a policy review to coordinate efforts to adopt
best practices across the Federal Government to mitigate foreign
exploitation of the U.S. open innovation system. This review is in-
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tended to develop a longer-term strategy for balancing engagement
and risk without stifling innovation. The U.S. government’s vast
and varied array of grant-making agencies complicates this policy
review.
As American policy makers navigate an increasingly complicated
relationship with China, it is not in our national security interest
to fund China’s economic and military development with taxpayer
dollars. China’s talent recruitment plans, including the Thousand
Talents Plan, undermine the integrity of our research enterprise
and harm our economic and national security interests.
U.S. universities and U.S.-based researchers must take responsi-
bility in addressing this threat. If U.S. universities can vet employ-
ees for scientific rigor or allegations of plagiarism, they also can vet
for financial conflicts of interests and foreign sources of funding. If
U.S. researchers can assess potential collaborators’ research apti-
tude and their past publications, they should know their collabo-
rators’ affiliations and their research intentions.
The U.S. academic community is in the crosshairs of not only for-
eign competitors contending for the best and brightest, but also of
foreign nation states that seek to transfer valuable intellectual cap-
ital and steal intellectual property. As the academic community
looks to the Federal Government for guidance and direction on
mitigating threats, the U.S. government must provide effective,
useful, timely, and specific threat information and tools to counter
the threats. Based on this investigation, the Subcommittee finds
that the Federal Government has failed to stop China from acquir-
ing knowledge and intellectual property from U.S. taxpayer funded
researchers and scientists. Nor do Federal agencies have a com-
prehensive strategy to combat this threat.
Findings and recommendations associated with this staff report
led to the Safeguarding American Innovation Act.
G. Continuity of Senate Operations and Remote Voting in Times of
Crisis, April 29, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and
Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions released in conjunction with the Subcommittee’s round-
table on April 30, 2020)
In April 2020, as the country dealt with the COVID–19 pan-
demic, the Subcommittee released a 29-page joint memorandum ex-
amines the possibility of amending the Standing Rules of the Sen-
ate to allow senators to participate and vote remotely during a na-
tional crisis. A summary of the bipartisan memorandum is found
below.
The COVID–19 virus has shut down major sectors of our society,
including many functions of Congress. By rule and custom, the two
chambers of Congress have always met in person to conduct busi-
ness, including committee hearings, floor deliberation, and voting.
Neither chamber has contingency plans that allow those functions
to proceed remotely, but this crisis highlights the need to consider
means for Congress to do its job at times when it may not be safe
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for members and staff to gather in person.
Some experts have expressed concerns about Congress operating
remotely, particularly citing the importance of physically meeting
together to facilitate the deliberative process and ensure broad par-
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ticipation in negotiations. Those concerns are valid: face-to-face
communications and in-person meetings are the most effective way
for Congress to conduct its business on a regular basis. Remote
participation should never take the place of in-person participation
except in the most limited circumstances—crises, affecting the en-
tire country, that would otherwise hobble Congress’s ability to act
without this authority. The current nationwide pandemic requires
Congress to consider how best to continue its operations, commu-
nicate, and pass necessary legislation safely.
This memorandum provided: (1) a brief overview of congressional
continuity efforts to date; (2) a description of Senate proposals to
allow senators to participate and vote remotely; (3) a legal analysis
of remote congressional proceedings; (4) a discussion of other juris-
dictions that have implemented remote legislative procedures; and
(5) a discussion of the technological security specifications the Sen-
ate should consider if it adopts a remote participation and voting
system.
H. Threats to U.S. Networks: Oversight of Chinese Government-
Owned Carriers, June 9, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Major-
ity and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations)
In June 2020, Subcommittee staff released a 104-page bipartisan
report detailing how the Federal Government provided little-to-no
oversight of Chinese state-owned telecommunications carriers oper-
ating in the United States for nearly twenty years. As dem-
onstrated in prior PSI investigations, China routinely exploits the
American education and scientific research sectors to further its
national interest and engages in cyber-attacks against U.S. compa-
nies, like Equifax and Marriott. This report revealed how the tele-
communications industry has been similarly targeted. A summary
of the report’s findings is found below.
Information and telecommunications technologies bring the world
closer together, allowing individuals and businesses nearly every-
where in the world to communicate with each other. The expansion
of global telecommunications networks, in particular, acts as a
driving force of economic development by affording individuals un-
precedented access to information and opportunities. Under-
standing the increasing interconnectedness of society, the Federal
Communications Commission (‘‘FCC’’)—the Federal agency tasked
with regulating the U.S. telecommunications industry—strives to
open U.S. markets to foreign telecommunications carriers, where
doing so is in the country’s public interest. As a result, foreign-
owned carriers have established operations within the United
States.
Not all international expansion of telecommunications carriers,
however, is in the United States’ national security interests. Some
foreign governments seek to exploit the openness of America’s tele-
communications market to advance their own national interests.
One such country is China. The Chinese government views tele-
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communications as a ‘‘strategic’’ industry. It has expended signifi-
cant resources to create and promote new business opportunities
for its state-owned carriers and has established barriers to market
entry for foreign carriers seeking to operate in China. Today, three
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105
state-owned carriers dominate the Chinese telecommunications
market: China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom, com-
monly referred to as the ‘Big Three.’’ In addition to shoring up a
stable domestic market for these carriers, the Chinese government
has encouraged its carriers to expand into global markets, includ-
ing the United States. This expansion, however, raises national se-
curity concerns. U.S. government officials have warned that Chi-
nese state-owned carriers are ‘‘subject to exploitation, influence,
and control by the Chinese government’’ and can be used in the
Chinese government’s cyber and economic espionage efforts tar-
geted at the United States.
The operation of Chinese state-owned telecommunications car-
riers in the United States garnered public attention in May 2019
after the FCC denied China Mobile International (USA) Inc.
(‘‘China Mobile USA’’) the authority to provide international tele-
communications services between the United States and foreign lo-
cations. The FCC premised its denial on national security concerns.
This marked the first instance in which the FCC denied an applica-
tion on national security grounds. Following that denial, the Sub-
committee launched an investigation into how the U.S. Federal
Government guards against risks posed by Chinese state-owned
carriers already authorized to provide international telecommuni-
cations services between the United States and other points.
This report detailed how the U.S. Federal Government—particu-
larly the FCC, Department of Justice (‘‘DOJ’’), and Department of
Homeland Security (‘‘DHS’’)—historically exercised minimal over-
sight to safeguard U.S. telecommunications networks against risks
posed by Chinese state-owned carriers. Three Chinese state-owned
carriers have been operating in the United States since the early
2000s, but only in recent years have the FCC, DOJ, and DHS fo-
cused on potential risks associated with these carriers. DOJ and
DHS did enter into security agreements with two of the Chinese
state-owned carriers prior to 2010, but they conducted only two site
visits to each carrier since that time (or four total). Three of those
visits occurred between 2017 and 2018. This lack of oversight un-
dermined the safety of American communications and endangered
our national security.
Since the Subcommittee launched its investigation, the agencies
have increased their oversight of the Chinese state-owned carriers.
The administration also issued an executive order establishing a
formal committee to review the national security and law enforce-
ment risks posed by foreign carriers operating in the United States.
Still, the new committee’s authorities remain limited, and as a re-
sult, our country, our privacy, and our information remain at risk.
The Chinese government exerts control over China’s domestic tele-
communications industry and state-owned carriers. China aims to
be a world leader in technology by 2050, including in the tele-
communications sector. To achieve this goal, China controls who
can provide domestic services by maintaining one of the most re-
strictive foreign investment regimes in the world. Although the
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Chinese government may publicly state that it is opening the tele-
communications market, foreign companies are subject to burden-
some regulatory requirements; required to enter into joint ventures
majority owned by Chinese parties; and often forced to transfer
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both technology and know-how to Chinese counterparts. State-
owned carriers are equally controlled, as the Chinese government
selects their management, sets target returns and growth rates,
and compels companies to put state interests ahead of the carriers’
market interests.
The Chinese government has encouraged state-owned tele-
communications carriers to expand internationally. In 1999, the
Chinese government issued a ‘‘Go Out’’ policy, through which it
pledged financial support to entities to expand into global markets.
Telecommunications carriers took advantage of this, with major
state-owned carriers establishing operations across the world, in-
cluding in the United States.
The Chinese government targets the United States through cyber
and economic espionage activities and enlists state-owned entities in
these efforts. Many U.S. government officials have highlighted the
‘‘persistent’’ threat posed by China. As Assistant Attorney General
of DOJ’s National Security Division John Demers stated, China’s
‘‘overall economic policy [is to] develop[ ] China at American ex-
pense.’’ U.S. government officials have also warned that China will
use its state-owned carriers to further its national interests. At
least one Chinese carrier is publicly alleged to have hijacked and
rerouted communications data through China. This allows Chinese
actors to access sensitive communications, regardless of whether
the data is encrypted.
The Subcommittee reviewed the Federal agencies responsible for
regulating and monitoring foreign telecommunications carriers op-
erating in the United States. Although foreign carriers have oper-
ated in the United States for decades, the U.S. government had no
statutory authorities to monitor the risks associated with these car-
riers. This is especially evident when reviewing the agencies’ over-
sight of Chinese state-owned carriers.
The FCC regulates the U.S. telecommunications market. Carriers
seeking to provide international telecommunications services be-
tween the United States and foreign points must apply for and ob-
tain authorization from the FCC. The FCC’s process is aimed at
protecting the U.S. market from anti-competitive behavior in for-
eign markets. Thus, in evaluating applications, the FCC considers
whether the foreign carrier’s proposed services are in the public in-
terest. Once authorization is granted, the Subcommittee found that
it effectively exists in perpetuity; the FCC does not periodically re-
view existing authorizations.
The FCC historically relied on ‘‘Team Telecom’’ to assess national
security and law enforcement risks associated with a foreign car-
rier’s provision of international telecommunications services. The
FCC’s public interest calculation involves weighing the national se-
curity, law enforcement, trade, and foreign policy implications asso-
ciated with a foreign carrier’s proposed services. The FCC has rec-
ognized, however, that it lacks the subject-matter expertise to
evaluate these topics, and thus, it relies on certain Executive
Branch agencies for guidance. For years, three agencies—DOJ,
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DHS, and the Department of Defense (‘‘DOD’’), which until recently
were collectively referred to as ‘‘Team Telecom’’—were tasked with
evaluating national security and law enforcement concerns. Where
Team Telecom believed that risks may exist, it attempted to miti-
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107
gate those risks through a security agreement with the foreign car-
rier. These agreements provided Team Telecom with oversight ca-
pabilities, including the right to visit the carrier’s U.S.-based facili-
ties. If Team Telecom opted not to enter into a security agreement
with a foreign carrier, it had no insight into the carrier’s oper-
ations.
These measures were ineffective as Team Telecom lacked formal
statutory authority, leaving its operations unstructured and ad hoc.
Because of the lack of statutory authority, Team Telecom had no
formal, written processes for reviewing applications or monitoring
compliance with security agreements. The informality also resulted
in protracted review periods and a process FCC commissioners de-
scribed as ‘‘broken’’ and an ‘‘inextricable black hole’’ that provided
‘‘no clarity for [the] future.’’ For example, Team Telecom’s review
of China Mobile USA’s application lasted seven years. Further, the
agencies did not dedicate sufficient resources to ensure Team
Telecom conducted oversight in an efficient and effective manner.
The components of DHS and DOJ responsible for Team Telecom to-
gether historically tasked three employees with reviewing applica-
tions and monitoring compliance with security agreements.
In April 2020, as the Subcommittee was nearing the end of its
investigation, the President issued Executive Order 13913, replac-
ing the informal Team Telecom with the Committee for the Assess-
ment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommuni-
cations Services (‘‘EO Telecom Committee’’). The Executive Order
seeks to address many of the shortcomings identified by the Sub-
committee’s investigation. The Executive Order requires members
of the EO Telecom Committee to enter into a memorandum of un-
derstanding by July 3, 2020. Therefore, this report continues to
refer to Team Telecom, even in relation to actions taken after April
4, 2020.
Beginning in 2018, Team Telecom and the FCC publicly high-
lighted the national security concerns associated with Chinese state-
owned carriers operating in the United States. China Mobile USA’s
application marked the first instance in which Team Telecom rec-
ommended that the FCC deny a foreign carrier authorization to
provide international telecommunications services on national secu-
rity grounds. In its denial, the FCC relied on Team Telecom’s con-
clusion that China Mobile USA is ‘‘subject to exploitation, influ-
ence, and control by the Chinese government.’’ Such government
control, Team Telecom warned, could advance the Chinese govern-
ment’s cyber and economic espionage activities targeted at the
United States. Team Telecom specifically cautioned that China Mo-
bile USA would build relationships with major U.S. carriers,
through which it could gain access to U.S. networks and the sen-
sitive public and private data transferred across those networks.
At least three other Chinese state-owned carriers have been oper-
ating in the United States for decades. The U.S. subsidiaries of the
two other Big Three carriers—China Telecom and China Unicom—
along with a smaller state-affiliated provider ComNet (USA) LLC
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(‘‘ComNet’’) each received authorization to provide international
telecommunications services in or prior to 2002 and have been op-
erating ever since. During this time, these Chinese carriers have
built relationships with major U.S. carriers and established points
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108
of presence across the United States. Further, China Telecom’s
U.S. subsidiary, China Telecom Americas, provides services to Chi-
nese government facilities in the United States.
Until recently, Team Telecom conducted limited oversight of these
Chinese state-owned carriers. Team Telecom entered into security
agreements with China Telecom Americas (2007) and ComNet
(2009), but it exercised minimal oversight over those entities until
recently. During the more-than-ten year period in which these se-
curity agreements have been in effect, Team Telecom conducted
just two site visits to each company—or four in total, three of
which occurred within the past three years. At no point did Team
Telecom enter into a security agreement with China Unicom Amer-
icas, meaning Team Telecom has no oversight authority to assess
the company’s operations in the United States.
The national security concerns Team Telecom and the FCC out-
lined in relation to China Mobile USA are applicable to the Chinese
state-owned carriers currently operating in the United States. In ad-
vocating that the FCC deny China Mobile USA’s application, Team
Telecom raised a number of national security concerns related to
China Mobile USA’s Chinese government ownership. As Team
Telecom officials acknowledged to the Subcommittee, those con-
cerns also apply to China Telecom Americas, China Unicom Amer-
icas, and ComNet. The carriers are ultimately owned by the Chi-
nese government; are required to comply with Chinese national se-
curity laws to support the Chinese government’s intelligence work;
and have established relationships with U.S. carriers, giving them
access to critical infrastructure that the Chinese government could
exploit in its economic and cyber espionage efforts. Team Telecom
recognized these issues in its recent recommendation that the FCC
to revoke China Telecom Americas’ authorizations. The FCC also
indicated its awareness of these concerns, when it recently called
for all the carriers to demonstrate why their authorizations should
not be revoked.
It must be noted that state-ownership does not presume a na-
tional security risk. Indeed, many foreign telecommunications com-
panies around the world are state-owned. There are also compel-
ling commercial interests dependent on facilitating the flow of data
between the United States and China, which are among each oth-
er’s top trading partners. The vast global telecommunications and
technology infrastructure that facilitates commerce and economic
development include undersea, terrestrial, wireless, and space-
based networks jointly owned or operated by Chinese and Western
companies.
Commercial interests, however, must be balanced against na-
tional security interests. Striking an appropriate balance between
these interests requires the Executive Branch to exercise greater
oversight and regularly evaluate the risks posed by foreign-owned
companies, especially considering that national security concerns
evolve over time. Currently, Chinese state-owned carriers are pro-
TKELLEY on DSKBCP9HB2PROD with SENATE REPORTS
viding international telecommunications services based on FCC au-
thorizations granted more than a decade ago, in some cases nearly
two decades. The carriers have provided services during this time,
with minimal oversight from Team Telecom.
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Following several Subcommittee briefings with the Department
of Justice, on April 4, 2020, the administration released Executive
Order 13913, ‘‘Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of
Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications
Services Sector.’’ The Department of Justice summarized the Exec-
utive Order in the following way:
This Executive Order formalizes and improves the inter-
agency committee, formerly known as Team Telecom, that advises
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on national secu-
rity and law enforcement concerns associated with applications for
telecommunications licenses meeting certain thresholds of foreign
ownership or control. The Executive Order creates a formal process
to review applications referred by the FCC to the Committee that
raise the concerns mentioned above within an established time-
frame. In addition, the Executive Order allows the Committee to
assess whether new national security or law enforcement concerns
exist with respect to existing FCC licenses previously reviewed by
interested Executive Branch agencies.
I. IRS Oversight of the Free File Program (Staff Memorandum by
the Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations)
In June 2020, Subcommittee staff released a bipartisan memo-
randum that found there has been little IRS oversight of the Free
File program, which provides free online tax preparation and filing
services to U.S. taxpayers. As a result, American taxpayers, who
are eligible for free tax filing through the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), may not be aware of the program or taking advantage of it.
This could result in eligible taxpayers paying fees to file their
taxes.
Over the course of a year-long investigation, the Subcommittee
examined the history of the IRS Free File program, the coordina-
tion between the Free File Alliance (FFA) and its membership of
tax preparation software companies, oversight of the Free File pro-
gram by IRS, and reporting in 2019 that certain FFA members
used coding to hide their Free File websites from online search en-
gines. The key findings of the memorandum included:
• Until recently, the IRS conducted little oversight of the Free
File program.
• Three different independent entities have reviewed the Free
File program since 2018 and provided recommendations for
improvement, but the program continues to struggle to serve
eligible taxpayers.
• For the first 15 years of the Free File program, the IRS de-
clined to take a position on whether FFA companies should
index Free File websites to appear in online search engines,
nor did FFA companies seek guidance from the IRS on
whether their indexing practices complied with the MOU. As
a result, participating FFA companies took different ap-
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proaches in deciding whether to code their Free File program
websites to appear in organic search engine results, or to
have users access the Free File program only through the
IRS website. Five companies (H&R Block, Intuit, TaxHawk,
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Drake, and TaxSlayer) coded their Free File websites in a
way that prevented a search engine from including the
websites in organic search results (or ‘‘non-indexed’’). In
doing so, all five companies believed they were complying
with the MOU that governs the Free File program. The IRS
and FFA companies executed an addendum to the MOU in
December 2019 that clarified Free File websites should be
indexed.
• Three companies (TaxHawk, Drake, and TaxSlayer) non-in-
dexed their Free File websites from the start of their partici-
pation in the Free File program. H&R Block non-indexed its
Free File website in 2018 in response to a technical issue
after determining the MOU did not require the website be
indexed. In 2018, Intuit changed the name of its Free File
program in an attempt to avoid consumer confusion and non-
indexed the landing page of its renamed Free File offering.
• According to an analysis performed by MITRE, approxi-
mately 85 percent of the visits made to FFA member web
sites and IRS.gov from Google, the most popular online
search engine, were made through links included in adver-
tisements placed by FFA members to promote commercial
products that may charge fees. Only a fraction of total vis-
its—approximately 56,000 out of 12 million—went directly
from Google to the website for an FFA member’s Free File
product.
• A lack of investment in marketing by the IRS likely led to
a lack of consumer awareness that hampered participation in
the Free File program.
J. The Art Industry and U.S. Policies that Undermine Sanctions,
July 29, 2020 (Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority
Staffs of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations)
In July 2020, Subcommittee staff released a 150-page bipartisan
report regarding how Russian oligarchs have used the secrecy of
the art industry to evade U.S. sanctions. Following a two-year in-
vestigation, which included the major auction houses, private New
York art dealers, and seven financial institutions, the report
showed how a lack of regulation allows the art industry to avoid
the same anti-money laundering requirements that apply to finan-
cial institutions. The Subcommittee found that the art industry’s
secretive nature allowed art intermediaries to purchase more than
$18 million in high-value art in the United States through shell
companies linked to Russian oligarchs after they were sanctioned
by the United States in March 2014. The Subcommittee also found
the shell companies linked to the Russian oligarchs were not lim-
ited to just art and engaged in a total of $91 million in post-sanc-
tions transactions. A summary of the report’s findings is found
below.
The United States government imposes economic sanctions on
foreign adversaries in attempt to change their behavior. In theory,
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sanctions are simple. U.S. persons and companies are prohibited
from doing business with sanctioned persons and entities. This pro-
hibition should bar access to the world’s largest economy. The
United States imposes sanctions for a wide range of reasons. For
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example, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia for
election interference, human rights abuses, providing support to
Venezuela and Syria, but mainly in response to Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine.
This report focused, in particular, on a case study documenting
how certain Russian oligarchs appear to have used transactions in-
volving high-value art to evade sanctions imposed on them by the
United States on March 20, 2014 in response to Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Specifically, the Sub-
committee traced purchases of high-value art back to anonymous
shell companies linked to sanctioned individuals Arkady and Boris
Rotenberg, two Russian oligarchs, and Arkady’s son, Igor. It ap-
pears the Rotenbergs continued actively participating in the U.S.
art market by purchasing over $18 million in art in the months fol-
lowing the imposition of sanctions on March 20, 2014. Shell compa-
nies linked to the Rotenbergs also transferred over $120 million to
Russia during a four-day window between President Obama’s
March 16, 2014 executive order stating that the U.S. would be
sanctioning certain Russian individuals and the Treasury Depart-
ment specifically naming the Rotenbergs as sanctioned on March
20, 2014. In addition, certain Rotenberg-linked shell companies
continued transacting in the U.S. financial system long after
Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were sanctioned. The Subcommittee
determined these Rotenberg-linked shell companies engaged in
over $91 million in transactions post-sanctions.
While Russia-related sanctions, including those against the
Rotenbergs, were set to expire in March 2020, President Trump ex-
tended them for another year. The effectiveness of these sanctions,
however, is in question. To date, Russia has not withdrawn from
Crimea and has even expanded its military operations in sur-
rounding waters. The Subcommittee sought to understand why the
sanctions have not been more effective and, after reviewing a num-
ber of suspect transactions, launched a narrow investigation into
high-value art. If wealthy Russian oligarchs can purchase millions
in art for personal investment or enjoyment while under sanction,
it follows that their businesses or hidden resources could also con-
tinue accessing the U.S. financial system.
The Subcommittee’s investigation uncovered a complex set of
facts involving shell companies with hidden owners, intermediaries
who mask purchasers and sellers, and lax money laundering safe-
guards in the U.S. art industry.
The art industry is largely unregulated. The art industry is con-
sidered the largest, legal unregulated industry in the United
States. Unlike financial institutions, the art industry is not subject
to Bank Secrecy Act’s (‘‘BSA’’) requirements, which mandate de-
tailed procedures to prevent money laundering and to verify a cus-
tomer’s identity. While the BSA does not apply to art transactions
by art dealers and auction houses, sanctions do. No U.S. person or
entity is allowed to do business with a sanctioned individual or en-
tity.
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The art industry has been enjoying a boom. According to the 2019
Art Basel and UBS Global Art Market Report, world-wide art sales
hit $64.1 billion in 2019. That report found the United States was
the world’s largest art market comprising 44 percent of global
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sales, or around $28.3 billion. The art industry is generally divided
into sales at public auctions and by private dealers. In 2019, sales
at auction houses made up 42 percent of total art sales, while the
remaining 58 percent of sales were through private dealers. The
four biggest auction houses—Sotheby’s, Christie’s, Phillips, and
Bonhams—are selling art for sizeable amounts. In November 2017,
Leonardo da Vinci’s Salvator Mundi sold at auction at Christie’s in
New York for over $450 million. In May 2019, Christie’s New York
sold Jeff Koon’s Rabbit for over $91 million, the highest price ever
paid for a piece by a living artist. Even during the COVID–19 pan-
demic, an online auction at Sotheby’s brought in $234.9 million in
total sales, including $84.55 million for Triptych Inspired by the
Oresteia of Aeschylus by Francis Bacon. In turn, the auction houses
report large annual sale numbers. Sotheby’s reported $4.8 billion in
sales for 2019, while Christie’s reported $2.8 billion in sales for just
the first six months of 2019.
Investors have taken notice. Deloitte’s 2019 Art and Finance Re-
port noted that ‘‘artnet’s Index for Top 100 Artists produced an 8
percent Compound Annual Growth Rate between 2000 and 2018,
compared with 3 percent for the S&P 500.’’ For example, Banksy’s
Devolved Parliament sold at Sotheby’s in London on October 3,
2019 for around $12.2 million; the artist’s previous record for a
painting sold at auction was $1.87 million for Keep It Spotless in
2008.
Secrecy is pervasive in the art industry. While the art market is
not regulated by the BSA, it is governed by unwritten rules. A
large number of art sales happen through intermediaries referred
to as ‘‘art advisors’’ who can represent both purchasers and sellers.
In a typical transaction, a purchaser may not ask who owns the
piece of art they are purchasing; the seller may not ask for whom
it is being purchased or the origin of the money. And in general
an art advisor would be reluctant to reveal the identity of their cli-
ent for fear of being cut out of the deal and losing the business.
Auction houses have voluntary AML polices. Because the art in-
dustry is not subject to BSA requirements, when a piece of art is
sold, there is no legal requirement for the selling party to confirm
the identity of the buyer or that the buyer is not laundering money
through the purchase. While the four biggest auction houses have
voluntary anti-money laundering (‘‘AML’’) programs, the employees
who facilitated art purchases in the Subcommittee’s case study said
they never asked the art advisor the identity of his client. Instead,
the auction houses considered the art advisor the principal pur-
chaser and performed any due diligence on the art advisor, even
when it was well-known that the ultimate owner was someone else.
With regard to the funds used to purchase art, the auction houses
told the Subcommittee they rely on financial institutions to ensure
the integrity of the funds, even though the auction houses interact
directly with the buyer. But these voluntary AML policies are just
for sales through the auction houses. As stated above, the majority
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of art sales are private transactions. A private dealer interviewed
by the Subcommittee stated she had no written AML policies, tries
to work with people she knows and trusts, looks for red flags, and
relies on her gut. She also explained that her practices have signifi-
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113
cantly changed over the years and that she also relies on advice
from AML lawyers.
Tracing the ownership of anonymous shell companies, including
those involved in high-value art transactions, is difficult. That dif-
ficulty continues even though corporate secrecy suffered a blow in
the spring of 2016 when the International Consortium of Investiga-
tive Journalists (‘‘ICIJ’’) shocked the world by releasing information
on 214,488 offshore entities from the Panamanian law firm
Mossack Fonseca (the ‘‘Panama Papers’’). One email chain included
among the Panama Papers and made public described links be-
tween nine offshore companies to the Rotenbergs. The email chain
listed Boris Rotenberg as the ultimate beneficial owner (‘‘UBO’’) of
Highland Ventures Group Limited (‘‘Highland Ventures’’) and
Arkady Rotenberg’s son Igor as the UBO of Highland Business
Group Limited (‘‘Highland Business’’). The email copied London-
based attorney Mark Omelnitski, who used his firm the Markom
Group to establish and maintain shell companies for the Rotenberg
family.
The true ownership of the listed shell companies was not, how-
ever, as straightforward as the Panama Papers email chain sug-
gested. For example, based on financial information reviewed by
the Subcommittee during its investigation, Arkady Rotenberg ap-
peared to be the UBO of Highland Ventures, not his brother Boris.
That information included non-public wire transfers showing multi-
million dollar transfers from a company owned by Arkady
Rotenberg to Highland Ventures. In 2012 and 2013, that com-
pany—Milasi Engineering—transferred over $124 million marked
as annual dividends to Highland Ventures. The December 31, 2014
Financial Report for Milasi Engineering listed Arkady Rotenberg
as its UBO, making it clear that Highland Ventures received its
funding from a company owned by an individual the U.S. would
later sanction. Milasi Engineering also held shares in
Stroygazmontazh, a gas pipeline company sanctioned in April 2014
by the United States due to its ownership by Arkady Rotenberg.
Arkady Rotenberg transferred his business interests to his son,
Igor. In July 2014, four months after the United States sanctioned
Arkady, Mr. Omelnitski’s firm, the Markom Group, executed paper-
work that appeared to transfer Arkady’s interest in Milasi Engi-
neering to his son, Igor, who was not sanctioned at the time. Milasi
Engineering was owned by two other holding companies. The
Markom Group transferred the ownership of those two companies
to Highland Ventures, which it asserted had always been owned by
Igor. Therefore, from July 2014 to April 2018, when Igor was fi-
nally sanctioned by the United States, Milasi Engineering was
owned on paper by an unsanctioned individual. A report by a bank
investigator produced to the Subcommittee determined the transfer
of Milasi Engineering from Arkady to Igor was done solely to evade
sanctions, and the Markom Group ‘‘intentionally structured [the
ownership of these shell companies] to be opaque in order to hide
the identities of true beneficiaries.’’ In response, the bank closed all
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accounts associated with the Markom Group. This included closing
accounts held by art advisor Gregory Baltser.
Art advisor Gregory Baltser facilitated purchases for the
Rotenbergs. Intermediaries played a central role in the Rotenbergs’
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art purchases in the United States. As previously explained, Mr.
Omelnitski and his company, the Markom Group, established and
maintained shell companies for the Rotenbergs to mask their iden-
tities. The Rotenbergs also employed art advisor Gregory Baltser,
who facilitated the purchase and sale of high-value art both before
and after sanctions without disclosing the names of his clients.
Mr. Baltser is a U.S. citizen, who must comply with U.S. sanc-
tions laws, but his business is based in Moscow. Prior to sanctions,
funds Mr. Baltser used to purchase art linked to the Rotenbergs
followed a unique and recognizable financial path: Mr. Baltser bid
on specific artworks at auction, purchased the art, and then as-
signed the title to the art to a Belize company named Steamort
Limited (‘‘Steamort’’). Steamort paid for the art using funds the
Subcommittee traced back to Highland Business.
Mr. Baltser, however, was not the owner of Steamort; he had a
contract with Steamort to serve as a consultant to purchase art on
behalf of the company. A copy of that contract was produced to the
Subcommittee by Christie’s. Both the contract and financial records
showed that Steamort paid Mr. Baltser $9,500 a month for his
services. In total, between March 2010 and October 2018, financial
records show Mr. Baltser received $1,116,000 in fees for his con-
sulting services under the Steamort Agreement.
Company documents obtained by the Subcommittee listed
Steamort’s only director and shareholder as Jason Hughes. Accord-
ing to a report by ICIJ, Mr. Hughes was associated with over 200
other companies as a nominee director—an individual who masks
the true UBO of a shell company.
The owner of Steamort remains unknown. In 2012, Christie’s
questioned Mr. Baltser about who owned Steamort, and asserted
that Mr. Baltser could no longer bid at auctions until he provided
Steamort’s UBO. Initially, Mr. Baltser responded that he did not
know who owned Steamort. When pressed and threatened with
missing the opportunity to bid at an upcoming auction, Mr. Baltser
verbally told Christie’s that Steamort was owned by ‘‘Luisa Brown.’’
Christie’s accepted this verbal assertion, conducted AML checks on
Ms. Brown, found no derogatory information, and cleared Mr.
Baltser to continue bidding at auctions. Mr. Baltser never provided
any documentary evidence of Steamort’s ownership by Ms. Brown.
The Subcommittee was unable to confirm if an individual named
Luisa Brown was the UBO for Steamort, or if she even existed at
all.
Mr. Baltser opened an auction agency and club in Moscow. In
late 2012, Mr. Baltser announced he was planning to open
BALTZER Auction Agency and Club. The agency would be located
in Moscow and its members would be ‘‘the leading Moscow and
Russian collectors—the active participants of auction biddings at
many world marketplaces.’’ Mr. Baltser proposed to partner with
both Christie’s and Sotheby’s. As part of the proposed agreement,
Mr. Baltser stated that he would bid at auctions on behalf of his
clients under an account in the name of BALTZER. This allowed
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Mr. Baltser to guarantee on his website that ‘‘we can give you com-
plete anonymity.’’ Under the proposed agreement, Mr. Baltser
pledged to conduct all AML and sanctions checks on his clients and
provide an annual certification to the auction houses that no mem-
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115
ber of BALTZER was engaged in money laundering. Mr.
Omelnitski served as BALTZER’s chief AML officer and rep-
resented Mr. Baltser in contract negotiations with the two auction
houses. To be clear, Mr. Baltser put the same attorney who estab-
lished and maintained shell companies to mask the Rotenbergs’
ownership in charge of his new venture’s AML compliance.
Christie’s partnered with BALTZER. Christie’s accepted Mr.
Baltser’s proposal and signed the agreement with BALTZER on
February 4, 2014. At the end of 2014, Mr. Omelnitski certified to
Christie’s that ‘‘despite BALTZER having a significant number of
Russian clients there were no transactions, which fall under recent
sanctions against Russia.’’ Mr. Omelnitski failed to provide another
such certification for the next three years, despite repeated re-
quests from Christie’s to provide the annual certificate promised in
the agreement. In 2018, Christie’s renegotiated its agreement with
BALTZER to require client due diligence documents after each pur-
chase.
A Sotheby’s employee identified Arkady and Boris Rotenberg as
Mr. Baltser’s clients. Sotheby’s also considered Mr. Baltser’s busi-
ness proposal, but ultimately declined. During negotiations, a
Sotheby’s employee represented to Sotheby’s management that Mr.
Baltser had told her that his clients included Russian oligarchs. In
fact, she told Sotheby’s management that Mr. Baltser had identi-
fied Arkady and Boris Rotenberg as two of his clients (five months
prior to U.S. sanctions). During her Subcommittee interview, how-
ever, the same Sotheby’s employee said Mr. Baltser had never told
her that Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were his clients. Instead, she
asserted she fabricated this information in an effort to convince
Sotheby’s to accept BALTZER’s proposal. Despite declining the pro-
posal, Sotheby’s continued to conduct business as usual with Mr.
Baltser and his new company, BALTZER, and never questioned
whether Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were his clients. The Sub-
committee independently traced post-sanction purchases by
BALTZER to shell companies linked to the Rotenbergs, suggesting
theSotheby’s employee was not truthful in her Subcommittee inter-
view.
Mr. Baltser continued to purchase art with funds linked to the
Rotenbergs even after March 2014 sanctions. Following the imposi-
tion of sanctions by the United States on Arkady and Boris
Rotenberg in March 2014, the funds Mr. Baltser used to purchase
works of art at auction houses continued to follow the same general
financial path as before sanctions. By this time, BALTZER pro-
vided another layer of anonymity for the funds used to purchase
art. After Mr. Baltser successfully bid at auction, funds were wired
from Highland Ventures to Steamort, just as they had arrived from
Highland Business before sanctions. Steamort then wired funds to
BALTZER, which paid the auction house and took title of the pur-
chase. All four auction houses considered Mr. Baltser the principal
purchaser, rather than an agent for a buyer, and never asked for
whom he was purchasing the art. Any client due diligence was per-
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formed only on Mr. Baltser and not his undisclosed clients, satis-
fying the voluntary AML policies at the auction houses.
Highland Ventures purchased a painting through a private art
dealer. The funds used to purchase René Magritte’s La Poitrine for
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116
$7.5 million in May 2014 through a private art dealer followed a
different path. In this transaction, Highland Ventures took title to
the painting and was listed on the invoice as the buyer. Anna
Wilkes, an employee of Mr. Omelnitski’s Markom Group, signed on
behalf of Highland Ventures as its Director. The funds used to pay
for the painting were wired to the private dealer from a company
named Advantage Alliance. The Subcommittee traced those funds
to a company called Senton Holdings. An investigation by a finan-
cial institution—produced to the Subcommittee—determined
Senton Holdings was owned by Arkady Rotenberg, linking him
through the chain of wire transfers to the purchase of the painting.
Art was shipped to Germany for storage. La Poitrine, like much
of the art traced to companies linked to the Rotenbergs, was
shipped to a storage facility in Germany called Hasenkamp. The
Subcommittee contacted Hasenkamp and was told the art was
originally stored there under the name Highland Business; no indi-
vidual was named. Later, a company named Taide Connoisseur Se-
lection took over the contract to store the art at Hasenkamp. The
only individual named on Taide Connoisseur Selection’s website
was Mr. Omelnitski.
In August 2019, during the course of the Subcommittee’s inves-
tigation, the Taide Connoisseur Selection account at Hasenkamp
was closed and all art stored under the account was shipped to
Moscow.
Art purchases linked to the Rotenberg shell companies totaled
millions of dollars. In total, the Subcommittee traced funds for over
$18 million in art purchased in the United States from March 2014
to November 2014, both at auction houses and through private
sales back to shell companies that appeared to be funded or owned
by the Rotenbergs.
Sotheby’s agreed to sell Brucke II for Mr. Baltser during the Sub-
committee’s investigation. Mr. Baltser also sold paintings owned by
his clients. In late 2018, he attempted to sell Lyonel Feininger’s
Brucke II. Brucke II was originally purchased through Mr. Baltser
on February 4, 2014 at an auction at Christie’s in London. The
painting later appeared on a list of 31 paintings sent to Christie’s
by a BALTZER employee, who stated that the list represented the
collection of one of Mr. Baltser’s clients. The Subcommittee traced
16 paintings on the list purchased in the United States back to sus-
pected Rotenberg shell companies. This suggests that all 31 paint-
ings were owned by the Rotenbergs.
When Mr. Baltser attempted to sell Brucke II in late 2018, both
Christie’s and Sotheby’s expressed interest in having the painting
at their auctions. Ultimately, Mr. Baltser’s client chose Sotheby’s
to sell Brucke II at auction in February 2019. At the time, the Sub-
committee was actively investigating the auction house and Mr.
Baltser. Sotheby’s requested Mr. Baltser provide the name of the
UBO of the painting, including whether that individual was cur-
rently sanctioned. Mr. Baltser said Brucke II had been resold since
it was purchased at Christie’s in February 2014 and now belonged
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to a company incorporated in the Marshall Islands and provided a
Russian passport for the company’s UBO. The Subcommittee asked
Sotheby’s to request the name of the February 2014 purchaser of
the painting; Mr. Baltser declined to disclose the name of that pur-
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117
chaser due to a non-disclosure agreement. Sotheby’s ultimately
pulled the painting from the 2019 auction due to a lack of interest.
The Subcommittee asked to interview Mr. Baltser, but through
his attorney, he declined the request and stated he was in Moscow
and had no plans to return to the United States. Through his attor-
ney, Mr. Baltser stated that: he has never represented or trans-
acted with Arkady or Boris Rotenberg; Highland Business and
Highland Ventures were not listed as sanctioned by the Treasury
Department; and he did not have access to the Panama Papers.
A delay between the 2014 announcement and imposition of sanc-
tions created a window to send U.S. dollars to Russia. On March
16, 2014, President Obama signed an executive order authorizing
the Treasury Department to impose sanctions on individuals for
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But the Treasury Department did
not name the specific individuals sanctioned under the executive
order until March 20, 2014. During this four-day window,
Rotenberg-linked shell companies transferred over $120 million
through the United States to Russia. On March 18, 2014, Highland
Ventures transferred over $39.5 million from its account at The
Pictet Group in Switzerland through the U.S. financial system to
its account at Gazprombank in Moscow. That same day, Culloden
Properties transferred over $82 million from its Pictet Group ac-
count in Switzerland through the U.S. financial system to its ac-
count in Moscow at the Gazprombank. Both the Panama Papers
and documents produced to a financial institution by the Markom
Group—and subsequently provided to the Subcommittee—identify
Boris Rotenberg as the owner of Culloden Properties.
Rotenberg-linked shell companies transacted in U.S. dollars post-
sanctions. Shell companies linked to the Rotenbergs continued con-
ducting transactions through the U.S. financial system even after
the imposition of sanctions in March 2014. For example, including
its art purchases, Highland Ventures was involved in transactions
worth over $16 million. Advantage Alliance was involved in trans-
actions worth over $29 million. And while the UBO of Steamort re-
mains hidden, the company served as an intermediary between
Rotenberg-linked shell companies and BALTZER in the purchase of
art. Following the imposition of sanctions in March 2014, Steamort
was a part of transactions totaling over $22 million. In total, the
Subcommittee identified over $91 million in transactions by
Rotenberg-linked shell companies after sanctions were imposed on
the Rotenberg in March 2014.
In response to the report, on October 30, 2020, the Treasury De-
partment issued an ‘‘Advisory and Guidance on Potential Sanctions
Risks Arising from Dealings in High-Value Artwork,’’ citing the
Subcommittee’s report in explaining the sanctions risks in the
high-value art market. The Advisory adopted a key recommenda-
tion of the Subcommittee’s report making clear that what is com-
monly referred to as the ‘‘Berman Amendment’’ to the International
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Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy
Act does not categorically exempt all dealings in artwork from
Treasury’s regulation and enforcement.
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K. Oversight of HHS Shelter Grants for UACs December 8, 2020
(Report Prepared by the Majority and Minority Staffs of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations)
In December 2020, Subcommittee staff released a bipartisan re-
port identifying failures in the Department of Health and Human
Services’ (HHS) shelter grant processes to ensure the safety of un-
accompanied alien children (UACs) and safeguard over $32 million
in taxpayers funds. The report confirmed that HHS awarded Office
of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) shelter grants to two companies
with a documented history of failing to provide adequate care of
children—VisionQuest National, Ltd. and New Horizon Group
Home, LLC. As a result of their previous failures in caring for chil-
dren and other regulatory issues, VisionQuest and New Horizon
struggled to acquire zoning and licensing approval to open shelters
across the country, meaning that taxpayers paid for facilities that
will never open.
A review of several prior funding opportunity announcements
and interviews with HHS officials demonstrated that, prior to fall
2019, HHS did not require grant applicants to disclose prior ad-
verse actions their respective State and local governments had
taken against them. The Department conducted no independent re-
search into the disciplinary history of either VisionQuest or New
Horizon. These oversight failures could have endangered unaccom-
panied children trusted to the care of these companies. Addition-
ally, until November 2019, HHS also had no policy to restrict fund-
ing for grantees that did not have a license to operate. HHS’s policy
of awarding grants to applicants, including VisionQuest and New
Horizon, prior to the applicants securing zoning and licensing ap-
proval led to issues that could cost tens of millions of taxpayer dol-
lars. At the time of the report’s release, HHS was attempting to re-
coup funds disbursed for facilities that failed to open.
A summary of the report’s findings is found below.
Since 2015, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has
conducted oversight of Federal Government programs designed to
protect and care for children who enter the United States without
a parent or legal guardian. Federal agencies, including the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (‘‘DHS’’), the Department of Justice
(‘‘DOJ’’), and the Department of Health and Human Services
(‘‘HHS’’) play key roles in the care of these unaccompanied alien
children (‘‘UACs’’). Deficiencies at these agencies have continued
across two presidential administrations, as discussed in two pre-
vious Subcommittee reports. In addition to the issues identified in
those reports, since 2018, the Subcommittee has examined whether
HHS has placed UACs in safe settings and made efficient use of
taxpayer dollars when establishing residential shelters for some
UACs. This report describes failures in HHS’s processes to ensure
the safety of children in the care of the Federal Government and
safeguard $32,125,779 in taxpayer funds.
Pursuant to the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Reauthorization Act (‘TVPRA’’) and the 1997 consent decree
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known as the Flores Settlement Agreement, HHS uses shelter fa-
cilities in cities and states across the United States to house cer-
tain UACs. Although HHS, through the Office of Refugee Resettle-
ment (‘ORR’’), works to place UACs with an adult sponsor, in some
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119
instances ORR cannot place a child with a sponsor. In these in-
stances, ORR places UACs in shelter facilities, which differ mark-
edly from detention facilities for adults and provide resources tai-
lored to children that are not available in temporary influx shel-
ters. In most shelter facilities, for example, children do not live in
a restricted setting, and they receive classroom education, health
care services, recreation, and case management. As noted in a re-
port the Subcommittee released in 2018, staff secure and secure fa-
cilities are also available for children who require placement in a
more restricted setting because they pose a danger to themselves
or the community, or present a flight risk.
HHS, through the Administration for Children and Families
(‘‘ACF’’) and ORR, offers grants to care providers to operate these
state-licensed shelter facilities. Traditionally, community-based
non-profit organizations operated most shelter facilities. A surge of
UAC arrivals in recent years, however, has led larger, for-profit
companies to apply for ORR funding opportunities. As of Sep-
tember 23, 2020, 120 shelter facilities in the United States house
1,478 UACs, with an average length of stay of 60 days.
The Subcommittee sought to understand the processes HHS uses
to fund and open shelter facilities for UACs. The Subcommittee
identified key gaps in the shelter grant process that affected HHS’s
ability to place UACs in safe settings and ensure efficient use of
taxpayer funds. A review of several prior funding opportunity an-
nouncements and interviews with HHS officials demonstrated that,
prior to fall 2019, the Department did not require a company seek-
ing a grant to provide shelter services for UACs to disclose prior
adverse regulatory actions from state and local governments re-
lated to the care of children. For example, an applicant for a shel-
ter facility that previously operated a facility for children and had
its license revoked by a state regulatory agency had no obligation
to disclose this information to HHS. Additionally, HHS did not con-
duct independent research on applicants and instead confined its
review to the contents of the grant applications. HHS also relied
entirely on grantees to obtain necessary zoning approval and state
licensure for a shelter facility. Furthermore, the Department did
not have a policy in place to restrict funding for grantees without
a license to operate until November 2019.
As a result of these gaps in the shelter grant process, the Sub-
committee confirmed that HHS awarded grants to two companies
with histories of questionable practices in caring for children—
VisionQuest National, Ltd. (‘‘VisionQuest’’) and New Horizon Group
Home, LLC (‘‘New Horizon’’). In 2016, the Philadelphia Department
of Human Services (‘‘Philadelphia DHS’’) contracted with
VisionQuest for the provision of residential services. VisionQuest
began operating four programs at three residential facilities for
young adults and children in the juvenile justice system in Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania. All three facilities faced troubling allega-
tions that local authorities in Philadelphia later substantiated.
Confirmed incidents included residents escaping from a facility, nu-
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merous fights among residents resulting in serious injuries, and fa-
cility staff organizing further fights among residents. By February
2018, Philadelphia authorities transferred all children out of the
three facilities, and VisionQuest voluntarily closed the program.
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In February 2018, New Horizon began operating a residential fa-
cility in North Carolina for male children ages 9 to 17 who required
full-time mental health services. Less than a month later, state of-
ficials conducted an inspection and identified more than a dozen
violations of state law. The violations included New Horizon’s fail-
ure to hire necessary medical personnel, failure to protect two of
its five residents from serious harm, and the use of an unauthor-
ized time-out room for residents. State officials ultimately revoked
New Horizon’s operating license. On appeal, an administrative law
judge upheld the license revocation and noted that the facility pre-
sented ‘‘an imminent danger to the health, safety, and welfare of
the clients.’’
In 2019, HHS awarded grants to VisionQuest and New Horizon
for UAC shelter facilities. VisionQuest received five grants totaling
over $50 million for seven facilities, including one of the same fa-
cilities in Philadelphia that local authorities deemed unsafe for
children in 2018. New Horizon received a grant award for approxi-
mately $8 million for a UAC shelter facility in North Carolina.
HHS did not require either company to disclose prior adverse ac-
tions their respective State and local governments had taken
against them, and the Department did not research the discipli-
nary history of either company. These oversights could have endan-
gered UACs trusted to the care of these companies.
Furthermore, both because of their previous failures in caring for
children and other regulatory issues, VisionQuest and New Horizon
have struggled to acquire zoning and licensing approval to open
shelters across the country. This means that taxpayers have paid
for facilities that will never open. HHS’s policy of awarding grants
to applicants, including VisionQuest and New Horizon, prior to the
applicants securing zoning and licensing approval led to issues that
could waste tens of millions of taxpayer dollars. VisionQuest, for
example, faced immediate challenges in opening the shelter facility
under its HHS grant after Philadelphia officials determined that
the zoning variance for a previous facility was invalid for a facility
housing migrant children. This dispute resulted in litigation prior
to the parties entering into a settlement agreement in October
2020. VisionQuest also failed to obtain the necessary zoning ap-
proval for proposed facilities in California and Texas after facing
local political opposition. Ultimately, HHS disbursed over $28 mil-
lion to VisionQuest for five facilities that will not open.
Similarly, North Carolina’s revocation of New Horizon’s oper-
ating license for one of its existing residential facilities meant that
New Horizon could not open its proposed UAC shelter facility.
Under North Carolina state law, a license revocation makes a facil-
ity operator ineligible for any new licenses for a five-year period.
(New Horizon executives told the Subcommittee that they were
confident that they would succeed in their appeal of the license rev-
ocation and had alternate plans to use a separate existing facility
license.) HHS was initially unaware of these licensing issues and
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only learned of them in August 2019—14 months after the license
revocation—from a congressional inquiry that cited a local media
report. HHS disbursed nearly $4 million in funding to New Horizon
for a facility in North Carolina that will not open.
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HHS has since discontinued all five grants to VisionQuest and
the grant to New Horizon. The Department also requested financial
documentation from both companies for expenditures made with
grant funds. This process is ongoing for both companies, but it is
further along with New Horizon. On June 8, 2020, HHS trans-
mitted a final disallowance letter to New Horizon requesting the
repayment of $3,119,453.69 (out of $3,984,803). On July 7, 2020,
New Horizon appealed the decision to the HHS Departmental Ap-
peals Board, which has the authority to either uphold the decision
or reduce the amount of the disallowance and reverse the dis-
continuation of the grant award. HHS officials stated that they
would comply with the decisions of the Departmental Appeals
Board.
HHS has also implemented changes to its shelter grant process.
For example, the Department now restricts funds for grantees that
are eligible for funding but do not yet have an operating license.
In a briefing with Subcommittee staff, however, HHS officials de-
fended their previous policy, which was in effect as recently as No-
vember 2019 and made funds available to unlicensed grantees.
In late 2019, HHS also began requiring applicants to disclose
prior documented licensing allegations or concerns. However, HHS
did not specify a time period for the issues applicants needed to
disclose. In funding announcements from June and July 2020, HHS
further required applicants to be licensed at the time of application
and to disclose any allegations or concerns of abuse or neglect, as
well as any prior denial, suspension, or revocation of their license.
As of the date of this report, however, HHS officials expressed un-
certainty regarding whether HHS will include the licensing re-
quirement in future announcements.
V. GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) issued 23 reports at the request of the Subcommittee.
Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and release date.
China: Agreements Establishing Confucius Institutes at U.S.
Universities are Similar, But Institute Operations Vary.
GAO–19–278. February 13, 2019.
China: Observations on Confucius Institutes in the United States
and U.S. Universities in China. GAO–19–401T. February 28, 2019.
Internet Privacy and Data Security: Additional Federal Authority
Could Enhance Consumer Protections and Provide Flexibility.
GAO–19–427T. March 7, 2019.
Federal Ethics Programs: Government-Wide Political Appointee
Data and Some Ethics Oversight Procedures at Interior and SBA
Could Be Improved. GAO–19–249. March 14, 2019.
U.S. Postal Service: Addressing Policy Gaps Could Improve Pilot
Design and Evaluation for Postal Innovations. GAO–19–293. March
14, 2019.
Employment and Training Programs: Department of Labor
Should Assess Efforts to Coordinate Services Across Programs.
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GAO–19–200. March 28, 2019.
Management Report: CMS Needs to Address Gaps in Federal
Oversight of Nursing Home Abuse Investigations that Persisted in
Oregon for at Least 15 Years. GAO–19–313R. April 15, 2019.
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Nursing Homes: Improved Oversight Needed to Better Protect
Residents from Abuse. GAO–19–433. June 13, 2019.
Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly Commu-
nicate Practices Associated with Identity Information in the Public
Comment Process. GAO–19–483. June 26, 2019.
U.S. Assistance to Central America: Department of State Should
Establish A Comprehensive Plan to Assess Progress Toward Pros-
perity, Governance, and Security. GAO–19–590. September 26,
2019.
U.S. Assistance to Central America: Department of State Should
Establish A Comprehensive Plan to Assess Progress Toward Pros-
perity, Governance, and Security. GAO–19–709. September 26,
2019.
Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly Commu-
nicate Public Comment Posting Practices Associated with Identity
Information. GAO–20–105T. October 24, 2019.
Evidence-Based Policymaking: Selected Agencies Coordinate Ac-
tivities, But Could Enhance Collaboration. GAO–20–119. December
4, 2019.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Outcomes Have Improved But
Actions Needed to Enhance Oversight of Schedule Goals.
GAO–20–170SP. December 19, 2019.
Information Management: Selected Agencies Need to Fully Ad-
dress Federal Electronic Recordkeeping Requirements.
GAO–20–50. February 27, 2020.
U.S. Assistance to Central America: Status of Funding.
GAO–20–163R. March 4, 2020.
Federal Rulemaking: Information on Selected Agencies’ Manage-
ment of Public Comments. GAO–20–383R. April 16, 2020.
Federal Management: Selected Reforms Could Be Strengthened
by Following Additional Planning, Communication, and Leadership
Practices. GAO–20–322.
DATA Act: OIGs Reported that Quality of Agency-Submitted
Data Varied, and Most Recommended Improvements. GAO–20–
540. July 9, 2020.
Federal Advisory Committees: Actions needed to Enhance Deci-
sion-Making Transparency and Cost Data Accuracy. GAO–20–575.
September 10, 2020.
Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Commerce Should Improve Its Ex-
clusion Request Process and Economic Impact Review.
GAO–20–517. September 15, 2020.
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID–19. Sep-
tember 17, 2020.
Federal Buying Power: OMB Can Further Advance Category
Management Initiative by Focusing on Requirements, Data, and
Training. GAO–21–40. November 30, 2020.
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SPENDING OVERSIGHT AND
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
CHAIRMAN: RAND PAUL (R–KY)
RANKING MEMBER: MAGGIE HASSAN (D–NH)
I. AUTHORITY
The Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emer-
gency Management focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of
Federal financial management; agency policies to promote program
integrity and the prevention of waste, fraud, and abuse; policies
and procedures related to Federal contracting and procurement, in-
cluding Federal Acquisition Regulation; and the acquisition func-
tions of the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office
of the Federal Procurement Policy. The Subcommittee also exam-
ines the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and re-
cover from natural and man-made disasters, including State and
local grant programs; activities under the Robert T. Stafford Dis-
aster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; and activities related
to the National Capital Region; the relationship between the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) and States and localities, in-
cluding in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from nat-
ural and man-made disasters; and activities relating to the Office
of the Private Sector and the integration of the private sector into
the Nation’s emergency preparedness, resilience, and response mat-
ters.
II. ACTIVITY
During the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee on Federal Spend-
ing Oversight and Emergency Management held seven hearings;
released six reports cataloging hundreds of examples of wasteful
federal spending practices, highlighting more than $104 billion in
wasted taxpayer money; produced and introduced a budget resolu-
tion; and introduced eight pieces of legislation that were referred
to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee,
three of which were reported out of committee; as well as others
that pertain to the work of the committee.
A. HEARINGS
Direct and Indirect Costs to the Federal Government from Manage-
ment of Federal Lands. April 25, 2019. Field Hearing in
Stearns, KY.
The Federal Government owns approximately 640 million acres
of land in the United States, roughly 28 percent of all the land in
the United States. Recently there has been much debate about ap-
propriateness of the federal government holding so much land and
questions have been asked if the Federal Government has more
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land than it has capacity to manage. The Park Service alone has
an $11.6 billion maintenance backlog despite its budget growing
10.8 percent in real dollars since 2010. And yet, the trend is toward
expanding federal ownership of lands.
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Not only does the Federal Government incur cost associated with
maintaining Federal land and property, but it may also be the case
that Federal land holding create secondary costs to the Federal
government in the form of depressed economies in areas of signifi-
cant Federal holding. Local populations are thus, then more likely
to qualify and utilize a variety of Federal assistance programs,
with little hope or opportunity to transition off of them.
While much of the focus of this debate has been in the west, this
problem is not isolated to western States. Nearly 2/3rds of
McCreary County, KY is owned and managed by the Federal Gov-
ernment, between the Daniel Boone National Forest and the Big
South Fork National River and Recreation Area. Local communities
rely on federally managed Cumberland Lake for water and power.
Meanwhile the median household income in McCreary County is
about 3.1 times below the national average and 42.5 percent of the
population lives below the poverty line.
To that end, this hearing aimed to explore what the cost and
benefits of the Federal Government of managing Federal lands, if
States and local communities could be better positioned to steward
these lands, and what impediments Federal ownership/manage-
ment pose to local economies.
Witnesses: Jimmie Greene, McCreary County Judge Executive;
Nathan Nevels, McCreary County Deputy Judge Executive; Randy
Maxwell, McCreary County Magistrate; Stephen Whitaker, Super-
visor, McCreary County Water Department; Randy Kidd, Chair-
man, McCreary County Industrial Authority Board; Jerry Ste-
phens, Owner, Stephens Hardwoods and Barrel Stave Mill; Robert
A. Vogel, Regional Director, Southeast Region, National Park Serv-
ice, U.S. Department of the Interior; and Ken Arney, Regional For-
ester for the Southern Region, Forest Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
Review of GAO’s Annual Duplication Report. May 21, 2019. (S. Hrg.
116–58)
This was a review of GAO’s annual duplication report. The report
identified 17 new areas of duplication, fragmentation, or overlap
that are identified in the report. There were also 11 other areas
GAO has identified as potential sources of cost savings or revenue
enhancement. Further, GAO made 33 new recommended corrective
actions that apply to areas identified in prior reports.
With regard to corrective actions taken, GAO notes that 53 per-
cent of actions directed toward Congress have either not been ad-
dressed or are only partially addressed. With regard to the execu-
tive branch that number is better, but still 35 percent of corrective
actions are not fully addressed.
Witnesses: Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the
United States, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Federally Incurred Cost of Regulatory Changes and How Such
Changes are Made. July 17, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116–62)
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The power of the purse theoretically rests with Congress; Section
9 (7) of the Constitution reads, ‘‘No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.’’
However, it has been generally accepted that mandatory spending,
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125
or ‘‘permanent appropriations’’ meet this test—Congress appro-
priates, ‘‘such sums as are necessary’’ to provide a certain benefit
to a certain population.
One of the problems this hearing investigated was regulatory
changes that affect spending; changes through regulation to man-
datory entitlement programs that alter the benefit or the recipient
population, and thus affect spending. For example, the Department
of Agriculture has latitude to broaden or contract eligibility for dis-
aster aid, the VA can alter what constitutes a service related dis-
ability, and Social Security Administration has made obesity and
illiteracy (including only speaking Spanish in Puerto Rico) quali-
fying disabilities.
Such changes cause fluctuations in Federal spending (called
budgetary regulations) without the express consent of Congress as
manifest in an appropriation; but also without the implied consent
contained in the authorizing legislation, as these changes are made
well beyond what was envisioned when these programs were cre-
ated decades earlier.
Moreover, research from the Pacific Legal Foundation has shown
that just at FDA, more than 3/4th of new regulations promulgated
over the last 20 years have gotten final sign off from a career em-
ployee, not a Senate confirmed principal officer. In other words,
Congress’s ability to hold decision makers accountable and provide
oversight of such spending is impaired when career employees
(with civil service protections) are responsible for these regulations.
Witnesses: James Broughel, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, The
Mercatus Center, George Mason University; Thomas A. Berry, At-
torney, Pacific Legal Foundation; and Richard W. Parker, Policy
Director, Center for Energy and Environmental Law, University of
Connecticut School of Law.
Squeezed at Both Ends: Federal Spending Resulting from Restric-
tive Logging Access and Timber Tariffs. October 7, 2019. Field
Hearing in Morehead, KY.
This hearing examined the cross-sectional impact of forest policy
and tariffs. Over the past three decades the Federal Government
has increasingly restricted access to Federal forests for logging.
This has depressed economic activity and contracted tax bases in
areas where logging is a major industry. This manifests in direct
costs to the Federal Government in the form of mitigation type
payments such as Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) and Secure
Rural School payments. Moreover, because local economies are de-
pressed, local populations are more likely to depend on direct fed-
eral aid.
Compounding and exacerbating this problem are recent and pro-
posed tariffs which impede access to markets for timber that can
be harvested in these communities. These trade actions have the
potential to further depress already vulnerable communities result-
ing in fewer tax receipts to the Federal Government and local com-
munities and pushing more people onto Government aid programs.
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Witnesses: Joseph L. Barloon, General Counsel, Office of the
United States Trade Representative; Cameron Bishop, Deputy As-
sistant United States Trade Representative for Congressional Af-
fairs, Office of the United States Trade Representative; Jeffrey W.
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Stringer, Ph.D., Chairman, Department of Forestry and Natural
Resources, University of Kentucky; Stephen M. Vacik, Ed.D., Presi-
dent and Chief Executive Officer, Maysville Community and Tech-
nical College; Ray White, Chief Executive Officer, Harold White
Lumber, Inc.; Bob Helton, Executive Director, Morehead Rowan
County Economic Development Council; Hon. Harry Clark, Judge/
Executive, Rowan County Kentucky; Hon. Laura White-Brown,
Mayor, City of Morehead Kentucky; Hon. Rick Stiltner, Judge/Ex-
ecutive, Menifee County Kentucky; and Hon. Bobby C. Rogers,
Judge/Executive, Bath County Kentucky.
Rise of the Zombies: The Unauthorized and Unaccountable Govern-
ment You Pay For. October 30, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116–132)
This hearing looked at unauthorized programs. Discretionary
programs are created through authorizing legislation—laws that
establish the programs and parameters under which they are to be
carried out. Authorizations also lay out funding parameters and
timelines for the program’s existence. After such time programs are
supposed to be evaluated and reformed through a reauthorization.
However, though authorizations are laws, so too are appropria-
tions bills. Thus, often appropriators regularly override authoriza-
tions by providing funds to programs inconsistent with the under-
lying authorization. Such was the case a number of years ago when
the NDAA eliminated a missile program, but the appropriations
that year funded the program anyway.
Another, and more pervasive, problem occurs when a program’s
authorization expires, but the appropriators fund it anyway. This
is a very prevalent practice, accounting for more than 1000 pro-
grams and $300 billion in spending.
Since appropriator override invalidates authorizing committees,
once a program is initially created authorizers have little incentive
to reassess programs for performance and need. Meaning many
programs have not been scrutinized for decades. For example, the
Inter-American Foundation (which has paid for clown college in Ar-
gentina) was last authorized (or scrutinized) in 1987, but has con-
tinued to be funded every year since.
There is little capacity for senators to prevent this practice. For
that reason, Chairman Paul has previously introduced the Legisla-
tive Performance Review Act, which would limit all authorizations
to 4 years, wind programs down over two years after their author-
izations have expired, and most importantly create a surgical point
of order against appropriations for unauthorized programs. Rep.
McMorris Rodgers has her own bill aimed at addressing this prob-
lem in the House.
Witnesses: Panel I—Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, U.S. House
of Representatives
Panel II—Kevin R. Kosar, Vice President of Policy, R Street In-
stitute; Jonathan Bydlak, President, Institute for Spending Reform;
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and James A. Thurber, Distinguished Professor of Government,
American University.
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The Afghanistan Papers: Costs and Benefits of America’s Longest
War. February 11, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116–203)
At the time of the hearing, the war in Afghanistan has now gone
on for more than 18 years, making it the longest military conflict
in U.S. history. By some estimates, this has cost the U.S. taxpayer
more than $1 trillion.
Prior to this hearing, The Washington Post published The Af-
ghanistan Papers, which chronicle that from the very beginning,
the Afghanistan conflict has been rudderless, with success largely
undefined and unachievable. Despite clear and obvious problems
with the war, military and other officials systematically mislead
Congress and the American people about conditions in Afghani-
stan.
Spending seems to have played a critical role in the effectiveness
of efforts in Afghanistan and as a justification for ongoing U.S. en-
gagement. One the one hand, the Afghan conflict has become a
long term justification for increases in appropriations; whereas on
the other hand, so much money has been thrown at the conflict in
the name of rebuilding, that it has diminished the effectiveness of
such efforts.
Witnesses: Panel I—John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction.
Panel II—Hon. Douglas E. Lute, Former United States Perma-
nent Representative to NATO and Senior Fellow, Project on Europe
and the Transatlantic Relationship, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
Panel III—Hon. Richard A. Boucher, Former United States Am-
bassador to Cyprus and Senior Fellow, The Watson Institute for
International and Public Affairs, Brown University; Lt. Col. Daniel
L. Davis, USA, Ret., Senior Fellow and Military Expert, Defense
Priorities.
State and Local Cybersecurity: Defending Our Communities from
Cyber Threats amid COVID–19. December 2, 2020. (S. Hrg.
116–)
In recent years, State and local governments and entities have
found themselves increasingly at risk from sophisticated cybersecu-
rity threats from a diverse set of actors. In 2020, the onset of the
COVID–19 pandemic and the need for millions of Americans to
convert their daily activities and routines to an internet-based regi-
men has amplified the cybersecurity threats to State and local gov-
ernments and entities.
This hearing served as a follow-up to the February 2020 HSGAC
hearing on state and local cyber security and examined in par-
ticular how State and local governments, schools, and hospitals are
responding to cyber threats amid the response to COVID–19 and
how the Federal Government can provide support to improve their
response, including through a standalone state and local cybersecu-
rity grant program and improved information sharing between the
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Federal Government and schools and hospitals.
Witnesses: Panel I—Brandon Wales, Acting Director, Cybersecu-
rity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Department of Home-
land Security.
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Panel II—Denis Goulet, Commissioner, New Hampshire Depart-
ment of Information Technology; Leslie Torres-Rodriguez, Ed.D.,
Superintendent of Schools, Hartford Public Schools; John Riggi,
Senior Advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk, American Hospital As-
sociation; and Bill Siegel, Chief Executive Officer and Founder,
Coveware, Inc.
B. REPORTS
In his capacity of Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal
Spending Oversight and Emergency Management, Senator Paul re-
leased six compilation reports, detailing various wasteful programs,
grants, and practices that have cost taxpayers billions.
‘‘The Waste Report: Swipe Left on Waste’’ February 14, 2019
This report detailed an effort by private researchers, using funds
totaling $1,200,000 from the National Institute of Child and
Human Development and the National Science Foundation to study
the habits of dating app users.
‘‘The Waste Report Spring 2019: Waste in Full Bloom’’ April 2019
This report cataloged 10 examples of the Federal Government
spending more than $42 million on wasteful projects. The report in-
cluded examples of waste such as:
• Sending international students to American colleges for free;
• Documented abuse of the DOD’s 1033 program;
• Studied the habits of online dating app users;
• Funded a week of summer school for grad students; and
• Improved the quality of TV in Moldova.
‘‘The Summer 2019 Waste Report!’’ August 2019
This report cataloged 10 examples of the Federal Government
spending more than $50 billion on wasteful projects. The report in-
cluded examples of waste such as:
• Funding ‘‘green growth’’ in Peru;
• Medicare’s paying of improper payments;
• Studying whether the Panamanian Tungara frog’s mating
calls sound different in the forest or the city;
• Spending money to teach English and information tech-
nology skills to students at Iraqi madrasas; and
• The attempt to convert an abandoned mental hospital into
the headquarters of the Department of Homeland Security.
‘‘The Waste Report: Fall 2019’’ November 2019
This report catalogued 8 examples of the Federal Government
spending more than $230 million on wasteful projects. The report
included examples of waste such as:
• The Federal subsidy of the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority;
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• Funding debate and model United Nations competitions in
Afghanistan;
• Purchasing a statute made by the musical artist Bob Dylan
for the U.S. Embassy in Mozambique;
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129
• Studying the connection between drinking alcohol and wind-
ing up in the emergency room; and
• Paying to bring Serbian cheese up to international stand-
ards.
‘‘The Festivus Report 2019’’ December 2019
This is Chairman Paul’s annual compilation report of wasteful
government spending. This edition of the Festivus Report cataloged
over $50 billion in wasteful spending including:
• The U.S. Agency for International Development funding the
acquisition of textbooks for students in Afghanistan that
were unusable and unused;
• The Department of State funding efforts to improve the ca-
pacity of the Pakistani film industry;
• FEMA paying for vehicles the New York City government
falsely claimed were damaged by Superstorm Sandy; and
• The NSF paying to teach social scientists how to apply for
grants.
‘‘The Festivus Report 2020’’ December 2020
This is Chairman Paul’s annual compilation report of wasteful
government spending. This edition of the Festivus Report
catalogued 57 examples of government waste across five categories:
Energy, Environment, and Science; Foreign Aid; Military; Health
Care; and Miscellaneous. The 57 items totaled over $54 billion in
wasteful spending, including:
• The Fish and Wildlife Service subsidizing investments to fa-
cilitate yachting;
• The Federal Aviation Administration using funds appro-
priated as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act to renovate a taxiway at an airport on Nan-
tucket island most often used by private jets;
• The National Institutes of Health paid researchers to inter-
view San Franciscans about their edible cannabis use; and
• The National Institutes of Health paying to find out if hot
tubbing can lower stress.
III. LEGISLATION
Since the Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and
Emergency Management’s hearings play an important role in
bringing issues to the attention of Congress and the public, its
work frequently contributes to the development of legislative initia-
tives. During the 116th Congress, Chairman Paul introduced the
following legislative proposals in his capacity as a Senator:
1. S. 2618—Bonuses for Cost-Cutters Act—Expands existing
agency Inspector General programs that pursue waste, fraud, and
abuse to also include surplus funds that are not needed to accom-
plish an Executive agency’s duties and responsibilities. Under this
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program, Executive Branch employees could propose savings and,
if confirmed by their agency’s Inspector General and Chief Finan-
cial Officer, extra funds may be returned to the Treasury at the
end of the year. Consistent with the existing Inspector General au-
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130
thority, if such savings are realized, the employee that made the
suggestion would also be eligible for a performance bonus of one
percent of the amount saved, capped at $10,000.
2. S.1740—Default Prevention Act—This bill requires the fol-
lowing obligations to be granted priority over all other U.S. obliga-
tions if the public debt reaches the statutory limit:
• Principal and interest on debt held by the public;
• Compensations, allowances, and benefits for members of the
Armed Forces on active duty;
• Social Security benefits;
• Medicare benefits; and
• Obligations under any program administered by the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs.
If Congress is notified, the Department of the Treasury may
issue additional debt for the priority obligations in excess of the
debt limit. Treasury may issue the additional debt during the 30-
day period beginning on the date on which the United States is un-
able to use revenues or extraordinary measures to fully pay the pri-
ority obligations at the time they are due.
(The term ‘‘extraordinary measures’’ refers to a series of actions
that the Department of Treasury may implement to allow the
United States to borrow additional funds without exceeding the
debt limit. The measures generally include suspensions or delays
of debt sales and suspensions or redemptions of investments in cer-
tain government funds.)
3. S. 5014—Shutdown Prevention Act—This bill provides speci-
fied continuing appropriations to prevent a government shutdown
if any appropriations measure for a fiscal year has not been en-
acted or a joint resolution making continuing appropriations is not
in effect after the fiscal year begins. The appropriations are pro-
vided to continue to fund programs, projects, and activities for
which funds were provided in the preceding fiscal year.
4. S. 4979—A bill to terminate the Department of Education—
This bill would terminate the Department of Education, effective
December 31, 2020. This bill reflects the belief that the Federal
Government need not impose itself on the education system by em-
powering unelected bureaucrats over our children’s education.
Local school systems, teachers, and parents, not the Federal Gov-
ernment, are in the best position to determine how to educate our
children and eliminating the Department of Education is the best
way to ensure that parents and local school boards are truly in con-
trol of their child’s education.
5. S. 2183—Duplication Scoring Act of 2019—This bill would re-
quire the Government Accountability Office to analyze legislation
reported by a congressional committee in order to prevent duplica-
tion of and overlap with existing federal programs, offices, and ini-
tiatives.
6. S. 4104—Stopping Improper Payments to Deceased People
Act—This bill expands and otherwise modifies the sharing of death
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data, particularly with regard to the recovery of improper pay-
ments to deceased individuals. It would require the Social Security
Administration to pay to States their reasonable costs for compiling
and sharing death records with the SSA. In addition, the bill per-
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mits the SSA to share, if certain conditions are met, the death data
with Federal and State agencies for purposes of, among other
things, ensuring proper payments and tax administration duties re-
lated to issuing Economic Impact Payments related to the COVID–
19 pandemic.
7. S. 4878—Stopping Improper Payments to Foreigners Act—
This bill would ensure proper Economic Impact Payments paid out
with Americans’ tax dollars would not be sent abroad to those with
tenuous or no ties to the United States.
8. S. Con. Res. 11—Penny Plan Balanced Budget—Establishes
the congressional budget for the Federal Government for FY2021
and sets forth budgetary levels for FY2021–FY2029. This budget
balances in 5 years by implementing a one percent year over year
cut for the first 5 years and then grows at one percent thereafter.
Recommends levels and amounts for FY2021–FY2029 in both
houses of Congress for:
• Federal revenues,
• New budget authority,
• Budget outlays,
• Deficits,
• Public debt,
• Debt held by the public, and
• The major functional categories of spending.
Recommends levels and amounts for FY2021–FY2029 in the Sen-
ate for Social Security and Postal Service discretionary administra-
tive expenses.
Includes reconciliation instructions directing: (1) several Senate
authorizing committees to report and submit to the Senate Budget
Committee legislation to reduce the deficit, and (2) the Senate Fi-
nance Committee to report and submit to the Senate Budget Com-
mittee legislation to reduce the deficit and legislation to reduce rev-
enues.
(Under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, reconciliation bills
are considered by Congress using expedited legislative procedures
that prevent a filibuster and restrict amendments in the Senate.)
Establishes reserve funds that provide flexibility in applying
budget enforcement rules to legislation relating to efficiencies, con-
solidations, and other savings; or health savings accounts.
Sets forth budget enforcement procedures for legislation consid-
ered in the Senate.
9. S. 2798—Whistleblower Protection Act of 2019—This bill
would retroactively prohibit a Federal contractor from taking a per-
sonnel action against an employee who has lawfully disclosed infor-
mation the employee reasonably believes shows 1) a violation of
any law, rule, or regulation; or 2) cooperation with or disclosure of
information to the agency’s inspector general or special counsel; or
3) refusal to obey an order that would require the individual to vio-
late a law, rule, or regulation. This bill also prohibits a Federal
agency from pressuring a Federal contractor to take any personnel
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action against an employee based on such disclosures or actions by
the employee.
10. S. 3904—Write the Laws Act—This bill would prohibit an act
of Congress from containing any delegation of legislative powers,
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132
whether to any component within the legislative branch, the Presi-
dent or any other member of the executive branch, the judicial
branch, any agency or quasi-public agency, any state or state in-
strumentality, or any other organization or individual. It would
also require the GAO to identify to Congress all statutes enacted
before 90 days after this bill’s enactment that contain any delega-
tion of legislative power.
11. S. 92—Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny
Act of 2019—This bill establishes a congressional approval process
for a major rule. A major rule may only take effect if Congress ap-
proves the rule. A major rule is a rule that results in 1) an annual
effect on the economy of $100 million or more, 2) a major increase
in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, government
agencies, or geographic regions, 3) significant adverse effects on
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or
the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based
enterprises. The bill also establishes a congressional disapproval
process for a nonmajor rule, providing that a nonmajor rule may
only take effect if Congress does not disapprove of the rule.
IV. GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) issued 32 reports at the request of the Subcommittee.
Reports are listed here by title, GAO number, and release date.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Status of FEMA Public Assistance
Funding and Implementation. GAO–19–253. February 25, 2019.
Grants Management: Agency Action Required to Ensure Grant-
ees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO–19–282. March
14, 2019.
Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight,
and Recovery Challenges. GAO–19–256. March 14, 2019.
Huracanes de Puerto Rico: Estado de Financiamiento de FEMA,
Suervision y Desafios de Recuperacion (Spanish Highlights). GAO–
19–331. March 14, 2019.
Disaster Recovery: Better Monitoring of Block Grants Funds is
Needed. GAO–19–232. March 25, 2019.
2017 Hurricane Season: Federal Support for Electricity Grid Res-
toration in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. GAO–19–296.
April 18, 2019.
2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the Use
of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery.
GAO–19–281. April 24, 2019.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed to Better Support In-
dividuals Who Are Older or Have Disabilities. GAO–19–318. May
14, 2019.
Government Efficiency and Effectiveness: Opportunities to Re-
duce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions
in Financial Benefits. GAO–19–536T. May 21, 2019.
2017 Disaster Relief Oversight: Strategy Needed to Ensure Agen-
cies’ Internal Control Plans Provide Sufficient Information. GAO–
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19–479. June 28, 2019.
Disaster Response: FEMA and the American Red Cross Need to
Ensure Key Mass Care Organizations are Included in Coordination
and Planning. GAO–19–526. September 19, 2019.
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Respuesta a Desastres: FEMA y La Cruz Roja Americana
Necesitan Asegurar que las Organizaciones Claves del Cuidado en
Masa Sean Incluidas en la Coordinacion y el Planeamiento. GAO–
19–708. September 19, 2019.
Disaster Response: HHS Should Address Deficiencies High-
lighted by Recent Hurricanes in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto
Rico. GAO–19–592. September 20, 2019.
Puerto Rico Electricity Grid Recovery: Better Information and
Enhanced Coordination is Needed to Address Challenges. GAO–20–
141. October 8, 2019.
Recuperacion de la Red Electrica en Puerto Rico: Se Necesita
Mejor Informacion y Coordinacion para Enfrentar Desafios. GAO–
20–143. October 8, 2019.
Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to Ad-
dress Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. GAO–20–5. Octo-
ber 9, 2019.
Highway Emergency Relief: Federal Highway Administration
Should Enhance Accountability Over Project Decisions. GAO–20–
32. October 17, 2019.
Emergency Transportation Relief: Federal Transit Administra-
tion and FEMA Took Actions to Coordinate, But Steps are Needed
to Address Risk of Duplicate Funding. GAO–20–85. November 13,
2019.
U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could Strength-
en FEMA’s Key Disaster Recovery Efforts. GAO–20–54. November
19, 2019.
Wildland Fire: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Reduce Wildland
Fuels and Lower Risk to Communities and Ecosystems. GAO–20–
52. December 19, 2019.
Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery: FEMA Actions Needed to
Strengthen Project Cost Estimation and Awareness of Program
Guidance. GAO–20–221. February 5, 2020.
Recuperacion de Desastres en Puerto Rico: Acciones de FEMA
son Necesarias para Fortalecer la Calculacion de Costos de
Proyectos y el Conocimento de las Directrices del Programa. GAO–
20–381. February 5, 2020.
Emergency Alerting: Agencies Need to Address Pending Applica-
tions and Monitor Industry Progress on System Improvements.
GAO–20–294. February 6, 2020.
FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address Deploy-
ment and Staff Development Challenges. GAO–20–360. May 4,
2020.
National Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed to Address
Gaps in the Nation’s Emergency Management Capabilities. GAO–
20–297. May 4, 2020.
National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve Commu-
nity Oversight and Data Sharing. GAO–20–396. May 5, 2020.
Critical Infrastructure Prioritization During COVID–19. Sep-
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tember 17, 2020.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to
Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance Emer-
gency Work Grants. GAO–20–604. September 29, 2020.
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Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen
FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program. GAO–20–503. Sep-
tember 20, 2020.
Supplemental Material for GAO–20–503: FEMA Individuals and
Households Program Applicant Data 2016–2018. GAO 20–675SP.
September 30, 2020.
Supplemental Material for GAO–20–503: Select Disaster Profiles
for FEMA’s Individuals and Households Program 2016–2018.
GAO–20–674SP. September 30, 2020.
Puerto Rico Electricity: FEMA and HUD Have Not Approved
Long-Term Projects and Need to Implement Recommendations to
Address Uncertainties and Enhance Resilience. GAO–21–54. No-
vember 17, 2020.
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON REGULATORY AFFAIRS AND
FEDERAL MANAGEMENT
CHAIRMAN: JAMES LANKFORD (R–OK)
RANKING MEMBER: KYRSTEN SINEMA (D–AZ)
I. AUTHORITY
The Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Manage-
ment oversees the management, efficiency, effectiveness, and econ-
omy of all government agencies, departments, and programs. The
Subcommittee has broad oversight over the Federal regulatory re-
gime, including the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA). In addition, the Subcommittee is responsible for exploring
policies that promote a skilled, efficient, and effective Federal
workforce that will work to ensure efficient and effective manage-
ment of Federal programs.
II. ACTIVITY
During the 116th Congress, the Subcommittee on Regulatory Af-
fairs and Federal Management held 7 hearings.
A. HEARINGS
From Beginning to End: An Examination of Agencies’ Early Public
Engagement and Retrospective Review. May 7, 2019.
(S. Hrg. 116–37)
At the beginning of a rulemaking, agencies are encouraged to
consult with stakeholders, consider multiple approaches to regula-
tion, and directed to provide opportunity for public comment. In the
years following the promulgation of a rule, agencies are expected
to periodically review regulations to ensure their effectiveness and
continued necessity. However, there is no overarching legal re-
quirements governing initial public outreach and review of existing
rules.
This hearing considered how the regulatory process could be im-
proved by legislation requiring advanced notices of proposed rule-
making and the creation of retrospective review frameworks during
the promulgation of ‘major’ rules.
Witnesses: Hon. Susan E. Dudley, Former Administrator (2007–
2009), of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, at the
Office of Management and Budget; Hon. Sally Katzen, Former Ad-
ministrator (1993–1998), of the Office of Information and Regu-
latory Affairs, at the Office of Management and Budget
Reauthorization of the SBA Office of Advocacy. May 22, 2019
(S. Hrg. 116–86)
The 1980 passage of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) greatly
expanded the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) Office of
Advocacy’s role. The RFA requires agencies to consider the effects
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of their regulatory actions on small entities, mitigate effects when
possible, and fill out initial and final regulatory analyses. The RFA
also charges the Chief Counsel with monitoring agencies’ compli-
ance with the Act and submitting an annual report to Congress. In
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1996, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) required the EPA and OSHA to hold panels with Advo-
cacy, OIRA, and small entity representatives when developing a
rule that requires an initial regulatory flexibility analysis. The
2010 Dodd-Frank added the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) to the list of agencies required to convene ‘‘SBREFA’’ pan-
els. Executive Order 13272 in 2002 required all Federal agencies
to establish procedures and policies to promote compliance with the
RFA, which was later codified in the Small Business Jobs Act of
2010.
This hearing, held jointly with the Senate Committee on Small
Business and Entrepreneurship, discussed the work at the office of
Advocacy, ways to enhance the Office’s mission to serve as a voice
for small businesses within the Federal Government, and figure
out the best ways to draft a reauthorization of the portions of the
Small Business Act and other laws that enable Advocacy.
Witnesses: Major Clark, III, Acting Chief Counsel, Office of Advo-
cacy, U.S. Small Business Administration; Winslow Sargeant, Sen-
ior Vice President for Partnerships, International Council for Small
Business; John Arensmeyer, CEO and Founder, Small Business
Majority; Jeanette Hernandez Prenger, Founder, President, and
CEO, ECCO Select; Rick Baumann, Owner, Murrells Inlet Seafood.
Solutions to Improve Federal Hiring. July 30, 2019. (S. Hrg. 116–
98)
This hearing provided an opportunity to discuss specific ways to
modernize the hiring process to attract and retain highly qualified
civil servants. Federal agencies continue to face a prolonged hiring
crisis. The average time to hire is 106 days, well above the Office
of Personnel Management’s goal of 80 days. This renders the Fed-
eral Government unable to compete with the private sector for top
talent. The Federal workforce is also aging. With 32 percent of em-
ployees eligible to retire by 2022, there is a significant risk of hav-
ing a wide knowledge gap amongst Federal workers in years to
come. It is therefore vital that the Federal hiring process be im-
proved so that agencies can strategically fill critical needs in a
timely manner. This hearing examined the challenges to imple-
menting a competitive hiring process in the Federal Government
and explored strategic measures to address these challenges.
Witnesses: Yvonne D. Jones, Director, Strategic Issues Team,
U.S. Government Accountability Office; Angela Bailey, Chief
Human Capital Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security;
and Daniel R. Sitterly, Assistant Secretary for Human Resources
and Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.
Review of E-Rulemaking Comment Systems. October 24, 2019.
(S. Hrg. 116–114).
This hearing, held jointly with the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, reviewed federal agency systems for receiving re-
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viewing, and publicizing comments on proposed regulations and
found the systems were abused, creating some public distrust in
the rule writing process, as well as additional work for federal em-
ployees. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations also re-
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leased a report in conjunction with the hearing titled ‘‘Abuses of
the Federal Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Process.’’
Witnesses: Elizabeth Angerman, Principal Deputy Administrator,
Office of Government-Wide Policy, U.S. General Services Adminis-
tration; Dominic Mancini, Acting Director, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget; Ashley
Boizelle, Deputy General Counsel, Federal Communications Com-
mission; Seto J. Bagdoyan, Director, Forensic Audits and Investiga-
tive Service, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Improving Public Service: A Review of Recommendations Made by
the National Commission on Military, National, and Public
Service. June 23, 2020 (S. Hrg. 116–268)
As the National Commission observed in its final report issued
on March 25th, ‘‘Public servants perform a critical role in the func-
tioning of American democracy,’’ but ‘‘significant barriers to enter-
ing public service exist due to lack of awareness, aspiration, and
access—especially among younger workers, who are underrep-
resented in Federal civilian employment.’’ The National Commis-
sion went on to make specific recommendations, including legisla-
tive proposals for improving the functioning of the Federal work-
force. This hearing focused on those recommendations with a par-
ticular emphasis on hiring reform.
Witnesses: Hon. Joseph Heck, D.O, Chairman, National Commis-
sion on Military, National, and Public Service; Shawn Skelly, Com-
missioner, National Commission on Military, National, and Public
Service.
Modernizing Telework: Review of Private Sector Telework Policies
during the COVID–19 Pandemic. July 28, 2020. (S. Hrg. 116–
283)
COVID–19 has forced both the Federal Government and private
sector to conduct much of their normal operations remotely. This
enhanced reliance on telework provides an opportunity to learn
what policies put in place before the pandemic lead to successful
remote work environments and what improvements are needed.
Given the agility of the private sector, the hearing invited rep-
resentatives from private sector companies to discuss their ap-
proach to telework before the pandemic and how, if at all, that ap-
proach changed since the pandemic and how it will continue to
change moving forward.
This hearing focused on what lessons the Federal Government
could learn from the private sector regarding the future of
telework. This will include what infrastructure is available to sup-
port telework practices, how to ensure employee productivity goals
are met, what technologies are available to optimize remote col-
laboration and improve data security, potential cost saving from
having a full or part-time remote workforce, as well as any other
proposals the private sector has found useful in establishing and
improving teleworking policies.
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Witnesses: Seán D. Morris, Principal, Deloitte Consulting LLP;
T. Lane Wilson, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, The
Williams Companies, Inc.; Michael Ly, Chief Executive Officer,
Reconciled; John Zanni, Chief Executive Officer, Acronis SCS.
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Modernizing Federal Telework: Moving forward using the Lessons
Learned during the COVID–19 Pandemic. November 18, 2020.
(S. Hrg. 116–402).
COVID–19 has required the Federal Government to conduct
most of its normal operations remotely. The need for maximal
telework during this period has provided an opportunity to identify
what existing telework policies and procedures have been success-
ful and areas for improvement. This hearing invited Federal agency
representatives to discuss their approach to telework before the
pandemic, what lessons they have learned during the pandemic,
and how these lessons might shape the future of telework.
Witnesses: Michelle Rosenberg, Acting Director, Strategic Issues
Team, Government Accountability Office; Keith Washington, Dep-
uty Secretary for Administration, U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation; Ms. Sydney T. Rose, Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of
Human Resources, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administra-
tion and Management, U.S. Department of Labor; Jim Borland, As-
sistant Deputy Commissioner for Systems and Deputy Chief Infor-
mation Officer for IT Operations, Social Security Administration.
III. LEGISLATION
Since the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and Federal Man-
agement’s hearings play an important role in bringing issues to the
attention of Congress and the public, its work frequently contrib-
utes to the development of legislative initiatives. During the 116th
Congress, Chairman Lankford introduced the following legislative
proposals in his capacity as a Senator:
1. S. 395—Providing Accountability Through Transparency—This
bill requires the notice of a proposed rule by a Federal agency to
include the Internet address of a summary of the rule. The sum-
mary must be 100 words or fewer, written in plain language, and
posted on regulations.gov.
2. S. 1120—Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements
Act—Updates the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Requires agencies to
analyze the total impact of a proposed regulation on small busi-
nesses during the rulemaking process. It also closes loopholes used
by agencies to avoid compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act
and the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act
of 1996.
3. S. 1419—Early Participation in Regulations Act—This bill di-
rects agencies to publish advance notice of a proposed rulemaking
at least 90 days before publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking
for a major rule that the Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs (OIRA) determines is likely to impose (1) an annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more; (2) a major increase in costs
or prices for consumers, individual industries, government agen-
cies, or geographic regions; or (3) significant adverse effects on com-
petition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, health,
safety, the environment, or the ability of U.S. enterprises to com-
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pete with foreign-based enterprises.
The advance notice must:
include, among other information, a written a description of the
rule and the legal authority under which it is proposed; and
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solicit and provide a period of at least 60 days for submission
of written data, views, and argument from interested persons.
Any difference between such advance notice and the notice of
proposed rulemaking may not be considered arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.
Advance notice is not required if the proposing agency is not re-
quired to publish notice of proposed rulemaking or OIRA finds that
such advance notice is not in the public interest or duplicative of
another statutory requirement. Such a determination made by
OIRA is not subject to judicial review.
4. S. 1430—Representative Payee Fraud Prevention Act—This
bill prohibits a representative payee (i.e., a person designated to re-
ceive payments on behalf of a minor, a mentally incompetent indi-
vidual, or an individual under other legal disability) from embez-
zling or converting the amounts received from certain retirement
funds.
If the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determines that a
representative payee has embezzled or converted payments from
the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employees Re-
tirement System for a use other than the benefit of the individual
on whose behalf such payments were received, OPM shall (1) re-
voke the certification for payment of benefits to the representative
payee, and (2) certify payment to another representative payee or
to the individual.
5. S. 2169—A bill to amend section 3116 of title 5, United States
Code, to clarify the applicability of the appointment limitations for
students appointed under the expedited hiring authority for post-
secondary students.This bill revises a provision that limits the au-
thority of an agency to appoint, through expedited hiring authority,
post-secondary students to an agency position at the GS–11 level.
Further, the bill authorizes an agency to grant paid leave for up
to (1) 20 days of rest and recuperation to a civilian employee serv-
ing in a combat zone or other high risk, high threat post; and (2)
5 days to a civilian employee serving in a foreign area for local
holidays observed in such area.
6. S. 2757—Harmless Error Lesser Penalty for Small Business
Act—This bill prohibits an agency from imposing a civil fine on a
small business for a first-time paperwork violation, with the excep-
tions that the agency may levy a fine for a violation that (1) inter-
feres with the detection of criminal activity; (2) contravenes an in-
ternal revenue law; or (3) endangers public health, safety, or the
environment. However, an agency must track each first-time viola-
tion and report each waiver or reduction of a civil penalty for the
violation.
7. S. 3412—Guidance Clarity Act—This bill requires Federal
agencies to state on the first page of guidance documents that such
guidance (1) does not have the force and effect of law, and (2) is
intended only to provide clarity to the public about existing legal
requirements or agency policies. Excluded from this requirement is
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guidance directed to the issuing agency or other agency that is not
intended to have a substantial effect on the behavior of regulated
parties, as well as internal executive branch legal advice or opin-
ions addressed to executive branch officials.
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8. S. 4138—Telework for U.S. Innovation Act—This bill makes
permanent the Telework Enhancement Act Pilot Program in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The program allows
USPTO employees to telework from locations across the United
States; USPTO may cover any necessary travel expenses to and
from an agency worksite. The program is set to expire on December
31, 2020.
9. S. 4691—Safeguarding Awards for Victims and Enforcement
Settlements Act—Previous administrations have directed DOJ set-
tlement money be issued to third parties with no direct interest in
or claim to the settlement, subverting Congress’s spending and
oversight authority. SAVES Act resolves this issue by preventing
third party payments except in limited circumstances where a third
party is necessary for a fair result. Specifically, it prohibits the gov-
ernment from entering into or enforcing an enforcement settlement
agreement on behalf of the US that directs or provides for a pay-
ment or loan to any person or entity other than the US except to:
directly remedy actual harm (including to the environment) caused
by the party making the payment or loan, pay for services rendered
in connection with the case, or pay for court ordered restitution to
victims in certain criminal cases or other persons in plea agree-
ments.
10. S. 4693—Better Evaluation of Science and Technology Act—
This bill requires Federal agencies to use the best available sci-
entific information during rulemaking and publish specified docu-
mentation of the rulemaking process.
Specifically, the bill requires a Federal agency, to the extent it
is making a decision based on science when issuing a rule, to use
scientific information, technical procedures, methods, protocols,
methodologies, or models in a manner that is consistent with the
best available science and the intended use of the information,
based on the weight of the scientific evidence.
Each Federal agency shall make available to the public (1) all of
its notices, determinations, findings, rules, consent agreements,
and orders in connection with a rule; (2) a nontechnical summary
of each risk evaluation conducted in connection with a rule; and (3)
a list of the studies considered by the agency in carrying out each
evaluation, along with the results of those studies.
11. S. 4708—Pandemic Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
Act—This bill establishes in the legislative branch the Pandemic
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Commission to make rec-
ommendations and propose legislation for modification, consolida-
tion, harmonization, or repeal of regulations to reduce compliance
costs, encourage growth and innovation, improve competitiveness,
and protect public safety.
The commission must give priority to regulations (1) the repeal
or modification of which may assist recovery or response to the
COVID–19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019) pandemic and future
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pandemics, (2) that impose disproportionately high costs on a small
entity, (3) that create substantial recurring paperwork burdens or
transaction costs, or (4) that could be made more effective while re-
ducing regulatory costs.
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The bill sets forth reporting requirements for the commission and
procedures for congressional consideration of commission reports,
recommendations, and proposed legislation.
12. S. 4977—Retirement Annuity Supplement Clarity Act—Clari-
fies that OPM has the flexibility to follow a court order, if that
order specifically divides the annuity supplement, rather than the
blanket approach applied now. Repays annuitants who were retired
on or before June 30, 2016, and entitled to an annuity supplement
that was subject to a court order that was silent on division of the
supplement, or expressly excluded the supplement from division;
and whose annuity supplement was recomputed retroactively.
Clarifies that any collection of overpayments to former spouses due
to this recalculation shall be waived.
IV. GAO REPORTS
During the 116th Congress, the Government Accountability Of-
fice (GAO) issued 8 reports at the request of the Subcommittee. Re-
ports are listed here by title, GAO number, and release date.
1. Grants Management: Agency Action Required to Ensure
Grantees Identify Federal Contribution Amounts. GAO–19–282.
March 14, 2018.
2. Federal Workforce: Key Talent Management Strategies for
Agencies to Better Meet their Missions. GAO–19–181. March 28,
2019.
3. Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly Com-
municate Practices Associated with Identity Information in the
Public Comment Process. GAO–19–483. June 26, 2019.
4. Federal Vehicle Fleets: Agencies have continued to Incorporate
Alternative Fuel Vehicles into Fleets, but Challenges Remain.
GAO–19–397. July 26, 2019.
5. Human Capital: Improving Federal Recruiting and Hiring Ef-
forts. GAO–19–696T. July 30, 2019.
6. Federal Rulemaking: Selected Agencies Should Clearly Com-
municate Public Comment Posting Practices Associated with Iden-
tity Information. GAO–20–105T. October 24, 2019.
7. Federal Rulemaking: Information on Selected Agencies’ Man-
agement of Public Comments. GAO–20–383R. April 16, 2020.
8. Federal Telework: Key Practices that can help ensure the Suc-
cess of Telework Programs. GAO–21–238T. November 18, 2020.
Æ
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