Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act
Summary
House Report 117–667, Part 1, is the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted by Mr. Meeks and ordered to be printed December 30, 2022, with dissenting views, on H.R. 3524, the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act, or EAGLE Act. The Committee reports favorably with an amendment the bill to revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, and recommends that it do pass. The table of contents places the amendment at page 2, the purpose and summary at page 163 and the dissenting views at page 263. The text read ends with the start of the amendment.
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“Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act.”
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117TH CONGRESS REPT. 117–667
" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES !
2d Session Part 1
ENSURING AMERICAN GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND
ENGAGEMENT ACT
DECEMBER 30, 2022.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. MEEKS, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 3524]
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 3524) to revitalize and reassert United States leadership, in-
vestment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2
Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 163
Background and Need for Legislation .................................................................... 164
Hearings ................................................................................................................... 165
Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 168
Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 230
New Budget Authority, Tax Expenditures, And Congressional Budget Office
Estimates .............................................................................................................. 230
Non-Duplication of Federal Programs ................................................................... 231
Performance Goals and Objectives ......................................................................... 231
Congressional Accountability Act ........................................................................... 231
New Advisory Committees ...................................................................................... 231
Earmark Identification ............................................................................................ 231
Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 231
Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 263
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 273
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AMENDMENT
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ensuring American Global Lead-
ership and Engagement Act’’ or the ‘‘EAGLE Act’’.
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.
TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
Subtitle A—Science and Technology
Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and manage-
ment.
Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards.
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign energy development.
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion.
Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion.
Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements.
Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition.
Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leadership.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross-border payment and financial
messaging systems.
TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review.
Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act.
Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act.
Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking.
Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation for vaccine
manufacturing.
Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic national security and economic
objectives.
Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic.
Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program.
Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.
Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021.
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Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding.
Subtitle B—International Security Matters
Sec. 221. Appropriate committees of Congress.
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Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the
Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization.
Sec. 226. Identification of PLA–supported institutions.
Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power
Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement.
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement.
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations.
Sec. 234. Junior professional officers.
Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations.
Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power
Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world.
PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens.
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human rights, and the rule of law in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the Carib-
bean.
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human
rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies.
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Sec. 250. United States-Caribbean Resilience Partnership.
Sec. 251. Countering China’s educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America.
Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean.
PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS
Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on transatlantic relationships.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and between China and Russia.
PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review.
PART IV—AFRICA
Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People’s Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks.
Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification.
PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People’s Republic of China-Iran relationship.
PART VI—ARCTIC REGION
Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on the Arctic Council.
PART VII—OCEANIA
Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue.
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.
PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS
Sec. 295. Short title.
Sec. 296. Findings.
Sec. 297. Statement of policy.
Sec. 298. Definition.
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports.
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners.
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime.
Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands.
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Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands.
TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
Sec. 301. Statement of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.
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Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong Kong.
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people’s freedom and choice.
Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
tonomous Region.
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor.
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection.
Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession or reincarnation of the Dalai
Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall circumvention tools for the peo-
ple of Hong Kong.
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with respect to human rights violations.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to international abuses of human rights.
Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games.
Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses.
Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy.
Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or invol-
untary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech.
Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent
United States laws and protections.
Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province.
Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.
Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information.
TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the People’s Republic of China’s industrial policy.
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy.
Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies.
TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of China on nuclear issues and bal-
listic missile issues.
Sec. 503. Countering the People’s Republic of China’s proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology
to the Middle East.
TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with the People’s Republic of China and other
countries account for environmental issues and climate change.
Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions.
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Ini-
tiative.
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and economic interests.
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy.
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and security.
Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation through the Green Climate
Fund.
Sec. 610. Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action.
Sec. 611. Working with international partners to reduce deforestation.
Sec. 612. Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United States supply chains.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the
term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese Communist Party.
(3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’
and ‘‘PLA’’ mean the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.
(4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and ‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic
of China.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its political, diplomatic,
economic, military, technological, and ideological power to become a strategic,
near-peer, global competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly pur-
sued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the interests and values of
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the United States, its partners, and much of the rest of the world.
(2) A number of policies being pursued by the PRC—
(A) threaten the future character of the international order and are shap-
ing the rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among states;
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(B) will put at risk the ability of the United States to secure its national
interests; and
(C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, and freedom of the inter-
national community in the coming decades.
(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, the United
States actively worked to advance the PRC’s economic and social development
to ensure that it participated in, and benefited from, the free and open inter-
national order. The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the
welfare of the Chinese people by—
(A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations and access to global capital mar-
kets;
(B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization;
(C) providing development finance and technical assistance;
(D) promoting research collaboration;
(E) educating the PRC’s top students;
(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge technologies and scientific knowl-
edge; and
(G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue state-led, mercantilist
economic policies, an increasingly authoritarian governance model at home
through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and as-
sertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and deliberately undermine
United States interests and are contrary to core United States values and the
values of other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this
strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been compelled to reexam-
ine and revise its strategy towards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the
international order.
(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the People’s Re-
public of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the ‘‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chi-
nese Nation’’ as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His pro-
gram demands—
(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
(B) concentration of military power;
(C) a dominant role for the CCP in the state and the economy;
(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control over broadly asserted ter-
ritorial claims; and
(E) the denial of any universal values and individual rights that are
deemed to threaten the CCP.
(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance as superior to, and at
odds with, the constitutional models of the United States and other democ-
racies. This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to secur-
ing the PRC’s status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of the world.
In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, ‘‘We firmly believe that as social-
ism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that
the superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and]
our country’s road of development will have increasingly greater influence on
the world.’’.
(7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish regional hegemony over the
Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be-
come the ‘‘leading world power’’, shaping an international order that is condu-
cive to the its interests. Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC
into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a strong military and ad-
vanced technological capability to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of
other countries’ interests.
(8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order, which is built upon
the rule of law and free and open ideals and principles, by conducting global
information and influence operations, seeking to redefine international laws and
norms to align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy of inter-
nationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and
agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit of the PRC and other au-
thoritarian regimes at the expense of the interests of the United States and the
international community.
(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its model of development
and governance. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi
said that the PRC could serve as a model of development for other countries
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by utilizing ‘‘Chinese wisdom’’ and a ‘‘Chinese approach to solving problems’’.
(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and attempting to weaken
other models of governance by—
(A) undermining democratic institutions;
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(B) subverting financial institutions;
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies of the PRC; and
(D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of the actions described
in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
(11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming the global leader in science and
technology. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to reach
‘‘prosperity and rejuvenation’’, it needs to ‘‘endeavor to be a major world center
for science and innovation’’. The PRC has invested the equivalent of billions of
dollars into education and research and development and established joint sci-
entific research centers and science universities.
(12) The PRC’s drive to become a ‘‘manufacturing and technological super-
power’’ and to promote ‘‘innovation with Chinese characteristics’’ is coming at
the expense of human rights and longstanding international rules and norms
with respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to United States
national security and the security of allies and like-minded countries. In par-
ticular, the PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies through mass
surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of the state in internet
governance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct and indirect gov-
ernment control over its citizens’ everyday lives. Its national strategy of ‘‘civil-
military fusion’’ mandates that civil and commercial research, which increas-
ingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to develop new military capabilities.
(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve its objective of be-
coming a manufacturing and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-di-
rected industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of
PRC companies. The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
dermine a free and open international market, such as intellectual property
theft, forced technology transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and man-
datory CCP access to proprietary data as part of business and commercial
agreements between Chinese and foreign companies.
(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) are designed to freeze United
States and other foreign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competi-
tion in other important markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies
includes potential violation of its World Trade Organization commitments. In
May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC aims to keep the ‘‘initiatives
of innovation and development security . . . in [China’s] own hands’’.
(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a variety of avenues,
including its signature initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in
this section as ‘‘BRI’’), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and in-
cludes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as
a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all countries. Eventually, it
seeks to create a web of economic relations with the PRC at its center, making
it the most concrete geographical representation of the PRC’s global ambitions.
BRI increases the economic influence of state-owned PRC firms in global mar-
kets, enhances the PRC’s political leverage with government leaders around the
world, and provides greater access to strategic nodes such as ports and rail-
ways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic de-
pendence.
(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional hegemony over the
Indo-Pacific and displace the United States from the region. As a Pacific power,
the United States has built and supported enduring alliances and economic
partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of law and
political pluralism in a free and open Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses
economic and military coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
(17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep the United States military
from operating in the Western Pacific and erodes United States security guar-
antees.
(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of critical land routes,
sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising
greater influence beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial
activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of security operations
in areas permitted under international law.
(19) The PRC seeks so-called ‘‘reunification’’ with Taiwan through whatever
means may ultimately be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called ‘‘reunifi-
cation’’ is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January
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2019, General Secretary Xi stated that the PRC ‘‘make[s] no promise to re-
nounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking all necessary means’’.
Taiwan’s embodiment of democratic values and economic liberalism challenges
General Secretary Xi’s goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans
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to exploit Taiwan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain and
to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an illegal island-building
campaign that threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of commerce,
damages the environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, and
coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to advance its un-
lawful claims and control the waters around neighboring countries. Despite
General Secretary Xi’s September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was
not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress,
General Secretary Xi announced that ‘‘construction on islands and reefs in the
South China Sea have seen steady progress’’.
(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a level of capacity and
capability superior to the United States in terms of equipment and conduct of
modern military operations by shifting its military doctrine from having a force
‘‘adequate [for] China’s defensive needs’’ to having a force ‘‘commensurate with
China’s international status’’. Ultimately, this transformation could enable
China to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military
force. In 2017, General Secretary Xi established the following developmental
benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
(A) A mechanized force with increased informatized and strategic capa-
bilities by 2020.
(B) The complete modernization of China’s national defense by 2035.
(C) The full transformation of the PLA into a world-class force by 2050.
(22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies described in this section un-
dermine United States interests, such as—
(A) upholding a free and open international order;
(B) maintaining the integrity of international institutions with liberal
norms and values;
(C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific;
(D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
(E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
(F) fostering the free flow of commerce through open and transparent
markets; and
(G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
(23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has intensified and accelerated these
trends in the PRC’s behavior and therefore increased the need for United States
global leadership and a competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the
world’s focus on the COVID–19 pandemic by—
(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, including im-
posing a so-called ‘‘national security law’’ on Hong Kong;
(B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and South China Seas;
(C) increasing its territorial aggression in South Asia, including against
India; and
(D) engaging in a widespread and government-directed disinformation
campaign to obscure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up the serious-
ness of COVID–19, sow confusion about the origination of the outbreak, and
discredit the United States, its allies, and global health efforts.
(24) The CCP’s disinformation campaign referred to in paragraph (24)(D) has
included—
(A) concerted efforts, in the early days of the pandemic, to downplay the
nature and scope of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well as cases
of person-to-person transmission;
(B) claims that the virus originated in United States biological defense
research at Fort Detrick, Maryland;
(C) Chinese state media reports insinuating a possible link between the
virus and other United States biological facilities; and
(D) efforts to block access to qualified international infectious disease ex-
perts who might contradict the CCP’s narrative.
(25) In response to the PRC’s strategy and policies, the United States must
adopt a policy of strategic competition with the PRC to protect and promote our
vital interests and values.
(26) The United States policy of strategic competition with respect to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China is part of a broader strategic approach to the Indo-Pa-
cific and the world that aligns with cooperation with United States allies and
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partners to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance
a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse region.
(27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) con-
tributed to a comprehensive framework for promoting United State security in-
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terests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pacific region, investing
$7,500,000,000 over 5 years—
(A) to support greater security and defense cooperation between the
United States and allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) to advance democracy and the protection and promotion of human
rights in the Indo-Pacific region;
(C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation between the United States and
partners in the Indo-Pacific;
(D) to deepen people-to-people engagement through programs such as the
Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth Volun-
teers program; and
(E) to enhance energy cooperation and energy security in the Indo-Pacific
region.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United States to pursue the following ob-
jectives:
(1) The United States global leadership role is sustained and its political sys-
tem and major foundations of national power are secured for the long-term in
the political, economic, technological, and military domains.
(2) The United States position as an indispensable power in the Indo-Pacific
and globally is sustained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and engagement.
(3) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both
nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(4) The United States and its allies maintain a stable balance of power in the
Indo-Pacific with China. The United States and its allies maintain unfettered
access to the region, including through freedom of navigation and the free flow
of commerce, consistent with international law and practice.
(5) The allies and partners of the United States—
(A) maintain confidence in United States leadership and its commitment
to the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) can withstand and combat subversion by the PRC; and
(C) work closely with the United States in setting global rules, norms,
and standards that benefit the international community.
(6) The combined economic and military strength of the United States and its
allies and partners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of attempts to domi-
nate other states outweigh the potential benefits.
(7) The United States leads the free, open, and rules-based international
order, which comprises resilient states and institutions that uphold and defend
principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human
rights. The international order is strong enough to withstand attempts at desta-
bilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.
(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of international engagement in the
21st century are maintained, including—
(A) the protection of human rights, commercial engagement and invest-
ment, and technology; and
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in alignment with the val-
ues and interests of the United States, its allies and partners, and other
stakeholders in the liberal international order.
(9) The United States counters attempts by the PRC to—
(A) undermine open and democratic societies;
(B) distort global markets;
(C) manipulate the international trade system;
(D) coerce other nations via economic, cyber, and military means; or
(E) use its technological advantages to undermine individual freedoms or
other states’ national security interests.
(10) The United States deters military confrontation with the PRC and both
nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of the objectives set
forth in subsection (a)—
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by reinvesting in
market-based economic growth, education, scientific and technological innova-
tion, democratic institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the
United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and national security
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
interests;
(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political,
diplomatic, economic, development, security, informational, and technological
realms to maximize the United States’ strengths and increase the costs for the
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PRC of harming the interests and values of the United States and its partners
and allies;
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by the
rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commit-
ment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, good and
transparent governance, and freedom from coercion;
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships by pur-
suing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance
shared interests and values and bolster partner countries’ confidence that the
United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner that
respects the views and interests of its allies and friends;
(5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies and partners in
boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect
shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure;
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy, constructive competition
in United States-China economic relations by—
(A) advancing policies that harden the United States economy against un-
fair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United
States businesses; and
(B) improving United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent
any PRC attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness;
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets
around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools
that—
(A) support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-build-
ing initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law;
(B) promote open markets;
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks;
(D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
(E) combat corruption;
(F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner
countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sus-
tainable infrastructure; and
(G) support American workers and create American jobs;
(8) to play a leading role in advancing international rules and norms that fos-
ter free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets;
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States
companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition;
(10) to ensure that the United States is second to none in the innovation of
critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications,
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology,
by—
(A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the pri-
vate sector to accelerate development of such technologies;
(B) modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and
associated policies and regulations;
(C) enhancing the role of the United States in technical standards-setting
bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging
critical technologies;
(D) reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collabo-
ration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of crit-
ical technologies;
(E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies
by—
(i) coordinating and aligning export control measures;
(ii) building capacity for defense technology security;
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in strategically critical supply chains;
and
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
(F) designing major defense capabilities for export to vetted allies and
partners;
(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies and other willing partners
to promote ideals and principles that—
(A) advance a free and open international order;
(B) strengthen democratic institutions;
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
(C) protect and promote human rights; and
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and policies to counter PRC
disinformation campaigns;
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(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated
agencies, and other multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity and ef-
fectiveness of these organizations in facilitating solutions to global challenges;
(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights
in the United States relationship with the PRC;
(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations that
sustain and strengthen a free and open order and address regional and global
challenges posed by the Government of the PRC regarding—
(A) violations and abuses of human rights;
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and
(C) the undermining and abrogation of treaties, other international agree-
ments, and other international norms related to human rights;
(16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, and coercion to attain
unfair economic advantages or compel other nations to defer to its political and
strategic objectives in ways that threaten the United States or its allies and
partners;
(17) to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including
through necessary investments in United States military capabilities, policies,
and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust cooperation, exercises, and
interoperability with allies and partners;
(18) to deter the PRC from—
(A) initiating armed conflict;
(B) coercing nations; or
(C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict;
(19) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and
improve both military and civilian crisis avoidance and management procedures
to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including
through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military
officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and
(20) to strengthen stability and reduce suspicions, cooperate with the PRC
when interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at
the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially in the following areas—
(A) global fight against climate change;
(B) nuclear security; and
(C) global financial stability.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy described in section
3(b) requires the following actions:
(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally and in the Indo-Pacific will re-
quire the United States—
(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect its vital interests, pro-
mote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives;
and
(B) to achieve this sustained political will, persuade the American people
and United States allies and partners of—
(i) the current challenges facing the international rules based order;
and
(ii) the need for long-term investments and engagement to defend
shared interests and values.
(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies and partners to com-
pete effectively with the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners to as-
sume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking aggressive PRC
behavior.
(3) Effective United States strategy toward China requires—
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation
between the executive branch and Congress.
(4) The United States must ensure close integration among economic and for-
eign policymakers and provide support to the private sector, civil society, uni-
versities and academic institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open
societies to enable such actors—
(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
(B) to identify appropriate policies—
(i) to strengthen the United States and its allies; and
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a free and open order.
(5) The United States must ensure that all Federal departments, agencies,
and overseas missions are organized and resourced to effectively defend and ad-
vance United States interests, by—
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(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific region, at posts around
the world, and in Washington, DC;
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service officers, international de-
velopment professionals, members of the foreign commercial service, intel-
ligence professionals, and other United States Government personnel in the
Indo-Pacific region; and
(C) ensuring that this workforce has the training, demonstrated pro-
ficiency in language and culture, technical skills, and other competencies
required to advance a successful strategy in relation to the PRC.
(6) The United States must place renewed priority and emphasis on strength-
ening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, including diplomacy, in-
formation, technology, economics, foreign assistance and development finance,
commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing
the challenges posed by the PRC.
(7) The United States must sustain military capabilities necessary to achieve
United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—
(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-Pacific;
(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting them from coercion;
and
(C) deterring PRC aggression and preventing unwanted conflict.
(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful adaptation to the information
environment of the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging
efforts must effectively—
(A) promote the value of partnership with the United States; and
(B) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation that threatens United
States interests.
SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECU-
RITY FORCES.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, super-
sede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United States Govern-
ment under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d)
or section 362 of title 10, United States Code.
(b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE.—Nothing in this Act
may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.
TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN
COMPETITIVENESS
Subtitle A—Science and Technology
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.
(a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
tate the contracting by the Department of State for the professional services of
qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee for service basis, to assist interested United
States persons and business entities with supply chain management issues related
to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including—
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain production facilities to
locations outside the PRC;
(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to diversify supply chains
to locations outside of the PRC;
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in the course of the activi-
ties described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and
(4) identifying alternative markets for production or sourcing outside of the
PRC, including through providing market intelligence, facilitating contact with
reliable local partners as appropriate, and other services.
(b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons contracted to perform the services
described in subsection (a) shall—
(1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of Mission in the coun-
try in which they are hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
(2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of Commerce offi-
cers; and
(3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant local partners in
other countries as needed to carry out the services described in subsection (a).
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(c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The
services described in subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small-
, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters described in subsection
(a).
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated
$15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying
out this section.
(e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of
the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—
(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of the Government of
the PRC or the CCP, or other foreign adversary;
(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign individuals subject
to the jurisdiction, direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and
(3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the receipt of such funds,
or has had a contract within the previous one year that is no longer in effect,
with—
(A) the Government of the PRC;
(B) the CCP;
(C) the PLA;
(D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled, or majority-financed by
the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or
(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity described in subpara-
graph (D).
(f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘foreign ownership, control, or influence’’ and ‘‘FOCI’’
have the meanings given to those terms in the National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor document.
SEC. 102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, which leverages
economies of scale with major allies, is necessary for the United States to retain
its lead in defense technology;
(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of defense-related tech-
nologies and services to members of the national technology and industrial base
(as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance
United States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-related tech-
nologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the dependence on
other countries, including countries that pose challenges to United States inter-
ests around the world, for defense-related innovation and investment; and
(3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue to increase cooperation
with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland to protect critical defense-related technology and services and lever-
age the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maximize the
strategic edge afforded by defense technology innovation.
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that—
(A) describes the Department of State’s efforts to facilitate access among
the national technology and industrial base to defense articles and services
subject to the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
(B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, foreign policy, or other challenges
or considerations that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps
in the respective export control regimes implemented by United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada.
(2) FORM.—This report required under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but
may include a classified annex.
Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy
Development
SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate; and
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(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVEST-
MENT STANDARDS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COLLABORATIVE STANDARDS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States should initiate collaboration among governments, the
private sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards for qual-
ity global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, in-
cluding with respect to the following issues:
(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which infrastructure invest-
ments are made.
(2) Anti-corruption.
(3) Rule of law.
(4) Human rights and labor rights.
(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
(6) Social and governance safeguards.
(7) Transparency.
(8) Environmental and energy standards.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMITMENT TO COOPERATION.—It is the sense of
Congress that the United States should launch a series of fora around the world
showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the United States
to high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the issues de-
scribed in subsection (a).
SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA.
(a) FINDING.—It is in the national interest of the United States to establish a co-
ordinated interagency strategy to marshal the resources of the United States Gov-
ernment to provide foreign countries with financing that strengthens independent
economic capacity and therefore reduces a foreign government’s need to enter into
agreements with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including to obtain support
from its Belt and Road Initiative.
(b) STRATEGY.—
(1) AUTHORITY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall develop and submit a strategy to the relevant con-
gressional committees to use the resources of Federal agencies to counteract of-
fers of assistance and financing from the PRC to foreign governments that are
of strategic importance to the United States.
(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy shall—
(A) identify primary sectors where the United States could provide a com-
petitive advantage to increase a country’s economic independence;
(B) select countries with corresponding economic needs, with priority
given to those who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influence;
(C) identify any corresponding existing financing available from United
States Government entities to prioritize and devise specific financing tai-
lored to the needs of such foreign governments if none are currently avail-
able;
(D) identify any cooperative and complementary assistance and financing
from friendly foreign governments, including coordinated assistance and co-
financing;
(E) create a streamlined decision-making process, directed by the Na-
tional Security Council, to devise financing and make agency decisions and
commitments on a timely basis to support United States competitive offers;
(F) establish a formal G7+European Commission Working Group to de-
velop a comprehensive strategy to develop alternatives to the PRC’s Belt
and Road Initiative for development finance; and
(G) integrate existing efforts into the strategy, including efforts to ad-
dress the Government of the PRC’s use of the United Nations to advance
the Belt and Road Initiative, including the proliferation of memoranda of
understanding between the PRC and United Nations funds and programs
regarding the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.
(3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating Federal agencies should include
the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), United States International Development
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Finance Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, United States Trade
and Development Agency, Department of Commerce, and other Federal depart-
ments and agencies as appropriate.
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(4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President should issue an Executive Order
to implement the strategy and make such changes in agency regulations and
procedures as are necessary to put the strategy into effect.
(5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘rel-
evant congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;
and
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate.
(c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of
the USAID, is authorized to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the
‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’, under which the Secretary of
State, in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those rep-
resented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may carry out var-
ious programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-
quality infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by—
(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve project evaluation
processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and project preparation
capacity of countries that are partners of the United States in such develop-
ment;
(2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance
to support sustainable infrastructure; and
(3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development
of infrastructure, including infrastructure that uses United States manufac-
tured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
(d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and
Assistance Network’’ described under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
thorized to provide support, including through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for
advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate con-
tracts and assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastruc-
ture projects, including through providing services such as—
(1) legal services;
(2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
(3) debt sustainability analyses;
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
(5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, trans-
parent, and high-quality infrastructure.
(e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.——
(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance
Network’’ described under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to
provide support, including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for tech-
nical assistance, project preparation, pipeline development, and other infra-
structure project support.
(2) JOINT STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the
Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in coordination with the Depart-
ment of Defense, the International Development Finance Corporation, like-
minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint
infrastructure projects that are in the national security interest of the United
States and vulnerable to strategic competitors.
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated,
for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction
and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 should be made available for the
Transaction Advisory Fund.
SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-year, whole
of government effort, in consultation with the private sector, to counter predatory
lending and financing, including in the form of providing support to companies in-
corporated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that engage in such activities,
by the Government of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing countries.
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs and capacities of
developing countries, and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-
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owned industries and other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nation-
als providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including direct financing
by the PRC government, PRC financial institutions, or direct state support to
state-owned enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
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(2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, and diplomatic en-
gagement on power sector reforms, to expand the development and deployment
of advanced energy technologies in developing countries;
(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial products on
terms that advance domestic economic and local employment opportunities, uti-
lize advanced energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when
appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products as alternatives
to the predatory lending tools offered by Chinese financial institutions;
(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international financial and multilat-
eral institutions to leverage investment in advanced energy technologies in de-
veloping countries; and
(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the cooperative development of
advanced energy technologies with countries of strategic significance, particu-
larly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by
the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that negatively impact
other countries.
(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.—Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a United States Government strategy to in-
crease United States exports of advanced energy technologies to—
(1) improve energy security in allied and developing countries;
(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent energy markets;
(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading relationships; and
(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.
SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN EN-
ERGY DEVELOPMENT.
(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report that—
(1) identifies priority countries for deepening United States engagement on
energy matters, in accordance with the economic and national security interests
of the United States and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
(2) describes the involvement of the Government of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, oper-
ation, financing, or ownership of energy generation facilities, transmission infra-
structure, or energy resources in the countries identified in paragraph (1);
(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and implications for United States
national interests and the interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1),
with respect to the PRC’s involvement and influence in developing country en-
ergy production or transmission; and
(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United States to partner with
the countries identified in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared
interests between the United States and such countries.
(b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in subsection (a) shall be published
on the Department of State’s website.
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership
SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States played a leadership role in constructing the architec-
ture, rules, and norms governing the international economic order following the
Second World War, yielding decades of domestic economic and geopolitical pros-
perity and stability.
(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), an economic pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered 40
percent of the world economy, leading the 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries
to sign the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Part-
nership (CPTPP) the following year, setting high-standard rules for regional
economic engagement.
(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
along with South Korea, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed the
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Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s biggest
trade deal in terms of GDP.
(4) Reduced United States economic engagement has led United States allies
and partners to question the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific re-
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16
gion. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices, the People’s Republic of
China is taking advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partnerships in the
region and promoting its own state-led economic model.
(5) The United States is increasingly on the outside looking in with regards
to economic pacts in the Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agree-
ments puts it at both a strategic and competitive disadvantage in the region
and allows competitors to expand their economic influence at the United States’
expense.
(6) Given that these partnerships and agreements will define the rules and
norms that will govern regional commerce over the coming decades, the United
States is currently not well positioned to shape the coming economic landscape.
(7) It is in the United States’ vital interest to upgrade its economic engage-
ment and leadership in the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to strength-
en its commercial diplomacy to fully participle in the region’s economic dyna-
mism.
SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT GLOBALLY OF THE PEOPLE’S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative
and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that describes the global trade and investment diplomacy and en-
gagement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade, including
any bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements it has signed, and
their impact on the United States economy, American companies and workers, as
well as on the countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC and the
global economy as a whole.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall include the following:
(1) A survey and comparison of the PRC’s international economic practices,
which will—
(A) provide an overview of the PRC’s distortive trade policies;
(B) list the PRC’s trade and investment agreements globally, both agree-
ments it has signed or entered into and any ongoing negotiations it has
with individual countries or groups of countries;
(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC uses to advance its inter-
national economic objectives, including economic and commercial dialogues
and BRI related activities;
(D) compare the United States and Chinese approaches and priorities on
trade and investment with major global economies, United States allies,
and for each region of the world; and
(E) outline what further steps the PRC may take in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion to bolster its economic position and influence.
(2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC’s trade and investment policies,
including—
(A) the impact of these trade and investment agreements on the PRC’s
economy, with a focus on its trade and investment profile, the impact on
the PRC’s economic growth and per-capita income, and the impact on the
profitability and market share of Chinese companies and SOEs;
(B) the impact of these agreements on the PRC’s political and diplomatic
relations with the countries it entered into agreements with and by region;
and
(C) the impact of the PRC’s trade and investment relationships with
other countries on the market share of United States companies.
SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PA-
CIFIC.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that United States national
interests and the primacy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately
tied to the following economic objectives:
(1) Deepening United States trade and investment relationships in the region,
especially with key allies and partners.
(2) Confirming American leadership and participation in global regional eco-
nomic organizations and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral agreements on trade and in-
vestment, as well as negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States eco-
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nomic leadership by writing the rules of the road on critical economic questions.
(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains for industries critical for
United States national interest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and per-
sonal protective equipment.
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(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a market-based economic model.
(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Represent-
ative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress that presents the steps the United States is taking and plans
to take to achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and includes specific ac-
tion plans for the following:
(1) Enhancing United States trade and investment relationships in the region
bilaterally and plurilaterally, especially with United States allies and the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations.
(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component of the region’s economic archi-
tecture.
(3) Work to ensure that the United States absence from the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not undermine the United States’ abil-
ity to shape regional trade and investment rules.
(4) Working with allies and partners to build resilient and trusted supply
chains especially for critical and emerging technologies, including semiconduc-
tors, and products and components critical for national health, including vac-
cines and related materials and personal protective equipment.
(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-standards and rules for the re-
gion in the following areas:
(A) Advanced technologies and the digital sphere.
(B) Labor practices and environmental standards.
(C) Intellectual property rights.
(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the PRC’s unfair trade and eco-
nomic practices, with a specific focus on—
(A) subsidies and unfair competition by state-owned enterprises; and
(B) corruption and politicized infrastructure.
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce.
SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE
ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States has benefitted from the regional economic integration
agenda of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its incep-
tion in 1989;
(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 21 member economies that, as
of 2018, accounted for 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global trade;
(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in trade barriers, harmonization
of regulations, and enhanced access to global value chains, while raising the
profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, and in-
clusive growth;
(4) it is in the United States interest to engage and lead at APEC to push
for an open and inclusive regional economy that benefits United States workers,
consumers, and businesses and better integrates the United States economy
with others in the region;
(5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 2011, it was able to promote
United States interests, while reassuring allies and partners about its strong
commitment to the region in the economic arena;
(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum to make progress on several
United States priorities, that are shared by United States allies and partners,
including—
(A) making regional commerce more inclusive;
(B) fostering innovation and digitization; and
(C) addressing climate change and environmental protection;
(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous opportunity to leverage Amer-
ican leadership to shape the regional economic agenda;
(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States to advance several of its own
priorities in the region, including to—
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(A) expand the participation of APEC stakeholders to include labor
groups, environmental advocates, and other part of civil society;
(B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and promote small and medium en-
terprises;
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(C) spotlight best practices and plans to upgrade skills for the next-gen-
eration of technology jobs;
(D) advance a climate and sustainable trade and development agenda
with a focus on green technologies, infrastructure and finance; and
(E) advance work on digital trade, including by expanding rules on data
privacy, promoting digital inclusiveness and promoting the free flow of
data; and
(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United States should immediately an-
nounce its interest to host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secretariat
and like-minded APEC members to build support.
SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COERCION.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
whole-of-government strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against third coun-
tries that includes the following:
(1) An explanation of the means available to the United States, with the co-
operation of allies, to enable a country with a smaller economy to withstand
such coercion.
(2) A description of the role that the Secretary of State, acting through the
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in
the imposition of reputational costs on the PRC for conducting economic coer-
cion.
(3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, the
head of each element of the intelligence community (as such term is defined by
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Rep-
resentative, and the United States International Development Finance Corpora-
tion in implementing such strategy.
(b) UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the submission of the strat-
egy under subsection (a), and every 2 years thereafter for 8 years, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment of the im-
plementation and effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the past year,
and planned changes to the strategy.
(c) FORM.—The strategy and update required by subsections (a) and (b), respec-
tively, shall be submitted in classified form with an unclassified summary.
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the
term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives;
and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.
(a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SETTING.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States must lead in international bodies that set the govern-
ance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to ensure
that these technologies operate within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable dig-
ital domain.
(b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It is the sense of Congress that the
United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an international effort
that uses all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the ex-
panding use of information and communications technology products and services to
surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as ‘‘digital
authoritarianism’’).
(c) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE.—It is the sense of Congress
that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of informa-
tion, including the ability to safely consume or publish information without fear of
undue reprisals, is maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly inte-
gral mechanism for communication.
(d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the
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United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt a set of common prin-
ciples and standards for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such tech-
nologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they are governments or other
entities, and that they do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.
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SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated United States dependence on dig-
ital tools, international rules around digital governance and trade have re-
mained largely piecemeal;
(2) the People’s Republic of China is operating under and advancing a set of
digital rules that are contrary to United States values and interests, and those
of United States allies and partners;
(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and bilateral digital trade agree-
ments, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership, the Singapore-Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the
Singapore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have
emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States should be driving;
(4) the United States has already underscored the need for such agreements
by signing the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and includ-
ing a robust digital trade or e-commerce chapter in the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement;
(5) a regional deal on digital governance and trade would allow the United
States to unite a group of like-minded economies around common standards and
norms, including the principles of openness, inclusiveness, fairness, trans-
parency, and the free flow of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the
global economy;
(6) such an agreement would facilitate the creation of common rules and
standards that govern cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, and cy-
bersecurity at a time of growing digital vulnerabilities for individuals, busi-
nesses, and institutions around the world;
(7) such an agreement would facilitate the participation of small and medium-
sized enterprises in the global economy through trade facilitation measures, in-
cluding e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-payment; and
(8) the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Sec-
retary of State should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or ar-
rangements relating to digital trade with the like-minded countries in the Indo-
Pacific region, the European Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes in-
telligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and allies, as appropriate.
SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.
(a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.—The President is
authorized to establish a program, to be known as the ‘‘Digital Connectivity and Cy-
bersecurity Partnership’’ to help foreign countries—
(1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital infrastructure;
(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and encourage open,
interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of
data, multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-competitive and
secure information and communications technology (ICT) policies and regula-
tions;
(3) promote and protect human rights and counter corruption and predatory
behavior throughout communications and cybersecurity policy and implementa-
tion;
(4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, disinformation and misinforma-
tion, and the use of digital technology and services to carry out criminal activity
or human rights violations;
(5) bolster the role of civil society in informing ICT policy and regulations;
(6) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services and increase
United States company market share in target markets;
(7) promote the innovation and diversification of ICT goods and supply chain
services to be less reliant on imports from the People’s Republic of China;
(8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, and promote best
practices for a national approach to cybersecurity; and
(9) enhance the security of their digital infrastructure to facilitate better in-
formation sharing with the United States and United States allies and partners,
as appropriate.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development shall jointly submit to the appropriate con-
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gressional committees an implementation plan for the 3-year period beginning on
the date of the submission of the plan to advance the goals identified in subsection
(a). The implementation plan shall also include a description of interagency respon-
sibilities to carry out implementation, a description of any barriers to successful im-
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plementation, and a description of any additional resources or authorities needed for
successful implementation.
(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the implementation plan required by subsection
(b), the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development shall consult with—
(1) the appropriate congressional committees;
(2) leaders of the United States industry;
(3) civil society leaders with expertise in technology, telecommunications, cy-
bersecurity, economic development and competitiveness, and human rights, in-
cluding from the Open Technology Fund;
(4) representatives from relevant United States Government agencies; and
(5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated
such sums as necessary for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this
section.
SEC. 129. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION.
It is the sense of Congress that National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan correctly
observed that the United States and likeminded democracies are in an ideological
competition with the People’s Republic of China, under the direction and control of
the Chinese Communist Party, when he stated, ‘‘China is essentially making the
case that the Chinese model is better than the American model. . . This is not any
longer some kind of implied contrast. It is an explicit statement that there is an
alternative model to the democratic market economy model that the United States
has been advancing over the course of decades.’’.
Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership
SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People’s Republic of China operates a system of state-owned financial
institutions including retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and in-
surers which are given favorable treatment under Chinese law while foreign fi-
nancial institutions have strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the
PRC.
(2) In order to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the PRC
Government committed to opening the credit card payment business to foreign
firms by 2006.
(3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its payment market, the United
States brought a case against the PRC before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO man-
dated that the PRC open its card payment market to global competitors.
(4) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Government refused to comply with
the ruling and maintained a rule that required all yuan-denominated payment
cards to use the PRC’s Union Pay network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese pay-
ment market had grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government approve the
application of foreign firms to enter the market.
(5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive capital controls, limiting access
to the Chinese market to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citizens
ability to control their money.
(6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that the
PRC would launch a technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai Stock
Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 2019.
(7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire Jack Ma referred to ‘‘pawnshop
mentality’’ of state-owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public offering
of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chinese regulators.
(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use of a fully digitized yuan,
which is set to be the world’s first central bank backed digital currency, and
the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority have al-
ready begun testing the cross-border functionality of the digital currency.
SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEAD-
ERSHIP.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
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(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global reserve currency has yielded sig-
nificant benefits to the United States and the American people by allowing the
United States to maintain economic independence, better control its monetary
policy, and finance government outlays;
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(2) American global leadership has benefited from the United States mone-
tary stability, creditworthiness, deep capital markets, and financial technology
innovations;
(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of American national security rely on
the United States role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade, and
source of economic opportunity;
(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key financial center of Hong Kong,
driving the creation of a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing for-
ward a Central Bank digital currency, the People’s Republic of China is at-
tempting to become the leading hub of finance in the world; and
(5) the United States must maintain its position as a global financial leader
to continue its broader global leadership role around the world.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall sub-
mit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—
(1) lists and examines the benefits to American foreign policy that derive from
the United States financial leadership and the dollar’s status as the world’s
global reserve currency;
(2) describes the actions taken by the People’s Republic of China that could
cement China’s role as the world’s leading financial center;
(3) analyzes the possible impact on American national security and foreign
policy were the yuan to supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve cur-
rency;
(4) outlines how the United States can work diplomatically with allies, part-
ners, and other nations to preserve a financial system that is free, open, and
fair; and
(5) identifies steps the United States can take to preserve its status as the
world’s leading financial center and maintain the dollar’s position as the global
reserve currency.
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives;
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.
(a) FINDINGS.—
(1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese companies sought to raise cap-
ital and list shares on American stock markets.
(2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese firms were delisted from the
New York Stock Exchange as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and other
corporate governance failures.
(3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the United States Government,
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memo-
randum of understanding with the China Securities Regulatory Commission
and the China Ministry of Finance for the production and exchange of audit
documents.
(4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regulators continue to hinder the
PCAOB’s access to relevant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to
carry out its enforcement duties.
(5) In August 2020, the Department of State sent a letter to American univer-
sities warning about national security implications related to Chinese stock
holdings.
(6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the President signed the Holding
Foreign Companies Accountable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires for-
eign companies listed on American stock markets to comply with PCAOB audit-
ing rules within three years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance
within three years will be delisted.
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that de-
scribes the costs and benefits to the United States posed by the presence of com-
panies incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that are listed on
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American stock exchanges or traded over the counter, in the form of American
depository receipts.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall—
(A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC that—
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(i) are listed or traded on one or several stock exchanges within the
United States, including over-the-counter market and ‘‘A Shares’’ added
to indexes and exchange-traded funds out of mainland exchanges in the
PRC; and
(ii) based on the factors for consideration described in paragraph (3),
have knowingly and materially contributed to—
(I) activities that undermine United States national security;
(II) serious abuses of internationally recognized human rights; or
(III) a substantially increased financial risk exposure for United
States-based investors;
(B) describe the activities of the companies identified pursuant to sub-
paragraph (A), and their implications for the United States; and
(C) develop policy recommendations for the United States Government,
State governments, United States financial institutions, United States eq-
uity and debt exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address the
risks posed by the presence in United States capital markets of the compa-
nies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.—In completing the report under
paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a company should be identi-
fied pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the company has—
(A) materially contributed to the development or manufacture, or sold or
facilitated procurement by the PLA, of lethal military equipment or compo-
nent parts of such equipment;
(B) contributed to the construction and militarization of features in the
South China Sea;
(C) been sanctioned by the United States or has been determined to have
conducted business with sanctioned entities;
(D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of intellectual property theft;
(E) engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
(F) contributed to the proliferation of nuclear or missile technology in vio-
lation of United Nations Security Council resolutions or United States sanc-
tions;
(G) contributed to the repression of religious and ethnic minorities within
the PRC, including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Auton-
omous Region;
(H) contributed to the development of technologies that enable censorship
directed or directly supported by the Government of the PRC; or
(I) contributed to other activities or behavior determined to be relevant
by the President.
(4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.—In completing the re-
port under paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the national security impli-
cations and consider the following factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3)
(except that such report should exclude from its analysis the delisting or poten-
tial delisting of companies from United States markets as a result of failing to
retain a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board-registered public account-
ing firm as required by section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C.
7214)):
(A) The possibility that banning or delisting companies from United
States markets could lead to an outflow of companies to list in the PRC.
(B) The possibility that banning or delisting companies from United
States markets could impact the status of the United States as the world’s
leading capital markets center, particularly vis-à-vis the PRC.
(C) The impact on American foreign policy and national security if United
States leadership in capital markets was weakened vis-à-vis the PRC.
(c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form.
(d) PUBLICATION.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be made acces-
sible to the public online through relevant United States Government websites.
SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-
BORDER PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS.
(a) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treas-
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ury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
diplomatic and economic implications of cross-border payment systems.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1)
shall—
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(A) assess the extent to which American diplomacy and global leadership
hinge upon the current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of cross-bor-
der payment and financial messaging systems;
(B) examine the durability of the Society for Worldwide Interbank Finan-
cial Telecommunication cooperative;
(C) review and analyze ways in which the Cross Border Interbank Pay-
ment Systems, cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital currencies could
erode this system; and
(D) analyze how changes to global cross-border payment systems could
undermine United States national security interests including impacts on
the efficacy of sanctions, the countering of terrorist finance, and the en-
forcement of anti-money laundering provisions.
(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form.
(c) PUBLICATION.—The report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to
the public online through relevant United States Government websites.
TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND
PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE
INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique
strategic advantage to the United States and are among the Nation’s most pre-
cious assets, enabling the United States to advance its vital national interests,
defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and com-
merce, establish enduring cooperation with allies while seeking to establish new
partnerships, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding
maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential ag-
gressors;
(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the
Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order
in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and
have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas such as
defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fun-
damental freedoms;
(3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion, including with India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and
Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues, and regional ar-
chitecture such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which are essential to further shared in-
terests;
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands consistent United
States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so that
they are postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained political
will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, technological, and security
cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive con-
sultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the
acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual
support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion;
(5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships ben-
efit United States adversaries and weaken the collective ability to advance
shared interests;
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(6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize human rights
throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert Group of the Inter-
national Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled ‘‘Climate
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24
and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific’’ noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of
the regions most vulnerable to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Sherri Goodman, Sec-
retary General of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in
the Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting
security throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food in-
security rises, and storms grow stronger and more frequent;
(8) the United State should continue to engage on and deepen cooperation
with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid
out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115–409), in the areas
of—
(A) forecasting environmental challenges;
(B) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable uses of forest
and water resources with the goal of preserving biodiversity and access to
safe drinking water;
(C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and
(D) meeting environmental challenges and developing resilience;
(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development,
should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and adapta-
tion strategy focusing on internal and external actions needed—
(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience to
weather-related impacts on strategic interests of the United States and
partners and allies of the United States in the region; and
(B) to address humanitarian and food security impacts of weather-related
changes in the region; and
(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain essential to the
evolving institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States—
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with and among
United States allies in the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through diplo-
matic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, sci-
entific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intel-
ligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations,
including—
(A) defending Japan consistent with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, done at
Washington, January 19, 1960, and all related and subsequent bilateral se-
curity agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of en-
actment of this Act;
(B) defending the Republic of Korea consistent with the Mutual Defense
Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, done at
Washington, October 1, 1953, and all related and subsequent bilateral secu-
rity agreements and arrangements concluded on or before the date of enact-
ment of this Act;
(C) defending the Philippines consistent with article IV of the Mutual De-
fense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Phil-
ippines, done at Washington, August 30, 1951, and all related and subse-
quent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on or be-
fore the date of enactment of this Act;
(D) defending Thailand consistent with the Southeast Asia Collective De-
fense Treaty (‘‘Manila Pact’’), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, under-
standing thereto the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962, and all related and
subsequent bilateral security agreements and arrangements concluded on
or before the date of enactment of this Act; and
(E) defending Australia consistent with the Security Treaty Between Aus-
tralia and the United States of America, done at San Francisco, September
1, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral security agreements and
arrangements concluded on or before the date of enactment of this Act;
(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States’ bilateral and regional part-
nerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;
(4) to cooperate with allies and partners to promote human rights across the
Indo-Pacific region bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora and
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pacts;
(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation
with regional partners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indo-
nesia, and India; and
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(6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustainable development of the
Mekong River Basin, including by providing support for environmental con-
servation and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-region and through as-
sistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, whose governments com-
prise the Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States efforts should focus
on increasing MRC member countries’ capacity in the sustainable conservation
and management of natural resources.
SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should continue to strengthen its co-
operation with Australia, India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the Quad-
rilateral Security Dialogue or ‘‘Quad’’) to enhance and implement a shared vi-
sion to meet regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient,
and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for democratic norms, rule of
law, and market-driven economic growth, and that is free from undue influence
and coercion;
(2) the United States should expand dialogue and cooperation through the
Quad with a range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation
and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial
integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resil-
ience in the Indo-Pacific;
(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders meeting on March 12,
2021, to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including
expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable ac-
cess, and to address shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical tech-
nologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances
the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-
Pacific region;
(4) building upon their announced commitment to finance 1,000,000,000 or
more COVID–19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region,
the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Co-
operation, including through partnerships other multilateral development
banks, should also venture to finance development and infrastructure projects
in the Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent, and sustainable;
(5) the United States should participate in the Resilient Supply Chain Initia-
tive launched by Australia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar initia-
tives that relocate supply chains in the health, economic, and national security
sectors to the United States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded coun-
tries; and
(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group could—
(A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior officials of the Quad
countries on a full spectrum of issues; and
(B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing bilateral intra-par-
liamentary groups between the United States and Mexico, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, as well as other formal and informal parliamentary ex-
changes.
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and cooperation with the
Quad.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A description of how the United States intends to demonstrate demo-
cratic leadership in the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engagement with
India, Japan, and Australia on shared interests and common challenges.
(B) A summary of—
(i) current and past Quad initiatives across the whole of the United
States Government, including to promote broad based and inclusive
economic growth, trade, and investment, and to advance technology co-
operation, energy innovation, climate mitigation and adaptation, phys-
ical and digital infrastructure development, education, disaster man-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
agement, and global health security;
(ii) proposals shared among Quad countries to deepen existing secu-
rity cooperation, intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, and mul-
tilateral coordination; and
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26
(iii) initiatives and agreements undertaken jointly with Quad coun-
tries, in addition to other like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, on
areas of shared interest.
(C) A description of efforts to jointly—
(i) expand ongoing COVID–19 cooperation to prepare for the next
pandemic by focusing on medium-term vaccine and medical supply pro-
duction and building a broader dialogue on global public health;
(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen regional economic engagement
and integration, and strengthen regional rules and standards around
trade and investment;
(iii) strengthen climate actions on mitigation, adaptation, resilience,
technology, capacity-building, and climate finance;
(iv) facilitate the development of quality infrastructure in the Indo-
Pacific through joint financing, investment, technical assistance, and
standards setting;
(v) enhance joint maritime security and maritime domain awareness
initiatives to protect the maritime commons and support international
law and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; and
(vi) develop international technology standards and share or co-de-
velop new innovative technologies of the future.
SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the govern-
ments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the United States, known
as the ‘‘Quad’’) with the goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad
Intra-Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer cooperation on shared inter-
ests and values.
(b) UNITED STATES GROUP.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the governments of the Quad countries
enter into a written agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a Quad
Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there shall be established a United States
Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-Parliamen-
tary Working Group.
(2) MEMBERSHIP.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall be comprised of not
more than 24 Members of Congress.
(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of Congress appointed to the United
States Group under subparagraph (A)—
(i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives from among Members of the House, not fewer than four of whom
shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and
(ii) half shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Sen-
ate, based on recommendations of the majority leader and minority
leader of the Senate, from among Members of the Senate, not fewer
than four of whom shall be members of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions (unless the majority leader and minority leader determine other-
wise).
(3) MEETINGS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The United States Group shall seek to meet not less
frequently than annually with representatives and appropriate staff of the
legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any other country invited
by mutual agreement of the Quad countries.
(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in subparagraph (A) may be held—
(i) in the United States;
(ii) in another Quad country during periods when Congress is not in
session; or
(iii) virtually.
(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—
(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the
United States Group from the House from among members of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs.
(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President Pro Tempore of the Senate shall
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designate the chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation of the
United States Group from the Senate from among members of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations.
(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
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27
(A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for
each fiscal years 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.
(B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year for which an appropriation is
made for the United States Group, half of the amount appropriated
shall be available to the delegation from the House of Representatives
and half of the amount appropriated shall be available to the delega-
tion from the Senate.
(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The amounts available to the delega-
tions of the House of Representatives and the Senate under clause (i)
shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved by the chairperson of the
delegation from the House of Representatives and the chairperson of
the delegation from the Senate, respectively.
(6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States Group may accept gifts or dona-
tions of services or property, subject to the review and approval, as appropriate,
of the Committee on Ethics of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Ethics of the Senate.
(7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The certificate of the chairperson of the
delegation from the House of Representatives or the delegation of the Senate
of the United States Group shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting
officers in the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.
(8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group shall submit to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an
appropriation is made for the United States Group, including a description of
its expenditures under such appropriation.
SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.
It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) as they respond to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in
building capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics and other public
health challenges;
(2) support high-level United States participation in the annual ASEAN Sum-
mit held each year;
(3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic engagement,
including the elimination of barriers to cross-border commerce, and support the
ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and
sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the United States
that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in technology, edu-
cation, disaster management, food security, human rights, and trade facilita-
tion, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest countries;
(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater integration and unity
within the ASEAN community, as well as to foster greater integration and unity
with non-ASEAN economic, political, and security partners, including Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;
(5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives such as United States-
ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC
and builds upon economic relationships in the region;
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and territorial disputes
in a constructive manner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic,
and, as necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration mecha-
nisms, consistent with international law, including through the adoption of a
code of conduct in the South China Sea that represents the interests of all par-
ties and promotes peace and stability in the region;
(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and territorial disputes in the
Indo-Pacific region, including the Government of the People’s Republic of
China—
(A) to cease any current activities, and avoid undertaking any actions in
the future, that undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes
through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and other features, and refrain
from new efforts to militarize, including the construction of new garrisons
and facilities and the relocation of additional military personnel, material,
or equipment;
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(C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent other countries from
exercising their sovereign rights to the resources in their exclusive economic
zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas in the
South China Sea that lack support in international law; and
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(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of administrative and military dis-
tricts in contested areas in the South China Sea;
(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that cause permanent phys-
ical damage to the marine environment and support the efforts of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines
to address the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
(9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common approach to encourage China
and the Philippines to comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case
against the People’s Republic of China’s excessive maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to continue joint efforts
with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and trafficking in persons and urge
ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance
and support to refugees and migrants;
(11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;
(12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN nations, including the
United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implemen-
tation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United
States-ASEAN Health Futures;
(13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN leaders the impor-
tance of promoting the rule of law and open and transparent government,
strengthening civil society, and protecting human rights, including releasing po-
litical prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary
killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom
of religion, and freedom of speech and expression;
(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address corruption in the
public and private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery
criminalization in the private sector, and build beneficial ownership trans-
parency through the ASEAN–USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the
South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA–PAC);
(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative as an example of
a people-to-people partnership that provides skills, networks, and leadership
training to a new generation that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border
cooperation and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global chal-
lenges of the future;
(16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the Young Southeast Asian
Leaders Initiative for other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people
partnerships with an emphasis on civil society leaders;
(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully upheld and im-
plemented all United Nations Security Council resolutions and international
agreements with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to
do the same; and
(18) allocate appropriate resources across the United States Government to
articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and supports
the crucial role of ASEAN and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning
and problem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.
SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘Young Southeast Asian Lead-
ers Initiative Act’’ or the ‘‘YSEALI Act’’.
(b) YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the Department of State the
Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (‘‘YSEALI’’) program.
(2) GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek to build to capacity of young
leaders in Southeast Asia to—
(A) support young leaders from Southeast Asia by offering professional
development and a global network to share expertise, including in the areas
of civic engagement, economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship,
education and environmental issues; and
(B) further strengthen the enduring partnership between the United
States and Southeast Asia and connect United States experts with YSEALI
participants.
(3) YSEALI PROGRAMS.—
(A) YSEALI ACADEMIC FELLOWS PROGRAM.—There is established the
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YSEALI Academic Fellows Program to bring students from YSEALI partner
countries to the United States for the purposes of building practical exper-
tise, leadership skills, and professional networks relating to one or more of
the YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award fellowships under
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29
the Academic Fellows Program to eligible individuals based on the fol-
lowing:
(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI partner country.
(ii) Status as a full-time undergraduate student, or recent graduate
of college, university, or other institutions of higher learning.
(iii) Other criteria determined appropriate by the Secretary.
(B) YSEALI PROFESSIONAL FELLOWS PROGRAM.—There is established the
YSEALI Professional Fellows Program to bring professionals from YSEALI
partner countries to the United States for the purposes of building practical
expertise, leadership skills, and professional networks relating to one or
more of the YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may award fellowships
under the Professional Fellows Program to eligible individuals based on the
following:
(i) Citizenship and residency in a YSEALI partner country.
(ii) Status as an emerging leader in government, civil society, or the
private sector, and demonstrated expertise relating to one or more of
the YSEALI themes.
(iii) Current employment, and two or more years of professional work
experience relevant to one or more YSEALI themes.
(iv) Other criteria determined appropriate by the Secretary.
(C) OTHER INITIATIVES.—The Secretary of State may designate other ini-
tiatives as YSEALI initiatives under this section if they advance the goals
of the YSEALI program as described in paragraph (2).
(4) ACTIVITIES.—
(A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State shall over-
see all United States-based activities carried out under the YSEALI pro-
gram, including the participation of YSEALI Academic Fellows in a pro-
gram at a United States university or college, and the participation of
YSEALI Professional Fellows at United States private and public sector or-
ganizations for individually-tailored work placements. Both fellowships may
include site visits, professional networking opportunities, leadership train-
ing, community service, and organized cultural activities, as appropriate.
(B) SOUTHEAST ASIA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State should
continue to support overseas initiatives of the program, including the fol-
lowing:
(i) Quality leadership training, professional development, and net-
working opportunities for YSEALI alumni.
(ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI Professional Fellows Program’s
United States professional hosts and interlocutors to support post-
United States exchange action plans and other related public diplomacy
goals, as appropriate.
(iii) Opportunities for networking with YSEALI alumni and profes-
sionals and experts who are American and Southeast Asian.
(iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop program, offering networking,
mentoring, hands-on training, and the tools necessary to lead commu-
nities in addressing economic, environmental, educational, and civic en-
gagement issues.
(v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Future program, providing small, com-
petitive grants to young leaders in Southeast Asia to improve their
communities, countries, and the region towards one or more of the
themes of civic engagement, economic empowerment and social entre-
preneurship, education, or environmental issues.
(vi) The YSEALI Academy at Fulbright University Vietnam, offering
executive-level seminars for entry to mid-level professionals around the
themes of technology and innovation, public policy, and entrepreneur-
ship.
(vii) The YSEALI Women’s Leadership Academy Program, enhancing
people-to-people ties and engagement with young and emerging leaders
by promoting gender equality and advancing the status of women and
girls, such as in the public health sector
(C) ALUMNI PLATFORM.—The Secretary of State is authorized to convene
current YSEALI participants and YSEALI alumni through a platform to
promote networking opportunities within the YSEALI community.
(D) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this paragraph, United States diplo-
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matic and consular posts, the Secretary of State, and agency external part-
ners managing and implementing the YSEALI program—
(i) shall promote United States policy goals in Southeast Asia by pro-
viding tools and resources to help young Southeast Asian leaders de-
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30
velop important skills and connections, including through online cam-
paigns and public diplomacy initiatives;
(ii) shall establish a system for monitoring, evaluating, and improv-
ing the YSEALI program; and
(iii) may accept financial contributions from foundations, corpora-
tions, private donors, program partners, and implementing agency ex-
ternal partners intended to foster the goals of the YSEALI program.
(5) REPORTS.—
(A) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a strategy for implementing the YSEALI pro-
gram, including the following:
(i) YSEALI program goals, targets, and planned outcomes for each
year and, separately, for the YSEALI program generally during the du-
ration of its implementation.
(ii) The continuation of YSEALI program monitoring and evaluation
plan, including metrics for measuring YSEALI program progress identi-
fication of annual YSEALI program goals, and targets.
(B) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enact-
ment of this section, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish
on a publicly available website of the Department a report on—
(i) YSEALI program progress and an assessment of the metrics,
goals, targets, and outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i), including
information relating to YSEALI program implementation and outcome
activities during the year covered by each report; and
(ii) recommendations for improvements or amendments to the
YSEALI program and strategy, if any, that would improve their effec-
tiveness during subsequent years of YSEALI program implementation.
(C) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than the date of the submission of the last
report required under subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a final assessment report that
evaluates YSEALI program implementation and outcomes during the entire
duration of YSEALI program operation, including recommendations regard-
ing whether the YSEALI program should be reauthorized and any changes
that would improve its effectiveness.
(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(A) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate
congressional committees’’ means—
(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives;
(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
(iv) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(B) IMPLEMENTING AGENCY EXTERNAL PARTNERS.—The term ‘‘imple-
menting agency external partners’’ means any external partner that is not
a United States Government agency, and may include one or more of the
following entities:
(i) Local or multinational corporations.
(ii) Nongovernmental organizations.
(iii) Universities.
(iv) Regional institutions.
(C) YSEALI THEME.—The term ‘‘YSEALI theme’’ means—
(i) civic engagement;
(ii) economic empowerment and social entrepreneurship;
(iii) education;
(iv) environmental issues; or
(v) any other theme included by the Secretary of State.
(D) YSEALI PARTNER COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘YSEALI partner countries’’
includes each member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions and each other country or political entity the Secretary of State deter-
mines appropriate to include in the programs established under this sec-
tion.
SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.
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It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the Secretary of
State, should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to
economic and democratic freedoms, including relating to the following:
(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
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31
(2) Building support for international infrastructure standards, including
standards agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.
(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual property theft, massive
subsidization of companies, and other policies and practices.
(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is inconsistent with
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and Paris Club prin-
ciples.
(7) International influence campaigns.
(8) Environmental standards.
(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that are not in the G7
and G20.
SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to support the close economic, political, and security relationship between
Taiwan and the United States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the ap-
proach to the United States Indo-Pacific;
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy a vital national secu-
rity interest of the United States;
(3) to reinforce all existing United States Government commitments to Tai-
wan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three
joint communiques, and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’;
(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy, in-
cluding the priorities identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource
its defense strategy;
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to en-
hance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and
integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-
armor, air defense, advanced command, control, communications, computers, in-
telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control
capabilities, into its military forces;
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in
international organizations, including the World Health Assembly, the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organi-
zation, and other international bodies as appropriate;
(8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the International
Agency for Research on Cancer;
(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and
other like-minded partners;
(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially through new agreements
or resumption of talks under the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement;
(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a bilateral free trade
agreement;
(12) to expand bilateral economic and technological cooperation, including im-
proving supply chain security;
(13) to support United States educational and exchange programs with Tai-
wan, including by promoting the study of Chinese language, culture, history,
and politics in Taiwan; and
(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Tai-
wan.
(b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH
TAIWAN.—
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE
FOUNDATION.—The Secretary of State should consider establishing an inde-
pendent nonprofit entity that—
(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the future leaders of Taiwan
and the United States; and
(B) works with State and local school districts and educational institu-
tions in the United States to send high school and university students to
Taiwan to study the Chinese language, culture, history, politics, and other
relevant subjects.
(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts and educational institutions, in-
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cluding public universities, in the United States are encouraged to partner with
the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States
to establish programs to promote an increase in educational and cultural ex-
changes.
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SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the pol-
icy of the United States to ‘‘promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial,
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the
people of Taiwan’’.
(2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to the American Institute in Tai-
wan, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, was renamed the
‘‘Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs’’.
(3) It is the policy of the United States to refer to Taiwan as ‘‘Taiwan’’, not
‘‘Taipei’’ or ‘‘Chinese Taipei’’.
(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office is inaptly named
as it works to cultivate the extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural,
and other relations between the people of the United States and the people, or-
ganizations, and enterprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei.
(b) NEGOTIATIONS TO RENAME TECRO.—Reflective of the substantively deepening
ties between Taiwan and the United States, the Secretary of State shall seek to
enter into negotiations with appropriate officials of the Taipei Economic and Cul-
tural Representative Office in the United States with the objective of renaming its
office in Washington, D.C., the Taiwan Representative Office in the United States,
and its subsidiary offices in the United States, accordingly.
SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Peace and Stability
Act’’.
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate con-
gressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘international organization’’ in-
cludes United Nations funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, and bod-
ies, as well as other organizations outside of the United Nations system that
the Secretary of State determines appropriate, in consultation with other rel-
evant Federal departments and agencies.
(3) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term ‘‘One-China Principle’’ means only the
PRC’s policy toward Taiwan.
(4) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term ‘‘civil society organizations’’
means international civil society organizations that are critical to maintaining
Taiwan’s international space and enabling Taiwan to play a positive and con-
structive role in the global community.
(5) POTENTIAL PLA CAMPAIGNS.—The term ‘‘potential PLA campaigns’’
means—
(A) a naval blockade of Taiwan;
(B) an amphibious assault and ground invasion of Taiwan, especially
such invasion designed to accomplish a fiat accompli before intervention is
possible; or
(C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s outlying islands.
(c) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States has consistently sought to advance peace and stability
in East Asia as a central element of United States foreign policy toward the re-
gion.
(2) The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), especially since
the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated campaign to
weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that
threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait accompli on questions
surrounding Taiwan’s future.
(3) In order to ensure the longevity of United States policy and preserve the
ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their future independently, it is
necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and physical space.
(4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humanitarian, and medical assistance to
combat diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever in coun-
tries around the world. During the COVID–19 pandemic, Taiwan donated mil-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
lions of pieces of personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests to coun-
tries in need.
(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, São Tomé and Principe, Panama, the Dominican
Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have
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33
severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with
China.
(6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA),
the decision-making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer an-
nually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the
PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. Taiwan was
not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.
(7) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 1,750,000 flights
and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan Inter-
national Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been ex-
cluded from participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization since
2013.
(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) does not address
the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor
does it give the PRC the right to represent the people on Taiwan.
(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are
in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are
matters of international concern; and
(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and stability in the Indo-
Pacific and deter military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that would
undermine regional stability.
(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, is home to 23,500,000 people,
and is an important contributor to the global community;
(2) multiple United States Government Administrations have taken important
steps to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organiza-
tions and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public goods,
including through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and dis-
aster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora;
(3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal barriers remain to ad-
vancing Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community; and
(4) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other parts of the global commu-
nity could be further enhanced through a systematic approach, along with
greater attention from Congress and the American public to such efforts.
(f) STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other Federal depart-
ments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a strategy—
(A) to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in a prioritized set of
international organizations; and
(B) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on foreign govern-
ments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society or-
ganizations to comply with its ‘‘One-China Principle’’ with respect to Tai-
wan.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required under paragraph (1)
shall include—
(A) an assessment of the methods the PRC uses to coerce actors to into
adhering to its ‘‘One-China Principle’’, including those employed against
governments, international organizations, and civil society organizations
and pressure on commercial actors, to the extent relevant in the context of
Taiwan’s meaningful participation international organizations;
(B) an assessment of the policies of foreign governments toward the PRC
and Taiwan, to identify likeminded allies and partners who might become
public or private partners in the strategy;
(C) a systematic analysis of all international organizations, as practicable,
to identify those that best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan’s participa-
tion, including—
(i) the organization’s policy on the requirements to obtain member-
ship and observer status, as well as the foundational documents defin-
ing membership requirements and observer status within the organiza-
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tion;
(ii) the organization’s participation rules;
(iii) the processes for developing membership requirements and par-
ticipation rules;
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34
(iv) the policies of current members regarding Taiwan’s political sta-
tus; and
(v) the organization’s relative reliance on contributions from the PRC
and how it may affect internal decision-making;
(D) an evaluation of the feasibility and advisability of expanding eco-
nomic, security, and diplomatic engagement with countries that have de-
monstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan,
where it aligns with United States interests;
(E) a survey of international organizations that have allowed Taiwan’s
meaningful participation, including an assessment of whether any erosion
in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred within those organizations and how
Taiwan’s participation has positively strengthened the capacity and activity
of these organizations, providing positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in
other similar forums;
(F) a list of not more than 20 international organizations at which the
United States Government will prioritize using its voice, vote, and influence
to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation over the three-year period fol-
lowing the date of enactment of this Act, to be derived from the organiza-
tions identified pursuant to subparagraph (C); and
(G) a description of the diplomatic strategies and the coalitions the
United States Government plans to develop to implement subparagraph (F).
(3) FORM.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
classified form but may include an unclassified summary.
(4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate
congressional committees—
(A) not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, with
respect to the international organizations identified pursuant to paragraph
(2)(C); and
(B) not later than 180 days after the date of the submission of the strat-
egy required under paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter for 2
years, regarding the development and implementation of the strategy re-
quired.
(g) EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID), in consultation with the United States International Develop-
ment Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral
development initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan as appro-
priate.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required in paragraph (1) shall in-
clude the following:
(A) A comprehensive review of existing cooperation mechanisms and ini-
tiatives between USAID or DFC and relevant departments and agencies in
Taiwan, including, but not limited to Taiwan’s International Cooperation
and Development Fund (ICDF).
(B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC development cooperation with
relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable co-
operation with partners of similar economic size and foreign assistance ca-
pacity.
(C) An analysis of the opportunities and challenges the cooperation de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) has offered to date, including—
(i) opportunities collaboration has offered to expand USAID’s and
DFC’s ability to deliver assistance into a wider range communities;
(ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other relevant agencies and
departments in Taiwan, or the organizations’ implementing partners,
have a comparative advantage in providing assistance; and
(iii) opportunities to transition virtual capacity building events rel-
evant departments and agencies in Taiwan, through the Global Co-
operation and Training Framework and other forums, into in-person,
enduring forms of development cooperation.
(D) An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical, financial, or administra-
tive barriers to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral develop-
ment, including—
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(i) availability of personnel at the American Institute in Taiwan re-
sponsible for coordinating development assistance cooperation;
(ii) volume of current cooperation initiatives and barriers to expand-
ing it;
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35
(iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers facing the United States or
other partners to including Taiwan in formal and informal multilateral
development cooperation mechanisms;
(iv) resource or capacity barriers to expanding cooperation facing the
United States or Taiwan; and
(v) geopolitical barriers that complicate United States-Taiwan co-
operation in third countries.
(E) Recommendations to address the challenges identified in subpara-
graph (D).
(F) A description of any additional resources or authorities that expand-
ing cooperation might require.
(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be submitted in un-
classified form but may include a classified annex.
(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH TAIWAN.—It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) expanding United States economic relations with Taiwan has benefited the
people of both the United States and Taiwan; and
(2) the United States should explore opportunities to deepen, and where pos-
sible expand, economic ties between Taiwan and the United States, through dia-
logue, and by developing the legal templates required to support potential fu-
ture agreements.
(i) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.—It is
the sense of Congress that—
(1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, including through high rates of PRC
sorties into air space near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises near
Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United States position that differences in
cross-Strait relations must be resolved peacefully;
(2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict to be highly destructive and
destabilizing, any increase in the risk of conflict demands attention and obli-
gates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most viable means to prevent war;
(3) Taiwan should continue to implement its asymmetric defense strategy, in-
cluding investing in cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also strength-
ening recruitment and training of its reserve and civil defense forces, and those
capabilities include, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise missiles; and
(4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essential to maintain open and effec-
tive crisis communication and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to reduce
the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately, conflict.
(j) STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait military
conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy shall include the following:
(A) A comprehensive review of existing diplomatic, economic, and military
tools to establish deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an assessment
of their efficacy.
(B) An examination of the present and future capabilities of the United
States and Taiwan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns against Tai-
wan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The analysis shall include an assessment of the
progress Taiwan has made in developing the cost-effective and resilient ca-
pabilities needed to respond to its strategic environment, as well as any ad-
ditional personnel, procurement, or training reforms required.
(C) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding coordination with United
States allies and partners to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.
The review shall include a review of the following matters:
(i) Expanding coordination of public or private messaging on deter-
rence vis-à-vis Taiwan.
(ii) Coordinating use of economic tools to raise the costs of PRC mili-
tary action that could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict.
(iii) Enhancing codevelopment and codeployment of military capabili-
ties related to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or enhancing co-
ordination on training of Taiwan’s military forces.
(D) Recommendations on significant additional diplomatic, economic, and
military steps available to the United States Government, unilaterally and
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
in concert with United States allies and partners, to enhance the clarity
and credibility of deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.
(E) A description of any additional resources or authorities needed to im-
plement the recommendations identified in subparagraph (D).
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36
(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph (1) shall be submitted classi-
fied form but may include an unclassified annex.
(4) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 years, the
President (or a designee), as well as representatives from the agencies and de-
partments involved in developing the strategy required in paragraph (1), shall
consult with the appropriate congressional committees regarding the develop-
ment and implementation of the strategy required in this subsection. The rep-
resentatives from the relevant agencies and departments shall be at the Under
Secretary level or above.
(k) STRENGTHENING TAIWAN’S CIVILIAN DEFENSE PROFESSIONALS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
shall present to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for strength-
ening the community of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated
through the American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall in-
clude the following:
(A) A comprehensive review of existing United States Government and
non-United States Government programmatic and funding modalities to
support Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals in pursuing professional de-
velopment, educational, and cultural exchanges in the United States, in-
cluding—
(i) opportunities through Department of State-supported programs,
such as the International Visitor Leaders Program; and
(ii) opportunities offered through nongovernmental institutions, such
as think tanks, to the extent the review can practicably make such an
assessment.
(B) A description of the frequency that civilian defense professionals from
Taiwan pursue or are selected for the programs reviewed pursuant to sub-
paragraph (A).
(C) An analysis of any funding, policy, administrative, or other barriers
preventing greater participation from Taiwan’s civilian defense profes-
sionals in the opportunities identified pursuant to subparagraph (A).
(D) An evaluation of the value expanding the opportunities reviewed pur-
suant to subparagraph (A) would offer for strengthening Taiwan’s existing
civilian defense community, and for increasing the perceived value of the
field for young professionals in Taiwan.
(E) An assessment of options the United States Government could take
individually, with partners in Taiwan, or with foreign governments, or non-
governmental partners, to expand the opportunities reviewed pursuant to
subparagraph (A).
(F) A description of additional resources and authorities required by the
options assessed pursuant to subparagraph (E).
(3) FORM.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan International Soli-
darity Act’’.
(b) CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
2758.—Subsection (a) of section 2 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) (relating to dip-
lomatic relations with Taiwan) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraphs:
‘‘(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) established
the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the
only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations. The resolution did
not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in the United
Nations or any related organizations, nor did the resolution take a position on
the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include
any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.
‘‘(11) The United States opposes any initiative that seeks to change Taiwan’s
status without the consent of the people.’’.
(c) UNITED STATES ADVOCACY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST THE
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PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE ‘‘ONE CHINA’’ POSITION.—
Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative
(TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to the policy of the United States regarding Taiwan’s
participation in international organizations) is amended—
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37
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon at the end;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’;
and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
‘‘(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives of the United States Govern-
ment in all organizations described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States to advocate such organizations to resist the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China’s efforts to distort the decisions, language, policies, or
procedures of such organizations regarding Taiwan.’’.
(d) OPPOSING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE TAI-
WAN’S TIES AND PARTNERSHIPS INTERNATIONALLY.—Subsection (a) of section 5 of the
Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of
2019 (relating to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon at the end;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’;
and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
‘‘(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States allies and partners to oppose
the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s official diplo-
matic relationships and its partnerships with countries with which it does not
maintain diplomatic relations.’’.
(e) REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE ITS
‘‘ONE CHINA’’ POSITION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies Inter-
national Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating
to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended by inserting before the period
at the end the following: ‘‘, as well as information relating to any prior or ongo-
ing attempts by the People’s Republic of China to undermine Taiwan’s member-
ship or observer status in all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Tai-
wan’s ties and relationships with other countries in accordance with subsection
(a) of this section’’.
(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take ef-
fect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first
report required under subsection (b) of section 5 of the Taiwan Allies Inter-
national Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as
amended by paragraph (1), that is required after such date.
SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’.
(b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.—
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.)
affirmed United States policy ‘‘to preserve and promote extensive, close, and
friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the
United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China
mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area’’.
(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public
Law 115–409), the United States has grown its strategic partnership with
Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 people.
(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the People’s Republic of China to
isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic partners and from international organi-
zations, including the World Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as
a global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic response, including by
donating more than 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment
to the United States.
(D) The creation of a United States fellowship program with Taiwan
would support—
(i) a key priority of expanding people-to-people exchanges, which was
outlined in President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strat-
egy;
(ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s commitment to Taiwan, ‘‘a leading
democracy and a critical economic and security partner’’, as expressed
in his March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; and
(iii) April 2021 guidance from the Department of State based on a re-
view required under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of
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title III of division FF of Public Law 116–260) to ‘‘encourage U.S. gov-
ernment engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial
relationship’’.
(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are—
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38
(A) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan strategic relationship
and broaden understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily as-
signing officials of agencies of the United States Government to Taiwan for
intensive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement as Fellows with the
governing authorities on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;
(B) to expand United States Government expertise in Mandarin Chinese
language skills and understanding of the politics, history, and culture of
Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region by providing eligible United States per-
sonnel the opportunity to acquire such skills and understanding through
the Taiwan Fellowship Program established under subsection (c); and
(C) to better position the United States to advance its economic, security,
and human rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.
(c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—
(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency head’’ means, in the case of the ex-
ecutive branch of United States Government, or in the case of a legislative
branch agency specified in subparagraph (B), the head of the respective
agency.
(B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.—The term ‘‘agency of
the United States Government’’ includes the Government Accountability Of-
fice, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service,
and the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission of
the legislative branch, as well as any agency of the executive branch.
(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate
congressional committees’’ means—
(i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Represent-
atives; and
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate.
(D) DETAILEE.—The term ‘‘detailee’’ means an employee of an agency of
the United States Government on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan,
without a change of position from the agency at which such employee is em-
ployed.
(E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term ‘‘implementing partner’’ means
any United States organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such
Code that—
(i) is selected through a competitive process;
(ii) performs logistical, administrative, and other functions, as deter-
mined by the Department of State and the American Institute of Tai-
wan, in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Program; and
(iii) enters into a cooperative agreement with the American Institute
in Taiwan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship Program.
(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—
(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish the ‘‘Taiwan
Fellowship Program’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Program’’) to pro-
vide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible
United States citizens through the cooperative agreement established in
subparagraph (B). The Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate
counterparts at the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing
partner, may modify the name of the Program.
(B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in Taiwan shall use
amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under paragraph
(6)(A) to enter into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with
an appropriate implementing partner.
(ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary of State, in consultation with the
American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing
partner, shall award to eligible United States citizens, subject to avail-
able funding—
(I) not fewer than five fellowships during the first two years of
the Program; and
(II) not fewer than ten fellowships during each of the remaining
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
years of the Program.
(C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than
30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Institute
in Taiwan, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall—
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39
(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep-
resentative Office, or with another appropriate entity, for the purpose
of entering into an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in
an agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; and
(ii) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, which—
(I) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements required to
operate in Taiwan; and
(II) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate significant expe-
rience managing exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.
(D) CURRICULUM.—
(i) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of each fellowship under this
subsection, each fellow should study—
(I) the Mandarin Chinese language;
(II) the people, history, and political climate on Taiwan; and
(III) the issues affecting the relationship between the United
States and the Indo-Pacific region.
(ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the second year of each fellowship under
this section, each fellow, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing part-
ner, and in accordance with the purposes of this section, shall work
in—
(I) a parliamentary office, ministry, or other agency of the gov-
erning authorities on Taiwan; or
(II) an organization outside of the governing authorities on Tai-
wan, whose interests are associated with the interests of the fellow
and the agency of the United States Government from which the
fellow had been employed.
(E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—Notwithstanding any requirement
under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner,
may award fellowships that have a duration of between nine months and
two years, and may alter the curriculum requirements under subparagraph
(D) for such purposes.
(F) SUNSET.—The Program shall terminate ten years after the date of the
enactment of this section.
(3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—
(A) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A United States citizen is eligible for a
fellowship under this section if he or she—
(i) is an employee of the United States Government;
(ii) has at least two years of experience in any branch of the United
States Government;
(iii) has received at least one exemplary performance review in his
or her current United States Government role within at least the last
three years prior to beginning the fellowship;
(iv) has a demonstrated professional or educational background in
the relationship between the United States and countries in the Indo-
Pacific region; and
(v) has demonstrated his or her commitment to further service in the
United States Government.
(B) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each recipient of a fellowship under
this section shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship—
(i) to maintain satisfactory progress in language training and appro-
priate behavior in Taiwan, as determined by the Department of State,
the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its imple-
menting partner;
(ii) to refrain from engaging in any intelligence or intelligence-related
activity on behalf of the United States Government; and
(iii) to continue Federal Government employment for a period of not
less than four years after the conclusion of the fellowship, or for not
less than two years for a fellowship that is one year or shorter.
(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—
(i) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The implementing partner, in close co-
ordination with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in
Taiwan, shall—
(I) make efforts to recruit fellowship candidates who reflect the
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diversity of the United States;
(II) select fellows for the Program based solely on merit, with ap-
propriate supervision from the Department of State and the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan; and
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40
(III) prioritize the selection of candidates willing to serve a fel-
lowship lasting one year or longer.
(ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing partner should provide each fel-
low in the first year (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the
Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, for those who
are not serving a two-year fellowship) with—
(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese language training; and
(II) courses in the politic, culture, and history of Taiwan, China,
and the broader Indo-Pacific.
(iii) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.—The Secretary of State, in co-
ordination with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate,
the implementing partner, may waive any of the training required
under clause (ii) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin Chinese lan-
guage skills, knowledge of the topics described in clause (ii)(II), or for
other related reasons approved by the Secretary of State and the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan. If any of the training requirements are
waived for a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the training portion
of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the extent appropriate.
(iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The implementing partner, in consultation
with the Secretary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall
maintain an office and at least one full-time staff member in Taiwan
to—
(I) liaise with the American Institute in Taiwan and the gov-
erning authorities on Taiwan; and
(II) serve as the primary in-country point of contact for the re-
cipients of fellowships under this section and their dependents.
(v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The implementing partner should perform
other functions in association in support of the Program, including
logistical and administrative functions, as included in the cooperative
agreement entered into pursuant to paragraph (2)(B) by the Secretary
of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.
(D) NONCOMPLIANCE.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to comply with the require-
ments under this section shall reimburse the American Institute in Tai-
wan for—
(I) the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation in
the fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii) and (iii); and
(II) interest accrued on such funds (calculated at the prevailing
rate).
(ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates clause (i) or (ii)
of subparagraph (B) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan
in an amount equal to the sum of—
(I) all of the Federal funds expended for the fellow’s participation
in the fellowship; and
(II) interest on the amount specified in subclause (I), which shall
be calculated at the prevailing rate.
(iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow who violates subpara-
graph (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an
amount equal to the difference between—
(I) the amount specified in clause (ii); and
(II) the product of—
(aa) the amount the fellow received in compensation during
the final year of the fellowship, including the value of any al-
lowances and benefits received by the fellow; multiplied by
(bb) the percentage of the period specified in subparagraph
(B)(iii) during which the fellow did not remain employed by the
United States Government.
(E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the selection of the
first class of fellows under this section and annually thereafter for 10 years,
the Secretary of State shall offer to brief the appropriate congressional com-
mittees regarding the following:
(i) An assessment of the performance of the implementing partner in
fulfilling the purposes of this section.
(ii) The number of applicants each year, the number of applicants
willing to serve a fellowship lasting one year or longer, and the number
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of such applicants selected for a fellowship.
(iii) The names and sponsoring agencies of the fellows selected by the
implementing partner and the extent to which such fellows represent
the diversity of the United States.
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41
(iv) The names of the parliamentary offices, ministries, other agen-
cies of the governing authorities on Taiwan, and nongovernmental in-
stitutions to which each fellow was assigned.
(v) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the implemen-
tation of the Program, including added flexibilities in the administra-
tion of the program.
(vi) An assessment of the Program’s value upon the relationship be-
tween the United States and Taiwan or the United States and Asian
countries.
(F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—The financial records of any implementing partner
shall be audited annually in accordance with generally accepted audit-
ing standards by independent certified public accountants or inde-
pendent licensed public accountants who are certified or licensed by a
regulatory authority of a State or another political subdivision of the
United States.
(ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under clause (i) shall be conducted at the
place or places where the financial records of the implementing partner
are normally kept.
(iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The implementing partner shall make
available to the accountants conducting an audit under clause (i)—
(I) all books, financial records, files, other papers, things, and
property belonging to, or in use by, the implementing partner that
are necessary to facilitate the audit; and
(II) full facilities for verifying transactions with the balances or
securities held by depositories, fiscal agents, and custodians.
(iv) REPORT.—
(I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the end of each
fiscal year, the implementing partner shall provide a report of the
audit conducted for such fiscal year under clause (i) to the Sec-
retary of State and the American Institute in Taiwan.
(II) CONTENTS.—Each audit report under subclause (I) shall—
(aa) set forth the scope of the audit at issue;
(bb) include such statements, along with the auditor’s opin-
ion of those statements, as may be necessary to present fairly
the implementing partner’s assets and liabilities, surplus or
deficit, with reasonable detail;
(cc) include a statement of the implementing partner’s in-
come and expenses during the year; and
(dd) include a schedule of—
(AA) all contracts and cooperative agreements requiring
payments greater than $5,000; and
(BB) any payments of compensation, salaries, or fees at
a rate greater than $5,000 per year.
(III) COPIES.—Each audit report shall be produced in sufficient
copies for distribution to the public.
(4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT SERVICE.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—
(i) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the approval of the Secretary of State,
an agency head may detail, for a period of not more than two years,
an employee of the agency of the United States Government who has
been awarded a fellowship under this Act, to the American Institute in
Taiwan for the purpose of assignment to the governing authorities on
Taiwan or an organization described in paragraph (2)(D)(ii)(II).
(ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter into a written agreement
with the Federal Government before receiving a fellowship, in which
the fellow shall agree—
(I) to continue in the service of the sponsoring agency at the end
of fellowship for a period of at least four years (or at least two
years if the fellowship duration is one year or shorter) unless such
detailee is involuntarily separated from the service of such agency;
and
(II) to pay to the American Institute in Taiwan any additional
expenses incurred by the United States Government in connection
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with the fellowship if the detailee voluntarily separates from serv-
ice with the sponsoring agency before the end of the period for
which the detailee has agreed to continue in the service of such
agency.
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42
(iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not
be required of a detailee who leaves the service of the sponsoring agen-
cy to enter into the service of another agency of the United States Gov-
ernment unless the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the detailee
before the effective date of entry into the service of the other agency
that payment will be required under this subsection.
(B) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.—A detailee under this para-
graph—
(i) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving allowances, privileges,
rights, seniority, and other benefits, to be an employee of the spon-
soring agency;
(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits from funds available
to such agency, which is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title
5, United States Code; and
(iii) may be assigned to a position with an entity described in para-
graph (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position does not involve—
(I) the taking of an oath of allegiance to another government; or
(II) the acceptance of compensation or other benefits from any
foreign government by such detailee.
(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING AGENCY.—
(i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the United States Government from
which a detailee is detailed should provide the fellow allowances and
benefits that are consistent with Department of State Standardized
Regulations or other applicable rules and regulations, including—
(I) a living quarters allowance to cover the cost of housing in Tai-
wan;
(II) a cost of living allowance to cover any possible higher costs
of living in Taiwan;
(III) a temporary quarters subsistence allowance for up to seven
days if the fellow is unable to find housing immediately upon arriv-
ing in Taiwan;
(IV) an education allowance to assist parents in providing the fel-
low’s minor children with educational services ordinarily provided
without charge by public schools in the United States;
(V) moving expenses to transport personal belongings of the fel-
low and his or her family in their move to Taiwan, which is com-
parable to the allowance given for American Institute in Taiwan
employees assigned to Taiwan; and
(VI) an economy-class airline ticket to and from Taiwan for each
fellow and the fellow’s immediate family.
(ii) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The American Institute in Taiwan
and its implementing partner, with the approval of the Department of
State, may modify the benefits set forth in clause (i) if such modifica-
tion is warranted by fiscal circumstances.
(D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The American Institute in Taiwan, the im-
plementing partner, and any governing authorities on Taiwan or non-
governmental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is detailed during the
second year of the fellowship may not be held responsible for the pay, allow-
ances, or any other benefit normally provided to the detailee.
(E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be detailed under clause (A)(ii) with-
out reimbursement to the United States by the American Institute in Tai-
wan.
(F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detailees may be paid by the American
Institute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed in subparagraph
(C).
(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year before the sunset of the Program
pursuant to paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States
shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that in-
cludes the following:
(A) An analysis of United States Government participants in the Pro-
gram, including the number of applicants and the number of fellowships
undertaken, and the places of employment.
(B) An assessment of the costs and benefits for participants in the Pro-
gram and for the United States Government of such fellowships.
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
(C) An analysis of the financial impact of the fellowship on United States
Government offices that have detailed fellows to participate in the Program.
(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to improve the Program.
(6) FUNDING.—
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43
(A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be ap-
propriated to the American Institute in Taiwan—
(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of which $500,000 should be made
available to an appropriate implementing partner to launch the Pro-
gram; and
(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each succeeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.
(B) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing partner selected to implement
the Program may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services
or property in carrying out such program, subject to the review and ap-
proval of the American Institute in Taiwan.
SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO
THE INDO-PACIFIC.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated $1,500,000,000 to
the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources, in-
cluding as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
of 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in the fiscal
year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These amounts represent only 5 per-
cent of the diplomatic engagement budget and only 4 percent of the total De-
partment of State-USAID budget.
(2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engagement budget and personnel
levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign as-
sistance resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.
(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to realign certain posi-
tions at posts to ensure that its personnel footprint matches the demands of
great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pacific.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be sufficient to meet
the current and emerging challenges of the 21st century, including those in the
Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;
(2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary for the success of the United
States diplomatic corps and integral to its ability to meet national security ob-
jectives;
(3) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of an Indo-Pacific
strategy focused on strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of coun-
tries that adhere to and uphold the rules-based international order; and
(4) the increase must be implemented with a focus on increased numbers of
economic, political, and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative in-
crease of at least 200 Foreign Service officer generalists, to—
(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and open investment environ-
ments for United States entities, and engaged in increased commercial di-
plomacy in key markets;
(B) better articulate and explain United States policies, strengthen civil
society and democratic principles, enhance reporting on global activities,
promote people-to-people exchanges, and advance United States influence;
and
(C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized embassies and con-
sulates in the Indo-Pacific and other regions around the world, as nec-
essary.
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—
(1) ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in the
Indo-Pacific reflect the region’s high degree of importance and significance to
United States political, economic, and security interests; and
(2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance funding and the
quantity of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the De-
partment of State’s total budget.
(d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees
of Congress an action plan that includes the following elements:
(1) Identification of requirements to advance United States strategic objec-
tives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary resources for the De-
partment of State needed to satisfy such objectives, assuming an unconstrained
resource environment.
(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department’s budget dedicated to the
Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and se-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
curity assistance.
(3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion and bureaus with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a de-
scription of increases at each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone,
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44
and a description of how such increases in personnel will advance United States
strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
(4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese-language speakers and trans-
lation specialists at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau offices
with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including in INR.
(5) A description of any staffing or other training or personnel reforms that
may be required to quickly increase departmental capacity to address the inter-
disciplinary, interconnected opportunities and challenges presented in the Indo-
Pacific, including but not limited to issues related to climate change, public
health, supply chains, cybersecurity, and digital technology issues.
(6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the Department will meet
in implementing the action plan.
(7) A description of any barriers to implementing the action plan and rec-
ommendations to address these barriers, noting whether additional authorities
or resources from Congress is needed to address these barriers.
(e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 180 days after the submission of
the action plan described in subsection (d) for not more than 3 years, the Secretary
of State shall submit an update and brief the appropriate congressional committees
on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting data and including a
detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated,
for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance re-
sources to carry out the purposes of part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific re-
gion and $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific re-
gion.
(g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSUANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INI-
TIATIVE ACT OF 2018.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f)
include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 201(b) of the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409).
(h) BENCHMARKS UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall report to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees on the extent to which the strategic objectives described in the action plan
in subsection (d) have been satisfied or progress toward such satisfaction has been
made.
SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.
(a) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECUR-
SORS.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a written report detailing—
(1) a description of United States Government efforts to gain a commitment
from the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to submit unregu-
lated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to controls;
(2) a plan for future steps the United States Government will take to urge
the PRC to combat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking originating in the
PRC;
(3) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking origi-
nating in China and illicit environmental trade and possible relationships of
trade-based money laundering; and
(4) an assessment of the intersection between illicit fentanyl trafficking origi-
nating in China and counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the United
States.
(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form with a classified annex.
SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZA-
TION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2018.
(a) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—Section 1421(c) of
the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22
U.S.C. 9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(7) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT OF 1990.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), support pro-
vided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be considered to
be a Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit Reform
Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
of such Act to such support.
‘‘(B) DETERMINATION OF COST.—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 502(5) of the Federal Credit
Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the cost of support pro-
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45
vided under paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be the net
present value, at the time when funds are disbursed to provide the sup-
port, of the following estimated cash flows:
‘‘(I) The purchase price of the support.
‘‘(II) Dividends, redemptions, and other shareholder distributions
during the term of the support.
‘‘(III) Proceeds received upon a sale, redemption, or other liquida-
tion of the support.
‘‘(IV) Adjustments for risk of estimated losses, if any.
‘‘(ii) CHANGES IN TERMS INCLUDED.—The estimated cash flows de-
scribed in subclauses (I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall include the ef-
fects of changes in terms resulting from the exercise of options included
in the agreement to provide the support.
‘‘(C) REESTIMATE OF COST.—When the estimated cost of support provided
under paragraph (1) with respect to a project made in a single fiscal year
is reestimated in a subsequent year, the difference between the reestimated
cost and the previous cost estimate shall be paid from the balances avail-
able in the Corporate Capital Account established under section 1434.’’.
(b) MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.—Section 1433 of the Better Utilization of
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by
striking ‘‘$60,000,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$100,000,000,000’’.
(c) FUNDING FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.—Section 1434(b) of the Better
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9634(b))
is amended—
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following:
‘‘(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursuant to section 1421(c); and’’.
(d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance
Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report
on—
(1) a plan to expand the Corporation’s financing to support United States na-
tional security and development priorities in critical regions; and
(2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic resources that would be re-
quired in order to carry out the plan required by this subsection.
SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FI-
NANCE CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFACTURING.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Corporation is authorized to provide
financing to entities in India and in other less developed countries to increase vac-
cine manufacturing capacity for the following purposes:
(1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Authorization (SRA) or World Health
Organization (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines.
(2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency Use Listing therapeutics used to
treat symptoms related to COVID–19.
(3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies needed for preventing, detecting
and treating COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective equipment,
oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the Development Finance Cor-
poration, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide a report to the
appropriate congressional committees—
(1) outlining the countries where DFC financing could be most impactful for
vaccine manufacturing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion
COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;
(2) including a detailed explanation of the United States and partner country
interests served by the United States providing support to such projects;
(3) including a detailed description of any support provided by other United
States allies and partners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a);
and
(4) including a detailed description of any support provided by the People’s
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Republic of China in support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form with a classified annex if necessary.
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SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC
NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.
(a) FINDING.—With 276 embassies and other representative offices globally, China
now has more diplomatic posts around the world than any other country, including
the United States. Many of Beijing’s new missions can be found in countries that
recently broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Sal-
vador, the Gambia, and São Tomé and Principe) or do not have any United States
diplomatic physical presence despite these countries asking for increased United
States engagement and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress, that the Department of
State should conduct an assessment of all United States diplomatic missions and
posts to verify such missions and posts align with United States national security
and economic interests, as well as ensuring that these locations position the United
States appropriately with its strategic competitors to advance the national interest
in every country worldwide, including those countries currently lacking any physical
United States diplomatic presence, whether an embassy, consulate general, or prin-
cipal officer post.
(c) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act and biennially thereafter for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the number, location, and
objectives of each of its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an as-
sessment of any gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competitors.
The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads of other Federal departments
and agencies having an overseas presence at any United States diplomatic mission
or post to ensure such assessment reflects all Federal Government equities and
viewpoints.
SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.
There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period beginning on Octo-
ber 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, training, research, and foreign lan-
guage skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b)
of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).
SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF USAGM APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be ap-
propriated for the United States Agency for Global Media $100,000,000 for each of
fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs to support local
media, build independent media, combat CCP disinformation inside and outside of
the People’s Republic of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and mon-
itor and evaluate such programs, of which—
(1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to a grant to Radio Free Asia
language services;
(2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made available to serve populations in
China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language services;
and
(3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made available for digital media serv-
ices—
(A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese populations in foreign coun-
tries; and
(B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in China through
‘‘Global Mandarin’’ programming.
(b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of State, acting through the As-
sistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Ad-
ministrator of the United States Agency for International Development, acting
through the Assistant Administrator for Development, Democracy, and Innovation,
shall jointly support and train foreign journalists on investigative techniques nec-
essary to ensure public accountability, promote transparency, fight corruption, and
support the ability of the public to develop informed opinions about pressing issues
facing their countries.
(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development
$170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new pro-
grams in support of press freedom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts
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appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until
expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appro-
priated to support press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.
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SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.
(a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global Engagement Center to ‘‘direct,
lead, and coordinate efforts’’ of the Federal Government to ‘‘recognize, understand,
expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation
globally’’.
(b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking ‘‘the date that is 8 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2027’’.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Global Engagement
Center should expand its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the
exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage as-
pects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, including the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations Command’s Joint MISO
Web Operations Center.
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated
$150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter for-
eign state and non-state sponsored propaganda and disinformation.
SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID–19 PANDEMIC.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID–19 pandemic so the
United States can better prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health
threats in the future;
(2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic on all Americans, the Amer-
ican people deserve to know what information the United States Government
possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as appropriate;
(3) it is critical for independent experts to have full access to all pertinent
human, animal, and environmental data, biological sample, research, and per-
sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how
this pandemic emerged;
(4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United States Government
and 13 other foreign governments that the international team of experts dis-
patched to the People’s Republic of China by the World Health Organization
(WHO) to study the origins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was ‘‘significantly delayed
and lacked access to complete, original data and samples’’;
(5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General of the WHO, Dr.
Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative team had
encountered ‘‘difficulties’’ in accessing necessary raw data, that ‘‘we have not yet
found the source of the virus’’, and that ‘‘all hypotheses remain on the table’’;
(6) the G7 communique expressing support for full implementation of the
International Health Regulations, including ‘‘a timely, transparent, expert-led,
and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID–19 Origins study including,
as recommended by the experts’ report, in China’’ is a valuable commitment by
the United States and its allies to investigating the origins of COVID–19 in
order to better prepare for future pandemics; and
(7) Congress supports the effort announced by President Biden, directing the
intelligence community to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze informa-
tion pointing to the origins of COVID–19.
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report con-
sisting of—
(1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2
virus, including a detailed review of all information the United States possesses
that it has identified as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the
SARS–CoV–2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, or other
sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the information the
United States Government has to date;
(2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and
(3) challenges identified to its ability to make such an assessment.
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form but may include a classified annex.
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
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(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
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(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and
(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of the world’s most dynamic de-
mocracies, economic opportunities, as well as many challenges to United States
interests and values as a result of the growth in authoritarian governance in
the region and by broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the changing
environment, and deteriorating adherence to human rights principles and obli-
gations;
(2) the People’s Republic of China poses a particular threat as it repeatedly
violates internationally recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic
and trade practices, disregards international laws and norms, coerces its neigh-
bors, engages in malign influence operations, and enables global digital
authoritarianism;
(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (‘‘ARIA’’) enhances the United
States’ commitment in the Indo-Pacific region by—
(A) expanding its defense cooperation with its allies and partners;
(B) investing in democracy and the protection of human rights;
(C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; and
(D) supporting people-to-people engagement and other shared priorities;
and
(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report concludes
that ARIA ‘‘enshrines a generational whole-of-government policy framework
that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region’’.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
2018 (Public Law 115–409) is amended—
(1) in section 201(b), by striking ‘‘$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
2019 through 2023’’ and inserting ‘‘$2,000,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022
through 2026’’;
(2) in section 215(b), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2026’’;
(3) in section 306(a)—
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘5 years’’ and inserting ‘‘8 years’’; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2026’’;
(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2026’’;
(5) in section 410—
(A) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2026’’; and
(B) in subsection (d), in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
‘‘2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2026’’; and
(6) in section 411, by striking ‘‘2023’’ and inserting ‘‘2026’’.
SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish United States strategies to
promote, facilitate, and increase trade and investment and development in Afri-
ca and Latin America and the Caribbean.
(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall focus
on increasing two-way trade and investment with Africa and Latin America and
the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value by the date that is 5 years
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—
(A) UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO PROMOTE TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVEST-
MENT IN AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN.—Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in consulta-
tion with the heads of the relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make publicly
available a government-wide strategy for Africa, to be known as the Prosper
Africa Strategy, and for Latin America and the Caribbean, that provides de-
tailed descriptions of how the United States intends to fulfill the policy ob-
jectives described in paragraph (2). The strategies shall—
(i) support and be aligned with other existing United States Govern-
ment strategies; and
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(ii) include specific and measurable goals, benchmarks, performance
metrics, timetables, and monitoring and evaluation plans to ensure the
accountability and effectiveness of all policies and initiatives carried
out under the strategy.
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(B) SPECIFIC PLANS FOR DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The strategies
submitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall also include specific imple-
mentation plans, in coordination with the recommendations and activities
of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group under section 708 of the Cham-
pioning American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C.
9904), from each of the relevant Federal departments and agencies that de-
scribes—
(i) the anticipated contributions of the department or agency, includ-
ing technical, financial, and in-kind contributions, to implement the
strategies;
(ii) the efforts of the department or agency to ensure that the policies
and initiatives carried out pursuant to the strategies are designed to
achieve maximum impact and effectiveness; and
(iii) recommendations on necessary resources, including staffing, to
expand efforts to promote trade and investment between the United
States and Africa, and the United States and Latin America and the
Caribbean.
(C) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The strategies submitted pursuant to
subparagraph (A) shall include plans for coordinating with relevant depart-
ments and agencies the implementation of agency-specific plans described
in subparagraph (B), particularly as it relates to advancing two-way trade
and investment transactions and business enabling environment reforms.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the submission of the strategies re-
quired by subsection (a)(3), and annually thereafter until 2026, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in coordination with
the report required by section 707 of the Championing American Business Through
Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that—
(1) summarizes and evaluates the implementation of United States diplomatic
efforts and foreign assistance programs, projects, and activities to advance the
policy objectives set forth in subsection (a)(2);
(2) describes the nature and extent of the coordination among the relevant
Federal departments and agencies, including summary of activities and engage-
ments of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group; and
(3) describes the monitoring and evaluation tools, mechanisms, and indicators
to assess progress made on the policy objectives of this section.
(c) EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The President shall designate an individual to serve as
the Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in Africa, also known as
the Prosper Africa Executive Director, and an individual to serve as Executive Di-
rector for Trade and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean to—
(1) oversee the development and implementation of the strategies required by
subsection (a); and
(2) coordinate developing and implementing the strategy with the Office of
the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Management and Budget,
and the relevant departments and agencies.
(d) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGES WITH AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN.—It is the sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the
date of the enactment of this Act, high-level officials of relevant departments and
agencies of the United States Government with responsibility for promoting trade,
investment, financing, and development should conduct joint activities to advance
the strategies described in subsection(a), including business development exchanges
with public and private sector representatives from Africa and Latin America, and
the Caribbean who are focused on promoting two-way trade and investment.
(e) TRAINING, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND INFORMATION SHARING.—The
President shall develop a plan—
(1) to standardize the training received by United States and Foreign Com-
mercial Service officers, economic officers of the Department of State, and eco-
nomic officers of the United States Agency for International Development with
respect to the programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the
United States, the United States International Development Finance Corpora-
tion, the Small Business Administration, and the United States Trade and De-
velopment Agency; and
(2) to ensure that—
(A) not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act—
(i) all personnel referred to in paragraph (1) receive the training de-
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scribed in that paragraph; and
(ii) relevant departments and agencies share information on trade
and investment transactions facilitated by the United States Govern-
ment and funded by the public or private sector;
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50
(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Administrator of USAID and the Chief Executive Officer of DFC shall
develop a plan to enhance coordination and expedite information sharing
that includes—
(i) a process for sharing of information in a timely fashion, and at
least monthly, on—
(I) active and early stage leads on transactions initiated, pro-
moted, or facilitated by DFC;
(II) transactions deemed ineligible for DFC support or not being
pursued by DFC for other reasons; and
(III) transaction opportunities identified by USAID or other rel-
evant United States departments and agencies submitted for DFC
consideration; and
(ii) any training required for DFC, USAID, or other interagency staff
to implement the plan;
(C) the Executive Directors and their appointed staff shall be responsible
for coordinating implementation of this plan; and
(D) DFC and USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Directors
and Congress, identify targets for DFC’s financial commitments and any
private capital mobilized to finalize a transaction.
(f) DATA SHARING PLATFORM.—
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator of USAID shall, in consultation with
the Executive Directors and relevant department and agencies, establish an
interoperable digital platform maintained by the staff of the Executive Directors
to—
(A) facilitate interagency information sharing and collaboration on trade
and investment transactions; and
(B) ensure relevant department and agencies use such platform to review,
track, and develop consensus on transactions and their relative priorities.
(2) COORDINATION.—The Executive Directors shall coordinate regularly with
the leadership of relevant Federal department and agencies to—
(A) advance and finalize transactions; or
(B) provide a written justification for any transaction deemed ineligible
for United States Government financing under existing authorities.
(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate con-
gressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
and
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(2) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The term ‘‘relevant
Federal departments and agencies’’ includes—
(A) the Department of State;
(B) the Department of the Treasury;
(C) the Department of Commerce;
(D) the United States Agency for International Development (USAID);
(E) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
(F) the United States International Development Finance Corporation
(DFC);
(G) the United States Trade and Development Agency;
(H) the United States African Development Foundation;
(I) the Export Import Bank;
(J) the Small Business Administration;
(K) the Department of Agriculture; and
(L) any other entity deemed appropriate by the President.
(3) EARLY-STAGE LEAD.—The term ‘‘early-stage lead’’ means a prospective
transaction which is being evaluated by DFC staff, prior to DFC holding an in-
ternal screening meeting or accepting an application.
(4) TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The term ‘‘two-way trade and invest-
ment’’ means United States exports to Africa and Latin America and the Carib-
bean, United States public and private investment in Africa and Latin America
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and the Caribbean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean
to the United States, and Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean invest-
ment in the United States.
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SEC. 219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and in coordination with relevant offices
and bureaus of the Department of State, shall implement a ‘‘China Watcher Pro-
gram’’ within the Department of State to—
(1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influence across economic and polit-
ical sectors in foreign countries; and
(2) augment the capacity of United States Government engagement with for-
eign countries and regional and international economic and political organiza-
tions and institutions relating to policy coordination regarding China and such
Chinese malign influence.
(b) PLACEMENT.—In carrying out the China Watcher Program under this section,
the Secretary of State shall place Foreign Service officers in positions in select
United States diplomatic and consular posts, at the discretion of the Secretary of
State, to engage both Chinese and third-country nationals, including host govern-
ments, on the matters described in subsection (a).
(c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Each diplomatic or consular post with a China Watcher Pro-
gram shall produce an annual report outlining the steps each such post has taken
to advance the mission, trends observed, and the nature and extent of Chinese for-
eign direct investment and influence in key economic and political sectors, including
technology, manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, agriculture, and real es-
tate.
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be ap-
propriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter to carry
out this section.
SEC. 219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the United States Government
should invest heavily into alternative programs and institutions that ensure
there remains a robust pipeline of Americans learning China’s many languages;
and
(2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by a strategic competition be-
tween the United States and China, it is in the national security interests of
the United States to ensure that Americans continue to invest in Chinese lan-
guage skills, as well as Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while en-
suring they can do so in a context free of malign political influence from foreign
state actors.
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE LAN-
GUAGE.—The Secretary of State shall establish in the Department of State the ‘‘Liu
Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language’’ to fund study by United States
persons of Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and
other contemporary spoken languages of China, abroad or in the United States.
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated
to the Department of State for fiscal year 2021 and every fiscal year thereafter,
$10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.
(d) REQUIRED ACTIVITIES.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
subsection (c) shall—
(1) be designed to advance the national security and foreign policy interests
of the United States, as determined by the Secretary of State;
(2) favor funding mechanisms that can maximize the total number of United
States persons given the opportunity to acquire full conversational linguistic
proficiency in Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian,
and other contemporary spoken languages of China;
(3) favor funding mechanisms that provide opportunities for such language
study to areas traditionally under-served by such opportunities;
(4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process taking into account design
inputs of—
(A) civil society institutions, including Chinese diaspora community orga-
nizations;
(B) language experts in Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan,
Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of China;
(C) organizations representing historically disadvantaged socioeconomic
groups in the United States; and
(D) human rights organizations; and
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(5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese,
Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken languages of
China at Alaska Native-serving institutions, Asian American and Native Amer-
ican Pacific Islander-serving institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, histori-
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52
cally Black college or universities, Native American-serving nontribal institu-
tions, Native Hawaiian-serving institutions, Predominantly Black institutions,
Tribal Colleges or Universities.
(e) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in con-
sultation with the heads of appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as
appropriate, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report
detailing activities and disbursements made to carry out this Act over the im-
mediately preceding academic year.
(2) REPORT CONTENTS.—Each report required under paragraph (1) shall in-
clude details on—
(A) which institutions, programs, or entities received funds through the
Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language;
(B) funds distribution disaggregated by institution, program, or entity, in-
cluding identification of the State or country in which such institution, pro-
gram, or entity is located;
(C) the number of United States persons who received language study
under the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language, and the av-
erage amount disbursed per person for such study;
(D) a comparative analysis of per dollar program effectiveness and effi-
ciency in allowing United States persons to reach conversational proficiency
Mandarin or Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other con-
temporary spoken languages of China;
(E) an analysis of which of the languages referred to in subparagraph (D)
were studied through the funding from the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of
the Chinese Language; and
(F) any recommendations of the Secretary of State for improvements to
the authorities, priorities, or management of the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study
of the Chinese Language.
(f) INTERAGENCY FUNDS TRANSFERS AUTHORIZATION.—Amounts authorized to be
appropriated to the Secretary of State to carry out this Act are authorized to be
transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies for
similar purposes, subject to prior notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate. Such heads shall consult with the Secretary in the preparation of the report
required under subsection (e).
(g) LIMITATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act
may only be made available for the costs of language study funded and administra-
tion incurred by the Department of State or programs carried out by the Depart-
ment of State (or by another Federal department or agency pursuant to subsection
(f)) to carry out this section.
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) ALASKA NATIVE-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘Alaska Native-serving
institution’’ has the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).
(2) ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN PACIFIC ISLANDER-SERVING INSTI-
TUTION.—The term ‘‘Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serv-
ing institution’’ has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
(3) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘Hispanic-serving institution’’
has the meaning given such term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).
(4) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term ‘‘historically
Black college or university’’ means a part B institution described in section
322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (22 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
(5) NATIVE AMERICAN-SERVING NONTRIBAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘Native
American-serving nontribal institution’’ has the meaning given such term in
section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
(6) NATIVE HAWAIIAN-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘Native Hawaiian-
serving institution’’ has the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).
(7) PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘Predominantly Black in-
stitution’’ has the meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Edu-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
(8) TRIBAL COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term ‘‘Tribal College or University’’
has the meaning given such term in section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).
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SEC. 219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN
ACT OF 2021.
(a) AUTHORITIES AND CONDITIONS.—Amounts authorized and appropriated under
title X of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–2) to carry out
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall be subject to the
applicable authorities and conditions for funds made available to carry out the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and division K of Public Law
116–260.
(b) OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.—Amounts authorized and appropriated
under sections 10001 and 10002 of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 may be trans-
ferred to the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Inspector Gen-
eral of the United States Agency for International Development to expand the ca-
pacity of such Inspectors General to conduct effective oversight of the foreign assist-
ance programs and activities under such Act.
(c) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBER-
CULOSIS, AND MALARIA COVID–19 RESPONSE MECHANISM.—United States contribu-
tions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria COVID–19 Re-
sponse Mechanism under section 10003(a)(2) of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021—
(1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner that incentivizes other public
and private donor contributions; and
(2) shall be subject to the reporting and withholding requirements under sub-
sections (c), (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of section 202 of the
United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of
2003 (22 U.S.C. 7622).
SEC. 219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE BRANDING.
The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated or otherwise procured and
financed by the United States Government shall be clearly branded with the United
States flag.
Subtitle B—International Security Matters
SEC. 221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through fiscal
year 2026 for the Department of State, out of amounts authorized to be appro-
priated or otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating to international
military education and training assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-
Pacific region in accordance with this subtitle. Funds may be disbursed only after
vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and
620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).
SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN INTER-
NATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC AND ON ARTIFICIAL
LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede
freedom of navigation operations in international airspace by military or civilian
aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;
(2) urges the Government of the People’s Republic of China to refrain from
implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, where contrary to freedom of over-
flight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative
actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision is final
and legally binding on both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s
claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful;
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and
(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016
Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a state
party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—
(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-
Pacific region, including with respect to the mutual defense treaties with Indo-
Pacific allies;
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the
sea, or the airspace above it, that are available to all countries, and oppose the
militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC claims in the South
China Sea, specifically—
(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, including to offshore re-
sources across most of the South China Sea, are unlawful;
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim vis-à-vis the
Philippines in areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be
in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental
shelf;
(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile terri-
torial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; and
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James
Shoal;
(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, includ-
ing environmentally harmful and provocative land reclamation;
(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with inter-
national law;
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including terri-
torial waters or territorial seas, must derive from land features and otherwise
comport with international law;
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas
in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;
(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of Conduct reflects the
interests of Southeast Asian claimant countries and does not serve as a vehicle
for the People’s Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, in-
cluding the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at
London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navi-
gation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other coun-
tries, including the People’s Republic of China;
(11) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including
the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the
East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build prac-
tical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the re-
gion for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts
by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate
multilateral mechanisms for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the South China
Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would serve to help countries avoid
destabilizing behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exer-
cising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea
that have no support in international law; and
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pa-
cific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and al-
lies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of
the sea.
SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen existing measures
under the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capabili-
ties to allies and partners consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility
for alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and partners in
the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with United States strategic imperatives;
(2) the United States should design for export to Indo-Pacific allies and part-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
ners capabilities critical to maintaining a favorable military balance in the re-
gion, including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense systems, anti-
ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic sys-
tems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command
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and control systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and international
commitments;
(3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent possible, antici-
patory technology security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems de-
scribed in paragraph (2);
(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
should—
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in sufficient quantities of munitions
to meet contingency requirements and avoid the need for accessing United
States stocks in wartime; and
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such munitions, or when necessary, to
increase allies’ capacity to produce such munitions; and
(5) it is in the United States interest to not authorize arms transfers or secu-
rity cooperation to governments that demonstrate patterns of gross violations
of human rights if such arms or security cooperation could be used to commit
or support such violations.
(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this section, the term ‘‘appro-
priate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes
United States priorities for building more capable security partners in the Indo-
Pacific region.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under paragraph (1)
shall—
(A) provide a priority list of defense and military capabilities that Indo-
Pacific allies and partners must possess for the United States to be able to
achieve its military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
(B) identify, from the list referred to in subparagraph (A), the capabilities
that are best provided, or can only be provided, by the United States;
(C) identify—
(i) actions required to expedite fielding the capabilities identified in
subparagraph (B); and
(ii) steps needed to fully account for and a plan to integrate all means
of United States foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, security
assistance, and all applicable authorities of the Department of State
and the Department of Defense;
(D) assess the requirements for United States security assistance, includ-
ing International Military Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion, as a part of the means to deliver critical partner capability require-
ments identified in subparagraph (B);
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet the requirements for United
States security assistance, and identify resource gaps;
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling requirements for United States
security assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and per-
sonnel limits, foreign legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to
specific partner countries;
(G) identify limitations on the ability of the United States to provide such
capabilities, including capabilities identified under subparagraph (B), be-
cause of existing United States treaty obligations, United States policies, in-
cluding sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d), or other regulations;
(H) recommend improvements to the process for developing requirements
for United States partner capabilities; and
(I) identify required jointly agreed recommendations for infrastructure
and posture, based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
(3) FORM.—The report required under this subsection shall be unclassified,
but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 225. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE THREAT POSED BY THE CHINESE COM-
MUNIST PARTY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.
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It is the policy of the United States to—
(1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like-minded partners, in particular
with the European Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen resil-
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ience, maintain a technological edge, and address the challenges to the rules-
based international order posed by the Chinese Communist Party;
(2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to monitor and defend against any
activity of the Chinese Communist Party that could impact collective defense,
military readiness, or resilience in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s
Area of Responsibility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key sectors
and supply chains, in coordination with the European Union;
(3) push for NATO allies to establish a consultative body to bring together
such allies, and other institutions and partners as relevant, to exchange infor-
mation, share experiences, and discuss all aspects of such allies’ security inter-
ests with respect to the Chinese Communist Party; and
(4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share the burden that comes with col-
lective security in an increasingly complex security environment by reaching by
2024 the pledge set at the 2014 Wales Summit to spend two percent of GDP
on defense spending and 20 percent of annual defense spending on major new
equipment.
SEC. 226. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA–SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall publish and disseminate
to United States institutions and places of study a list identifying the research, en-
gineering, and scientific institutions that the Secretary determines are affiliated
with, or funded by, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
(b) FORM.—The list published and disseminated under subsection (a) shall be un-
classified and publicly accessible, but may include a classified annex.
Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster
American Power
SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Every UN member state is legally required to finance the UN’s core budg-
et in order to ensure that these missions are properly resourced, and assess-
ment rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN General Assembly.
(2) While the United States is the largest single financial contributor to the
UN system, the current model is beneficial because it requires all UN member
states, no matter how big or small, to help shoulder the UN’s regular and peace-
keeping budgets at specified levels.
(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments to the UN also empowers the
PRC, which has raised our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable part-
ner and is seeking to leverage its own contributions to the regular budget and
peacekeeping in ways that run counter to United States interests and values.
(4) The People’s Republic of China is now the second largest financial contrib-
utor to UN peacekeeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just 3 percent
in 2008 to more than 15 percent today, and is the ninth largest troop-contrib-
utor to UN missions, providing more personnel than the other four permanent
members of the Security Council combined.
(5) With greater engagement comes greater influence, and PRC diplomats
have sought to use their expanded clout to push back against the human rights,
civilian protection, and gender-based violence aspects of UN peacekeeping man-
dates, using United States funding shortfalls as a pretext.
(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to fill key posts at UN agencies:
Chinese nationals currently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15 special-
ized agencies, while the United States occupies only one.
(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections for the heads of UN special-
ized agencies and five for major UN funds and programs. With the exception
of the World Food Programme, none are currently led by Americans.
(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector General Inspection found that the
Bureau for International Organizations did not have a standard operating pro-
cedure for tracking and promoting the employment of American Citizens in the
UN system, and their recommendation to the department to establish one re-
mains open.
SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA’S MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.
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It is the policy of the United States that—
(1) the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations
serves as a standing member of the cabinet;
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(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be paid in full in a timely fash-
ion;
(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities under section 3343 of title 5,
United States Code, and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relat-
ing to detail and transfer of Federal employees to international organizations),
to detail or transfer employees to relevant international organizations;
(4) the Secretary of State should assist the Department of State and other
Federal agencies in carrying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent;
(5) the Secretary of State should support qualified American candidates in
their bid to win election to United Nations-related leadership positions; and
(6) the Secretary of State should support the placement of Junior Professional
Officers sponsored by the United States in United Nations-affiliated agencies.
SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is authorized to establish within the
Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs an Office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.
(b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection (a) of this section shall be re-
sponsible for—
(1) promoting United States leadership and participation in the United Na-
tions system, with a focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are exer-
cising increased influence in and determining the agenda of the United Nations
system;
(2) establishing and implementing a standard operating procedure for the pro-
motion and efficient tracking of United States citizen employment at the United
Nations and other international organizations that includes Mission Geneva;
(3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and identifying qualified
United States citizens and other qualified nationals to promote for such posi-
tions;
(4) tracking leadership changes in United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
grams, and agencies, and developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-
minded countries are assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by
countries that do not share United States interests;
(5) eliminating current barriers to the employment of United States citizens
in the United Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and
(6) increasing the number of qualified United States candidates for leadership
and oversight positions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, programs,
agencies, and at other international organizations.
SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS.
(a) INCREASE IN JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER POSITIONS.—The Secretary of
State should increase the number of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored
by the United States within the United Nations system.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary of State
shall provide the appropriate congressional committees information regarding the
amount of funding each bureau has designated during the immediately preceding
fiscal year for Junior Professional Officer positions in the United Nations system
and the number of such positions that exist as of the end of the prior fiscal year.
SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads
of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall develop and submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on how many Federal employ-
ees are currently detailed or transferred to an international organization during the
immediately preceding 1-year period and a strategy for increasing the number of
Federal employees so detailed or transferred.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report required by subsection (a) shall in-
clude the following:
(1) The number of Federal employees detailed or transferred to an inter-
national organization under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and
subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the detail and
transfer of Federal employees to international organizations), including—
(A) an identification of the Federal agency from which such employees
were detailed or transferred; and
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
(B) an identification of the international organizations to and from which
such employees have been so detailed or transferred.
(2) A list of international organizations to and from which the United States
previously detailed or transferred Federal employees.
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Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster
American Power
SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND
THE WORLD.
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with like-minded countries
around the globe; and
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and partners—
(A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, and military challenges
posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC);
(B) to deter the PRC from pursuing military aggression;
(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in accordance
with international law;
(D) to promote private sector-led long-term economic development while
countering efforts by the Government of the PRC to leverage predatory eco-
nomic practices as a means of political and economic coercion in the Indo-
Pacific region and beyond;
(E) to promote the values of democracy and human rights, including
through efforts to end the repression by the PRC of political dissidents,
Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and
other ethnic minorities;
(F) to respond to the crackdown by the PRC, in contravention of the com-
mitments made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the
Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people of
Hong Kong; and
(G) to counter the PRC Government’s efforts to spread disinformation in
the PRC and beyond with respect to its response to COVID–19.
PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship based on shared
geography, extensive personal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense
commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democracy, human rights, and the
rules based international order established after World War II;
(2) the United States and Canada can better address the People’s Republic
of China’s economic, political, and security influence through closer cooperation
on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public
procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity
issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal matters, and support for
democracy, good governance, and human rights;
(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United States and Canada should
maintain joint initiatives to address border management, commercial and trade
relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with respect to the People’s Re-
public of China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy se-
curity, and environmental stewardship;
(4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation to counter Chi-
nese disinformation, influence operations, economic espionage, and propaganda
efforts;
(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments, particularly in
5G telecommunications technology, extraction of natural resources, and port in-
frastructure, pose national security risks for the United States and Canada;
(6) the United States should share, as appropriate, intelligence gathered re-
garding—
(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and
(B) the PRC government’s intentions with respect to 5G expansion;
(7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance collaborative
initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada Joint Ac-
tion Plan on Critical Minerals Development Collaboration; and
(8) the United States and Canada should prioritize cooperation on continental
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
defense and in the Arctic, including by modernizing the North American Aero-
space Defense Command (NORAD) sensor architecture to provide effective
warning and tracking of threats by peer competitors, including long-range mis-
siles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern Hemisphere.
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SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA’S ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANA-
DIAN CITIZENS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s apparent arbitrary de-
tention and abusive treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Mi-
chael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Government of Canada’s arrest of
Meng Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
(2) the Government of Canada has shown international leadership by—
(A) upholding the rule of law and complying with its international legal
obligations, including obligations pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Be-
tween the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington De-
cember 3, 1971; and
(B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-
State Relations, which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the European
Union, and reaffirms well-established prohibitions under international
human rights conventions against the arbitrary detention of foreign nation-
als to be used as leverage in country-to-country relations; and
(3) the United States continues to join the Government of Canada in calling
for the immediate release of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for due
process for Canadian national Robert Schellenberg.
SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, and
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
a strategy that describes how the United States will enhance cooperation with the
Government of Canada in managing relations with the Government of the People’s
Republic of China.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall—
(1) identify key policy points of convergence and divergence between the
United States and Canada in managing relations with the People’s Republic of
China in the areas of technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, se-
cure supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
(2) include a description of United States development and coordination ef-
forts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the
United States and Canada with respect to—
(A) managing economic relations with the People’s Republic of China;
(B) democracy and human rights in the People’s Republic of China;
(C) technology issues involving the People’s Republic of China;
(D) defense issues involving the People’s Republic of China; and
(E) international law enforcement and transnational organized crime
issues;
(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with Canada to counter
the People’s Republic of China’s projection of an authoritarian governing model
around the world;
(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence cooperation to date and future
plans to support Canadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to
Huawei’s 5G technology;
(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—
(A) to advance joint United States-Canadian priorities for responsible
stewardship in the Arctic Region; and
(B) to counter the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to project political,
economic, and military influence into the Arctic Region; and
(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track and counter the
People’s Republic of China’s attempts to exert influence across the multilateral
system.
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section shall be submitted in an un-
classified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified
annex, if necessary.
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act and not less frequently than every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Sec-
retary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, and the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, re-
garding the development and implementation of the strategy required under this
section.
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of
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the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Attorney General, the United
States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States
International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Finance
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a multi-year strategy for in-
creasing United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance,
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, par-
ticularly in the areas of—
(1) investment;
(2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable development;
(3) commercial relations;
(4) anti-corruption activities; and
(5) infrastructure projects.
(b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall in-
clude a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—
(1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin American and Caribbean countries
to advance the sustainable and inclusive development of equitable economies;
(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between such countries;
(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive environment for
United States businesses in the region;
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term financial sus-
tainability and security implications of foreign investments in strategic sectors
or services, including transportation, communications, natural resources, and
energy;
(5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclusive infrastructure project se-
lection and procurement processes that promote transparency, supplier diver-
sity, open competition, financial sustainability, adherence to robust global
standards, and the employment of a diverse local workforce and management;
(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust democratic governance, fair
competition, combatting corruption, and ending impunity; and
(7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equitable access to the internet and
digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.
(c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one year after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, after
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the At-
torney General, the United States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the
United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the con-
gressional committees specified in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of
this section, including examples of successes and challenges.
SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report that assesses the nature, intent, and impact on United States strategic
interests of Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, pro-
cedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin America and the
Caribbean, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organiza-
tion of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
(2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall include
an assessment of the nature, intent, and impact on United States strategic in-
terests of Chinese military activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, includ-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
ing military education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-related
activities in the military or civilian spheres, such as—
(A) the satellite and space control station the People’s Republic of China
constructed in Argentina; and
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(B) defense and security cooperation carried out by the People’s Republic
of China in Latin America and the Caribbean, including sales of surveil-
lance and monitoring technology to governments in the region such as Ven-
ezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of such tech-
nologies as tools of Chinese intelligence services.
(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in un-
classified form and include classified annexes.
SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
State $13,500,000 for the International Military Education and Training Program
for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
(b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall modernize and strengthen the
programs receiving funding in accordance with subsection (a) to ensure that such
programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international
military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
(c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred to in subsection (a) shall—
(1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American
and Caribbean security services;
(2) provide practical skills and frameworks for—
(A) improving the functioning and organization of security services in
Latin America and the Caribbean;
(B) creating a better understanding of the United States and its values;
and
(C) using technology for maximum efficiency and organization;
(3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Carib-
bean respect civilian authority and operate in compliance with international
norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including a respect for human
rights, and full compliance with requirements under section 620M of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly referred to as the
‘‘Leahy law’’); and
(4) receive funds only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, con-
sistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).
SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN RE-
GARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RISKS OF PERVASIVE SUR-
VEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China is exporting its model
for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology
and artificial intelligence; and
(2) the inclusion of communication networks and communications supply
chains with equipment and services from companies with close ties to or that
are susceptible to pressure from governments or security services without reli-
able legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ pri-
vate information, increased censorship, violations of human rights, and harass-
ment of political opponents.
(b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State shall conduct diplomatic
engagement with governments and civil society organizations in Latin America and
the Caribbean to—
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties posed by technologies
and services described in subsection (a); and
(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Executive Officer of the United
States Agency for Global Media, who may work through the Open Technology Fund
of the Agency, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democ-
racy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom and Business and Human
Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship tech-
nology and services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to
enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information.
(d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall
work through nongovernmental organizations to—
(1) support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean;
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable access to internet in Latin
America and the Caribbean;
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(3) provide integrated support to civil society for technology, digital safety,
policy and advocacy, and applied research programs in Latin America and the
Caribbean;
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Carib-
bean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and
prevent government overreach in the digital sphere;
(5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the
Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news
reports covering governance and human rights topics;
(6) provide training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative
techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government
and the private sector;
(7) provide training on investigative reporting of incidents of corruption and
unfair trade, business, and commercial practices;
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen their capacity to mon-
itor the incidents and practices described in paragraph (7); and
(9) identify local resources to support the preponderance of activities that
would be carried out under this subsection.
SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE TO CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INI-
TIATIVE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily reliant upon imported oil to
provide for approximately 90 percent of their energy production.
(2) The level of dependence is even higher including—
(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 percent of its electricity;
(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 percent of its electricity;
(C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil for nearly 100 percent of its
electricity; and
(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 percent of its electricity.
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had a detrimental effect on eco-
nomic development, growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean.
(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Caribbean coral reefs have been lost
due to coastal development and pollution. Soot particulates and climate change
caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously damaged coral reefs, which are a
significant source of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural beauty.
(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for electricity—
(A) has serious health impacts in the form of higher rates of asthma and
other lung ailments; and
(B) can also exacerbate climate change.
(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulnerable to sea level rise and
stronger storms.
(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of the countries of the Caribbean
on oil was perpetuated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, which—
(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; and
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 percent of their energy produc-
tion needs.
(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and political turmoil in Venezuela
has forced the Government of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the
Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional power. Only Cuba still re-
ceives preferential Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, while
other Petrocaribe member countries are experiencing a destabilized flow of oil.
(9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide
since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Although the majority of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has also
been the largest investor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
(10) The World Bank estimates that the Caribbean will need $12,000,000,000
in power investments through 2035.
(11) Renewable energy technology costs have decreased dramatically in recent
years, offering a more viable economic alternative for energy production. Solar
energy prices have fallen by 80 percent since 2008, causing significant market
growth, and according to data released by the International Renewable Energy
Agency, 1⁄3 of global power capacity is based in renewable energy.
(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund estimated that transportation
accounted for 36 percent of the total primary energy consumed in the Caribbean
subregion.
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(13) According to the United Nations Environment Programme, Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 and a
reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 2050 if the region’s energy and trans-
port sectors reach net zero emissions.
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(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore and offshore resources need-
ed for renewable energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some hydropower
production capacity.
(15) The United States Government is deeply engaged in providing technical
and policy assistance to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues through—
(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas;
(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
(C) bilateral assistance programs.
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North American Leaders’ Summit, Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, and President
Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico reaffirmed their commitment to bring affordable,
reliable, and increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while opening
wider markets for clean energy and green technology.
(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack Obama announced the Caribbean
Energy Security Initiative, which would partner with individual countries—
(A) to transform its energy sector;
(B) to work to increase access to finance, good governance, and diver-
sification; and
(C) to maximize the impact of existing donor effects.
(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Caribbean-Central American En-
ergy Summit, the energy security task force formally launched the Caribbean
Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C–SERMS) as a mechanism to
manage regional coordination and action on energy security and agreed to ex-
pand the regional market and transmission system.
(19) The United States has an important opportunity—
(A) to deepen this engagement;
(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean countries on a more regional and
coordinated basis;
(C) to help ease the region’s dependence on imported oil; and
(D) to promote affordable alternative sources of energy.
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘Caribbean countries’’ means countries
in the Caribbean region, but does not include Cuba or Venezuela.
(2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term ‘‘Caribbean governments’’ means
the national governments of the Caribbean countries.
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean
countries—
(1) achieve greater energy security and improve domestic energy resource mo-
bilization;
(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, other petroleum products, and
coal for the generation of electricity;
(4) increase production of renewable energy; and
(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of their national determined
contributions to the Paris Agreement.
(d) STRATEGY.—
(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a multi-year strategy that describes
how the Department of State will promote regional cooperation with Caribbean
countries—
(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, grow domestic clean energy
production in the region, strengthen regional energy security, and lower en-
ergy sector greenhouse gas emissions;
(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the transportation sector;
(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy conservation, and investment in
alternatives to imported fuels;
(D) to improve grid reliability and modernize electricity transmission net-
works;
(E) to advance deployment of innovative solutions to expand community
and individuals’ access to electricity;
(F) to help reform energy markets to encourage good regulatory govern-
ance and to promote a climate of private sector investment; and
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from the energy and transpor-
tation sector.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include—
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(A) a thorough review and inventory of United States Government activi-
ties that are being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in coordination
with multilateral institutions—
(i) to promote energy and climate security in the Caribbean region;
and
(ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on oil for electricity generation;
(B) opportunities for marshaling regional cooperation—
(i) to overcome market barriers resulting from the small size of Car-
ibbean energy markets;
(ii) to address the high transportation and infrastructure costs faced
by Caribbean countries;
(iii) to ensure greater donor coordination between governments, mul-
tilateral institutions, multilateral banks, and private investors; and
(iv) to expand regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost
energy entrepreneurship;
(C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean government has—
(i) an independent utility regulator or equivalent;
(ii) affordable access by third party investors to its electrical grid
with minimal regulatory interference;
(iii) effective energy efficiency and energy conservation;
(iv) programs to address technical and nontechnical issues;
(v) a plan to eliminate major market distortions;
(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean energy solutions; and
(D) recommendations for how United States policy, technical, and eco-
nomic assistance can be used in the Caribbean region—
(i) to advance renewable energy development and the incorporation
of renewable technologies into existing energy grids and the develop-
ment and deployment of micro-grids where appropriate and feasible to
boost energy security and reliability, particularly to underserved com-
munities;
(ii) to increase the generation of clean energy sufficiently to replace
and allow for the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy generation
units in Caribbean countries;
(iii) to create regional financing opportunities to allow for lower cost
energy entrepreneurship;
(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in the region to help attract pri-
vate investment and break down any market or regulatory barriers;
and
(v) to establish a mechanism for each host government to have access
to independent legal advice—
(I) to speed the development of energy-related contracts; and
(II) to better protect the interests of Caribbean governments and
citizens.
(3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy under this subsection, the Sec-
retary of State shall work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult with—
(A) the Secretary of the Interior;
(B) the Secretary of Commerce;
(C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(D) the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of the United
States;
(E) the Board of Directors of the Development Finance Corporation;
(F) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International De-
velopment;
(G) the Caribbean governments;
(H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
(I) the World Bank Group; and
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation.
SEC. 250. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States shares with the Caribbean a collective vulnerability to
natural disasters, which affects the lives and the economies of our citizens.
(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La Soufriere volcano is another re-
minder of the devastation caused by the many natural disasters the Caribbean
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
confronts each year and the region’s vulnerability to external shocks. Hurricane
Dorian, the largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts of the north-
ern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes Maria and Irma devastated multiple is-
lands across the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According to IMF re-
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search, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide to hit small states since 1950,
around two-thirds (324) have been in the Caribbean.
(3) This region is seven times more likely to experience a natural disaster
than elsewhere. And, when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times more
damage.
(4) Extreme weather events and other environmental impacts will only wors-
en over the coming years, and if not addressed, we will see only increasing eco-
nomic shocks on these countries, driving irregular migration.
(5) While the United States has considerable expertise and capacity in assist-
ing countries with disaster response, there remains a need for stronger partner-
ships that build regional resilience through efficient and interoperable plat-
forms, protecting people and speeding recovery.
(6) The People’s Republic of China has dramatically increased its engagement
in the Caribbean in the past five years, including offering loans and grants re-
lated to disaster response and resilience and sought to acquire property rights
in the Caribbean that would be detrimental to United States national security
interests.
(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new U.S.-Caribbean Resilience
Partnership to deepen cooperation and investment to strengthen our disaster
resilience throughout the Caribbean region, including—
(A) to streamline early warning response networks and formalize commu-
nication channels;
(B) to enhance, encourage, and work collaboratively on further developing
aviation disaster resilience plans and partnerships;
(C) to prioritize regional technical exchange in energy planning, risk re-
duction, and resilience;
(D) to increase communications network interoperability between Carib-
bean partners and the United States;
(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data and share real-time information
in preparation for potential damage resulting from tropical cyclones and
tsunamis;
(F) to use meteorological services to strengthen and deepen physical and
communications infrastructure, data collection networks, and human and
technical capacity throughout the region, as well as interactions with the
public;
(G) to understand that while the use of international and military and
civil defense assets in disaster response may only be considered as a last
resort, when local, national, and international civilian capabilities are over-
whelmed, civil-military coordination should occur, in support of the affected
nation;
(H) to develop a framework that would govern the deployment of inter-
national military and civil defense assets in disaster response when local,
national, and international civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, in support
of the affected nation;
(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensuring rapid disaster response and
recovery, including waiving or expediting diplomatic clearances, waiving of
or reducing customs fees, streamlining overflight and airspace clearance,
and ensuring that the first responders have the ability to rapidly respond
to disasters in other countries;
(J) to promote the integration and coordination of regional response
mechanisms in the Caribbean, including through the Caribbean Disaster
Emergency Management Agency, the Regional Security System, United
States Government Agencies, and allies in ways that facilitate more effec-
tive and efficient planning, mitigation, response, and resilience to natural
disasters;
(K) to share best practices in improved building codes with national dis-
aster organizations, including building better programs, at regional, na-
tional and community levels; and
(L) to promote community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation ac-
tivities, particularly in underserved communities, with the aim of increas-
ing broad public participation and resilience.
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to help Caribbean countries—
(1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural disasters and the impacts
of severe weather events and a changing environment;
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
(2) partner with United States Federal, State, and local agencies and engage
in technical cooperation, dialogue, and assistance activities;
(3) harmonize standards and practices related to paragraphs (1) and (2) to
promote increased investment and integration;
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(4) increase investment from United States companies in the Caribbean on re-
silience-building, adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;
(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure efforts by the United States, Car-
ibbean countries, and international partners complement each other; and
(6) further assist with the efforts described in subsection (a)(7).
(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal depart-
ments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
multi-year strategy that describes how the Department of State will achieve the
policies described in subsection (b).
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated
for activities, programs, technical assistance, and engagement under this section the
following:
(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.
(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each fiscal year thereafter.
(e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated each fiscal
year pursuant to subsection (d), at least five percent of all programming funding
allocation shall support and be directed toward reporting, monitoring, and as-
sessment of effectiveness.
(2) ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION.—The Department of State shall ensure
that at least 20 percent of amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
subsection (d) directly support the training of, engagement with, collaboration
with, and exchange of expertise on resilience between United States Federal,
State, and local officials and their Caribbean government counterparts. Such
amounts should also support, as appropriate, increased academic, civil society,
media, and private sector engagement in the fields of resilience-building, adap-
tation, and mitigation.
SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA’S EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMER-
ICA.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) According to a report by the National Endowment for Democracy, China
has spent the equivalent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion and per-
ceptions around the world through thousands of people-to-people exchanges, cul-
tural activities, educational programs, and the development of media enter-
prises and information initiatives with global reach.
(2) Educational and exchange programs are a core element of United States
public diplomacy, elevating our culture, policies, and interests worldwide.
(3) These programs provide students with access to international knowledge,
an opportunity to learn foreign languages, and a unique environment for devel-
oping cultural understanding, all of which are valuable skills in today’s global
economy.
(4) 90 percent of ECA’s appropriation is spent in the United States or in-
vested directly in American citizens or American organizations.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) China’s efforts to mold public opinion and influence educational institu-
tions undermine United States’ influence in Latin America and the Caribbean
and threaten democratic institutions and practices in the region;
(2) the United States Government should expand current educational and cul-
tural exchange programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, which are cost-
effective and strengthen people-to-people diplomacy, to promote national secu-
rity and foreign policy interests of the United States; and
(3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cultural, and educational skills
that advance United States economic competitiveness, strengthen alliances, and
support democracies worldwide.
(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Edu-
cational and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assistant Administrator
for the Bureau of Economic Growth, Education, and Environment at the United
States Agency for International Development, shall devise a strategy—
(1) to evaluate and expand existing programs and, as necessary, design and
implement new educational, professional, and cultural exchanges and other pro-
grams to—
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(A) create and sustain mutual understanding with other countries nec-
essary to advance United States foreign policy goals by cultivating people-
to-people ties among current and future global leaders that build enduring
networks and personal relationships; and
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(B) promote United States national security interests and values, includ-
ing through the expansion of exchange visitor programs such as inter-
national visitor leadership programs and the Young Leaders of the Amer-
icas Initiative, as well as professional capacity building programs that
prioritize building skills in entrepreneurship, promoting transparency, and
technology;
(2) to ensure that exchange programs for Americans abroad and international
visitors attract a diverse pool of participants, including from underrepresented,
marginalized, and low-income communities; and
(3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing programs, and, as necessary,
design and implement new basic and higher education programs in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, in accordance with the United States Strategy on Inter-
national Basic Education and the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment Education Policy, to enable all young adults, youth, and children to ac-
quire the quality education and skills needed to be productive members in soci-
ety, which will lead to better individual and societal outcomes.
(d) REPORT WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with
the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report that assesses the nature and impact of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na’s educational and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the Caribbean,
its impact on United States’ strategic interests, and recommendations for the United
States Government to expand people-to-people ties.
SEC. 252. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) narcotics trafficking continues to pose a security threat to the countries
and peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean;
(2) other forms of transnational organized crime, including arms trafficking,
human smuggling, money laundering, and illicit financing, are drivers of irreg-
ular migration;
(3) narcotics trafficking is fueled by governments that fail to curb the illicit
drug trade by adequately regulating the legal trade of non-fentanyl opioids and
precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and other syn-
thetic drugs;
(4) further, governments that do not cooperate sufficiently on financial inves-
tigations and prosecutions, withhold information with respect to money laun-
dering crimes, or are determined to facilitate illicit activities, particularly by
transnational organized criminal organizations, should be held accountable;
(5) as noted in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2020,
China ‘‘has not cooperated sufficiently on financial investigations and does not
provide adequate responses to requests for financial investigation information’’;
(6) the United States should apply economic and other targeted financial
sanctions with respect to individuals engaged in financial crimes and money
laundering that fosters narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin America
and the Caribbean; and
(7) the United States should look to policies to hold accountable countries that
fail to sufficiently investigate financial crimes and money laundering that foster
narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS
SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other Euro-
pean countries are close partners, sharing values grounded in democracy,
human rights, transparency, and the rules-based international order established
after World War II;
(2) without a common approach by the United States, European Union, the
United Kingdom, and other European countries on connectivity, trade,
transnational challenges, and support for democracy and human rights, the
People’s Republic of China will continue to increase its economic, political, and
security leverage in Europe;
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(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment of assistance to European
countries following the COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to
aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic ties to the People’s Republic
of China;
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(4) as European countries seek to recover from the economic toll of the
COVID–19 outbreak, the United States must stand in partnership with Europe
to support our collective economic recovery, reinforce our collective national se-
curity, and defend shared values;
(5) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other Euro-
pean countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reliance on sup-
ply chains away from the People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical
and pharmaceutical sectors;
(6) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other Euro-
pean countries should leverage their respective economic innovation capabilities
to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw
a contrast with the centralized economy of the People’s Republic of China;
(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union should accel-
erate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including negotiating a United
States-European Union trade agreement that benefits workers and the broader
economy in both the United States and European Union;
(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should continue trilateral
efforts to address the security, economic, democracy, and human rights chal-
lenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;
(9) the United States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and other Euro-
pean countries should enhance cooperation to counter People’s Republic of
China disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
(10) the United States and Europe share serious concerns with the repres-
sions being supported and executed by the Government of the People’s Republic
of China, and should continue implementing measures to address the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong,
and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the
export of China’s authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;
(11) the United States and Europe should remain united in their shared val-
ues against attempts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China at
the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that
erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ‘‘community of a
shared future for mankind’’ and ‘‘democratization of international relations’’;
(12) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments around the
world, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastruc-
ture, could threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of key
countries;
(13) as appropriate, the United States should share intelligence with Euro-
pean allies and partners on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the
Government of the People’s Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in
Europe;
(14) the European Union’s Investment Screening Regulation, which came into
force in October 2020, is a welcome development, and member states should
closely scrutinize PRC investments in their countries through their own na-
tional investment screening measures;
(15) the President should actively engage the European Union on the imple-
mentation of the Export Control Reform Act regulations and to better har-
monize United States and European Union policies with respect to export con-
trols;
(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing of more items and
technologies to restrict dual use exports controlled at the National Security and
above level to the People’s Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment;
(17) the United States should explore the value of establishing a body akin
to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that
would specifically coordinate United States and European Union export control
policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the People’s
Republic of China; and
(18) the United States should work with counterparts in Europe to—
(A) evaluate United States and European overreliance on goods origi-
nating in the People’s Republic of China, including in the medical and phar-
maceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;
(B) develop a common strategy for promoting energy security and eco-
nomic growth in eastern Europe and the Balkans that addresses shared
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
concerns related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative in these regions, in-
cluding complementary investments in the Three Seas Initiative Fund for
clean energy and digital connectivity projects;
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(C) counter PRC efforts to use COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive
tool to pressure developing countries by offering relevant United States and
European expertise and assistance; and
(D) leverage the United States and European private sectors to advance
the post-COVID–19 economic recovery.
SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall brief the appropriate congressional committees, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States will enhance
cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries with
respect to the People’s Republic of China.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under subsection (a) shall include the fol-
lowing elements with respect to the strategy referred to in such subsection:
(1) An identification of the senior Senate-confirmed Department of State offi-
cial who leads United States efforts to cooperate with the European Union,
NATO, and European partner countries to advance a shared approach with re-
spect to the People’s Republic of China.
(2) An identification of key policy points of convergence and divergence be-
tween the United States and European allies and partners with respect to the
People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic prac-
tices.
(3) A description of efforts to advance shared interests with European coun-
terparts on—
(A) security and economic challenges with respect to the People’s Republic
of China;
(B) democracy and human rights challenges with respect to the People’s
Republic of China;
(C) technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China;
(D) defense issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China; and
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond to the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) established by the Government of the People’s Republic of
China.
(4) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and
functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense
tasked with engaging with European allies and partners on the People’s Repub-
lic of China.
(5) A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the date of the briefing and future
plans to work with European allies and partners to counter the Government of
the People’s Republic of China’s advancement of an authoritarian governance
model around the world.
(6) A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made up to the date of the briefing
and future plans to support European efforts to identify cost-effective alter-
natives to Huawei’s 5G technology.
(7) A detailing of how United States public diplomacy tools, including the
Global Engagement Center of the Department of State, will coordinate efforts
with counterpart entities within the European Union to counter Chinese propa-
ganda.
(8) A description of the staffing and budget resources the Department of State
dedicates to engagement between the United States and the European Union
on the People’s Republic of China and provide an assessment of out-year re-
source needs to execute such strategy.
(9) A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work with European allies and partners
to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral
fora, including at the World Health Organization.
(c) FORM.—The briefing required under section (a) shall be classified.
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and annually thereafter for three years, the Secretary of State shall consult
with the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representa-
tives regarding the development and implementation of the elements described in
subsection (b).
SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FI-
NANCE.
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(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with transatlantic partners to build
on the agreement among the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada,
and the European Development Finance Institutions (referred to as the ‘‘DFI Alli-
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ance’’) to enhance coordination on shared objectives to foster private sector-led de-
velopment and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in
emerging markets, particularly as related to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—
(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia;
(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative Fund;
(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, and Australia;
and
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged $65,000,000,000 for
infrastructure projects and emphasizes transparency standards.
(b) STANDARDS.—The United States and the European Union should coordinate
and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the
Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for Belt and Road Initiative
contracts and terms with developing countries.
SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BE-
TWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and
Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such other heads of
Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, submit to the appro-
priate committees of Congress a report and brief such committees on coopera-
tion between—
(A) the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
(B) the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.
(2) CONTENTS.—The report and briefing under paragraph (1) shall include the
following elements:
(A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic energy, infrastructure,
banking, financial, economic, military, and space cooperation—
(i) between the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic
of Iran; and
(ii) between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federa-
tion.
(B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID–19 pandemic on such co-
operation.
(C) An assessment of the effect that United States compliance with the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016,
and United States withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the
cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).
(D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation described in subpara-
graph (A)(i) that would be had by the United States reentering compliance
with the JCPOA or a successor agreement and the effect of the United
States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or reaching a successor
agreement.
(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense
of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other appro-
priate Federal departments and agencies should share with important allies and
partners of the United States, as appropriate, the findings of the report required
under subsection (b).
PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
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SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
It is the sense of Congress that—
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(1) the United States should continue to stand with friends and partners,
while also working to establish new partners in South and Central Asia as they
contend with efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China to
interfere in their respective political systems and encroach upon their sovereign
territory; and
(2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the Comprehensive
Global Strategic Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral defense
consultations and collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a
major defense partner.
SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and, the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will engage
with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 mecha-
nism, with respect to the People’s Republic of China.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the fol-
lowing elements:
(1) A detailed description of the security and economic challenges that the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses to the countries of South and Central
Asia, including border disputes with South and Central Asian countries that
border the People’s Republic of China, and PRC investments in land and sea
ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the region.
(2) A detailed description of United States efforts to provide alternatives to
PRC investment in infrastructure and other sectors in South and Central Asia.
(3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional efforts to work with coun-
tries in South Asia on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts to inter-
fere in their political systems and economies.
(4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts to work with the
Government of Afghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by PRC invest-
ment in the Afghan mineral sector.
(5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with the Govern-
ment of Pakistan with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Republic of
China, including investments by the People’s Republic of China in Pakistan
through the Belt and Road Initiative.
(6) In close consultation with the Government of India, identification of areas
with respect to which the United States Government can provide diplomatic and
other support as appropriate for India’s efforts to address economic and security
challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China in the region.
(7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key regional and
functional bureaus within the Department of State and Department of Defense
tasked with engaging with the countries of South and Central Asia on issues
relating to the People’s Republic of China.
(8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal departments and agen-
cies, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, the Department of Commerce, the Department of En-
ergy, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the
countries of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce links that will
help those countries diversify their trade away from the People’s Republic of
China.
(9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic efforts with Central
Asian countries, Turkey, and any other countries with significant populations
of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People’s Re-
public of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic minori-
ties to the People’s Republic of China, protect ethnic minorities from intimida-
tion by Chinese Government authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms
of assembly and expression.
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a) shall be submitted in an un-
classified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified
annex as necessary.
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and not less often than annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of
State shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation of the
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
strategy required under subsection (a).
SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
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(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally important part of the Indo-Pacific
where the United States has political, economic, and security interests.
(2) The United States has an interest in working with partners in the Indo-
Pacific, including India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional governance,
economic connectivity, and security challenges including threats to freedom of
navigation.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—As a part of the United States engagement in the
Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement
with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including with governments, civil so-
ciety, and private sectors in such countries to—
(1) promote United States political engagement with such region, including
through active participation in regional organizations, and strengthened diplo-
matic relations with United States partners in such region;
(2) enhance United States economic connectivity and commercial exchange
with such region;
(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region from security challenges, in-
cluding related to piracy;
(4) support the ability of governments and organizations in such region to re-
spond to natural disasters;
(5) support and facilitate the role of regional allies and partners as net pro-
viders of security to such region and as partners to the United States in ad-
dressing security challenges in such region, including through assistance to
such allies and partners to build capacity in maritime security and maritime
domain awareness;
(6) continue to build the United States-India relationship in order to regu-
larize security cooperation through the negotiation of agreements concerning ac-
cess, communication, and navigation, including through foundational agree-
ments; and
(7) promote cooperation with United States allies in the Indo-Pacific, includ-
ing Japan and Australia, and major defense partners, including India, and
NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-
based order in such region.
(c) STRATEGY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a multi-
year strategy for United States engagement to support United States interests
in the Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall—
(A) define United States political, economic, and security interests in the
Indian Ocean region;
(B) outline challenges to the interests of the United States in such region;
(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation between the United States and
members of the Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, through co-
ordination in diplomacy and development priorities, joint military exercises
and operations, and other activities that promote United States political,
economic, and security interests;
(D) outline efforts to support economic connectivity in such region, includ-
ing through the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infrastructure Work-
ing Group, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand
and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pacific, including with the coun-
tries of Southeast Asia, that maintain high standards of investment and
support for civil society and people-to-people connectivity;
(E) describe how the United States can engage with regional intergovern-
mental organizations and entities, including the Indian Ocean Rim Associa-
tion, to promote United States political, economic, and security interests in
such region;
(F) review the United States diplomatic posture in such region, including
an assessment of United States diplomatic engagement in countries without
a permanent United States embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assess-
ment of ways to improve the cooperation with the Maldives, the Seychelles,
and Comoros;
(G) review United States diplomatic agreements with countries in such
region that facilitate United States military operations in such region, in-
cluding bilateral and multilateral agreements, and describe efforts to ex-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
pand United States cooperation with such countries through the negotiation
of additional agreements; and
(H) include a security assistance strategy for such region that outlines
priorities, objectives, and actions for United States security assistance ef-
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73
forts to governments of countries in such region to promote United States
political, economic, and security interests in such region.
(2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) may be submitted
as a part of any other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific.
(3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than one year after the submis-
sion of the strategy required under paragraph (1) and one year thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on progress made toward implementing such strategy.
(d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D.
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C.
7002(c)(2)) is amended—
(A) by inserting ‘‘, including in the Indian Ocean region’’ after ‘‘deploy-
ments of the People’s Republic of China military’’; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ‘‘In this subpara-
graph, the term ‘Indian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, including
the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas surrounding
the Indian Ocean.’’.
(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by paragraph (1) shall take ef-
fect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the first
report required under section 1238 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) that is
submitted after such date.
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-
eign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term ‘‘Indian Ocean region’’ means the Indian
Ocean, including the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral areas
surrounding the Indian Ocean.
PART IV—AFRICA
SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives.
(b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director
of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
that assesses the nature and impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political,
economic, socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on
United States strategic interests, including information relating to—
(1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, development financing,
oil-for-loans deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;
(2) the involvement of People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-owned enter-
prises in Africa;
(3) the amount of African debt held by the PRC;
(4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and media companies
in Africa;
(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African countries;
(6) the scope of PRC investment in and control of African energy resources
and minerals critical for emerging and foundational technologies;
(7) an analysis on the linkages between PRC’s aid and assistance to African
countries and African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in inter-
national fora;
(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate illegal and corrupt activ-
DMWilson on DSKJM0X7X2PROD with REPORTS
ity, including trade in counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled extrac-
tive resources and wildlife products, between Africa and the PRC;
(9) the methods and techniques that the PRC uses to exert undue influence
on African governments and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including
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through the CCP’s party-to-party training program, and to influence African
multilateral organizations; and
(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and educational activities under-
taken by the PRC and CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa.
SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations,
and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and
the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.
(b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States
Trade Representative, the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, and the leadership of the United States International Devel-
opment Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic
competitiveness and promoting improvements in the investment climate in Africa,
including through support for—
(1) democratic institutions and the rule of law, including property rights; and
(2) improved transparency, anti-corruption efforts, and good governance.
(c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—
(1) a description and assessment of barriers to United States investment in
Africa for United States businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-
ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an assess-
ment of whether existing programs effectively address such barriers;
(2) a description and assessment of barriers to African diaspora investment
in Africa, and recommendations to overcome such barriers;
(3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United States that have
a comparative advantage in African markets;
(4) a determination of priority African countries for promoting two-way trade
and investment and an assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, in-
cluding democracy and governance and rule of law support, to promote a condu-
cive operating environment in priority countries;
(5) an identification of opportunities for strategic cooperation with European
allies on trade and investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on
trade, security, development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders Summit to pro-
mote two-way trade and investment, strategic engagement, and security in Afri-
ca.
(d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—
The Comptroller General of the United States shall—
(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial Service Officers
and Department of State Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa; and
(2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assess-
ment of whether human resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to
meet the goals of the various trade and economic programs and initiatives in
Africa, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Africa.
SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means—
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives.
(b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER PRC CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRI-
CA.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an interagency Working
Group, which shall include representatives of the Department of State, the De-
partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
such other agencies of the United States Government as the President considers
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appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression with respect to Africa.
(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established pursuant to this subsection
shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a set of
recommendations, such as for—
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(A) bolstering the capacity of governments in Africa to ensure the integ-
rity of their data networks and critical infrastructure, where applicable;
(B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
(C) an action plan for United States embassies in Africa to provide assist-
ance to host-country governments with respect to protecting their vital dig-
ital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage, including an assess-
ment of staffing resources needed to implement the action plan in embas-
sies in Africa;
(D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC disinformation and
propaganda in traditional and digital media targeted to African audiences;
and
(E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital authoritarianism and
identifying tools and assistance to enhance and promote digital democracy.
SEC. 274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010, is a signature ef-
fort to invest in the next generation of African leaders;
(2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is vital for the United
States to support strong and enduring partnerships with the next generation of
African leaders; and
(3) the United States Government should prioritize investments to build the
capacity of emerging young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including
through efforts to enhance leadership skills, encourage entrepreneurship,
strengthen public administration and the role of civil society, and connect young
African leaders continentally and globally across the private, civic, and public
sectors.
(b) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE PROGRAM.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established in the Department of State the Young
African Leaders Initiative (‘‘YALI’’) program.
(2) PURPOSE.—The YALI program shall seek to build the capacity of young
African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of business, civic engage-
ment, or public administration, including through efforts to—
(A) support young African leaders by offering professional development,
training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leader-
ship, innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, entrepreneur-
ship, good governance, and public administration; and
(B) provide increased economic and technical assistance to young African
leaders to promote economic growth and strengthen ties between United
States and African businesses.
(3) FELLOWSHIPS.—The YALI program shall award fellowships under the
Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders program to young
African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have demonstrated strong capabilities in en-
trepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership, and who have had a
positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions.
(4) REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CENTERS.—The YALI program shall seek to estab-
lish regional leadership centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer training to young
African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have demonstrated strong capabilities in en-
trepreneurship, innovation, public service and leadership, and who have had a
positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions.
(5) ACTIVITIES.—
(A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
nation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development and the heads of other relevant Federal departments
and agencies, shall oversee all United States-based activities carried out
under the YALI program, including the following:
(i) The participation of Mandela Washington fellows in a six-week
Leadership Institute at a United States university or college in busi-
ness, civic engagement, or public management, including academic ses-
sions, site visits, professional networking opportunities, leadership
training, community service, and organized cultural activities.
(ii) The participation by Mandela Washington fellows in an annual
Mandela Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such Fellows the
opportunity to meet with United States leaders from the private, pub-
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lic, and non-profit sectors.
(B) AFRICA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Secretary of State, in coordination
with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International De-
velopment and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agen-
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cies, should continue to support YALI programs in sub-Saharan Africa, in-
cluding the following:
(i) Access to continued leadership training and other professional de-
velopment opportunities for Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young
African Leaders alumni upon their return to their home countries, in-
cluding online courses, technical assistance, and access to funding.
(ii) Training for young African leaders at regional leadership centers
established in accordance with paragraph (4), and through online and
in-person courses offered by such centers.
(iii) Opportunities for networking and engagement with—
(I) other alumni of the Mandela Washington Fellowship for
Young African Leaders;
(II) alumni of programs at regional leadership centers estab-
lished in accordance with paragraph (4); and
(III) United States and like-minded diplomatic missions, business
leaders, and others as appropriate.
(C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this paragraph, the Secretary of
State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency
for International Development and the heads of other relevant Federal de-
partments and agencies shall seek to partner with the private sector to pur-
sue public-private partnerships, leverage private sector expertise, expand
networking opportunities, and identify funding opportunities as well as fel-
lowship and employment opportunities for participants in the YALI pro-
gram.
(6) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International Development and the heads
of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a plan for implementing the YALI program, in-
cluding the following:
(A) A description of clearly defined program goals, targets, and planned
outcomes for each year and for the duration of implementation of the pro-
gram.
(B) A strategy to monitor and evaluate the program and progress made
toward achieving such goals, targets, and planned outcomes.
(C) A strategy to ensure the program is promoting United States foreign
policy goals in Africa, including ensuring that the program is clearly brand-
ed and paired with robust public diplomacy efforts.
(7) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act,
and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development,
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and publish in a pub-
licly accessible, internet–based form, a report on the following:
(A) The progress made toward achieving the goals, targets, and planned
outcomes described in paragraph (6)(A), including an overview of the pro-
gram implemented in the previous year and an estimated number of bene-
ficiaries.
(B) An assessment of how the YALI program is contributing to and pro-
moting United States-Africa relations, particularly in areas of increased pri-
vate sector investment, trade promotion, support to civil society, improved
public administration, and fostering entrepreneurship and youth empower-
ment.
(C) Recommendations for improvements or changes to the program and
implementation plan, if any, that would improve their effectiveness during
subsequent years of implementation of the program.
(8) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection,
the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate.
(9) SUNSET.—The requirements of this section shall terminate on the date
that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.
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Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report on the resources and timeline needed
to establish within the Agency an organization the mission of which shall be to pro-
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mote democratic values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate,
and relevant news and information to the people of Africa and counter
disinformation from malign actors, especially in countries in which a free press is
banned by the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, and
the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open de-
bate.
SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICATION.
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to support in-
creased access to energy in Africa and reduce Africa’s energy dependence on coun-
tries that use energy reliance for undue political influence such as the Russian Fed-
eration and the People’s Republic of China.
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Lack of access to energy remains a significant barrier to economic ad-
vancement and opportunity in Africa. As of 2018, an estimated 789,000,000 peo-
ple, the vast majority of them in sub-Saharan Africa, lacked access to any mod-
ern electricity. Even in the region’s most advanced economies, average annual
per capita electricity consumption is often under 200 kilowatt-hours, less than
what is needed to power a typical refrigerator. Only a small fraction of the
12,000,000 young Africans who enter the job market each year find employ-
ment; and the cost and reliability of electricity remain top constraints to job cre-
ation and economic competitiveness.
(2) The United States’ global strategic competitors have stepped in to address
this disparity and finance energy sector development across Africa. China is the
single largest trading partner for African countries in aggregate, and the largest
bilateral lender for public sector loans across Africa. Approximately 65 percent
of Chinese lending to Africa goes to infrastructure, and between 2013–2020, the
energy sector consistently accounted for the largest share of all investment
under China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
(3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is the foundation for all mod-
ern economies and necessary for increasing growth and employment.
(4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower middle-income countries is
necessary in the next decades in order to meet human, social, security, and eco-
nomic needs.
(5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclusive economies, and making en-
ergy systems resilient in low- and lower middle-income countries will require
diversified power systems and a mix of technologies that align with local condi-
tions, resources, and needs.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that countries in Africa con-
tinue to be important partners to the United States and the DFC should continue
to make investments in sub-Saharan Africa to facilitate technologies that contribute
to energy security and reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in low and lower
middle-income countries.
(d) AMENDMENT.—Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–
121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
‘‘(10) advance United States foreign policy and development goals by assisting
African countries to reduce their dependence on energy resources from countries
that use energy dependence for undue political influence, such as the Russian
Federation or the People’s Republic of China, which have used energy and fi-
nancial resources to influence other countries;
‘‘(11) promote the energy security of allies and partners of the United States
by encouraging the development of accessible, transparent, and competitive en-
ergy markets that provide diversified sources and reliable, affordable, and sus-
tainable power;
‘‘(12) encourage United States public and private sector investment in African
energy infrastructure projects to bridge the gap between energy security re-
quirements and commercial demand in a way that is consistent with the re-
gion’s capacity; and
‘‘(13) help facilitate the export of United States energy resources, technology,
and expertise to global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of
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allies and partners of the United States, including in Africa.’’.
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PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading its influence in the Middle
East and North Africa through its energy and infrastructure investments, tech-
nology transfer, and arms sales;
(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to establish military or dual use fa-
cilities in geographically strategic locations in the Middle East and North Africa
to further its Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of United States national
security interests; and
(3) the export of certain communications infrastructure from the People’s Re-
public of China degrades the security of partner networks, exposes intellectual
property to theft, threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security
cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s authori-
tarian surveillance model.
(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development,
and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a strategy for
countering and limiting the People’s Republic of China’s influence in, and access
to, the Middle East and North Africa.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include—
(A) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s intent with regards
to increased cooperation with Middle East and North African countries and
how such cooperation fits into its broader global strategic objectives;
(B) an assessment of how governments across the region are responding
to the People’s Republic of China’s efforts to increase its military presence
in their countries;
(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through foreign military sales,
financing, and efforts to build partner capacity and increase interoperability
with the United States;
(D) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s joint research and
development with the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on the United
States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the
People’s Republic of China’s influence in such area;
(E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons technology transfers from
the People’s Republic of China to the Middle East and North Africa, im-
pacts on United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps
to mitigate the People’s Republic of China’s influence in such area;
(F) an assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s military sales to the
region, including lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;
(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of China military basing and dual-
use facility initiatives across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on
United States’ national security interests, and recommended steps to miti-
gate the People’s Republic of China’s influence in such area;
(H) efforts to improve regional security cooperation with United States al-
lies and partners with a focus on—
(i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the East-
ern Mediterranean;
(ii) integrated air and missile defense;
(iii) cyber security;
(iv) border security; and
(v) critical infrastructure security, to include energy security;
(I) increased support for government-to-government engagement on crit-
ical infrastructure development projects, including ports and water infra-
structure;
(J) efforts to encourage United States private sector and public-private
partnerships in healthcare technology and foreign direct investment in non-
energy sectors;
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(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and professional education ex-
changes with key partner countries;
(L) specific steps to counter increased investment from the People’s Re-
public of China in telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic efforts
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to stress the political, economic, and social benefits of a free and open inter-
net;
(M) efforts to promote United States private sector engagement in and
public-private partnerships on renewable energy development;
(N) the expansion of public-private partnership efforts on water, desalina-
tion, and irrigation projects; and
(O) efforts to warn United States partners in the Middle East and North
Africa of the risks associated with the People’s Republic of China’s tele-
communications infrastructure and provide alternative ‘‘clean paths’’ to the
People’s Republic of China’s technology.
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b) shall be submitted in an un-
classified form that can be made available to the public, but may include a classified
annex as necessary.
SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States and the international community have long-term inter-
ests in the stability, security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle East
and North Africa.
(2) In addition to and apart from military and security efforts, the United
States should harness a whole of government approach, including bilateral and
multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete
with and counter PRC influence.
(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United States engagement,
transparent governance structures, and active civil society engagement help
counter predatory foreign investment and influence efforts.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States that the United
States and the international community should continue diplomatic and economic
efforts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that support reform efforts to—
(1) promote greater economic opportunity;
(2) foster private sector development;
(3) strengthen civil society;
(4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the rule of law; and
(5) promote greater regional integration and intraregional cooperation, includ-
ing with Israel.
SEC. 283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA-IRAN RELATIONSHIP.
It is the sense of Congress that the People’s Republic of China’s economic relation-
ship with Iran, including oil purchases in violation of United States sanctions, un-
dermines United States efforts to compel Iran to abandon its malign activities.
PART VI—ARCTIC REGION
SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—
(A) creates new national and regional security challenges due to in-
creased military activity in the Arctic;
(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a major theater of con-
flict in ongoing strategic competition;
(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral countries have inadequate
capacity to patrol the increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which
is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
(D) impacts public safety due to increased human activity in the Arctic
region where search and rescue capacity remains very limited; and
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s fragile and pristine environment
and the unique and highly sensitive species found in the Arctic’s marine
and terrestrial ecosystems; and
(2) the United States should reduce the consequences described in paragraph
(1) by—
(A) evaluating the wide variety and dynamic set of security and safety
risks developing in the Arctic;
(B) developing policies and making preparations to mitigate and respond
to threats and risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to work with al-
lies and partners in the Arctic region to deter potential aggressive activities
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and build Arctic competencies;
(C) adequately funding the National Earth System Prediction Capability
to substantively improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on the time
scales necessary to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
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(D) investing in resources, including a significantly expanded icebreaker
fleet, to ensure that the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and
respond to security threats in the Arctic region; and
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all states in the Arctic region
to reach an agreement for—
(i) maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic region;
(ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship and safety initiatives in the
Arctic region;
(iii) ensuring safe and efficient management of commercial maritime
traffic in the Arctic;
(iv) promoting responsible natural resource management and eco-
nomic development; and
(v) countering China’s Polar Silk Road initiative;
(vi) examining the possibility of reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of De-
fense Forum; and
(vii) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic Re-
gion, including by working with observers of the Arctic Council, includ-
ing India and the People’s Republic of China, to adopt mitigation plans
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Arctic Coun-
cil’s Framework for Action on Black Carbon and Methane.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to recognize only the states specified in subsection (c)(1) as Arctic states,
and to reject all other claims to such status; and
(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious threat to Arctic peace
and stability, and the interests of United States allies and partners.
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term ‘‘Arctic states’’ means Russia, Canada, the
United States, Norway, Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and
Iceland.
(2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term ‘‘Arctic Region’’ means the geographic region
north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.
(d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is estab-
lished within the Department of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs
(referred to in this section as the ‘‘Ambassador’’), appointed in accordance with para-
graph (1).
(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) DUTIES.—
(A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Subject to the direction of the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State, the Ambassador is authorized to represent
the United States in matters and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in—
(i) contacts with foreign governments, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, and specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Arctic Coun-
cil, and other international organizations of which the United States is
a member; and
(ii) multilateral conferences and meetings relating to Arctic affairs.
(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The Ambassador shall serve as the
Chair of the Arctic Council when the United States holds the Chairmanship
of the Arctic Council.
(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambassador shall coordinate United
States policies related to the Arctic Region, including—
(A) meeting national security, economic, and commercial needs pertaining
to Arctic affairs;
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological re-
sources;
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable natural resource management
and economic development;
(D) strengthening institutions for cooperation among the Arctic states;
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions that affect them;
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, regional, and
global environmental issues;
(G) integrating scientific data on the current and projected effects of cli-
mate change in the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to
the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
(H) making available the methods and approaches on the integration of
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climate science to other regional security planning programs in the Depart-
ment of State to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may
more adequately account for the effects of climate change; and
(I) reducing black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic Region.
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(e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Ambassador shall develop a policy, to
be known as the ‘‘Arctic Region Security Policy’’, to assess, develop, budget for, and
implement plans, policies, and actions—
(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States in Arctic states,
including through enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, participa-
tion in regional and bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and coordina-
tion of United States initiatives and assistance programs across agencies to pro-
tect the national security of the United States and its allies and partners;
(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic states to the effects of envi-
ronmental change and increased civilian and military activity by Arctic states
and other states that may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Re-
gion;
(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and Arctic states that—
(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic environment; and
(B) are strategically significant to the United States;
(4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change and national secu-
rity risk and vulnerability assessments into the decision making process on for-
eign assistance awards with Greenland;
(5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging and cooperating
with Arctic states on collaborative approaches—
(A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the Arctic Region;
(B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety in the Arctic Region;
(C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions by mitigating against
the militarization of the Arctic Region;
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral policies among Arctic
states on the management of maritime transit routes through the Arctic Re-
gion and work cooperatively on the transit policies for access to and transit
in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region Security Action Plans
to ensure stability and public safety in disaster situations in a humane and
responsible fashion;
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, and resiliency of
United States interests and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and
(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emissions in the Arctic.
SEC. 286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON THE ARC-
TIC COUNCIL.
It is the policy of the United States to urge that Taiwan be given observer status
on the Arctic Council.
PART VII—OCEANIA
SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.
It shall be the policy of the United States—
(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic national security and eco-
nomic priority of the United States Government;
(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and democratic governance across
Oceania as part of a free and open Indo-Pacific region;
(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely Associated States of
the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated
States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and develop-
ment exchanges that promote the goals of individual countries and the entire
region;
(4) to work with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Japan to
advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania region concerning health, environ-
mental protection, disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic development;
(5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in existing regional or-
ganizations and international structures to promote the national security and
economic goals of the United States and countries of Oceania;
(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States strategy that will en-
hance youth engagement and advance long-term growth and development
throughout the region, especially as such relates to protecting marine resources
that are critical to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries
of Oceania against current and future threats resulting from extreme weather
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and severe changes in the environment;
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence and corruption aimed
at undermining the political, environmental, social, and economic stability of
the people and governments of the countries of Oceania;
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(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of Oceania to address public
health challenges and improve global health security;
(9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based private sector invest-
ments that adhere to best practices regarding transparency, debt sustainability,
and environmental and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed in-
vestments by authoritarian governments;
(10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain safe from the
risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and other debris that threaten
health and livelihoods;
(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States support for maintain-
ing Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Oceania; and
(12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania to promote the
dignified return of the remains of members of the United States Armed Forces
who are missing in action from previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.
SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.
(a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening United States engage-
ment with the countries of Oceania, including an analysis of opportunities to cooper-
ate with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and pro-
mote shared goals in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) A description of United States regional goals and concerns with respect
to Oceania and increasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.
(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States regional goals
and concerns that are shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, including
a review of issues related to anti-corruption efforts, maritime and other security
issues, environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth and
development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the Governments of the
United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of shared regional
goals and concerns.
(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by regional organizations
and other related intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing shared re-
gional goals and concerns.
(5) A plan for aligning United States programs and resources in pursuit of
shared regional goals and concerns, as appropriate.
(6) Recommendations for additional United States authorities, personnel, pro-
grams, or resources necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.
(7) Any other elements the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on
the feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States-based public-private
sponsored security dialogue (to be known as the ‘‘Oceania Security Dialogue’’) among
the countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and discussing issues
affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national security of the Indo-Pacific coun-
tries of Oceania.
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by subsection (a) shall, at a min-
imum, include the following:
(1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to participate in a pub-
lic-private sponsored security dialogue.
(2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting an Oceania Secu-
rity Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United States.
(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue that
would maximize participation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries
of Oceania.
(4) A review of the funding modalities available to the Department of State
to help finance an Oceania Security Dialogue, including grant-making authori-
ties available to the Department of State.
(5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or other legal limitations
that would prevent the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue with par-
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ticipation and support of the Department of State.
(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help to advance
the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the chang-
ing environment as the greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.
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(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could help amplify the
issues and work of existing regional structures and organizations dedicated to
the security of the Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific
Environmental Security Forum.
(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would help with imple-
mentation of the strategic roadmap required by section 292 and advance the
National Security Strategy of the United States.
(c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent practicable, the Secretary of
State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate
the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies of the Department
of Defense to determine the feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania
Security Dialogue.
SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on strategies to reasonably and safely expand the number of
Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of—
(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all currently feasible loca-
tions in Oceania; and
(2) working with regional and international partners of the United States to
expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania commu-
nities in support of climate resilience initiatives.
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall—
(1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence of the Peace Corps
and its volunteers in Oceania;
(2) examine potential remedies that include working with United States Gov-
ernment agencies and regional governments, including governments of United
States allies—
(A) to increase the health infrastructure and medical evacuation capabili-
ties of the countries of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps
volunteers while in such countries;
(B) to address physical safety concerns that have decreased the ability of
the Peace Corps to operate in Oceania; and
(C) to increase transportation infrastructure in the countries of Oceania
to better support the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to
necessary facilities;
(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of Peace Corps Response
volunteers to help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and devel-
opment needs of their communities that require specific professional expertise;
and
(4) explore potential new operational models to address safety and security
needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including—
(A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and
(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to regional or United States-
based healthcare facilities for routine physical and behavioral health eval-
uation.
(c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMUNITIES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential to expand the presence of Peace
Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania communities under subsection (a)(2),
the Director of the Peace Corps shall consider the development of initiatives de-
scribed in paragraph (2).
(2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives described in this paragraph are volun-
teer initiatives that help the countries of Oceania address social, economic, and
development needs of their communities, including by—
(A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-based interventions, the
vulnerability that communities in Oceania face as result of extreme weath-
er, severe environmental change, and other climate related trends; and
(B) improving, through smart infrastructure principles, access to trans-
portation and connectivity infrastructure that will help address the eco-
nomic and social challenges that communities in Oceania confront as a re-
sult of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.
(d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘Oceania’’ includes the following:
(1) Easter Island of Chile.
(2) Fiji.
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(3) French Polynesia of France.
(4) Kiribati.
(5) New Caledonia of France.
(6) Nieu of New Zealand.
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(7) Papua New Guinea.
(8) Samoa.
(9) Vanuatu.
(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
(12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
(13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
(16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
(17) The Republic of Palau.
(18) The Solomon Islands.
(19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
(20) Tonga.
(21) Tuvalu.
(22) Wallis and Futuna of France.
PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS
SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE.
This part may be cited as the ‘‘Boosting Long-term U.S. Engagement in the Pacific
Act’’ or the ‘‘BLUE Pacific Act’’.
SEC. 296. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The Pacific Islands—
(A) are home to roughly 10 million residents, including over 8.6 million
in Papua New Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cultures and peo-
ples;
(B) are spread across an expanse of the Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15
percent of the Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions of Melanesia,
Micronesia, and Polynesia; and
(C) face shared challenges in development that have distinct local con-
texts, including climate change and rising sea levels, geographic distances
from major markets, and vulnerability to external shocks such as natural
disasters.
(2) The United States is a Pacific country with longstanding ties and shared
values and interests with the Pacific Islands, including through the Compacts
of Free Association with the Freely Associated States, the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau.
(3) The United States has vital national security interests in the Pacific Is-
lands, including—
(A) protecting regional peace and security that fully respects the sov-
ereignty of all nations;
(B) advancing economic prosperity free from coercion through trade and
sustainable development; and
(C) supporting democracy, good governance, the rule of law, and human
rights and fundamental freedoms.
(4) Successive United States administrations have recognized the importance
of the Pacific region, including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic docu-
ments, including the following:
(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, which first declared the rebal-
ance to Asia and the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pacific nation,
and paved the way for subsequent United States engagement with the Pa-
cific Islands, including several new policies focused on conservation and re-
silience to climate change announced in September 2016.
(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, which includes a commitment
to ‘‘shore up fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to reduce
their vulnerability to economic fluctuations and natural disasters’’.
(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which identified the Pacific Is-
lands as ‘‘critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared values, interests,
and commitments’’ and committed the United States to ‘‘building capacity
and resilience to address maritime security; Illegal, Unreported, and Un-
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regulated fishing; drug trafficking; and resilience to address climate change
and disaster response’’.
(5) The United States has deepened its diplomatic engagement with the Pa-
cific Islands through several recent initiatives, including—
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(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an additional $100,000,000 in 2019
and $200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approximately $350,000,000 that
the United States provides annually to the region to support shared prior-
ities in economic and human development, climate change, and more; and
(B) the Small and Less Populous Island Economies (SALPIE) Initiative
launched in March 2021 to strengthen United States collaboration with is-
land countries and territories, including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID–
19 economic challenges, long-term economic development, climate change,
and other shared interests.
(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed by leaders of the Pacific
Islands Forum in 2018, affirmed that climate change ‘‘remains the single great-
est threat to the livelihoods, security, and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pa-
cific’’ and asserted ‘‘the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its national
affairs free of external interference and coercion’’.
(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated that the Pacific Islands re-
gion needs upwards of $2.8 billion a year in investment needs through 2030,
in addition to $300 million a year for climate mitigation and adaptation over
the same period.
(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective policies to prevent and contain
the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as ‘‘COVID–
19’’) pandemic to their populations. The United States has provided over
$130,000,000 in assistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID–19 response.
However, priorities must be met to ensure continued success in preventing the
spread of the COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and widespread vaccina-
tions, and pursuing long-term economic recovery in the Pacific Islands, includ-
ing through—
(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisition of needed medical sup-
plies, including available COVID–19 vaccines and supporting vaccination
efforts, through a reliable supply chain;
(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and reopening of economic and social
activities; and
(C) mitigating and recovering from the impacts of the COVID–19 pan-
demic on the health system and the reliance on food and energy imports
as well as lost tourism revenue and other economic and food security dam-
ages caused by the pandemic.
(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volunteers have proudly served in
the Pacific Islands, building strong people-to-people relationships and dem-
onstrating the United States commitment to peace and development in the re-
gion. Prior to the COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence
in four countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps volunteers continue to be
in high demand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested across the re-
gion.
SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled
United States policy in the Pacific Islands that—
(A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity for all countries through a
rules-based regional order that respects the sovereignty and political inde-
pendence of all nations;
(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open and vibrant corridor for inter-
national maritime trade and promotes trade and sustainable development
that supports inclusive economic growth and autonomy for all nations and
addresses socioeconomic challenges related to public health, education, re-
newable energy, digital connectivity, and more;
(C) supports regional efforts to address the challenges posed by climate
change, including by strengthening resilience to natural disasters and
through responsible stewardship of natural resources;
(D) improves civil society, strengthens democratic governance and the
rule of law, and promotes human rights and the preservation of the region’s
unique cultural heritages;
(E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing and containing the spread of
the COVID–19 pandemic and in pursuing long-term economic recovery; and
(F) supports existing regional architecture and international norms;
(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives of existing regional multilat-
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eral institutions and frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pa-
cific Community, including—
(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Regionalism;
(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security; and
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(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan;
(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the Compacts of Free Association
and related United States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic of the
Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia and in 2024 for the
Republic of Palau unless they are extended and renewed; and
(4) to work closely with United States allies and partners with existing rela-
tionships and interests in the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing common goals.
SEC. 298. DEFINITION.
In this part, the terms ‘‘Pacific Islands’’ means the Cook Islands, the Republic of
Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, the Inde-
pendent State of Papua New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon
Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu.
SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF REPORTS.
(a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any reports required to be submitted
to the appropriate congressional committees under this part that are subject to
deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of time may be consolidated
into a single report that is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees
pursuant to such deadlines and that contains all information required under such
reports.
(b) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report required by this part shall be submitted in
unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Islands necessitates an examination
of whether United States diplomatic, economic, and development engagement
and presence in the Pacific Islands region is sufficient to effectively support
United States objectives and meaningful participation in regional fora;
(2) improving shared understanding of and jointly combatting the
transnational challenges pertinent to the Pacific Islands region with countries
of the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, and Taiwan is vitally important to our shared long-term interests of sta-
bility, security, and prosperity;
(3) the United States should seek to participate in and support efforts to co-
ordinate a regional response toward maritime security, including through con-
tinued United States and Pacific Islands participation in the Pacific Fusion
Centre in Vanuatu and Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust co-
operation with regional allies and partners; and
(4) the United States Government should commit to sending appropriate lev-
els of representation to regional events.
(b) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the diplomatic and development presence
of the United States in the Pacific Islands.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
lowing:
(A) A description of the Department of State, United States Agency for
International Development, United States International Development Fi-
nance Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and United States
Commercial Service presence, staffing, programming, and resourcing of op-
erations in the Pacific Islands, including programming and resourcing not
specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands.
(B) A description of gaps in such presence, including unfilled full-time
equivalent positions.
(C) A description of limitations and challenges such gaps pose to United
States strategic objectives, including—
(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Islands due to operations being con-
ducted from the United States Agency for International Development
offices in Manila and Suva; and
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(ii) gaps in programming and resourcing.
(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such presence to fill such gaps, in-
cluding by establishing new missions, expanding participation in regional
forums, and elevating United States representation in regional forums.
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(c) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Sec-
retary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally em-
ployed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of promoting increased diplomatic
engagement and economic and commercial engagement between the United States
and the Pacific Islands.
(d) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every five years thereafter, the Ad-
ministrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a regional development cooperation
strategy for the Pacific Islands.
SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall consult and coordinate with re-
gional allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and re-
gional institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community,
with respect to programs to provide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including pro-
grams established by this Act, including for purposes of—
(1) deconflicting programming;
(2) ensuring that any programming does not adversely affect the absorptive
capacity of the Pacific Islands; and
(3) ensuring complementary programs benefit the Pacific Islands to the max-
imum extent practicable.
(b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Secretary of State shall establish a for-
mal consultative process with such regional allies and partners to coordinate with
respect to such programs and future-years programming.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act
and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives a report that includes—
(1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs undertaken by re-
gional allies and partners, including multilateral organizations, to advance pri-
orities identified in this Act;
(2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and programs undertaken by non-
allied foreign actors that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in any way
detrimental to one or more countries of the Pacific Islands;
(3) an assessment of United States programs in the Pacific Islands and their
alignment and complementarity with the efforts of regional allies and partners
identified in paragraph (1); and
(4) a review of the formal consultative process required in subsection (b) to
summarize engagements held and identify opportunities to improve coordina-
tion with regional allies and partners.
SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States Government should leverage the full range of authori-
ties and programs available to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their de-
velopment goals;
(2) United States development assistance should seek to build on existing
public and private sector investments while creating new opportunities toward
a favorable environment for additional such investments; and
(3) United States development efforts should be coordinated with and seek to
build on existing efforts by like-minded partners and allies and regional and
international multilateral organizations.
(b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of
the United States Agency for International Development, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development
Finance Corporation, shall develop and implement a strategy to—
(1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, including transport
connectivity, information and communications technology, food security, coastal
zone management, marine and water resource management, and energy secu-
rity and access to electricity in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on climate
resiliency and sustainable development;
(2) provide technical assistance to assist local government and civil society
leaders assess risks to local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate
change, consider and implement risk mitigation efforts and policies to strength-
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en resilience, and evaluate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy and
sustainability; and
(3) support investment and improvement in ecosystem conservation and pro-
tection for the long-term sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially those
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that mitigate effects of climate change and those that support food security and
livelihoods.
(c) CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy developed under this section shall be co-
ordinated with like-minded partners and allies, regional and international multilat-
eral organizations, and regional frameworks for development in the Pacific Islands.
(d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall
direct the representatives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank to use the voice and
vote of the United States to support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the
Pacific Islands.
(e) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment this
Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees, the Committee on Natural Resources of the
House of Representatives, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
of the Senate a report on foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific Is-
lands.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall in-
clude—
(A) a review of foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific Islands
by non-United States allies and partners;
(B) assessments of the environmental impact and sustainability of such
developments; and
(C) an analysis of the financial sustainability of such developments and
their impacts on the debt of host countries in the Pacific Islands.
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated
$50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.
SEC. 299D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall develop and implement a plan to
expand coverage of the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) program
for the Pacific Islands, including by—
(1) expanding coverage of the regional program located in Bangkok, Thailand,
to the Pacific Islands; or
(2) establishing a new regional program for the Pacific Islands.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include
consultation and coordination with existing regional law enforcement entities, in-
cluding the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and civil society, including those focused
on human rights and specializing in victim-centered approaches, and take into con-
sideration costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capacity of the Pacific Islands
to participate in the ILEA program.
(c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a briefing on the plan developed under this section.
SEC. 299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) STRATEGY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Sec-
retary of Defense and in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security,
shall develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to provide assistance to
and build the capacity of local civilian and national security institutions of the
Pacific Islands for purposes of—
(A) enhancing maritime security and maritime domain awareness to ad-
dress challenges such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing;
(B) assisting local law enforcement in detecting, preventing, and combat-
ting human and drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime;
(C) participating in efforts by regional institutions and frameworks to co-
ordinate and facilitate cooperation on shared security challenges; and
(D) expanding information sharing and to work toward operational co-
ordination and interoperability among Pacific Island maritime security
forces, including through regional fusion centers.
(2) PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED.—The strategy required by this
subsection shall build on but not be limited to the following programs and au-
thorities:
(A) The International Military Education and Training program.
(B) The Foreign Military Financing program.
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(C) The authority to build the capacity of foreign security forces under
section 333 of title 10, United States Code.
(D) The authority to provide excess defense articles under section 516 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
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(E) The Department of Defense State Partnership Program.
(3) NATIONAL POLICE FORCES AND COAST GUARDS.—The national police forces
and coast guards of the Pacific Islands are eligible to receive assistance under
the programs and authorities described in paragraph (2) (other than the pro-
grams and authorities described in subparagraphs (A), (D), and (F) of paragraph
(2)) for purposes of the strategy required by this subsection.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall seek
to preserve peace and regional stability in the Pacific Islands and take into consider-
ation and seek to build upon but not duplicate existing assistance provided by
United States allies and partners.
(c) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
a report that contains the strategy developed under this section.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall in-
clude—
(A) an assessment of security challenges to the Pacific Islands;
(B) an analysis of demonstrated needs of the Pacific Islands for assist-
ance;
(C) a review of existing security assistance programs in the Pacific Is-
lands, including programs and efforts provided by United States allies and
partners;
(D) a plan for programs for training, equipping, and sustainment, includ-
ing excess defense equipment and related materials;
(E) a list of militaries, national police forces, coast guards, and other na-
tional security forces of the Pacific Islands receiving assistance under the
strategy;
(F) a review of existing cross-border maritime law enforcement operations
(commonly known as ‘‘shiprider agreements’’) with the Pacific Islands, an
assessment of additional resourcing needs to enhance operational capacity,
and a plan to improve on these programs and operations;
(G) a review of existing Department of Defense State Partnership Pro-
grams with the Pacific Islands and an assessment of additional opportuni-
ties to leverage Department of Defense State Partnership Programs to ad-
dress national security, law enforcement, disaster relief and emergency
management, and related priorities;
(H) a review of current efforts and progress in removing unexploded ord-
nance in the Pacific Islands and an assessment of additional resourcing
needed to ensure continued progress, including to support coordination with
regional efforts and those of United States allies and partners;
(I) a review of existing regional fusion centers and other cooperative intel-
ligence sharing efforts in the Pacific Islands to address maritime security,
transnational crime, natural disasters, and other security challenges and an
assessment of opportunities for the United States to participate in such ef-
forts, including by allocating staff and supplying resourcing;
(J) measures to evaluate success for the strategy; and
(K) a detailed assessment of appropriations required to achieve the objec-
tives for the strategy in future years.
(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection,
the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services,
and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the
Senate.
SEC. 299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME.
(a) RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall prioritize efforts to assist the
Pacific Islands in ratifying and implementing international legal conventions re-
lated to transnational crime, such as—
(A) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wildlife Fauna and Flora;
(B) the Agreement on Port State Measures; and
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(C) relevant protocols supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, such as—
(i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Per-
son, Especially Women and Children; and
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(ii) the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea,
and Air.
(2) BIENNIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act and every two years thereafter as appropriate, the Secretary
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—
(A) the status of the progress of each country of the Pacific Islands to-
ward ratifying and implementing international legal conventions related to
transnational crime; and
(B) United States plans for assisting those countries that have yet to fully
ratify such conventions with their respective ratification efforts.
(b) UPDATES OF CERTAIN REPORTS.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with
other Federal agencies as appropriate, shall identify and update existing reports to
include forms of transnational crime affecting the Pacific Islands, such as—
(1) the International Narcotics Control Strategy report;
(2) the Improving International Fisheries Management report; and
(3) the Trafficking in Persons report.
(c) ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the heads of relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to appropriate congres-
sional committees a report that identifies countries of the Pacific Islands that
are countries of concern with respect to illegal logging and associated trade.
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
lowing:
(A) A description of the impact illegal logging and associated trade have
had on local communities, good governance, and biodiversity, including an
identification of those foreign countries that may be financing or in any
other manner supporting illegal logging activities.
(B) A description of efforts taken by countries identified under paragraph
(1) to comply and take appropriate corrective action to mitigate illegal log-
ging, and an evaluation of the progress of those efforts.
(C) A description of steps taken by the heads of relevant Federal agencies
to assist the Pacific Islands in adopting and implementing international
measures comparable to those of the United States, such as the Lacey Act,
to reduce impacts of illicit logging.
(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection,
the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Finance
of the Senate.
(d) ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING.—Section 3553 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C. 8033) is amend-
ed—
(1) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amended) the following:
‘‘(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the ability of the United States
to effectively assist priority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU fish-
ing due to resource constraints and the additional resources necessary to over-
come those constraints; and’’.
SEC. 299G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development shall develop and implement an initiative to assist the Pacific
Islands in enhancing their preparedness for and resilience to natural disasters and
other emergencies.
(b) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program developed under this section shall in-
clude—
(1) education and training programs on natural disaster prevention and pre-
paredness for emergency management professionals in the Pacific Islands, in-
cluding by leveraging the expertise of nonprofit organizations and institutions
of higher education in the United States;
(2) technical assistance, including through grants and cooperative agreements
for qualified United States and local nongovernmental organizations, to enhance
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early warning systems, emergency management and preparedness procedures,
and post-disaster relief and recovery; and
(3) coordination of existing disaster mitigation and response plans in the re-
gion, including by United States allies and partners in the region.
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(c) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Administrator shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report on the program developed under this section.
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall in-
clude—
(A) an assessment of disaster risks in the Pacific Islands and existing
local and regional capacity to respond to such risks;
(B) a review of existing efforts by United States allies and partners to
provide assistance and training for natural disaster preparedness and
emergency management; and
(C) objectives, means of implementation, and measures of success for the
initiative.
(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this subsection,
the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Natural Re-
sources of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources of the Senate.
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated
$40,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.
SEC. 299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands should be expanded
and the Peace Corps should reopen its programs in as many of the Pacific Is-
lands as possible, including where it has previously operated but has suspended
operations;
(2) consulting like-minded regional allies and partners, such as Australia,
New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is crucial for identifying and overcoming chal-
lenges for increased Peace Corps presence in the Pacific Islands;
(3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship
in part by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for
trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the
American people with the people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau; and
(4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its programs in the Republic of
the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of
Palau.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report that includes—
(1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps presence in the Pacific Islands
region to other regions of the world, including a cost-benefit analysis of place-
ment in the region versus elsewhere globally;
(2) analysis of current impediments to Peace Corps expansion in the Pacific
Islands region;
(3) outcomes of consultations among United States agencies, and with re-
gional allies and partners, on areas in which cooperation can reduce factors lim-
iting Peace Corps expansion, particularly those related to medical transpor-
tation and personal safety; and
(4) a plan and timeline for implementing outcomes identified in paragraph (3)
to facilitate expansion of Peace Corps presence in the region, where appropriate.
TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND FREE-
DOMS OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Despite international condemnation, the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China (‘‘PRC’’) continues to disregard its international legal obligations
under the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong (‘‘Joint Declaration’’), in which the PRC
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committed that—
(A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy;
(B) for at least 50 years the ‘‘social and economic systems in Hong Kong’’
would remain unchanged; and
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(C) the personal rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong would
be protected by law.
(2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine the established rights of the
Hong Kong people, the PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee
(‘‘Standing Committee’’) passed and imposed upon Hong Kong oppressive and
intentionally vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, that grants
Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of ‘‘separating the country, subverting
state power, and organizing terroristic activities’’.
(3) The legislative process by which the Standing Committee imposed the na-
tional security law on Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong’s local government in
a potential violation of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People’s Republic of China (‘‘Basic Law’’), and involved unusual
secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the legislation was only the second
law since 2008 that the Standing Committee has passed without releasing a
draft for public comment.
(4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-democracy candidates from partici-
pating in the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which were subse-
quently postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by citing the public
health risk of holding elections during the COVID–19 pandemic.
(5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, the
HKSAR Government announced indictments of and arrest warrants for six
Hong Kong activists living overseas, including United States citizen Samuel
Chu, for alleged violations of the national security law.
(6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Government removed four lawmakers
from office for allegedly violating the law after the Standing Committee passed
additional legislation barring those who promoted or supported Hong Kong
independence and refused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong, or
otherwise violates the national security law, from running for or serving in the
Legislative Council.
(7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow,
and Ivan Lam were sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 protests.
(8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also known as ‘‘the Hong Kong
12’’) who sought to flee by boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August 23, 2020,
were taken to mainland China and sentenced on December 30, 2020, to prison
terms ranging from seven months to three years for illegal border crossing.
(9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong’s highest court revoked bail for Jimmy
Lai Chee-Ying, a pro-democracy figure and publisher, who was charged on De-
cember 12 with colluding with foreign forces and endangering national security
under the national security legislation.
(10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of Justice in Henan and Sichuan
province threatened to revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help the
Hong Kong 12.
(11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police Force arrested more than fifty
opposition figures, including pro-democracy officials, activists, and an American
lawyer, for their involvement in an informal July 2020 primary to select can-
didates for the general election originally scheduled for September 2020, despite
other political parties having held similar primaries without retribution.
(12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court convicted Choy Yuk-ling, a video
producer with Radio Television Hong Kong, in relation to her investigative re-
porting on the Hong Kong police.
(13) On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong Kong’s only surviving pro-democ-
racy newspaper, published its final edition following months of intimidation and
repression by the HKSAR Government, including through the arrest of its sen-
ior editors, police raids on its offices, and the freezing of its financial assets.
(b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.—Congress—
(1) condemns the actions taken by the Government of the People’s Republic
of China (‘‘PRC’’) and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (‘‘HKSAR’’), including the adoption and implementation of national secu-
rity legislation for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that violate the
rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong that are guaranteed by the
Joint Declaration and its implementing document, the Basic Law;
(2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong Kong, who face grave threats
to their rights and freedoms;
(3) calls on the Governments of the PRC and HKSAR to—
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(A) respect and uphold—
(i) commitments made to the international community and the people
of Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration; and
(ii) the judicial independence of the Hong Kong legal system; and
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(B) release pro-democracy activists and politicians arrested under the na-
tional security law; and
(4) encourages the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the
Treasury to coordinate with allies and partners and continue United States ef-
forts to respond to developments in Hong Kong, including by—
(A) providing protection for Hong Kong residents who fear persecution;
(B) supporting those who may seek to file a case before the International
Court of Justice to hold the Government of the PRC accountable for vio-
lating its binding legal commitments under the Joint Declaration;
(C) encouraging allies and partner countries to instruct, as appropriate,
their respective representatives to the United Nations to use their voice,
vote, and influence to press for the appointment of a United Nations special
mandate holder to monitor and report on human rights developments in
Hong Kong;
(D) ensuring the private sector, particularly United States companies
with economic interests in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the national secu-
rity legislation poses to the security of United States citizens and to the me-
dium and long-term interest of United States businesses in Hong Kong;
(E) continuing to implement sanctions authorities, especially authorities
recently enacted to address actions undermining the rights and freedoms of
the Hong Kong people, such as the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law
116–149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019
(Public Law 116–76), with respect to officials of the Chinese Communist
Party, the Government of the PRC, or the Government of the HKSAR who
are responsible for undermining such rights and freedoms; and
(F) coordinating with allies and partners to ensure that such implementa-
tion of sanctions is multilateral.
SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG
KONG.
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated
$10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy in Hong Kong.
(b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall designate an office with the
Department of State to administer and coordinate the provision of such funds de-
scribed in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across the United
States Government.
SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE’S FREEDOM AND CHOICE.
(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:
(1) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint Declaration’’ means the Joint Dec-
laration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Ques-
tion of Hong Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force on May
27, 1985.
(2) PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENT.—The term ‘‘Priority Hong Kong resident’’
means—
(A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong who—
(i) holds no right to citizenship in any country or jurisdiction other
than the People’s Republic of China (referred to in this section as the
‘‘PRC’’), Hong Kong, or Macau as of the date of enactment of this Act;
(ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not less than the last ten years as
of the date of enactment of this Act; and
(iii) has been designated by the Secretary of State or Secretary of
Homeland Security as having met the requirements of this subpara-
graph, in accordance with the procedures described in subsection (f) of
this section; or
(B) the spouse of a person described in subparagraph (A), or the child of
such person as such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an
unmarried person under twenty-seven years of age.
(3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.—The term ‘‘Hong Kong National Se-
curity Law’’ means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that was
passed unanimously by the National People’s Congress and signed by President
Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020, and promulgated in the Hong Kong Special Ad-
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ministrative Region (referred to in this section as ‘‘Hong Kong SAR’’) on July
1, 2020.
(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate con-
gressional committees’’ means—
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(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judi-
ciary of the Senate.
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) The Hong Kong National Security Law promulgated on July 1, 2020—
(A) contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (referred to in this Act as ‘‘the Basic Law’’) that provides in Article
23 that the Legislative Council of Hong Kong shall enact legislation related
to national security;
(B) violates the PRC’s commitments under international law, as defined
by the Joint Declaration; and
(C) causes severe and irreparable damage to the ‘‘one country, two sys-
tems’’ principle and further erodes global confidence in the PRC’s commit-
ment to international law.
(2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promulgation of the Hong Kong Na-
tional Security Law, President Trump signed an Executive order on Hong Kong
normalization that, among other policy actions, suspended the special treatment
of Hong Kong persons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of immigrant
and nonimmigrant visas.
(3) The United States has a long and proud history as a destination for refu-
gees and asylees fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
(4) The United States also shares deep social, cultural, and economic ties with
the people of Hong Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy, to the
rule of law, and to the protection of human rights.
(5) The United States has sheltered, protected, and welcomed individuals who
have fled authoritarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC following the
violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between
the people of the United States and those individuals seeking to contribute to
a free, open society founded on democracy, human rights, and the respect for
the rule of law.
(6) The United States has reaped enormous economic, cultural, and strategic
benefits from welcoming successive generations of scientists, doctors, entre-
preneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other freedom-loving people fleeing fascism,
communism, violent Islamist extremism, and other repressive ideologies, includ-
ing in the cases of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Cen-
tral Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran.
(7) A major asymmetric advantage of the United States in its long-term stra-
tegic competition with the Communist Party of China is the ability of people
from every country in the world, irrespective of their race, ethnicity, or religion,
to immigrate to the United States and become American citizens.
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set forth in the United States-
Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–383), specifically that—
(A) the United States has ‘‘a strong interest in the continued vitality,
prosperity, and stability of Hong Kong’’;
(B) ‘‘support for democratization is a fundamental principle of United
States foreign policy’’, and therefore ‘‘naturally applies to United States pol-
icy toward Hong Kong’’;
(C) ‘‘the human rights of the people of Hong Kong are of great importance
to the United States and are directly relevant to United States interests in
Hong Kong and serve as a basis for Hong Kong’s continued economic pros-
perity’’; and
(D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently autonomous from the PRC to
‘‘justify treatment under a particular law of the United States, or any provi-
sion thereof, different from that accorded the People’s Republic of China’’;
(2) to continue to support the high degree of autonomy and fundamental
rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by—
(A) the Joint Declaration;
(B) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, done at New
York, December 19, 1966; and
(C) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, done at Paris, December
10, 1948;
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(3) to continue to support the democratic aspirations of the people of Hong
Kong, including the ‘‘ultimate aim’’ of the selection of the Chief Executive and
all members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage, as articulated in
the Basic Law;
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