Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol: House Report 117-663
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This is the Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, House Report 117-663, Union Calendar No. 482, dated December 22, 2022, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed. The front matter lists Bennie G. Thompson as Chairman and Liz Cheney as Vice Chair, followed by committee staff and contractors and consultants. A letter of transmittal dated December 22, 2022 from Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, to Cheryl L. Johnson, Clerk, transmits the final report pursuant to section 4(a) of House Resolution 503, 117th Congress. A foreword from the Speaker of the House states that the Select Committee was charged with investigating the facts, circumstances and causes that led to the attack on the Capitol.
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Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
FINAL REPORT
Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol
December 22, 2022
117th Congress Second Session
House Report 117-663
49-937_cover_1.625bs.indd All Pages 12/23/22 11:08 AM
Union Calendar No. 482
117th Congress Report
2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 117-663
FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE
JANUARY 6TH
ATTACK ON THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL
December 22, 2022
Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-937
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SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ii JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL
BENNIE G. THOMPSON Mississippi, Chairman
LIZ CHENEY Wyoming, Vice Chair
ZOE LOFGREN California
ADAM B. SCHIFF California
PETE AGUILAR California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY Florida
JAMIE RASKIN Maryland
ELAINE G. LURIA Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER Illinois
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COMMITTEE STAFF iii
DAVID B. BUCKLEY Staff Director
KRISTIN L. AMERLING Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
HOPE GOINS Senior Counsel to the Chairman
JOSEPH B. MAHER Senior Counsel to the Vice Chair
TIMOTHY J. HEAPHY Chief Investigative Counsel
JAMIE FLEET Senior Advisor
TIMOTHY R. MULVEY Communications Director
CANDYCE PHOENIX Senior Counsel and Senior Advisor
JOHN F. WOOD Senior Investigative Counsel and
Of Counsel to the Vice Chair
KATHERINE B. ABRAMS, Staff Associate THOMAS E. JOSCELYN, Senior Professional
TEMIDAYO AGANGA-WILLIAMS, Senior Staff Member
Investigative Counsel REBECCA L. KNOOIHUIZEN, Financial
ALEJANDRA APECECHEA, Investigative Counsel Investigator
LISA A. BIANCO, Director of Member Services CASEY E. LUCIER, Investigative Counsel
and Security Manager DAMON M. MARX, Professional Staff Member
JEROME P. BJELOPERA, Investigator EVAN B. MAULDIN, Chief Clerk
BRYAN BONNER, Investigative Counsel YONATAN L. MOSKOWITZ, Senior Counsel
RICHARD R. BRUNO, Senior Administrative HANNAH G. MULDAVIN, Deputy
Assistant Communications Director
MARCUS CHILDRESS, Investigative Counsel JONATHAN D. MURRAY, Professional Staff
JOHN MARCUS CLARK, Security Director Member
JACQUELINE N. COLVETT, Digital Director JACOB A. NELSON, Professional Staff Member
HEATHER I. CONNELLY, Professional Staff ELIZABETH OBRAND, Staff Associate
Member RAYMOND O’MARA, Director of External
MEGHAN E. CONROY, Investigator Affairs
HEATHER L. CROWELL, Printer Proofreader ELYES OUECHTATI, Technology Partner
WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Senior Researcher ROBIN M. PEGUERO, Investigative Counsel
SOUMYALATHA O. DAYANANDA, Senior SANDEEP A. PRASANNA, Investigative Counsel
Investigative Counsel BARRY PUMP, Parliamentarian
STEPHEN W. DEVINE, Senior Counsel SEAN M. QUINN, Investigative Counsel
LAWRENCE J. EAGLEBURGER, Professional BRITTANY M. J. RECORD, Senior Counsel
Staff Member DENVER RIGGLEMAN, Senior Technical Advisor
KEVIN S. ELLIKER, Investigative Counsel JOSHUA D. ROSELMAN, Investigative Counsel
MARGARET E. EMAMZADEH, Staff Associate JAMES N. SASSO, Senior Investigative Counsel
SADALLAH A. FARAH, Professional Staff GRANT H. SAUNDERS, Professional Staff
Member Member
DANIEL GEORGE, Senior Investigative Counsel SAMANTHA O. STILES, Chief Administrative
JACOB H. GLICK, Investigative Counsel Officer
AARON S. GREENE, Clerk SEAN P. TONOLLI, Senior Investigative Counsel
MARC S. HARRIS, Senior Investigative Counsel DAVID A. WEINBERG, Senior Professional Staff
ALICE K. HAYES, Clerk Member
QUINCY T. HENDERSON, Staff Assistant AMANDA S. WICK, Senior Investigative
JENNA HOPKINS, Professional Staff Member Counsel
CAMISHA L. JOHNSON, Professional Staff DARRIN L. WILLIAMS, JR., Staff Assistant
Member ZACHARY S. WOOD, Clerk
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iv CONTRACTORS & CONSULTANTS
RAWAA ALOBAIDI
MELINDA ARONS
STEVE BAKER
ELIZABETH BISBEE
DAVID CANADY
JOHN COUGHLIN
AARON DIETZEN
GINA FERRISE
ANGEL GOLDSBOROUGH
JAMES GOLDSTON
POLLY GRUBE
L. CHRISTINE HEALEY
DANNY HOLLADAY
PERCY HOWARD
DEAN JACKSON
STEPHANIE J. JONES
HYATT MAMOUN
MARY MARSH
TODD MASON
RYAN MAYERS
JEFF MCBRIDE
FRED MURAM
ALEX NEWHOUSE
JOHN NORTON
ORLANDO PINDER
OWEN PRATT
DAN PRYZGODA
BRIAN SASSER
WILLIAM SCHERER
DRISS SEKKAT
CHRIS STUART
PRESTON SULLIVAN
BRIAN YOUNG
INNOVATIVE DRIVEN
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL v
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE
JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL,
Washington, DC,
December 22, 2022.
Hon. CHERYL L. JOHNSON,
Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MS. JOHNSON: By direction of the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, I hereby transmit its final report
pursuant to section 4(a) of House Resolution 503, 117th
Congress.
Sincerely,
BENNIE G. THOMPSON,
Chairman.
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FOREWORD: SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE vii
“THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH”
“I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am
about to enter: So help me God.”
All Members of the United States Congress take this sacred oath. On January
6, 2021, Democrats and Republicans agreed that we would fulfill this oath—
and that we had an obligation to signal to the world that American Democ-
racy would prevail.
In furtherance of fulfilling this duty, the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol was charged with
investigating the facts, circumstances and causes that led to this domestic
terror attack on the Capitol, the Congress and the Constitution.
We owe a debt of gratitude to Chairman Bennie Thompson, Vice Chair
Liz Cheney, the patriotic Members of Congress and dedicated staff—who
devoted themselves to this investigation, to uncovering the truth and to
writing a report that is a “Roadmap for Justice.”
The Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack has suc-
ceeded in bringing clarity and demonstrating with painstaking detail the
fragility of our Democracy. Above all, the work of the Select Committee
underscores that our democratic institutions are only as strong as the com-
mitment of those who are entrusted with their care.
As the Select Committee concludes its work, their words must be a
clarion call to all Americans: to vigilantly
guard our Democracy and to give our vote
only to those dutiful in their defense of our
Constitution.
Let us always honor our oath to, as
Abraham Lincoln said, “nobly save, or
meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.”
So help us God.
NANCY PELOSI
Speaker of the House
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viii FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN
We were told to remove our lapel pins. At the start of every new Congress,
House Members are presented with lapel pins. They are about the size of a
quarter and carry a seal of a bald eagle.
On a routine day in the Capitol, there are thousands of tourists, advo-
cates, and workers. Typically, the pins are an easy way to spot House Mem-
bers.
However, on January 6, 2021, the pin that once was a badge of honor
and distinction turned into a bullseye.
On that day, tear gas fogged the air as gunfire rang out, and a violent
mob crashed against the sealed doors. Concerned for our safety, Capitol
Police officers told us that our lapel pins would make us a target for rioters.
As the Capitol Police rushed Members of Congress and staff to safety,
that simple and, in context, sensible warning stuck with me. On January 6,
2021, my colleagues and I came to work with the intent of fulfilling our
oaths of office and constitutional duty to carry out the peaceful transfer of
power. We were the people’s representatives in the people’s House doing
the people’s business. Sadly, on that day, the danger was too great for our
work to continue and for us to remain in the Capitol. It was too dangerous
to be identified as a representative of the American people.
I’ve been a Member of the House for nearly 30 years. In that time,
there’s not a day that goes by that I don’t feel a profound sense of duty and
responsibility to the men and women who sent me to Congress to be their
voice. After all, I’m from a part of the country where, in my lifetime, Black
people were excluded entirely from political processes. Jim Crow laws pre-
vented my father from registering to vote, and tragically during his life, he
never cast a vote.
For generations, the people in communities I represent have struggled
to have their voices heard by their government. Therefore, I take my duties
and responsibilities seriously, advocating for greater economic opportunity,
robust infrastructure, better schools, and safer housing for my constitu-
ents.
However, that long struggle to overcome oppression and secure basic
civil and human rights continues to be my highest priority. I am always
mindful of the journey that brought me to Washington as a member of
Congress to be the voice of the women and men of Mississippi. As a violent
mob stormed the Capitol trying to take away people’s votes, rioters carried
the battle flag from a failed rebellion of confederate states. This moment
resonated deeply with me because of my personal history. Additionally, I
continually think about the ongoing struggle to ensure justice and equality
for all Americans.
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FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN ix
The Capitol building itself is a fixture in our country’s history, of both
good and bad. After all, this structure is among the most recognizable sym-
bols of American democracy. The Capitol’s shining dome, topped with the
statue of goddess Freedom, was built partially by the labor of enslaved
people in the 18th and 19th centuries. Dark chapters of America’s history
are written into the building’s marble, sandstone, and mortar. And yet in
the halls and chambers of this building, leaders of courage passed amend-
ments to our Constitution and enacted the laws that banned slavery, guar-
anteed equal rights under the law, expanded the vote, promoted equality,
and moved our country, and her people, forward. The Capitol Building itself
is a symbol of our journey toward a more perfect union. It is a temple to our
democracy.
Those great moments in our history have come when men and women
put loyalty to our country and Constitution ahead of politics and party.
They did the right thing. The work of the Select Committee certainly origi-
nates from the same tradition. Our bipartisan membership has moved poli-
tics to the side and focused on the facts, circumstances, and causes of
January 6th.
When I think back to January 6th, after nearly a year and a half of
investigation, I am frightened about the peril our democracy faced. Specifi-
cally, I think about what that mob was there to do: to block the peaceful
transfer of power from one president to another based on a lie that the
election was rigged and tainted with widespread fraud.
I also think about why the rioters were there, besieging the legislative
branch of our government. The rioters were inside the halls of Congress
because the head of the executive branch of our government, the then-
President of the United States, told them to attack. Donald Trump sum-
moned that mob to Washington, DC. Afterward, he sent them to the Capitol
to try to prevent my colleagues and me from doing our Constitutional duty
to certify the election. They put our very democracy to the test.
Trump’s mob came dangerously close to succeeding. Courageous law
enforcement officers put their lives on the line for hours while Trump sat in
the White House, refusing to tell the rioters to go home, while watching the
assault on our republic unfold live on television.
When it was clear the insurrection would fail, Trump finally called off
the mob, telling them, “We love you.” Afterward, Congress was able to
return to this Capitol Building and finish the job of counting the Electoral
College votes and certifying the election.
This is the key conclusion of the Select Committee, all nine of us,
Republicans and Democrats alike.
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x FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN
But who knows what would have happened if Trump’s mob had suc-
ceeded in stopping us from doing our job? Who knows what sort of consti-
tutional grey zone our country would have slid into? Who would have been
left to correct that wrong?
As required by House Resolution 503, which established the Select
Committee, we’ve explored in great detail the facts, circumstances, and
causes of the attack. This report will provide new details that supplement
those findings the committee already presented during our hearings.
But there are some questions for which there are still no clear answers,
even if all the facts, circumstances, and causes are brought to bear. The
“What If?” questions. For the good of American democracy, those questions
must never again be put to the test. So, while it’s important that this report
lays out what happened, it’s just as important to focus on how to make sure
that January 6th was a one-time event—to identify the ongoing threats
that could lead us down that dangerous path again—with hopes and
humble prayers that the committee’s work is carried on through corrective
action.
This report will provide greater detail about the multistep effort devised
and driven by Donald Trump to overturn the 2020 election and block the
transfer of power. Building on the information presented in our hearings
earlier this year, we will present new findings about Trump’s pressure
campaign on officials from the local level all the way up to his Vice Presi-
dent, orchestrated and designed solely to throw out the will of the voters
and keep him in office past the end of his elected term.
As we’ve shown previously, this plan faltered at several points because
of the courage of officials (nearly all of them Republicans) who refused to
go along with it. Donald Trump appeared to believe that anyone who shared
his partisan affiliation would also share the same callous disregard for his
or her oath to uphold the rule of law. Fortunately, he was wrong.
The failure of Trump’s plan was not assured. To the contrary, Trump’s
plan was successful at several turns. When his scheme to stay in power
through political pressure hit roadblocks, he relentlessly pushed ahead with
a parallel plan: summoning a mob to gather in Washington, DC on January
6th, promising things “will be wild!”
That mob showed up. They were armed. They were angry. They believed
the “Big Lie” that the election had been stolen. And when Donald Trump
pointed them toward the Capitol and told them to “fight like hell,” that’s
exactly what they did.
Donald Trump lit that fire. But in the weeks beforehand, the kindling he
ultimately ignited was amassed in plain sight.
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FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN xi
That’s why as part of the Select Committee’s investigation, we took a
hard look at whether enough was done to mitigate that risk. Our investiga-
tive teams focused on the way intelligence was gathered, shared, and
assessed. We probed preparations by law enforcement agencies and security
responses on the day of the attack. We followed the money, to determine
who paid for a number of events in the run-up to the attack and to gain a
clearer understanding of the way the former President’s campaign appara-
tus cashed in on the big lie. And we pulled back the curtain at certain major
social media companies to determine if their policies and protocols were up
to the challenge when the President spread a message of violence and his
supporters began to plan and coordinate their descent on Washington.
The Select Committee’s conclusion on these matters—particularly
dealing with intelligence and law enforcement—is consistent with our
broader findings about the causes of January 6th. Were agencies perfect in
their preparations for January 6th and their responses as the violence
unfolded? Of course not. Relevant oversight committees and watchdogs
should continue to find efficiencies and improvements, some of which are
laid out in Committee’s recommendations.
But the shortfall of communications, intelligence and law enforcement
around January 6th was much less about what they did or did not know. It
was more about what they could not know. The President of the United
States inciting a mob to march on the Capitol and impede the work of Con-
gress is not a scenario our intelligence and law enforcement communities
envisioned for this country. Prior to January 6th, it was unimaginable.
Whatever weaknesses existed in the policies, procedures, or institutions,
they were not to blame for what happened on that day.
And so, when I think about the ongoing threats—when I think about
how to avoid having to confront those “What-Ifs?” in the future—my con-
cerns are less with the mechanics of intelligence gathering and security
posture, as important as those questions are. My concerns remain first and
foremost with those who continue to seek power at the expense of Ameri-
can democracy.
What if those election officials had given in to Donald Trump’s pres-
sure? What if the Justice Department had gone along with Trump’s scheme
to declare the 2020 election fraudulent? What if the Vice President had tried
to throw out electoral votes? What if the rioters bent on stopping the
peaceful transfer of power hadn’t been repelled?
To cast a vote in the United States of America is an act of both hope and
faith. When you drop that ballot in the ballot box, you do so with the confi-
dence that every person named on that ballot will hold up their end of the
bargain. The person who wins must swear an oath and live up to it. The
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xii FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN
people who come up short must accept the ultimate results and abide by the
will of the voters and the rule of law. This faith in our institutions and laws
is what upholds our democracy.
If that faith is broken—if those who seek power accept only the results
of elections that they win—then American democracy, only a few centuries
old, comes tumbling down.
That’s the danger.
What’s the solution?
The Committee believes a good starting point is the set of recommen-
dations we set forth in our report, pursuant to House Resolution 503.
Driven by our investigative findings, these recommendations will help
strengthen the guardrails of our democracy.
Beyond what we recommend, in my view and as I said during our hear-
ings, the best way to prevent another January 6th is to ensure accountabil-
ity for January 6th. Accountability at all levels.
I have confidence in our Department of Justice and institutions at the
state and local level to ensure accountability under the law. As this report is
released, we see those processes moving forward.
But preventing another January 6th will require a broader sort of
accountability. Ultimately, the American people chart the course for our
country’s future. The American people decide whom to give the reins of
power. If this Select Committee has accomplished one thing, I hope it has
shed light on how dangerous it would be to empower anyone whose desire
for authority comes before their commitment to American democracy and
the Constitution.
I believe most Americans will turn their backs on those enemies of
democracy.
But some will rally to the side of the election deniers, and when I think
about who some of those people are, it troubles me deep inside. White
supremacists. Violent extremists. Groups that subscribe to racism, anti-
Semitism, and violent conspiracy theories; those who would march through
the halls of the Capitol waving the Confederate battle flag.
These are people who want to take America backward, not toward some
imagined prior greatness, but toward repression. These are people who
want to roll back what we’ve accomplished. I believe that those who aligned
with the scheme to overturn the election heeded Donald Trump’s call to
march on the Capitol because they thought taking up Donald Trump’s cause
was a way to advance their vile ambitions.
That is why I did not remove my lapel pin on January 6th.
Our country has come too far to allow a defeated President to turn him-
self into a successful tyrant by upending our democratic institutions,
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FOREWORD: CHAIRMAN xiii
fomenting violence, and, as I saw it, opening the door to those in our coun-
try whose hatred and bigotry threaten equality and justice for all Ameri-
cans.
We can never surrender to democracy’s enemies. We can never allow
America to be defined by forces of division and hatred. We can never go
backward in the progress we have made through the sacrifice and dedica-
tion of true patriots. We can never and will never relent in our pursuit of a
more perfect union, with liberty and justice for all Americans.
I pray that God continues to bless the United States of America.
BENNIE G. THOMPSON
Chairman
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xiv FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR
In April 1861, when Abraham Lincoln issued the first call for volunteers for
the Union Army, my great-great grandfather, Samuel Fletcher Cheney,
joined the 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry. He fought through all four years of
the Civil War, from Chickamauga to Stones River to Atlanta. He marched
with his unit in the Grand Review of Troops up Pennsylvania Avenue in May
1865, past a reviewing stand where President Johnson and General Grant
were seated.
Silas Canfield, the regimental historian of the 21st OVI, described the
men in the unit this way:
Industry had taught them perseverance, and they had learned to turn
aside for no obstacle. Their intelligence gave them a just appreciation of
the value and advantage of free government, and the necessity of
defending and maintaining it, and they enlisted prepared to accept all
the necessary labors, fatigues, exposures, dangers, and even death for
the unity of our Nation, and the perpetuity of our institutions.1
I have found myself thinking often, especially since January 6th, of my
great-great grandfather, and all those in every generation who have sacri-
ficed so much for “the unity of our Nation and the perpetuity of our insti-
tutions.”
At the heart of our Republic is the guarantee of the peaceful transfer of
power. Members of Congress are reminded of this every day as we pass
through the Capitol Rotunda. There, eight magnificent paintings detail the
earliest days of our Republic. Four were painted by John Trumbull, includ-
ing one depicting the moment in 1793 when George Washington resigned
his commission, handing control of the Continental Army back to Congress.
Trumbull called this, “one of the highest moral lessons ever given the
world.” With this noble act, George Washington established the indispens-
able example of the peaceful transfer of power in our nation.
Standing on the West Front of the Capitol in 1981, President Ronald
Reagan described it this way:
To a few of us here today, this is a solemn and most momentous occa-
sion, and yet in the history of our nation it is a commonplace occurrence.
The orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution rou-
tinely takes place, as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us stop
to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this
every-4-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a
miracle.
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FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR xv
Every President in our history has defended this orderly transfer of
authority, except one. January 6, 2021 was the first time one American
President refused his Constitutional duty to transfer power peacefully to the
next.
In our work over the last 18 months, the Select Committee has recog-
nized our obligation to do everything we can to ensure this never happens
again. At the outset of our investigation, we recognized that tens of millions
of Americans had been persuaded by President Trump that the 2020 Presi-
dential election was stolen by overwhelming fraud. We also knew this was
flatly false, and that dozens of state and federal judges had addressed and
resolved all manner of allegations about the election. Our legal system
functioned as it should, but our President would not accept the outcome.
What most of the public did not know before our investigation is this:
Donald Trump’s own campaign officials told him early on that his claims of
fraud were false. Donald Trump’s senior Justice Department officials—each
appointed by Donald Trump himself—investigated the allegations and told
him repeatedly that his fraud claims were false. Donald Trump’s White
House lawyers also told him his fraud claims were false. From the begin-
ning, Donald Trump’s fraud allegations were concocted nonsense, designed
to prey upon the patriotism of millions of men and women who love our
country.
Most Americans also did not know exactly how Donald Trump, along
with a handful of others, planned to defeat the transfer of Presidential
power on January 6th. This was not a simple plan, but it was a corrupt one.
This report lays that plan out in detail—a plan that ultimately had seven
parts, anticipating that Vice President Pence, serving in his role as Presi-
dent of the Senate, would refuse to count official Biden electoral slates from
multiple states. We understood from the beginning that explaining all the
planning and machinations would be complex and would require many
hours of public presentations and testimony. We also understood that our
presentations needed to be organized into a series of hearings that pre-
sented the key evidence for the American public to watch live or streamed
over a reasonable time period, rather than rely on second-hand accounts as
reported by media organizations with their own editorial biases. We orga-
nized our hearings in segments to meet that goal. Tens of millions of
Americans watched.
Among the most shameful findings from our hearings was this: Presi-
dent Trump sat in the dining room off the Oval Office watching the violent
riot at the Capitol on television. For hours, he would not issue a public
statement instructing his supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol,
despite urgent pleas from his White House staff and dozens of others to do
so. Members of his family, his White House lawyers, virtually all those
around him knew that this simple act was critical. For hours, he would not
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xvi FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR
do it. During this time, law enforcement agents were attacked and seriously
injured, the Capitol was invaded, the electoral count was halted and the
lives of those in the Capitol were put at risk. In addition to being unlawful,
as described in this report, this was an utter moral failure—and a clear der-
eliction of duty. Evidence of this can be seen in the testimony of his White
House Counsel and several other White House witnesses. No man who
would behave that way at that moment in time can ever serve in any posi-
tion of authority in our nation again. He is unfit for any office.
* * * * *
In presenting all of the information in our hearings, we decided that the
vast majority of our witnesses needed to be Republicans. They were. We
presented evidence from two former Trump Administration Attorneys Gen-
eral, a former White House Counsel, many former Trump-appointed White
House, Justice Department, and Trump Campaign staff, a respected former
conservative judge, the former Secretary of Labor, and many others.
Like our hearings, this report is designed to deliver our findings in
detail in a format that is accessible for all Americans. We do so in an execu-
tive summary, while also providing immense detail for historians and oth-
ers. We are also releasing transcripts and evidence for the public to review,
consistent with a small number of security and privacy concerns. A section
of this report also explains the legal conclusions we draw from the evi-
dence, and our concerns about efforts to obstruct our investigation.
The Committee recognizes that this investigation is just a beginning; it
is only an initial step in addressing President Trump’s effort to remain in
office illegally. Prosecutors are considering the implications of the conduct
we describe in this report. As are voters. John Adams wrote in 1761, “The
very ground of our liberties is the freedom of elections.” Faith in our elec-
tions and the rule of law are paramount to our Republic. Election-deniers—
those who refuse to accept lawful election results—purposely attack the
rule of law and the foundation of our country.
As you read this report, please consider this: Vice President Pence,
along with many of the appointed officials who surrounded Donald Trump,
worked to defeat many of the worst parts of Trump’s plan to overturn the
election. This was not a certainty. It is comforting to assume that the insti-
tutions of our Republic will always withstand those who try to defeat our
Constitution from within. But our institutions are only strong when those
who hold office are faithful to our Constitution. We do not know what
would have happened if the leadership of the Department of Justice
declared, as Donald Trump requested, that the election was “corrupt,” if
Jeff Clark’s letters to State Legislatures had been sent, if Pat Cipollone, Jeff
Rosen, Richard Donoghue, Steve Engel and others were not serving as
guardrails on Donald Trump’s abuses.
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FOREWORD: VICE CHAIR xvii
Part of the tragedy of January 6th is the conduct of those who knew that
what happened was profoundly wrong, but nevertheless tried to downplay
it, minimize it or defend those responsible. That effort continues every day.
Today, I am perhaps most disappointed in many of my fellow conservatives
who know better, those who stood against the threats of communism and
Islamic terrorism but concluded that it was easier to appease Donald
Trump, or keep their heads down. I had hoped for more from them.
The late Charles Krauthammer wrote, “The lesson of our history is that
the task of merely maintaining strong and sturdy the structures of a consti-
tutional order is unending, the continuing and ceaseless work of every gen-
eration.” This task is unending because democracy can be fragile and our
institutions do not defend themselves.
The history of our time will show that the bravery of a handful of
Americans, doing their duty, saved us from an even more grave Constitu-
tional crisis. Elected officials, election workers, and public servants stood
against Donald Trump’s corrupt pressure. Many of our witnesses showed
selfless patriotism and their words and courage will be remembered.
The brave men and women of the Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police
and all the other law enforcement officers who fought to defend us that day
undoubtedly saved lives and our democracy.
Finally, I wish to thank all who honorably contributed to the work of
the Committee and to this Report. We accomplished much over a relatively
short period of time, and many of you sacrificed for the good of your
nation. You have helped make history and, I hope, helped right the ship.
LIZ CHENEY
Vice Chair
ENDNOTE
1. Silas S. Canfield, History of the 21st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the War of the
Rebellion (Vrooman, Anderson & Bateman, printers, 1893), p. 10.
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xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
PRELIMINARIES
Foreword: Speaker of the House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Foreword: Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Foreword: Vice Chair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Executive Summary: Overview of the Evidence
Developed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Referrals to the U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel
and House Ethics Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Efforts to Avoid Testifying, Evidence of Obstruction, and
Assessments of Witness Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Summary: Creation of the Select Committee; Purposes . . . . . . 128
Select Committee Witnesses Were Almost Entirely
Republican . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
NARRATIVE
Chapter 1 THE BIG LIE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
1.1 The Big Lie Reflected Deliberate Exploitation of the
“Red Mirage” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
1.2 Trump’s Pre-Election Plans to Declare Victory . . . . . . . . . . . 199
1.3 Trump’s Pre-Election Efforts to Delegitimize the
Election Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
1.4 President Trump’s Launch of the Big Lie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
1.5 Post-Election: President Trump Replaces His Campaign
Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
1.6 President Trump’s Campaign Team Told Him He Lost
the Election and There Was No Significant Fraud . . . . . . . 204
1.7 President Trump Had His Day in Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
1.8 President Trump Repeatedly Promoted Conspiracy
Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
1.9 President Trump’s January 6th Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
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TABLE OF CONTENTS xix
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)
Chapter 2 “I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
2.1 The Electoral College, and President Trump’s Attempt
to Subvert It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
2.2 The Plan Emerges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
2.3 Outreach and Implementation of the Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
2.4 An Outright Request for Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
2.5 Some Officials Eagerly Assisted President Trump With
His Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
2.6 The Final Outreach to State Legislators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
2.7 The Harm Caused by Demonizing Public Servants . . . . . . . 300
Chapter 3 FAKE ELECTORS AND THE “THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
STRATEGY” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
3.1 Laying the Groundwork for the Fake Elector Plan: The
Chesebro Memos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
3.2 President Trump and the Campaign Adopt the Fake
Elector Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
3.3 The Campaign Legal Team Bows Out, and Giuliani Steps
In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
3.4 Some of the Proposed Fake Electors Express Concerns
About the Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
3.5 On December 14th, The Fake Electors Meet and Vote . . . 352
3.6 The Fallout from the Fake Elector Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Chapter 4 ‘‘JUST CALL IT CORRUPT AND LEAVE THE REST TO ME’’ . . . . . . . . . 373
4.1 The DOJ Found No Significant Evidence of Fraud . . . . . . . . 373
4.2 November 23, 2020: Barr Challenges President Trump’s
Election Lies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
4.3 December 1, 2020: President Trump is Irate After Barr
Says There is No Significant Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
4.4 December 14, 2020: Barr Submits His Resignation . . . . . . 379
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xx TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)
4.5 Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen and Acting
Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue Hold the
Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
4.6 President Trump is Introduced to Jeffrey Clark . . . . . . . . 382
4.7 December 27th Phone Call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
4.8 Congressman Scott Perry Calls Donoghue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
4.9 December 28, 2020: The Clark Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
4.10 December 29th Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
4.11 Rosen’s December 30th Call with President Trump . . . . . 395
4.12 December 31st Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
4.13 January 2, 2021: Rosen and Donoghue Confront Clark
Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
4.14 January 3, 2021: Clark Informs DOJ Leadership that He
Will Accept President Trump’s Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
4.15 President Trump’s Unprecedented Attempt to Subvert
the DOJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
Chapter 5 “A COUP IN SEARCH OF A LEGAL THEORY” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
5.1 President Trump and His Allies Embark on a Desperate
Gambit to Block Certification of the 2020 Presidential
Election. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
5.2 President Trump and his Allies Exert Intense Public and
Private Pressure on the Vice President in Advance of
the Joint Session of Congress on January 6th . . . . . . . . . . . 441
5.3 President Trump and his Allies Continue to Pressure
the Vice President on January 6th, Threatening His Life
and Our Democracy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
5.4 President Trump Endangers Pence’s Life, Causing the
Vice President, His Family, and Staff to Narrowly
Miss the Rioters as They Flee the Mob Attacking the
Capitol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
5.5 Aftermath of the Attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
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TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)
Chapter 6 “BE THERE, WILL BE WILD!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
6.1 How Far-Right Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists
Planned for January 6th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502
6.2 The Proud Boys: “[Y]ou Want to Storm the Capitol” . . . . 507
6.3 The Oath Keepers: “He Called Us All to the Capitol
and Wants Us to Make it Wild!!!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512
6.4 “Trump Said It’s Gonna be Wild!!!!!!! It’s Gonna be
Wild!!!!!!!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
6.5 “Ready to Step in And Do What Is Needed” . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
6.6 “Friends of Stone” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
6.7 White Nationalists: “The Capitol Siege was Fucking
Awesome…” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519
6.8 The Three (III%) Percenters: “#OccupyCongress” . . . . . . . 521
6.9 QAnon: “Operation Occupy the Capitol” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
6.10 TheDonald.win: “Occupy the Capitol” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
6.11 How the White House and Rally Organizers Prepared
for January 6th . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
6.12 “He’s Calling on You, He Needs Your Help” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
6.13 “Trump is Supposed to Order Us to the Capitol” . . . . . . . 532
6.14 “Well, I Should Walk With the People.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533
6.15 “POTUS…Likes the Crazies.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
6.16 January 5, 2021: “Fort Trump” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536
6.17 “Together, We Will STOP THE STEAL.” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538
Chapter 7 187 MINUTES OF DERELICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577
7.1 “Reinsert the Mike Pence Lines” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
7.2 “I’ll Be There With You” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
7.3 The President’s Anger When He Could Not March to
the Capitol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
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xxii TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
NARRATIVE (CONTINUED)
7.4 “We’re Going to Try to Get the President to Put Out a
Statement” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592
7.5 “He Doesn’t Want to Do Anything” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595
7.6 “He Thinks Mike Deserves It” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596
7.7 “I Guess They’re Just More Upset About the Election
Theft Than You Are” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 597
7.8 “Stay Peaceful!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 599
7.9 “The President Needs to Stop This ASAP” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 600
7.10 “We Love You. You’re Very Special” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 603
7.11 “Remember This Day Forever!” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607
7.12 President Trump Still Sought to Delay the Joint
Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
7.13 He “Just Didn’t Want to Talk About It Anymore” . . . . . . . . 610
7.14 President Trump’s “Rhetoric Killed Someone” . . . . . . . . . . 611
Chapter 8 ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
8.1 The Mob Assembles in Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
8.2 March of the Proud Boys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 642
8.3 The Initial Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645
8.4 President Trump’s Mob Descends on the U.S. Capitol . . . 647
8.5 The Mob Surges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
8.6 The United States Capitol is Breached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
8.7 President Trump Pours Fuel on the Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 659
8.8 The Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
8.9 Clearing the U.S. Capitol Building and Restricted
Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 666
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689
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TABLE OF CONTENTS xxiii
Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
APPENDICES
Appendix 1 GOVERNMENT AGENCY PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
JANUARY 6TH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693
APPENDIX 2: DC NATIONAL GUARD PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
JANUARY 6TH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
APPENDIX 3: THE BIG RIP-OFF: FOLLOW THE MONEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 770
APPENDIX 4: MALIGN FOREIGN INFLUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 806
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
On October 31, 2022, in a Federal courthouse in Washington, DC, Graydon
Young testified against Stewart Rhodes and other members of the Oath
Keepers militia group. The defendants had been charged with seditious
conspiracy against the United States and other crimes related to the January
6, 2021, attack on Congress.1
In his testimony that day, Young explained to the jury how he and other
Oath Keepers were provoked to travel to Washington by President Donald
Trump’s tweets and by Trump’s false claims that the 2020 Presidential
election was “stolen” from him.2 And, in emotional testimony, Young
acknowledged what he and others believed they were doing on January 6th:
attacking Congress in the manner the French had attacked the Bastille at
the outset of the French Revolution.3 Reflecting on that day more than a
year and half later, Young testified:
Prosecutor: And so how do you feel about the fact that you were
pushing towards a line of police officers?
Young: Today I feel extremely ashamed and embarrassed. . . .
Prosecutor: How did you feel at the time?
Young: I felt like, again, we were continuing in some kind of his-
torical event to achieve a goal.
* * *
Prosecutor: Looking back now almost two years later, what would
that make you as someone who was coming to D.C. to fight against
the government?
Young: I guess I was [acting] like a traitor, somebody against my
own government.4
Young’s testimony was dramatic, but not unique. Many participants in
the attack on the Capitol acknowledged that they had betrayed their own
country:
• Reimler: “And I’m sorry to the people of this country for threatening
the democracy that makes this country so great . . . My participation in
the events that day were part of an attack on the rule of law.” 5
• Pert: “I know that the peaceful transition of power is to ensure the
common good for our nation and that it is critical in protecting our
country’s security needs. I am truly sorry for my part and accept full
responsibility for my actions.” 6
• Markofski: “My actions put me on the other side of the line from my
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2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Protestors gather at the Capitol.
(Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images)
brothers in the Army. The wrong side. Had I lived in the area, I would
have been called up to defend the Capitol and restore order . . . My
actions brought dishonor to my beloved U.S. Army National Guard.” 7
• Witcher: “Every member—every male member of my family has served
in the military, in the Marine Corps, and most have saw combat. And I
cast a shadow and cast embarrassment upon my family name and that
legacy.” 8
• Edwards: “I am ashamed to be for the first time in my 68 years,
standing before a judge, having pleaded guilty to committing a crime,
ashamed to be associated with an attack on the United States Capitol, a
symbol of American democracy and greatness that means a great deal
to me.” 9
Hundreds of other participants in the January 6th attack have pleaded
guilty, been convicted, or await trial for crimes related to their actions that
day. And, like Young, hundreds of others have acknowledged exactly what
provoked them to travel to Washington, and to engage in violence. For
example:
• Ronald Sandlin, who threatened police officers in the Capitol saying,
“[y]ou’re going to die,” posted on December 23, 2020: “I’m going to be
there to show support for our president and to do my part to stop the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
steal and stand behind Trump when he decides to cross the rubicon. If
you are a patriot I believe it’s your duty to be there. I see it as my civic
responsibility.” 10
• Garret Miller, who brought a gun to the Capitol on January 6th,
explained: “I was in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021, because I
believed I was following the instructions of former President Trump
and he was my president and the commander-in-chief. His statements
also had me believing the election was stolen from him.” 11
• John Douglas Wright explained that he brought busloads of people to
Washington, DC, on January 6th “because [Trump] called me there, and
he laid out what is happening in our government.” 12
• Lewis Cantwell testified: If “the President of the United States . . . [is]
out on TV telling the world that it was stolen, what else would I believe,
as a patriotic American who voted for him and wants to continue to see
the country thrive as I thought it was?” 13
• Likewise, Stephen Ayres testified that “with everything the President
was putting out” ahead of January 6th that “the election was rigged . . .
the votes were wrong and stuff . . . it just got into my head.” “The
President [was] calling on us to come” to Washington, DC. 14 Ayres
“was hanging on every word he [President Trump] was saying” 15 Ayres
posted that “Civil War will ensue” if President Trump did not stay in
power after January 6th.16
The Committee has compiled hundreds of similar statements from par-
ticipants in the January 6th attack.17
House Resolution 503 instructed the Select Committee to “investigate
and report upon the facts, circumstances, and causes relating to the January
6, 2021, domestic terrorist attack upon the United States Capitol Complex”
and to “issue a final report” containing “findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations for corrective measures.” The Select Committee has conducted
nine public hearings, presenting testimony from more than 70 witnesses.
In structuring our investigation and hearings, we began with President
Trump’s contentions that the election was stolen and took testimony from
nearly all of the President’s principal advisors on this topic. We focused on
the rulings of more than 60 Federal and State courts rejecting President
Trump’s and his supporters’ efforts to reverse the electoral outcome.
Despite the rulings of these courts, we understood that millions of
Americans still lack the information necessary to understand and evaluate
what President Trump has told them about the election. For that reason,
our hearings featured a number of members of President Trump’s inner
circle refuting his fraud claims and testifying that the election was not in
fact stolen. In all, the Committee displayed the testimony of more than four
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4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
dozen Republicans—by far the majority of witnesses in our hearings—
including two of President Trump’s former Attorneys General, his former
White House Counsel, numerous members of his White House staff, and the
highest-ranking members of his 2020 election campaign, including his
campaign manager and his campaign general counsel. Even key individuals
who worked closely with President Trump to try to overturn the 2020 elec-
tion on January 6th ultimately admitted that they lacked actual evidence
sufficient to change the election result, and they admitted that what they
were attempting was unlawful.18
This Report supplies an immense volume of information and testimony
assembled through the Select Committee’s investigation, including informa-
tion obtained following litigation in Federal district and appellate courts, as
well as in the U.S. Supreme Court. Based upon this assembled evidence, the
Committee has reached a series of specific findings,19 including the follow-
ing:
1. Beginning election night and continuing through January 6th and
thereafter, Donald Trump purposely disseminated false allegations of
fraud related to the 2020 Presidential election in order to aid his effort
to overturn the election and for purposes of soliciting contributions.
These false claims provoked his supporters to violence on January 6th.
2. Knowing that he and his supporters had lost dozens of election law-
suits, and despite his own senior advisors refuting his election fraud
claims and urging him to concede his election loss, Donald Trump
refused to accept the lawful result of the 2020 election. Rather than
honor his constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” President Trump instead plotted to overturn the
election outcome.
3. Despite knowing that such an action would be illegal, and that no
State had or would submit an altered electoral slate, Donald Trump
corruptly pressured Vice President Mike Pence to refuse to count
electoral votes during Congress’s joint session on January 6th.
4. Donald Trump sought to corrupt the U.S. Department of Justice by
attempting to enlist Department officials to make purposely false
statements and thereby aid his effort to overturn the Presidential
election. After that effort failed, Donald Trump offered the position of
Acting Attorney General to Jeff Clark knowing that Clark intended to
disseminate false information aimed at overturning the election.
5. Without any evidentiary basis and contrary to State and Federal law,
Donald Trump unlawfully pressured State officials and legislators to
change the results of the election in their States.
6. Donald Trump oversaw an effort to obtain and transmit false electoral
certificates to Congress and the National Archives.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
7. Donald Trump pressured Members of Congress to object to valid
slates of electors from several States.
8. Donald Trump purposely verified false information filed in Federal
court.
9. Based on false allegations that the election was stolen, Donald Trump
summoned tens of thousands of supporters to Washington for Janu-
ary 6th. Although these supporters were angry and some were armed,
Donald Trump instructed them to march to the Capitol on January 6th
to “take back” their country.
10. Knowing that a violent attack on the Capitol was underway and
knowing that his words would incite further violence, Donald Trump
purposely sent a social media message publicly condemning Vice
President Pence at 2:24 p.m. on January 6th.
11. Knowing that violence was underway at the Capitol, and despite his
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed, Donald Trump
refused repeated requests over a multiple hour period that he instruct
his violent supporters to disperse and leave the Capitol, and instead
watched the violent attack unfold on television. This failure to act
perpetuated the violence at the Capitol and obstructed Congress’s
proceeding to count electoral votes.
12. Each of these actions by Donald Trump was taken in support of a
multi-part conspiracy to overturn the lawful results of the 2020
Presidential election.
13. The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies did suc-
cessfully detect the planning for potential violence on January 6th,
including planning specifically by the Proud Boys and Oath Keeper
militia groups who ultimately led the attack on the Capitol. As January
6th approached, the intelligence specifically identified the potential
for violence at the U.S. Capitol. This intelligence was shared within the
executive branch, including with the Secret Service and the Presi-
dent’s National Security Council.
14. Intelligence gathered in advance of January 6th did not support a
conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage
in a violent counter-demonstration, or attack Trump supporters on
January 6th. Indeed, intelligence from January 5th indicated that
some left-wing groups were instructing their members to “stay at
home” and not attend on January 6th.20 Ultimately, none of these
groups was involved to any material extent with the attack on the
Capitol on January 6th.
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6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
15. Neither the intelligence community nor law enforcement obtained
intelligence in advance of January 6th on the full extent of the ongo-
ing planning by President Trump, John Eastman, Rudolph Giuliani
and their associates to overturn the certified election results. Such
agencies apparently did not (and potentially could not) anticipate the
provocation President Trump would offer the crowd in his Ellipse
speech, that President Trump would “spontaneously” instruct the
crowd to march to the Capitol, that President Trump would exacerbate
the violent riot by sending his 2:24 p.m. tweet condemning Vice
President Pence, or the full scale of the violence and lawlessness that
would ensue. Nor did law enforcement anticipate that President
Trump would refuse to direct his supporters to leave the Capitol once
violence began. No intelligence community advance analysis pre-
dicted exactly how President Trump would behave; no such analysis
recognized the full scale and extent of the threat to the Capitol on
January 6th.
16. Hundreds of Capitol and DC Metropolitan police officers performed
their duties bravely on January 6th, and America owes those individu-
als immense gratitude for their courage in the defense of Congress
and our Constitution. Without their bravery, January 6th would have
been far worse. Although certain members of the Capitol Police lead-
ership regarded their approach to January 6th as “all hands on deck,”
the Capitol Police leadership did not have sufficient assets in place to
address the violent and lawless crowd.21 Capitol Police leadership did
not anticipate the scale of the violence that would ensue after Presi-
dent Trump instructed tens of thousands of his supporters in the
Ellipse crowd to march to the Capitol, and then tweeted at 2:24 p.m.
Although Chief Steven Sund raised the idea of National Guard support,
the Capitol Police Board did not request Guard assistance prior to
January 6th. The Metropolitan Police took an even more proactive
approach to January 6th, and deployed roughly 800 officers, including
responding to the emergency calls for help at the Capitol. Rioters still
managed to break their line in certain locations, when the crowd
surged forward in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2:24
p.m. tweet. The Department of Justice readied a group of Federal
agents at Quantico and in the District of Columbia, anticipating that
January 6th could become violent, and then deployed those agents
once it became clear that police at the Capitol were overwhelmed.
Agents from the Department of Homeland Security were also
deployed to assist.
17. President Trump had authority and responsibility to direct deploy-
ment of the National Guard in the District of Columbia, but never gave
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
any order to deploy the National Guard on January 6th or on any other
day. Nor did he instruct any Federal law enforcement agency to assist.
Because the authority to deploy the National Guard had been del-
egated to the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense could,
and ultimately did deploy the Guard. Although evidence identifies a
likely miscommunication between members of the civilian leadership
in the Department of Defense impacting the timing of deployment,
the Committee has found no evidence that the Department of Defense
intentionally delayed deployment of the National Guard. The Select
Committee recognizes that some at the Department had genuine
concerns, counseling caution, that President Trump might give an
illegal order to use the military in support of his efforts to overturn
the election.
* * *
This Report begins with a factual overview framing each of these con-
clusions and summarizing what our investigation found. That overview is
in turn supported by eight chapters identifying the very specific evidence of
each of the principal elements of President Trump’s multi-part plan to
overturn the election, along with evidence regarding intelligence gathered
before January 6th and security shortfalls that day.
Although the Committee’s hearings were viewed live by tens of millions
of Americans and widely publicized in nearly every major news source,22
the Committee also recognizes that other news outlets and commentators
have actively discouraged viewers from watching, and that millions of other
Americans have not yet seen the actual evidence addressed by this Report.
Accordingly, the Committee is also releasing video summaries of relevant
evidence on each major topic investigated.
This Report also examines the legal implications of Donald Trump and
his co-conspirators’ conduct and includes criminal referrals to the Depart-
ment of Justice regarding President Trump and certain other individuals.
The criminal referrals build upon three relevant rulings issued by a Federal
district court and explain in detail how the facts found support further
evaluation by the Department of Justice of specific criminal charges. To
assist the public in understanding the nature and importance of this mate-
rial, this Report also contains sections identifying how the Committee has
evaluated the credibility of its witnesses and suggests that the Department
of Justice further examine possible efforts to obstruct our investigation. We
also note that more than 30 witnesses invoked their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, others invoked Executive Privilege or
categorically refused to appear (including Steve Bannon, who has since
been convicted of contempt of Congress).
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8 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Finally, this report identifies a series of legislative recommendations,
including the Presidential Election Reform Act, which has already passed
the House of Representatives.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED
In the Committee’s hearings, we presented evidence of what ultimately
became a multi-part plan to overturn the 2020 Presidential election. That
evidence has led to an overriding and straight forward conclusion: the cen-
tral cause of January 6th was one man, former President Donald Trump,
whom many others followed. None of the events of January 6th would have
happened without him.
THE BIG LIE
In the weeks before election day 2020, Donald Trump’s campaign experts,
including his campaign manager Bill Stepien, advised him that the election
results would not be fully known on election night.23 This was because cer-
tain States would not begin to count absentee and other mail-in votes until
election day or after election-day polls had closed.24 Because Republican
voters tend to vote in greater numbers on election day and Democratic vot-
ers tend to vote in greater numbers in advance of election day, it was widely
anticipated that Donald Trump could initially appear to have a lead, but that
the continued counting of mail-in, absentee and other votes beginning
election night would erode and could overcome that perceived lead.25 Thus,
as President Trump’s campaign manager cautioned, understanding the
results of the 2020 election would be a lengthy “process,” and an initial
appearance of a Trump lead could be a “red mirage.” 26 This was not unique
to the 2020 election; similar scenarios had played out in prior elections as
well.27
Prior to the 2020 election, Donald Trump’s campaign manager Bill
Stepien, along with House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, urged Presi-
dent Trump to embrace mail-in voting as potentially beneficial to the
Trump Campaign.28 Presidential advisor and son-in-law Jared Kushner
recounted others giving Donald Trump the same advice: “[M]ail in ballots
could be a good thing for us if we looked at it correctly.” 29 Multiple States,
including Florida, had successfully utilized mail-in voting in prior elec-
tions, and in 2020.30 Trump White House Counselor Hope Hicks testified: “I
think he [President Trump] understood that a lot of people vote via absen-
tee ballot in places like Florida and have for a long time and that it’s worked
fine.” 31 Donald Trump won in numerous States that allowed no-excuse
absentee voting in 2020, including Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Wyoming.32
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9
On election night 2020, the election returns were reported in almost
exactly the way that Stepien and other Trump Campaign experts predicted,
with the counting of mail-in and absentee ballots gradually diminishing
President Trump’s perceived lead. As the evening progressed, President
Trump called in his campaign team to discuss the results. Stepien and other
campaign experts advised him that the results of the election would not be
known for some time, and that he could not truthfully declare victory.33 “It
was far too early to be making any calls like that. Ballots—ballots were still
being counted. Ballots were still going to be counted for days.” 34
Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the Select Committee that he
argued against declaring victory at that time as well, because “it was too
early to say one way [or] the other” who had won.35 Stepien advised Trump
to say that “votes were still being counted. It’s too early to tell, too early to
call the race but, you know, we are proud of the race we run—we ran and
we, you know, think we’re—think we’re in a good position” and would say
more in the coming days.36
President Trump refused, and instead said this in his public remarks
that evening: “This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embar-
rassment to our country. We were getting ready to win this election.
Frankly, we did win this election. We did win this election . . . . We want all
voting to stop.” 37 And on the morning of November 5th, he tweeted “STOP
THE COUNT!” 38 Halting the counting of votes at that point would have vio-
lated both State and Federal laws.39
According to testimony received by the Select Committee, the only
advisor present who supported President Trump’s inclination to declare
victory was Rudolph Giuliani, who appeared to be inebriated.40 President
Trump’s Attorney General, William Barr, who had earlier left the election
night gathering, perceived the President’s statement this way:
[R]ight out of the box on election night, the President claimed that
there was major fraud underway. I mean, this happened, as far as I
could tell, before there was actually any potential of looking at evi-
dence. He claimed there was major fraud. And it seemed to be based
on the dynamic that, at the end of the evening, a lot of Democratic
votes came in which changed the vote counts in certain States, and
that seemed to be the basis for this broad claim that there was
major fraud. And I didn’t think much of that, because people had
been talking for weeks and everyone understood for weeks that that
was going to be what happened on election night . . . . 41
President Trump’s decision to declare victory falsely on election night
and, unlawfully, to call for the vote counting to stop, was not a spontaneous
decision. It was premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of
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10 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
President Trump declares victory in a speech at an election night party.
(Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)
evidence of President Trump’s preplanning for a false declaration of vic-
tory. This includes multiple written communications on October 31 and
November 3, 2020, to the White House by Judicial Watch President Tom
Fitton.42 This evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with
President Trump and understood that President Trump would falsely
declare victory on election night and call for vote counting to stop. The evi-
dence also includes an audio recording of President Trump’s advisor Steve
Bannon, who said this on October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates
from China:
And what Trump’s gonna do is just declare victory, right? He’s
gonna declare victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s a winner. He’s
just gonna say he’s a winner . . . The Democrats—more of our
people vote early that count. Theirs vote in mail. And so they’re
gonna have a natural disadvantage, and Trump’s going to take
advantage of it—that’s our strategy. He’s gonna declare himself a
winner. So when you wake up Wednesday morning, it’s going to be
a firestorm . . . . Also, if Trump, if Trump is losing, by 10 or 11
o’clock at night, it’s going to be even crazier. No, because he’s
gonna sit right there and say “They stole it. I’m directing the Attor-
ney General to shut down all ballot places in all 50 states.” It’s
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11
going to be, no, he’s not going out easy. If Trump—if Biden’s win-
ning, Trump is going to do some crazy shit.43
Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another outside advisor to
President Trump, made this statement:
I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens,
the key thing to do is to claim victory. Possession is nine-tenths of
the law. No, we won. Fuck you, Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong.
Fuck you.44
On election day, Vice President Pence’s staff, including his Chief of Staff
and Counsel, became concerned that President Trump might falsely claim
victory that evening. The Vice President’s Counsel, Greg Jacob, testified
about their concern that the Vice President might be asked improperly to
echo such a false statement.45 Jacob drafted a memorandum with this spe-
cific recommendation: “[I]t is essential that the Vice President not be per-
ceived by the public as having decided questions concerning disputed
electoral votes prior to the full development of all relevant facts.” 46
Millions of Americans believed that President Trump was telling the
truth on election night—that President Trump actually had proof the elec-
tion was stolen and that the ongoing counting of votes was an act of fraud.
As votes were being counted in the days after the election, President
Trump’s senior campaign advisors informed him that his chances of suc-
cess were almost zero.
Former Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien testified that he had
come to this conclusion by November 7th, and told President Trump:
Committee Staff: What was your view on the state of the election at
that point?
Stepien: You know, very, very, very bleak. You know, I—we told
him—the group that went over there outlined, you know, my belief
and chances for success at this point. And then we pegged that at,
you know, 5, maybe 10 percent based on recounts that were—that,
you know, either were automatically initiated or could be—could be
initiated based on, you know, realistic legal challenges, not all the
legal challenges that eventually were pursued. But, you know, it
was—you know, my belief is that it was a very, very—5 to 10 per-
cent is not a very good optimistic outlook.47
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12 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller testified to the Committee
about this exchange:
Miller: I was in the Oval Office. And at some point in the conversa-
tion Matt Oczkowski, who was the lead data person, was brought
on, and I remember he delivered to the President in pretty blunt
terms that he was going to lose.
Committee Staff: And that was based, Mr. Miller, on Matt and the
data team’s assessment of this sort of county-by-county, State-by-
State results as reported?
Miller: Correct.48
In one of the Select Committee’s hearings, former Fox News political
editor Chris Stirewalt was asked what the chance President Trump had of
winning the election after November 7th, when the votes were tallied and
every news organization had called the race for now-President Biden. His
response: “None.” 49
As the Committee’s hearings demonstrated, President Trump made a
series of statements to White House staff and others during this time
period indicating his understanding that he had lost.50 President Trump
also took consequential actions reflecting his understanding that he would
be leaving office on January 20th. For example, President Trump personally
signed a Memorandum and Order instructing his Department of Defense to
withdraw all military forces from Somalia by December 31, 2020, and from
Afghanistan by January 15, 2021.51 General Keith Kellogg (ret.), who had
been appointed by President Trump as Chief of Staff for the National Secu-
rity Council and was Vice President Pence’s National Security Advisor on
January 6th, told the Select Committee that “[a]n immediate departure that
that memo said would have been catastrophic. It’s the same thing what
President Biden went through. It would have been a debacle.” 52
In the weeks that followed the election, President Trump’s campaign
experts and his senior Justice Department officials were informing him and
others in the White House that there was no genuine evidence of fraud suf-
ficient to change the results of the election. For example, former Attorney
General Barr testified:
And I repeatedly told the President in no uncertain terms that I did
not see evidence of fraud, you know, that would have affected the
outcome of the election. And, frankly, a year and a half later, I
haven’t seen anything to change my mind on that.53
Former Trump Campaign lawyer Alex Cannon, who was asked to over-
see incoming information about voter fraud and set up a voter fraud tip
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13
line, told the Select Committee about a pertinent call with White House
Chief of Staff Mark Meadows in November 2020:
Cannon: So I remember a call with Mr. Meadows where Mr. Mead-
ows was asking me what I was finding and if I was finding anything.
And I remember sharing with him that we weren’t finding anything
that would be sufficient to change the results in any of the key
States.
Committee Staff: When was that conversation?
Cannon: Probably in November. Mid- to late November . . . .
Committee Staff: And what was Mr. Meadows’s reaction to that
information?
Cannon: I believe the words he used were: “So there is no there
there?” 54
President Trump’s Campaign Manager Bill Stepien recalled that Presi-
dent Trump was being told “wild allegations” and that it was the Cam-
paign’s job to “track [the allegations] down”:
Committee Staff: You said that you were very confident that you
were telling the President the truth in your dealings with [him]. And
had your team been able to verify any of these allegations of fraud,
would you have reported those to the President?
Stepien: Sure.
Committee Staff: Did you ever have to report that—
Stepien: One of my frustrations would be that, you know, people
would throw out, you know, these reports, these allegations, these
things that they heard or saw in a State, and they’d tell President
Trump. And, you know, it would be the campaign’s job to track
down the information, the facts. And, you know, President Trump,
you know—if someone’s saying, hey, you know, all these votes
aren’t counted or were miscounted, you know, if you’re down in a
State like Arizona, you liked hearing that. It would be our job to
track it down and come up dry because the allegation didn’t prove
to be true. And we’d have to, you know, relay the news that, yeah,
that tip that someone told you about those votes or that fraud or,
you know, nothing came of it.
That would be our job as, you know, the truth telling squad and, you
know, not—not a fun job to be, you know, much—it’s an easier job to
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14 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
be telling the President about, you know, wild allegations. It’s a harder
job to be telling him on the back end that, yeah, that wasn’t true.
Committee Staff: How did he react to those types of conversations
where you [told] him that an allegation or another wasn’t true?
Stepien: He was—he had—usually he had pretty clear eyes. Like, he
understood, you know—you know, we told him where we thought
the race was, and I think he was pretty realistic with our viewpoint,
in agreement with our viewpoint of kind of the forecast and the
uphill climb we thought he had.55
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason Miller told the Committee that
he informed President Trump “several” times that “specific to election day
fraud and irregularities, there were not enough to overturn the election.” 56
Vice President Pence has also said publicly that he told President Trump
there was no basis to allege that the election was stolen. When a reporter
recently asked “Did you ever point blank say to the President [that] we lost
this election?,” Pence responded that “I did . . . Many times.” 57 Pence has
also explained:
There was never evidence of widespread fraud. I don’t believe fraud
changed the outcome of the election. But the President and the
Campaign had every right to have those examined in court. But I
told the President that, once those legal challenges played out, he
should simply accept the outcome of the election and move on.58
The General Counsel of President Trump’s campaign, Matthew Morgan,
informed members of the White House staff, and likely many others, of the
Campaign’s conclusion that none of the allegations of fraud and irregulari-
ties could be sufficient to change the outcome of the election:
What was generally discussed on that topic was whether the fraud,
maladministration, abuse, or irregularities, if aggregated and read
most favorably to the campaign, would that be outcome determina-
tive. And I think everyone’s assessment in the room, at least
amongst the staff, Marc Short, myself, and Greg Jacob, was that it
was not sufficient to be outcome determinative.59
In a meeting on November 23rd, Barr told President Trump that the
Justice Department was doing its duty by investigating every fraud allega-
tion “if it’s specific, credible, and could’ve affected the outcome,” but that
“they’re just not meritorious. They’re not panning out.” 60
Barr then told the Associated Press on December 1st that the Depart-
ment had “not seen fraud on a scale that could have effected a different
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15
outcome in the election.” 61 Next, he reiterated this point in private meet-
ings with the President both that afternoon and on December 14th, as well
as in his final press conference as Attorney General later that month.62 The
Department of Homeland Security had reached a similar determination two
weeks earlier: “There is no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost
votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.” 63
In addition, multiple other high ranking Justice Department personnel
appointed by President Trump also informed him repeatedly that the alle-
gations were false. As January 6th drew closer, Acting Attorney General
Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue had calls with Presi-
dent Trump on almost a daily basis explaining in detail what the Depart-
ment’s investigations showed.64 Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard
Donoghue told the Select Committee that he and Acting Attorney General
Rosen tried “to put it in very clear terms to the President. And I said some-
thing to the effect of ‘Sir, we’ve done dozens of investigations, hundreds of
interviews. The major allegations are not supported by the evidence devel-
oped. We’ve looked in Georgia, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Nevada. We’re
doing our job.’” 65 On December 31st, Donoghue recalls telling the President
that “people keep telling you these things and they turn out not to be
true.” 66 And then on January 3rd, Donoghue reiterated this point with the
President:
[A]s in previous conservations, we would say to him, you know,
“We checked that out, and there’s nothing to it.” 67
Acting Attorney General Rosen testified before the Select Committee
that “the common element” of all of his communications with President
Trump was President Trump urging the Department to find widespread
fraud that did not actually exist. None of the Department’s investigations
identified any genuine fraud sufficient to impact the election outcome:
During my tenure as the Acting Attorney General, which began on
December 24 of [2020], the Department of Justice maintained the
position, publicly announced by former Attorney General William
Barr, that the Department had been presented with no evidence of
widespread voter fraud in a scale sufficient to change the outcome
of the 2020 election.68
As President Trump was hearing from his campaign and his Justice
Department that the allegations of widespread fraud were not supported by
the evidence, his White House legal staff also reached the same conclu-
sions, and agreed specifically with what Barr told President Trump. Both
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone and White House Senior Advisor Eric
Herschmann reinforced to President Trump that the Justice Department
was doing its duty to investigate allegations of supposed voter fraud.69
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16 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cipollone told the Select Committee that he “had seen no evidence of
massive fraud in the election” and that he “forcefully” made this point “over
and over again.” For example, during a late-night group meeting with Presi-
dent Trump on December 18th, at which he and Herschmann urged Trump
not to heed the advice of several election conspiracists at the meeting:
Cipollone: They didn’t think that we were, you know—they didn’t
think we believed this, you know, that there had been massive fraud
in the election, and the reason they didn’t think we believed it is
because we didn’t.
Committee Staff: And you articulated that forcefully to them during
the meeting?
Cipollone: I did, yeah. I had seen no evidence of massive fraud in the
election. . . . At some point, you have to deliver with the evidence.
And I—again, I just to go back to what [Barr] said, he had not seen
and I was not aware of any evidence of fraud to the extent that it
would change the results of the election. That was made clear to
them, okay, over and over again.70
Similarly, White House Attorney Eric Herschmann was also very clear
about his views:
[T]hey never proved the allegations that they were making, and
they were trying to develop.71
In short, President Trump was informed over and over again, by his
senior appointees, campaign experts and those who had served him for
years, that his election fraud allegations were nonsense.
How did President Trump continue to make false allegations despite all
of this unequivocal information? President Trump sought out those who
were not scrupulous with the facts, and were willing to be dishonest. He
found a new legal team to assert claims that his existing advisors and the
Justice Department had specifically informed him were false. President
Trump’s new legal team, headed by Rudolph Giuliani, and their allies ulti-
mately lost dozens of election lawsuits in Federal and State courts.
The testimony of Trump Campaign Manager Bill Stepien helps to put
this series of events in perspective. Stepien described his interaction with
Giuliani as an intentional “self-demotion,” with Stepien stepping aside
once it became clear that President Trump intended to spread falsehoods.
Stepien knew the President’s new team was relying on unsupportable
accusations, and he refused to be associated with their approach:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17
There were two groups of family. We called them kind of my team
and Rudy’s team. I didn’t mind being characterized as being part of
“team normal,” as reporters, you know, kind of started to do
around that point in time. 72
Having worked for Republican campaigns for over two decades, Stepien
said, “I think along the way I’ve built up a pretty good -- I hope a good
reputation for being honest and professional, and I didn’t think what was
happening was necessarily honest or professional at that point in time.” 73
As Giuliani visited Campaign headquarters to discuss election litigation,
the Trump Campaign’s professional staff began to view him as unhinged.74
In addition, multiple law firms previously engaged to work for the Trump
Campaign decided that they could not participate in the strategy being
instituted by Giuliani. They quit. Campaign General Counsel Matthew Mor-
gan explained that he had conversations with “probably all of our counsel
who [we]re signed up to assist on election day as they disengaged with the
campaign.” 75 The “general consensus was that the law firms were not
comfortable making the arguments that Rudy Giuliani was making pub-
licly.” 76 When asked how many outside firms expressed this concern, Mor-
gan recalled having “a similar conversation with most all of them.” 77
Stepien grew so wary of the new team that he locked Giuliani out of
his office:
Committee Staff: Yeah. I’m getting the sense from listening to you
here for a few hours that you sort of chose to pull back, that you
were uncomfortable with what Mr. Giuliani and others were saying
and doing and, therefore, you were purposefully stepping back from
a day-to-day role as the leader of the campaign. Is that—I don’t
want to put words in your mouth. Is that accurate?
Stepien: That’s accurate. That’s accurate. You know, I had my assis-
tant -- it was a big glass kind of wall office in our headquarters, and
I had my assistant lock my door. I told her, don’t let anyone in. You
know, I’ll be around when I need to be around. You know, tell me
what I need to know. Tell me what’s going on here, but, you know,
you’re going to see less of me.
And, you know, sure enough, you know, Mayor Giuliani tried to, you
know, get in my office and ordered her to unlock the door, and she
didn’t do that, you know. She’s, you know, smart about that. But
your words are ones I agree with.78
Over the weeks that followed, dozens of judges across the country spe-
cifically rejected the allegations of fraud and irregularities being advanced
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18 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
by the Trump team and their allies. For example, courts described the argu-
ments as “an amalgamation of theories, conjecture, and speculation,”
“allegations … sorely wanting of relevant or reliable evidence,” “strained
legal arguments without merit,” assertions that “did not prove by any
standard of proof that any illegal votes were cast and counted,” and even a
“fundamental and obvious misreading of the Constitution.” 79
Reflecting back on this period, Trump Campaign Communications
Director Tim Murtaugh texted colleagues in January 2021 about a news
report that the New York State Bar was considering expelling Rudolph Giu-
liani over the Ellipse rally: “Why wouldn’t they expel him based solely on
the outrageous lies he told for 2 1/2 months?” 80
This is exactly what ultimately came to pass. When suspending his
license, a New York court said that Giuliani “communicated demonstrably
false and misleading statements to courts, lawmakers and the public at
large in his capacity as lawyer for former President Donald J. Trump and the
Trump campaign in connection with Trump’s failed effort at reelection in
2020.” 81 The court added that “[t]he seriousness of [Giuliani’s] uncontro-
verted misconduct cannot be overstated.” 82
Other Trump lawyers were sanctioned for making outlandish claims of
election fraud without the evidence to back them up, including Sidney Pow-
ell, Lin Wood and seven other pro-Trump lawyers in a case that a Federal
judge described as “a historic and profound abuse of the judicial process”:
It is one thing to take on the charge of vindicating rights associated
with an allegedly fraudulent election. It is another to take on the
charge of deceiving a federal court and the American people into
believing that rights were infringed, without regard to whether any
laws or rights were in fact violated. This is what happened here.83
A group of prominent Republicans have more recently issued a report—
titled Lost, Not Stolen—examining “every count of every case brought in
these six battleground states” by President Trump and his allies. The report
concludes “that Donald Trump and his supporters had their day in court
and failed to produce substantive evidence to make their case.” 84 President
Trump and his legal allies “failed because of a lack of evidence and not
because of erroneous rulings or unfair judges . . . . In many cases, after
making extravagant claims of wrongdoing, Trump’s legal representatives
showed up in court or state proceedings empty-handed, and then returned
to their rallies and media campaigns to repeat the same unsupported
claims.” 85
There is no reasonable basis for the allegation that these dozens of rul-
ings by State and Federal courts were somehow politically motivated.86 The
outcome of these suits was uniform regardless of who appointed the judges.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19
One of the authors of Lost, Not Stolen, longtime Republican election lawyer
Benjamin Ginsberg, testified before the Select Committee that “in no
instance did a court find that the charges of fraud were real,” without
variation based on the judges involved.87 Indeed, eleven of the judges who
ruled against Donald Trump and his supporters were appointed by Donald
Trump himself.
One of those Trump nominees, Judge Stephanos Bibas of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rejected an appeal by the Trump Campaign
claiming that Pennsylvania officials “did not undertake any meaningful
effort” to fight illegal absentee ballots and uneven treatment of voters
across counties.88 Judge Bibas wrote in his decision that “calling an election
unfair does not make it so. Charges require specific allegations and then
proof. We have neither here.” 89 Another Trump nominee, Judge Brett Lud-
wig of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, ruled against President Trump’s
lawsuit alleging that the result was skewed by illegal procedures that gov-
erned drop boxes, ballot address information, and individuals who claimed
“indefinitely confined” status to vote from home.90 Judge Ludwig wrote in
his decision, that “[t]his Court has allowed plaintiff the chance to make his
case and he has lost on the merits” because the procedures used “do not
remotely rise to the level” of breaking Wisconsin’s election rules.91
Nor is it true that these rulings focused solely on standing, or proce-
dural issues. As Ginsberg confirmed in his testimony to the Select Commit-
tee, President Trump’s team “did have their day in court.” 92 Indeed, he and
his co-authors determined in their report that 30 of these post-election
cases were dismissed by a judge after an evidentiary hearing had been held,
and many of these judges explicitly indicated in their decisions that the evi-
dence presented by the plaintiffs was wholly insufficient on the merits.93
Ultimately, even Rudolph Giuliani and his legal team acknowledged that
they had no definitive evidence of election fraud sufficient to change the
election outcome. For example, although Giuliani repeatedly had claimed in
public that Dominion voting machines stole the election, he admitted during
his Select Committee deposition that “I do not think the machines stole the
election.” 94 An attorney representing his lead investigator, Bernard Kerik,
declared in a letter to the Select Committee that “it was impossible for
Kerik and his team to determine conclusively whether there was widespread
fraud or whether that widespread fraud would have altered the outcome of
the election.” 95 Kerik also emailed President Trump’s chief of staff on
December 28, 2020, writing: “We can do all the investigations we want
later, but if the president plans on winning, it’s the legislators that have to
be moved and this will do just that.” 96 Other Trump lawyers and support-
ers, Jenna Ellis, John Eastman, Phil Waldron, and Michael Flynn, all
invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when
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20 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Rudolph Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, and other hold a press conference at Four Seasons Total
Landscaping on November 7, 2020 falsely claiming Donald Trump had won the state of
Pennsylvania.
(Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images)
asked by the Select Committee what supposed proof they uncovered that
the election was stolen.97 Not a single witness--nor any combination of
witnesses--provided the Select Committee with evidence demonstrating
that fraud occurred on a scale even remotely close to changing the outcome
in any State.98
By mid-December 2020, Donald Trump had come to what most of his
staff believed was the end of the line. The Supreme Court rejected a lawsuit
he supported filed by the State of Texas in the Supreme Court, and Donald
Trump had this exchange, according to Special Assistant to the President
Cassidy Hutchinson:
The President was fired up about the Supreme Court decision. And so
I was standing next to [Chief of Staff Mark] Meadows, but I had
stepped back . . . The President [was] just raging about the decision
and how it’s wrong, and why didn’t we make more calls, and just this
typical anger outburst at this decision . . . And the President said I
think—so he had said something to the effect of, “I don’t want
people to know we lost, Mark. This is embarrassing. Figure it out. We
need to figure it out. I don’t want people to know that we lost.” 99
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21
On December 14, 2020, the Electoral College met to cast and certify each
State’s electoral votes. By this time, many of President Trump’s senior staff,
and certain members of his family, were urging him to concede that he had lost.
Labor Secretary Gene Scalia told the Committee that he called President
Trump around this time and gave him such feedback quite directly:
[S]o, I had put a call in to the President—I might have called on the
13th; we spoke, I believe, on the 14th—in which I conveyed to him that
I thought that it was time for him to acknowledge that President
Biden had prevailed in the election . . . . But I communicated to the
President that when that legal process is exhausted and when the
electors have voted, that that’s the point at which that outcome needs
to be expected . . . . And I told him that I did believe, yes, that once
those legal processes were run, if fraud had not been established that
had affected the outcome of the election, that, unfortunately, I
believed that what had to be done was concede the outcome.100
Deputy White House Press Secretary Judd Deere also told President
Trump that he should concede. He recalled other staffers advising President
Trump at some point to concede and that he “encouraged him to do it at
least once after the electoral college met in mid-December.” 101 White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone also believed that President Trump should
concede: “[I]f your question is did I believe he should concede the election
at a point in time, yes, I did.” 102
Attorney General Barr told the Select Committee this: “And in my view,
that [the December 14 electoral college vote] was the end of the matter. I
didn’t see—you know, I thought that this would lead inexorably to a new
administration. I was not aware at that time of any theory, you know, why
this could be reversed. And so I felt that the die was cast . . . .” 103
Barr also told the Committee that he suggested several weeks earlier
that the President’s efforts in this regard needed to come to an end soon, in
conversation with several White House officials after his meeting with
Trump on November 23rd:
[A]s I walked out of the Oval Office, Jared was there with Dan
Scavino, who ran the President’s social media and who I thought
was a reasonable guy and believe is a reasonable guy. And I said,
how long is he going to carry on with this ‘stolen election’ stuff?
Where is this going to go?
And by that time, Meadows had caught up with me and—leaving the
office, and caught up to me and said that—he said, look, I think that
he’s becoming more realistic and knows that there’s a limit to how
far he can take this. And then Jared said, you know, yeah, we’re
working on this, we’re working on it.104
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22 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Despite all that Donald Trump was being told, he continued to purposely
and maliciously make false claims. To understand the very stark differences
between what he was being told and what he said publicly and in fundraising
solicitations, the Committee has assembled the following examples.
Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey President Trump one week later
Rosen (12/15/20): (12/22/20):
“And so he said, ‘Well, what about “There is even security cam-
this? I saw it on the videotape, some- era footage from Georgia that
body delivering a suitcase of ballots.’ shows officials telling poll
And we said, ‘It wasn’t a suitcase. It watchers to leave the room
was a bin. That’s what they use when before pulling suitcases of
they’re counting ballots. It’s ballots out from under the
benign.’” 105 tables and continuing to count
for hours.” 106
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard President Trump later that
Donoghue (12/27 & 12/31/20): week (1/2/21):
“I told the President myself that several “[S]he stuffed the machine.
times, in several conversations, that She stuffed the ballot. Each
these allegations about ballots being ballot went three times, they
smuggled in in a suitcase and run were showing: Here’s ballot
through the machine several times, it number one. Here it is a sec-
was not true, that we looked at it, we ond time, third time, next
looked at the video, we interviewed the ballot.” 108
witnesses, that it was not true . . . . I
believe it was in the phone call on
December 27th. It was also in a meeting
in the Oval Office on December 31st.” 107
GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger President Trump one day later
(1/2/21): (1/3/21):
“You’re talking about the State Farm “I spoke to Secretary of State
video. And I think it’s extremely unfor- Brad Raffensperger yesterday
tunate that Rudy Giuliani or his people, about Fulton County and voter
they sliced and diced that video and fraud in Georgia. He was
took it out of context.” . . . “[W]e did an unwilling, or unable, to answer
audit of that and we proved conclu- questions such as the ‘ballots
sively that they were not scanned three under table’ scam, ballot
times. . . . Yes, Mr. President, we’ll send destruction, out of state ‘vot-
you the link from WSB.” ers’, dead voters, and more. He
[Trump]: “I don’t care about a link. I has no clue!” 110
don’t need it.” 109
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 23
Attorney General Barr (12/1/20): President Trump one day later
“Then he raised the ‘big vote dump,’ as (12/2/20):
he called it, in Detroit. And, you know, “I’ll tell you what’s wrong,
he said, people saw boxes coming into voter fraud. Here’s an example.
the counting station at all hours of the This is Michigan. At 6:31 in the
morning and so forth…. I said, ‘Mr. morning, a vote dump of
President, there are 630 precincts in 149,772 votes came in unex-
Detroit, and unlike elsewhere in the pectedly. We were winning by a
State, they centralize the counting pro- lot. That batch was received in
cess, so they’re not counted in each horror. . . . In Detroit everybody
precinct, they’re moved to counting saw the tremendous conflict . . .
stations, and so the normal process there were more votes than
would involve boxes coming in at all there were voters.” 112
different hours.’ And I said, ‘Did any-
one point out to you—did all the people
complaining about it point out to you,
you actually did better in Detroit than
you did last time? I mean, there’s no
indication of fraud in Detroit.’” 111
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard President Trump ten days later
Donoghue (12/27/20): (1/6/21):
“The President then continued, there “More votes than they had
are ‘more votes than voters…’. But I voters. And many other States
was aware of that allegation, and I said, also.” 114
you know, that was just a matter of
them ‘comparing the 2020 votes cast to
2016 registration numbers.’ That is ‘not
a valid complaint.’” 113
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard President Trump three days
Donoghue (1/3/21): later (1/6/21):
“[W]e would say to him, you know, “In Pennsylvania, you had
‘We checked that out, and there’s 205,000 more votes than you
nothing to it. . . . And we would cite to had voters. And the number is
certain allegations. And so—like such actually much greater than
as Pennsylvania, right. ‘No, there were that now. That was as of a
not 250,000 more votes reported than week ago. And this is a math-
were actually cast. That’s not true.’ So ematical impossibility unless
we would say things like that.” 115 you want to say it’s a total
fraud.” 116
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24 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger President Trump two days later
(1/2/21): (1/4/21):
[Trump]: “[I]t’s 4,502 who voted, but “4,502 illegal ballots were
they weren’t on the voter registration cast by individuals who do not
roll, which they had to be. You had appear on the state’s voter
18,325 vacant address voters. The ad- rolls. Well, that’s sort of
dress was vacant, and they’re not strange. 18,325 illegal ballots
allowed to be counted. That’s were cast by individuals who
18,325.” . . . registered to vote using an
[Raffensperger]: “Well, Mr. President, address listed as vacant
the challenge that you have is the data according to the postal ser-
you have is wrong.” 117 vice.” 118
GA Sec. of State Brad Raffensperger President Trump four days later
(1/2/21): (1/6/21):
[Trump]: “So dead people voted, and I “[T]he number of fraudulent
think the number is close to 5,000 ballots that we've identified
people. And they went to obituaries. across the state is staggering.
They went to all sorts of methods to Over 10,300 ballots in Georgia
come up with an accurate number, and were cast by individuals
a minimum is close to about 5,000 whose names and dates of
voters.” . . . birth match Georgia residents
[Raffensperger]: “The actual number who died in 2020 and prior to
were two. Two. Two people that were the election.” 120
dead that voted. So that’s wrong.” 119
GA Sec. State General Counsel Ryan President Trump four days later
Germany (1/2/21): (1/6/21):
[Trump]: “You had out-of-state voters. “And at least 15,000 ballots
They voted in Georgia, but they were were cast by individuals who
from out of state, of 4,925.” . . . [Ger- moved out of the state prior to
many]: “Every one we’ve been through November 3rd election. They
are people that lived in Georgia, moved say they moved right
to a different state, but then moved back.” 122
back to Georgia legitimately.” . . . “They
moved back in years ago. This was not
like something just before the election.
So there’s something about that data
that, it’s just not accurate.” 121
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 25
White House Press Secretary Kayleigh President Trump:
McEnany (n.d.): Between mid-November and
“[T]he one specific I remember refer- January 5, 2021, President
encing was I don’t agree with the Trump tweeted or retweeted
Dominion track.” . . . “I specifically conspiracy theories about
referenced waving him off of the Domin- Dominion nearly three dozen
ion theory earlier in my testimony.” . . . times.124
[Q] “Are you saying you think he still
continued to tweet that after you
waved him off of it?”
[A] “Yeah . . .” 123
Trump Campaign Senior Advisor Jason President Trump:
Miller: “You have Dominion, which is
“…the international allegations for very, very suspect to start off
Dominion were not valid.” with. Nobody knows the own-
[Q] “Okay. Did anybody communicate ership. People say the votes
that to the President?” are counted in foreign coun-
[A]: “I know that that was—I know tries and much worse…” 126
that was communicated. I know I
communicated it” 125
Attorney General Barr (11/23/20): President Trump three days
“I specifically raised the Dominion vot- later (11/26/20):
ing machines, which I found to be one “[T]hose machines are fixed,
of the most disturbing allegations— they’re rigged. You can press
‘disturbing’ in the sense that I saw Trump and the vote goes to
absolutely zero basis for the allegations Biden. . . . All you have to do is
. . . I told him that it was crazy stuff and play with a chip, and they
they were wasting their time on that played with a chip, especially
and it was doing great, great disservice in Wayne County and
to the country.” 127 Detroit.” 128
Attorney General Barr (12/1/20): President Trump one day later
“I explained, I said, look, if you have a (12/2/20):
machine and it counts 500 votes for “In one Michigan County, as
Biden and 500 votes for Trump, and an example, that used Domin-
then you go back later and you have ion systems, they found that
a—you will have the 1,000 pieces of nearly 6,000 votes had been
paper put through that machine, and wrongly switched from Trump
you can see if there’s any discrep- to Biden, and this is just the
ancy . . . there has been no discrep- tip of the iceberg. This is what
ancy.” 129 we caught. How many didn’t
we catch?” 130
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26 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Attorney General Barr (12/14/20): “‘I President Trump one day later
will, Mr. President. But there are a (12/15/20):
couple of things,’ I responded. ‘My “This is BIG NEWS. Dominion
understanding is that our experts have Voting Machines are a disaster
looked at the Antrim situation and are all over the Country. Changed
sure it was a human error that did not the results of a landslide
occur anywhere else. And, in any election. Can’t let this
event, Antrim is doing a hand recount happen. . . .” 132
of the paper ballots, so we should
know in a couple of days whether
there is any real problem with the
machines.’ ” 131
Then-Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey President Trump one day later
Rosen (12/15/20): (12/16/20):
“[O]ther people were telling him there “ ‘Study: Dominion Machines
was fraud, you know, corruption in shifted 2-3% of Trump Votes
the election. The voting machines to Biden. Far more votes than
were no good. And we were telling him needed to sway election.’
that is inconsistent, by ‘we,’ I mean Florida, Ohio, Texas and many
Richard Donoghue and myself, that other states were won by even
that was not what we were seeing.” . . . greater margins than pro-
“There was this open issue as to the jected. Did just as well with
Michigan report. And—I think it was Swing States, but bad things
Mr. Cuccinelli, not certain, but had happened. @OANN” 134
indicated that there was a hand
recount. And I think he said, ‘That's
the gold standard.’ ” 133
National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien President Trump one day later
(12/18/20): (12/19/20):
“I got a call from, I think, Molly “. . . There could also have
Michael in outer oval, the President’s been a hit on our ridiculous
assistant, and she said, ‘I’m connect- voting machines during the
ing you to the Oval’ . . . somebody election, which is now obvious
asked me, was there—did I have any that I won big, making it an
evidence of election fraud in the vot- even more corrupted embar-
ing machines or foreign interference rassment for the USA. @DNI-
in our voting machines. And I said, no, _Ratcliffe @SecPompeo”136
we’ve looked into that and there’s no
evidence of it.” 135
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 27
Acting Deputy AG Richard Donoghue President Trump two days later
(12/31/20): (1/2/21):
“We definitely talked about Antrim “Well, Brad. Not that there’s
County again. That was sort of done at not an issue, because we have
that point, because the hand recount a big issue with Dominion in
had been done and all of that. But we other states and perhaps in
cited back to that to say, you know, yours. . . . in other states, we
this is an example of what people are think we found tremendous
telling you and what’s being filed in corruption with Dominion
some of these court filings that are machines, but we’ll have to
just not supported by the evi- see.” . . . “I won’t give
dence.” 137 Dominion a pass because we
found too many bad
things.” 138
GA Sec. State Brad Raffensperger President Trump four days later
(1/2/21): (1/6/21):
“I don’t believe that you’re really “In addition, there is the
questioning the Dominion machines. highly troubling matter of
Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 Dominion Voting Systems. In
percent re-tally of all the ballots, and one Michigan county alone,
compared them to what the machines 6,000 votes were switched
said and came up with virtually the from Trump to Biden and the
same result. Then we did the recount, same systems are used in the
and we got virtually the same majority of states in our coun-
result.” 139 try.” . . . “There is clear evi-
dence that tens of thousands
of votes were switched from
President Trump to former
Vice President Biden in several
counties in Georgia.” 140
Evidence gathered by the Committee indicates that President Trump
raised roughly one quarter of a billion dollars in fundraising efforts
between the election and January 6th.141 Those solicitations persistently
claimed and referred to election fraud that did not exist. For example, the
Trump Campaign, along with the Republican National Committee, sent
millions of emails to their supporters, with messaging claiming that the
election was “rigged,” that their donations could stop Democrats from
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28 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Taped footage of William Barr speaking to the January 6th Select Committee is shown at
one of its hearings.
(Photo by Mandel Ngan-Pool/Getty Images)
“trying to steal the election,” and that Vice President Biden would be an
“illegitimate president” if he took office.
Ultimately, Attorney General Barr suggested that the Department of
Justice’s investigations disproving President Trump’s fraud claims may
have prevented an even more serious series of events:
[F]rankly, I think the fact that I put myself in the position that I
could say that we had looked at this and didn’t think there was
fraud was really important to moving things forward. And I sort of
shudder to think what the situation would have been if the position
of the Department was, “We’re not even looking at this until after
Biden’s in office.” I’m not sure we would’ve had a transition at
all.142
RATHER THAN CONCEDE, DONALD TRUMP CHOOSES TO OBSTRUCT THE JANUARY 6TH
PROCEEDING
President Trump disregarded the rulings of the courts and rejected the
findings and conclusions and advice from his Justice Department, his cam-
paign experts, and his White House and Cabinet advisors. He chose instead
to try to overturn the election on January 6th and took a series of very spe-
cific steps to attempt to achieve that result.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 29
A central element of Donald Trump’s plan to overturn the election
relied upon Vice President Mike Pence. As Vice President, Pence served as
the President of the Senate, the presiding officer for the joint session of
Congress on January 6th. Beginning in December, and with greater fre-
quency as January 6th approached, Trump repeatedly and unlawfully pres-
sured Pence in private and public to prevent Congress from counting lawful
electoral votes from several States.
To understand the plan President Trump devised with attorney and law
professor John Eastman, it is necessary to understand the constitutional
structure for selecting our President.
At the Constitutional Convention 233 years ago, the framers considered
but rejected multiple proposals that Congress itself vote to select the Presi-
dent of the United States.143 Indeed the Framers voiced very specific con-
cerns with Congress selecting the President. They viewed it as important
that the electors, chosen for the specific purpose of selecting the President,
should make the determination rather than Congress:
It was desireable, that the sense of the people should operate in the
choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be con-
fided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making
it, not to any pre-established body, but to men, chosen by the
people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.144
The Framers understood that a thoughtful structure for the appoint-
ment of the President was necessary to avoid certain evils: “Nothing was
more to be desired, than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed
to cabal, intrigue and corruption.” 145 They were careful to ensure that
“those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the
president in office” “were not among those that chose the president.” 146
For that reason, “[n]o senator, representative, or other person holding a
place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the number of the
electors.” 147
Article II of our Constitution, as modified by the Twelfth Amendment,
governs election of the President. Article II created the electoral college,
providing that the States would select electors in the manner provided by
State legislatures, and those electors would in turn vote for the President.
Today, every State selects Presidential electors by popular vote, and each
State’s laws provide for procedures to resolve election disputes, including
through lawsuits if necessary. After any election issues are resolved in State
or Federal court, each State’s government transmits a certificate of the
ascertainment of the appointed electors to Congress and the National
Archives.
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30 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The electoral college meets in mid-December to cast their votes, and
all of these electoral votes are then ultimately counted by Congress on
January 6th. The Vice President, as President of the Senate, presides over
the joint session of Congress to count votes. The Twelfth Amendment
provides this straight forward instruction: “The president of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; The person having the
greatest number of votes for President shall be the President…” The Vice
President has only a ministerial role, opening the envelopes and ensuring
that the votes are counted. Likewise, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 pro-
vides no substantive role for the Vice President in counting votes, rein-
forcing that he or she can only act in a ministerial fashion—the Vice
President may not choose, for example, to decline to count particular
votes. In most cases (e.g., when one candidate has a majority of votes sub-
mitted by the States) Congress has only a ministerial role, as well. It simply
counts electoral college votes provided by each State’s governor. Congress
is not a court and cannot overrule State and Federal court rulings in elec-
tion challenges.
As January 6th approached, John Eastman and others devised a plan
whereby Vice President Pence would, as the presiding officer, declare that
certain electoral votes from certain States could not be counted at the
joint session.148 John Eastman knew before proposing this plan that it
was not legal. Indeed, in a pre-election document discussing Congress’s
counting of electoral votes, Dr. Eastman specifically disagreed with a col-
league’s proposed argument that the Vice President had the power to
choose which envelopes to “open” and which votes to “count.” Dr. East-
man wrote:
I don’t agree with this. The 12th Amendment only says that the
President of the Senate opens the ballots in the joint session then,
in the passive voice, that the votes shall then be counted. 3 USC § 12
[of the Electoral Count Act] says merely that he is the presiding
officer, and then it spells out specific procedures, presumptions,
and default rules for which slates will be counted. Nowhere does it
suggest that the president of the Senate gets to make the determi-
nation on his own. § 15 [of the Electoral Count Act] doesn’t
either.149
Despite recognizing prior to the 2020 election that the Vice President
had no power to refuse to count certain electoral votes, Eastman neverthe-
less drafted memoranda two months later proposing that Pence could do
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 31
exactly that on January 6th—refuse to count certified electoral votes from
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and Wis-
consin.150
Eastman’s theory was related to other efforts overseen by President
Trump (described in detail below, see infra) to create and transmit fake
electoral slates to Congress and the National Archives, and to pressure
States to change the election outcome and issue new electoral slates.
Eastman supported these ideas despite writing two months earlier that:
Article II [of the Constitution] says the electors are appointed “in
such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” but I don’t
think that entitles the Legislature to change the rules after the elec-
tion and appoint a different slate of electors in a manner different
than what was in place on election day. And 3 U.S.C. §15 [of the
Electoral Count Act] gives dispositive weight to the slate of electors
that was certified by the Governor in accord with 3 U.S.C. §5.151
Even after Eastman proposed the theories in his December and January
memoranda, he acknowledged in conversations with Vice President Pence’s
counsel Greg Jacob that Pence could not lawfully do what his own memo-
randa proposed.152 Eastman admitted that the U.S. Supreme Court would
unanimously reject his legal theory. “He [Eastman] had acknowledged that
he would lose 9-0 at the Supreme Court.” 153 Moreover, Eastman acknowl-
edged to Jacob that he didn’t think Vice President Al Gore had that power in
2001, nor did he think Vice President Kamala Harris should have that power
in 2025.154
In testimony before the Select Committee, Jacob described in detail why
the Trump plan for Pence was illegal:
[T]he Vice President’s first instinct, when he heard this theory, was
that there was no way that our Framers, who abhorred concentrated
power, who had broken away from the tyranny of George III, would
ever have put one person—particularly not a person who had a
direct interest in the outcome because they were on the ticket for
the election—in a role to have decisive impact on the outcome of
the election. And our review of text, history, and, frankly, just com-
mon sense, all confirmed the Vice President’s first instinct on that
point. There is no justifiable basis to conclude that the Vice Presi-
dent has that kind of authority.155
This is how the Vice President later described his views in a public
speech:
I had no right to overturn the election. The Presidency belongs to
the American people, and the American people alone. And frankly,
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32 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
there is no idea more un-American than the notion that any one
person could choose the American President. Under the Constitu-
tion, I had no right to change the outcome of our election.156
But as January 6th approached, President Trump nevertheless embraced
the new Eastman theories, and attempted to implement them. In a series of
meetings and calls, President Trump attempted to pressure Pence to inter-
vene on January 6th to prevent Congress from counting multiple States’
electoral votes for Joe Biden. At several points in the days before January
6th, President Trump was told directly that Vice President Pence could not
legally do what Trump was asking. For example, at a January 4th meeting in
the Oval Office, Eastman acknowledged that any variation of his proposal—
whether rejecting electoral votes outright or delaying certification to send
them back to the States—would violate several provisions of the Electoral
Count Act. According to Greg Jacob:
In the conversation in the Oval Office on the 4th, I had raised the
fact that . . . [Eastman’s] preferred course had issues with the Elec-
toral Count Act, which he had acknowledged was the case, that
there would be an inconsistency with the Electoral Count Act[ ]157
Jacob recorded Eastman’s admission in an internal memo he drafted for
Vice President Pence on the evening of January 4th: “Professor Eastman
acknowledges that his proposal violates several provisions of statutory
law.” 158 And, during a phone call with President Trump and Eastman on the
evening of January 5, 2021, Eastman again acknowledged that his proposal
also would violate several provisions of the Electoral Count Act.
[W]e did have an in-depth discussion about [the Electoral Count
Act] in the subsequent phone calls as I walked him through provi-
sion after provision on the recess and on the fact that . . . Congress-
men and Senators are supposed to get to object and debate. And he
acknowledged, one after another, that those provisions would—in
order for us to send it back to the States, we couldn’t do those
things as well. We can’t do a 10-day, send it back to the States, and
honor an Electoral Count Act provision that says you can’t recess for
more than one day and, once you get to the 5th, you have to stay
continuously in session.159
As Pence’s Chief of Staff, Marc Short, testified that the Vice President
also repeatedly informed President Trump that the Vice President’s role on
January 6th was only ministerial.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 33
Committee Staff: But just to pick up on that, Mr. Short, was it your
impression that the Vice President had directly conveyed his posi-
tion on these issues to the President, not just to the world through a
Dear Colleague Letter, but directly to President Trump?
Marc Short: Many times.
Committee Staff: And had been consistent in conveying his position
to the President?
Short: Very consistent. 160
As the situation grew increasingly acrimonious, Vice President Pence’s
private counsel Richard Cullen contacted former Fourth Circuit Judge
Michael Luttig, a renowned conservative judge for whom Eastman had pre-
viously clerked, and asked Luttig to make a public statement. On January
5th, Luttig wrote the following on Twitter: “The only responsibility and
power of the Vice President under the Constitution is to faithfully count the
electoral college votes as they have been cast.” 161 As Judge Luttig testified
in the Committee’s hearings, “there was no basis in the Constitution or
laws of the United States at all for the theory espoused by Eastman—at all.
None.” 162 Judge Luttig completely rejected Eastman’s “blueprint to over-
turn the 2020 election” as “constitutional mischief” and ‘the most reck-
less, insidious, and calamitous failure[ ] in both legal and political
judgment in American history.” 163
Contemporaneous written correspondence also confirms both that: (1)
Eastman himself recognized Pence could not lawfully refuse to count elec-
toral votes, and (2) President Trump also knew this. While sheltering in a
loading dock with the Vice President during the violent January 6th attack,
Greg Jacob asked Eastman in an email, “Did you advise the President that in
your professional judgment the Vice President DOES NOT have the power to
decide things unilaterally?” Eastman’s response stated that the President
had “been so advised,” but then indicated that President Trump continued
to pressure the Vice President to act illegally: “But you know him—once he
gets something in his head, it is hard to get him to change course.” 164
To be absolutely clear, no White House lawyer believed Pence could
lawfully refuse to count electoral votes. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone
told the Select Committee this:
I thought that the Vice President did not have the authority to do
what was being suggested under a proper reading of the law. I con-
veyed that, ok? I think I actually told somebody, you know, in the
Vice President’s—“Just blame me.” You know this is—I’m not a
politician, you know . . . but, you know, I just said, “I’m a lawyer.
This is my legal opinion.” 165
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34 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Greg Jacob and Judge Michael Luttig testify at January 6th Select Committee hearing.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
Cipollone also testified that he was “sure [he] conveyed” his views.166
Indeed, other testimony from Cipollone indicates that Trump knew of
Cipollone’s view and suggests that Trump purposely excluded Cipollone
from the meeting with Pence and Pence’s General Counsel on January
4th.167 Indeed, at one point, Cipollone confronted Eastman in the hallway
outside the Oval Office and expressed his disapproval of and anger with
Eastman’s position. According to Jason Miller, “Pat Cipollone thought the
idea was nutty and had at one point confronted Eastman basically with the
same sentiment” outside the Oval Office.168 Pat Cipollone did not deny hav-
ing an angry confrontation with Eastman outside of the Oval Office—
though he said he didn’t have a specific recollection, he had no reason to
contradict what Jason Miller said and, moreover, said that Eastman was
aware of his views.169
Likewise, Eric Herschmann, another White House lawyer, expressed the
same understanding that Eastman’s plan “obviously made no sense” and
“had no practical ability to work.” 170 Herschmann also recounted telling
Eastman directly that his plan was “completely crazy”:
And I said to [Eastman], hold on a second, I want to understand
what you’re saying. You’re saying you believe the Vice President,
acting as President of the Senate, can be the sole decisionmaker as
to, under your theory, who becomes the next President of the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 35
United States? And he said, yes. And I said, are you out of your F’ing
mind, right. And that was pretty blunt. I said, you’re completely
crazy. 171
Deputy White House Counsel Pat Philbin also had the same understand-
ing.172 Indeed, as Herschmann testified, even Rudolph Giuliani doubted that
Vice President Mike Pence had any legal ability to do what Eastman had
proposed.173
Despite all this opposition from all White House lawyers, Trump never-
theless continued to exert immense pressure on Pence to refuse to count
electoral votes.
The pressure began before the January 4th Oval Office meeting with
Pence, Eastman, Jacob, Short and Trump, but became even more intense
thereafter. On the evening of January 5, 2021, the New York Times pub-
lished an article reporting that “Vice President Mike Pence told President
Trump on Tuesday that he did not believe he had the power to block con-
gressional certification of Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s victory in the Presidential
election despite President Trump’s baseless insistence that he did.” 174 This
reporting was correct—both as to the Vice President’s power and as to Vice
President Pence having informed President Trump that he did not have the
authority to change the outcome of the election. But in response to that
story, late in the evening before the January 6th joint session, President
Trump dictated to Jason Miller a statement falsely asserting, “The Vice
President and I are in total agreement that the Vice President has the power
to act.” 175 This statement was released at President Trump’s direction and
was false.176
Thereafter, Trump continued to apply public pressure in a series of
tweets. At 1:00 a.m. on January 6th, “[i]f Vice President @Mike_Pence
comes through for us, we will win the Presidency. Many States want to
decertify the mistake they made in certifying incorrect & even fraudulent
numbers in a process NOT approved by their State Legislatures (which it
must be). Mike can send it back!” 177 At 8:17 a.m. on January 6th, he tweeted
again: “States want to correct their votes, which they now know were based
on irregularities and fraud, plus corrupt process never received legislative
approval. All Mike Pence has to do is send them back to the States, AND WE
WIN. Do it Mike, this is a time for extreme courage!” 178
President Trump tried to reach the Vice President early in the morning
of January 6th, but the Vice President did not take the call. The President
finally reached the Vice President later that morning, shouting from the
Oval Office to his assistants to “get the Vice President on the phone.” 179
After again telling the Vice President that he had “the legal authority to
send [electoral votes] back to the respective states,” President Trump grew
very heated.180 Witnesses in the Oval Office during this call told the Select
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36 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
President Trump speaks with Vice President Pence over the phone in the Oval Office on the
morning of January 6th.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)
Committee that the President called Vice President Pence a “wimp,” 181 told
him it would be “a political career killer” to certify the lawful electoral
votes electing President Biden,182 and accused him of “not [being] tough
enough to make the call.” 183 As Ivanka Trump would recount to her chief of
staff moments later, her father called the Vice President “the p-word” for
refusing to overturn the election.184
In response, Vice President Pence again refused to take any action other
than counting the lawfully certified electoral votes of the States. But Presi-
dent Trump was angry and undeterred. After the conclusion of this call, he
edited his speech for the Ellipse to insert language to which his lawyers
objected—targeting Vice President Pence directly.185
Earlier that morning, Eric Herschmann had tried to remove the refer-
ence to Vice President Pence from the speech. As he told speechwriter Ste-
phen Miller, he “didn’t concur with the legal analysis” that John Eastman
had advanced and believed it “wouldn’t advance the ball” to discuss it pub-
licly.186 But after the call with Vice President Pence, speechwriters were
instructed to reinsert the line. Although the final written draft of his speech
referred to Pence just once—a line President Trump didn’t end up
reading187—the President went off-script five different times to pressure
the Vice President:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 37
“I hope Mike is going to do the right thing. I hope so. Because if Mike
Pence does the right thing, we win the election,” Trump first told the
crowd.188
“Mike Pence is going to have to come through for us,” Trump later
said, “and if he doesn’t, that will be a, a sad day for our country because
you’re sworn to uphold our Constitution.” 189
Addressing Pence directly, Trump told the assembled crowd: “Mike
Pence, I hope you’re going to stand up for the good of our Constitution and
for the good of our country.” Trump said at another point, “And if you’re
not, I’m going to be very disappointed in you. I will tell you right now. I’m
not hearing good stories.” 190
“So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he
doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that he’s listening to,”
Trump said.191
These statements to the assembled crowd at the Ellipse had Trump’s
intended effect—they produced substantial anger against Pence. When
Pence released a statement confirming that he would not act to prevent
Congress from counting electoral votes, the crowd’s reaction was harshly
negative.
“I’m telling you what, I’m hearing that Pence—hearing the Pence
just caved. No. Is that true? I didn’t hear it. I’m hear — I’m hearing
reports that Pence caved. No way. I’m telling you, if Pence caved,
we’re going to drag motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking
politicians are going to get fucking drug through the streets.” 192
Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: “Ok. And that’s when all
this started?”] Yup. That’s when we marched on the Capitol. 193
“We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent
electoral votes. [Other speaker: “Boo. You’re a traitor!”] That's
right. You’ve heard it here first. Mike Pence has betrayed the United
States of America. [Other speaker: “Fuck you, Mike Pence!”] Mike
Pence has betrayed this President and he has betrayed the people of
the United States and we will never, ever forget.” [Cheers]194
“This woman cames [sic] up to the side of us and she says Pence
folded. So it was kind of, like, Ok, well — in my mind I was think-
ing, well that’s it. You know. Well, my son-in-law looks at me and
he says I want to go in.” 195
“[Q] “What percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol?” [A]
[Oath Keeper Jessica Watkins]: “One hundred percent. It has, it has
spread like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us, and everybody’s
marching on the Capitol. All million of us. it’s insane.” 196
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38 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence.
Bring him out. Bring out Pence. Bring him out. Bring out Pence.” 197
“Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike Pence. Hang Mike
Pence. Hang Mike Pence.” 198
Once Trump returned to the White House, he was informed almost
immediately that violence and lawlessness had broken out at the Capitol
among his supporters.199 At 2:24 p.m., President Trump applied yet further
pressure to Pence (see infra), posting a tweet accusing Vice President Mike
Pence of cowardice for not using his role as President of the Senate to
change the outcome of the election: “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to
do what should have been done to protect our Country and our Constitu-
tion, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the
fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify.
USA demands the truth!” 200 Almost immediately thereafter, the crowd
around the Capitol surged, and more individuals joined the effort to con-
front police and break further into the building.
The sentiment expressed in President Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet, already
present in the crowd, only grew more powerful as the President’s words
spread. Timothy Hale-Cusanelli—a white supremacist who expressed Nazi
sympathies—heard about the tweet while in the Crypt around 2:25 p.m.,
and he, according to the Department of Justice, “knew what that meant.”
Vice President Pence had decided not to keep President Trump in power.201
Other rioters described what happened next as follows:
Once we found out Pence turned on us and that they had stolen the
election, like officially, the crowd went crazy. I mean, it became a
mob. We crossed the gate.202
Then we heard the news on [P]ence . . . And lost it . . . So we
stormed.203
They’re making an announcement right now saying if Pence betrays us
you better get your mind right because we’re storming that building.204
Minutes after the tweet—at 2:35 p.m.—rioters continued their surge
and broke a security line of the DC Metropolitan Police Department, result-
ing in the first fighting withdrawal in the history of that force.205
President Trump issued this tweet after he had falsely claimed to the
angry crowd that Vice President Mike Pence could “do the right thing” and
ensure a second Trump term, after that angry crowd had turned into a vio-
lent mob assaulting the Capitol while chanting, “Hang Mike Pence!” 206 and
after the U.S. Secret Service had evacuated the Vice President from the Sen-
ate floor.207 One minute after the President’s tweet, at 2:25 p.m., the Secret
Service determined they could no longer protect the Vice President in his
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 39
ceremonial office near the Senate Chamber, and evacuated the Vice Presi-
dent and his family to a secure location, missing the violent mob by a mere
40 feet.208
Further evidence presented at our hearing shows the violent reaction
following President Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet and the efforts to protect Vice
President Pence in the time that followed.209
The day after the attack on the Capitol, Eastman called Eric Her-
schmann to talk about continuing litigation on behalf of the Trump Presi-
dential Campaign in Georgia. Herschmann described his reaction to
Eastman this way:
And I said to him, are you out of your F'ing mind? Right? I said,
because I only want to hear two words coming out of your mouth
from now on: Orderly transition. I said, I don't want to hear any
other F'ing words coming out of your mouth, no matter what, other
than orderly transition. Repeat those words to me.” 210
Herschmann concluded the call by telling Eastman: “Now I’m going to
give you the best free legal advice you’re ever getting in your life. Get a
great F’ing criminal defense lawyer, you’re going to need it,” and hanging
up the phone.211
In the course of investigating this series of facts, the Select Committee
subpoenaed Eastman’s emails from his employer, Chapman University.212
Eastman sued to prevent Chapman from producing the emails, arguing that
the emails were attorney-client privileged. Federal District Court Judge
David Carter reviewed Eastman’s emails in camera to determine, among
other things, whether the emails had to be produced because they likely
furthered a crime committed by one of Eastman’s clients or by Eastman
himself. In addition to reviewing the emails themselves, Judge Carter
reviewed substantial additional evidence presented by the Select Committee
and by Eastman.
After reciting a series of factual findings regarding President Trump’s
multi-part plan to overturn the election, Judge Carter concluded that Presi-
dent Trump likely violated two criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (cor-
ruptly obstructing, impeding or influencing Congress’s official proceeding
to count electoral votes); and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiring to defraud the
United States). The Court also concluded that John Eastman likely violated
at least one of these criminal laws. As to §1512(c), Judge Carter explained:
Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that President Trump
likely knew the electoral count plan had no factual justification.
The plan not only lacked factual basis but also legal justification. . . .
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40 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The illegality of the plan was obvious. Our nation was founded on
the peaceful transition of power, epitomized by George Washington
laying down his sword to make way for democratic elections. Ignor-
ing this history, President Trump vigorously campaigned for the
Vice President to single-handedly determine the results of the 2020
election. . . . Every American—and certainly the President of the
United States—knows that in a democracy, leaders are elected, not
installed. With a plan this “BOLD,” President Trump knowingly
tried to subvert this fundamental principle. Based on the evidence,
the Court finds it more likely than not that President Trump cor-
ruptly attempted to obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on Janu-
ary 6, 2021.213
As to 18 U.S.C. § 371, Judge Carter identified evidence demonstrating
that both President Trump and John Eastman knew their electoral count
plan was illegal, and knew it could not “survive judicial scrutiny” in any of
its iterations:
Dr. Eastman himself repeatedly recognized that his plan had no
legal support. . . . Dr. Eastman likely acted deceitfully and dishon-
estly each time he pushed an outcome-driven plan that he knew
was unsupported by the law.214
Finally, Judge Carter concluded:
Dr. Eastman and President Trump launched a campaign to overturn
a democratic election, an action unprecedented in American history.
Their campaign was not confined to the ivory tower—it was a coup
in search of a legal theory. The plan spurred violent attacks on the
seat of our nation’s government, led to the deaths of several law
enforcement officers, and deepened public distrust in our political
process.215
Judge Luttig reached similar conclusions during his live hearing testi-
mony: “I have written, as you said, Chairman Thompson, that, today,
almost two years after that fateful day in January 2021, that, still, Donald
Trump and his allies and supporters are a clear and present danger to
American democracy.” 216
During the hearing, Judge Luttig took issue with certain of Greg Jacob’s
characterizations of the 12th Amendment’s text, explaining that the appli-
cable text was not ambiguous in any way. The Committee agrees with Judge
Luttig: the application of the Twelfth Amendment’s text is plain in this
context; it does not authorize Congress to second-guess State and Federal
courts and refuse to count State electoral votes based on concerns about
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 41
fraud. See infra. Although Jacob did not discuss his position in great detail
during the hearing, his private testimony gives more insight on his actual
views:
In my view, a lot has been said about the fact that the role of the
Vice President in the electoral count on January 6th is purely minis-
terial, and that is a correct conclusion. But if you look at the consti-
tutional text, the role of Congress is purely ministerial as well. You
open the certificates and you count them. Those are the only things
provided for in the Constitution.217
EFFORTS TO PRESSURE STATES TO CHANGE THE ELECTION OUTCOME, AND TO
CREATE AND TRANSMIT FAKE ELECTION CERTIFICATES
Anticipating that the Eastman strategy for January 6th would be imple-
mented, President Trump worked with a handful of others to prepare a
series of false Trump electoral slates for seven States Biden actually won.
President Trump personally conducted a teleconference with Eastman and
Republican National Committee Chair Ronna McDaniel “a few days before
December 14” and solicited the RNC’s assistance with the scheme.218
McDaniel agreed to provide that assistance.219
A series of contemporaneous documents demonstrate what President
Trump and his allies, including attorney Kenneth Chesebro, were attempt-
ing to accomplish: they anticipated that the President of the Senate (which,
under the Constitution, is the Vice President) could rely upon these false
slates of electors on January 6th to justify refusing to count genuine elec-
toral votes.220
The false slates were created by fake Republican electors on December
14th, at the same time the actual, certified electors in those States were
meeting to cast their States’ Electoral College votes for President Biden. By
that point in time, election-related litigation was over in all or nearly all of
the subject States, and Trump Campaign election lawyers realized that the
fake slates could not be lawful or justifiable on any grounds. Justin Clark,
the Trump Campaign Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior Counsel told
the Select Committee that he “had real problems with the process.” 221
Clark warned his colleagues, “unless we have litigation pending like in
these States, like, I don’t think this is appropriate or, you know, this isn’t
the right thing to do. I don’t remember how I phrased it, but I got into a
little bit of a back and forth and I think it was with Ken Chesebro, where I
said, ‘Alright, you know, you just get after it, like, I’m out.’ ” 222
Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaign General Counsel, told the Select
Committee that without an official State certificate of ascertainment,223
“the [fake] electors were, for lack of a better way of saying it, no good or
not—not valid.” 224
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42 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Graphic depicting the difference between the real and the fake elector certificates.
The Office of White House Counsel also appears to have expressed con-
cerns with this fake elector plan. In his interview by the Select Committee,
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone acknowledged his view that by mid-
December, the process was “done” and that his deputy, Pat Philbin, may
have advised against the fake elector strategy.225 In an informal Committee
interview, Philbin described the fake elector scheme as one of the “bad
theories” that were like “Whac-A-Mole” in the White House during this
period.226 Cipollone agreed with this characterization.227
In her testimony, Cassidy Hutchinson testified that she heard at least
one member of the White House Counsel’s Office say that the plan was not
legal:
Committee Staff: [T]o be clear, did you hear the White House Coun-
sel’s Office say that this plan to have alternate electors meet and
cast votes for Donald Trump in States that he had lost was not
legally sound?
Hutchinson: Yes, sir.228
Multiple Republicans who were persuaded to sign the fake certificates
also testified that they felt misled or betrayed, and would not have done so
had they known that the fake votes would be used on January 6th without
an intervening court ruling. One elector told the Select Committee that he
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 43
thought his vote would be strictly contingent: “[I]t was a very consistent
message that we were told throughout all of that, is this is the only reason
why we’re doing this, is to preserve the integrity of being able to have a
challenge.” 229
The “Chairperson” of the Wisconsin fake electors, who was also at the
time Chairman of the Wisconsin Republican Party, insisted in testimony to
the Select Committee that he “was told that these would only count if a
court ruled in our favor” and that he wouldn’t have supported anyone using
the Trump electors’ votes without a court ruling.230
Despite the fact that all major election lawsuits thus far had failed,
President Trump and his co-conspirators in this effort, including John
Eastman and Kenneth Chesebro, pressed forward with the fake elector
scheme. Ultimately, these false electoral slates, five of which purported to
represent the “duly elected” electoral college votes of their States, were
transmitted to Executive Branch officials at the National Archives, and to
the Legislative Branch, including to the Office of the President of the Sen-
ate, Vice President Mike Pence.231
The fake electors followed Chesebro’s step-by-step instructions for
completing and mailing the fake certificates to multiple officials in the U.S.
Government,232 complete with registered mail stickers and return address
labels identifying senders like the “Arizona Republican Party” and the
“Georgia Republican Party.” 233 The Wisconsin Republican Party’s fake cer-
tificates apparently weren’t properly delivered, however, so the Trump
Campaign arranged to fly them to Washington just before the joint session
on January 6th, and try to deliver them to the Vice President via Senator
Ron Johnson and Representative Mike Kelly’s offices.234 Both Johnson and
Kelly’s offices attempted to do so, but Vice President Pence’s aide refused
the delivery.235
Despite pressure from President Trump, Vice President Pence and the
Senate parliamentarian refused to recognize or count the unofficial fake
electoral votes. Greg Jacob testified that he advised Vice President Pence on
January 2nd that “none of the slates that had been sent in would qualify as
an alternate slate” under the law and that the Senate Parliamentarian “was
in agreement” with this conclusion.236
* * *
In addition to this plan to create and transmit fake electoral slates,
Donald Trump was also personally and substantially involved in multiple
efforts to pressure State election officials and State legislatures to alter
official lawful election results. As U.S. District Judge Carter stated in his
June 7, 2022, opinion:
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44 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Dr. Eastman’s actions in these few weeks [in December 2020] indi-
cate that his and President Trump’s pressure campaign to stop the
electoral count did not end with Vice President Pence—it targeted
every tier of federal and state elected officials. Convincing state leg-
islatures to certify competing electors was essential to stop the
count and ensure President Trump’s reelection.237
Judge Carter also explained that “Dr. Eastman and President Trump’s
plan to disrupt the Joint Session was fully formed and actionable as early as
December 7, 2020.” 238
Chapter 2 of this report provides substantial detail on many of Presi-
dent Trump’s specific efforts to apply pressure to State officials and legis-
lators. We provide a few examples here:
During a January 2, 2021, call, President Trump pressured Georgia’s
Republican Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to “find 11,780 votes.”
During that call, President Trump asserted conspiracy theories about the
election that Department of Justice officials had already debunked. Presi-
dent Trump also made a thinly veiled threat to Raffensperger and his attor-
ney about his failure to respond to President Trump’s demands: “That’s a
criminal, that’s a criminal offense . . . That’s a big risk to you and to Ryan,
your lawyer . . . I’m notifying you that you’re letting it happen.” 239
Judge Carter drew these conclusions:
Mr. Raffensperger debunked the President’s allegations “point by
point” and explained that “the data you have is wrong;” however,
President Trump still told him, “I just want to find 11,780 votes.” 240
***
President Trump’s repeated pleas for Georgia Secretary of State
Raffensperger clearly demonstrate that his justification was not to
investigate fraud, but to win the election. . . . Taken together, this
evidence demonstrates that President Trump likely knew the elec-
toral count plan had no factual justification. The plan not only
lacked factual basis but also legal justification.241
That call to Raffensperger came on the heels of President Trump’s
repeated attacks on Raffensperger, election workers, and other public ser-
vants about President Trump’s loss in the election. A month earlier, the
Georgia Secretary of State’s Chief Operating Officer, Gabriel Sterling, had
given this explicit public warning to President Trump and his team, a
warning that the Select Committee has determined President Trump appar-
ently saw and disregarded:242
[I]t has all gone too far. All of it. . . .
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 45
A 20-something tech in Gwinnett County today has death threats
and a noose put out, saying he should be hung for treason because
he was transferring a report on batches from an EMS to a county
computer so he could read it.
It has to stop.
Mr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this lan-
guage. Senators, you have not condemned this language or these
actions. This has to stop. We need you to step up. And if you’re
going to take a position of leadership, show some.
My boss, Secretary Raffensperger—his address is out there. They
have people doing caravans in front of their house, they’ve had
people come onto their property. Tricia, his wife of 40 years, is get-
ting sexualized threats through her cellphone.
It has to stop.
This is elections, this is the backbone of democracy, and all of you
who have not said a damn word are complicit in this. It’s too
much. . . .
What you don’t have the ability to do—and you need to step up and
say this—is stop inspiring people to commit potential acts of vio-
lence. Someone’s going to get hurt. Someone’s going to get shot.
Someone’s going to get killed.243
The stark warning was entirely appropriate, and prescient. In addition
to the examples Sterling identified, President Trump and his team were also
fixated on Georgia election workers Ruby Freeman and Wandrea “Shaye”
Moss. He and Giuliani mentioned Freeman repeatedly in meetings with
State legislators, at public rallies, and in the January 2nd call with Raffens-
perger. Referring to a video clip, Giuliani even accused Freeman and Moss
of trading USB drives to affect votes “as if they [were] vials of heroin or
cocaine.” 244 This was completely bogus: it was not a USB drive; it was a
ginger mint.245
After their contact information was published, Trump supporters sent
hundreds of threats to the women and even showed up at Freeman’s
home.246 As Freeman testified to the Select Committee, Trump and his fol-
lowers’ conduct had a profound impact on her life. She left her home based
on advice from the FBI, and wouldn’t move back for months.247 And she
explained, “I’ve lost my sense of security—all because a group of people,
starting with Number 45 [Donald Trump] and his ally Rudy Giuliani,
decided to scapegoat me and my daughter Shaye to push their own lies
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46 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Gabriel Sterling at a press conference on November 6, 2020 in Atlanta, Georgia.
(Photo by Jessica McGowan/Getty Images)
about how the Presidential election was stolen.” 248 The treatment of Free-
man and Moss was callous, inhumane, and inexcusable. Rudolph Giuliani
and others with responsibility should be held accountable.
In Arizona, a primary target of President Trump’s pressure, and ire, was
House Speaker Russell “Rusty” Bowers, a longtime Republican who had
served 17 years in the State legislature. Throughout November and Decem-
ber, Bowers spoke to President Trump, Giuliani, and members of Giuliani’s
legal team, in person or on the phone. During these calls, President Trump
and others alleged that the results in Arizona were affected by fraud and
asked that Bowers consider replacing Presidential electors for Biden with
electors for President Trump.249 Bowers demanded proof for the claims of
fraud, but never got it. At one point, after Bowers pressed Giuliani on the
claims of fraud, Giuliani responded, “we’ve got lots of theories, we just
don’t have the evidence.” 250 Bowers explained to Giuliani: “You are asking
me do something against my oath, and I will not break my oath.” 251
President Trump and his supporters’ intimidation tactics affected Bow-
ers, too. Bowers’s personal cell phone and home address were doxed,252
leading demonstrators to show up at his home and shout insults until
police arrived. One protestor who showed up at his home was armed and
believed to be a member of an extremist militia.253 Another hired a truck
with a defamatory and profane allegation that Bowers, a deeply religious
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 47
man, was a pedophile, and drove it through Bowers’s neighborhood.254
This, again, is the conduct of thugs and criminals, each of whom should be
held accountable.
In Michigan, President Trump focused on Republican Senate Majority
Leader Mike Shirkey and Republican House Speaker Lee Chatfield. He
invited them to the White House for a November 20, 2020, meeting during
which President Trump and Giuliani, who joined by phone, went through a
“litany” of false allegations about supposed fraud in Michigan’s election.255
Chatfield recalled President Trump’s more generic directive for the group to
“have some backbone and do the right thing,” which he understood to
mean overturning the election by naming Michigan’s Electoral College
electors for President Trump.256 Shirkey told President Trump that he
wouldn’t do anything that would violate Michigan law,257 and after the
meeting ended, issued a joint statement with Chatfield: “We have not yet
been made aware of any information that would change the outcome of the
election in Michigan and as legislative leaders, we will follow the law and
follow the normal process regarding Michigan’s electors, just as we have
said throughout this election.” 258
When President Trump couldn’t convince Shirkey and Chatfield to
change the outcome of the election in Michigan during that meeting or in
calls after, he or his team maliciously tweeted out Shirkey’s personal cell
phone number and a number for Chatfield that turned out to be wrong.259
Shirkey received nearly 4,000 text messages after that, and another private
citizen reported being inundated with calls and texts intended for Chat-
field.260
None of Donald Trump’s efforts ultimately succeeded in changing the
official results in any State. That these efforts had failed was apparent to
Donald Trump and his co-conspirators well before January 6th. By January
6th, there was no evidence at all that a majority of any State legislature
would even attempt to change its electoral votes.261
This past October, U.S. District Court Judge David Carter issued a further
ruling relating to one of President Trump’s lawsuits in Georgia. Judge
Carter applied the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege again,
and identified potential criminal activity related to a knowingly false repre-
sentation by Donald Trump to a Federal court. He wrote:
The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific num-
bers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout those num-
bers, both in court and in public.262
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48 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Steven Engel, Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue at a Select Committee hearing on June
23, 2022.
(Photo by House Creative Services)
As John Eastman wrote in an email on December 31, 2020, President
Trump was “made aware that some of the allegations (and evidence prof-
fered by the experts)” in a verified State court complaint was “inaccu-
rate.” 263 Dr. Eastman noted that “with that knowledge” President Trump
could not accurately verify a Federal court complaint that incorporated by
reference the “inaccurate” State court complaint: “I have no doubt that an
aggressive DA or US Atty someplace will go after both the President and his
lawyers once all the dust settles on this.” 264 Despite this specific warning,
“President Trump and his attorneys ultimately filed the complaint with the
same inaccurate numbers without rectifying, clarifying, or otherwise
changing them.” 265 And President Trump personally “signed a verification
swearing under oath that the incorporated, inaccurate numbers ‘are true
and correct’ or ‘believed to be true and correct’ to the best of his knowledge
and belief.” 266 The numbers were not correct, and President Trump and his
legal team knew it.
EFFORTS TO CORRUPT THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
In the weeks after the 2020 election, Attorney General Barr advised Presi-
dent Trump that the Department of Justice had not seen any evidence to
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 49
support Trump’s theory that the election was stolen by fraud. Acting Attor-
ney General Jeffrey Rosen and his Deputy repeatedly reinforced to President
Trump that his claims of election fraud were false when they took over in
mid-December. Also in mid-December 2020, Attorney General Barr
announced his plans to resign. Between that time and January 6th, Trump
spoke with Acting Attorney General Jeff Rosen and Acting Deputy Richard
Donoghue repeatedly, attempting to persuade them and the Department of
Justice to find factual support for his stolen election claims and thereby to
assist his efforts to reverse election results.
As Rosen publicly testified, “. . . between December 23rd and January
3rd, the President either called me or met with me virtually every day, with
one or two exceptions, like Christmas Day.” 267 As discussed earlier, Justice
Department investigations had demonstrated that the stolen election
claims were false; both Rosen and Donoghue told President Trump this
comprehensively and repeatedly.
One of those conversations occurred on December 27th, when President
Trump called Rosen to go through a “stream of allegations” about the elec-
tion.268 Donoghue described that call as an “escalation of the earlier con-
versations” they had.269 Initially, President Trump called Rosen directly.
When Donoghue joined the call, he sought to “make it clear to the President
[that] these allegations were simply not true.” 270
So [the President] went through [the allegations]—in what for me
was a 90-minute conversation or so, and what for the former Acting
AG was a 2-hour conversation—as the President went through
them I went piece by piece to say “no, that’s false, that is not true,”
and to correct him really in a serial fashion as he moved from one
theory to another.271
The President raised, among others, debunked claims about voting
machines in Michigan, a truck driver who allegedly moved ballots from
New York to Pennsylvania, and a purported election fraud at the State Farm
Arena in Georgia.272 None of the allegations were credible, and Rosen and
Donoghue said so to the President.273
At one point during the December 27th call in which Donoghue refuted
President Trump’s fraud allegations, Donoghue recorded in handwritten
notes a request President Trump made specifically to him and Acting Attor-
ney General Rosen: “Just say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to
me and the Republican Congressmen.” 274 Donoghue explained: “[T]he
Department had zero involvement in anyone’s political strategy,” and “he
wanted us to say that it was corrupt.” 275 “We told him we were not going to
do that.” 276 At the time, neither Rosen nor Donoghue knew the full extent
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50 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
to which Republican Congressmen, including Representative Scott Perry,
were attempting to assist President Trump to overturn the election results.
The Committee’s investigation has shown that Congressman Perry was
working with one Department of Justice official, Jeffrey Clark, regarding the
stolen election claims. Perry was working with Clark and with President
Trump and Chief of Staff Mark Meadows with this goal: to enlist Clark to
reverse the Department of Justice’s findings regarding the election and help
overturn the election outcome.277
After introducing Clark to the President, Perry sent multiple text mes-
sages to Meadows between December 26th and December 28th, pressing
that Clark be elevated within the Department. Perry reminded Meadows
that there are only “11 days to 1/6 . . . We gotta get going!,” and, as the days
went on, one asking, “Did you call Jeff Clark?” 278
Acting Attorney General Rosen first learned about Clark’s contact with
President Trump in a call on Christmas Eve. On that call, President Trump
mentioned Clark to Rosen, who was surprised to learn that Trump knew
Clark and had met with him. Rosen later confronted Clark about the con-
tact: “Jeff, anything going on that you think I should know about?” 279
Clark didn’t “immediately volunteer” the fact that he had met with the
President, but ultimately “acknowledged that he had been at a meeting
with the President in the Oval Office, not alone, with other people.” 280
Clark was “kind of defensive” and “somewhat apologetic,” “casting it as
that he had had a meeting with Congressman Perry from Pennsylvania and
that, to his surprise, or, you know, he hadn’t anticipated it, that they some-
how wound up at a meeting in the Oval Office.” 281 Clark’s contact with
President Trump violated both Justice Department and White House poli-
cies designed to prevent political pressure on the Department.282
While Clark initially appeared apologetic and assured Rosen that “[i]t
won’t happen again,” 283 he nevertheless continued to work and meet
secretly with President Trump and Congressman Perry. Less than five days
after assuring Rosen that he would comply with the Department’s White
House contacts policy, Clark told Rosen and Donoghue that he had again
violated that policy. Donoghue confronted him: “I reminded him that I was
his boss and that I had directed him to do otherwise.” 284
Around the same time, Representative Perry called Acting Deputy
Attorney General Donoghue, criticized the FBI, and suggested that the
Department hadn’t been doing its job. Perry told Donoghue that Clark
“would do something about this.” 285
On December 28th, Clark worked with a Department employee named
Kenneth Klukowski—a political appointee who had earlier worked with
John Eastman—to produce a draft letter from the Justice Department to the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 51
State legislature of Georgia.286 That letter mirrored a number of the posi-
tions President Trump and Eastman were taking at the time.287 (Although
both Clark and Eastman refused to answer questions by asserting their Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, evidence shows that Clark
and Eastman were in communication in this period leading up to January
6th.288 The draft letter to Georgia was intended to be one of several Depart-
ment letters to State legislatures in swing States that had voted for
Biden.289
The letter read: “The Department of Justice is investigating various
irregularities in the 2020 election for President of the United States.” 290
Clark continued: “The Department will update you as we are able on inves-
tigatory progress, but at this time we have identified significant concerns
that may have impacted the outcome of the election in multiple States,
including the State of Georgia.” 291 This was affirmatively untrue. The
Department had conducted many investigations of election fraud allega-
tions by that point, but it absolutely did not have “significant concerns”
that fraud “may have impacted the outcome of the election” in any State.
Jeff Clark knew this; Donoghue confirmed it again in an email responding
to Clark’s letter: “[W]e simply do not currently have a basis to make such a
statement. Despite dramatic claims to the contrary, we have not seen the
type of fraud that calls into question the reported (and certified) results of
the election.” 292
The letter also explicitly recommended that Georgia’s State legislature
should call a special session to evaluate potential election fraud. “In light of
these developments, the Department recommends that the Georgia General
Assembly should convene in special session so that its legislators are in a
special position to take additional testimony, receive new evidence, and
deliberate on the matter consistent with its duties under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.” 293
Clark’s draft letter also referenced the fake electors that President
Trump and his campaign organized—arguing falsely that there were cur-
rently two competing slates of legitimate Presidential electors in Geor-
gia:294
The Department believes that in Georgia and several other States,
both a slate of electors supporting Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and a sepa-
rate slate of electors supporting Donald J. Trump, gathered on
[December 14, 2020] at the proper location to cast their ballots, and
that both sets of those ballots have been transmitted to Washing-
ton, D.C., to be opened by Vice President Pence.295
This, of course, was part of Donald Trump and John Eastman’s plan for
January 6th. This letter reflects an effort to use the Department of Justice to
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52 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
help overturn the election outcome in Georgia and elsewhere. Rosen and
Donoghue reacted immediately to this draft letter:
“[T]here’s no chance that I would sign this letter or anything remotely
like this,” Donoghue wrote.296 The plan set forth by Clark was “not even
within the realm of possibility,” 297 and Donoghue warned that if they sent
Clark’s letter, it “would be a grave step for the Department to take and it
could have tremendous Constitutional, political and social ramifications for
the country.” 298
As Richard Donoghue testified when describing his response to Clark’s
proposed letter:
Well, I had to read both the email and the attached letter twice to
make sure I really understood what he was proposing because it was
so extreme to me I had a hard time getting my head around it ini-
tially.
But I read it, and I did understand it for what he intended, and I had
to sit down and sort of compose what I thought was an appropriate
response . . . .
In my response I explained a number of reasons this is not the
Department’s role to suggest or dictate to State legislatures how
they should select their electors. But more importantly, this was not
based on fact. This was actually contrary to the facts as developed
by Department investigations over the last several weeks and
months.
So, I respond to that. And for the department to insert itself into the
political process this way I think would have had grave conse-
quences for the country. It may very well have spiraled us into a
constitutional crisis.299
Rosen and Donoghue also met with Clark about the letter. Their conver-
sation “was a very difficult and contentious” one, according to Dono-
ghue.300 “What you’re proposing is nothing less than the United States
Justice Department meddling in the outcome of a Presidential election,”
Donoghue admonished Clark, to which Clark indignantly responded, “I
think a lot of people have meddled in this election.” 301
Both Rosen and Donoghue refused to sign the letter, and confronted
Clark with the actual results of the Department’s investigations.302 They
also permitted Clark access to a classified briefing from the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”) showing Clark that allegations
he made to Rosen and Donoghue about foreign interference with voting
machines were not true. According to Rosen, the decision to give Clark the
briefing at that point “was a difficult question because, if he’s going to brief
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 53
the President, I reluctantly think it’s probably better that he’s heard from
Director Ratcliffe than that he not, even if—I don’t think he should brief
the President. But, at this point, he’s telling me that this is happening
whether I agree with it or not. So, so I let him have that briefing.” 303
After Clark received the ODNI briefing, “he acknowledged [to Dono-
ghue] that there was nothing in that briefing that would have supported his
earlier suspicion about foreign involvement.” 304 While Clark then dropped
his claims about foreign interference, he continued to press to send the let-
ter to Georgia and other States, despite being told that the Department of
Justice investigations had found no fraud sufficient to overturn the election
outcome in Georgia or any other States. This was an intentional choice by
Jeff Clark to contradict specific Department findings on election fraud, and
purposely insert the Department into the Presidential election on President
Trump’s behalf and risk creating or exacerbating a constitutional crisis.
By this point, President Trump recognized that neither Rosen nor
Donoghue would sign the letter or support his false election claims. Presi-
dent Trump and his team then communicated further with Clark and
offered him the job of Acting Attorney General. On January 2nd, Clark told
Rosen that he “would turn down the President’s offer if [Rosen] reversed
[his] position and signed the letter” that he and Klukowski had drafted.305
The next day, Clark decided to accept and informed Rosen, who then called
White House Counsel to seek a meeting directly with President Trump. As
Rosen put it, “I wasn’t going to accept being fired by my subordinate, so I
wanted to talk to the President directly.” 306
On January 3rd, that meeting was convened. Although contemporane-
ous White House documents suggest that Clark had already been appointed
as the Acting Attorney General,307 all the participants in the meeting other
than Clark and President Trump aggressively opposed Clark’s appointment.
At that point, Rosen decided to “broaden the circle” and ask that his
subordinates inform all the other Assistant Attorneys General (AAGs) what
was afoot.308 Rosen wanted to know how the AAGs would respond if Jeff
Clark was installed as the Acting Attorney General. Pat Hovakimian, who
worked for Rosen, then set up a conference call. The AAGs almost immedi-
ately agreed that they would resign if Rosen was removed from office.309
Rosen, Donoghue, and Steve Engel, the Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel, attended the meeting. White House lawyers Pat
Cipollone, Eric Herschmann and Pat Philbin joined as well.
When the meeting started, Clark attempted to defend his appointment.
Clark declared that this was the “last opportunity to sort of set things
straight with this defective election,” and he had the “intelligence,” the
“will,” and “desire” to “pursue these matters in the way that the President
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54 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
thought most appropriate.” 310 Everyone else present disagreed that Clark
could conceivably accomplish these things.
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone threatened to resign as well,
describing Clark’s letter as a “murder-suicide pact.” 311 Cipollone warned
that the letter would “damage everyone who touches it” and no one should
have anything to do with it.312
President Trump asked Donoghue and Engel what they would do if
Clark took office. Both confirmed they would resign.313 Steve Engel recalled
that the President next asked if he would resign:
At some point, [] I believe Rich Donoghue said that senior Depart-
ment officials would all resign if Mr. Clark were put in, and the
President turned to me and said, “Steve, you wouldn’t resign, would
you?” I said, “Well, Mr. President, I’ve been with you through four
Attorneys General, including two Acting Attorneys General, and I
just couldn’t be part of this if Mr. Clark were here.” And I said, “And
I believe that the other senior Department officials would resign as
well. And Mr. Clark would be here by himself with a hostile building,
those folks who remained, and nothing would get done.”314
Donoghue added that they would not be the only ones to resign. “You
should understand that your entire Department leadership will resign,”
Donoghue recalled saying. This included every Assistant Attorney General.
“Mr. President, these aren’t bureaucratic leftovers from another adminis-
tration,” Donoghue reminded Trump, “You picked them. This is your lead-
ership team.” Donoghue added, “And what happens if, within 48 hours, we
have hundreds of resignations from your Justice Department because of
your actions? What does that say about your leadership?” 315 Steve Engel
then reinforced Donoghue’s point, saying that Clark would be leading a
“graveyard.”
Faced with mass resignations and recognizing that the “breakage”
could be too severe, Donald Trump decided to rescind his offer to Clark and
drop his plans to use the Justice Department to aid in his efforts to overturn
the election outcome.316 The President looked at Clark and said, “I appreci-
ate your willingness to do it. I appreciate you being willing to suffer the
abuse. But the reality is, you’re not going to get anything done. These guys
are going to quit. Everyone else is going to resign. It’s going to be a disas-
ter. The bureaucracy will eat you alive. And no matter how much you want
to get things done in the next few weeks, you won’t be able to get it done,
and it’s not going to be worth the breakage.” 317
***
Evidence gathered by the Committee also suggests that President
Trump offered Sidney Powell the position of Special Counsel for election
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 55
related matters during a highly charged White House meeting on December
18, 2020.318 White House lawyers vehemently opposed Powell’s appoint-
ment, and it also was not ultimately made formal.
SUMMONING A MOB TO WASHINGTON, AND KNOWING THEY WERE ANGRY AND
ARMED, INSTRUCTING THEM TO MARCH TO THE CAPITOL
In the early morning hours of December 19th, shortly after the contentious
December 18th White House meeting with Sidney Powell and others, Donald
Trump sent a tweet urging his supporters to travel to Washington for Janu-
ary 6th. In that tweet, President Trump attached false allegations that the
election was stolen and promised a “wild” time on January 6th.319 This
Twitter invitation was followed by over a dozen other instances in which he
used Twitter to encourage supporters to rally for him in Washington, DC on
January 6th.320
The Committee has assembled detailed material demonstrating the
effects of these communications on members of far-right extremist groups,
like the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and others, and on
individuals looking to respond to their president’s call to action. President
Trump’s supporters believed the election was stolen because they listened
to his words,321 and they knew what he had called them to do; stop the cer-
tification of the electoral count.322
For example, one supporter, Charles Bradford Smith, noted on Decem-
ber 22, 2020, that “Trump is asking everyone to go” to Washington, DC on
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56 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
January 6th “to fill the streets” on the “day Pence counts up the votes.” 323
Derek Sulenta posted to Facebook on December 23, 2020, that “I’ll be there
Jan 6th to support the president no matter what happens” because “That’s
the day he called for patriots to show up.” 324 By December 31, 2020, Robert
Morss believed January 6th stood for the moment when “1776 Will Com-
mence Again” because President Trump asked them to “Be there, Will be
Wild.” 325 Kenneth Grayson predicted what would eventually happen on
January 6th, when on December 23, 2020, he wrote on Facebook that Presi-
dent Trump called people to Washington, DC through his December 19th
tweet and then added “IF TRUMP TELLS US TO STORM THE FUKIN CAPI-
TAL IMA DO THAT THEN!” 326 Some demonstrated their inspiration for
January 6th by circulating flyers, which proclaimed “#OccupyCongress”
over images of the United States Capitol.327 Robert Gieswein, a Coloradan
affiliated with Three Percenters who was among the first to breach the
Capitol, said that he came to Washington, DC “to keep President Trump
in.” 328
Chapter 8 of this report documents how the Proud Boys led the attack,
penetrated the Capitol, and led hundreds of others inside. Multiple Proud
Boys reacted immediately to President Trump’s December 19th tweet and
began their planning. Immediately, Proud Boys leaders reorganized their
hierarchy, with Enrique Tarrio, Joseph Biggs, and Ethan Nordean messag-
ing groups of Proud Boys about what to expect on January 6th.329 Tarrio
created a group chat known as the Ministry of Self-Defense for hand-
selected Proud Boys whom he wanted to “organize and direct” plans for
January 6th.330 On social media, Tarrio referenced “revolt” and “[r]evolu-
tion,” and conspicuously asked “What if we invade it?” on Telegram.331 As
of December 29, 2020, Tarrio told the group the events on January 6th
would be “centered around the Capitol.” 332
At the time of publication of this report, prosecutions of certain Proud
Boys are ongoing. To date, one Proud Boy has pled guilty to seditious con-
spiracy and other Proud Boys have pled guilty to other crimes, including
conspiracy to obstruct Congress.333 Jeremy Bertino, a Proud Boy who pled
guilty to seditious conspiracy, admitted that he:
understood from internal discussions among the Proud Boys that in
the leadup to January 6, the willingness to resort to unlawful con-
duct increasingly included a willingness to use and promote vio-
lence to achieve political objectives.334
Moreover,
Bertino believed that the 2020 election had been “stolen” and, as
January 6, 2021, approached, believed that drastic measures,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 57
including violence, were necessary to prevent Congress from certi-
fying the Electoral College Vote on January 6, 2021. Bertino made
his views in this regard known publicly, as well as in private discus-
sions with MOSD leadership. Bertino understood from his discus-
sions with MOSD leadership that they agreed that the election had
been stolen, that the purpose of traveling to Washington, D.C., on
January 6, 2021, was to stop the certification of the Electoral College
Vote, and that the MOSD leaders were willing to do whatever it
would take, including using force against police and others, to
achieve that objective.335
As set out in Bertino’s plea agreement, members of MOSD:
openly discussed plans for potential violence at the Capitol [. . . and]
members of MOSD leadership were discussing the possibility of
storming the Capitol. Bertino believed that storming the Capitol
would achieve the group's goal of stopping Congress from certifying
the Electoral College Vote. Bertino understood that storming the
Capitol or its grounds would be illegal and would require using force
against police or other government officials.336
Another Proud Boy who has pled guilty to conspiracy and assault
charges, Charles Donohoe, understood that the Proud Boys planned to
storm the Capitol. Donohoe, a Proud Boys local chapter leader from North
Carolina:
was aware [as early as January 4, 2021] that members of MOSD
leadership were discussing the possibility of storming the Capitol.
Donohoe believed that storming the Capitol would achieve the
group’s goal of stopping the government from carrying out the
transfer of presidential power.337
The Department of Justice has charged a number of Oath Keepers with
seditious conspiracy. Specifically, the government alleges that “[a]fter the
Presidential Election, Elmer Stewart Rhodes III conspired with his
co-defendants, introduced below, and other co-conspirators, known and
unknown to the Grand Jury, to oppose by force the lawful transfer of presi-
dential power.” 338 A jury agreed, convicting Stewart Rhodes and Kelly
Meggs—the leader of the Florida Oath Keepers chapter—of seditious con-
spiracy. The jury also convicted Rhodes and Meggs, as well as fellow Oath
Keepers Jessica Watkins, Kenneth Harrelson, and Thomas Caldwell,339 of
other serious felonies for their actions on January 6th.340
Meggs celebrated the December 19th tweet, sending an encrypted Signal
message to Florida Oath Keepers that President Trump “wants us to make it
WILD that’s what he’s saying. He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to
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58 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
make it wild!!! . . . Gentlemen we are heading to DC pack your shit!!” 341
Similarly, Oath Keeper Joshua James—who pleaded guilty to seditious
conspiracy—told Oath Keepers that there was now a “NATIONAL CALL TO
ACTION FOR DC JAN 6TH” following President Trump’s words.342
Stewart Rhodes, the Oath Keepers’ founder, felt that “the time for
peaceful protest is over” after December 19th and, according to the govern-
ment, “urged President Trump to use military force to stop the lawful
transfer of presidential power, describing January 6, 2021, as “a hard con-
stitutional deadline” to do so.343 Rhodes created a “an invitation-only Sig-
nal group chat titled, ‘DC OP: Jan 6 21’” on December 30, 2020, which he
and other Oath Keepers, like Meggs and James, used to plan for January
6th, including by creating a “quick reaction force” of firearms to be stashed
in Virginia.344
Multiple members of the Oath Keepers have pleaded guilty to seditious
conspiracy. Brian Ulrich started planning for January 6th right after Presi-
dent Trump sent out his December 19th tweet. The Department of Justice
summarized Ulrich’s communications, as follows:
Ulrich messaged the “Oath Keepers of Georgia” Signal group chat,
“Trump acts now maybe a few hundred radicals die trying to burn
down cities . . . Trump sits on his hands Biden wins . . . millions die
resisting the death of the 1st and 2nd amendment.” On December
20, 2020, an individual in the “Oath Keepers of Georgia” Signal
group chat, who later traveled with Ulrich to Washington, D.C., and
breached the Capitol grounds with Ulrich on January 6, 2021, mes-
saged, “January 6th. The great reset. America or not.” 345
The Justice Department’s Statement of Offense for Oath Keeper Joshua
James provided these details:
In advance of and on January 6, 2021, James and others agreed to
take part in the plan developed by Rhodes to use any means neces-
sary, up to and including the use of force, to stop the lawful transfer
of presidential power. In the weeks leading up to January 6, 2021,
Rhodes instructed James and other coconspirators to be prepared, if
called upon, to report to the White House grounds to secure the
perimeter and use lethal force if necessary against anyone who tried
to remove President Trump from the White House, including the
National Guard or other government actors who might be sent to
remove President Trump as a result of the Presidential Election.346
The former President’s call also galvanized Three Percenters to act. A
group known as The Three Percenters Original sent a message to its mem-
bers on December 16, 2020, noting they “stand ready and are standing by to
answer the call from our President should the need arise” to combat the
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“pure evil that is conspiring to steal our country away from the american
people” through the “2020 presidential election.” 347 After President
Trump’s tweet, the group put out another letter instructing “any member
who can attend . . . to participate” on January 6th because “[t]he President
of the United States has put out a general call for the patriots of this Nation
to gather” in Washington, DC.348
Other Three Percenter groups also responded. Alan Hostetter and Rus-
sell Taylor led a group of Three Percenters calling themselves the California
Patriots–DC Brigade, who have been charged with conspiracy to obstruct
Congress because they organized to fight to keep President Trump in power
on January 6th after President Trump’s December 19th tweet inspired them
to come to Washington, DC.349 On December 19th, Hostetter posted on Ins-
tagram:
President Trump tweeted that all patriots should descend on Wash-
ington DC on Wednesday l/6/2021. This is the date of the Joint Ses-
sion of Congress in which they will either accept or reject the fake/
phony/stolen electoral college votes.350
Between December 19th and January 6th, Hostetter, Taylor, and other
members of the California Patriots–DC Brigade exchanged messages and
posted to social media about bringing gear, including “weaponry,” like
“hatchet[s],” “bat[s],” or “[l]arge metal flashlights,” and possibly “fire-
arms,” and, about being “ready and willing to fight” like it was “1776.”
Taylor even spoke in front of the Supreme Court on January 5, 2021,
explaining that “[p]atriots” would “not return to our peaceful way of life
until this election is made right . . . .” 351 On December 29, 2020, Taylor
exclaimed “I personally want to be on the front steps and be one of the first
ones to breach the doors!” 352
Similarly, members of the Florida Guardians of Freedom, Three Percent
sent around a flyer on December 24, 2020, saying they were “responding to
the call from President Donald J. Trump to assist in the security, protection,
and support of the people as we all protest the fraudulent election and
re-establish liberty for our nation.” 353 Their leader, Jeremy Liggett, posted
a meme to Facebook stating that “3% Will Show In Record Numbers In
DC” 354 and put out a “safety video” instructing people that they could
bring “an expandable metal baton, a walking cane and a folding knife” 355
to Washington, DC on January 6th. Several have been arrested for partici-
pating in the violence around the tunnel on January 6th.356
When interviewed by the FBI on March 31, 2021, Danny Rodriguez—a
Three Percenter from California who tased Officer Michael Fanone in the
neck as rioters tried to break through a door on the west side of the
Capitol—reflected on his decision to go to Washington, DC357:
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60 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Trump called us to D.C. . . . and he’s calling for help—I thought he
was calling for help. I thought he was—I thought we were doing the
right thing. . . . [W]e thought we were going to hit it like a civil war.
There was going to be a big battle. . . . I thought that the main fight,
the main battle, was going to be in D.C. because Trump called
everyone there.358
These groups were not operating in silos. Meggs bragged on Facebook
that following President Trump’s December 19th tweet he had formed an
alliance between the Oath Keepers, the Florida Three Percenters, and the
Proud Boys “to work together to shut this shit down.” 359 On December
19th, Meggs called Enrique Tarrio and they spoke for more than three min-
utes.360 Three days later, Meggs messaged Liggett, echoing his excitement
about the December 19th tweet and specifically referencing the seat of Con-
gress: “He called us all to the Capitol and wants us to make it wild!!!” 361
Liggett said “I will have a ton of men with me” and Meggs replied that “we
have made Contact [sic] with PB [Proud Boys] and they always have a big
group. Force multiplier. . . . I figure we could splinter off the main group of
PB and come up behind them. Fucking crush them for good.” 362 Aside from
Meggs, Stewart Rhodes brought in at least one local militia leader363 and
Three Percenters into the Oath Keepers January 6th planning chats that
came about following President Trump’s tweet.364
Even on January 6th, rioters referenced the tweet. An unknown rioter
was caught on video as they ascended the Capitol steps saying “He said it
was gonna be wild. He didn’t lie.” 365 MPD body-worn cameras captured
Cale Clayton around 3:15 p.m. as he taunted officers from under the scaf-
folding: “Your fucking president told us to be here. You should be on this
side, right here, going with us. You are an American citizen. Your fucking
President told you to do that. You too. You too. You. All of you guys. That
Tweet was for you guys. For us. For you.” 366
As January 6th neared, intelligence emerged indicating that January 6th
was likely to be violent, and specifically that the Capitol was a target. On
January 3rd, an intelligence summary informed Department of Justice offi-
cials of plans to “occupy the Capitol” and “invade” the Capitol on January
6th. This summarized a “SITE Intelligence Group” report about the “online
rhetoric focused on the 6 Jan event.” Some of the reporting includes: “Calls
to occupy federal buildings.” “intimidating Congress and invading the
capitol building.” The email also quoted WUSA9 local reporting: “one of the
websites used for organizing the event was encouraging attendees to bring
guns.”
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue testified:
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And we knew that if you have tens of thousands of very upset people
showing up in Washington, DC, that there was potential for vio-
lence.368
At the same time, a Defense Department official predicted on a White
House National Security Council call that violence could be targeted at the
Capitol on January 6th. According to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Mark Milley:
So during these calls, I—I only remember in hindsight because he
was almost like clairvoyant. [Deputy Secretary of Defense David]
Norquist says during one of these calls, the greatest threat is a
direct assault on the Capitol. I’ll never forget it.369
Likewise, documentation received by the Committee from the Secret
Service demonstrates a growing number of warnings both that January 6th
was likely to be violent, and specifically that the Capitol would likely be the
target, including intelligence directly regarding the Proud Boys and Oath
Keepers militia groups.
Even two weeks ahead of January 6th, the intelligence started to show
what could happen. On December 22, 2020, the FBI received a screenshot of
an online chat among Oath Keepers, seemingly referring to the State capi-
tols besieged by protesters across the country earlier that year: “if they
were going to go in, then they should have went all the way.” 370 “There is
only one way. It is not signs. It’s not rallies. It’s fucking bullets,” one user
replied.371
A public source emailed the Secret Service a document titled “Armed
and Ready, Mr. President,” on December 24th, which summarized online
comments responding to President Trump’s December 19th tweet.372 Pro-
testors should “start marching into the chambers,” one user wrote.373
Trump “can’t exactly openly tell you to revolt,” another replied. “This is
the closest he’ll ever get.” 374 “I read [the President’s tweet] as armed,”
someone said.375 “[T]here is not enough cops in DC to stop what is com-
ing,” replied yet another.376 “[B]e already in place when Congress tries to
get to their meeting,” the comments continued, and “make sure they know
who to fear.’” 377 “[W]aiting for Trump to say the word,” a person said, and
“this is what Trump expects,” exclaimed another.378 Capitol Police’s head
of intelligence, Jack Donohue, got the same compilation from a former col-
league at the New York Police Department on December 28, 2020.379
On December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a tip about the Proud
Boys detailing plans to have “a large enough group to march into DC armed
[that] will outnumber the police so they can’t be stopped.” 380 “Their plan
is to literally kill people,” the informant stated. “Please please take this tip
seriously . . . ” 381 On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related
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62 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
warnings to Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged
to “occupy federal building[s],” including “march[ing] into the capital
building and mak[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.” 382
Civilians also tipped off Capitol Police about people bringing weapons to
besiege the Capitol. One tipster, who had “track[ed] online far right
extremism for years,” emailed Capitol Police warning “I’ve seen countless
tweets from Trump supporters saying they will be armed,” and “I[’]ve also
seen tweets from people organizing to ‘storm the Capitol’ on January
6th.” 383
On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related warnings to
Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to “occupy
federal building,” including “march[ing] into the capital building and mak-
[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.” 384 Indeed, a Secret
Service intelligence briefing on December 30th entitled “March for
Trump,” highlighted the President’s “Will be wild!” tweet alongside hash-
tags #WeAreTheStorm, #1776Rebel, and #OccupyCapitols, writing “Presi-
dent Trump supporters have proposed a movement to occupy Capitol
Hill.” 385
On January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the intelligence branch at DC Police
forwarded a civilian tip about “a website planning terroristic behavior on
Jan 6th, during the rally” to Capitol Police intelligence.386 “There are
detailed plans to storm federal buildings,” including “the capitol in DC on
Jan 6th,” the tipster reported, linking to thedonald.win.387
On January 2, 2021, the FBI discovered a social media posting that read,
“This is not a rally and it’s no longer a protest. This is a final stand . . .
many are ready to die to take back #USA . . . . And don’t be surprised if we
take the #capital building.” 388
On January 3, 2021, a Parler user’s post—under the name 1776(2.0)
Minuteman— noting “after weds we are going to need a new congress” and
“Jan 6 may actually be their [Members of Congress] last day in office”
reached the FBI and Capitol Police.389
The FBI field office in Norfolk, Virginia issued an alert to law enforce-
ment agencies on January 5th tiled “Potential for Violence in Washington,
D.C. Area in Connection with Planned ‘StopTheSteal’ Protest on 6 January
2021,” which noted:
An online thread discussed specific calls for violence to include
stating, “Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking,
doors being kicked in, and blood . . . being spilled. Get violent . . .
stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. Go there ready for
war. We get our President or we die. NOTHING else will achieve this
goal.”390
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 63
In addition, the alert copied “perimeter maps [of the Capitol] and cara-
van pictures [that] were posted” on thedonald.win, particularly worrying
that the “caravans . . . had the same colors as the sections of the perimeter”
of the Capitol.391 Secret Service also knew about caravans planning to come
to DC to “Occupy the Capitol.” 392
That same day, representatives from DHS, FBI, DC’s Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Agency, Secret Service, DC Police, and Capitol
Police shared a website, Red State Secession, which had a post titled “Why
the Second American Revolution Starts Jan 6.” A user asked visitors to post
where they could find the home addresses of Democratic congressmen and
“political enemies” and asked if “any of our enemies [will] be working in
offices in DC that afternoon.” 393 “What are their routes to and from the
event?” the post continued.394 “[T]he crowd will be looking for
enemies.” 395
A Secret Service open-source unit flagged an account on thedonald.win
that threatened to bring a sniper rifle to a rally on January 6th. The user
also posted a picture of a handgun and rifle with the caption, “Sunday Gun
Day Providing Overwatch January 6th Will be Wild.” 396
The Secret Service learned from the FBI on January 5th about right-
wing groups establishing armed quick reaction forces in Virginia, where
they could amass firearms illegal in DC397 Trump supporters staged there
waiting across the river “to respond to ‘calls for help.’” 398 The Oath Keep-
ers were such a group.399
President Trump’s closest aides knew about the political power of sites
like thedonald.win, which is where much of this violent rhetoric and plan-
ning happened. On December 30, 2020, Jason Miller—a Senior Adviser to
and former spokesman for the former President—texted Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows a link to the thedonald.win, adding “I got the base FIRED UP.” 400
The link connected to a page with comments like “Gallows don’t require
electricity,” “if the filthy commie maggots try to push their fraud through,
there will be hell to pay,” and Congress can certify Trump the winner or
leave “in a bodybag.” 401 Symbolic gallows were constructed on January 6th
at the foot of the Capitol.402
After President Trump’s signal, his supporters did not hide their plans
for violence at the Capitol, and those threats made their way to national and
local law enforcement agencies. As described in this report, the intelligence
agencies did detect this planning, and they shared it with the White House
and with the U.S. Secret Service.
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64 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Noose set up outside of the Capitol on January 6th.
Testimony from White House staff also suggests real concerns about
the risk of violence as January 6th approached. Cassidy Hutchinson, for
example, testified about a conversation she had with her boss, Mark Mead-
ows, on January 2nd:
I went into Mark’s office, and he was still on his phone . . . . I said to
Mark, “Rudy [Giuliani] said these things to me. What’s going on
here? Anything I should know about?”
This was—he was, like, looking at his phone. He was like, “Oh, it’s
all about the rally on Wednesday. Isn’t that what he was talking to
you about?”
I said, “Yeah. Yeah, sounds like we’re going to the Capitol.”
He said, “Yeah. Are you talking with Tony?”
“I’m having a conversation, sir.”
He said—still looking at his phone. I remember he was scrolling. He
was like, “Yeah. You know, things might get real, real bad on the
6th.”
And I remember saying to him, “What do you mean?”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 65
Mark Meadows walks along the South Lawn on October 30, 2020.
(Photo by Sarah Silbiger/Getty Images)
He was like, “I don’t know. There’s just going to be a lot of people
here, and there’s a lot of different ideas right now. I’m not really
sure of everything that’s going on. Let's just make sure we keep tabs
on it.” 403
Hutchinson also testified about a conversation she had with Director of
National Intelligence, Ratcliffe:
He had expressed to me that he was concerned that it could spiral
out of control and potentially be dangerous, either for our democ-
racy or the way that things were going for the 6th.404
Hope Hicks texted Trump Campaign spokesperson Hogan Gidley in the
midst of the January 6th violence, explaining that she had “suggested . . .
several times” on the preceding days (January 4th and January 5th) that
President Trump publicly state that January 6th must remain peaceful and
that he had refused her advice to do so.405 Her recollection was that Her-
schmann earlier advised President Trump to make a preemptive public
statement in advance of January 6th calling for no violence that day.406 No
such statement was made.
The District of Columbia Homeland Security office explicitly warned
that groups were planning to “occupy the [Capitol] to halt the vote.” 407
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66 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[W]e got derogatory information from OSINT suggesting that some
very, very violent individuals were organizing to come to DC, and
not only were they organized to come to DC, but they were—these
groups, these nonaligned groups were aligning. And so all the red
flags went up at that point, you know, when you have armed militia,
you know, collaborating with White supremacy groups, collaborat-
ing with conspiracy theory groups online all toward a common goal,
you start seeing what we call in, you know, terrorism, a blended
ideology, and that’s a very, very bad sign. . . . [T]hen when they
were clearly across—not just across one platform but across mul-
tiple platforms of these groups coordinating, not just like chatting,
“Hey, how’s it going, what’s the weather like where you’re at,” but
like, “what are you bringing, what are you wearing, you know,
where do we meet up, do you have plans for the Capitol.” That’s
operational—that’s like preoperational intelligence, right, and that
is something that's clearly alarming.408
Again, this type of intelligence was shared, including obvious warnings
about potential violence prior to January 6th.409 What was not shared, and
was not fully understood by intelligence and law enforcement entities, is
what role President Trump would play on January 6th in exacerbating the
violence, and later refusing for multiple hours to instruct his supporters to
stand down and leave the Capitol. No intelligence collection was apparently
performed on President Trump’s plans for January 6th, nor was there any
analysis performed on what he might do to exacerbate potential violence.
Certain Republican members of Congress who were working with Trump
and the Giuliani team may have had insight on this particular risk, but none
appear to have alerted the Capitol Police or any other law enforcement
authority.
On January 2, 2021, Katrina Pierson wrote in an email to fellow rally
organizers, “POTUS expectations are to have something intimate at the
[E]llipse, and call on everyone to march to the Capitol.” 410 And, on January
4, 2021, another rally organizer texted Mike Lindell, the MyPillow CEO, that
President Trump would “unexpectedly” call on his supporters to march to
the Capitol:
This stays only between us . . . . It can also not get out about the
march because I will be in trouble with the national park service and
all the agencies but POTUS is going to just call for it “unexpect-
edly.” 411
Testimony obtained by the Committee also indicates that President
Trump was specifically aware that the crowd he had called to Washington
was fired up and angry on the evening of January 5th. Judd Deere, a deputy
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 67
White House press secretary recalled a conversation with President Trump
in the Oval Office on the evening of January 5th:
Judd Deere: I said he should focus on policy accomplishments. I
didn’t mention the 2020 election.
Committee Staff: Okay. What was his response?
Deere: He acknowledged that and said, “We’ve had a lot,” some-
thing along those lines, but didn’t—he fairly quickly moved to how
fired up the crowd is, or was going to be.
Committee Staff: Okay. What did he say about it?
Deere: Just that they were—they were fired up. They were angry.
They feel like the election’s been stolen, that the election was
rigged, that—he went on and on about that for a little bit. 412
Testimony indicated that President Trump was briefed on the risk of
violence on the morning of the 6th before he left the White House. Cassidy
Hutchinson provided this testimony:
Vice Chair Cheney: So, Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding
that Mr. Ornato told the President about weapons at the rally on the
morning of January 6th?
Hutchinson: That is what Mr. Ornato relayed to me.413
The head of President Trump’s security detail, Bobby Engel, told the
Select Committee that when he shared critical information with White
House Deputy Chief of Staff Anthony Ornato, it was a means of conveying
that information with the Oval Office: “So, when it came to passing infor-
mation to Mr. Ornato, I—my assumption was that it would get to the chief
[of staff, Mark Meadows], or that he was sharing the information with the
chief. I don’t—and the filtering process, or if the chief thinks it needs to get
to the President, then he would share it with the President.” 414 Also, Engel
confirmed that if “information would come to my attention, whether it was
a protective intelligence issue or a concern or—primarily, I would—I would
make sure that the information got filtered up through the appropriate
chain usually through Mr. Ornato. So if I received a report on something
that was happening in the DC area, I’d either forward that information to
Mr. Ornato, or call him about that information or communicate in some
way.” 415
The Select Committee also queried Deputy Chief of Staff Ornato this
November about what he generally would have done in this sort of situa-
tion, asking him the following: “Generally you receive information about
things like the groups that are coming, the stuff that we talked earlier. You
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68 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
would bring that to Mr. Meadows and likely did here, although you don’t
have a specific recollection?” 416 Ornato responded: “That is correct, sir.” 417
Ornato also explained to the Committee that “… in my normal daily func-
tions, in my general functions as my job, I would’ve had a conversation
with him about all the groups coming in and what was expected from the
secret service.” 418 As for the morning of January 6th itself, he had the fol-
lowing answer:
Committee Staff: Do you remember talking to Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows about any of your concerns about the threat landscape
going into January 6th?
Ornato: I don’t recall; however, in my position I would’ve made sure
he was tracking the demos, which he received a daily brief, Presi-
dential briefing. So he most likely was getting all this in his daily
brief as well. I wouldn’t know what was in his intelligence brief that
day, but I would’ve made sure that he was tracking these things and
just mentioned, “Hey, are you tracking the demos?” If he gave me a
“yeah”, I don’t recall it today, but I’m sure that was something that
took place.419
Ornato had access to intelligence that suggested violence at the Capitol
on January 6th, and it was his job to inform Meadows and President Trump
of that. Although Ornato told us that he did not recall doing so, the Select
Committee found multiple parts of Ornato’s testimony questionable. The
Select Committee finds it difficult to believe that neither Meadows nor
Ornato told President Trump, as was their job, about the intelligence that
was emerging as the January 6th rally approached.
Hours before the Ellipse rally on January 6th, the fact that the
assembled crowd was prepared for potential violence was widely known. In
addition to intelligence reports indicating potential violence at the Capitol,
weapons and other prohibited items were being seized by police on the
streets and by Secret Service at the magnetometers for the Ellipse speech.
Secret Service confiscated a haul of weapons from the 28,000 spectators
who did pass through the magnetometers: 242 cannisters of pepper spray,
269 knives or blades, 18 brass knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body armor, 3
gas masks, 30 batons or blunt instruments, and 17 miscellaneous items like
scissors, needles, or screwdrivers.420 And thousands of others purposely
remained outside the magnetometers, or left their packs outside.421
Others brought firearms. Three men in fatigues from Broward County,
Florida brandished AR-15s in front of Metropolitan police officers on 14th
Street and Independence Avenue on the morning of January 6th.422 MPD
advised over the radio that one individual was possibly armed with a
“Glock” at 14th and Constitution Avenue, and another was possibly armed
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 69
President Trump looks backstage at the crowd gathered at the Ellipse.
(Photo provided to the Select Committee by the National Archives and Records Administration)
with a “rifle” at 15th and Constitution Avenue around 11:23 a.m.423 The
National Park Service detained an individual with a rifle between 12 and 1
p.m.424 Almost all of this was known before Donald Trump took the stage at
the Ellipse.
By the time President Trump was preparing to give his speech, he and
his advisors knew enough to cancel the rally. And he certainly knew enough
to cancel any plans for a march to the Capitol. According to testimony
obtained by the Select Committee, President Trump knew that elements of
the crowd were armed, and had prohibited items, and that many thousands
would not pass through the magnetometers for that reason. Testimony
indicates that the President had received an earlier security briefing, and
testimony indicates that the Secret Service mentioned the prohibited items
again as they drove President Trump to the Ellipse.
Cassidy Hutchinson was with the President backstage. Her contempora-
neous text messages indicate that President Trump was “effing furious”
about the fact that a large number of his supporters would not go through
the magnetometers:
Cassidy Hutchinson: But the crowd looks good from this vanish [sic]
point. As long as we get the shot. He was fucking furious
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70 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Tony Ornato: He doesn’t get it that the people on the monument
side don’t want to come in. They can see from there and don’t want
to come in. They can see from there and don’t have to go through
mags. With 30k magged inside.
Cassidy Hutchinson: That’s what was relayed several times and in
different iterations
Cassidy Hutchinson: Poor max got chewed out
Cassidy Hutchinson: He also kept mentioning [an off the record
trip] to Capitol before he took the stage
Tony Ornato: Bobby will tell him no. It’s not safe to do. No assets
available to safely do it.425
And Hutchinson described what President Trump said as he prepared to
take the stage:
When we were in the off-stage announce area tent behind the stage,
he was very concerned about the shot. Meaning the photograph that
we would get because the rally space wasn’t full. One of the reasons,
which I’ve previously stated, was because he wanted it to be full and
for people to not feel excluded because they had come far to watch
him at the rally. And he felt the mags were at fault for not letting
everybody in, but another leading reason and likely the primary
reasons is because he wanted it full and he was angry that we
weren’t letting people through the mags with weapons—what the
Secret Service deemed as weapons, and are, are weapons. But when
we were in the off-stage announce tent, I was a part of a conversa-
tion, I was in the vicinity of a conversation where I overheard the
President say something to the effect of, “I don’t F’ing care that
they have weapons. They’re not here to hurt me. Take the F’ing
mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from
here. Let the people in. Take the F’ing mags away.” 426
The Secret Service special agent who drove the President after his
speech told the Select Committee that Trump made a similar remark in the
vehicle when his demand to go to the Capitol was refused—essentially that
Trump did not believe his supporters posed a security risk to him person-
ally.427
Minutes after the exchange that Hutchinson described—when President
Trump took the stage—he pointedly expressed his concern about the thou-
sands of attendees who would not enter the rally area and instructed Secret
Service to allow that part of the crowd to enter anyway:
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. . . I’d love to have if those tens of thousands of people would be
allowed. The military, the secret service. And we want to thank you
and the police law enforcement. Great. You’re doing a great job. But
I’d love it if they could be allowed to come up here with us. Is that
possible? Can you just let [them] come up, please?428
Although President Trump and his advisors knew of the risk of violence,
and knew specifically that elements of the crowd were angry and some were
armed, from intelligence and law enforcement reports that morning, Presi-
dent Trump nevertheless went forward with the rally, and then specifically
instructed the crowd to march to the Capitol: “Because you’ll never take
back our country with weakness. You have to show strength and you have to
be strong. We have come to demand that Congress do the right thing and
only count the electors who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated.” 429
Much of President Trump’s speech was improvised. Even before his impro-
visation, during the review of President Trump’s prepared remarks, White
House lawyer Eric Herschmann specifically requested that “if there were
any factual allegations, someone needed to independently validate or verify
the statements.” 430 And in the days just before January 6th, Herschmann
“chewed out” John Eastman and told him he was “out of [his] F’ing mind”
to argue that the Vice President could be the sole decision-maker as to who
becomes the next President.431 Herschmann told us, “I so berated him that
I believed that theory would not go forward.” 432 But President Trump made
that very argument during his speech at the Ellipse and made many false
statements. Herschmann attended that speech, but walked out during the
middle of it.433
President Trump’s speech to the crowd that day lasted more than an
hour. The speech walked through dozens of known falsehoods about pur-
ported election fraud. And Trump again made false and malicious claims
about Dominion voting systems.434 As discussed earlier, he again pressured
Mike Pence to refuse to count lawful electoral votes, going off script
repeatedly, leading the crowd to believe falsely that Pence could and would
alter the election outcome:
And I actually, I just spoke to Mike. I said: “Mike, that doesn’t take
courage. What takes courage is to do nothing. That takes courage.”
And then we’re stuck with a president who lost the election by a lot
and we have to live with that for four more years. We’re just not
going to let that happen . . . .
When you catch somebody in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by very
different rules.
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72 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
So I hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope
he doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that he’s lis-
tening to.” 435
This characterization of Vice President Pence’s decision had a direct
impact on those who marched to and approached the Capitol, as illustrated
by this testimony from a person convicted of crimes committed on January
6th:
So this woman came up to the side of us, and she, says, Pence
folded. So it was kind of, like, okay. Well, in my mind I was think-
ing, ”Well, that’s it, you know.” Well, my son-in-law looks at me,
and he says, ”I want to go in.”436
Trump used the word “peacefully,” written by speech writers, one time.
But he delivered many other scripted and unscripted comments that con-
veyed a very different message:
Because you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have
to show strength and you have to be strong. We have come to
demand that Congress do the right thing and only count the electors
who have been lawfully slated, lawfully slated. . . .
And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell,
you’re not going to have a country anymore . . . .437
Trump also was not the only rally speaker to do these things. Giuliani,
for instance, also said, “Let’s have trial by combat.” 438 Likewise, Eastman
used his two minutes on the Ellipse stage to make a claim already known to
be false—that corrupted voted machines stole the election.439
The best indication of the impact of President Trump’s words, both
during the Ellipse speech and beforehand, are the comments from those
supporters who attended the Ellipse rally and their conduct immediately
thereafter. Videoclips show several of the attendees on their way to the
Capitol or shortly after they arrived:
I’m telling you what, I’m hearing that Pence—hearing the Pence
just caved. No. Is that true? I didn’t hear it. I’m hear—I’m hearing
reports that Pence caved. No way. I’m telling you, if Pence caved,
we’re going to drag motherfuckers through the streets. You fucking
politicians are going to get fucking drug through the streets.440
Yes. I guess the hope is that there’s such a show of force here that
Pence will decide do the right thing, according to Trump.441
Pence voted against Trump. [Interviewer: Ok. And that’s when all
this started?] Yup. That’s when we marched on the Capitol.442
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We just heard that Mike Pence is not going to reject any fraudulent
electoral votes. [Other speaker: Boo. You're a traitor! Boo!] That’s
right. You’ve heard it here first. Mike Pence has betrayed the United
States of America. [Other speaker: Boo! Fuck you, Mike Pence!] Mike
Pence has betrayed this President and he has betrayed the people of
the United States and we will never, ever forget. [Cheers]443
[Q] What percentage of the crowd is going to the Capitol? [A] [Oath
Keeper Jessica Watkins]: One hundred percent. It has, it has spread
like wildfire that Pence has betrayed us, and everybody’s marching
on the Capitol. All million of us. It’s insane. 444
Another criminal defendant—charged with assaulting an officer with a
flagpole and other crimes—explained in an interview why he went to the
Capitol and fought:
Dale Huttle: We were not there illegally, we were invited there by
the President himself. . . . Trump’s backers had been told that the
election had been stolen. . . .
Reporter Megan Hickey: But do you think he encouraged violence?
Dale Huttle: Well, I sat there, or stood there, with half a million
people listening to his speech. And in that speech, both Giuliani and
[Trump] said we were going to have to fight like hell to save our
country. Now, whether it was a figure of speech or not—it wasn’t
taken that way.
Reporter Megan Hickey: You didn’t take it as a figure of speech?
Dale Huttle: No.445
President Trump concluded his speech at 1:10 p.m.
Among other statements from the Ellipse podium, President Trump
informed the crowd that he would be marching to the Capitol with them:
Now, it is up to Congress to confront this egregious assault on our
democracy. And after this, we’re going to walk down, and I’ll be
there with you, we’re going to walk down, we’re going to walk
down. Anyone you want, but I think right here, we’re going to walk
down to the Capitol, and we’re going to cheer on our brave senators
and congressmen and women, and we’re probably not going to be
cheering so much for some of them.446
Hutchinson testified that she first became aware of President Trump’s
plans to attend Congress’s session to count votes on or about January 2nd.
She learned this from a conversation with Giuliani: “It’s going to be great.
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The President’s going to be there. He’s going to look powerful. He’s—he’s
going to be with the members. He’s going to be with the Senators.” 447 Evi-
dence also indicates that multiple members of the White House staff,
including White House lawyers, were concerned about the President’s
apparent intentions to go to the Capitol.448
After he exited the stage, President Trump entered the Presidential SUV
and forcefully expressed his intention that Bobby Engel, the head of his
Secret Service detail, direct the motorcade to the Capitol. The Committee
has now obtained evidence from several sources about a “furious interac-
tion” in the SUV. The vast majority of witnesses who have testified before
the Select Committee about this topic, including multiple members of the
Secret Service, a member of the Metropolitan police, and national security
and military officials in the White House, described President Trump’s
behavior as “irate,” “furious,” “insistent,” “profane” and “heated.”
Hutchinson heard about the exchange second-hand and related what she
heard in our June 28, 2022, hearing from Ornato (as did another witness, a
White House employee with national security responsibilities, who shared
that Ornato also recounted to him President Trump’s “irate” behavior in
the Presidential vehicle). Other members of the White House staff and
Secret Service also heard about the exchange after the fact. The White
House employee with national security responsibilities gave this testimony:
Committee Staff: But it sounds like you recall some rumor or some
discussion around the West Wing about the President’s anger about
being told that he couldn’t go to the Capitol. Is that right?
Employee: So Mr. Ornato said that he was angry that he couldn’t go
right away. In the days following that, I do remember, you know,
again, hearing again how angry the President was when, you know,
they were in the limo. But beyond specifics of that, that's pretty
much the extent of the cooler talk.449
The Committee has regarded both Hutchinson and the corroborating
testimony by the White House employee with national security responsi-
bilities as earnest and has no reason to conclude that either had a reason to
invent their accounts. A Secret Service agent who worked on one of the
details in the White House and was present in the Ellipse motorcade had
this comment:
Committee Staff: Ms. Hutchinson has suggested to the committee
that you sympathized with her after her testimony, and believed her
account. Is that accurate?
Special Agent: I have no—yeah, that’s accurate. I have no reason—I
mean, we—we became friends. We worked—I worked every day
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 75
with her for 6 months. Yeah, she became a friend of mine. We had a
good working relationship. I have no reason—she’s never done me
wrong. She’s never lied that I know of.450
The Committee’s principal concern was that the President actually
intended to participate personally in the January 6th efforts at the Capitol,
leading the attempt to overturn the election either from inside the House
Chamber, from a stage outside the Capitol, or otherwise. The Committee
regarded those facts as important because they are relevant to President
Trump’s intent on January 6th. There is no question from all the evidence
assembled that President Trump did have that intent.451
As it became clear that Donald Trump desired to travel to the Capitol on
January 6th, a White House Security Official in the White House complex
became very concerned about his intentions:
To be completely honest, we were all in a state of shock. . . . it just—
one, I think the actual physical feasibility of doing it, and then also
we all knew what that implicated and what that meant, that this
was no longer a rally, that this was going to move to something else
if he physically walked to the Capitol. I—I don’t know if you want to
use the word “insurrection,” “coup,” whatever. We all knew that
this would move from a normal, democratic, you know, public event
into something else.452
President Trump continued to push to travel to the Capitol even after
his return to the White House, despite knowing that a riot was underway.
Kayleigh McEnany, the White House press secretary, spoke with President
Trump about his desire to go to the Capitol after he returned to the White
House from the Ellipse. “So to the best of my recollection, I recall him
being—wanting to—saying that he wanted to physically walk and be a part
of the march and then saying that he would ride the Beast if he needed to,
ride in the Presidential limo.” 453
Later in the afternoon, Mark Meadows relayed to Cassidy Hutchinson
that President Trump was still upset that he would not be able to go to the
Capitol that day. As he told Hutchinson, “the President wasn’t happy that
Bobby [Engel] didn’t pull it off for him and that Mark didn’t work hard
enough to get the movement on the books.” 454
187 MINUTES: TRUMP’S DERELICTION OF DUTY
Just after 1:00 p.m., Vice President Pence, serving as President of the Senate
under Article I of the Constitution, gaveled the Congress into its Joint Ses-
sion. President Trump was giving a speech at the Ellipse, which he con-
cluded at 1:10 pm. For the next few hours, an attack on our Capitol occurred,
perpetrated by Trump supporters many of whom were present at the Ellipse
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76 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
for President Trump’s speech. More than 140 Capitol and Metropolitan
police were injured, some very seriously.455 A perimeter security line of
Metropolitan Police intended to secure the Capitol against intrusion broke
in the face of thousands of armed rioters—more than 2,000 of whom
gained access to the interior of the Capitol building.456 A woman who
attempted to forcibly enter the Chamber of the House of Representatives
through a broken window while the House was in session was shot and
killed by police guarding the chamber. Vice President Pence and his family
were at risk, as were those Secret Service professionals protecting him.
Congressional proceedings were halted, and legislators were rushed to
secure locations.
From the outset of the violence and for several hours that followed,
people at the Capitol, people inside President Trump’s Administration,
elected officials of both parties, members of President Trump’s family, and
Fox News commentators sympathetic to President Trump all tried to con-
tact him to urge him to do one singular thing—one thing that all of these
people immediately understood was required: Instruct his supporters to
stand down and disperse—to leave the Capitol.
As the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates, President Trump spe-
cifically and repeatedly refused to do so—for multiple hours—while the
mayhem ensued. Chapter 8 of this report explains in meticulous detail the
horrific nature of the violence taking place, that was directed at law
enforcement officers at the Capitol and that put the lives of American law-
makers at risk. Yet in spite of this, President Trump watched the violence
on television from a dining room adjacent to the Oval Office, calling Sena-
tors to urge them to help him delay the electoral count, but refusing to sup-
ply the specific help that everyone knew was unequivocally required. As this
report shows, when Trump finally did make such a statement at 4:17 p.m.—
after hours of violence—the statement immediately had the expected
effect; the rioters began to disperse immediately and leave the Capitol.457
To fully understand the President’s behavior during those hours—now
commonly known as the “187 minutes”—it is important to understand the
context in which it occurred. As outlined in this report, by the afternoon of
January 6th, virtually all of President Trump’s efforts to overturn the out-
come of the 2020 election had failed. Virtually all the lawsuits had already
been lost. Vice President Mike Pence had refused Trump’s pressure to stop
the count of certain electoral votes. State officials and legislators had
refused to reverse the election outcomes in every State where Trump and
his team applied pressure. The Justice Department’s investigations of
alleged election fraud had all contradicted Trump’s allegations.
The only factor working in Trump’s favor that might succeed in materi-
ally delaying the counting of electoral votes for President-elect Biden was
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 77
the violent crowd at the Capitol. And for much of the afternoon of January
6th, it appeared that the crowd had accomplished that purpose. Congres-
sional leaders were advised by Capitol Police at one or more points during
the attack that it would likely take several days before the Capitol could
safely be reopened.458
By the time the President’s speech concluded, the lawlessness at the
United States Capitol had already begun, but the situation was about to get
much worse.
By 1:25 p.m., President Trump was informed that the Capitol was under
attack.
Minutes after arriving back at the White House, the President ran into a
member of the White House staff and asked if they had watched his speech
on television. “Sir, they cut it off because they’re rioting down at the Capi-
tol,” the employee said. The President asked what they meant by that.
“[T]hey’re rioting down there at the Capitol,” the employee repeated. “Oh
really?” the President asked. “All right, let’s go see.” 459 A photograph
taken by the White House photographer—the last one permitted until later
in the day—captures the moment the President was made aware of the vio-
lent uprising at the Capitol.460
Not long thereafter, as thousands of Trump supporters from the Ellipse
speech continued to arrive at the Capitol, the DC Metropolitan Police
Department declared a riot at the Capitol at 1:49 p.m., the same time Capitol
Police Chief Steven Sund informed the DC National Guard “that there was a
dire emergency on Capitol Hill and requested the immediate assistance” of
as many national guard troops as possible.461
No photographs exist of the President for the remainder of the after-
noon until after 4 p.m. President Trump appears to have instructed that the
White House photographer was not to take any photographs.462 The Select
Committee also was unable to locate any official records of President
Trump’s telephone calls that afternoon.463 And the President’s official Daily
Diary contains no information for this afternoon between the hours of 1:19
p.m. and 4:03 p.m., at the height of the worst attack on the seat of the
United States Congress in over two centuries.464
The Select Committee did, however, obtain records from non-official
sources that contained data of some phone calls President Trump made that
afternoon. Even though “he was placing lots of calls” that afternoon,
according to his personal assistant,465 the Select Committee was given no
records of any calls from the President to security or law enforcement offi-
cials that afternoon, and that absence of data is consistent with testimony
of witnesses who would have knowledge of any such calls, who said that he
did not do so.466 Based on testimony from President Trump’s close aides,
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78 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
we know that President Trump remained in the Dining Room adjacent to
the Oval Office for the rest of the afternoon until after 4:03 p.m.467
In fact, from cellular telephone records, it appears that at 1:39 p.m. and
2:03 p.m., after being informed of the riot at the Capitol, President Trump
called his lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani. These calls lasted approximately four
minutes and eight minutes, respectively.468 And Press Secretary Kayleigh
McEnany testified that President Trump also called a number of Sena-
tors.469 The number or names of all such Members of Congress is unknown,
although Senator Mike Lee (R–UT) received one such outgoing call from
the President within the hour that followed.470
At 1:49 p.m., just as the DC Metropolitan Police officially declared a riot
and the Capitol Police were calling for help from the National Guard to
address the crisis, President Trump sent a tweet with a link to a recording
of his speech at the Ellipse.471
At about that point, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone became aware
of the Capitol riot. The Committee collected sworn testimony from several
White House officials, each with similar accounts. The President’s White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone testified that he raced downstairs, and went to
the Oval Office Dining Room as soon as he learned about the violence at the
Capitol—likely just around or just after 2 p.m. Cipollone knew immediately
that the President had to deliver a message to the rioters—asking them to
leave the Capitol.
Here is how he described this series of events:
. . . the first time I remember going downstairs was when people had
breached the Capitol… But I went down with [Deputy White House
Counsel] Pat [Philbin], and I remember we were both very upset
about what was happening. And we both wanted, you know, action
to be taken related to that . . . But we went down to the Oval Office,
we went through the Oval office, and we went to the back where the
President was. . . . I think he was already in the dining room . . . I
can’t talk about conversations [with the President]. I think I was
pretty clear there needed to be an immediate and forceful response,
statement, public statement, that people need to leave the Capitol
now.472
Cipollone also left little doubt that virtually everyone among senior
White House staff had the same view:
There were a lot of people in the White House that day . . . Senior
people who, you know, felt the same way that I did and who were
working very hard to achieve that result. There were—I think
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 79
Ivanka was one of them. And Eric Herschmann was there, Pat Phil-
bin was there, and a number of other people . . . . many people sug-
gested it. . . . Many people felt the same way. I’m sure I had
conversations with Mark [Meadows] about this during the course of
the day and expressed my opinion very forcefully that this needs to
be done.473
Likewise, senior staff cooperated to produce a message for the Presi-
dent on a notecard, which read:
ANYONE WHO ENTERED THE CAPITOL ILLEGALLY WITHOUT
PROPER AUTHORITY SHOULD LEAVE IMMEDIATELY. 474
The President declined to make the statement. Cipollone also made it
clear that the advice they were giving to the President never changed
throughout this three-hour period. Trump refused to do what was neces-
sary.
Committee Staff: [I]t sounds like you from the very onset of vio-
lence at the Capitol right around 2 o’clock were pushing for a strong
statement that people should leave the Capitol. Is that right?
Cipollone: I was, and others were as well. 475
Cassidy Hutchinson, who worked closely with Mark Meadows and sat
directly outside his office, confirmed this account and described several
additional details:
I see Pat Cipollone barreling down the hallway towards our office.
And he rushed right in, looked at me, said, “Is Mark in his office?”
And I said, “Yes.” And on a normal day he would’ve said, “Can I pop
in,” or, “Is he talking to anyone,” or, “Is it an appropriate time for
me to go chat with him,” and myself or Eliza would go let him in or
tell him no. But after I had said yes, he just looked at me and started
shaking his head and went over, opened Mark’s office door, stood
there with the door propped open, and said something to the—Mark
was still sitting on his phone. I remember, like, glancing in. He was
still sitting on his phone.
And I remember Pat saying to him something to the effect of, “The
rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and
see the President now.” And Mark looked up at him and said, “He
doesn't want to do anything, Pat.” And Pat said something to the
effect of—and very clearly said this to Mark—something to the
effect of, “Mark, something needs to be done, or people are going to
die and the blood’s gonna be on your F’ing hands. This is getting
out of control. I’m going down there. 476
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The Select Committee believes that the entire White House senior staff
was in favor of a Presidential statement specifically instructing the violent
rioters to leave. But President Trump refused. White House Counsel Pat
Cipollone answered certain questions from the Select Committee on this
subject as follows:
Vice Chair Cheney: And when you talk about others on the staff
thinking more should be done, or thinking that the President
needed to tell people to go home, who would you put in that cat-
egory?
Cipollone: Well, I would put . . . Pat Philbin, Eric Herschmann. Over-
all, Mark Meadows, Ivanka. Once Jared got there, Jared. General
Kellogg. I’m probably missing some, but those are—Kayleigh I
think was there. But I don’t—Dan Scavino.
Vice Chair Cheney: And who on the staff did not want people to
leave the Capitol?”
Cipollone: On the staff?
Vice Chair Cheney: In the White House?
Cipollone: I can’t think of anybody on that day who didn’t want
people to get out of the Capitol once the—particularly once the vio-
lence started. No. I mean—
Mr. Schiff: What about the President?
Vice Chair Cheney: Yeah.
...
[Consultation between Mr. Cipollone and his counsel.]
Cipollone: Yeah. I can’t reveal communications. But obviously I
think, you know—yeah.477
The testimony of a White House employee with national security
responsibilities also corroborated these facts. This employee testified about
a conversation between Pat Cipollone and Eric Herschmann in which Her-
schmann indicated that the President did not want to do anything to halt
the violence. That employee told the Select Committee that he overheard
Herschmann saying something to the effect of “the President didn’t want
anything done.” 478
Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere also testified to the Select Committee
that as soon as it was clear that the Capitol’s outer perimeter had been
breached, he urged that the President make a statement telling the rioters
to go home:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 81
Committee Staff: And so what did you do at that point?
Judd Deere: If I recall, I went back up to [Press Secretary] Kayleigh
[McEnany]’s office and indicated that we now likely needed to say
something.
Committee Staff: Okay. And why did you think it was necessary to
say something?
Deere: Well, I mean, it appears that individuals are storming the
U.S. Capitol building. They also appear to be supporters of Donald
Trump, who may have been in attendance at the rally. We’re going
to need to say something.
Committee Staff: And did you have a view as to what should be said
by the White House?
Deere: If I recall, I told Kayleigh that I thought that we needed to
encourage individuals to stop, to respect law enforcement, and to go
home. . . . And it was—it was incumbent upon us to encourage those
individuals, should they be supporters of ours, to stop.479
Testimony from both Deputy Press Secretary Matthews and White
House Counsel Cipollone indicated that it would have been easy, and nearly
instantaneous, for Trump to make a public statement insisting that the
crowd disperse. As Matthews explained, he could have done so in under a
minute:
. . . it would take probably less than 60 seconds from the Oval Office
dining room over to the Press Briefing Room. And, for folks that
might not know, the Briefing Room is the room that you see the
White House Press Secretary do briefings from with the podium and
the blue backdrop. And there is a camera that is on in there at all
times. And so, if the President had wanted to make a statement and
address the American people, he could have been on camera almost
instantly.480
Cipollone also shared that assessment:
Committee Staff: Would it have been possible at any moment for the
President to walk down to the podium in the briefing room and talk
to the nation at any time between when you first gave him that
advice at 2 o’clock and 4:17 when the video statement went out?
Would that have been possible?
Cipollone: Would it have been possible?”
Committee Staff: Yes.
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82 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cipollone: Yes, it would have been possible.481
At 2:13 p.m., rioters broke into the Capitol and flooded the building.482
As the violence began to escalate, many Trump supporters and others
outside the White House began urgently seeking his intervention. Mark
Meadows’s phone was flooded with text messages. These are just some of
them:
2:32 p.m. from Fox News anchor Laura Ingraham: “Hey Mark, The
president needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home.” 483
2:35 p.m. from Mick Mulvaney: “Mark: he needs to stop this, now.
Can I do anything to help?” 484
2:46 p.m. from Rep. William Timmons (R–SC): “The president
needs to stop this ASAP” 485
2:53 p.m. from Donald Trump, Jr.: “He’s got to condem [sic] this
shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police tweet is not enough.” 486
3:04 p.m. from Rep. Jeff Duncan (R–SC): “POTUS needs to calm this
shit down” 487
3:09 p.m. from former White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus:
“TELL THEM TO GO HOME !!!” 488
3:13 p.m. from Alyssa Farah Griffin: “Potus has to come out firmly
and tell protestors to dissipate. Someone is going to get killed.” 489
3:15 p.m. from Rep. Chip Roy (R–TX): “Fix this now.” 490
3:31 p.m. from Fox News anchor Sean Hannity: “Can he make a
statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully leave the capital
[sic]” 491
3:58 p.m. from Fox News anchor Brian Kilmeade: “Please get him
on tv. Destroying every thing you guys have accomplished” 492
Others on Capitol Hill appeared in the media, or otherwise appeared via
internet. Representative Mike Gallagher (R–WI) issued a video appealing
directly to the President:
Mr. President, you have got to stop this. You are the only person
who can call this off. Call it off. The election is over. Call it off!493
Some Members of Congress sent texts to President Trump’s immediate
staff or took to Twitter, where they knew the President spent time:
Sen. Bill Cassidy (R–LA) issued a tweet: @realDonaldTrump please
appear on TV, condemn the violence and tell people to disband.494
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Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R–WA) sent a text to Mark Meadows:
We need to hear from the president. On TV. I hate that Biden jumped
him on it.495
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy tried repeatedly to reach President
Trump, and did at least once. He also reached out for help to multiple
members of President Trump’s family, including Ivanka Trump and Jared
Kushner.496 Kushner characterized Leader McCarthy’s demeanor on the call
as “scared”:
Kushner: I could hear in his voice that he really was nervous, and
so, obviously, I took that seriously. And, you know, I didn’t know if
I’d be able to have any impact, but I said, you know, it’s better to at
least try. And so I—like I said, I turned the shower off, threw on a
suit, and, you know, and rushed into the White House as quickly as I
could.
Committee Staff: Yeah. What did he ask you to do? When you say
have an impact, what is it specifically that he needed your help
with?
Kushner: I don't recall a specific ask, just anything you could do.
Again, I got the sense that, you know, they were—they were—you
know, they were scared.
Committee Staff: “They” meaning Leader McCarthy and people on
the Hill because of the violence?
Kushner: That he was scared, yes.497
Kevin McCarthy told Fox News at 3:09 p.m. about his call with the
President498 and elaborated about its contents in a conversation with CBS
News’s Norah O’Donnell at around 3:30 p.m.:
O’Donnell: Have you spoken with the President and asked him to
perhaps come to the Capitol and tell his supporters it’s time to
leave?
Leader McCarthy: I have spoken to the President. I asked him to talk
to the nation and tell them to stop this. . . .
* * *
O’Donnell: The President invited tens of thousands of people to
quote unquote stop the steal. I don’t know if you heard his more-
than-hour-long remarks or the remarks of his son, who was the
wind-up. It was some heated stuff, Leader McCarthy. I just wonder
whether someone is going to accurately call a spade a spade, and I
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84 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
am giving you the opportunity right now that your precious and
beloved United States Capitol and our democracy is witnessing this.
Call a spade a spade.
Leader McCarthy: I was very clear with the President when I called
him. This has to stop. And he has to, he’s gotta go to the American
public and tell them to stop this.
* * *
O’Donnell: Leader McCarthy, the President of the United States has
a briefing room steps from the Oval Office. It is, the cameras are hot
24/7, as you know. Why hasn’t he walked down and said that, now?
Leader McCarthy: I conveyed to the President what I think is best to
do, and I’m hopeful the President will do it.499
The Committee has evidence from multiple sources regarding the con-
tent of Kevin McCarthy’s direct conversation with Donald Trump during the
violence.
Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler (R–WA), to whom McCarthy spoke soon
after, relayed more of the conversation between McCarthy and President
Trump:
And he said [to President Trump], “You have got to get on TV.
You’ve got to get on Twitter. You’ve got to call these people off.”
You know what the President said to him? This is as it’s happening.
He said, “Well Kevin, these aren’t my people. You know, these are
Antifa. And Kevin responded and said, “No, they’re your people.
They literally just came through my office windows and my staff are
running for cover. I mean they’re running for their lives. You need
to call them off.” And the President’s response to Kevin to me was
chilling. He said, “Well Kevin, I guess they’re just more upset about
the election, you know, theft than you are”.500
Rep. Herrera Beutler’s account of the incident was also corroborated by
former Acting White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, who testified that
Leader McCarthy told him several days later that President Trump had said
during their call: “Kevin, maybe these people are just more angry about this
than you are. Maybe they’re more upset.” 501
Mulvaney was also trying to reach administration officials to urge
President Trump to instruct his supporters to leave the Capitol.502 As were
many elected officials in both parties, including Nancy Pelosi and Chuck
Schumer, and several Republican Members of Congress.503
As already noted, Cipollone and others in the White House repeatedly
urged President Trump to tell his supporters to leave the Capitol. Cipollone
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 85
described his conversations with Meadows after they failed to convince
President Trump to deliver the necessary message:
Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion with Mark
Meadows with respect to his view that the President didn’t want to
do anything or was somehow resistant to wanting to say something
along the lines that you suggested.
Pat Cipollone: Not just—just to be clear, many people suggested it.
Committee Staff: Yeah.
Cipollone: Not just me. Many people felt the same way. I’m sure I
had conversations with Mark about this during the course of the day
and expressed my opinion very forcefully that this needs to be
done.504
***
Committee Staff: So your advice was tell people to leave the Capitol,
and that took over 2 hours when there were subsequent statements
made, tweets put forth, that in your view were insufficient. Did you
continue, Mr. Cipollone, throughout the period of time up until 4:17,
continue, you and others, to push for a stronger statement?
Cipollone: Yes.505
***
Committee Staff: . . . at the onset of the violence when you first
notice on television or wherever that rioters have actually breached
the Capitol, did you have a conversation with Mark Meadows in
which Meadows indicated he doesn’t want to do anything, “he”
meaning the President?
Cipollone: I don’t—I had a conversation I’m sure with Mark Mead-
ows, I’m sure with other people, of what I thought should be done.
Did Mark say that to me? I don’t have a recollection of him saying
that to me, but he may have said something along the lines.506
At 2:16 p.m., security records indicate that the Vice President was
“being pulled” to a safer location.507
In an interview with the Select Committee, a White House Security Offi-
cial on duty at the White House explained his observations as he listened to
Secret Service communications and made contemporaneous entries into a
security log. In particular, he explained an entry he made at 2:24 p.m.:
Committee Staff: Ok. That last entry on this page is: “Service at the
Capitol does not sound good right now.”
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86 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Official: Correct.
Committee Staff: What does that mean?
Official: The members of the VP detail at this time were starting to
fear for their own lives. There were a lot of—there was a lot of yell-
ing, a lot of—I don’t know—a lot [of] very personal calls over the
radio. So—it was disturbing. I don’t like talking about it, but there
were calls to say good-bye to family members, so on and so forth. It
was getting—for whatever the reason was on the ground, the VP
detail thought that this was about to get very ugly.
Committee Staff: And did you hear that over the radio?
Official: Correct.
...
Committee Staff: … obviously, you’ve conveyed that’s disturbing,
but what prompted you to put it into an entry as it states there,
“Service at the Capitol—”
Official: That they’re running out of options, and they’re getting
nervous. It sounds like that we came very close to either Service
having to use lethal options or worse. At that point, I don’t know. Is
the VP compromised? Is the detail—like, I don’t know. Like, we
didn’t have visibility, but it doesn’t—if they’re screaming and say-
ing things, like, say good-bye to the family, like, the floor needs to
know this is going to a whole another level soon.508
Also at 2:24 p.m., knowing the riot was underway and that Vice Presi-
dent Pence was at the Capitol, President Trump sent this tweet:
Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been
done to protect our Country and our Constitution, giving States a
chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inac-
curate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA
demands the truth! 509
Evidence shows that the 2:24 p.m. tweet immediately precipitated fur-
ther violence at the Capitol. Immediately after this tweet, the crowds both
inside and outside of the Capitol building violently surged forward.510 Out-
side the building, within ten minutes thousands of rioters overran the line
on the west side of the Capitol that was being held by the Metropolitan
Police Force’s Civil Disturbance Unit, the first time in history of the DC
Metro Police that such a security line had ever been broken.511
Virtually everyone on the White House staff the Select Committee inter-
viewed condemned the 2:24 p.m. tweet in the strongest terms.
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Police officers attempt to clear rioters inside the Capitol building.
(Photo by Brent Stirton/Getty Images)
Deputy National Security Adviser Matthew Pottinger told the Select
Committee that the 2:24 p.m. tweet was so destructive that it convinced
him to resign as soon as possible:
One of my aides handed me a sheet of paper that contained the
tweet that you just read. I read it and was quite disturbed by it. I was
disturbed and worried to see that the President was attacking Vice
President Pence for doing his constitutional duty.
So the tweet looked to me like the opposite of what we really needed
at that moment, which was a de-escalation. And that is why I had
said earlier that it looked like fuel being poured on the fire.
So that was the moment that I decided that I was going to resign,
that that would be my last day at the White House. I simply didn’t
want to be associated with the events with the events that were
unfolding at the Capitol.512
Deputy Press Secretary Sarah Matthews had a similar reaction:
So it was obvious that the situation at the Capitol was violent and
escalating quickly. And so I thought that the tweet about the Vice
President was the last thing that was needed in that moment.
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88 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
And I remember thinking that this was going to be bad for him to
tweet this, because it was essentially him giving the green light to
these people, telling them that what they were doing at the steps of
the Capitol and entering the Capitol was okay, that they were justi-
fied in their anger.
And he shouldn’t have been doing that. He should have been telling
these people to go home and to leave and to condemn the violence
that we were seeing.
And I am someone who has worked with him, you know, I worked
on the campaign, traveled all around the country, going to countless
rallies with him, and I have seen the impact that his words have on
his supporters. They truly latch onto every word and every tweet
that he says.
And so, I think that in that moment for him to tweet out the mes-
sage about Mike Pence, it was him pouring gasoline on the fire and
making it much worse.513
Deputy Press Secretary Judd Deere stated the following:
Committee Staff: What was your reaction when you saw that tweet?
Deere: Extremely unhelpful.
Committee Staff: Why?
Deere: It wasn’t the message that we needed at that time. It wasn’t
going to—the scenes at the U.S. Capitol were only getting worse at
that point. This was not going to help that.514
White House Counsel Pat Cipollone told the Select Committee, “I don’t
remember when exactly I heard about that tweet, but my reaction to it is
that’s a terrible tweet, and I disagreed with the sentiment. And I thought it
was wrong.” 515
Likewise, Counselor to the President Hope Hicks texted a colleague that
evening: “Attacking the VP? Wtf is wrong with him.”516
At 2:26 p.m., Vice President Pence was again moved to a different loca-
tion.517
President Trump had the TV on in the dining room.518 At 2:38 p.m., Fox
News was showing video of the chaos and attack, with tear gas filling the
air in the Capitol Rotunda. And a newscaster reported, “[T]his is a very
dangerous situation.” 519 This is the context in which Trump sent the tweet.
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Testimony obtained by the Committee indicates that President Trump
knew about the rioters’ anger at Vice President Pence and indicated some-
thing to the effect that the Vice President “deserves it.” 520 As Cassidy
Hutchinson explained:
I remember Pat saying something to the effect of, “Mark, we need
to do something more. They’re literally calling for the Vice Presi-
dent to be f’ing hung.” And Mark had responded something to the
effect of, “You heard him, Pat. He thinks Mike deserves it. He
doesn’t think they're doing anything wrong.” To which Pat said
something, “[t]his is f’ing crazy, we need to be doing something
more,” briefly stepped into Mark’s office, and when Mark had said
something—when Mark had said something to the effect of, “He
doesn’t think they’re doing anything wrong,” knowing what I had
heard briefly in the dining room coupled with Pat discussing the
hanging Mike Pence chants in the lobby of our office and then
Mark’s response, I understood “they’re” to be the rioters in the
Capitol that were chanting for the Vice President to be hung.521
Although White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was limited in what he
would discuss because of privilege concerns, he stated the following:
Committee Staff: Do you remember any discussion at any point dur-
ing the day about rioters at the Capitol chanting ‘hang Mike Pence?’
Cipollone: Yes. I remember—I remember hearing that—about that.
Yes.
Committee Staff: Yeah. And—
Cipollone: I don’t know if I observed that myself on TV. I don’t
remember.
Committee Staff: I'm just curious, I understand the privilege line
you’ve drawn, but do you remember what you can share with us
about the discussion about those chants, the ‘hang Mike Pence’
chants?
Cipollone: I could tell you my view of that.
Committee Staff: Yeah. Please.
Cipollone: My view of that is that is outrageous.
Committee Staff: Uh-huh.
Cipollone: And for anyone to suggest such a thing as the Vice Presi-
dent of the United States, for people in that crowd to be chanting
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90 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
that I thought was terrible. I thought it was outrageous and wrong.
And I expressed that very clearly to people. 522
Almost immediately after the 2:24 p.m. tweet, Eric Herschmann went
upstairs in the West Wing to try to enlist Ivanka Trump’s assistance to per-
suade her father to do the right thing.523 Ivanka rushed down to the Oval
Office dining room. Although no one could convince President Trump to call
for the violent rioters to leave the Capitol, Ivanka persuaded President
Trump that a tweet could be issued to discourage violence against the
police.
At 2:38 p.m., President Trump sent this tweet:
“Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are
truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!” 524
While some in the meeting invoked executive privilege, or failed to
recall the specifics, others told us what happened at that point. Sarah Mat-
thews, the White House Deputy Press Secretary, had urged her boss, Kay-
leigh McEnany, to have the President make a stronger statement. But she
informed us that President Trump resisted using the word “peaceful” in his
message:
Committee Staff: Ms. Matthews, Ms. McEnany told us she came
right back to the press office after meeting with the President about
this particular tweet. What did she tell you about what happened in
that dining room?
Sarah Matthews: When she got back, she told me that a tweet had
been sent out. And I told her that I thought the tweet did not go far
enough, that I thought there needed to be a call to action and he
needed to condemn the violence. And we were in a room full of
people, but people weren’t paying attention. And so, she looked
directly at me and in a hushed tone shared with me that the Presi-
dent did not want to include any sort of mention of peace in that
tweet and that it took some convincing on their part, those who
were in the room. And she said that there was a back and forth
going over different phrases to find something that he was com-
fortable with. And it wasn’t until Ivanka Trump suggested the
phrase ‘stay peaceful’ that he finally agreed to include it.525
At 3:13 p.m., President Trump sent another tweet, but again declined to
tell people to go home:
“I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No
violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order—respect the
Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!” 526
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Almost everyone, including staff in the White House also found the
President’s 2:38 p.m. and 3:13 p.m. tweets to be insufficient because they
did not instruct the rioters to leave the Capitol. As mentioned, President
Trump’s son, Donald Trump Jr., texted Meadows:
He’s got to condem [sic] this shit. Asap. The captiol [sic] police
tweet is not enough. 527
Sean Hannity also texted Mark Meadows:
Can he make a statement. I saw the tweet. Ask people to peacefully
leave the capital [sic].528
None of these efforts resulted in President Trump immediately issuing
the message that was needed. White House staff had these comments:
Pottinger: Yeah. It was insufficient. I think what—you could count
me among those who was hoping to see an unequivocal strong
statement clearing out the Capitol, telling people to stand down,
leave, go home. I think that’s what we were hoping for. 529
...
Matthews: Yeah. So a conversation started in the press office after
the President sent out those two tweets that I deemed were insuffi-
cient. . . . I thought that we should condemn the violence and con-
demn it unequivocally. And I thought that he needed to include a
call to action and to tell these people to go home. 530
And they were right. Evidence showed that neither of these tweets had
any appreciable impact on the violent rioters. Unlike the video-message
tweet that did not come until 4:17 finally instructing rioters to leave, nei-
ther the 2:38 nor the 3:13 tweets made any difference.
At some point after 3:05 p.m. that afternoon, President Trump’s Chief
of Staff—and President Trump himself—were informed that someone had
been shot.531 That person was Ashli Babbitt, who was fatally shot at 2:44
p.m. as she and other rioters tried to gain access to the House chamber.532
There is no indication that this affected the President’s state of mind that
day, and we found no evidence that the President expressed any remorse
that day.
Meanwhile, leaders in Congress—including Speaker Pelosi, Senator
Schumer, Senator McConnell—and the Vice President, were taking action.
They called the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, governors and
officials in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia, begging for
assistance.533
President-elect Biden also broadcast a video calling on President Trump
to take action:
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92 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I call on President Trump to go on national television now to fulfill
his oath and defend the Constitution and demand an end to this
siege.534
President Trump could have done this, of course, anytime after he
learned of the violence at the Capitol. At 4:17 p.m., 187 minutes after finish-
ing his speech (and even longer after the attack began), President Trump
finally broadcast a video message in which he asked those attacking the
Capitol to leave:
I know your pain. I know you’re hurt. We had an election that was
stolen from us. It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it,
especially the other side, but you have to go home now. We have to
have peace. 535
President Trump’s Deputy Press Secretary, Sarah Matthews testified
about her reaction to this video message:
[H]e told the people who we had just watched storm our nation’s
Capitol with the intent on overthrowing our democracy, violently
attack police officers, and chant heinous things like, “Hang Mike
Pence,” “We love you. You’re very special.” As a spokesperson for
him, I knew that I would be asked to defend that. And to me, his
refusal to act and call off the mob that day and his refusal to con-
demn the violence was indefensible. And so, I knew that I would be
resigning that evening. 536
By this time, the National Guard and other additional law enforcement
had begun to arrive in force and started to turn the tide of the violence.
Many of those attackers in the Capitol saw or received word of President
Trump’s 4:17 p.m. message, and they understood this message as an
instruction to leave:537
• Stephen Ayres testified in front of the Select Committee that: “Well, we
were there. As soon as that come out, everybody started talking about it,
and it seemed like it started to disperse, you know, some of the crowd.
Obviously, you know, once we got back to the hotel room, we seen that
it was still going on, but it definitely dispersed a lot of the crowd.” 538
• Jacob Chansley, also known as the QAnon-Shaman answered President
Trump’s directive: “I’m here delivering the President’s message. Don-
ald Trump has asked everybody to go home.” Another responded to
Chansley: “That’s our order.” 539
• Other unknown individuals also listened to President Trump’s message
while outside the Capitol, and responded: “He says, go home. He says,
go home.” And “Yeah. Here. He said to go home.” 540
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At 6:01 p.m., President Trump sent his last tweet of the day, not con-
demning the violence, but instead attempting to justify it:
These are the things and events that happen when a sacred election
landslide victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away
from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so
long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!541
Staff in President Trump’s own White House and campaign had a
strong reaction to this message:
Sarah Matthews: At that point I had already made the decision to
resign and this tweet just further cemented my decision. I thought
that January 6, 2021, was one of the darkest days in our Nation’s
history and President Trump was treating it as a celebratory occa-
sion with that tweet. And so, it just further cemented my decision to
resign.542
Tim Murtaugh: I don’t think it’s a patriotic act to attack the Capitol.
But I have no idea how to characterize the people other than they
trespassed, destroyed property, and assaulted the U.S. Capitol. I
think calling them patriots is a, let’s say, a stretch, to say the least. .
. . I don’t think it’s a patriotic act to attack the U.S. Capitol.543
Pat Cipollone: [W]hat happened at the Capitol cannot be justified in
any form or fashion. It was wrong, and it was tragic. And a lot—and
it was a terrible day. It was a terrible day for this country.544
Greg Jacob: I thought it was inappropriate. . . . To my mind, it was a
day that should live in infamy.545
At 6:27 p.m., President Trump retired to his residence for the night. As
he did, he had one final comment to an employee who accompanied him to
the residence. The one takeaway that the President expressed in that
moment, following a horrific afternoon of violence and the worst attack
against the U.S. Capitol building in over two centuries, was this: “Mike
Pence let me down.” 546
President Trump’s inner circle was still trying to delay the counting of
electoral votes into the evening, even after the violence had been quelled.
Rudolph Giuliani tried calling numerous Members of Congress in the hour
before the joint session resumed, including Rep. Jim Jordan (R–OH) and
Senators Marsha Blackburn (R–TN), Tommy Tuberville (R–AL), Bill
Hagerty (R–TN), Lindsey Graham (R–SC), Josh Hawley (R–MO), and Ted
Cruz (R–TX).547 His voicemail intended for Senator Tuberville at 7:02 p.m.
that evening eventually was made public:
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94 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A Trump sign with Vice President Mike Pence’s name removed.
(Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images)
Guiliani: Sen. Tuberville? Or I should say Coach Tuberville. This is
Rudy Guiliani, the President’s lawyer. I’m calling you because I
want to discuss with you how they’re trying to rush this hearing and
how we need you, our Republican friends, to try to just slow it down
so we can get these legislatures to get more information to you.548
Reflecting on President Trump’s conduct that day, Vice President Pence
noted that President Trump “had made no effort to contact me in the midst
of the rioting or any point afterward.” 549 He wrote that President Trump’s
“reckless words had endangered my family and all those serving at the
Capitol.” 550
President Trump did not contact a single top national security official
during the day. Not at the Pentagon, nor at the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice, the F.B.I., the Capitol Police Depart-
ment, or the D.C. Mayor’s office.551 As Vice President Pence has confirmed,
President Trump didn’t even try to reach his own Vice President to make
sure that Pence was safe.552 President Trump did not order any of his staff
to facilitate a law enforcement response of any sort.553 His Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff—who is by statute the primary military advisor to the
President—had this reaction:
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General Milley: You know, you’re the Commander in Chief. You’ve
got an assault going on on the Capitol of the United States of
America. And there’s nothing? No call? Nothing? Zero?554
General Milley did, however, receive a call from President Trump’s
Chief of Staff Mark Meadows that day. Here is how he described that call:
He said, “We have to kill the narrative that the Vice President is
making all the decisions. We need to establish the narrative, you
know, that the President is still in charge and that things are steady
or stable,” or words to that effect. I immediately interpreted that as
politics, politics, politics. Red flag for me, personally. No action. But
I remember it distinctly. And I don’t do political narratives.555
Some have suggested that President Trump gave an order to have
10,000 troops ready for January 6th.556 The Select Committee found no evi-
dence of this. In fact, President Trump’s Acting Secretary of Defense Chris-
topher Miller directly refuted this when he testified under oath:
Committee Staff: To be crystal clear, there was no direct order from
President Trump to put 10,000 troops to be on the ready for January
6th, correct?
Miller: No. Yeah. That’s correct. There was no direct—there was no
order from the President.557
Later, on the evening of January 6th, President Trump’s former cam-
paign manager, Brad Parscale, texted Katrina Pierson, one of President
Trump’s rally organizers, that the events of the day were the result of a
“sitting president asking for civil war” and that “This week I feel guilty for
helping him win” now that “. . . a woman is dead.” Pierson answered: “You
do realize this was going to happen.” Parscale replied: “Yeah. If I was
Trump and knew my rhetoric killed someone.” “It wasn’t the rhetoric,”
Pierson suggested. But Parscale insisted: “Yes it was.” 558
THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF JANUARY 6TH
In days following January 6th, President Trump’s family and staff
attempted repeatedly to persuade him not to repeat his election fraud alle-
gations, to concede defeat, and to allow the transition to President Biden to
proceed. Trump did make two video recordings, which initially appeared
contrite. But evidence suggests that these statements were designed at least
in part to ward off other potential consequences of January 6th, such as
invocation of the 25th Amendment or impeachment.
In fact, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy indicated after the attack, in a
discussion with House Republican leaders, that he would ask President
Trump to resign:
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96 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Rep. Cheney: I guess there’s a question when we were talking about
the 25th Amendment resolution, and you asked what would happen
after he’s gone? Is there any chance? Are you hearing that he might
resign? Is there any reason to think that might happen?
Leader McCarthy: I’ve had a few discussions. My gut tells me no.
I’m seriously thinking of having that discussion with him tonight. I
haven’t talked to him in a couple of days. From what I know of him,
I mean, you guys all know him too, do you think he’d ever back
away? But what I think I’m going to do is I’m going to call him. This
is what I think. We know [the 25th Amendment resolution] will pass
the House. I think there’s a chance it will pass the Senate, even
when he’s gone. And I think there’s a lot of different ramifications
for that. . . . Again, the only discussion I would have with him is that
I think this will pass, and it would be my recommendation you
should resign.559
Before January 6th, Fox News personality Sean Hannity warned that
January 6th could be disastrous:
Dec. 31, 2020 text from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows: “We can’t
lose the entire WH counsels office. I do NOT see January 6 happen-
ing the way he is being told. After the 6 th [sic]. He should announce
will lead the nationwide effort to reform voting integrity. Go to Fl
and watch Joe mess up daily. Stay engaged. When he speaks people
will listen.” 560
January 5, 2021 texts from Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows:
“Im very worried about the next 48 hours”
“Pence pressure. WH counsel will leave.”
“Sorry, I can’t talk right now.”
“On with boss”561
A member of the Republican Freedom caucus also warned, on December
31, 2020, and on January 1, 2021:
The President should call everyone off. It’s the only path. If we sub-
stitute the will of states through electors with a vote by Congress
every 4 years . . . we have destroyed the electoral college . . .
Respectfully.562 If POTUS allows this to occur . . . we’re driving a
stake in the heart of the federal republic . . . 563
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After January 6th, Hannity worked to persuade President Trump to stop
talking about election fraud, proposed that Trump pardon Hunter Biden,
and discussed attending the Inauguration:
1. No more stolen election talk.
2. Yes, impeachment and 25th amendment are real, and many people
will quit.
3. He was intrigued by the Pardon idea!! (Hunter)
4. Resistant but listened to Pence thoughts, to make it right.
5. Seemed to like attending Inauguration talk.564
Ultimately, President Trump took little of the advice from Hannity and his
White House staff. A few days later, Hannity wrote again to Meadows and
Jim Jordan:
Guys, we have a clear path to land the plane in 9 days. He can’t
mention the election again. Ever. I did not have a good call with him
today. And worse, I’m not sure what is left to do or say, and I don t
like not knowing if it’s truly understood. Ideas?565
Likewise, despite her many contrary public statements, Republican
Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene privately texted her concerns on
January 6th about a continuing and real threat of violence.
Mark I was just told there is an active shooter on the first floor of
the Capitol Please tell the President to calm people This isn’t the
way to solve anything 566
Donald Trump was impeached on January 13th. In a speech that day,
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy made this statement from the House
floor, but voted against impeachment:
The President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on Con-
gress by mob rioters. He should have immediately denounced the
mob when he saw what was unfolding. These facts require immedi-
ate action by President Trump, accept his share of responsibility,
quell the brewing unrest and ensure President-elect Biden is able to
successfully begin his term. The President’s immediate action also
deserves congressional action, which is why I think a fact-finding
commission and a censure resolution would be prudent.567
Later, McCarthy told members of the House Republican conference that
Trump had acknowledged that he was at least partially responsible for the
January 6th attack.
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98 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Kevin McCarthy speaks at a press conference at the Capitol building on August 27, 2021.
(Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)
I asked him personally today, does he hold responsibility for what
happened? Does he feel bad about what happened? He told me he
does have some responsibility for what happened. And he need to
acknowledge that.568
Since January 6th, President Trump has continued to claim falsely that
the 2020 Presidential election was stolen. Not only that, he has urged other
politicians to push this argument as well. Representative Mo Brooks has
issued a public statement appearing to represent Trump’s private views and
intentions:
President Trump asked me to rescind the 2020 elections, immedi-
ately remove Joe Biden from the White House, immediately put
President Trump back in the White House, and hold a new special
election for the presidency.569
REFERRALS TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL COUNSEL AND HOUSE
ETHICS COMMITTEE
The Committee’s work has produced a substantial body of new information.
We know far more about the President’s plans and actions to overturn the
election than almost all Members of Congress did when President Trump
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 99
was impeached on January 13, 2021, or when he was tried by the Senate in
February of that year. Fifty-seven of 100 Senators voted to convict Presi-
dent Trump at that time, and more than 20 others condemned the Presi-
dent’s conduct and said they were voting against conviction because the
President’s term had already expired.570 At the time, the Republican Leader
of the U.S. Senate said this about Donald Trump: “A mob was assaulting the
Capitol in his name. These criminals were carrying his banners, hanging his
flags, and screaming their loyalty to him. It was obvious that only President
Trump could end this. He was the only one who could.” 571 House Republi-
can Leader Kevin McCarthy, who spoke directly with President Trump dur-
ing the violence of January 6th, expressed similar views both in private and
in public. Privately, Leader McCarthy stated: “But let me be very clear to
you and I have been very clear to the President. He bears responsibility for
his words and actions. No if, ands or buts.” 572 In public, Leader McCarthy
concluded: “The President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on
Congress by mob rioters.” 573
Today we know that the planning to overturn the election on January
6th was substantially more extensive, and involved many other players, and
many other efforts over a longer time period. Indeed, the violent attack and
invasion of the Capitol, and what provoked it, are only a part of the story.
From the outset of its hearings, the Committee has explained that
President Trump and a number of other individuals made a series of very
specific plans, ultimately with multiple separate elements, but all with one
overriding objective: to corruptly obstruct, impede, or influence the count-
ing of electoral votes on January 6th, and thereby overturn the lawful
results of the election. The underlying and fundamental feature of that
planning was the effort to get one man, Vice President Mike Pence, to
assert and then exercise unprecedented and lawless powers to unilaterally
alter the actual election outcome on January 6th. Evidence obtained by the
Committee demonstrates that John Eastman, who worked with President
Trump to put that and other elements of the plan in place, knew even
before the 2020 Presidential election that Vice President Pence could not
lawfully refuse to count official, certified electoral slates submitted by the
Governors of the States.574 Testimony and contemporaneous documentary
evidence also indicate that President Trump knew that the plan was unlaw-
ful before January 6th.575 When the Vice President’s counsel wrote to East-
man on January 6th to ask whether the latter had informed the President
that the Vice President did not have authority to decide the election unilat-
erally, Eastman responded: “He’s been so advised,” and added, “[b]ut you
know him—once he gets something in his head, it is hard to get him to
change course.” 576
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100 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Many of the other elements of President Trump’s plans were specifi-
cally designed to create a set of circumstances on January 6th to assist
President Trump in overturning the lawful election outcome during Con-
gress’s joint session that day. For example, President Trump pressured
State legislatures to adopt new electoral slates that Vice President Pence
could, unlawfully, count. Trump solicited State officials to “find” a suffi-
cient number of votes to alter the final count, and instructed the Depart-
ment of Justice to “just say that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave
the rest to me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.” 577 President Trump
offered the job of Acting Attorney General to Jeffrey Clark. As our evidence
has unequivocally demonstrated, Clark intended to use that position to send
a series of letters from the Department of Justice to multiple States falsely
asserting that the Department had found fraud and urging those States to
convene their legislatures to alter their official electoral slates.578 And
President Trump, with the help of the Republican National Committee and
others, oversaw an effort to create and transmit to Government officials a
series of intentionally false electoral slates for Vice President Pence to uti-
lize on January 6th to alter or delay the count of lawful votes.579
Of course, other elements of the plan complemented these efforts too.
As this Report documents, President Trump was advised by his own experts
and the Justice Department that his election fraud allegations were false,
and he knew he had lost virtually all the legal challenges to the election, but
he nevertheless engaged in a successful but fraudulent effort to persuade
tens of millions of Americans that the election was stolen from him. This
effort was designed to convince Americans that President Trump’s actions
to overturn the election were justified. President Trump then urged his
supporters to travel to Washington on January 6th to apply pressure to
Congress to halt the count and change the election outcome, explaining to
those who were coming to Washington that they needed to “take back”
their country and “stop the steal.” 580
It is helpful in understanding these facts to focus on specific moments
in time when President Trump made corrupt, dishonest, and unlawful
choices to pursue his plans. For example, by December 14th when the elec-
toral college met and certified Joe Biden’s victory, President Trump knew
that he had failed in all the relevant litigation; he had been advised by his
own experts and the Justice Department that his election fraud claims were
false; and he had been told by numerous advisors that he had lost and
should concede. But despite his duty as President to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, he chose instead to ignore all of the judicial rulings
and the facts before him and push forward to overturn the election. Like-
wise, in the days and hours before the violence of January 6th, President
Trump knew that no State had issued any changed electoral slate. Indeed,
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 101
neither President Trump nor his co-conspirators had any evidence that any
majority of any State legislature was willing to do so. President Trump also
knew that Vice President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count legitimate
votes. Despite all of these facts, President Trump nevertheless proceeded to
instruct Vice President Pence to execute a plan he already knew was illegal.
And then knowing that a violent riot was underway, President Trump
breached his oath of office; our Commander in Chief refused for hours to
take the one simple step that his advisors were begging him to take—to
instruct his supporters to disperse, stand down, and leave the Capitol.
Instead, fully understanding what had unfolded at the Capitol, President
Trump exacerbated the violence with a tweet attacking Vice President
Pence.581 Any rational person who had watched the events that day knew
that President Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet would lead to further violence. It
did. And, at almost exactly the same time, President Trump continued to
lobby Congress to delay the electoral count.
As the evidence demonstrates, the rioters at the Capitol had invaded the
building and halted the electoral count. They did not begin to relent until
President Trump finally issued a video statement instructing his supporters
to leave the Capitol at 4:17 p.m., which had an immediate and helpful effect:
rioters began to disperse582—but not before the Capitol was invaded, the
election count was halted, feces were smeared in the Capitol, the Vice
President and his family and many others were put in danger, and more
than 140 law enforcement officers were attacked and seriously injured by
mob rioters. Even if it were true that President Trump genuinely believed
the election was stolen, this is no defense. No President can ignore the courts
and purposely violate the law no matter what supposed “justification” he
or she presents.
These conclusions are not the Committee’s alone. In the course of its
investigation, the Committee had occasion to present evidence to Federal
District Court Judge David Carter, who weighed that evidence against sub-
missions from President Trump’s lawyer, John Eastman. Judge Carter con-
sidered this evidence in the context of a discovery dispute—specifically
whether the Committee could obtain certain of Eastman’s documents pur-
suant to the “crime-fraud” exception to the attorney-client privilege. That
exception provides that otherwise privileged documents may lose their
privilege if they were part of an effort to commit a crime or a fraud, in this
case by President Trump. Judge Carter set out his factual findings, discuss-
ing multiple elements of President Trump’s multi-part plan to overturn the
election,583 and then addressed whether the evidence, including Eastman’s
email communications, demonstrated that Trump and Eastman committed
crimes. “Based on the evidence,” Judge Carter explained, “the Court finds it
more likely than not that President Trump corruptly attempted to obstruct
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102 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021,” and “more likely than
not that President Trump and Dr. Eastman dishonestly conspired to
obstruct the Joint Session of Congress on January 6th.” 584 Judge Carter also
concluded that President Trump’s and Eastman’s “pressure campaign to
stop the electoral count did not end with Vice President Pence—it targeted
every tier of federal and state elected officials” 585 and was “a coup in
search of a legal theory.” 586 “The plan spurred violent attacks on the seat
of our nation’s government,” Judge Carter wrote, and it threatened to
“permanently end[] the peaceful transition of power. . . .” 587
The U.S. Department of Justice has been investigating and prosecuting
persons who invaded the Capitol, engaged in violence, and planned violence
on that day. The Department has charged more than 900 individuals, and
nearly 500 have already been convicted or pleaded guilty as we write.588 As
the Committee’s investigation progressed through its hearings, public
reporting emerged suggesting that the Department of Justice had also
begun to investigate several others specifically involved in the events being
examined by the Committee. Such reports indicated that search warrants
had been issued, based on findings of probable cause, for the cell phones of
John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, and Representative Scott Perry.589 Other
reports suggested that the Department had empaneled one or more grand
juries and was pursuing a ruling compelling several of this Committee’s
witnesses, including Pat Cipollone and Greg Jacob, to give testimony on
topics for which President Trump had apparently asserted executive privi-
lege. Recent reporting suggests that a Federal district court judge has now
rejected President Trump’s executive privilege claims in that context.590
Criminal referrals from a congressional committee are often made in
circumstances where prosecutors are not yet known to be pursuing some of
the same facts and evidence. That is not the case here. During the course of
our investigation, both the U.S. Department of Justice and at least one local
prosecutor’s office (Fulton County, Georgia) have been actively conducting
criminal investigations concurrently with this congressional investiga-
tion.591 In fact, the U.S. Department of Justice has recently taken the
extraordinary step of appointing a Special Counsel to investigate the former
President’s conduct.592
The Committee recognizes that the Department of Justice and other
prosecutorial authorities may be in a position to utilize investigative tools,
including search warrants and grand juries, superior to the means the
Committee has for obtaining relevant information and testimony. Indeed,
both the Department of Justice and the Fulton County District Attorney may
now have access to witness testimony and records that have been unavail-
able to the Committee, including testimony from President Trump’s Chief
of Staff Mark Meadows, and others who either asserted privileges or
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 103
invoked their Fifth Amendment rights.593 The Department may also be able
to access, via grand jury subpoena or otherwise, the testimony of Republi-
can Leader Kevin McCarthy, Representative Scott Perry, Representative Jim
Jordan and others, each of whom appears to have had materially relevant
communications with Donald Trump or others in the White House but who
failed to comply with the Select Committee’s subpoenas.
Taking all of these facts into account, and based on the breadth of the
evidence it has accumulated, the Committee makes the following criminal
referrals to the Department of Justice’s Special Counsel.
I. Obstruction of an Official Proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c))
Section 1512(c)(2) of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime to
“corruptly” “obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding, or
attempt[] to do so.” 594 Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential
violations of this statute for a criminal referral of President Trump and
others.595
First, there should be no question that Congress’s joint session to count
electoral votes on January 6th was an “official proceeding” under section
1512(c). Many Federal judges have already reached that specific conclu-
sion.596
Second, there should be no doubt that President Trump knew that his
actions were likely to “obstruct, influence or impede” that proceeding.
Based on the evidence developed, President Trump was attempting to pre-
vent or delay the counting of lawful certified electoral college votes from
multiple States.597 President Trump was directly and personally involved in
this effort, personally pressuring Vice President Pence relentlessly as the
joint session on January 6th approached.598
Third, President Trump acted with a “corrupt” purpose. Vice President
Pence, Greg Jacob, and others repeatedly told the President that the Vice
President had no unilateral authority to prevent certification of the elec-
tion.599 Indeed, in an email exchange during the violence of January 6th,
Eastman admitted that President Trump had been “advised” that Vice
President Pence could not lawfully refuse to count votes under the Electoral
Count Act, but “once he gets something in his head, it’s hard to get him to
change course.” 600 In addition, President Trump knew that he had lost
dozens of State and Federal lawsuits, and that the Justice Department, his
campaign and his other advisors concluded that there was insufficient fraud
to alter the outcome. President Trump also knew that no majority of any
State legislature had taken or manifested any intention to take any official
action that could change a State’s electoral college votes.601 But President
Trump pushed forward anyway. As Judge Carter explained, “[b]ecause
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104 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
President Trump likely knew that the plan to disrupt the electoral count
was wrongful, his mindset exceeds the threshold for acting ‘corruptly’
under § 1512(c).” 602
Sufficient evidence exists of one or more potential violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c) for a criminal referral of President Trump based solely on his plan
to get Vice President Pence to prevent certification of the election at the
joint session of Congress. Those facts standing alone are sufficient. But
such a charge under that statute can also be based on the plan to create and
transmit to the executive and legislative branches fraudulent electoral
slates, which were ultimately intended to facilitate an unlawful action by
Vice President Pence, to refuse to count legitimate, certified electoral votes
during Congress’s official January 6th proceeding.603 Additionally, evidence
developed about the many other elements of President Trump’s plans to
overturn the election, including soliciting State legislatures, State officials,
and others to alter official electoral outcomes, provides further evidence
that President Trump was attempting through multiple means to corruptly
obstruct, impede, or influence the counting of electoral votes on January
6th. This is also true of President Trump’s personal directive to the Depart-
ment of Justice to “just say that the election was was [sic] corrupt + leave
the rest to me and the R[epublican] Congressmen.” 604
We also stress in particular the draft letter to the Georgia legislature
authored by Jeffrey Clark and another Trump political appointee at the
Department of Justice. The draft letter embraces many of the same theories
that John Eastman and others were asserting in President Trump’s effort to
lobby State legislatures. White House Counsel Pat Cipollone described that
letter as “a murder-suicide pact,” and other White House and Justice
Department officials offered similar descriptions.605 As described herein,
that draft letter was intended to help persuade a State legislature to change
its certified slate of electoral college electors based on false allegations of
fraud, so Vice President Pence could unilaterally and unlawfully decide to
count a different slate on January 6th.606 The letter was transparently false,
improper, and illegal. President Trump had multiple communications with
Clark in the days before January 6th, and there is no basis to doubt that
President Trump offered Clark the position of Acting Attorney General
knowing that Clark would send the letter and others like it.607
Of course, President Trump is also responsible for recruiting tens of
thousands of his supporters to Washington for January 6th, and knowing
they were angry and some were armed, instructing them to march to the
Capitol and “fight like hell.” 608 And then, while knowing a violent riot was
underway, he refused for multiple hours to take the single step his advisors
and supporters were begging him to take to halt the violence: to make a
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 105
public statement instructing his supporters to disperse and leave the Capi-
tol.609 Through action and inaction, President Trump corruptly obstructed,
delayed, and impeded the vote count.
In addition, the Committee believes sufficient evidence exists for a
criminal referral of John Eastman and certain other Trump associates under
18 U.S.C. §1512(c). The evidence shows that Eastman knew in advance of the
2020 election that Vice President Pence could not refuse to count electoral
votes on January 6th.610 In the days before January 6th, Eastman was
warned repeatedly that his plan was illegal and “completely crazy,” and
would “cause riots in the streets.” 611 Nonetheless, Eastman continued to
assist President Trump’s pressure campaign in public and in private,
including in meetings with the Vice President and in his own speech at the
Ellipse on January 6th. And even as the violence was playing out at the
Capitol, Eastman admitted in writing that his plan violated the law but
pressed for Pence to do it anyway.612 In the immediate aftermath of January
6th, White House lawyer Eric Herschmann told Eastman that he should
“[g]et a great F'ing criminal defense lawyer, you’re going to need it.” 613
Others working with Eastman likely share in Eastman’s culpability. For
example, Kenneth Chesebro was a central player in the scheme to submit
fake electors to the Congress and the National Archives.
The Committee notes that multiple Republican Members of Congress,
including Representative Scott Perry, likely have material facts regarding
President Trump’s plans to overturn the election. For example, many Mem-
bers of Congress attended a White House meeting on December 21, 2020, in
which the plan to have the Vice President affect the outcome of the election
was disclosed and discussed. Evidence indicates that certain of those Mem-
bers unsuccessfully sought Presidential pardons from President Trump
after January 6th,614 as did Eastman,615 revealing their own clear con-
sciousness of guilt.
II. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371)
Section 371 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides that “[i]f two or more per-
sons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to
defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.” The Committee believes sufficient evidence exists
for a criminal referral of President Trump and others under this statute.616
First, President Trump entered into an agreement with individuals to
obstruct a lawful function of the government (the certification of the elec-
tion). The evidence of this element overlaps greatly with the evidence of the
section 1512(c)(2) violations, so we will not repeat it at length here. Presi-
dent Trump engaged in a multi-part plan described in this Report to
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106 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
obstruct a lawful certification of the election. Judge Carter focused his opin-
ions largely on John Eastman’s role, as Eastman’s documents were at issue
in that case, concluding that “the evidence shows that an agreement to
enact the electoral count plan likely existed between President Trump and
Eastman.” 617 But President Trump entered into agreements—whether for-
mal or informal618—with several other individuals who assisted with the
multi-part plan. With regard to the Department of Justice, Jeffrey Clark
stands out as a participant in the conspiracy, as the evidence suggests that
Clark entered into an agreement with President Trump that if appointed
Acting Attorney General, he would send a letter to State officials falsely
stating that the Department of Justice believed that State legislatures had a
sufficient factual basis to convene to select new electors. This was false—
the Department of Justice had reached the conclusion that there was no
factual basis to contend that the election was stolen. Again, as with section
1512(c), the conspiracy under section 371 appears to have also included
other individuals such as Chesebro, Rudolph Giuliani, and Mark Meadows,
but this Committee does not attempt to determine all of the participants of
the conspiracy, many of whom refused to answer this Committee’s ques-
tions.
Second, there are several bases for finding that the conspirators used
“deceitful or dishonest means.” For example, President Trump repeatedly
lied about the election, after he had been told by his advisors that there was
no evidence of fraud sufficient to change the results of the election.619 In
addition, the plot to get the Vice President to unilaterally prevent certifica-
tion of the election was manifestly (and admittedly) illegal, as discussed
above. Eastman and others told President Trump that it would violate the
Electoral Count Act if the Vice President unilaterally rejected electors. Thus
Judge Carter once again had little trouble finding that the intent require-
ment (“deceitful or dishonest means”) was met, stating that “President
Trump continuing to push that plan despite being aware of its illegality
constituted obstruction by ‘dishonest’ means under § 371.” 620 Judge Carter
rejected the notion that Eastman’s plan—which the President adopted and
actualized—was a “good faith interpretation” of the law, finding instead
that it was “a partisan distortion of the democratic process.” 621 Similarly,
both President Trump and Clark had been told repeatedly that the Depart-
ment of Justice had found no evidence of significant fraud in any of its
investigations, but they nonetheless pushed the Department of Justice to
send a letter to State officials stating that the Department had found such
fraud. And Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and others made
clear to President Trump that they had no authority to “find” him 11,780
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 107
votes, but the President relentlessly insisted that they do exactly that, even
to the point of suggesting there could be criminal consequences if they
refused.622
Third, there were numerous overt acts in furtherance of the agreement,
including each of the parts of the President’s effort to overturn the election.
As Judge Carter concluded, President Trump and Eastman participated in
“numerous overt acts in furtherance of their shared plan.” 623 These
included, but certainly were not limited to, direct pleas to the Vice President
to reject electors or delay certification, including in Oval Office meetings
and the President’s vulgar comments to the Vice President on the morning
of January 6th. Judge Carter also addressed evidence that President Trump
knowingly made false representations to a court. Judge Carter concluded
that Eastman’s emails showed “that President Trump knew that the spe-
cific numbers of voter fraud” cited in a complaint on behalf of President
Trump “were wrong but continued to tout those numbers, both in court
and to the public.” Judge Carter found that the emails in question were
related to and in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud the United
States.624
In finding that President Trump, Eastman, and others engaged in con-
spiracy to defraud the United States under section 371, Judge Carter relied
on the documents at issue (largely consisting of Eastman’s own emails) and
evidence presented to the court by this Committee. This Committee’s
investigation has progressed significantly since Judge Carter issued his first
crime-fraud ruling in March 2022. The evidence found by this Committee
and discussed in detail in this Report further documents that the conspiracy
to defraud the United States under section 371 extended far beyond the
effort to pressure the Vice President to prevent certification of the election.
The Committee believes there is sufficient evidence for a criminal referral
of the multi-part plan described in this Report under section 371, as the
very purpose of the plan was to prevent the lawful certification of Joe
Biden’s election as President.
III. Conspiracy to Make a False Statement (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001)
President Trump, through others acting at his behest, submitted slates of
fake electors to Congress and the National Archives. Section 1001 of Title 18
of the United States Code applies, in relevant part, to “whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or
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108 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry.”
According to the Department of Justice, whether a false statement is
criminal under section 1001 “depends on whether there is an affirmative
response to each of the following questions:
1. Was the act or statement material?
2. Was the act within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the
United States?
3. Was the act done knowingly and willfully?” 625
In addition, and as explained above, 18 U.S.C. § 371 makes it a crime to con-
spire to “commit any offense against the United States.” 626
The evidence suggests President Trump conspired with others to submit
slates of fake electors to Congress and the National Archives. Sufficient evi-
dence exists of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001 for a criminal referral
of President Trump and others.
As explained earlier and in Chapter 3 of this Report, the certifications
signed by Trump electors in multiple States were patently false. Vice Presi-
dent Biden won each of those States, and the relevant State authorities had
so certified. It can hardly be disputed that the false slates of electors were
material, as nothing can be more material to the joint session of Congress
to certify the election than the question of which candidate won which
States. Indeed, evidence obtained by the Committee suggests that those
attempting to submit certain of the electoral votes regarded the need to
provide that material to Vice President Pence as urgent.627
There should be no question that section 1001 applies here. The false
electoral slates were provided both to the executive branch (the National
Archives) and the legislative branch.628 The statute applies to “any matter
within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States.” 629 It is well established that false state-
ments to Congress can constitute violations of section 1001.630
Finally, the false statement was made knowingly and willfully. There is
some evidence suggesting that some signatories of the fake certificates
believed that the certificates were contingent, to be used only in the event
that President Trump prevailed in litigation challenging the election results
in their States. That may be relevant to the question whether those electors
knowingly and willfully signed a false statement at the time they signed the
certificates. But it is of no moment to President Trump’s conduct, as Presi-
dent Trump (including acting through co-conspirators such as John East-
man and Kenneth Chesebro) relied on the existence of those fake electors as
a basis for asserting that the Vice President could reject or delay certifica-
tion of the Biden electors. In fact, as explained earlier and in Chapter 5 of
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 109
this Report, Eastman’s memorandum setting out a six-step plan for over-
turning the election on January 6th begins by stating that “7 states have
transmitted dual slates of electors to the President of the Senate.”
The remaining question is who engaged in this conspiracy to make the
false statement to Congress under section 1001. The evidence is clear that
President Trump personally participated in a scheme to have the Trump
electors meet, cast votes, and send their votes to the joint session of Con-
gress in several States that Vice President Biden won, and then his support-
ers relied on the existence of these fake electors as part of their effort to
obstruct the joint session. Republican National Committee (RNC) Chair-
woman Ronna McDaniel testified before this Committee that President
Trump and Eastman directly requested that the RNC organize the effort to
have these fake (i.e., Trump) electors meet and cast their votes.631 Thus, the
Committee believes that sufficient evidence exists for a criminal referral of
President Trump for illegally engaging in a conspiracy to violate section
1001; the evidence indicates that he entered into an agreement with East-
man and others to make the false statement (the fake electoral certificates),
by deceitful or dishonest means, and at least one member of the conspiracy
engaged in at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy (e.g.,
President Trump and Eastman’s call to Ronna McDaniel).
IV. “Incite,” “Assist” or “Aid and Comfort” an Insurrection (18 U.S.C. § 2383)
Section 2383 of Title 18 of the United States Code applies to anyone who
“incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection
against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or
comfort thereto.” 632 The Committee recognizes that section 2383 does not
require evidence of an “agreement” between President Trump and the vio-
lent rioters to establish a violation of that provision; instead, the President
need only have incited, assisted, or aided and comforted those engaged in
violence or other lawless activity in an effort to prevent the peaceful transi-
tion of the Presidency under our Constitution. A Federal court has already
concluded that President Trump’s statements during his Ellipse speech
were “plausibly words of incitement not protected by the First Amend-
ment.” 633 Moreover, President Trump was impeached for “Incitement of
Insurrection,” and a majority of the Senate voted to convict, with many
more suggesting they might have voted to convict had President Trump still
been in office at the time.634
As explained throughout this Report and in this Committee’s hearings,
President Trump was directly responsible for summoning what became a
violent mob to Washington, DC, urging them to march to the Capitol, and
then further provoking the already violent and lawless crowd with his 2:24
p.m. tweet about the Vice President. Even though President Trump had
repeatedly been told that Vice President Pence had no legal authority to
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110 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
stop the certification of the election, he asserted in his speech on January
6th that if the Vice President “comes through for us” that he could deliver
victory to Trump: “[I]f Mike Pence does the right thing, we win the elec-
tion.” This created a desperate and false expectation in President Trump’s
mob that ended up putting the Vice President and his entourage and many
others at the Capitol in physical danger. When President Trump tweeted at
2:24 p.m., he knew violence was underway. His tweet exacerbated that vio-
lence.635
During the ensuing riot, the President refused to condemn the violence
or encourage the crowd to disperse despite repeated pleas from his staff
and family that he do so. The Committee has evidence from multiple
sources establishing these facts, including testimony from former White
House Counsel Pat Cipollone. Although Cipollone’s testimony did not dis-
close a number of direct communications with President Trump in light of
concerns about executive privilege, the Department now appears to have
obtained a ruling that Cipollone can testify before a grand jury about these
communications. Based on the information it has obtained, the Committee
believes that Cipollone and others can provide direct testimony establishing
that President Trump refused repeatedly, for multiple hours, to make a
public statement directing his violent and lawless supporters to leave the
Capitol. President Trump did not want his supporters (who had effectively
halted the vote counting) to disperse. Evidence obtained by the Committee
also indicates that President Trump did not want to provide security assis-
tance to the Capitol during that violent period.636 This appalling behavior
by our Commander in Chief occurred despite his affirmative constitutional
duty to act to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.637
The Committee believes that sufficient evidence exists for a criminal
referral of President Trump for “assist[ing]” or “ai[ding] and comfort-
[ing]” those at the Capitol who engaged in a violent attack on the United
States. The Committee has developed significant evidence that President
Trump intended to disrupt the peaceful transition of power and believes
that the Department of Justice can likely elicit testimony relevant to an
investigation under section 2383.
For example, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows told White House Counsel
Pat Cipollone that the President “doesn’t want to do anything” to stop the
violence.638 Worse, at 2:24 p.m., the President inflamed and exacerbated the
mob violence by sending a tweet stating that the Vice President “didn’t
have the courage to do what should have been done.” 639 The President
threw gasoline on the fire despite knowing that there was a violent riot
underway at the Capitol. Indeed, video and audio footage from the attack
shows that many of the rioters specifically mentioned Vice President
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 111
Pence.640 And immediately after President Trump sent his tweet, the vio-
lence escalated. Between 2:25 p.m. and 2:28 p.m., rioters breached the East
Rotunda doors, other rioters breached the police line in the Capitol Crypt,
Vice President Pence had to be evacuated from his Senate office, and Leader
McCarthy was evacuated from his Capitol office.641
Evidence developed in the Committee’s investigation showed that the
President, when told that the crowd was chanting “Hang Mike Pence,”
responded that perhaps the Vice President deserved to be hanged.642 And
President Trump rebuffed pleas from Leader McCarthy to ask that his sup-
porters leave the Capitol stating, “Well, Kevin, I guess these people are
more upset about the election than you are.” After hours of deadly riot,
President Trump eventually released a videotaped statement encouraging
the crowd to disperse, though openly professing his “love” for the mem-
bers of the mob and empathizing with their frustration at the “stolen”
election. President Trump has since expressed a desire to pardon those
involved in the attack.643
Both the purpose and the effect of the President’s actions were to
mobilize a large crowd to descend on the Capitol. Several defendants in
pending criminal cases identified the President's allegations about the
“stolen election” as the key motivation for their activities at the Capitol.
Many of them specifically cited the President’s tweets asking his supporters
to come to Washington, DC, on January 6th. For example, one defendant
who later pleaded guilty to threatening House Speaker Nancy Pelosi texted
a family member on January 6th to say: “[Trump] wants heads and I'm
going to deliver.” 644 Another defendant released a statement through his
attorney stating: “I was in Washington, DC on January 6, 2021, because I
believed I was following the instructions of former President Trump and he
was my President and the commander-in-chief. His statements also had
me believing the election was stolen from him.” 645
As the violence began to subside and law enforcement continued to
secure the Capitol, President Trump tweeted again, at 6:01 pm to justify the
actions of the rioters: “These are the things and events that happen,” he
wrote, when his so-called victory was “so unceremoniously & viciously
stripped away. . . .” 646 When he wrote those words, he knew exactly what
he was doing. Before President Trump issued the tweet, a White House
staffer cautioned him that the statement would imply that he “had some-
thing to do with the events that happened at the Capitol”—but he tweeted
it anyway.647 The final words of that tweet leave little doubt about President
Trump’s sentiments toward those who invaded the Capitol: “Remember
this day forever!” 648
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112 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
V. Other Conspiracy Statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 372 and 2384)
Depending on evidence developed by the Department of Justice, the Presi-
dent’s actions with the knowledge of the risk of violence could also consti-
tute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 372 and § 2384, both of which require proof of
a conspiracy. Section 372 prohibits a conspiracy between two or more per-
sons “to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accept-
ing or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United
States, or from discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means
any officer of the United States to leave the place, where his duties as an
officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in the discharge of his
official duties.” 649 Oath Keepers Kelly Meggs, Kenneth Harrelson, and Jes-
sica Watkins were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 372 in connection with
the January 6th attack on the Capitol.650 The Committee believes that for-
mer Chief of Staff Mark Meadows (who refused to testify and was held in
contempt of Congress) could have specific evidence relevant to such
charges, as may witnesses who invoked their Fifth Amendment rights
against self-incrimination before this Committee.
Section 2384, the seditious conspiracy statute, prohibits “conspir[acy]
to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the
United States . . . or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force
to prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United
States . . . .” 651 A jury has already determined beyond a reasonable doubt that
a conspiracy existed under section 2384, as the leader of the Oath Keepers
and at least one other individual were convicted of seditious conspiracy
under section 2384 for their actions related to the attack on the Capitol.652
A trial regarding a series of other “Proud Boy” defendants may also address
similar issues.653
The Department of Justice, through its investigative tools that exceed
those of this Committee, may have evidence sufficient to prosecute Presi-
dent Trump under sections 372 and 2384. Accordingly, we believe sufficient
evidence exists for a criminal referral of President Trump under these two
statutes.
VI. The Committee’s Concerns Regarding Possible Obstruction of its Investigation
The Committee has substantial concerns regarding potential efforts to
obstruct its investigation, including by certain counsel (some paid by
groups connected to the former President) who may have advised clients to
provide false or misleading testimony to the Committee.654 Such actions
could violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512. The Committee is aware that both the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office
have already obtained information relevant to these matters, including
from the Committee directly. We urge the Department of Justice to examine
the facts to discern whether prosecution is warranted. The Committee’s
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 113
broad concerns regarding obstruction and witness credibility are addressed
in the Executive Summary to this Report.
VII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THOSE WHO PLOTTED UNLAWFULLY TO OVERTURN THE
ELECTION IS CRITICAL.
To date, the Justice Department has pursued prosecution of hundreds of
individuals who planned and participated in the January 6th invasion of and
attack on our Capitol. But the Department has not yet charged individuals
who engaged in the broader plan to overturn the election through the
means discussed in this Report. The Committee has concluded that it is
critical to hold those individuals accountable as well, including those who
worked with President Trump to create and effectuate these plans.
In his speech from the Ellipse on January 6th, President Trump recited
a host of election fraud allegations he knew to be false, and then told tens
of thousands of his angry supporters this:
And fraud breaks up everything, doesn’t it? When you catch some-
body in a fraud, you’re allowed to go by very different rules. So I
hope Mike has the courage to do what he has to do. And I hope he
doesn’t listen to the RINOs and the stupid people that he’s listening
to. 655
The meaning of President Trump’s comments was sufficiently clear
then, but he recently gave America an even more detailed understanding of
his state of mind. Trump wrote that allegations of “massive fraud” related
to the 2020 election “allow[] for the termination of all rules, regulations
and articles, even those found in the Constitution.” 656 And President
Trump considered pardoning those involved in the attack and has since
expressed a desire to pardon them—and even give them an apology—if he
returns to the Oval Office.657
In the Committee’s judgment, based on all the evidence developed,
President Trump believed then, and continues to believe now, that he is
above the law, not bound by our Constitution and its explicit checks on
Presidential authority. This recent Trump statement only heightens our
concern about accountability. If President Trump and the associates who
assisted him in an effort to overturn the lawful outcome of the 2020 elec-
tion are not ultimately held accountable under the law, their behavior may
become a precedent, and invitation to danger, for future elections. A failure
to hold them accountable now may ultimately lead to future unlawful
efforts to overturn our elections, thereby threatening the security and
viability of our Republic.
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114 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
VIII. REFERRAL OF MEMBERS TO THE HOUSE ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH SUBPOENAS
During the course of the Select Committee’s investigation of President
Trump’s efforts to subvert the election, the Committee learned that various
Members of Congress had information relevant to the investigation.
Accordingly, the Committee wrote letters to a number of Members involved
in that activity inviting them to participate voluntarily in the Select Com-
mittee’s investigation. None of the members was willing to provide infor-
mation, which forced the Select Committee to consider alternative means of
securing evidence about the conduct of these Members and the information
they might have. On May 12, 2022, the Select Committee subpoenaed sev-
eral members of Congress—including House Minority Leader Kevin McCa-
rthy, Representative Jim Jordan, Representative Scott Perry, and
Representative Andy Biggs—to obtain information related to the Commit-
tee’s investigation.
This was a significant step, but it was one that was warranted by the
certain volume of information these Members possessed that was relevant
to the Select Committee’s investigation, as well as the centrality of their
efforts to President Trump’s multi-part plan to remain in power.
Representative McCarthy, among other things, had multiple communi-
cations with President Trump, Vice President Pence, and others on and
related to January 6th. For example, during the attack on the Capitol, Rep-
resentative McCarthy urgently requested that the former President issue a
statement calling off the rioters, to which President Trump responded by
“push[ing] back” and said: “Well, Kevin, I guess these people are more
upset about the election than you are.” 658 And, after the attack, Represen-
tative McCarthy spoke on the House floor and said that, “[t]here is abso-
lutely no evidence” that Antifa caused the attack on the Capitol and instead
called on President Trump to “accept his share of responsibility” for the
violence.659 As noted above, Representative McCarthy privately confided in
colleagues that President Trump accepted some responsibility for the attack
on the Capitol.660
Representative Jordan was a significant player in President Trump’s
efforts. He participated in numerous post-election meetings in which
senior White House officials, Rudolph Giuliani, and others, discussed strat-
egies for challenging the election, chief among them claims that the elec-
tion had been tainted by fraud. On January 2, 2021, Representative Jordan
led a conference call in which he, President Trump, and other Members of
Congress discussed strategies for delaying the January 6th joint session.
During that call, the group also discussed issuing social media posts
encouraging President Trump’s supporters to “march to the Capitol” on
the 6th.661 An hour and a half later, President Trump and Representative
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 115
Jordan spoke by phone for 18 minutes.662 The day before January 6th, Rep-
resentative Jordan texted Mark Meadows, passing along advice that Vice
President Pence should “call out all the electoral votes that he believes are
unconstitutional as no electoral votes at all.” 663 He spoke with President
Trump by phone at least twice on January 6th, though he has provided
inconsistent public statements about how many times they spoke and what
they discussed.664 He also received five calls from Rudolph Giuliani that
evening, and the two connected at least twice, at 7:33 p.m. and 7:49 p.m.665
During that time, Giuliani has testified, he was attempting to reach Mem-
bers of Congress after the joint session resumed to encourage them to con-
tinue objecting to Joe Biden’s electoral votes.666 And, in the days following
January 6th, Representative Jordan spoke with White House staff about the
prospect of Presidential pardons for Members of Congress.667
Like Representative Jordan, Representative Perry was also involved in
early post-election messaging strategy. Both Representative Jordan and
Representative Perry were involved in discussions with White House offi-
cials about Vice President Pence’s role on January 6th as early as November
2020.668 Representative Perry was present for conversations in which the
White House Counsel’s Office informed him and others that President
Trump’s efforts to submit fake electoral votes were not legally sound.669
But perhaps most pivotally, he was involved in President Trump’s efforts to
install Jeffrey Clark as the Acting Attorney General in December 2020 and
January 2021. Beginning in early December 2020, Representative Perry sug-
gested Clark as a candidate to Mark Meadows,670 then introduced Clark to
President Trump.671 In the days before January 6th, Representative Perry
advocated for President Trump to speak at the Capitol during the joint ses-
sion, speaking to Mark Meadows on at least one occasion about it.672 He
was also a participant in the January 2, 2021, call in which Representative
Jordan, President Trump, and others discussed issuing social media posts to
encourage Trump supporters to march to the Capitol on January 6th.673
After January 6th, Representative Perry reached out to White House staff
asking to receive a Presidential pardon.674
Representative Biggs was involved in numerous elements of President
Trump’s efforts to contest the election results. As early as November 6,
2020, Representative Biggs texted Mark Meadows, urging him to “encour-
age the state legislatures to appoint [electors].” 675 In the following days,
Representative Biggs told Meadows not to let President Trump concede his
loss.676 Between then and January 6th, Representative Biggs coordinated
with Arizona State Representative Mark Finchem to gather signatures from
Arizona lawmakers endorsing fake Trump electors.677 He also contacted
fake Trump electors in at least one State seeking evidence related to voter
fraud.678
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116 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To date, none of the subpoenaed Members has complied with either
voluntary or compulsory requests for participation.
Representative McCarthy initially responded to the Select Committee’s
subpoena in two letters on May 27 and May 30, 2022, in which he objected
to the Select Committee’s composition and validity of the subpoena and
offered to submit written interrogatories in lieu of deposition testimony.
Although the Select Committee did not release Representative McCarthy
from his subpoena obligations, Representative McCarthy failed to appear
for his scheduled deposition on May 31, 2022. The Select Committee
responded to Representative McCarthy’s letters this same day, rejecting his
proposal to participate via written interrogatories and compelling his
appearance for deposition testimony no later than June 11, 2022. Although
Representative McCarthy again responded via letter on June 9, 2022, he did
not appear for deposition testimony on or before the specified June 11,
2022, deadline.
Representative Jordan also responded to the Select Committee’s sub-
poena just before his scheduled deposition in a letter on May 25, 2022, con-
taining a variety of objections. Representative Jordan also requested
material from the Select Committee, including all materials referencing
him in the Select Committee’s possession and all internal legal analysis
related to the constitutionality of Member subpoenas. Although the Select
Committee did not release Representative Jordan from his subpoena obliga-
tions, Representative Jordan failed to appear for his scheduled deposition
on May 27, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the Select Committee responded to the
substance of Representative Jordan’s May 25th letter and indicated that
Representative Jordan should appear for deposition testimony no later than
June 11, 2022. On June 9, 2022, Representative Jordan again wrote to reiter-
ate the points from his May 25th letter. That same day, Representative Jor-
dan sent out a fundraising email with the subject line: “I’VE BEEN
SUBPOENED.” 679 Representative Jordan did not appear before the Select
Committee on or before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Representative Perry likewise responded to the Select Committee’s sub-
poena on May 24, 2022, in a letter, “declin[ing] to appear for deposition”
and requesting that the subpoena be “immediately withdrawn.” 680
Although the Select Committee did not release Representative Perry from
his subpoena obligations, Representative Perry failed to appear on May 26,
2022, for his scheduled deposition. Representative Perry sent a second let-
ter to the Select Committee on May 31, 2022, with additional objections.
That same day, the Select Committee responded to Representative Perry’s
letters and stated that he should appear before the Select Committee no
later than June 11, 2022, for deposition testimony. Representative Perry
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 117
responded via letter on June 10, 2022, maintaining his objections. He did
not appear before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Representative Biggs issued a press release on the day the Select Com-
mittee issued its subpoena, calling the subpoena “illegitimate” and “pure
political theater.” The day before his scheduled deposition, Representative
Biggs sent a letter to the Select Committee with a series of objections and
an invocation of Speech or Debate immunity. Although the Select Commit-
tee did not release Representative Biggs from his subpoena obligations,
Representative Biggs did not appear for his scheduled deposition on May
26, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the Select Committee responded to the sub-
stance of Representative Biggs’ May 25th letter and indicated that Repre-
sentative Biggs should appear for deposition testimony no later than June
11, 2022. Although Representative Biggs responded with another letter on
June 9th, he did not appear before the June 11, 2022, deadline.
Despite the Select Committee’s repeated attempts to obtain information
from these Members and the issuance of subpoenas, each has refused to
cooperate and failed to comply with a lawfully issued subpoena. Accord-
ingly, the Select Committee is referring their failure to comply with the
subpoenas issued to them to the Ethics Committee for further action. To be
clear, this referral is only for failure to comply with lawfully issued subpoe-
nas.
The Rules of the House of Representatives make clear that their willful
noncompliance violates multiple standards of conduct and subjects them to
discipline. Willful non-compliance with compulsory congressional commit-
tee subpoenas by House Members violates the spirit and letter of House rule
XXIII, clause 1, which requires House Members to conduct themselves “at
all times in a manner that shall reflect creditably on the House.” As a previ-
ous version of the House Ethics Manual explained, this catchall provision
encompasses “‘flagrant’ violations of the law that reflect on ‘Congress as a
whole,’ and that might otherwise go unpunished.” 681 The subpoenaed
House Members’ refusal to comply with their subpoena obligations satisfies
these criteria. A House Member’s willful failure to comply with a congres-
sional subpoena also reflects discredit on Congress. If left unpunished, such
behavior undermines Congress’s longstanding power to investigate in sup-
port of its lawmaking authority and suggests that Members of Congress
may disregard legal obligations that apply to ordinary citizens.
For these reasons, the Select Committee refers Leader McCarthy and
Representatives Jordan, Perry, and Biggs for sanction by the House Ethics
Committee for failure to comply with subpoenas. The Committee also
believes that each of these individuals, along with other Members who
attended the December 21st planning meeting with President Trump at the
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118 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
White House,682 should be questioned in a public forum about their advance
knowledge of and role in President Trump’s plan to prevent the peaceful
transition of power.
EFFORTS TO AVOID TESTIFYING, EVIDENCE OF OBSTRUCTION, AND ASSESSMENTS OF
WITNESS CREDIBILITY
More than 30 witnesses before the Select Committee exercised their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused on that basis
to provide testimony. They included individuals central to the investigation,
such as John Eastman, Jeffrey Clark, Roger Stone, Michael Flynn, Kenneth
Chesebro, and others.683 The law allows a civil litigant to rely upon an
“adverse inference” when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment. “[T]he
Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil
actions . . ..” 684 The Committee has not chosen to rely on any such infer-
ence in this Report or in its hearings.
We do note that certain witness assertions of the Fifth Amendment
were particularly troubling, including this:
Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe the violence on
January 6th was justified?
Counsel for the Witness: Can I get clarification, is that a moral
question or are you asking a legal question?
Vice Chair Cheney: I'm asking both.
General Flynn: The Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January 6th was
justified morally?
General Flynn: Take the Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: Do you believe the violence on January 6th was
justified legally?
General Flynn: Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney: General Flynn, do you believe in the peaceful
transition of power in the United States of America?
General Flynn: The Fifth.685
President Trump refused to comply with the Committee’s subpoena,
and also filed suit to block the National Archives from supplying the Com-
mittee with White House records. The Committee litigated the National
Archives case in Federal District Court, in the Federal Appellate Court for
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 119
the District of Columbia, and before the Supreme Court. The Select Com-
mittee was successful in this litigation. The opinion of the D.C. Circuit
explained:
On January 6, 2021, a mob professing support for then-President
Trump violently attacked the United States Capitol in an effort to
prevent a Joint Session of Congress from certifying the electoral
college votes designating Joseph R. Biden the 46th President of the
United States. The rampage left multiple people dead, injured more
than 140 people, and inflicted millions of dollars in damage to the
Capitol. Then-Vice President Pence, Senators, and Representatives
were all forced to halt their constitutional duties and flee the House
and Senate chambers for safety.686
Benjamin Franklin said, at the founding, that we have “[a]
Republic”—“if [we] can keep it.” The events of January 6th exposed
the fragility of those democratic institutions and traditions that we
had perhaps come to take for granted. In response, the President of
the United States and Congress have each made the judgment that
access to this subset of presidential communication records is nec-
essary to address a matter of great constitutional moment for the
Republic. Former President Trump has given this court no legal rea-
son to cast aside President Biden’s assessment of the Executive
Branch interests at stake, or to create a separation of powers con-
flict that the Political Branches have avoided.687
Several other witnesses have also avoided testifying in whole or in part
by asserting Executive Privilege or Absolute Immunity from any obligation
to appear before Congress. For example, the President’s Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows invoked both, and categorically refused to testify, even about text
messages he provided to the Committee. The House of Representatives
voted to hold him in criminal contempt.688 Although the Justice Department
has taken the position in litigation that a former high level White House
staffer for a former President is not entitled to absolute immunity,689 and
that any interests in the confidentiality of his communications with Presi-
dent Trump and others are overcome in this case, the Justice Department
declined to prosecute Meadows for criminal contempt. The reasons for Jus-
tice’s refusal to do so are not apparent to the Committee.690 Commentators
have speculated that Meadows may be cooperating in the Justice Depart-
ment’s January 6th investigation.691 The same may be true for Daniel
Scavino, President Trump’s White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Commu-
nications and Director of Social Media, whom the House also voted to hold
in contempt.692
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120 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Steve Bannon also chose not to cooperate with the Committee, and the
Justice Department prosecuted him for contempt of Congress.693 Bannon
has been sentenced and is currently appealing his conviction. Peter
Navarro, another White House Staffer who refused to testify, is currently
awaiting his criminal trial.694
Although the Committee issued letters and subpoenas to seven Republi-
can members of Congress who have unique knowledge of certain develop-
ments on or in relation to January 6th, none agreed to participate in the
investigation; none considered themselves obligated to comply with the
subpoenas. A number of these same individuals were aware well in advance
of January 6th of the plotting by Donald Trump, John Eastman, and others
to overturn the election, and certain of them had an active role in that
activity.695 None seem to have alerted law enforcement of this activity, or of
the known risk of violence. On January 5th, after promoting unfounded
objections to election results, Rep. Debbie Lesko appears to have recognized
the danger in a call with her colleagues:
I also ask leadership to come up with a safety plan for Members [of
Congress]. . . . We also have, quite honestly, Trump supporters who
actually believe that we are going to overturn the election, and when
that doesn’t happen—most likely will not happen—they are going
to go nuts.696
During our hearings, the Committee presented the testimony of numer-
ous White House witnesses who testified about efforts by certain Republi-
can Members of Congress to obtain Presidential pardons for their conduct
in connection with January 6th.697 Cassidy Hutchinson provided extensive
detail in this regard:
Vice Chair Cheney: And are you aware of any members of Congress
seeking pardons?
Hutchinson: I guess Mr. Gaetz and Mr. Brooks, I know, have both
advocated for there'd be a blanket pardon for members involved in
that meeting, and a — a handful of other members that weren't at
the December 21st meeting as the presumptive pardons. Mr. Gaetz
was personally pushing for a pardon, and he was doing so since
early December.
I’m not sure why Mr. Gaetz would reach out to me to ask if he could
have a meeting with Mr. Meadows about receiving a presidential
pardon.
Vice Chair Cheney: Did they all contact you?
Hutchinson: Not all of them, but several of them did.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 121
Vice Chair Cheney: So, you mentioned Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Brooks.
Hutchinson: Mr. Biggs did. Mr. Jordan talked about Congressional
pardons, but he never asked me for one. It was more for an update
on whether the White House was going to pardon members of Con-
gress. Mr. Gohmert asked for one as well. Mr. Perry asked for a par-
don, too. I’m sorry.
Vice Chair Cheney: Mr. Perry? Did he talk to you directly?
Hutchinson: Yes, he did.
Vice Chair Cheney: Did Marjorie Taylor Greene contact you?
Hutchinson: No, she didn't contact me about it. I heard that she had
asked White House Counsel’s Office for a pardon from Mr. Philbin,
but I didn't frequently communicate with Ms. Greene.698
Many of these details were also corroborated by other sources. Presi-
dent Personnel Director Johnny McEntee confirmed that he was personally
asked for a pardon by Representative Matt Gaetz (R-FL).699 Eric Her-
schmann recalled that Representative Gaetz “. . . asked for a very, very
broad pardon. . . . And I said Nixon’s pardon was never nearly that
broad.” 700 When asked about reporting that Representatives Mo Brooks
and Andy Biggs also requested pardons, Herschmann did not reject either
possibility out of hand, instead answering: “It’s possible that Representa-
tive Brooks or Biggs, but I don’t remember.” 701 The National Archives pro-
duced to the Select Committee an email from Representative Mo Brooks to
the President’s executive assistant stating that “President Trump asked me
to send you this letter” and “… pursuant to a request from Matt Gaetz” that
recommended blanket Presidential pardons to every Member of Congress
who objected to the electoral college votes on January 6th.702
These requests for pardons suggest that the Members identified above
were conscious of the potential legal jeopardy arising from their conduct.
As noted infra 136, the Committee has referred a number of these individu-
als to the House Ethics Committee for their failure to comply with subpoe-
nas, and believes that they each owe the American people their direct and
unvarnished testimony.
The Select Committee has also received a range of evidence suggesting
specific efforts to obstruct the Committee’s investigation. Much of this evi-
dence is already known by the Department of Justice and by other prosecu-
torial authorities. For example:
1. The Committee received testimony from a witness about her decision to
terminate a lawyer who was receiving payments for the representation
from a group allied with President Trump. Among other concerns
expressed by the witness:
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122 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The lawyer had advised the witness that the witness could, in certain
circumstances, tell the Committee that she did not recall facts when
she actually did recall them.
• During a break in the Select Committee’s interview, the witness
expressed concerns to her lawyer that an aspect of her testimony
was not truthful. The lawyer did not advise her to clarify the specific
testimony that the witness believed was not complete and accurate,
and instead conveyed that, “They don’t know what you know, [wit-
ness]. They don’t know that you can recall some of these things. So
you saying ‘I don't recall’ is an entirely acceptable response to this.”
• The lawyer instructed the client about a particular issue that would
cast a bad light on President Trump: “No, no, no, no, no. We don’t
want to go there. We don’t want to talk about that.”
• The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share her testi-
mony before the Committee with other lawyers representing other
witnesses. The lawyer shared such information over the client’s
objection.
• The lawyer refused directions from the client not to share informa-
tion regarding her testimony with at least one and possibly more
than one member of the press. The lawyer shared the information
with the press over her objection.
• The lawyer did not disclose who was paying for the lawyers’ repre-
sentation of the client, despite questions from the client seeking
that information, and told her, “we’re not telling people where
funding is coming from right now.”
• The client was offered potential employment that would make her
“financially very comfortable” as the date of her testimony
approached by entities apparently linked to Donald Trump and his
associates. Such offers were withdrawn or did not materialize as
reports of the content of her testimony circulated. The client
believed this was an effort to impact her testimony.
Further details regarding these instances will be available to the public
when transcripts are released.
2. Similarly, the witness testified that multiple persons affiliated with
President Trump contacted her in advance of the witness’s testimony
and made the following statements:
What they said to me is, as long as I continue to be a team player,
they know that I am on the right team. I am doing the right thing. I
am protecting who I need to protect. You know, I will continue to
stay in good graces in Trump World. And they have reminded me a
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 123
couple of times that Trump does read transcripts and just keep that
in mind as I proceed through my interviews with the committee.
Here is another sample in a different context. This is a call received by
one of our witnesses:
[A person] let me know you have your deposition tomorrow. He
wants me to let you know he’s thinking about you. He knows you’re
a team player, you’re loyal, and you’re going do the right thing
when you go in for your deposition.703
3. The Select Committee is aware of multiple efforts by President Trump to
contact Select Committee witnesses. The Department of Justice is aware
of at least one of those circumstances.
4. Rather than relying on representation by Secret Service lawyers at no
cost, a small number of Secret Service agents engaged private counsel for
their interviews before the Committee. 704 During one such witness’s tran-
scribed interview, a retained private counsel was observed writing notes to
the witness regarding the content of the witness’s testimony while the ques-
tioning was underway. The witness’s counsel admitted on the record that he
had done so.705
Recently, published accounts of the Justice Department’s Mar-a-Lago
investigation suggest that the Department is investigating the conduct of
counsel for certain witnesses whose fees are being paid by President
Trump’s Save America Political Action Committee.706 The public report
implies the Department is concerned that such individuals are seeking to
influence the testimony of the witnesses they represent.707 This Committee
also has these concerns, including that lawyers who are receiving such pay-
ments have specific incentives to defend President Trump rather than zeal-
ously represent their own clients. The Department of Justice and the Fulton
County District Attorney have been provided with certain information
related to this topic.
The Select Committee recognizes of course that most of the testimony
we have gathered was given more than a year after January 6th. Recollec-
tions are not perfect, and the Committee expects that different accounts of
the same events will naturally vary. Indeed, the lack of any inconsistencies
in witness accounts would itself be suspicious. And many witnesses may
simply recall different things than others.
Many of the witnesses before this Committee had nothing at all to gain
from their testimony, gave straightforward responses to the questions
posted, and made no effort to downplay, deflect, or rationalize. Trump
Administration Justice Department officials such as Attorney General Barr,
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124 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Acting Attorney General Rosen, and Acting Deputy Attorney General Dono-
ghue are good examples. Multiple members of President Trump’s White
House staff were also suitably forthcoming, including Sarah Matthews,
Matthew Pottinger, Greg Jacob, and Pat Philbin, as were multiple career
White House, military and agency personnel whose names the Committee
agreed not to disclose publicly; as were former Secretary of Labor Eugene
Scalia, Bill Stepien, and certain other members of the Trump Campaign.
The Committee very much appreciates the earnestness and bravery of
Cassidy Hutchinson, Rusty Bowers, Shaye Moss, Ruby Freeman, Brad
Raffensperger, Gabriel Sterling, Al Schmidt, and many others who provided
important live testimony during the Committees hearings.708
The Committee, along with our nation, offers particular thanks to Offi-
cers Caroline Edwards, Michael Fanone, Harry Dunn, Aquilino Gonell, and
Daniel Hodges, along with hundreds of other members of law enforcement
who defended the Capitol on that fateful day, all of whom should be com-
mended for their bravery and sacrifice. We especially thank the families of
Officer Brian Sicknick, Howard Liebengood and Jeffrey Smith, whose loss
can never be repaid.
The Committee very much appreciates the invaluable testimony of Gen-
eral Milley and other members of our military, Judge J. Michael Luttig, and
the important contributions of Benjamin Ginsberg and Chris Stirewalt.
This, of course is only a partial list, and the Committee is indebted to many
others, as well.
The Committee believes that White House Counsel Pat Cipollone gave a
particularly important account of the events of January 6th, as did White
House lawyer, Eric Herschmann. For multiple months, Cipollone resisted
giving any testimony at all, asserting concerns about executive privilege
and other issues, until after the Committee’s hearing with Hutchinson.
When he did testify, Cipollone corroborated key elements of testimony
given by several White House staff, including Hutchinson—most impor-
tantly, regarding what happened in the White House during the violence of
January 6th—but also frankly recognized the limits on what he could say
due to privilege: “Again, I’m not going to get into either my legal advice on
matters, and the other thing I don’t want to do is, again, other witnesses
have their own recollections of things.” Cipollone also told the Committee
that, to the extent that other witnesses recall communications attributable
to White House counsel that he does not, the communications might have
been with his deputy Pat Philbin, or with Eric Herschmann, who had strong
feelings and was particularly animated about certain issues.709
Of course, that is not to say that all witnesses were entirely frank or
forthcoming. Other witnesses, including certain witnesses from the Trump
White House, displayed a lack of full recollection of certain issues, or were
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 125
not otherwise as frank or direct as Cipollone. We cite two examples here,
both relating to testimony played during the hearings.
Kayleigh McEnany was President Trump’s Press Secretary on January
6th. Her deposition was taken early in the investigation. McEnany seemed
to acknowledge that President Trump: (1) should have instructed his violent
supporters to leave the Capitol earlier than he ultimately did on January
6th;710 (2) should have respected the rulings of the courts;711 and (3) was
wrong to publicly allege that Dominion voting machines stole the elec-
tion.712 But a segment of McEnany’s testimony seemed evasive, as if she
was testifying from pre-prepared talking points. In multiple instances,
McEnany’s testimony did not seem nearly as forthright as that of her press
office staff, who testified about what McEnany said.
For example, McEnany disputed suggestions that President Trump was
resistant to condemning the violence and urging the crowd at the Capitol to
act peacefully when they crafted his tweet at 2:38 p.m. on January 6th.713
Yet one of her deputies, Sarah Matthews, told the Select Committee that
McEnany informed her otherwise: that McEnany and other advisors in the
dining room with President Trump persuaded him to send the tweet, but
that “. . . she said that he did not want to put that in and that they went
through different phrasing of that, of the mention of peace, in order to get
him to agree to include it, and that it was Ivanka Trump who came up with
‘stay peaceful’ and that he agreed to that phrasing to include in the tweet,
but he was initially resistant to mentioning peace of any sort.” 714 When the
Select Committee asked “Did Ms. McEnany describe in any way how resis-
tant the President was to including something about being peaceful,” Mat-
thews answered: “Just that he didn’t want to include it, but they got him to
agree on the phrasing ‘stay peaceful.’” 715
The Committee invites the public to compare McEnany’s testimony
with the testimony of Pat Cipollone, Sarah Matthews, Judd Deere, and oth-
ers.
Ivanka Trump is another example. Among other things, Ivanka Trump
acknowledged to the Committee that: (1) she agreed with Attorney General
Barr’s statements that there was no evidence of sufficient fraud to overturn
the election; (2) the President and others are bound by the rulings of the
courts and the rule of law; (3) President Trump pressured Vice President
Pence on the morning of January 6th regarding his authorities at the joint
session of Congress that day to count electoral votes; and (4) President
Trump watched the violence on television as it was occurring.716 But again,
Ivanka Trump was not as forthcoming as Cipollone and others about Presi-
dent Trump’s conduct.
Indeed, Ivanka Trump’s Chief of Staff Julie Radford had a more specific
recollection of Ivanka Trump’s actions and statements. For example, Ivanka
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126 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Trump had the following exchange with the Committee about her atten-
dance at her father’s speech on January 6th that was at odds with what the
Committee learned from Radford:
Committee Staff: It’s been reported that you ultimately decided to
attend the rally because you hoped that you would calm the Presi-
dent and keep the event on an even keel. Is that accurate?
Ivanka Trump: No. I don’t know who said that or where that came
from.717
However, this is what Radford said about her boss’s decision:
Committee Staff: What did she share with you about why it was
concerning that her father was upset or agitated after that call with
Vice President Pence in relation to the Ellipse rally? Why did that
matter? Why did he have to be calmed down, I should say.
Radford: Well, she shared that he had called the Vice President a
not—an expletive word. I think that bothered her. And I think she
could tell based on the conversations and what was going on in the
office that he was angry and upset and people were providing mis-
information. And she felt like she might be able to help calm the
situation down, at least before he went on stage.
Committee Staff: And the word that she relayed to you that the
President called the Vice President—apologize for being impolite—
but do you remember what she said her father called him?
Radford: The “P” word.718
When the Committee asked Ivanka Trump whether there were “[a]ny
particular words that you recall your father using during the conversation”
that morning with Vice President Pence, she answered simply: “No.” 719
In several circumstances, the Committee has found that less senior
White House aides had significantly better recollection of events than
senior staff purported to have.
The Select Committee also has concerns regarding certain other wit-
nesses, including those who still rely for their income or employment on
organizations linked to President Trump, such as the America First Policy
Institute. Certain witnesses and lawyers were unnecessarily combative,
answered hundreds of questions with variants of “I do not recall” in cir-
cumstances where that answer seemed unbelievable, appeared to testify
from lawyer-written talking points rather than their own recollections,
provided highly questionable rationalizations or otherwise resisted telling
the truth. The public can ultimately make its own assessment of these
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 127
issues when it reviews the Committee transcripts and can compare the
accounts of different witnesses and the conduct of counsel.
One particular concern arose from what the Committee realized early on
were a number of intentional falsehoods in former White House Chief of
Staff Mark Meadows’s December 7, 2021 book, The Chief’s Chief. 720 Here is
one of several examples: Meadows wrote, “When he got offstage, President
Trump let me know that he had been speaking metaphorically about going
to the Capitol.” 721 Meadows goes on in his book to claim that it “was clear
the whole time” President Trump didn’t intend to go to the Capitol.722 This
appeared to be an intentional effort to conceal the facts. Multiple witnesses
directly contradicted Meadows’s account about President Trump’s desire to
travel to the Capitol, including Kayleigh McEnany, Cassidy Hutchinson,
multiple Secret Service agents, a White House employee with national secu-
rity responsibilities and other staff in the White House, a member of the
Metropolitan Police and others. This and several other statements in the
Meadows book were false, and the Select Committee was concerned that
multiple witnesses might attempt to repeat elements of these false
accounts, as if they were the party line. Most witnesses did not, but a few
did.
President Trump’s desire to travel to the Capitol was particularly
important for the Committee to evaluate because it bears on President
Trump’s intent on January 6th. One witness account suggests that Presi-
dent Trump even wished to participate in the electoral vote count from the
House floor, standing with Republican Congressmen, perhaps in an effort
to apply further pressure to Vice President Mike Pence and others.723
Mark Meadows’s former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Anthony
Ornato gave testimony consistent with the false account in Meadows book.
In particular, Ornato told the Committee that he was not aware of a genuine
push by the President to go to the Capitol, suggesting instead that “it was
one of those hypotheticals from the good idea fairy . . . [b]ecause it’s ridicu-
lous to think that a President of the United States can travel especially with,
you know, people around just on the street up to the Capitol and peacefully
protest outside the Capitol. . . .” 724 He told the Select Committee that the
only conversation he had about the possibility of the President traveling to
the Capitol was in a single meeting officials from the President’s advance
team,725 and his understanding is that this idea “wasn’t from the Presi-
dent.” 726 Two witnesses before the Committee, including a White House
employee with national security responsibilities and Hutchinson, testified
that Ornato related an account of President Trump’s “irate” behavior when
he was told in the Presidential SUV on January 6th that he would not be
driven to the Capitol.727 Both accounts recall Ornato doing so from his
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128 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
office in the White House, with another member of the Secret Service pres-
ent.728 Multiple other witness accounts indicate that the President genu-
inely was “irate,” “heated,” “angry,” and “insistent” in the Presidential
vehicle.729 But Ornato professed that he did not recall either communica-
tion, and that he had no knowledge at all about the President’s anger.730
Likewise, despite a significant and increasing volume of intelligence
information in the days before January 6th showing that violence at the
Capitol was indeed possible or likely, and despite other intelligence and law
enforcement agencies similar conclusions,731 Ornato claimed never to have
reviewed or had any knowledge of that specific information732 He testified
that he was only aware of warnings that opposing groups might “clash on
the Washington Monument” and that is what he “would have briefed to
[Chief of Staff] Meadows.” 733 The Committee has significant concerns
about the credibility of this testimony, including because it was Ornato’s
responsibility to be aware of this information and convey it to decision-
makers.734 The Committee will release Ornato’s November Transcript so the
public can review his testimony on these topics.
SUMMARY: CREATION OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE; PURPOSES.
In the week after January 6th, House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy
initially supported legislation to create a bipartisan commission to investi-
gate the January 6th attack on the United States Capitol, stating that “the
President bears responsibility for Wednesday’s attack on Congress by mob
rioters” and calling for creation of a “fact-finding commission.” 735 Leader
McCarthy repeated his support for a bipartisan commission during a press
conference on January 21st: “The only way you will be able to answer these
questions is through a bipartisan commission.” 736
On February 15th, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced in a letter to
the House Democratic Caucus her intent to establish the type of indepen-
dent commission McCarthy had supported, to “investigate and report on
the facts and causes relating to the January 6, 2021 domestic terrorist attack
upon the United States Capitol Complex.” 737 A few days thereafter, Leader
McCarthy provided the Speaker a wish list that mirrored “suggestions from
the Co-Chairs of the 9/11 Commission” that he and House Republicans
hoped would be included in the House’s legislation to establish the Com-
mission.738
In particular, Leader McCarthy requested an equal ratio of Democratic
and Republican nominations, equal subpoena power for the Democratic
Chair and Republican Vice Chair of the Commission, and the exclusion of
predetermined findings or outcomes that the Commission itself would pro-
duce. Closing his letter, Leader McCarthy quoted the 9/11 Commission
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 129
Co-Chairs, writing that a “bipartisan independent investigation will earn
credibility with the American public.” 739 He again repeated his confidence
in achieving that goal.740 In April 2021, Speaker Pelosi agreed to make the
number of Republican and Democratic Members of the Commission equal,
and to provide both parties with an equal say in subpoenas, as McCarthy
had requested.741
In May 2021, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Bennie G.
Thompson began to negotiate more of the details for the Commission with
his Republican counterpart, Ranking Member John Katko.742 On May 14th,
Chairman Thompson announced that he and Ranking Member Katko had
reached an agreement on legislation to “form a bipartisan, independent
Commission to investigate the January 6th domestic terrorism attack on
the United States Capitol and recommend changes to further protect the
Capitol, the citadel of our democracy.” 743
On May 18th, the day before the House’s consideration of the
Thompson-Katko agreement, Leader McCarthy released a statement in
opposition to the legislation.744 Speaker Pelosi responded to that statement,
saying: “Leader McCarthy won’t take yes for an answer.” 745 The Speaker
referred to Leader McCarthy’s February 22nd letter where “he made three
requests to be addressed in Democrats’ discussion draft.” 746 She noted that
“every single one was granted by Democrats, yet he still says no.” 747
In the days that followed, Republican Ranking Member Katko defended
the bipartisan nature of the bill to create the Commission:
As I have called for since the days just after the attack, an independent,
9/11-style review is critical for removing the politics around January 6
and focusing solely on the facts and circumstances of the security breach
at the Capitol, as well as other instances of violence relevant to such a
review. Make no mistake about it, Mr. Thompson and I know this is
about facts. It’s not partisan politics. We would have never gotten to this
point if it was about partisan politics.748
That evening, the House passed the legislation to establish a National
Commission to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol Complex in a bipartisan fashion, with 35 Republicans joining 217
Democrats voting in favor and 175 Republicans voting against.749 In the
days thereafter, however, only six Senate Republicans joined Senate Demo-
crats in supporting the legislation, killing the bill in the Senate.750
On June 24th, Speaker Pelosi announced her intent to create a House
select committee to investigate the attack.751 On June 25th, Leader McCa-
rthy met with DC Metropolitan Police Officer Michael Fanone, who was
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130 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
seriously injured on January 6th.752 Officer Fanone pressed Leader McCa-
rthy “for a commitment not to put obstructionists and the wrong people in
that position.” 753
On June 30th, the House voted on H. Res. 503 to establish a 13-Member
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol by a vote of 222 Yeas and 190 Nays with just two Republicans sup-
porting the measure: Representative Liz Cheney and Representative Adam
Kinzinger.754 On July 1st, Speaker Pelosi named eight initial Members to the
Select Committee, including one Republican: Representative Cheney.755
On July 17th, Leader McCarthy proposed his selection of five members:
Representative Jim Jordan, Ranking Member of the House Judiciary
Committee;
Representative Kelly Armstrong of North Dakota; House Energy and
Commerce Committee;
Representative Troy Nehls, House Transportation & Infrastructure and
Veterans’ Affairs Committees.
Representative Jim Banks, Armed Services, Veterans’ Affairs and Educa-
tion and Labor Committees;
Representative Rodney Davis, Ranking Member of the Committee on
House Administration.756
Jordan was personally involved in the acts and circumstances of January
6th, and would be one of the targets of the investigation. By that point,
Banks had made public statements indicating that he had already reached
his own conclusions and had no intention of cooperating in any objective
investigation of January 6th, proclaiming, for example, that the Select
Committee was created “. . . solely to malign conservatives and to justify
the Left’s authoritarian agenda.” 757
On July 21st, Speaker Nancy Pelosi exercised her power under H. Res.
503 not to approve the appointments of Representatives Jordan or Banks,
expressing “concern about statements made and actions taken by these
Members” and “the impact their appointments may have on the integrity
of the investigation.” 758 However, she also stated that she had informed
Leader McCarthy “. . . that I was prepared to appoint Representatives
Rodney Davis, Kelly Armstrong and Troy Nehls, and requested that he rec-
ommend two other Members.” 759
In response, Leader McCarthy elected to remove all five of his Republi-
can appointments, refusing to allow Representatives Armstrong, Davis and
Nehls to participate on the Select Committee.760 On July 26, 2021, Speaker
Pelosi then appointed Republican Representative Adam Kinzinger.761 In
resisting the Committee’s subpoenas, certain litigants attempted to argue
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that the Commission’s Select Committee’s composition violated House
Rules or H. Res. 503, but those arguments failed in court.762
SELECT COMMITTEE WITNESSES WERE ALMOST ENTIRELY REPUBLICAN
In its ten hearings or business meetings, the Select Committee called live
testimony or played video for several dozen witnesses, the vast majority of
whom were Republicans. A full list is set forth below.
Republicans:
• John McEntee (served as Director of the White House Presidential
Personnel Office in Trump Administration)
• Judd Deere (served as Deputy Assistant to the President and White
House Deputy Press Secretary in the Trump Administration)
• Jared Kushner (served as a Senior Advisor to President Donald Trump)
• Pat Cipollone (served as White House Counsel for President Donald
Trump)
• Eric Herschmann (served as a Senior Advisor to President Donald
Trump)
• Kayleigh McEnany (served as White House Press Secretary in Trump
Administration)
• Derek Lyons (served as White House Staff Secretary and Counselor to
the President in the Trump Administration)
• Cassidy Hutchinson (served as Assistant to Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows in the Trump Administration)
• Matt Pottinger (served as Deputy National Security Advisor in the
Trump Administration)
• Ben Williamson (served as Senior Advisor to Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows)
• Sarah Matthews (served as Deputy Press Secretary in the Trump
Administration)
• William Barr (served as Attorney General in the Trump Administration)
• Mike Pompeo (served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and
Secretary of State in the Trump Administration)
• Ivanka Trump (served as a Senior Advisor and Director of the Office of
Economic Initiatives and Entrepreneurship in the Trump Administra-
tion)
• Donald Trump Jr. (eldest child of Donald Trump)
• Molly Michael (served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Execu-
tive Assistant to the President)
• Tim Murtaugh (served as Director of Communications for the Trump
2020 Presidential campaign)
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132 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Richard Donoghue (served as Acting Deputy Attorney General in the
Trump Administration)
• Jeffrey Rosen (served as Acting Attorney General in the Trump Admin-
istration)
• Steven Engel (served as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Trump Administration)
• Marc Short (served as Chief of Staff to Vice President Mike Pence)
• Greg Jacob (served as Counsel to Vice President Mike Pence)
• Keith Kellogg (served as National Security Advisor to Vice President
Mike Pence)
• Chris Hodgson (served as Director of Legislative Affairs for Vice Presi-
dent Mike Pence)
• Douglas Macgregor (served as advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the
Trump Administration)
• Jason Miller (served as spokesman for the Donald Trump 2016 Presi-
dential Campaign and was a Senior Adviser to the Trump 2020 Presi-
dential Campaign)
• Alex Cannon (Counsel for the Trump 2020 Presidential Campaign)
• Bill Stepien (served as the Campaign Manager for the Trump 2020
Presidential Campaign and was the White House Director of Political
Affairs in the Trump Administration from 2017 to 2018)
• Rudolph Giuliani (an attorney for Donald Trump)
• John Eastman (an attorney for Donald Trump)
• Michael Flynn (served as National Security Advisor in the Trump
Administration)
• Eugene Scalia (served as the Secretary of Labor in the Trump Adminis-
tration)
• Matthew Morgan (General Counsel for the Trump 2020 Presidential
Campaign)
• Sidney Powell (an attorney and advisor to Donald Trump)
• Jeffrey Clark (served as Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Division in the Trump Administration)
• Cleta Mitchell (an attorney working with the Trump 2020 Presidential
Campaign)
• Ronna Romney McDaniel (Chair of the Republican National Commit-
tee)
• Justin Clark (served as Deputy Campaign Manager for the Trump 2020
Presidential Campaign)
• Robert Sinners (Georgia State Director of Election Day Operations for
the Trump 2020 Presidential Campaign)
• Andrew Hitt (Wisconsin Republican Party Chair)
• Laura Cox (Michigan Republican Party Chair)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 133
• Mike Shirkey (Majority Leader, Michigan State Senate)
• Bryan Cutler (Speaker, Pennsylvania House of Representatives)
• Rusty Bowers (Speaker, Arizona House of Representatives)
• Brad Raffensperger (Georgia Secretary of State)
• Gabriel Sterling (Georgia Secretary of State, Chief Operating Officer)
• BJay Pak (served as United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Georgia in the Trump Administration)
• Al Schmidt (City Commissioner of Philadelphia)
• Chris Stirewalt (Fox News Political Editor)
• Benjamin Ginsberg (Election Attorney)
• J. Michael Luttig (Retired judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and informal advisor to Vice President Mike Pence)
• Katrina Pierson (served as a liaison for the White House and organizers
at Donald Trump’s “Save America” rally on January 6)
• Nicholas Luna (served as Personal Aide to President Trump)
• Stephen Miller (served as Senior Advisor to President Trump)
• Vincent Haley (served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Advisor
for Policy, Strategy and Speechwriting in the Trump Administration)
• Julie Radford (Chief of Staff to Ivanka Trump in the Trump Administra-
tion)
• Mick Mulvaney (former Acting Chief of Staff and Special Envoy for
Northern Ireland in the Trump Administration)
• Elaine Chao (Secretary of Transportation in the Trump Administration)
• Roger Stone (Trump associate)
Democrats:
• Jocelyn Benson (Michigan Secretary of State)
Other:
• U.S. Capitol Police Officer Harry Dunn
• DC Metropolitan Police Officer Michael Fanone
• U.S. Capitol Police Sgt. Aquilino Gonell
• DC Metropolitan Police Officer Daniel Hodges
• General Mark Milley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
• U.S. Capitol Police Officer Caroline Edwards
• Nick Quested (award-winning British filmmaker)
• Robert Schornack (sentenced to 36 months’ probation)
• Eric Barber (charged with theft and unlawful demonstration in the
Capitol)
• John Wright (awaiting trial for felony civil disorder and other charges)
• George Meza (Proud Boy)
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134 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Daniel Herendeen (sentenced to 36 months’ probation for role in Capi-
tol attack)
• Matthew Walter (Proud Boy)
• Wandrea ArShaye “Shaye” Moss (Georgia election worker)
• Ruby Freeman (Georgia election worker)
• Anika Collier Navaroli (former Twitter employee)
• White House Security Official
• Jim Watkins (Founder and owner, 8kun)
• Jody Williams (former owner of TheDonald.win)
• Dr. Donell Harvin (Chief of Homeland Security and Intelligence for the
government of the District of Columbia)
• Kellye SoRelle (attorney for Oath Keepers)
• Shealah Craighead (White House Photographer)
• Jason Van Tatenhove (former Oath Keepers spokesperson)
• Stephen Ayres (plead guilty to disorderly and disruptive conduct related
to Capitol attack)
• Sgt. Mark Robinson (Ret.) (Metropolitan Police Department)
• Janet Buhler (plead guilty to charges related to the Capitol attack)
ENDNOTES
1. A few weeks later, Rhodes and his associate Kelly Meggs were found guilty of seditious
conspiracy, and other Oath Keepers were found guilty on numerous charges for obstruct-
ing the electoral count. Trial Transcript at 10502-508, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.
1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); Alan Feuer and Zach Montague, “Oath Keepers Leader Con-
victed of Sedition in Landmark Jan. 6 Case,” New York Times, (Nov. 29, 2022), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/29/us/politics/oath-keepers-trial-verdict-jan-6.html.
2. Trial Transcript at 5698, 5759, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31,
2022).
3. Trial Transcript at 5775, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2022)
(“for me at the time, it meant I felt it was like a Bastille type moment in history where in
the French Revolution it was that big turning point moment where the population made
their presence felt. I thought it was going to be a similar type of event for us”).
4. Trial Transcript at 5783, 5866, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 31,
2022).
5. Sentencing Transcript at 15-17, United States v. Reimler, No. 1:21-cr-239 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022),
ECF No. 37.
6. Sentencing Transcript at 33, United States v. Pert, No. 1:21-cr-139 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2022), ECF
No. 64.
7. Sentencing Memorandum by Abram Markofski, Exhibit B, United States v. Markofski, No.
1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2021), ECF No. 44-2.
8. Sentencing Transcript at 49, United States v. Witcher, No. 1:21-cr-235 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2022),
ECF No. 53.
9. Sentencing Transcript at 19–20, United States v. Edwards, No. 1:21-cr-366 (D.D.C. Jan. 21,
2022), ECF No. 33. See also, Sentencing Memorandum by Brandon Nelson, Exhibit B, United
States v. Nelson, No. 1:21-cr-344 (D.D.C. Dec. 6, 2021), ECF No. 51-2; Sentencing Transcript at
65–66, United States v. Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2021), ECF No. 137; Sentencing
49-937_text.pdf 158 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 135
Transcript at 45, United States v. Schornak, 1:21-cr-278 (D.D.C. May 11, 2022), ECF No. 90;
Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v. Wilkerson, No. 1:21-cr-302 (D.D.C. Nov. 22,
2021), ECF No. 31; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Barber, (Mar. 16, 2022), pp. 50–51.
10. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Sandlin, No. 1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1; Ryan J. Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter Oct. 1, 2022 3:33 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/1576295667412017157; Ryan J. Reily (@ryanjreily), Twitter, Oct.
1, 2022 3:40 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/ryanjreilly/status/
1576296016512692225; Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 2, 16, United States v. San-
dlin, No. 1:21-cr-88 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2022), ECF No. 92.
11. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judge’s Detention
Order at 4, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-cr-119 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2021), ECF No 16; Dan Man-
gan, “Capitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was Following Trump’s Orders, Apologizes to AOC
for Threat,” CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/25/capitol-
riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-aoc.html.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of John Douglas Wright, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 22, 63.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Lewis Cantwell, (Apr. 26, 2022), p. 54.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Stephen Ayres, (June 22, 2022), p. 8.
15. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
16. Affidavit at 8, United States v. Ayres, No. 1:21-cr-156 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2021), ECF No. 5-1.
17. See infra, Chapter 6. See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart Compiling
Defendant Statements). The Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements iden-
tifies hundreds of examples of such testimony. Select Committee staff tracked cases filed
by the Department of Justice against defendants who committed crimes related to the
attack on the United States Capitol. Through Department of Justice criminal filings, through
public reporting, through social media research, and through court hearings, staff col-
lected a range of statements by these defendants about why they came to Washington, DC,
on January 6th. Almost always, it was because President Trump had called upon them to
support his big lie. Those defendants also discussed plans for violence at the Capitol,
against law enforcement, against other American citizens, and against elected officials in
the days leading up to January 6th. In the days immediately following the attack, defen-
dants also bragged about their conduct. Some defendants later reflected on their actions
at sentencing. The Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements is not meant
to be comprehensive or polished; it is a small sampling of the tremendous work the
Department of Justice has done tracking down and prosecuting criminal activity during the
attempted insurrection.
Moreover, the trial of multiple members of the Proud Boys on seditious conspiracy and
other charges is set to begin on December 19, 2022, and may provide additional informa-
tion directly relevant to this topic. See Court Calendar: December 9, 2022–December 31,
2022, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, available at https://
media.dcd.uscourts.gov/datepicker/index.html (last accessed Dec. 9, 2022); Alan Feuer,
“Outcome in Oath Keepers Trial Could Hold Lessons for Coming Jan. 6 Cases,” New York
Times, (Nov. 30, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/30/us/politics/oath-
keepers-stewart-rhodes.html.
18. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001890_00001 (December
28, 2020, email from Bernard Kerik to Mark Meadows explaining that “[w]e can do all the
investigations we want later”); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
49-937_text.pdf 159 12/23/22 9:11 AM
136 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-
R000005090_0001 (January. 6, 2021, email from John Eastman to Gregory Jacob acknowl-
edging that President Trump had “been so advised” that Vice President Pence “DOES NOT
have the power to decide things unilaterally”); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th (Russell “Rusty” Bowers testimony recalling Rudolph Giuliani stating that
“[w]e've got lots of theories; we just don't have the evidence”); see also Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 128 (“Whether Rudy was at this stage of his life in the
same abilities to manage things at this level or not, I mean, obviously, I think Bernie Kerik
publicly said it, they never proved the allegations that they were making, and they were
trying to develop.”) Note: Some documents cited in this report show timestamps based on
a time zone other than Eastern Time—such as Greenwich Mean Time—because that is how
they were produced to the Committee.
19. The Committee notes that a number of these findings are similar to those Federal Judge
David Carter reached after reviewing the evidence presented by the Committee. Order Re
Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 31-40, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F.
Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM); Order Re Privilege of 599
Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 23-24, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356; Order Re Privilege of Remaining
Documents at 13-17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2022), ECF
No. 372.
20. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000091086 (United States
Secret Service: Protective Intelligence Division communication noting left wing groups tell-
ing members to “stay at home” on January 6th).
21. Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the United States Capitol Police and
Preparations for and Response to the Attack of January 6th: Part I, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,
(Apr. 21, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-
united-states-capitol-police-and-preparations-and-response; Committee on House Admin-
istration, Oversight of the United States Capitol Police and Preparations for and Response
to the Attack of January 6th: Part II, 117th Cong., 1st sess.,, (May 10, 2021), available at
https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-
states-capitol-police-threat; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January
6th Attack: Review of the Architect of the Capitol’s Emergency Preparedness, 117th Cong., 1st
sess., (May 12, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/
oversight-january-6th-attack-review-architect-capitol-s-emergency; Committee on House
Administration, Reforming the Capitol Police and Improving Accountability for the Capitol
Police Board, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (May 19, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/
committee-activity/hearings/reforming-capitol-police-and-improving-accountability-
capitol-police; Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January 6th Attack:
United States Capitol Police Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders
Unit, 117th Cong., 1st sess., (June 15, 2021), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-
activity/hearings/oversight-january-6th-attack-united-states-capitol-police-containment;
Committee on House Administration, Oversight of the January 6th Capitol Attack: Ongoing
Review of the United States Capitol Police Inspector General Flash Reports, 117th Cong., 2d
sess., (Feb. 17, 2022), available at https://cha.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/
oversight-january-6th-capitol-attack-ongoing-review-united-states.
22. John Koblin, “At Least 20 Million Watched Jan. 6 Hearing,” New York Times, (June 10, 2022),
available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/business/media/jan-6-hearing-
ratings.html. Their findings were also widely noted by major media outlets, including con-
servative ones. “Editorial: What the Jan. 6 Hearings Accomplished,” Wall Street Journal,
(Oct. 14, 2022), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-jan-6-inquiry-
accomplished-donald-trump-liz-cheney-subpoena-congress-11665699321; “Editorial: The
Jan. 6 Hearings are Over. Time to Vote.,” Washington Post, (Oct. 13, 2022), available at
49-937_text.pdf 160 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 137
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/10/13/jan-6-hearings-are-over-time-
vote/; “Editorial: The President Who Stood Still on Jan. 6,” Wall Street Journal, (July 22,
2022), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-president-who-stood-still-donald-
trump-jan-6-committee-mike-pence-capitol-riot-11658528548; "Editorial: ‘We All have a
Duty to Ensure that What Happened on Jan. 6 Never Happens Again’,” New York Times,
(June 10, 2022), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/10/opinion/january-6-
hearing-trump.html; “Editorial: Trump’s Silence on Jan. 6 is Damning,” New York Post, (July
22, 2022), available at https://nypost.com/2022/07/22/trumps-jan-6-silence-renders-him-
unworthy-for-2024-reelection/
23. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45 (“And I told him it was going to
be a process. It was going to be, you know–you know, we're going to have to wait and see
how this turned out. So I, just like I did in 2016, I did the same thing in 2020.”).
24. “When States Can Begin Processing and Counting Absentee/Mail-In Ballots, 2020,” Ballot-
pedia (accessed on Dec. 5, 2022), available at https://ballotpedia.org/
When_states_can_begin_processing_and_counting_absentee/mail-in_ballots,_2020.
25. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
26. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investiga-
tion, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/
house-january6th.
27. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.
29. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), p. 21.
30. John J. Martin, Mail-in Ballots and Constraints on Federal Power under the Electors Clause,
107 Va. L. Rev. Online 84, 86 (Apr. 2021) (noting that 45 States and DC permitted voters to
request a mail-in ballot or automatically receive one in the 2020 election); Nathanial Rak-
ich and Jasmine Mithani, “What Absentee Voting Looked Like In All 50 States,” FiveThir-
tyEight, (Feb. 9, 2021), available at https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-absentee-
voting-looked-like-in-all-50-states/; Lisa Danetz, “Mail Ballot Security Features: A Primer,”
Brennan Center for Justice, (Oct. 16, 2020), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/
our-work/research-reports/mail-ballot-security-features-primer.
31. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), p. 24.
32. He also won in Utah, which mailed absentee ballots to all active voters, and won one or
more electoral votes in both Maine and Nebraska, which allowed no-excuse absentee vot-
ing and assign their electoral votes proportionally. See “Table 1: States with No-Excuse
Absentee Voting,” National Conference of State Legislatures, (July 12, 2022), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201004185006/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/vopp-table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting.aspx (archived); “Vot-
ing Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and Other Voting at Home Options,”
National Conference of State Legislatures, (Sep. 24, 2020), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201103175057/https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx (archived); Federal Election Commission,
“Federal Elections 2020 – Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives,” (Oct. 2022), p. 12, available at https://www.fec.gov/
resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.
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138 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
33. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 66; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller,
(Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 75-76.
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 66.
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 74-77.
36. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 60-61.
37. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
38. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 5, 2020 9:12 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201105170250/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1324353932022480896 (archived). Note: Citations in this report that refer to an archived
tweet may list a timestamp that is several hours earlier or later than the one shown on
the suggested webpage because tweets are archived from various time zones.
39. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10307; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-1010.
40. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 77-78.
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
42. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (November 3,
2020, email exchange between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael copying proposed election
day victory statement).
43. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory. We
note that Mr. Bannon refused to testify and has been convicted of criminal contempt by a
jury of his peers. “Stephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two counts
of Contempt of Congress,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 21, 2022), available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-two-
counts-contempt-congress.
44. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself in
response to over 70 questions, including questions regarding his direct communications
with Donald Trump and his role in January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone (Dec. 17, 2021). See
also Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Christoffer Guldbrandsen Production), Video file 201101_1
(November 1, 2020, footage of Roger Stone speaking to associates).
45. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 12-13.
46. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 79VP-R000011578_0001, 079VP-
R000011579_0001, 079VP-R000011579_0002 (November 3, 2020, email and memorandum
from Gregory Jacob to Marc Short regarding electoral vote count).
47. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 117-18.
49-937_text.pdf 162 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 139
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
50. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 121; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Alyssa Farah Griffin, (Apr. 15, 2022), p. 62; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchin-
son, (Sep. 14, 2022), p. 113; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Kellyanne Conway, (Nov. 28, 2022), pp.
79-84.
51. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 212-21; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark
A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 108-10; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 44, 46, 48-51;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Douglas Macgregor, (June 7, 2022), pp. 27-41.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 215.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 6.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 22, 33-34.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111-12.
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.
57. ABC News, “Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6: Exclusive,” YouTube, at 2:13, Nov. 14,
2022, available at https://youtu.be/-AAyKAoPFQs?t=133.
58. “CNN Townhall: Former Vice President Mike Pence,” CNN, (Nov. 16, 2022), available at
https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2022-11-16/segment/01.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 118.
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 18.
61. Michael Balsamo, “Disputing Trump, Barr Says No Widespread Election Fraud,” Associated
Press, (Dec. 1, 2020, updated June 28, 2022), available at https://apnews.com/article/barr-
no-widespread-election-fraud-b1f1488796c9a98c4b1a9061a6c7f49d.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 24-30; “Bill Barr Press Conference
Transcript: No Special Counsels Needed to Investigate Election or Hunter Biden,” Rev, (Dec.
21, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/bill-barr-press-conference-
transcript-no-special-counsels-needed-to-investigate-election-or-hunter-biden.
63. “Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the
Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,” Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, (Nov. 12, 2020), available at https://www.cisa.gov/news/
2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-
election (emphasis in original).
49-937_text.pdf 163 12/23/22 9:11 AM
140 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 59-60.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 21, 2021), pp. 108-09.
67. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6,
2021), p. 156, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 18-19.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 50, 123; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 168-69, 184, 187.
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 50.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (April 6, 2022), p. 128.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 172-73.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 63-70; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Mor-
gan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 57-62; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), pp,
66-68; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Transcribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 19, 2022), pp. 37-38; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Tim
Murtaugh production), XXM-0021349 (text chain with Giuliani, Ellis, Epshteyn, Ryan, Bobb,
and Herschmann).
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
77. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 58.
78. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 173.
79. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020), also available athttps://
electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/King-v-Whitmer-Doc62.pdf; Bowyer v.
Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706 (D. Ariz. 2020), also available at https://
storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.azd.1255923/
gov.uscourts.azd.1255923.84.0_2.pdf; Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp.
3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020), also available at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/
gov.uscourts.pamd.127057/gov.uscourts.pamd.127057.202.0_1.pdf; Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC
00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52, 54 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020),
available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 141
court decision), also available at https://election.conservative.org/files/2020/12/20-OC-
00163-Order-Granting-Motion-to-Dismiss-Statement-of-Contest.pdf; Wisconsin Voters Alli-
ance v. Pence, 514 F. Supp. 3d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2021), also available at https://
electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WVA-v-Pence-Doc10.pdf.
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0620 (text message between
Tim Murtaugh, Zach Parkinson, and “Matt”).
81. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
82. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
83. Opinion and Order at 1, King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2020) (No.
20-13134), ECF No. 172.
84. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost,
Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential
Election, (July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
85. Senator John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost,
Not Stolen: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential
Election, (July 2022), pp. 3-4, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/. We also
note this: The authors of Lost, Not Stolen also conclude that one of the pieces of supposed
evidence that President Trump and his allies have pointed to since January 6, 2021, to try
to bolster their allegations that the 2020 election was stolen shows nothing of the sort.
Lost, Not Stolen explains that Dinesh D’Souza’s “2000 Mules” tries to establish widespread
voter fraud in the 2020 election using phone-tracking data. “Yet the film, heartily endorsed
by Trump at its Mar-a-Lago premiere, has subsequently been thoroughly debunked in
analysis. What the film claims to portray is simply not supported by the evidence invoked
by the film.” Id., at 6. Likewise, former Attorney General Bill Barr told the Select Commit-
tee: “. . . I haven’t seen anything since the election that changes my mind [that fraud deter-
mined the outcome] including, the 2000 Mules movie.” Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr,
(June 2, 2022), p. 37. He called its cell phone tracking data “singularly unimpressive”
because “. . . in a big city like Atlanta or wherever, just by definition you’re going to find
many hundreds of them have passed by and spent time in the vicinity of these boxes” for
submitting ballots, and to argue that those people must be “mules” delivering fraudulent
ballots was “just indefensible.” Id., at 37–38.
86. White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann told the Committee that when he disputed
allegations of election fraud in a December 18th Oval Office meeting, Sidney Powell fired
back that “the judges are corrupt. And I was like, every one? Every single case that you’ve
done in the country you guys lost every one of them is corrupt, even the ones we
appointed?” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 171.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:53:10-1:53:20,
available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-
committee-hearing.
88. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 46-47, Donald J. Trump for Presi-
dent, Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 4:20-cv-02078 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://
cdn.donaldjtrump.com/public-files/press_assets/2020-11-09-complaint-as-filed.pdf.
89. Opinion at 2, 3, 16, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 20-3371 (3d Cir. Nov.
27, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Donald-
J.-Trump-for-President-v-Boockvar-3rd-Cir-Doc91.pdf.
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142 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
90. Complaint for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to Article II of the
United States Constitution, Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, No. 2:20-cv-01785
(E.D. Wis. Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-Doc1.pdf.
91. Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 21, 22 (E.D. Wis. 2020), avail-
able at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Trump-v-WEC-
Doc134.pdf.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), at 1:52:45 to
1:53:20, available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/06132022-select-
committee-hearing.
93. The authors determined that thirty cases were dismissed by a judge after an evidentiary
hearing had been held, compared to twenty cases that were dismissed by a judge before-
hand, while the remaining fourteen were withdrawn voluntarily by plaintiffs. See Senator
John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Honorable Thomas B. Griffith, et al, Lost, Not Sto-
len: The Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election,
(July 2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.
95. Letter from Timothy C. Parlatore to Chairman Bennie G. Thompson on “Re: Subpoena to
Bernard B. Kerik,” (Dec. 31, 2021).
96. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004125_0001 (December 28,
2020, email from Kerik to Meadows).
97. When our courts weigh evidence to determine facts, they often infer that disputed facts do
not favor a witness who refuses to testify by invoking his Fifth Amendment right against
incriminating himself. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (the Fifth Amend-
ment allows for “adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to
testify to probative evidence offered against them”).
98. Nor was there such evidence of widespread fraud in any of the documents produced in
response to Select Committee subpoenas issued to the proponents of the claims, includ-
ing Rudy Giuliani and his team members and investigators Bernard Kerik and Christina
Bobb, or other proponents of election fraud claims such as Pennsylvania Senator Doug
Mastriano, Arizona legislator Mark Finchem, disbarred attorney Phill Kline, and attorneys
Sidney Powell, Cleta Mitchell, and John Eastman. Not one of them provided evidence rais-
ing genuine questions about the election outcome. In short, it was a big scam.
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 19, 2022), at 56:30
to 58:10, available at https://january6th.house.gov/legislation/hearings/101322-select-
committee-hearing.
100. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eugene Scalia (June 30, 2022), pp. 11-13. Then-Secretary Scalia also
sent a memorandum to President Trump on January 8, 2021. In that memorandum, he
requested that the President “convene an immediate meeting of the Cabinet.” He told the
President that he was “concerned by certain statements you made since the election . . .
of further actions you may be considering,” and he “concluded that [his] responsibilities
as a Cabinet Secretary obligate[d] [him] to take further steps to address those concerns.”
The Select Committee will make this memorandum available to the public. Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (Department of Labor Production), CTRL0000087637, (January 8, 2021, Memorandum
for The President of the United States from Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia, regarding
Request for Cabinet Meeting).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 143
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 23-25.
102. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 12.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 3, 2022), p. 62.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 3, 2022), pp. 19-20.
105. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021),
pp. 30-31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Rosen%20Transcript.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 14-15 (in
which Rosen confirms the general accuracy of the transcription of his Senate testimony
and then is asked and agrees to the following question: [Committee staff]: “And we are
going to – the select committee is going to essentially incorporate those transcripts as
part of our record and rely upon your testimony there for our purposes going forward, as
long as you’re comfortable with that?” [Rosen]: “Yes.”)
106. “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results – December 22, 2020,” Factba.se, at 9:11-
9:25 (Dec. 22, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-
contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 43.
108. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
109. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
110. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 8:57 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210103135742/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1345731043861659650 (archived).
111. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 25-26.
112. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, at 15:12-
15:44, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 64.
114. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:42:58-1:43:02, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=6178.
115. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6, 2021), p. 156,
available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
116. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:15:19-1:15:39, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=4519.
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144 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
117. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
118. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, at
51:38-52:01, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-
trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
119. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
120. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:32:25-1:32:43, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5545.
121. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
122. PBS NewsHour, “WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win,” YouTube, at 1:33:35-1:33:44, Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5615.
123. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 290-91.
124. Search results for “dominion”, Trump Twitter Archive v2, (accessed Sep. 20, 2022), https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22&results=1.
125. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.
126. “Donald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript 2020: Addresses Possibility of Con-
ceding Election,” Rev, at 23:35-23:46, (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/
blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-
possibility-of-conceding-election.
127. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.
128. “Donald Trump Thanksgiving Call to Troops Transcript 2020: Addresses Possibility of Con-
ceding Election,” Rev, at 24:16-24:35 (Nov. 26, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/
blog/transcripts/donald-trump-thanksgiving-call-to-troops-transcript-2020-addresses-
possibility-of-conceding-election.
129. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 27.
130. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, at 10:46-
11:06, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
131. William P. Barr, One Damn Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney General, (New York:
HarperCollins, 2022), at p. 554.
132. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 15, 2020 12:21 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1338715842931023873.jpg (archived).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 145
133. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7, 2021),
pp. 25, 31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
134. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 16, 2020 1:09 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1339090279429775363.jpg (archived).
135. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert O’Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 164-65.
136. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 11:30 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1340333619299147781.jpg (archived).
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 109.
138. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
139. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html
140. PBS NewsHour, "WATCH LIVE: Trump Speaks as Congress Prepares to Count Electoral Col-
lege Votes in Biden Win," YouTube, at 1:39:09 to 1:39:27 and 1:40:51 to 1:41:01, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at https://youtu.be/pa9sT4efsqY?t=5949.
141. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 15.
143. The framers specifically considered and rejected two constitutional plans that would have
given Congress the power to select the Executive. Under both the Virginia and New Jersey
Plans, the national executive would have been chosen by the national legislature. See Cur-
tis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102
Mich. L. Rev. 545, 592, 595 (2004); see also 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
at 21, 244 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (introducing Virginia and New Jersey Plans), available at
https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/farrand-the-records-of-the-federal-convention-of-1787-
vol-1; James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention (Sep. 4, 1787) (Gov. Morris
warning of “the danger of intrigue & faction” if Congress selected the President), available
at https://www.consource.org/document/james-madisons-notes-of-the-constitutional-
convention-1787-9-4/.
144. The Federalist No. 68, at 458 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
145. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
146. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
147. The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See also U.S.
Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector”).
148. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman052976 (Eastman Jan 6
scenario dual slates of electors memo); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Pro-
duction), CTRL0000923171 (Eastman Jan. 6 scenario conduct by elected officials memo).
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146 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
149. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (Eastman memo
to President Trump).
150. See Eastman v. Thompson et al. at 6-8, 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No.
8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
151. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman003228 (Eastman memo
to President Trump).
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 118.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 110, 117.
154. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 109-10; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th.
155. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
156. “Former Vice President Pence Remarks at Federalist Society Conference,” C-SPAN (Feb. 4,
2022), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?517647-2/vice-president-pence-remarks-
federalist-society-conference.
157. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 122.
158. Document on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production), VP-R0000107
(January 5, 2021, Greg Jacob memo to Vice President); see also Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1,
2022), pp. 127-28 (discussing memorandum).
159. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 122-23.
160. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), pp. 26-27.
161. Judge Luttig (@judgeluttig), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:53 a.m. ET available at https://
twitter.com/judgeluttig/status/1346469787329646592.
162. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
163. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee, (Chapman University Production), Chap-
man005442 (Eastman emails with Greg Jacob).
165. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 88.
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
167. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 85-86.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 147
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 157.
169. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 86-87.
170. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 34.
171. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.
172. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 85.
173. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 40.
174. Maggie Haberman and Annie Karni, “Pence Said to Have Told Trump He Lacks Power to
Change Election Result,” New York Times, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/pence-trump-election-results.html.
175. Meredith Lee (@meredithllee), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 9:58 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/meredithllee/status/1346652403605647367; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), p.
174-76; Greg Jacob testified that the President’s statement was “categorically untrue.”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Marc Short testified that the state-
ment was “incorrect” and “false.” Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Marc Short, (Jan. 26, 2022), p. 224; Chris Hodg-
son testified that it was not an accurate statement. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Chris Hodgson, (Mar. 30,
2022), pp. 184-85.
176. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 175-77 (acknowledging that Miller normally would
have called the Vice President’s office before issuing a public statement describing the
Vice President’s views but stating “I don’t think that ultimately -- don’t know if it ulti-
mately would have changed anything as the President was very adamant that this is where
they both were” and acknowledging that “the way this [statement] came out was the way
that [Trump] wanted [it] to.”).
177. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:00 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210106072109/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346698217304584192 (archived).
178. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 8:17 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210106175200/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346808075626426371 (archived).
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 47; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21,
2022), p. 126.
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of General Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 90; See also, Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Donald John Trump Jr., (May 3, 2022), p. 84; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6,
2022), p. 49; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 21-22. The
Select Committee is not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of
retaliation.
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148 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), p. 127.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee (June 10, 2022), p. 20. The Select Committee is
not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.
183. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of General Keith Kellogg, Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), p. 92.
184. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19. See also Peter Baker, Maggie Hab-
erman, and Annie Karni, “Pence Reached His Limit with Trump. It Wasn’t Pretty,” New York
Times, (Jan. 12, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/mike-
pence-trump.html; Jonathan Karl, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show, (New York:
Dutton, 2021), at pp. 273-74.
185. At 11:33 a.m., Stephen Miller’s assistant, Robert Gabriel, emailed the speechwriting team
with the line: “REINSERT THE MIKE PENCE LINES.” Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000007531_0001 (January 6, 2021, Robert Gabriel email to Trump
speechwriting team at 11:33 a.m.).
186. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Stephen Miller (Apr. 14, 2022), p. 153.
187. Document on file with the Select Committee (Ross Worthington Production), RW_0002341-
2351 (S. Miller Jan. 6 Speech Edits Native File), pp. 2-3.
188. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Ross Wor-
thington Production), CTRL0000924249, (changes in speech between draft and as deliv-
ered), pp. 2, 5, 12, 16, 22.
189. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
190. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
191. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
192. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11-0:14:29,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
193. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:07:02-2:07:07,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:07:02-2:07:07,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:46-1:01:12,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.
196. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:01:13-1:01:26,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645.
49-937_text.pdf 172 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 149
197. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:37-0:14:46,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
198. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:47-0:14:55,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
199. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 26-27 (establishing time as
1:21 p.m. based on time stamp of a photograph recognized and described).
200. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210106192450/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1346900434540240897 (archived).
201. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 32-33, United States v. Cusanelli, No. 1:21-cr-37
(D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2022), ECF No. 110.
202. See Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 5, United States v.
Black, No. 1:21-cr-127 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/
opa/page/file/1354806/download.
203. Indictment at 9, United States v. Neefe, No. 1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1, avail-
able at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/case-multi-defendant/file/1432686/download.
204. Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant at 8, United States v. Evans,
No. 1:21-cr-337 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1-1, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-
dc/press-release/file/1351946/download.
205. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at
2:26:06-2:26:26, available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript
at 19, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying
for a victim impact statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: "At approximately 1435 hours,
with rapidly mounting injuries and most of the MPD less than lethal munitions expended,
the defending officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back towards the
United States Capitol Building entrance. This is the first fighting withdrawal in the history
of the Metropolitan Police Department").
206. See Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan.
13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
207. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:16.
208. United States Secret Service Radio Tango Frequency at 14:25; see also Spencer S. Hsu,
“Pence Spent Jan. 6 at Underground Senate Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,” Wash-
ington Post, (Mar. 21, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/
03/21/couy-griffin-cowboys-trump-jan6/.
209. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:11:22-2:13:55,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.
210. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 43-44.
211. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44.
212. Complaint, Exhibit 2 (Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol subpoena to Chapman University, dated Jan. 21, 2022), Eastman v. Thompson
et al. et al., No. 8:22-cv-99, (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022) ECF No. 1-2.
49-937_text.pdf 173 12/23/22 9:11 AM
150 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
213. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 51-52, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
214. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 56-57, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
215. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 63-64, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
216. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
217. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 223.
218. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 7-8.
219. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Ronna Romney McDaniel, (June 1, 2022), pp. 9-11.
220. On December 13th, Chesebro memorialized the strategy in an email he sent Rudy Giuliani
with the subject line: “PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL – Brief notes on ‘President of the
Senate strategy.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman UniversityProduction), Chapman004708
(Dec. 13, 2020, Kenneth Chesebro email to Rudy Giuliani). Chesebro argued that the Trump
team could use the fake slates of electors to complicate the joint session on January 6th if
the President of the Senate “firmly t[ook] the position that he, and he alone, is charged
with the constitutional responsibility not just to open the votes, but to count them—
including making judgments about what to do if thereare conflicting votes.” Id. In the
weeks that followed, Chesebro and John Eastman would build upon that framework and
write two memos asserting that Joe Biden’s certification could be derailed on January 6th
if Vice President Pence acted as the “ultimate arbiter” when opening the real and fake
Electoral College votes during the joint session of Congress. Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chap-
man University Production), Chapman053476 (December 23, 2020, Eastman memo titled
“PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL – Dec 23 memo on Jan 6 scenario.docx”); see also Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061863 (January 1, 2021,
Chesebro email to Eastman).
221. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 114, 116.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 116.
223. The “certificate of ascertainment” is a State executive’s official documentation announcing
the official electors appointed pursuant to State law. See 3 U.S.C. § 6.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 70.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone (July 8, 2022), pp. 70-72.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Informal Inter-
view of Patrick Philbin (Apr. 13, 2022).
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone (July 8, 2022), p. 75.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), p. 64.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 151
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Shawn Still, (Feb. 25, 2022), p. 24.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Andrew Hitt, (Feb. 28, 2022), pp. 50–51.
231. The National Archives produced copies of the seven slates of electoral votes they received
from Trump electors in States that President Trump lost. See Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(National Archives Production), CTRL0000037568, CTRL0000037944, CTRL0000037945,
CTRL0000037946, CTRL0000037947, CTRL0000037948, CTRL0000037949 (December 14, 2020,
memoranda from slates of purported electors in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico,
Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Produc-
tion), VP-R0000323_0001 (Senate Parliamentarian office tracking receipt and attaching cop-
ies of the seven slates); See also Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Robert Sinners Produc-
tion), CTRL0000083893 (Trump campaign staffers emailing regarding submission); Docu-
ments on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Bill Stepien Production), WS 00096 – WS 00097 (Trump campaign
staffers emailing regarding submission).
232. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (David Shafer Production), 108751.0001 000004 (December 10, 2020,
Kenneth Chesebro email to David Shafer).
233. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037944 (December 14, 2020,
certificate and mailing envelope from Georgia); Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), CTRL0000037941 (December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from
Arizona), Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000037945
(December 14, 2020, certificate and mailing envelope from Michigan).
234. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Andrew Hitt Production), Hitt000080 (January 4, 2021, Hitt text mes-
sage with Mark Jefferson); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Angela McCallum Production), McCal-
lum_01_001576 - McCallum_01_001577 (January 5, 2021, McCallum text messages with G.
Michael Brown); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production) CTRL0000056548_00007
(January 6, 2021, Hodgson text messages with Matt Stroia); Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris
Hodgson Production), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6, 2021, text messages from Senator
Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Chris Hodgson (Mar. 30, 2022), pp. 206–07; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson
Production) CTRL0000056548_00007 (January 6, 2021, text message from Rep. Kelly’s Chief
of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris Hodgson at 8:41 a.m.), CTRL0000056548_00035 (January 6,
2021, text messages from Senator Johnson’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson
around 12:37 p.m.); Jason Lennon, “Johnson Says Involvement with 1/6 Fake Electors Plan
Only 'Lasted Seconds',” Newsweek, (Aug. 21, 2022), available at https://
www.newsweek.com/johnson-says-involvement-1-6-fake-electors-plan-only-lasted-
seconds-1735486.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), pp. 52–54.
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152 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
237. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 6, East-
man v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.
238. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 - January 20, 2021 at 20,
Eastman v. Thompson et al.., No. 8:22-cv-99 (C.D. Cal June 7, 2022), ECF No. 356.
239. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
240. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 5, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-
7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf. .
241. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 35, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM), also available at
https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Dkt%20260%2C%20Order%20RE%20Privilege%20of%20Jan.%204-
7%2C%202021%20Documents_0.pdf.
242. After a journalist tweeted a video clip of key remarks from Gabriel Sterling’s warning
addressed to President Trump, President Trump responded by quote-tweeting that post,
along with a comment that doubled down on demonizing Georgia election workers in spite
of Sterling’s stark and detailed warning. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter,
Dec. 1, 2020 10:27 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203173245/
https://mobile.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333975991518187521 (archived)
(“Rigged Election. Show signatures and envelopes. Expose the massive voter fraud in Geor-
gia. What is Secretary of State and @BrianKempGA afraid of. They know what we’ll find!!!
[linking to] twitter.com/BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633”); Brendan Keefe
(@BrendanKeefe), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 4:22 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
BrendanKeefe/status/1333884246277189633 (“"It. Has. All. Gone. Too. Far," says @Gabriel-
Sterling with Georgia Sec of State after a Dominion tech's life was threatened with a
noose. "Mr. President, you have not condemned these actions or this language....all of you
who have not said a damn word are complicit in this."” with embedded video of Gabriel
Sterling’s remarks); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21,
2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
243. Stephen Fowler, “‘Someone’s Going to Get Killed’: Election Official Blasts GOP Silence on
Threats,” GPB News, (Dec. 1, 2020, updated Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://www.gpb.org/
news/2020/12/01/someones-going-get-killed-election-official-blasts-gop-silence-on-
threats.
244. House Governmental Affairs Committee, Georgia House of Representatives, Public Hearing
(Dec. 10, 2020), YouTube, at 1:55:10-1:59:10, available at https://youtu.be/9EfgETUKfsI?t=
6910.
245. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 2:25:45 to
2:26:00, available at https://youtu.be/xa43_z_82Og?t=8745.
246. Jason Szep and Linda So, “A Reuters Special Report: Trump Campaign Demonized Two
Georgia Election Workers – and Death Threats Followed,” Reuters (Dec. 1, 2021), available at
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-threats-georgia/.
247. Amended Complaint at 52, Freeman v. Giuliani, No. 21-cv-03354-BAH (D.D.C. filed May 10,
2022), ECF No. 22, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/61642105/22/
freeman-v-herring-networks-inc.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 153
248. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ruby Freeman, (May 31, 2022), pp. 7-8.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
Ronald J. Hansen, “White House Phone Calls, Baseless Fraud Charges: The Origins of the
Arizona Election Review,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 17, 2021), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/17/arizona-audit-trump-
allies-pushed-to-undermine-2020-election/6045151001/; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and
Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to do Something Huge’: An Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizona’s
Election Results,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021, updated Dec. 2, 2021), available at
https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-
rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/6349795001/.
250. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 53:00-53:40,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
251. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), at 41:30-46:35,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xa43_z_82Og.
252. Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020 11:23 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336526978640302080 (retweeting people who were post-
ing Bowers's personal information); Dennis Welch (@dennis_welch), Twitter, Dec. 8, 2020
11:28 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/dennis_welch/status/1336528029791604737.
253. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Russel “Rusty” Bowers, (June 19, 2022), pp. 50-52; Kelly Weill, “Arizona GOP Civil
War Somehow Keeps Getting Weirder,” Daily Beast, (Dec. 11, 2020), available at https://
www.thedailybeast.com/arizona-republican-party-civil-war-somehow-keeps-getting-
weirder; Yvonne Wingett Sanchez and Ronald J. Hansen, “‘Asked to do Something Huge’: An
Audacious Pitch to Reserve Arizona’s Election Results,” Arizona Republic, (Nov. 18, 2021,
updated Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://www.azcentral.com/in-depth/news/politics/
elections/2021/11/18/arizona-audit-rudy-giuliani-failed-effort-replace-electors/
6349795001/.
254. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
255. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), pp. 16-22.
256. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Infor-
mal Interview of Lee Chatfield, (Oct. 15, 2021).
257. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 57.
258. “Legislative Leaders Meet with President Trump,” State Senator Mike Shirkey, (Nov. 20,
2020), available at https://www.senatormikeshirkey.com/legislative-leaders-meet-with-
president-trump/.
259. Team Trump (Text TRUMP to 88022) (@TeamTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 9:00 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103170109/https://twitter.com/TeamTrump/
status/1345776940196659201 (archived); Beth LeBlanc, “Trump Campaign Lists Lawmakers’
Cells, Misdirects Calls for Chatfield to Former Petoskey Resident,” Detroit News, (Jan. 4,
2021), available at https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2021/01/04/trump-
campaign-lists-michigan-lawmakers-cell-numbers-misdirects-private-citizen/4130279001/;
Jaclyn Peiser, “Trump Shared the Wrong Number for a Michigan Lawmaker: A 28-Year-Old
Has Gotten Thousands of Angry Calls,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/05/michigan-trump-wrong-number-chatfield/.
49-937_text.pdf 177 12/23/22 9:11 AM
154 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
260. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Michael Shirkey, (June 8, 2022), p. 52; Aaron Parseghian, “Former Michi-
gan Resident Slammed with Calls After Trump Campaign Mistakenly Posts Number on
Social Media,” Fox 17 West Michigan, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.fox17online.com/news/politics/former-michigan-resident-slammed-with-calls-after-
trump-campaign-mistakenly-posts-number-on-social-media.
261. Nor would any State legislature have had such authority.
262. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 16-17, Eastman v. Thompson et al.., No. 8:22-
cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/
Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.
263. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (December 31,
2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurt Hilbert)
264. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (December 31,
2020, from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurt Hilbert).
265. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-
cv-99 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/
Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf..
266. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-
099 (C.D. Cal Oct. 19, 2022), ECF No. 372, available at https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/
Dkt.%20372%2C%20Order%20Re%20Privilege%20of%20Remaining%20Documents.pdf.
267. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 53.
269. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 47-48, 53; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January
6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
270. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
271. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
272. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
273. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th .
49-937_text.pdf 178 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 155
274. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 58; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000738, HCOR-
Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739 (December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from
Richard Donoghue about call with President Trump).
275. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.
276. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 59.
277. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099 (December 26, 2020, message
from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: “Mark, just checking in as time continues to
count down. 11 days to 1/6 and 25 days to inauguration. We gotta get going!”), MM014100
(December 26, 2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows stating: “Mark, you
should call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him and he explained to me why the principal
deputy won’t work especially with the FBI. They will view it as as [sic] not having the
authority to enforce what needs to be done.”), MM014101 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from
Meadows to Rep. Perry stating: “I got it. I think I understand. Let me work on the deputy
position”), MM014102 (Dec. 26, 2020 Message from Rep. Perry to Meadows stating: “Roger.
Just sent you something on Signal”), MM014162 (December 27, 2020, message from Rep.
Perry to Meadows stating: “Can you call me when you get a chance? I just want to talk to
you for a few moments before I return the presidents [sic] call as requested.”), MM014178
(December 28, 2020, message from Rep. Perry to Meadows stating: “Did you call Jeff
Clark?”), MM014208 (December 29, 2020, message from Representative Perry to Meadows
stating: “Mark, I sent you a note on signal”), MM014586 (January 2, 2021, message from Rep-
resentative Perry to Meadows stating: “Please call me the instant you get off the phone
with Jeff.”). President Trump, Mark Meadows, and Representative Perry refused to testify
before the Select Committee, and Jeffrey Clark asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in
refusing to answer questions from the Select Committee. “Thompson & Cheney Statement
on Donald Trump’s Defiance of Select Committee Subpoena,” Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Nov. 14, 2022), available at
https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-cheney-statement-donald-
trump-s-defiance-select-committee-subpoena; Luke Broadwater, “Trump Sues to Block
Subpoena from Jan. 6 Committee,” New York Times, (Nov. 11, 2022), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/11/11/us/politics/trump-subpoena-jan-6-committee.html; H. Rept.
117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Mark Randall
Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-
117hrpt216.pdf; Letter from John P. Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, re:
Subpoena to Representative Scott Perry, May 24, 2022, available at https://
keystonenewsroom.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2022/05/575876667-Rep-perry-Ltr-
SelectComm.pdf; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Jeffrey Clark, (Nov. 5, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Deposition of Jeffrey Clark,
(Feb. 2, 2022). See also Jonathan Tamari and Chris Brennan, “Pa. Congressman Scott Perry
Acknowledges Introducing Trump to Lawyer at the Center of Election Plot,” Philadelphia
Inquirer, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/scott-
perry-trump-georgia-election-results-20210125.html .
278. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014099-014103, MM014178.
49-937_text.pdf 179 12/23/22 9:11 AM
156 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
279. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 54-55.
280. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 55.
281. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.
282. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 114; Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000681
(Department of Justice policy), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000685 (White
House policy).
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 56.
284. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
285. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 72-73; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698,
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue about call with Congress-
man Perry).
286. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 15-17, 64-80, 179-191; Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697,
HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with draft letter attached to Decem-
ber 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
287. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021), pp. 184-88; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department
of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000697, HCOR-Pre-
CertificationEvents-07262021-000698 (email with draft letter attached to Dec. 28 email from
Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue). As further discussed in Chapter 4 of
this report, Klukowski, a lawyer, joined DOJ’s Civil Division with just weeks remaining in
President Trump’s term and helped Clark on issues related to the 2020 election, despite
the fact that “election-related matters are not part of the Civil portfolio.” Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Ken-
neth Klukowski (Dec. 15, 2021), p. 66-67. Although Klukowski told the Select Committee that
the Trump Campaign was his client before joining DOJ, id. at p. 190, and despite the fact
that he had sent John Eastman draft talking points titled “TRUMP RE-ELECTION” that
encouraged Republican State legislatures to “summon” new Electoral College electors for
the 2020 election less than a week before starting at DOJ, Klukowski nevertheless helped
Clark draft the December 28th letter described in this Report that, if sent, would have
encouraged one or more State legislatures to take actions that could have changed the
outcome of the 2020 election. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chapman University Production),
Chapman028219, Chapman028220 (December 9, 2020, email from Klukowski to Eastman
with attached memo). The Select Committee has concerns about whether Klukowski’s
actions at DOJ, and his continued contacts with those working for, or to benefit, the Trump
Campaign, may have presented a conflict of interest to the detriment of DOJ’s mission. In
addition, the Select Committee has concerns about many of the “privilege” claims Klu-
kowski used to withhold information responsive to his subpoena, as well as concerns
about some of his testimony, including his testimony about contacts with, among others,
49-937_text.pdf 180 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 157
John Eastman. The Committee has learned that their communications included at least
four known calls between December 22, 2020, and January 2, 2021. Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol
(Verizon Production, July 1, 2022) (showing that Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:38
a.m. EST for 22.8 min, that Klukowski called Eastman on 12/22 at 7:09 p.m. EST for 6.4 min,
that Eastman called Klukowski on 12/30 at 9:11 p.m. EST for 31.9 min, and that Klukowski
called Eastman on 1/02 at 6:59 p.m. EST for 6.4 min).
288. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Chapman University Production), Chapman061893 (Jan. 1, 2021,
emails between Jeffrey Clark and John Eastman); see Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Verizon Pro-
duction, July 1, 2022) (showing five calls between John Eastman and Jeffrey Clark from
January 1, 2021, through January 8, 2021).
289. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (Dec. 28 email from Jeffrey Clark to Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue
titled “Two Urgent Action Items”) (“The concept is to send it to the Governor, Speaker, and
President pro temp of each relevant state…”); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Kenneth Klukowski, (Dec. 15, 2021),
pp. 68-69, 79.
290. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
291. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
292. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000703.
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
294. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
295. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000697 (draft letter attached to December 28, 2020, email from Jeffrey Clark to
Jeffrey Rosen and Richard Donoghue).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled “RE:
Two Urgent Action Items”).
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled “RE:
Two Urgent Action Items”).
49-937_text.pdf 181 12/23/22 9:11 AM
158 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
06032021-000200 (January 2, 2021, email from Jeffrey Rosen to Richard Donoghue titled “RE:
Two Urgent Action Items”).
299. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
300. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
301. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 82.
302. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter
Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 79-82; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Produc-
tion), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703 (December 28, 2020, email from
Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action Items in
which Donoghue writes: “there is no chance that I would sign this letter or anything
remotely like this.”).
303. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack at the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), p. 73; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Department
of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000703 (December 28, 2020,
email from Richard Donoghue to Jeffrey Clark, cc’ing Jeffrey Rosen re: Two Urgent Action
Items in which Donoghue writes: “there is no chance that I would sign this letter or any-
thing remotely like this.”); Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Interview of Richard Dono-
ghue, (August 6, 2021), at p. 99, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
304. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 113.
305. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
306. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
307. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), CTRL0000083040 (January 3, 2021,
White House Presidential Call Log).
308. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119.
309. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 119-20. (“And so it was
unanimous; everyone was going to resign if Jeff Rosen was removed from the seat.” The
only exception was John Demers, the Assistant Attorney General for the National Security
Division. Donoghue encouraged Demers to stay on because he didn’t want to further jeop-
ardize national security.)
310. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 124.
49-937_text.pdf 182 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 159
311. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 126-28; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 120.
312. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 126.
313. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
314. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven A. Engel, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 64.
315. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 125.
316. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-132.
317. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 131-32.
318. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 75, 84.
319. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1340185773220515840 (archived).
320. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 2020 8:14 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792; Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1343328708963299338; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020 2:06 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1344359312878149634; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021
12:52 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22 (archived) (retweeting @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020
3:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/KylieJaneKremer/status/
1340399063875895296)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 2:53 p.m.
ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345095714687377418; Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 3:34 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944; Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 6:38 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1345551634907209730; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 1:29 a.m.
ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22 (archived)
(retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730)); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22 (archived) (retweet-
ing Jennifer Lynn Lawrence (@JenLawrence21)), Jan. 3, 2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464); Donald J. Trump (@real-
DonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:17 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22 (archived)
(retweeting Ron Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2, 2021 9:14 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/
1345599512560078849 (archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3,
49-937_text.pdf 183 12/23/22 9:11 AM
160 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2021 10:24 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22 (archived) (retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan.
2, 2021 5:47 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://
twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/1345547185836978176 (archived)); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twit-
ter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:28 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22 (archived) (retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2,
2021 2:58 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/
1345459488107749386); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021 9:46 a.m.
ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22 (retweeting Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1346478482105069568; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
5:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346588064026685443.
321. See, e.g., Sentencing Memorandum of Daniel Johnson at 5, United States v. Johnson, No.
1:21-cr-407 (D.D.C. May 25, 2022), ECF No. 56 (“Mr. Johnson believed what he read on the
internet and heard from the President himself - that the election had been stolen.”);
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Zac Martin, (Mar. 9, 2022), p. 20 (answering that he believed President
Trump wanted “patriots to show up in Washington, DC on January 6th” because “we felt
like our rights were being taken away from us” given the election results).
322. See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 4106-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C.
Oct. 18, 2022) (Oath Keeper Jason Dolan testified that the Oath Keepers came to Washing-
ton, DC “to stop the certification of the election. … [b]y any means necessary. That’s why
we brought our firearms.”); Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 34, 85-86, United States v.
Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1 (“Trump called us. Trump
called us to DC ... and he's calling for help -- I thought he was calling for help. I thought he
was -- I thought we were doing the right thing.”); Statement of Facts at 2, United States v.
Martin, No. 1:21-cr-394 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2021) (“MARTIN reported that he decided to travel to
Washington, D.C. after reading then-President Donald Trump’s tweets regarding the elec-
tion being stolen and a protest on January 6, 2021, flying to D.C. on January 5, 2021, and
attending the rallies on January 6, 2021, and then heading to the U.S. Capitol where he
entered along with a crowd of other individuals.”); Statement of Facts at 9-10, United
States v. Denney, No. 1:22-cr-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021) (“So Trump has called this himself. For
everyone to come. It’s the day the electoral college is suppose [sic] to be certified by con-
gress to officially elect Biden.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6thth Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin Thompson (Nov. 16, 2022), pp.
34, 44, 70-71 (noting that he went to the Capitol at President Trump’s direction and that he
“figured [stopping the certification of the vote] was [President Trump’s] plan”; see also,
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Select Committee Chart Compiling Defendant Statements).
323. Indictment at 6, United States v. Smith, No. 1:21-cr-567 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2021), ECF No. 1.
324. Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Sulenta, No. 1:22-mj-00129-ZMF (D.D.C. June 6,
2022), ECF No. 1-1.
325. Stipulated Statement of Facts at 7, United States v. Morss, No. 1:21-cr-40 (D.D.C. August 23,
2022), ECF No. 430.
326. Statement of Facts at 9, United States v. Grayson, No. 1:21-cr-224 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1.
327. Statement of Facts at 11, United States v. Denney, No. 1:21-mj-00686-RMM-ZMF (D.D.C. Dec.
7, 2021), ECF No. 1-1.
49-937_text.pdf 184 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 161
328. Gieswein denies that he was a Three Percenter as of January 6, 2021, even though he affili-
ated with an apparent Three Percenter group at previous times. See Gieswein’s Motion for
Hearing & Revocation of Detention Order at 2-3, 18-19, 25, United States v. Gieswein, No.
1:21-cr-24 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021), ECF No. 18. When the FBI arrested Gieswein, the criminal
complaint noted that he “appears to be affiliated with the radical militia group known as
the Three Percenters.” Criminal Complaint at 5, United States v. Gieswein, No. 1:21-cr-24
(D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1360831/
download. See also Adam Rawnsley (@arawnsley), Twitter, Jan. 17, 2021 9:13 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/arawnsley/status/1350989535954530315 (highlighting photos of
Gieswein flashing a Three Percenter symbol).
329. Second Superseding Indictment at 9-10, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. March 7, 2022), ECF No. 305.
330. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 5; Third Superseding Indictment at 6, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Statement of Offense at 3, United States v. Donohoe, No.
1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336.
331. Third Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v. Nordean, et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380; Georgia Wells, Rebecca Ballhaus, and Keach Hagey, “Proud Boys,
Seizing Trump’s Call to Washington, Helped Lead Capitol Attack,” Wall Street Journal,
(Jan.17, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/proud-boys-seizing-trumps-call-
to-washington-helped-lead-capitol-attack-11610911596.
332. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jay Thaxton Production), CTRL0000070865, (December 29, 2020, Tele-
gram chat at 11:09 a.m. from Enrique Tarrio under the name “HEIKA NOBLELEAD.”).
333. “Former Leader of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Seditious Conspiracy for Efforts to Stop
Transfer of Power Following 2020 Presidential Election,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 6,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-proud-boys-pleads-
guilty-seditious-conspiracy-efforts-stop-transfer-power; “Leader of North Carolina Chapter
of Proud Boys Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy and Assault Charges in Jan. 6 Capitol Breach,”
Department of Justice, (Apr. 8, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-
north-carolina-chapter-proud-boys-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-and-assault-charges-jan-6.
334. Statement of Offense at 2, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 5.
335. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022), ECF
No. 5.
336. Statement of Offense at 4-5, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 2022),
ECF No. 5.
337. Statement of Offense at 4, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022),
ECF No. 336. Indeed, Proud Boys leaders Biggs and Nordean told MOSD on January 5th
about a plan they had discussed with Tarrio for January 6th. Although Biggs and Nordean
did not share the plan’s precise details, Proud Boys like Bertino and Donohoe nonetheless
understood the “objective in Washington, D.C., on January 6, 2021, was to obstruct, impede,
or interfere with the certification of the Electoral College vote, including by force if neces-
sary,” and that the Proud Boys “would accomplish this through the use of force and vio-
lence, which could include storming the Capitol through police lines and barricades if
necessary.” Statement of Offense at 8, United States v. Bertino, No. 1:22-cr-329 (D.D.C. Oct.
6, 2022), ECF No. 5; Statement of Offense at 6, United States v. Donohoe, No. 1:21-cr-175
(D.D.C. Apr. 8, 2022), ECF No. 336.
338. Superseding Indictment at 2-3, United States v. Rhodes et al, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22,
2022), ECF No. 167.
339. Caldwell testified that he was not an Oath Keeper. See Trial Transcript at 8778-79, United
States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2022); Hannah Rabinowitz and Holmes
Lybrand, “Capitol Riot Defendant Calls Himself a ‘Little Bit of a Goof’ Regarding Pelosi and
Pence Comments,” CNN, (Nov. 15, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/15/
49-937_text.pdf 185 12/23/22 9:11 AM
162 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
politics/thomas-caldwell-testifies-oath-keeper-trial. Because the government tried
Caldwell in a conspiracy case with known Oath Keepers, the Select Committee has referred
to him as an Oath Keeper.
340. See Trial Transcript at 10502-08, United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov.
29, 2022).
341. Trial Exhibit 6860 (1.S.656.9328 - 9396), United States v. Rhodes, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct.
13, 2022).
342. Superseding Indictment at 13, United States v. Rhodes, III, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22,
2022), ECF No 167.
343. Superseding Indictment at 13-14, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June
22, 2022), ECF No. 167.
344. Superseding Indictment at 15-17, United States v. Rhodes, et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. June 22,
2022), ECF No 167.
345. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. Ulrich, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2022), ECF
No. 117.
346. Statement of Offense at 5, United States v. James, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2022), ECF
No. 60.
347. "TTPO Stance on Election Fraud," The Three Percenters - Original, available at https://
archive.ph/YemCC#selection-289.0-289.29 (archived).
348. Statement of Facts at 7-8, United States v. Buxton, No. 1:21-cr-739 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF
No. 1-1; Post: “Oath Keepers claim to stand for the constitution yet will not call up its 30k
membership to attend the 6th. I thought you guys stood for the constitution? It's your only
job as an organization...now or never boys,” Patriots.win, Dec. 29, 2020, available at
https://patriots.win/p/11RO2hdyR2/x/c/4DrwV8RcV1s.
349. Indictment at 1, 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
350. Indictment at 7, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
351. Indictment at 8-13, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
352. Indictment at 9, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021), ECF
No. 1.
353. Statement of Facts at 4, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1.
354. Statement of Facts at 5, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1. When the Select Committee asked about this post to the leader of the Florida
Guardians of Freedom, Liggett downplayed any significance or any knowledge about other
Three Percenter groups that might “show in record numbers.” Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Jeremy Liggett,
(May 17, 2022), pp. 51-52.
355. Statement of Facts at 5-6, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022),
ECF No. 5-1; #SeditionHunters (@SeditionHunters), Twitter, June 7, 2021 2:11 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/SeditionHunters/status/1401965056980627458.
356. Statement of Facts at 15-17, United States v. Cole et al., No. 1:22-mj-184, (D.D.C. Aug. 29,
2022), ECF No. 5-1. The "tunnel" is actually a flight of stairs leading to a doorway from
which the President emerges on Inauguration Day to take the oath of office. When the
inauguration stage is present, the stairs leading to the doorway are converted into a "10-
foot-wide, slightly sloped, short tunnel that was approximately 15 feet long." Government's
Sentencing Memorandum at 5-6, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291-3 (D.D.C. Sept. 13,
2022), ECF No. 140. For other examples of how extremist groups responded to President
Trump’s call to action, see Chapter 6.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 163
357. Indictment at 11, United States v. Rodriguez et al., No. 1:21-cr-246 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2021), ECF
No. 65; Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 70, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246
(D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
358. Motion to Suppress, Exhibit A at 34, 85-86, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 1:21-cr-246
(D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021), ECF No. 38-1.
359. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Request for Pretrial Release at 7, United
States v. Meggs, No. 1:21-cr-28 (D.D.C Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 98.
360. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol ( Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Google Voice Production, Feb. 25, 2022).
361. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,
2022).
362. Trial Exhibit 6868 (2000.T.420), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct. 13,
2022).
363. Trial Exhibit 9221, United States v. Rhodes et al., No.1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2022).
364. Motion for Bond, Exhibit 1 at 125-26, United States v. Vallejo, No. 1:22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 18,
2022), ECF No. 102-1 (Collection of redacted text messages, labeled as Exhibit 8, showing
Rhodes adding “a CA Oath Keeper who is in with a four man team, followed by that person
announcing his identifiable radio frequency) Ryan J. Reilly, “New Evidence Reveals Coordi-
nation Between Oath Keepers, Three Percenters on Jan. 6,” NBC News, (May 28, 2022), avail-
able at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/new-evidence-reveals-
coordination-oath-keepers-three-percenters-jan-6-rcna30355 (noting how public source
investigators linked the identifiable radio frequency to Derek Kinnison, who is one of the
California Three Percenters indicted on conspiracy charges for their conduct on January
6th. See Indictment, United States v. Hostetter et al., No. 1:21-cr-392 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021),
ECF No. 1).
365. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), CTRL 0000010471, at 7:01 (January
6, 2021, video footage recorded by Samuel Montoya at the U.S. Capitol).
366. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (District of Columbia Production), Axon Body 3 X6039BKH5 13.53.47
20210106-FELONYRIOT-FIRSTSTSE, at 15:28:13 (MPD body camera footage); Statement of
Facts at 3, United States v. Cale, No. 1:22-cr-139 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2022), ECF No. 1-1.
367. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Jan6-07222021-000603.
368. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 143.
369. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199.
370. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December 22, 2020,
email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers chats),
371. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mary McCord Production), CTRL0000930476 (December 22, 2020,
email to the FBI noting troubling Oath Keepers chats).
372. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
373. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
49-937_text.pdf 187 12/23/22 9:11 AM
164 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
374. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
375. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
376. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
377. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
378. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000038637, (December 25, 2020,
email chain from PIOC on January 6th intelligence).
379. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000080 (December 28, 2020,
email to John Donohue re: (LES) Armed and Ready SITE.pdf.); Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jack
Donohue, (Jan. 31, 2022), p. 8; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Informal Interview of Jack Donohue, (Jan. 7, 2022).
380. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420 (December 26, 2020,
email to PIOC regarding possible Proud Boys plan for January 6, 2021).
381. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000067420 (December 26, 2020,
email to PIOC regarding possible Proud Boys plan for January 6, 2021).
382. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020,
email from PIOC-ONDUTY to THREAT ASSESSMENT re: FW: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls
on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.).
383. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000087 (December 28, 2020,
email re: 1/6 warning.).
384. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001473 (December 29, 2020,
email from PIOC-ONDUTY@USSS.DHS.GOV to THREATS@uscp.gov titled “FW: [EXTERNAL
EMAIL] - Neo-Nazi Calls on D.C. Pro-Trump Protesters to Occupy Federal Building.”).
385. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000101135.0001, pp. 1, 3 (December
30, 2020, Protective Intelligence Brief titled “Wild Protest”).
386. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email titled “Fwd:
MPD MMS Text Tip.”).
387. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001527 (Email titled “Fwd:
MPD MMS Text Tip.”).
388. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Parler Production) PARLER_00000013 (January 2, 2021, email from
Parler to the FBI re: Another to check out, attaching Parler posts).
49-937_text.pdf 188 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 165
389. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001487 (January 2, 2021, email
to Capitol Police and Department of Justice with screenshots of Parler posts); Documents
on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000116, CTRL0000000116.0001 (January
4, 2021, email from U.S. Capitol Police re: Comments of concern for Jan 6 rally, collecting
Parler posts).
390. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5,
2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
391. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5,
2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
392. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000293417 (December 30, 2020,
email to OSU-ALL titled “Discovery of Event Website- MAGA Drag the Interstate & Occupy
the Capitol”).
393. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001
(January 5, 2021, email re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).
394. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001
(January 5, 2021, email al re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post of Concern.).
395. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000000083, CTRL0000000083.0001
(January 5, 2021, email Deleted for privacy concerns. et. al re: (U//FOUO//LES) OSINT Post
of Concern.).
396. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), USSS0000066986, USSS0000066986.0001
(January 5, 2021, Secret Service email noting social media user threatening to bring a fire-
arm to Washington, D.C. on January 6th).
397. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46000114_00000238,
DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5, 2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of
Investigation. “Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned
'StopTheSteal' Protest on 6 January 2021.”).
398. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Department of Interior Production), DOI_46000114_00000238,
DOI_46000114_00000239 (January 5, 2021, Situational Information Report Federal Bureau of
Investigation. “Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned
'StopTheSteal' Protest on 6 January 2021.”).
399. Trial Exhibit 6923 (1.S.159.817, 955), United States v. Rhodes et al., No. 22-cr-15 (D.D.C. Oct.
14, 2022) ( Rhodes sent an encrypted message to Oath Keeper leadership on January 5,
2021, stating: “We will have several well equipped QRFs outside DC. And there are many,
many others, from other groups, who will be watching and waiting on the outside in case
of worst case scenarios.”).
400. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014441-MM01442 (December 30, 2020,
6:05 p.m. ET text from Jason Miller to Mark Meadows).
401. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), Exhibit 45, pp. 4, 13. Miller claimed he had no idea
about the comments and would have “flag[ged]” them for “Secret Service” had he seen
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166 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
them. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 210-12.
402. On his way to the Capitol, Proud Boy David Nicholas Dempsey stopped on the National
Mall in front of an erected gallows, fitted with a noose, to tell the world what he hoped
would happen: “Them worthless shitholes like Jerry Nadler, fuckin Pelosi … They don’t
need a jail cell. They need to hang from these motherfuckers [pointing to gallows]. They
need to get the point across that the time for peace is over. … For four, or five years
really, they’ve been fucking demonizing us, belittling us, … doing everything they can to
stop what this is, and people are sick of that shit …. Hopefully one day soon we really
have someone hanging from one of these motherfuckers … .” Statement of Facts at 2-3,
United States v. Dempsey, No. 1:21-cr-566 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2021); #SeditionHunters (@Sedi-
tionHunters), Twitter, Mar. 11, 2021 8:12 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
SeditionHunters/status/1370180789770588163.
403. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.
404. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 92.
405. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_035, SC_HH_036 (January 6, 2021,
text messages with Hogan Gidley).
406. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 109-10.
407. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency, DC Produc-
tion), CTRL0000926794 (Talking points put together by Dr. Christopher Rodriguez, Director
of HSEMA, for a briefing with Mayor Muriel Bowers on December 30, 2020).
408. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell Har-
vin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23.
409. Given the timing of receipt of much of this intelligence immediately in advance of January
6th, it is unclear that any comprehensive intelligence community analytical product could
have been reasonably expected. But it is clear that the information itself was communi-
cated.
410. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Caroline Wren Production), REVU_000181 (January 2, 2021, email from
Katrina Pierson to Caroline Wren and Taylor Budowich re: 1/6 Speaker Schedule).
411. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kylie Kremer Production), KKremer5449; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Inves-
tigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
412. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 83, 86.
413. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
414. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert “Bobby” Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 64.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 167
415. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 21.
416. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
417. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
418. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 152.
419. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), p. 16.
420. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production), CTRL0000086772, p. 4 (November 18, 2021,
document titled: United States Secret Service - Coordinated Response to a Request for
Information from the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol).
421. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nick Quested Production), Video file ML_DC_20210106_Sony_FS7-
GC_1935.mov; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (Summary
of updates from January 6, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Dustin Thompson, (Nov. 16, 2022),
pp. 30-31 ("I was seeing these, like, piles of backpacks and flagpoles [outside the magne-
tometers]. And some people were watching that for other people. And I just -- there were
lots of piles all over the place of stuff like that.").
422. Tom Jackman, Rachel Weiner, and Spencer S. Hsu, “Evidence of Firearms in Jan. 6 Crowd
Grows as Arrests and Trials Mount,” Washington Post, (July 8, 2022), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/07/08/jan6-defendants-guns/.
423. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Secret Service Production), CTRL0000882478 (summary of radio traf-
fic on January 6, 2021).
424. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (District of Columbia Production), MPD 73-78 (District of Columbia,
Metropolitan Police Department, Transcript of Radio Calls, January 6, 2021); Documents on
file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol (District of Columbia Production), CTRL0000070375, at 3:40 (District of Columbia,
Metropolitan Police Department, audio file of radio traffic from January 6, 2021, from 12:00
- 13:00).
425. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Cassidy Hutchinson Production), CH-CTRL0000000069.
426. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
427. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), p. 77 ("The
most--the thing that sticks out most was he kept asking why we couldn't go, why we
couldn't go, and that he wasn't concerned about the people that were there or referenced
them being Trump people or Trump supporters.").
428. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
429. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
49-937_text.pdf 191 12/23/22 9:11 AM
168 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
430. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 20-21.
431. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 24, 26.
432. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 26.
433. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 23.
434. See “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), at
1:00:00 – 1:02:31, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-
save-america-rally-transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).
435. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
436. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:45-1:01:12,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Janet West
Buhler, (Feb. 28, 2022), p. 40.
437. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
438. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
439. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
440. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 0:14:11-0:15:00,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851; Hearing on Motion to Modify Conditions
of Release, Exhibit 07 at 7:43 - 8:00, United States v. Nichols, No. 1:21-cr-117 (D.D.C. Dec. 20,
2021).
441. Unframe of Mind, “Unframe of Mind in DC #stopthesteal Rally,” YouTube, at 9:40 – 9:47, Jan.
6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s; Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at, at 0:14:11-0:15:00, avail-
able at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=851.
442. Walter Masterson, “Live from the Trump Rally in Washington, D.C.,” YouTube, at 17:32 –
17:50, Jan. 11, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFbvpBu_7ws&t=579s;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at, at 2:07:02-
2:07:07, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
443. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022) at, at 2:07:13-
2:07:47, available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7609.
444. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:00:45-1:01:12,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3645; On the Media, “Jessica Watkins on
‘Stop the Steal J6’ Zello Channel (Unedited),” Soundcloud, at 4:00-4:18, available at https://
soundcloud.com/user-403747081/jessica-watkins-on-stop-the-steal-j6-zello-channel-
unedited .
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 169
445. For a video of the interview, see “Crown Point, Indiana Man Charged in Jan. 6 Capitol Riot
Says He Has ‘No Regrets’,” CBS Chicago, Nov. 29, 2022, available at https://
www.cbsnews.com/chicago/video/crown-point-indiana-man-charged-in-jan-6-capitol-riot-
says-he-has-no-regrets/#x.
446. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27 (emphasis added).
447. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 49.
448. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 131 (“I just didn’t
think it would be, you know, a good idea for the President to go up to the Capitol.”). While
Cipollone did not specifically recall talking with Cassidy Hutchinson about this topic, he
informed the Select Committee that he was sure that he did express his view to some
people. Id. Hutchinson believes it was Pat Cipollone, but also testified that it may have
been a different lawyer. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 113-
16.
449. For security reasons, the Select Committee is not releasing the name of this employee.
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022) at p. 73. See also Chapter 7, which discusses this topic in greater detail.
450. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of United States Secret Service Agent, (Nov. 21, 2022), pp. 22-23. The
Select Committee has agreed to keep confidential the identity of this witness due to their
sensitive national security responsibilities.
451. A book written by Chief of Staff Mark Meadows in December 2021 made the categorical
claim that the President never intended to travel to the Capitol that day. See Mark Mead-
ows, The Chief’s Chief (St. Petersburg, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 250. The Committee’s
evidence demonstrates that Meadows’s claim is categorically false. Because the Meadows
book conflicted sharply with information that was being received by the Select Committee,
the Committee became increasingly wary that other witnesses might intentionally conceal
what happened. That appeared to be the case with Ornato. Ornato does not recall that he
conveyed the information to Cassidy Hutchinson regarding the SUV, and also does not
recall that he conveyed similar information to a White House employee with national
security responsibilities who testified that Ornato recalled a similar account to him. The
Committee is skeptical of Ornato’s account.
452. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), p. 45. The Select Commit-
tee has agreed to keep confidential the identity of this witness due to their sensitive
national security responsibilities.
453. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), p. 159.
454. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 8.
455. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 2-9, United States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291
(D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2022), ECF No. 140; 167 Cong. Rec. S619 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at
https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Michael
S. Schmidt and Luke Broadwater, "Officers' Injuries, Including Concussions, Show Scope of
Violence at Capitol Riot," New York Times, (Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/us/politics/capitol-riot-police-officer-injuries.html.
49-937_text.pdf 193 12/23/22 9:11 AM
170 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
456. See Sentencing Transcript at 35, United States v. Griffith, No. 1:21-cr-204 (D.D.C. Oct. 30,
2021), ECF No. 137; Kyle Cheney and Josh Gerstein, "Where Jan. 6 Prosecutions Stand, 18
Months after the Attack," Politico, (July 7, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/
news/2022/07/07/jan-6-prosecutions-months-later-00044354.
457. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30,
2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen
President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as
that come out, everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the
crowd. . . . We left.”); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21,
2022), at 1:58:00, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo (“I’m here
delivering the President’s message. Donald Trump has asked everybody to go home. ...
That’s our order.”).
458. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:50:59-1:52:19,
available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=6659; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Inves-
tigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 2:15:45-2:17:12, available at https://
youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8145; CBS News, “Former Vice President Mike Pence on 'Face the
Nation with Margaret Brennan' | Full Interview,” YouTube, at 16:23-19:01, Nov. 21, 2022,
available at https://youtu.be/U9GbkPhG1Lo?t=983; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Steven Andrew
Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), p. 173.
459. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 27. The Select Committee is
not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation; See “Don-
ald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-rally-
transcript-january-6 (timestamping the speech).
460. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), Photo file 40a8_hi_j0087_0bea; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 34:18, available at
https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2058.
461. Washington Post, “D.C. Police requested backup at least 17 times in 78 minutes during
Capitol riot | Visual Forensics,” YouTube, at 7:58 to 8:45, Apr. 15, 2021, available at https://
youtu.be/rsQTY9083r8?t=478; Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Public Hearing, (Mar. 3, 2021),
Written Testimony of William J. Walker, Commanding General District of Columbia National
Guard, p. 3, available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Walker-
2021-03-03.pdf.
462. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Shealah Craighead, (June 8, 2022), pp. 42, 46.
463. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000261; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th
464. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000257; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th
49-937_text.pdf 194 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 171
465. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 138.
466. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith
Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14, 2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th
Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
january6th; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 186-90.
467. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), pp. 127, 129, 131-32, 137, 141, 143-44, 148-49, 159.
468. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
469. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 163-64; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation,
117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/
house-january6th.
470. Senator Lee wrote to a reporter that he received a call from the President moments after
the Senate halted its proceedings and that the President claimed he had dialed Sen.
Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), so Lee let Tuberville talk to the President on his phone for 5 or
10 minutes until they were ordered to evacuate. Bryan Schott, “What Sen. Mike Lee Told Me
about Trump’s Call the Day of the Capitol Riot,” Salt Lake Tribune, (Feb. 10, 2021, updated
Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2021/02/11/what-sen-
mike-lee-told-me/; see also Kyle Cheney, “Tuberville Says He Informed Trump of Pence’s
Evacuation before Rioters Reached Senate,” Politico, (Feb. 11, 2021), available at https://
www.politico.com/news/2021/02/11/tuberville-pences-evacuation-trump-impeachment-
468572.
471. 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/
crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 1:49 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20210107235835/
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1346891760174329859 (archived).
472. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 149-50.
473. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 150-51.
474. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:39:03-1:40:42,
available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5943. Two witnesses recall writing this note:
Cassidy Hutchinson and Eric Herschmann, although Hutchinson recalls that Herschmann
was responsible for the revision made to the note. The Committee’s review of Hutchinson’s
handwriting was consistent with the script of the note. Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchin-
son, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 167; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 67-68.
Who wrote the note is not material to the Select Committee—the important point is that it
was prepared for the President.
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172 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
475. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.
476. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:27:52-1:28:53,
available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5272; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchin-
son, (June 20, 2022), pp. 25-26.
477. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 161; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:29:30 - 1:31:51, available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
478. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), pp. 12-15, 98-99; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July
21, 2022), at 38:02-38:44, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=2283.
479. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), pp. 108-09.
480. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
481. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 163.
482. Third Superseding Indictment at 21, United States v. Nordean et al., No. 1:21-cr-175 (D.D.C.
June 6, 2022), ECF No. 380 (noting that Dominic Pezzola “used [a] riot shield … to break a
window of the Capitol” at “2:13 p.m.” and that “[t]he first members of the mob entered the
Capitol through this broken window.”); 167 Cong. Rec. S634 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf.
483. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014907.
484. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014912.
485. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014919.
486. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
487. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014933.
488. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014935.
489. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014937.
490. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014939.
491. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
492. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014961.
49-937_text.pdf 196 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 173
493. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
494. U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (@SenBillCassidy), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 4:03 p.m. ET, available
at https://twitter.com/SenBillCassidy/status/1346925444189327361.
495. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014971.
496. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 149-50; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Julie
Radford, (May 25, 2022), p. 37.
497. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 145, 150.
498. Leader McCarthy spoke on the air to Fox News starting at 3:05 p.m. ET and told the net-
work that “I’ve already talked to the President. I called him. I think we need to make a
statement, make sure that we can calm individuals down.” Fox News (FoxNews), “LISTEN:
Rep. Kevin McCarthy on protesters storming Capitol,” Facebook, at 3:27-3:40, Jan. 6, 2021
(uploaded to Facebook at 3:35 p.m. ET), available at https://www.facebook.com/FoxNews/
videos/listen-rep-kevin-mccarthy-on-protesters-storming-capitol/232725075039919/.
499. CBS News, “Live coverage: Protesters Swarm Capitol, Abruptly Halting Electoral Vote
Count,” YouTube, at 3:29:02-3:29:15, 3:29:43-3:30:03, 3:31:28-3:32:07, 3:33:52-3:34:12, Jan. 6,
2021, available at https://youtu.be/3Fsf4aWudJk?t=12542.
500. Rep. Herrera Beutler Describes Efforts to Get Trump to Intervene in Stopping Jan. 6 riot,”
WTHR (Feb. 13, 2021), at 1:20 - 1:50, available at https://www.wthr.com/video/news/nation-
world/capitol-riot-herrera-beutler-trump-mccarthy-call/507-477fa84f-1277-444a-aad6-
716c5ec9f66f.
501. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of John Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), p. 43. CNN’s Jamie Gan-
gel related that she also confirmed the account with multiple other sources, reporting that
“I’ve spoken to multiple Republican Members of the House who have knowledge of that
call, who tell us that after Trump tried to say to Kevin, ‘these are not my people, it’s
Antifa,’ Kevin McCarthy said to Trump, ‘no, it’s not Antifa. These are your people’…. We’re
also told by several other Republican Members that Kevin McCarthy wasn’t shy about this
heated exchange with Trump, that he wanted his Members to know about it.” CNN, “New
Details Emerge in McCarthy's Call with Trump on January 6,” YouTube, at 0:25 - 1:50, Feb. 12,
2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gy1FPNluoOE.
502. Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of John Michael “Mick” Mulvaney, (July 28, 2022), pp. 10-12 (describing calls and
text messages to Dan Scavino and Mark Meadows).
503. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (HBO Productions), Video file Reel_204I - All Clips Com-
pilation.mp4 at 5:32–5:55 (January 6, 2021 footage from HBO of Nancy Pelosi and Chuck
Schumer on phone call with Jeffrey Rosen); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Produc-
tion), MM014906 (January 6, 2021 text message from Marjorie Taylor Greene to Mark Mead-
ows), MM014919 (January 6, 2021 text message from William Timmons to Mark Meadows),
MM014939 (January 6, 2021 text message from Chip Roy to Mark Meadows).
504. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 151.
505. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 162.
506. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 152.
49-937_text.pdf 197 12/23/22 9:11 AM
174 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
507. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 0:57:48 -
0:58:19, available at https://youtu.be/pbRVqWbHGuo?t=3468.
508. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Security Official, (July 11, 2022), pp. 81-83; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th. The Select Committee is not revealing the
identity of this witness because of national security concerns as well as to guard against
the risk of retaliation.
509. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346900434540240897.jpg (archived).
510. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:11:22-2:13:55,
available at https://youtu.be/vBjUWVKuDj0?t=7882.
511. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:26:06-2:26:26,
available at https://youtu.be/IQvuBoLBuC0?t=8766; Sentencing Transcript at 19, United
States v. Young, No. 1:21-cr-291 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2022), ECF No. 170 (testifying for a victim
impact statement, Officer Michael Fanone said: “At approximately 1435 hours, with rapidly
mounting injuries and most of the MPD less than lethal munitions expended, the defend-
ing officers were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal back towards the United States
Capitol Building entrance. This is the first fighting withdrawal in the history of the Metro-
politan Police Department.”).
512. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
513. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
514. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Judson P. Deere, (Mar. 3, 2022), p. 113.
515. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 160.
516. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Hope Hicks Production), SC_HH_043-044 (January 6, 2021, text mes-
sage from Hope Hicks to Julie Radford at 7:18 p.m.).
517. 167 Cong. Rec. S635 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/
crec/2021/02/10/CREC-2021-02-10-pt1-PgS615-4.pdf; Spencer S. Hsu, “Pence Spent Jan. 6 at
Underground Senate Loading Dock, Secret Service Confirms,” Washington Post, (Mar. 21,
2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/03/21/couy-griffin-
cowboys-trump-jan6/.
518. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Molly Michael, (Mar. 24, 2022), p. 137.
519. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
520. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
521. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), at 1:31:25 –
49-937_text.pdf 198 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 175
1:32:22, available at https://youtu.be/HeQNV-aQ_jU?t=5359; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy
Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 27-28.
522. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 182.
523. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 68-69, 71.
524. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:38 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346904110969315332.jpg (archived).
525. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
526. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 3:13 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1346912780700577792.jpg (archived).
527. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014925.
528. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014944.
529. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
530. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th].
531. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004112_0001 (January 6,
2021 email at 3:05 p.m. notifying Beau Harrison of Ashli Babbitt shooting); Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Inter-
view of William Beau Harrison (Aug. 18, 2022), pp. 73–76 (describing writing note and
passing it to Mark Meadows or Tony Ornato); Documents on file with the Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Pro-
duction), P-R000241 (January 6, 2021 pocket card written by Beau Harrison with the mes-
sage, “1x CIVILIAN GUNSHOT WOUND TO CHEST @ DOOR OF HOUSE CHABER [sic]”); Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), pp. 46–47 (“I remember seeing that
[note] in front of [President Trump], yeah.”). The Select Committee is not revealing the
identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation. See also Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Anthony Ornato, (January 28, 2022), p. 115; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6,
2022), p. 87 (recalling announcing during the afternoon that a Trump supporter had been
killed).
532. “Department of Justice Closes Investigation into the Death of Ashli Babbitt,” Department of
Justice, (Apr. 14, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/department-
justice-closes-investigation-death-ashli-babbitt.
533. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th; ABC News, “Mike Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6:
Exclusive,” YouTube, at 9:27-10:00, Nov. 14, 2022, available at https://youtu.be/-
AAyKAoPFQs?t=567; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
49-937_text.pdf 199 12/23/22 9:11 AM
176 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-81;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-25; Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2021), pp. 172-73, 182-84; Select Committee to Investigate the Janu-
ary 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Dono-
ghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 186.
534. NBC News, "Biden Condemns Chaos at the Capitol as 'Insurrection,'" YouTube, Jan. 6, 2021,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FBCWTqJT7M4; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Inves-
tigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
535. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-
at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript.
536. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
537. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th
538. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30,
2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen
President Trump put his tweet out, we literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as
that come out, everybody started talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the
crowd. . . . We left.”).
539. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 1:58:00, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
540. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 1:58:00, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo.
541. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 at 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210106232133/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1346954970910707712 (archived).
542. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
543. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Timothy Murtaugh, (May 19, 2022), p. 175; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
544. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), p. 194; Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://
www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
545. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Greg Jacob, (Feb. 1, 2022), p. 192.
49-937_text.pdf 200 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 177
546. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House Employee, (June 10, 2022), p. 53. The Select Committee is
not revealing the identity of this witness to guard against the risk of retaliation.
547. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Rudolph Giuliani Production, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
548. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205-07; Sunlen Serfaty, Devan Cole, and Alex
Rogers, “As Riot Raged at Capitol, Trump Tried to Call Senators to Overturn Election,” CNN,
(Jan. 8, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/08/politics/mike-lee-tommy-
tuberville-trump-misdialed-capitol-riot; Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Rudolph Giuliani Produc-
tion, Mar. 11, 2022); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
549. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 475.
550. Mike Pence, So Help Me God (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), p. 474.
551. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14,
2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A.
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021),
pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 21-22.
552. ABC News, “Pence Opens Up with David Muir on Jan. 6: Exclusive,” YouTube, at 10:45-11:02,
Nov. 14, 2022, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-AAyKAoPFQs.
553. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Steven Andrew Sund, (Apr. 20, 2022), pp. 170-71; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 174; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Keith Kellogg Jr., (Dec. 14,
2021), pp. 126–27; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Deposition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 151-52; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Christopher Charles Miller, (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 124-26; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A.
Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 80-82; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021),
pp. 186-89; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Muriel Bowser, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 21-22.
554. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), pp. 17, 268.
555. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 296; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th
Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/
committee/house-january6th.
49-937_text.pdf 201 12/23/22 9:11 AM
178 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
556. Glenn Kessler, “Trump Falsely Claims He ‘Requested’ 10,000 Troops Rejected by Pelosi,”
Washington Post, (Mar. 2, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2021/03/02/trump-falsely-claims-he-requested-10000-troops-rejected-by-pelosi/; “Mark
Meadows: Biden Administration Policies Put 'America Last',” Fox News, (Feb. 7, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/mark-meadows-biden-administration-
policies-put-america-last.
557. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christopher Charles Miller (Jan. 14, 2022), pp. 100-01. On January 4,
2021, Max Miller and Katrina Pierson exchanged text messages discussing their planning
activities for the 6th. In those messages, Max Miller stated: “Just glad we killed the
national guard and a procession” and that “… chief [Mark Meadows] already had said no
for days!”. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Max Miller Production), Miller Production 0001 (Janu-
ary 4, 2021, text messages between Max Miller and Katrina Pierson).
558. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:22:45-2:23:22,
available at https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo?t=8565; Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Katrina Pierson
Production), KPierson0717-719.
559. "House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy on Asking President Trump for his Resignation,"
ed. Alex Burns and Jonathan Martin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 8, 2021), available at
https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/bookresources.
560. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014456.
561. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014858 - MM014861.
562. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014467 (December 31, 2020, text mes-
sage from telephone number assigned to Carrah Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark
Meadows). The Select Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.
563. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014503 (January 1, 2021, text message
from telephone number assigned to Carrah Jo Roy, wife of Rep. Chip Roy. to Mark Mead-
ows). The Select Committee believes that Rep. Chip Roy sent this message.
564. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Kayleigh McEnany Production), CTRL0000925383, p. 3 (January 7, 2021,
text message from Sean Hannity to Kayleigh McEnany)
565. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM015209 (January 10, 2021, text mes-
sage Sean Hannity to Mark Meadows and Jim Jordan).
566. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014906.
567. "U.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time, 232-197," C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 -
4:15:31, Jan. 13, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-
impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=.
568. "Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy says Pres. Trump Admitted He Bears Some Responsi-
bility for the January 6 Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol," ed. Alex Burns and Jonathan Mar-
tin, ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/
bookresources.
569. "Statement by Mo Brooks," Mo Brooks for U.S. Senate, available at https://mobrooks.com/
statement-by-mo-brooks/; Joe Walsh, "GOP Rep. Mo Brooks Claims Trump Asked Him to
Reinstate Trump Presidency," Forbes, (Mar. 23, 2022), available at https://www.forbes.com/
49-937_text.pdf 202 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 179
sites/joewalsh/2022/03/23/gop-rep-mo-brooks-claims-trump-asked-him-to-reinstate-
trump-presidency/?sh=7264e1d91edd (noting that Rep. Mo Brooks issued this statement on
Wednesday, March 23, 2022).
570. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, “In Their Own Words: The 43 Republicans’ Explana-
tions of Their Votes Not to Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,” Just Security, (Feb. 15,
2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-
republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.
571. C-SPAN, “Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell Remarks Following Senate Impeachment
Vote,” YouTube, at 5:10 – 5:46, (Feb. 13, 2021), available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yxRMoqNnfvw.
572. “Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy Says Pres. Trump Admitted He Bears Some Responsi-
bility for the January 6 Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol,” Alex Burns and Jonathan Martin,
eds., ThisWillNotPass.com, (Jan. 11, 2021), available at https://www.thiswillnotpass.com/
bookresources; Melanie Zanona, “New Audio Reveals McCarthy said Trump Admitted Bear-
ing Some Responsibility for Capitol Attack,” CNN, (April 22, 2022), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2022/04/22/politics/trump-january-6-responsibility-book/index.html.
Leader McCarthy also relayed this conversation with President Trump to his Republican
colleagues: “I asked him [Trump] personally today, does he hold responsibility for what
happened. And he needs to acknowledge that.” Id. The Committee believes that House
Republican Leader McCarthy’s testimony would be material to any criminal investigation of
Donald Trump, not just to probe this apparent Trump acknowledgement of culpability, but
also because Leader McCarthy spoke directly to Donald Trump and others who were in the
White House on January 6th and unsuccessfully pleaded for the President’s immediate
assistance to halt the violence. Leader McCarthy did not comply with the Select Commit-
tee’s subpoena.
573. "U.S. House Impeaches President Trump for Second Time, 232-197," C-SPAN, at 4:14:56 -
4:15:31, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-101/house-
impeaches-president-trump-time-232-197&live=; 167 Cong. Rec. H172 (daily ed. Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2021/01/13/CREC-2021-01-13-pt1-
PgH165.pdf.
574. See supra, Executive Summary.
575. See supra, Executive Summary.
576. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter).
577. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-
Certification-Events-07282021-000738—HCOR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).
578. See supra, Executive Summary. The State legislatures lacked authority to change the lawful
outcome of the State elections at that point. Nevertheless Eastman, Trump, and others
nevertheless pushed for such action.
579. See supra, Executive Summary.
580. See Supra, Executive Summary; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020
1:42 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201219064257/https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1340185773220515840 (archived); see also, e.g., Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 2020 8:14 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1342821189077622792; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twit-
ter, Dec. 27, 2020 5:51 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1343328708963299338; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 30, 2020 2:06
p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1344359312878149634;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 12:52 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40KylieJaneKremer%22 (retweet-
ing @KylieJaneKremer, Dec. 19, 2020 3:50 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
KylieJaneKremer/status/1340399063875895296); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
49-937_text.pdf 203 12/23/22 9:11 AM
180 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 2:53 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1345095714687377418; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 3:34 p.m.
ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345106078141394944; Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 1, 2021 6:38 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345152408591204352; Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 1:29 a.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/
?searchbox=%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump%3A+https%3A%2F%2Ft.co%2FnslWcFwkCj%22
(retweeting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 2, 2021 9:04 p.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1345551634907209730); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40JenLawrence21%22 (retweeting Jennifer
Lynn Lawrence (@JenLawrence21), Jan. 3, 2021 12:17 a.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/JenLawrence21/status/1345600194826686464); Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:17 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40CodeMonkeyZ+if%22 (retweeting Ron
Watkins (@CodeMonkeyZ) Jan. 2, 2021 9:14 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20210103151826/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/1345599512560078849
(archived)); Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:24 a.m. ET, avail-
able at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22RT+%40realMikeLindell%22
(retweeting Mike Lindell (@realMikeLindell), Jan. 2, 2021 5:47 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20210103152421/https://twitter.com/realMikeLindell/status/
1345547185836978176 (archived)); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021
10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1345753534168506370; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 3, 2021 10:28 a.m.
ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40AmyKremer+we%22 (retweeting Amy Kremer (@AmyKremer), Jan. 2, 2021 2:58
p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/AmyKremer/status/1345459488107749386); Donald
J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 4, 2021 9:46 a.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
%22RT+%40realDonaldTrump+I+will+be+there.+Historic+day%21%22 (retweeting Donald J.
Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Jan. 3, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1345753534168506370); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021 10:27 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1346478482105069568; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 5, 2021
5:43 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1346588064026685443.
581. Donald J. Trump (@realDonldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22mike+pence+%22&results=1 (archived) (“Mike
Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our Country
and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the
fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands
the truth!”); USA Today Graphics (@usatgraphics), Twitter, Jan. 7, 2021 9:56 p.m. ET, avail-
able at https://twitter.com/usatgraphics/status/1347376642956603392 (screenshotting the
since-deleted tweet).
582. “Trump Video Telling Protesters at Capitol Building to Go Home: Transcript,” Rev, (Jan. 6,
2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-video-telling-protesters-
at-capitol-building-to-go-home-transcript; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong.,
2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2:36:58-2:37:30 and 2:44:00-2:45:05, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrUa0hfG6Lo (“[W]hen President Trump put his tweet out, we
literally left right after that come out . . . As soon as that come out, everybody started
talking about it . . . it definitely dispersed a lot of the crowd. . . . We left.”).
583. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 3−16, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
49-937_text.pdf 204 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 181
584. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 53−53, 58, Eastman v. Thomp-
son et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM) (refer-
ring to two Federal criminal statutes).
585. Order Re Privilege of 599 Documents Dated November 3, 2020 – January 20, 2021 at 24,
Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2022), ECF No. 24.
586. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 63−64, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
587. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 64, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
588. See “23 Months Since the January 6th Attack on the Capitol,” Department of Justice, (Dec. 8,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/23-months-january-6-attack-capitol.
589. Kyle Cheney, “Rep. Scott Perry Suing to Block DOJ Access to His Cell Phone,” Politico, (Aug.
24, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/24/rep-scott-perry-suing-
to-block-doj-access-to-his-cell-phone-00053486; Betsy Woodruff Swan, Josh Gerstein, and
Kyle Cheney, “DOJ Searches Home of Former Official Who Aided Alleged Pro-Trump ‘Coup’,”
Politico, (June 23, 2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/23/law-
enforcement-trump-official-coup-00041767.
590. See, e.g., Sarah Murray, Evan Perez, and Katelyn Polantz, “Federal Judge Orders Former Top
Lawyers in Trump’s White House to Testify in Criminal Grand Jury Probe,” CNN, (Dec. 1,
2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/01/politics/cipollone-philbin-trump-
lawyers-testify.
591. Sara Murray and Jason Morris, “Fulton County Prosecutor Investigating Trump Aims for
Indictments as Soon as December,” CNN, (Oct. 6, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/
2022/10/06/politics/fani-willis-georgia-prosecutor-trump-indictments-december/
index.html.
592. The Special Counsel is to oversee the Department’s ongoing investigation “into whether
any person or entity unlawfully interfered with the transfer of power following the 2020
Presidential election or the certification of the Electoral College vote held on or about
January 6, 2021.” “Appointment of a Special Counsel,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 18,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel-0. In
addition, the Special Counsel is to oversee the Department’s “ongoing investigation involv-
ing classified documents and other Presidential records, as well as the possible obstruc-
tion of that investigation. . . .” Id.
593. The House of Representatives held Meadows in contempt for refusing to testify before the
Committee, 167 Cong. Rec. H7814-7815 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2021), but DOJ declined to pros-
ecute him. See Josh Gerstein, Kyle Cheny, and Nicholas Wu, “DOJ Declines to Charge Mead-
ows, Scavino with Contempt of Congress for Defying Jan. 6 Committee,” Politico, (June 3,
2022), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/03/doj-declines-to-charge-
meadows-scavino-with-contempt-of-congress-for-defying-jan-6-committee-00037230.
594. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
595. According to DOJ, “[a] conviction under Section 1512(c)(2) requires proof that”: (1) “the
natural and probable effect of the defendant’s actions were to obstruct [influence or
impede] the official proceeding;” (2) “that [defendant] knew that his actions were likely to
obstruct [influence or impede] that proceeding;” and (3) “that he acted with the wrongful
or improper purpose of delaying or stopping the official proceeding.” United States v.
Andries, No. 21-93 (RC), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44794 at *37 n.8 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting
Government’s Response to Defendant’s Second Supplemental Brief at 6); see United States
v. Aguilar; 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (describ-
ing the “longstanding and well-accepted meaning” of “corruptly” as denoting “an act done
with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of oth-
ers” (quoting United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979))).
596. See, e.g., United States v. Gillespie, No. 22-CR-60 (BAH), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214833, at *7-8
(D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022); United States v. Seefried, No. 1:21-cr-287 (TNM), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
49-937_text.pdf 205 12/23/22 9:11 AM
182 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
196980, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2022); United States v. Miller, 589 F. Supp. 3d 60, 67 (D.D.C.
2022), reconsideration denied, No. 1:21-CR-119 (CJN), 589 F. Supp. 3d 60 (D.D.C. May 27, 2022);
United States v. Puma, No. 1:21-CR-454 (PLF), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48875, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar.
19, 2022); United States v. McHugh, 583 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2022). See also T. Kan-
efield, “January 6 Defendants Are Raising a Creative Defense. It Isn’t Working,” Washington
Post, (Feb. 15, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/15/
jan-6-official-proceeding/.
597. See supra, Executive Summary.
598. See supra, Executive Summary.
599. See supra, Executive Summary.
600. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter). One judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in
the course of concluding that section 1512(c) is not void for vagueness, interpreted the
“corruptly” element as meaning “contrary to law, statute, or established rule.” United
States v. Sandlin, 575 F. Supp. 3d. 15−16, (D.D.C. 2021). As explained above, President Trump
attempted to cause the Vice President to violate the Electoral Count Act, and even Dr.
Eastman advised President Trump that the proposed course of action would violate the
Act. We believe this satisfies the “corruptly” element of the offense under the Sandlin
opinion.
601. Indeed, it would not have been legally possible for a State to have done so in the days
before January 6th.
602. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 49-50, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
603. See supra, Executive Summary.
604. Documents on file with Select Committee (Department of Justice Production), HCOR-Pre-
Certification-Events-07282021-000738 - COR-Pre-Certification-Events-07282021-000739
(December 27, 2020, handwritten notes from Richard Donoghue).
605. See supra, Executive Summary.
606. See supra, Executive Summary.
607. See supra, Executive Summary. Jeffrey Clark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in response to questions regarding this letter. As already noted, the
political appointee who assisted in drafting the letter was hired at the Justice Department
on December 15, 2020, but had worked on behalf of President Trump on election chal-
lenges in the weeks beforehand (including, apparently, while simultaneously serving as
Special Counsel for the White House Office of Management and Budget).
608. See supra, Executive Summary.
609. See supra, Executive Summary.
610. See supra, Executive Summary.
611. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 26.
612. Documents on file with the Select Committee (National Archives Production),
VP-R0000156_0001 (January 6, 2021, email chain between John Eastman and Greg Jacob re:
Pennsylvania letter).
613. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 44. Although Eastman invoked his
Fifth Amendment rights as a reason not to answer any of this Committee’s substantive
questions during his deposition, he has recently suggested in public that he only wished
to delay the count of votes by multiple days. As the evidence developed by this Committee
demonstrates, Eastman knew that such an effort to delay the count would also be illegal.
See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
49-937_text.pdf 206 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 183
Hearing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 1:32:00-
1:35:13, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (“[D]id Dr. Eastman
seem to admit that both of these theories suffered from similar legal flaws? [T]his new
theory, as I was pointing out to him, or the procedural theory, still violates several provi-
sions of the Electoral Count Act, as he acknowledged.... So, he acknowledged in those con-
versations that the underlying legal theory was the same....”). In addition, neither Eastman
nor any other co-conspirator had information establishing that any delay in counting
votes would or could have changed the outcome of the election in any State.
614. See supra, Executive Summary. We also note that these Republican Members of Congress,
who had more knowledge of Trump’s planning for January 6th than any other Members of
Congress, were also likely in a far superior position than any other Members to warn the
Capitol Police of the risks of violence at the Capitol on January 6th.
615. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 16, 2022), at 2:29:50, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBjUWVKuDj0 (“I’ve decided that I should be on the
pardon list, if that is still in the works.”).
616. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy to defraud the United States are: (1) at least two
people entered into an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the government, (2) by
deceitful or dishonest means, and (3) a member of the conspiracy engaged in at least one
overt act in furtherance of the agreement. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January
4-7, 2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022)
(No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM). Put similarly, to prove a violation section 371’s “defraud” provi-
sion, the Government must prove that the defendant: (1) agreed with at least one other
person to defraud the United States, (2) knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the
intent to defraud the United States, and (3) that at least one overt act was taken in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing
United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see also United States v. Mel-
len, 158, 393 F.3d 175, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2004). An individual “defrauds” the Government for pur-
poses of section 371 if he “interfere[s] with or obstruct[s] one of its lawful governmental
functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.” Hammer-
schmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924); see also United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31, 122 n.255 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding jury verdict on instruction defining “defrauding
the United States” as: “depriv[ing] the Government of its right to have the officials of its
departments and agencies transact their official business honestly and impartially, free
from corruption, fraud, improper and undue influence, dishonesty and obstruction”).
617. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 54-55, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
618. See Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 53, Eastman v. Thompson
et al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM). (“An ‘agree-
ment’ between co-conspirators need not be express and can be inferred from the con-
spirators’ conduct.”).
619. See infra, Chapter 1.
620. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 55, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
621. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
622. See infra, Chapter 2. President Trump’s call with Secretary Raffensperger may have violated
several provisions of both Federal and Georgia law. We do not attempt to catalogue all the
possible violations here.
623. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 57, Eastman v. Thompson et
al., 594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
624. Order Re Privilege of Documents Dated January 4-7, 2021 at 59, Eastman v. Thompson et al.,
594 F. Supp. 3d 1156, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM).
49-937_text.pdf 207 12/23/22 9:11 AM
184 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
625. “908. ELEMENTS OF 18 U.S.C. § 1001,” Department of Justice, (last accessed on Dec. 13, 2022),
available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-908-elements-
18-usc-1001.
626. The elements of a section 371 conspiracy are discussed above.
627. As explained in Chapter 5, staffers for Rep. Mike Kelly (R-PA) and Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI)
reached out to Vice President Pence’s director of legislative affairs, apparently seeking to
deliver fake certificates on January 6. Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Chris Hodgson Production),
00012 (January 6, 2021, text message from Rep. Kelly’s Chief of Staff, Matt Stroia, to Chris
Hodgson on January at 8:41 a.m.), 00058 (January 6, 2021, text messages from Senator John-
son’s Chief of Staff, Sean Riley, to Chris Hodgson around 12:37 p.m.).
628. See infra, Chapter 3.
629. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (emphasis added).
630. See, e.g., United States v. Bowser, 964 F.3d 26, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1390
(2021) (“[T]he False Statements Act applies to ‘any investigation or review, conducted pur-
suant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Con-
gress.’ 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(2) (emphasis added).”); United States v. Stone, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1,
10 (D.D.C. 2019).
631. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at
1:14:59-1:15:22 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0 (“[President
Trump] turned the call over to Mr. Eastman, who then proceeded to talk about the impor-
tance of the RNC helping the campaign gather these contingent electors, in case any of the
legal challenges that were ongoing changed the result of any of the states.”).
632. 18 U.S.C. § 2383.
633. Thompson v. Trump, 590 F. Supp. 3d 46, 115 (D.D.C. 2022), appeal pending, No. 22-5069 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 18, 2022).
634. See Ryan Goodman and Josh Asabor, “In Their Own Words: The 43 Republicans’ Explana-
tions of Their Votes Not to Convict Trump in Impeachment Trial,” Just Security, (Feb. 15,
2021), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/74725/in-their-own-words-the-43-
republicans-explanations-of-their-votes-not-to-convict-trump-in-impeachment-trial/.
635. See supra, Executive Summary.
636. See supra, Executive Summary. The evidence suggests that the Vice President and certain
members of President Trump’s staff urged DOD to deploy the National Guard notwith-
standing the President’s wishes.
637. A prominent U.S. professor of criminal law has opined that President Trump can be held
criminally responsible under section 2383 for his failure to act, when he had a duty to act
given his constitutional obligation under Article II section 3 of the Constitution to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” See Albert W. Alschuler, “Trump and the Insur-
rection Act: The Legal Framework,” Just Security, (Aug. 16, 2022), available at https://
www.justsecurity.org/82696/trump-and-the-insurrection-act-the-true-legal-framework/.
Professor Albert Alschuler, the Julius Kreeger Professor Emeritus at the University of Chi-
cago Law School, taught criminal law for over 50 years at many of our Nation’s leading law
schools. He has published a number of analytical pieces applying the “assists” and “aid
and comfort” clauses of that provisions (which he analogizes to “aiding and abetting”
accomplice liability) to the evidence presented at the Committee’s hearings. In any event,
as described above, President Trump did act, including through his 2:24 p.m. tweet about
the Vice President that inflamed the crowd attacking the Capitol.
638. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022) p. 26.
639. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 21, 2022), at 1:02:53, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbRVqWbHGuo; Donald J. Trump
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 185
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 2:24 p.m. ET, available at https://
www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=
"didn’t+have+the+courage+to+do+what+should+have+been+done" (archived).
640. See infra, Chapter 8.
641. See supra, Executive Summary
642. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 27.
643. See Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardons, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if
Elected,” Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
644. Jordan Fischer, Eric Flack, and Stephanie Wilson, “Georgia Man Who Wanted to ‘Remove
Some Craniums’ on January 6 Sentenced to More than 2 Years in Prison,” WUSA9, (Dec. 14,
2021), available at https://perma.cc/RSY2-J3RU.
645. Dan Mangan, “Capitol Rioter Garret Miller Says He Was Following Trump’s Orders, Apolo-
gizes to AOC for Threat,” CNBC, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/
25/capitol-riots-garret-miller-says-he-was-following-trumps-orders-apologizes-to-
aoc.html.
646. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
647. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Nicholas Luna, (Mar. 21, 2022), pp. 166–67.
648. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Jan. 6, 2021 6:01 p.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+are+the+things+and+events%22
(archived).
649. 18 U.S.C. § 372.
650. See “Leader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member Found Guilty of Seditious Con-
spiracy and Other Charges Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 29,
2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-
keepers-member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.
651. 18 U.S.C. § 2384. To establish a violation of section 2384, the government must establish (1)
a conspiracy, (2) to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United
States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by
force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force
to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority
thereof. See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 487 (4th Cir. 2006).
652. “Leader of Oath Keepers and Oath Keepers Member Found Guilty of Seditious Conspiracy
and Other Charges Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 29, 2022),
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-oath-keepers-and-oath-keepers-
member-found-guilty-seditious-conspiracy-and-other.
653. “Leader of Proud Boys and Four Other Members Indicted in Federal Court for Seditious
Conspiracy and Other Offenses Related to U.S. Capitol Breach,” Department of Justice,
(June 6, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-proud-boys-and-four-
other-members-indicted-federal-court-seditious-conspiracy-and.
654. See supra, Executive Summary.
655. Brian Naylor, "Read Trump's Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial," NPR, (Feb. 10,
2021), available at https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-
a-key-part-of-impeachment-trial.
656. Kristen Holmes, “Trump Calls for the Termination of the Constitution in Truth Social Post,”
CNN, (Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/03/politics/trump-
constitution-truth-social/index.html.
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186 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
657. See Mariana Alfaro, “Trump Vows Pardons, Government Apology to Capitol Rioters if
Elected,” Washington Post, (Sept. 1, 2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2022/09/01/trump-jan-6-rioters-pardon/.
658. See infra, Chapter 7.
659. 167 Cong. Rec. H171-72 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2021).
660. See supra, Executive Summary.
661. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 84−87.
662. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008962_0009 (January 2,
2021, White House Presidential Call Log).
663. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM014864 (January 5, 2021, text message
from Rep. Jim Jordan to Mark Meadows describing the Vice President’s actions on January
6th).
664. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), P-R000255-259 (January 6, 2021,
Presidential Daily Diary); Felicia Somnez, “Rep. Jim Jordan Tells House Panel He Can’t Recall
How Many Times He Spoke with Trump on Jan. 6,” Washington Post, (Oct. 20, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/jordan-trump-calls-capitol-attack/2021/
10/20/1a570d0e-31c7-11ec-9241-aad8e48f01ff_story.html.
665. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (AT&T Production, Feb. 9, 2022).
666. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 205−07.
667. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), p. 106.
668. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), pp. 72−73.
669. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Mar. 7, 2022), pp. 66−67.
670. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 62–64.
671. See Sarah Lynch and David Shepardson, “Watchdog to Probe if Justice Dept. Officials
Improperly Tried to Alter 2020 Election,” Reuters, (Jan. 25, 2021), available at https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-justice/watchdog-to-probe-if-justice-dept-
officials-improperly-tried-to-alter-2020-election-idUSKBN29U21E (“‘Throughout the past
four years, I worked with Assistant Attorney General Clark on various legislative matters.
When President Trump asked if I would make an introduction, I obliged,’ Perry said in a
statement.”).
672. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), p. 48.
673. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (Feb. 23, 2022), p. 45.
674. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 106–07.
675. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011449.
676. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM011506, (November 2020 text mes-
sages from Rep. Andy Biggs to Mark Meadows).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 187
677. Josh Kelety, “Congressman Andy Biggs Coordinated Efforts with Mark Finchem before Capi-
tol Riot,” Phoenix New Times, (Feb. 18, 2021), available at https://
www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/congressman-andy-biggs-coordinated-with-mark-
finchem-before-capitol-riot-11532527.
678. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jim DeGraffenreid Production), DEGRAFFENREID 000554 (December
18, 2020, text messages between James DeGraffenreid, a Nevada fake elector for Trump,
and another remarking that “Andy Biggs ... has reached out to NV to ask about our evi-
dence”).
679. Audrey Fahlberg, “January 6 Hearings Become Fundraising Fodder,” The Dispatch, (July 7,
2022), available at https://thedispatch.com/p/january-6-hearings-become-fundraising;
Archive of Political Emails, Jim Jordan, “The January 6th Committee Is After Me,” June 9,
2022 12:41 p.m., available at https://politicalemails.org/messages/686023.
680. John Rowley III to the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson re: “Subpoena to Representative
Scott Perry,” (May 24, 2022), available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
22061774-scott-perry-j6-response.
681. Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, House Ethics Manual, p. 13 (2008).
682. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R001080 (December 21, 2020,
WAVES records showing Representatives Babin, Biggs, Brooks, Gaetz, Gohmert, Gosar, Tay-
lor Greene, Harris, Hice, Jordan, and Perry entering the White House).
683. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Deposition of John Eastman, (Dec. 9, 2021); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Roger Stone, (Dec. 17, 2021); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of
Jeffrey Clark, (Feb. 2, 2022); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Deposition of Michael Flynn, (Mar. 10, 2022).
684. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S.
314, 328 (1999)). Justice Scalia not only agreed with this principle, but he also reasoned
that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent an adverse inference in even criminal cases.
This is because the text of that Amendment does not require such a rule and applying an
adverse inference to a refusal to testify is exactly in keeping with “normal evidentiary
inferences.” See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agreed with
Justice Scalia. See id. at 341-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
685. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Michael Flynn, (Mar. 10, 2022), p. 82.
686. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1350 (2022).
687. Trump v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct.
1350 (2022). Former President Trump also asked the United State Supreme Court to block
the Select Committee from accessing his documents. The Supreme Court denied that
request stating, “Because the Court of Appeals concluded that President Trump’s claims
would have failed even if he were the incumbent, his status as a former President neces-
sarily made no difference to the court’s decision.” Trump v. Thompson, 142 S.Ct. 680, 680
(2022) (citation omitted).
688. H. Res. 851, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-216, Resolution Recommending that the House
of Representatives Find Mark Randall Meadows in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to
Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://
www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt216/CRPT-117hrpt216.pdf.
689. Statement of Interest of the United States at 9-10, Meadows v. Pelosi et al., No. 1:21-cv-
03217 (CJN) (D.D.C. July 15, 2022), ECF No. 42.
690. “Thompson & Cheney Statement on Justice Department Decisions on Contempt Referrals,”
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (June
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188 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3, 2022), available at https://january6th.house.gov/news/press-releases/thompson-
cheney-statement-justice-department-decisions-contempt-referrals.
691. Dennis Aftergut, “Why the DOJ Did Not Indict Mark Meadows (and What It Should Do Next),”
NBC News, (June 7, 2022), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-
lackey-mark-meadows-escaped-january-6-prosecution-peter-navarro-rcna32319.
692. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending that the House
of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Contempt of Congress
for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d Sess. (2022), available
at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf. In particular, Scavino
may have further information on President Trump’s advance knowledge from social media
posts of the rioters’ plans to invade the Capitol. See supra __.
693. H. Res. 730, 117th Cong., (2021); H. Rept. 117-152, Resolution Recommending that the House
of Representatives Find Stephen K. Bannon in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply
with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021), available at https://
www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt152/CRPT-117hrpt152.pdf.
694. H. Res. 1037, 117th Cong., (2022); “Peter Navarro Indicted for Contempt of Congress,”
Department of Justice, (June 3, 2022), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/
peter-navarro-indicted-contempt-congress; H. Rept. 117-284, Resolution Recommending
that the House of Representatives Find Peter K. Navarro and Daniel Scavino, Jr., in Con-
tempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply with a Subpoena Duly Issued by the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2022), available at https://www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt284/CRPT-117hrpt284.pdf.
695. See infra 136.
696. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (July 12, 2022), at 2;14:00-2:14:50,
available at https://youtu.be/rrUa0hfG6Lo.
697. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Herschmann,
(Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 129-35; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (July 8,
2022), pp. 176-77; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (May 17, 2022), pp. 104-06.
698. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:22:05-2:23:41,
available at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8525.
699. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of John McEntee, (Mar. 28, 2022), pp. 153-55; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the January 6th Investigation,
117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:23:41-2:24:42, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4535-VW-bY&t=8620s.
700. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 129-35, esp. pp. 130-131; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on
the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:21:26-2:22:04, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8486.
701. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 133.
702. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000005854_0001 (January 11,
2021, email from Molly Michael to Rep. Mo Brooks, confirming receipt of email from Brooks
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 189
recommending pardons, including for “Every Congressman and Senator who voted to
reject the electoral college vote submissions of Arizona and Pennsylvania”); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hearing on the
January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), at 2:20:52-2:21:12, available
at https://www.youtube.com/live/Z4535-VW-bY?feature=share&t=8452.
703. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 28, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
704. The Committee has enormous respect for the U.S. Secret Service and recognized that the
testimony regarding their work is sensitive for law enforcement, protectee security, and
national security reasons. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee “Driver”, (Nov. 7,
2022), p. 4 (the Select Committee is not releasing the name of this individual); Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Inter-
view of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 28, 2022), p. 4; Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 21,
2022), p. 4; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol, Transcribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 18, 2022), p. 4 Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Robert Engel, (Nov. 17, 2022), p. 4.
705. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of USSS Employee, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 4, 86-87.
706. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Jacqueline Alemany, Josh Dawsey, and Rosalind S. Heldeman, “The
Justice Dept.’s Jan. 6 Investigation Is Looking at … Everything,” Washington Post, (Sept. 16,
2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/trump-
january-6-subpoenas-meadows/; Josh Dawsey and Isaac Arnsdorf, “Prosecutors Seek
Details from Trump’s PAC in Expanding Jan. 6 Probe,” Washington Post, (Sept. 8, 2022),
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/08/trump-
subpoenas-pac-jan-6/.
707. See Devlin Barrett, Josh Dawsey, and Isaac Stanley-Becker, “Trump’s Committee Paying for
Lawyers of Key Mar-a-Lago Witnesses,” Washington Post, (Dec. 5, 2022), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/12/05/trump-witnesses-legal-
bills-pac/.
708. The Committee sat for dozens of hours with Hutchinson and concluded that she is brave
and earnest, and understood the intense backlash that would inevitably result from those
who were enlisted to defend President Trump’s behavior. [See infra, Chapter 7]. The thug-
gish behavior from President Trump’s team, including efforts to intimidate described else-
where in this report (see e.g. Chapter 3), gave rise to many concerns about Hutchinson’s
security, both in advance of and since her public testimony. (We note that multiple mem-
bers of the Committee were regularly receiving threats of violence during this period.)
Accordingly, the Committee attempted to take appropriate measures to help ensure her
safety in advance of her testimony, including measures designed to minimize the risk of
leaks that might put her safety at risk.
709. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony "Pat" Cipollone, (July 8, 2022), pp. 71-72
(noting that another witness reference may have been to Pat Philbin).
710. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 264-65.
711. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 52-57, 70-74, 282-88.
712. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 142-45, 288-92. See also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 12-15.
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190 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
713. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 183-86.
714. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), pp. 39-41.
715. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Sarah Matthews, (Feb. 8, 2022), p. 41.
716. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), pp. 38-39, 120, 205, 210, 213-14.
717. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 27.
718. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Julie Radford, (May 24, 2022), p. 19.
719. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Ivanka Trump, (Apr. 5, 2022), p. 40.
720. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021).
721. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.
722. Mark Meadows, The Chief’s Chief (Ft. Lauderdale, FL: All Seasons Press, 2021), p. 259.
723. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 47-49.
724. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Jan.y 28, 2022), pp. 76-77.
725. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), pp. 46-47. Ornato was interviewed at
length by the Select Committee in November 2022, after the Secret Service produced
nearly a million new internal documents in August and September of this year.
726. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 92; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of
Anthony Ornato, (Mar. 29, 2022), pp. 45-46 (stating that he had not heard about President
Trump’s instruction to others to ask Ornato about going to the Capitol).
727. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Inter-
view of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp.
69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.
728. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Inter-
view of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19, 2022), pp.
69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-6.
729. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of White House employee with national security responsibilities, (July 19,
2022), pp. 69-70; Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Continued Interview of Cassidy Hutchinson, (June 20, 2022), pp. 4-7; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of USSS Employee “Driver”, (Nov. 7, 2022), pp. 77-80, 92-93; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Mark Robinson, (July 7, 2022), pp. 17-18.
730. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 104-105, 131-32, 135-36. See also
Chapter 7.
731. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of General Mark A. Milley, (Nov. 17, 2021), p. 199 (describing
49-937_text.pdf 214 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 191
another senior intelligence official worrying, ahead of January 6th, about violence at the
Capitol); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of Donnell Harvin, (Jan. 24, 2022), pp. 22-23 (former Chief of
Homeland Security and Intelligence for the District of Columbia describing the threat
scene ahead of January 6th); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Capitol Police Production),
CTRL0000001532.0001, p.2 (January 5, 2021, FBI Situational Information Report).
732. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 54-56.
733. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Con-
tinued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), pp. 55-56.
734. See supra pp. 81-83. See also Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol, Continued Interview of Anthony Ornato, (Nov. 29, 2022), p. 13
(Ornato confirming that one of his responsibilities was briefing the chief of staff and,
through the chief of staff at times, the President on security-related issues).
735. “U.S. House of Representatives Debate on Impeachment of President Trump,” C-SPAN, at
1:03:53 - 1:13:42, Jan. 13, 2021, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507879-4/debate-
impeachment-president-trump; Tyler Moyer, “McCarthy: "President Bears Responsibility for
Wednesday's Attack”,” Bakersfield Now, (Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://
bakersfieldnow.com/news/local/mccarthy-president-bears-responsibility-for-wednesdays-
attack.
736. “House Minority Leader Weekly Briefing.” C-SPAN, at 7:30 - 8:44, Jan. 21, 2021, available at
https://www.c-span.org/video/?508185-1/minority-leader-mccarthy-backs-gop-conference-
chair-liz-cheney; Rudy Talaka, “GOP Leader McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan Commission to
Investigate Allegations of Members Helping Rioters,” Mediaite, (Jan. 21, 2021), available at
https://www.mediaite.com/news/gop-leader-mccarthy-calls-for-bipartisan-commission-to-
investigate-allegations-of-members-helping-rioters/; “Rep. McCarthy Calls for Bipartisan
Commission to Probe Capitol Riot,” Newsmax, (Jan. 22, 2021), available at https://
www.newsmax.com/politics/kevin-mccarthy-capitol-riot-boebert-probe/2021/01/21/id/
1006648/.
737. Clare Foran, Ryan Nobles, and Annie Grayer, ‘‘Pelosi Announces Plans for ‘9/11-Type Com-
mission’ to Investigate Capitol Attack,” CNN, (Feb. 15, 2021), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2021/02/15/politics/pelosi-capitol-attack-commission/index.html.
738. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy,
(Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
739. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy,
(Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
740. “Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCa-
rthy, (Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
741. Ryan Nobles, Annie Grayer, and Jeremy Herb, “Pelosi Concedes to Even Partisan Split on
1/6 Commission in Effort to Jumpstart Talks,” CNN, (Apr. 20, 2021), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/politics/nancy-pelosi-january-6-commission-talks/index.html;
Ryan Nobles and Daniella Diaz, “Pelosi Makes Concession on Subpoenas for 9/11 Style
Commission to Investigate Insurrection,” CNN, (Apr. 22, 2021), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2021/04/22/politics/nancy-pelosi-911-style-commission-insurrection-
subpoenas/index.html.
742. John Bresnahan, Anna Palmer, and Jake Sherman, “Pelosi Taps Top Dem to Negotiate on
Jan. 6 Commission,” Punchbowl News, (May 11, 2021), available at https://punchbowl.news/
archive/punchbowl-news-am-5-11/.
49-937_text.pdf 215 12/23/22 9:11 AM
192 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
743. “Chairman Thompson Announces Bipartisan Agreement with Ranking Member Katko to
Create Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the Capitol,” House Committee
on Homeland Security, (May 14, 2021), available at https://homeland.house.gov/news/
press-releases/chairman-thompson-announces-bipartisan-agreement-with-ranking-
member-katko-to-create-commission-to-investigate-the-january-6-attack-on-the-capitol.
744. “McCarthy Statement on January 6 Commission Legislation,” House Republican Leader
Kevin McCarthy, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.republicanleader.gov/mccarthy-
statement-on-january-6-commission-legislation/.
745. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,” Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.
746. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,” Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821;
“Letter to The Honorable Speaker Nancy Pelosi,” House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy,
(Feb. 22, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/
Sharp%20MX-4141_20210518_081238.pdf.
747. “Pelosi Statement on McCarthy Opposition to January 6th Commission,” Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi, (May 18, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/51821.
748. “U.S. House of Representatives House Session,” C-SPAN, at 4:12:23-4:12:55, May 19, 2021,
available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?511820-2/houses-passes-bill-create-january-6-
commission-252-175.
749. “Roll Call 154 | Bill Number: H. R. 3233,” Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, (May
19, 2021), available at https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021154?Page=1&Date=
05%2F19%2F2021.
750. “Roll Call Vote 117th Congress - 1st Session,” Question: On the Cloture Motion (Motion to
Invoke Cloture Re: Motion to Proceed to H.R. 3233), H.R. 3233 - 117th Congress (2021):
National Commission to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol Com-
plex Act, H.R.3233, 117th Cong. (2021), available at https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_votes/vote1171/vote_117_1_00218.htm.
751. “House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Announces Select Committee on the January 6th Insurrec-
tion,” C-SPAN, at 4:44-5:26, June 24, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
guCcy9tUfn8.
752. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, “Officer Injured in Capitol Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP
January 6 Conspiracies,” CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/
25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.
753. Manu Raju and Clare Foran, “Officer Injured in Capitol Riot asks McCarthy to Denounce GOP
January 6 Conspiracies,” CNN, (June 25, 2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/
25/politics/michael-fanone-kevin-mccarthy-meeting/index.html.
754. “Roll Call 197 | Bill Number: H. Res. 503,” Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, (June
30, 2021), available at https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2021197.
755. “Pelosi Names Members to Select Committee to Investigate January 6th Attack on the U.S.
Capitol,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, (July 1, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/
newsroom/7121-0.
756. “McCarthy Names House Republicans to Serve on Select Committees,” House Republican
Leader Kevin McCarthy, (July 19, 2021), available at https://www.republicanleader.gov/
mccarthy-names-house-republicans-to-serve-on-select-committees/.
757. “McCarthy Taps Banks to Lead Republicans on Jan 6 Committee,” Congressman Jim Banks,
(Jul. 19, 2021), available at https://banks.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=1921.
758. “Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,
(Jul. 21, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.
49-937_text.pdf 216 12/23/22 9:11 AM
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 193
759. “Pelosi Statement on Republican Recommendations to Serve on the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,
(Jul. 21, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72121-2.
760. “McCarthy Statement about Pelosi’s Abuse of Power on January 6th Select Committee,”
Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, (July 21, 2021), available at https://
republicanleader.house.gov/mccarthy-statement-about-pelosis-abuse-of-power-on-
january-6th-select-committee/; “McCarthy Pulls Republicans from Jan. 6 Select Committee
after Pelosi Rejects Picks,” Axios, (July 21, 2021), available at https://www.axios.com/2021/
07/21/pelosi-jim-jordan-banks-select-committee.
761. “Pelosi Announces Appointment of Congressman Adam Kinzinger to Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol,” House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, (July
25, 2021), available at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/72521; 167 Cong. Rec. H3885
(daily ed. July 26, 2021).
762. See, e.g., Eastman v. Thompson et al., No. 8:22-cv-99-DOC-DFM, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25546,
at *12-14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2022); Memorandum Opinion, Republican National Committee v.
Nancy Pelosi et al.. https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.241102/
gov.uscourts.dcd.241102.33.0.pdf.
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Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
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1
THE BIG LIE
Late on election night 2020, President Donald J. Trump addressed the
nation from the East Room of the White House. When Trump spoke, at 2:21
a.m. on November 4th, the President’s re-election was very much in doubt.
Fox News, a conservative media outlet, had correctly called Arizona for for-
mer Vice President Joseph R. Biden. Every Republican presidential candidate
since 1996 had won Arizona. If the President lost the State, and in the days
ahead it became clear that he had, then his campaign was in trouble. But as
the votes continued to be counted, President Trump’s apparent early lead in
other key States—States he needed to win—steadily shrank. Soon, he would
not be in the lead at all—he’d be losing.
So, the President of the United States did something he had planned to
do long before election day: he lied.
“This is a fraud on the American public. This is an embarrassment to
our country,” President Trump said. “We were getting ready to win this
election,” the President continued. “Frankly, we did win this election. We
did win this election.” Trump claimed, without offering any evidence, that a
“major fraud” was occurring “in our nation.” 1
Neither of President Trump’s claims were true. He had no basis for
claiming victory or that fraud was taking place. Millions of votes still had
not been counted. The States were simply tabulating the ballots cast by the
American people. Trump’s own campaign advisors told him to wait—that it
was far too early to declare victory.
As the evening progressed, President Trump called in his campaign
team to discuss the results. Trump Campaign Manager William Stepien and
other campaign experts advised him that the results of the election would
not be known for some time, and that he could not truthfully declare vic-
tory. Stepien was of the view that, because ballots were going to be counted
for days, “it was far too early to be making any proclamation [about having
195
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196 CHAPTER 1
won the election].” Stepien told President Trump that his recommendation
was to say, “votes are still being counted. It's . . . too early to call the
race.” 2
Jason Miller, another senior Trump Campaign advisor, told the Select
Committee that he argued in conversations with Stepien and others that
night against declaring victory at the time as well, because “it was too early
to say one way [or] the other” who had won. Miller recalled recommending
that “we should not go and declare victory until we had a better sense of
the numbers.” 3
According to testimony received by the Committee, the only advisor
present who supported President Trump’s inclination to declare victory was
Rudy Giuliani, who, according to Miller, was “definitely intoxicated” that
evening.4
President Trump’s decision to declare victory falsely on election night
and, unlawfully, to call for the vote counting to stop, was not a spontaneous
decision. It was premeditated. The Committee has assembled a range of
evidence of President Trump’s preplanning for a false declaration of vic-
tory. This includes multiple written communications on October 31st and
November 3, 2020, to the White House by Judicial Watch President Tom
Fitton.5 This evidence demonstrates that Fitton was in direct contact with
President Trump and understood that he would falsely declare victory on
election night and call for vote counting to stop. The evidence also includes
an audio recording of President Trump’s advisor Steve Bannon, who said
this on October 31, 2020, to a group of his associates from China:
And what Trump’s going to do is just declare victory, right? He’s
gonna declare victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s the winner. He’s
just gonna say he’s a winner. . . . The Democrats, more of our people
vote early that count. Their vote in mail. And so they’re gonna
have a natural disadvantage, and Trump’s going to take advantage
of it. That’s our strategy. He’s gonna declare himself a winner.
So when you wake up Wednesday morning, it’s going to be a
firestorm. . . . Also, if Trump, if Trump is losing, by ten or eleven
o’clock at night, it’s going to be even crazier. No, because he’s
gonna sit right there and say ‘They stole it. I’m directing the Attor-
ney General to shut down all ballot places in all 50 states. It’s going
to be, no, he’s not going out easy. If Trump—if Biden’s winning,
Trump is going to do some crazy shit.6
Also in advance of the election, Roger Stone, another outside advisor to
President Trump, made this statement:
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THE BIG LIE 197
I really do suspect it will still be up in the air. When that happens,
the key thing to do is to claim victory. Possession is 9/10s of the
law. No, we won. Fuck you, Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong.
Fuck you.7
In the days after the election, the President’s own campaign team told
him he had lost and there was no evidence of significant fraud. When his
campaign staff wouldn’t tell him what he wanted to hear, President Trump
replaced them with what Attorney General William Barr described as a
“clown car” of individuals willing to promote various conspiracy theories.8
But Donald Trump was no passive consumer of these lies. He actively
propagated them. Time and again President Trump was informed that his
election fraud claims were not true. He chose to spread them anyway. He
did so even after they were legally tested and rejected in dozens of lawsuits.
Not even the electoral college’s certification of former Vice President
Biden’s victory on December 14, 2020, stopped the President from lying.
Throughout, the Big Lie remained central to President Trump’s efforts to
block the peaceful transfer of power on January 6, 2021.
1.1 THE BIG LIE REFLECTED DELIBERATE EXPLOITATION OF THE “RED MIRAGE”
President Trump’s “Big Lie” on election night was based on simple differ-
ences in how Americans vote. In 2020, it was well-known that Democrats
were much more likely to vote via mail-in ballots than in person in 2020.
On the other hand, Republicans generally preferred to vote in person on
election day.9 In key swing States with tight margins between the candi-
dates, the election day votes would favor President Trump and dispropor-
tionately be counted first. Mail-in ballots, which would favor former Vice
President Biden, would disproportionately be counted later. In some States
it would take days to process the remaining mail-in ballots.
The timing of how votes are counted created the potential for what is
known as a “Red Mirage”—or an illusion of a Republican (Red) victory in
the early stages of vote counting. President Trump would appear to be in
the lead on election night, but this was not the whole picture. Many mail-in
votes for former Vice President Biden would not be counted on election day.
Therefore, the actual winner would likely not be known on election night.
The “Red Mirage” phenomenon was widely known prior to the 2020
presidential election. Chris Stirewalt was the head of the Fox News elections
desk that correctly called Arizona for Biden. Stirewalt and his team tried to
warn viewers of the Red Mirage. He testified that over the past 40 or 50
years, “Americans have increasingly chosen to vote by mail or early or
absentee,” and that “Democrats prefer that method of voting more than
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198 CHAPTER 1
Photo by House Creative Services
Republicans do.” 10 In nearly “every election,” Stirewalt elaborated,
“Republicans win Election Day and Democrats win the early vote, and then
you wait and start counting.” It “[h]appens every time.” 11
President Trump’s campaign team made sure the President was briefed
on the timing of vote tallying. Stepien, his campaign manager, told the
Select Committee that President Trump was reminded on election day that
large numbers of mail-in ballots would still remain to be counted over the
coming days.12 Stepien added that he personally reminded the President
that while early returns may be favorable, the counting would continue: “I
recounted back to 2016 when I had a very similar conversation with him on
election day . . . I recounted back to that conversation with him in which I
said, just like I said in 2016 was going to be a long night, I told him in 2020
that, you know, it was going to be a process again, as, you know, the early
returns are going to be positive. Then we’re going to, you know, be watch-
ing the returns of ballots as, you know, they rolled in thereafter.” 13
Ordinarily, the “Red Mirage” anomaly does not create problems in the
election process because candidates wait for the votes to be tallied before
declaring victory or conceding. As Stirewalt emphasized, prior to President
Trump, “no candidate had ever tried to avail themselves of this quirk in the
election counting system.” 14
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THE BIG LIE 199
President Trump, however, made a different choice. In an extraordinary
breach of the American democratic process, he decided to exploit the
potential for confusion about the staggered timing of vote counting to
deceive the American public about the election results. He and his allies
foreshadowed this decision in their statements in the months leading up to
the November 2020 election.
1.2 TRUMP’S PRE-ELECTION PLANS TO DECLARE VICTORY
On Halloween, advisor Steve Bannon, who had served four years earlier as
Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign manager, laid out the election night plan.
“What Trump’s gonna do is just declare victory. Right? He’s gonna declare
victory. But that doesn’t mean he’s a winner,” Bannon told a private audi-
ence. “He’s just gonna say he’s a winner.” 15
Bannon explained that the Democrats “[would] have a natural disad-
vantage” on election night, because more Democrats would vote by mail
than Republicans and it would take time to count the mail-in ballots. This
would give President Trump the illusion of a lead. “And Trump’s going to
take advantage of it,” Bannon said. “That’s our strategy. He’s gonna
declare himself a winner.” 16
In an interview on Fox News the morning of the election, Bannon
insisted that President Trump needed to address the nation that night, to
“provide the narrative engine for how we go forward.” 17 During an episode
of his podcast later that same day, Bannon clarified what he meant: Presi-
dent Trump is “going to claim victory. Right? He’s going to claim
victory.” 18
Tom Fitton drafted a victory statement for the President to read on
election night.19 On October 31st, he emailed the statement to President
Trump’s assistant, Molly Michael, and social media guru, Dan Scavino. Fit-
ton wrote that election day, November 3rd, was the “deadline by which
voters in states across the country must choose a president.” Fitton argued
that counting ballots that arrived after election day would be part of an
effort by “partisans” to “overturn” the election results.20
Of course, that claim wasn’t true—mail-in ballots are regularly pro-
cessed after election day. Regardless, Fitton encouraged the President to
pre-emptively declare victory. “We had an election today—and I won,” Fit-
ton wrote for President Trump.21 Early in the evening on election day, Fit-
ton emailed Michael again to say he had “[j]ust talked to him [President
Trump] about the draft [statement].” 22 Later that evening, before President
Trump made his election night remarks, Michael replied that she
was “ . . . redelivering to him [President Trump] now.” 23
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200 CHAPTER 1
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
Roger Stone, President Trump’s longtime political confidante, told sev-
eral associates just prior to the election that Trump needed to declare
victory—especially if the race wasn’t called on election day. “Let’s just
hope we are celebrating” on election night, Stone said. “I really do suspect
it will still be up in the air. When that happens, the key thing to do is claim
victory.” Stone elaborated with colorful language. “Possession is nine-
tenths of the law. No, we won. Fuck you. Sorry. Over. We won. You’re wrong.
Fuck you.” 24
Indeed, published reports echoed these warnings about President
Trump’s election strategy. Two days before the election, Jonathan Swan of
Axios reported that President Trump “has told confidants he'll declare vic-
tory on Tuesday night if it looks like he's ‘ahead.’” 25 Swan added that
“Trump's team is preparing to falsely claim that mail-in ballots counted
after Nov. 3—a legitimate count expected to favor Democrats—are evidence
of election fraud.” 26 If the vote tally swung against Trump after election
night in States such as Pennsylvania, then the Trump team would claim the
Democrats had “stolen” the election.27 Fox News election analysis Chris
Stirewalt testified that he and his team “had gone to pains” to inform
viewers that early votes would favor Republicans but the lead would be illu-
sory “because the Trump campaign and the President had made it clear that
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THE BIG LIE 201
they were going to try to exploit this anomaly.” 28 Others warned that
President Trump could exploit the Red Mirage as well.29
1.3 TRUMP’S PRE-ELECTION EFFORTS TO DELEGITIMIZE THE ELECTION PROCESS
President Trump also paved the way for his false election-night declaration
of victory by blanketing voters with a blizzard of lies and statements dele-
gitimizing mail-in voting in the middle of a deadly pandemic and consis-
tently questioning the security of ballots. President Trump used the
president’s bully pulpit, including his heavily-trafficked Twitter feed, to tell
one lie after another.
The Select Committee found dozens of instances in which President
Trump claimed that mail-in voting would produce a “rigged” election.
Trump repeatedly denounced mail-in voting on Twitter, during interviews,
and even during the presidential debate. Here is a small sample of President
Trump’s attempts to delegitimize mail-in balloting.
On April 7, 2020, President Trump claimed:
Mail ballots are a very dangerous thing for this country, because they’re
cheaters. They go and collect them. They’re fraudulent in many
cases. . . . These mailed ballots come in. The mailed ballots are corrupt, in
my opinion. And they collect them, and they get people to go in and sign
them. And then they—they’re forgeries in many cases. It’s a horrible
thing.30
The following day, April 8, President Trump tweeted:
Republicans should fight very hard when it comes to statewide mail-in
voting. Democrats are clamoring for it. Tremendous potential for voter
fraud, and for whatever reason, doesn’t work out well for Republicans.
@foxandfriends31
On May 24, President Trump tweeted:
The United States cannot have all Mail In Ballots. It will be the greatest
Rigged Election in history. People grab them from mailboxes, print
thousands of forgeries and “force” people to sign. Also, forge names.
Some absentee OK, when necessary. Trying to use Covid for this Scam!32
On September 17, President Trump falsely alleged that mail-in ballots
were ripe for foreign interference:
@TrueTheVote There is a group of people (largely Radical Left Demo-
crats) that want ELECTION MAYHEM. States must end this CRAZY mass
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202 CHAPTER 1
sending of Ballots. Also, a GIFT to foreign interference into our elec-
tion!!! Stop it now, before it is too late.33
Before the election, as President Trump campaigned against mail-in
voting, Bill Stepien sought an intercession. Along with House Minority
Leader Kevin McCarthy, Stepien attempted to convince the President that
mail-in voting was “not . . . a bad thing for his campaign.” 34 They argued
that President Trump’s decision to discourage mail-in voting, while “urg-
ing [his] voters to vote only on election day leaves a lot to chance” and
would fail to take advantage of a superior grassroots operation that could
encourage Trump voters to return their ballots.35 President Trump did not
heed their warning. He continued to demonize mail-in voting. The Red
Mirage was a key part of his “Big Lie.”
Ominously, President Trump consistently refused to commit to accept-
ing the outcome of the election. During an interview on Fox News in July,
Chris Wallace asked: “Can you give a direct answer [if] you will accept the
election?” President Trump responded: “I have to see. Look, you—I have to
see. No, I’m not going to just say yes. I’m not going to say no, and I didn’t
last time either.” 36
On September 23, 2020, a reporter asked President Trump if he would
commit to a “peaceful transferal of power after the election.” The President
refused, saying, “we’re going to have to see what happens.” 37 The Presi-
dent claimed, “the ballots are disaster,” adding that if he could “get rid of
the ballots . . . we’ll have a very peaceful—there won’t be a transfer, frankly;
there’ll be a continuation.” 38 That is, according to President Trump, there
would be a “continuation” of his presidency.
The following day, September 24, another reporter followed up by ask-
ing if the election would be legitimate only if President Trump won. The
President again suggested there was something suspect about mail-in bal-
lots, adding that he was “not sure” the election could be an honest one.39
1.4 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S LAUNCH OF THE BIG LIE
Consistent with the pre-election narrative planted by President Trump,
within hours of polls closing, President Trump began pushing the claim
that late-reported vote tallies were illegitimate.40 Even though he had been
reminded by his Campaign Manager that very day that a large number of
mail-in ballots would not be counted for several hours or days,41 President
Trump claimed that Democrats were going to “find . . . ballots at four o’clock
in the morning and add them to the list.” 42 He also suggested that Demo-
crats were continuing to vote after the polls had closed.43
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THE BIG LIE 203
Indeed, this is exactly what Steve Bannon described when he said Presi-
dent Trump would “take advantage” of the Democrats’ “natural disadvan-
tage” on election night.44
In the ensuing days and weeks, President Trump often referred to
“dumps” of votes that were injected into the counting process.45 His sup-
porters latched onto these false claims.46 There were no “dumps” of
votes—just tallies of absentee ballots as they were reported by jurisdictions
throughout the country in a fully transparent process.47 These batches of
ballots included votes for both Trump and Biden. The late-reported votes
favored the former Vice President, just as President Trump’s campaign
advisors said they would, particularly in primarily Democratic cities.48
Attorney General Bill Barr recognized immediately that the “Red
Mirage” was the basis for President Trump’s erroneous claim of fraud.
“[R]ight out of the box on election night, the President claimed that there
was major fraud underway,” Barr said. “I mean, this happened, as far as I
could tell, before there was actually any potential of looking at evidence.” 49
President Trump’s claim “seemed to be based on the dynamic that, at the
end of the evening, a lot of Democratic votes came in which changed the
vote counts in certain states, and that seemed to be the basis for this broad
claim that there was major fraud.” 50
President Trump knew about the Red Mirage. He chose to lie about it
repeatedly—even after being directly informed that his claims were false.
This was often the case in the post-election period. The President con-
sciously disregarded facts that did not support his Big Lie.
1.5 POST-ELECTION: PRESIDENT TRUMP REPLACES HIS CAMPAIGN TEAM
President Trump’s campaign leadership, including Bill Stepien (the cam-
paign’s manager) and Justin Clark (the campaign’s deputy manager), sup-
ported President Trump, and were willing to pursue recounts and other
standard post-election litigation, but they were not willing to promote
baseless conspiracy theories.51 Stepien and others characterized this group
as “Team Normal.” 52
Less than two weeks after the election, President Trump pushed “Team
Normal” aside because its members didn’t tell him what he wanted to hear.
In their place, Trump promoted Rudy Giuliani and his associates, men and
women who spread baseless and extreme claims of election fraud. Giuliani,
the former mayor of New York City, recruited several investigators and
lawyers to assist him.53 Giuliani’s team included Jenna Ellis, Bernard Kerik,
Boris Epshteyn, Katherine Friess, and Christina Bobb.54 Ellis functioned as
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Giuliani’s deputy on the new Trump Campaign legal team.55 Kerik, the for-
mer commissioner of the New York Police Department and a pardoned
felon, served as Giuliani’s chief investigator.56 Other attorneys who col-
laborated with Giuliani’s legal team included Sidney Powell, Cleta Mitchell,
and John Eastman. As discussed elsewhere in this report, Eastman became a
key player in President Trump’s efforts to overturn the election.
1.6 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S CAMPAIGN TEAM TOLD HIM HE LOST THE ELECTION AND
THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT FRAUD
President Trump’s campaign team quickly realized that none of the signifi-
cant fraud claims were real. Bill Stepien testified that, as of November 5th,
the Trump Campaign had not found any proof of fraudulent activity. There
were “allegations and reports,” but “nothing hard [and] fast” that drew the
results of the election into question.57
The Trump Campaign continued to investigate claims of fraud into the
second week after the election. According to Stepien, as people shared “wild
allegations” with the President, the campaign team was forced to review
the facts and then serve as a “truth telling squad” to the President regard-
ing why the claims “didn’t prove to be true.” 58 For example, Stepien
recalled someone alleging that thousands of illegal votes had been cast in
Arizona. That wasn’t true. The votes had been submitted by overseas voters
(such as military deployed or stationed abroad) who were obviously eligible
to participate in the election.59
Alex Cannon was a lawyer for the Trump Campaign and previously
worked for the Trump Organization. After the election, Cannon was tasked
with looking into allegations of voter fraud in the 2020 election—including
the claim that thousands of ineligible votes had been cast in Arizona.60
Cannon recalled that Vice President Pence asked him what he was finding.
“And I said that I didn't believe we were finding it, or I was not personally
finding anything sufficient to alter the results of the election,” Cannon
responded. Vice President Pence thanked him.61
Cannon reported his assessment to Mark Meadows, the White House
Chief of Staff, as well. In mid to late-November 2020, Meadows asked Can-
non what his investigation had turned up. “And I remember sharing with
him that we weren't finding anything that would be sufficient to change the
results in any of the key states,” Cannon told Meadows. “So there is no
there, there?” Meadows replied.62
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THE BIG LIE 205
Jason Miller, a senior advisor to the Trump Campaign, pushed claims of
election fraud in public. In private, however, Miller says that he told Presi-
dent Trump a different story, informing him numerous times that there
was not enough election fraud to have changed the election:
Miller: My understanding is that I think there are still very valid
questions and concerns with the rules that were changed under the
guise of COVID, but, specific to election day fraud and irregularities,
there were not enough to overturn the election.
Committee Staff: And did you give your opinion on that to the
President?
Miller: Yes.
Committee Staff: What was his reaction when you told him that?
Miller: “You haven't seen or heard”—I’m paraphrasing, but—“you
haven't seen or heard all the different concerns and questions that
have been raised.”
Committee Staff: How many times did you have this conversation
with the President?
Miller: Several. I couldn't put a specific number on it, though.
Committee Staff: But more than one?
Miller: Correct.63
Matthew Morgan, the Trump Campaign’s top lawyer, came to a similar
conclusion. Nearly two months after the election, on January 2nd, Morgan
met with the Vice President’s staff. According to Morgan, the consensus in
the room was that even if all the claims of fraud and irregularities were
“aggregated and read most favorably to the campaign . . . it was not suffi-
cient to be outcome determinative.” 64
As far as the Trump Campaign’s professional leadership was concerned,
there was no evidence that the election had been “stolen” from President
Trump. To the contrary, they had seen ample evidence that President
Trump simply lost—and told the President so.
On November 6th, Jared Kushner arranged for the senior campaign staff
to brief President Trump in the Oval Office on the state of the race.65 Since
election day, Matt Oczkowski, the Campaign’s leading data expert, had
tracked voting returns in the swing States to analyze the campaign’s odds
of success.66 Miller texted such updates on data from key States to Mead-
ows.67 The Trump Campaign’s data did not add up to victory. Oczkowski
“delivered to the President in pretty blunt terms that he was going to lose”
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Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
the election.68 There were not enough outstanding votes in the battle-
ground States for President Trump to overcome Biden’s lead. President
Trump disagreed and insisted that he would still prevail through legal chal-
lenges.69
But the data did not lie.
On November 7th, the Associated Press called Pennsylvania and the
overall presidential election for former Vice President Biden.70 At that
point, a small team of the President’s campaign advisors including Stepien
met with the President and told him that his path to victory was virtually
non-existent.71 The campaign team conveyed to the President that his
chance of success was only “5, maybe 10 percent,” which Stepien explained
to the Committee was a “very, very, very bleak” assessment.72
In retrospect, the campaign’s estimate of a 5 to 10 percent chance of
winning, as of November 7th, was far too optimistic. In one of the most
favorable possible scenarios, for example, President Trump and his team
would need to win recounts in Arizona and Georgia, while also prevailing in
litigation challenging absentee or vote by mail ballots in Wisconsin, or pos-
sibly Michigan or Pennsylvania.73 But the election wasn’t even close enough
to trigger automatic recounts in Arizona or Georgia.
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THE BIG LIE 207
The narrowest margin of total votes between the two candidates was in
Arizona, where former Vice President Biden won by more than 10,000 votes.
This may seem like a small number of votes, but it was more than enough
to avoid an automatic recount. As Benjamin Ginsberg, a longtime Republi-
can elections lawyer, explained to the Select Committee, “the 2020 election
was not close.” 74 Previous campaigns had successfully challenged vote dif-
ferentials in the hundreds—not thousands—of votes.75 Ginsberg explained,
“you just don't make up those sorts of numbers in recounts.” 76 Georgia
performed a hand recount of all the ballots anyway, confirming within
weeks of the election that Biden had won the State.77 Also, by January 6th,
Arizona and New Mexico had conducted statutory post-election audits of
voting machines or randomly-selected, representative samples of ballots at
the State- or county-level that affirmed the accuracy of their election
results.78
Chris Stirewalt, who led the elections desk at Fox News at the time,
concurred with Ginsberg’s analysis. Asked what President Trump’s odds of
victory were as of November 7th, Stirewalt replied: “None.” 79
Meanwhile, the Trump Campaign continued to crunch the numbers. On
the morning of November 12th, Oczkowski circulated among top campaign
advisors a presentation describing what happened in each of the battle-
ground States the campaign was monitoring.80 This analysis by the data
team examined the turnout and margins on a county-by-county basis in a
dozen States while also analyzing demographic changes that impacted the
results.81 Among the States were Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Nevada, and Wisconsin.82 Oczkowski’s team determined that President
Trump lost each of those six States because Biden had performed better
than President Trump in certain areas like population centers or suburbs.83
Yet, in the weeks that followed, President Trump and his new legal team—
the “clown car”—went to great lengths to challenge the results of the elec-
tion in these six states, spreading multiple conspiracy theories.
The voting data told a clear story: President Trump lost. But, regardless
of the facts, the President had no intention of conceding defeat.
On election night, President Trump and Rudy Giuliani agreed that the
President should just declare victory—even though he had no basis for
doing so. Giuliani also told the Select Committee that President Trump
asked him on November 4th to take over his campaign’s legal operation.84
Giuliani thought the only way that it would work would be for the President
to call the existing campaign team to announce Giuliani’s takeover because,
in Giuliani’s words, “they are going to be extraordinarily resentful, because
they don’t like me already, and I don’t trust them.” 85 He said that the
President agreed.86
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Although Giuliani wouldn’t assume leadership of the Campaign’s legal
operations until mid-November, the former New York City mayor quickly
began to butt heads with “Team Normal.”
On November 6th, Giuliani and his team met with the Trump Cam-
paign’s leadership at its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.87
“Team Normal” was not impressed. Stepien told the Select Committee
the campaign team was concerned that Giuliani would be a distraction to
them and to President Trump.88 When Giuliani suggested traveling to
Pennsylvania to assist in the campaign’s efforts, the campaign team
“didn’t dissuade him from doing so.” 89 After just 10 to 15 minutes in the
conference room, Stepien and other staffers left the meeting.90
That same day, President Trump discussed the Campaign’s legal strat-
egy in the Oval Office with Giuliani, Clark, and Matt Morgan, the Trump
Campaign’s General Counsel.91 Prior to the election, Morgan was respon-
sible for the Campaign’s litigation strategy.92 Morgan and his team filed
lawsuits challenging the changes States made to voting practices during the
coronavirus pandemic.93 Morgan also studied previous elections to deter-
mine the types of cases that were likely to succeed.94 Clark described how
the Campaign’s original legal strategy was based on his general theory for
election cases: “to look at what do you think, what do you know, and what
can you prove” and then determine which cases to file from there.95
Giuliani had other ideas and advocated to President Trump that he be
put in charge of the Campaign’s legal operation so that he could pursue his
preferred strategy.96 “Mr. Giuliani didn’t seem bound by those cases or by
those precedents. He felt he could press forward on anything that he
thought was wrong with the election and bring a strategy around that,”
Morgan explained.97 “Rudy was just chasing ghosts,” Clark said.98 Morgan
and Clark excused themselves from the meeting because it “was going
nowhere.” 99
The next day, November 7th, Giuliani held a press conference at Four
Seasons Total Landscaping in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He immediately
began making outlandish claims, arguing that the Democrats had conspired
to steal the election. “As you know from the very beginning, mail-in ballots
were a source of some degree of skepticism, if not a lot of skepticism, as
being innately prone to fraud,” Giuliani said. “Those mail-in ballots could
have been written the day before by the Democratic Party hacks that were
all over the Convention Center.” 100 Giuliani offered no evidence to support
his shocking and baseless allegation. Echoes of President Trump’s relent-
less campaign against mail-in balloting, and his decision to exploit the Red
Mirage, were easy to hear.
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THE BIG LIE 209
Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images
On November 10th, Giuliani and Kerik met with President Trump in the
Oval Office to discuss their investigation into voter fraud. White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone and White House Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann
were also in attendance. After Giuliani’s presentation, President Trump
asked Cipollone whether he had spoken to Attorney General Barr about the
allegations of fraud.101 One day before, Barr had issued a memorandum out-
lining a shift in DOJ policy that allowed Federal prosecutors to investigate
claims of voting irregularities without waiting for the results to be certi-
fied.102 President Trump’s question was an early indication that he was
going to pressure the DOJ to endorse his phony fraud claims.
Days later, Giuliani and Justin Clark engaged in a screaming match dur-
ing a meeting in the Oval Office.103 Giuliani was urging President Trump to
file a lawsuit in Georgia, but Clark pointed out that a hand recount was
already being conducted and argued it was better to wait.104 Giuliani told
President Trump that Clark was lying to him.105 A formal changing of the
guard would follow.
On November 14th, President Trump announced on Twitter that Giu-
liani was now the head of his campaign’s legal team.106 “Team Normal”
saw drastic changes to their roles on the newly-structured campaign
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210 CHAPTER 1
team—some self-imposed—and many outside law firms that had signed up
to support the campaign’s legal efforts disengaged completely.107
“I didn’t think what was happening was necessarily honest or profes-
sional at that point in time,” Stepien explained. “This wasn’t a fight that I
was comfortable with,” he added.108
On the day the leadership change was announced, Giuliani participated
in a “surrogate” briefing to coordinate messaging by Trump loyalists dur-
ing their media appearances.109 Giuliani announced that the messaging
strategy should be “to go hard on Dominion/Smartmatic, bringing up
Chavez and Maduro.” 110 Giuliani claimed that additional lawsuits would
soon be filed “to invalidate upwards of 1M ballots.” 111
Consistent with the messaging advanced by the new campaign team,
President Trump in mid-November remained dug-in, still refusing to con-
cede defeat. President Trump continued to insist that he was cheated out of
victory, endorsing one wild conspiracy theory after another to deny the
simple fact that he lost.
1.7 PRESIDENT TRUMP HAD HIS DAY IN COURT
“We’ve proven” the election was stolen, but “no judge, including the
Supreme Court of the United States, has had the courage to allow it to be
heard.” 112 That was how President Trump described efforts to overturn the
election in court one day before the electoral college met on December 14,
2020. That was false.
Judges across the nation did evaluate President Trump’s claims that the
election was stolen. As longtime Republican election attorney Benjamin
Ginsberg testified before the Select Committee, the President’s camp “did
have their day in court,” it’s just that “in no instance did a court find that
the charges of fraud were real.” 113 In total, the Trump Campaign and allies
of President Trump filed 62 separate lawsuits between November 4, 2020,
and January 6, 2021, calling into question or seeking to overturn the elec-
tion results.114 Out of 62 cases, only one case resulted in a victory for the
President Trump or his allies, which affected relatively few votes, did not
vindicate any underlying claims of fraud, and would not have changed the
outcome in Pennsylvania.115 Thirty of the cases were dismissed by a judge
after a hearing on the merits.116
In every State in which claims were brought, one or more judges spe-
cifically explained as part of their dismissal orders that they had evaluated
the plaintiffs’ allegations or supposed proof of widespread election fraud or
other irregularities, and found the claims to be entirely unconvincing. In
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THE BIG LIE 211
Arizona, for example, the plaintiffs in Bowyer v. Ducey alleged that the elec-
tion was tainted by the introduction of “hundreds of thousands of illegal,
ineligible, duplicate or purely fictitious ballots.” 117 A Federal judge dis-
missed their suit, finding it “void of plausible allegations” and “sorely
wanting of relevant or reliable evidence.” 118 Likewise, in Ward v. Jackson, an
Arizona State-court judge dismissed a lawsuit by the State GOP chair fol-
lowing a two-day trial, finding no evidence of misconduct, fraud, or illegal
votes.119 This ruling was unanimously upheld by the State supreme court,
where all seven justices were appointed by GOP governors.120
In Georgia, a State court dismissed Boland v. Raffensperger, which
alleged that tens of thousands of illegal ballots were cast by out-of-State
voters or with invalid signature matches.121 The judge found that “the Com-
plaint’s factual allegations . . . rest on speculation rather than duly pled
facts” and “do not support . . . a conclusion that sufficient illegal votes were
cast to change or place in doubt the result of the election.” 122 The judge
who issued this decision had been appointed by a Republican governor, as
had seven of the eight justices of the State supreme court who upheld her
ruling.123 Likewise, a Federal judge denied relief to the plaintiff in Wood v.
Raffensperger, which alleged that new procedures for checking absentee
ballot signatures spoiled the result by making it harder to reject illegal bal-
lots, finding “no basis in fact or law to grant him the relief he seeks.” 124
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The judge wrote that “[t]his argument is belied by the record” because
absentee ballots were actually rejected for signature issues at the same rate
as in 2018.125
In Michigan, a Federal judge found in King v. Whitmer that the plaintiffs’
claims of “massive election fraud” were based on “nothing but speculation
and conjecture that votes for President Trump were destroyed, discarded or
switched to votes for Vice President Biden. . . .” 126 Similarly, a State-court
judge rejected plaintiffs’ claims in two cases brought against Detroit and
the surrounding county that accused them of systematic fraud in how
absentee ballots were counted; the judge found that one group of plaintiffs
“. . . offered no evidence to support their assertions,” 127 and that the other
group’s “interpretation of events is incorrect” and “decidedly contra-
dicted” by “highly-respected” election experts.128
In Nevada, a State-court judge rejected a litany of claims of systematic
election fraud in Law v. Whitmer, ruling that plaintiffs “did not prove under
any standard of proof that illegal votes were cast and counted, or legal
votes were not counted at all, due to voter fraud” or “for any other
improper or illegal reason.” 129 The ruling was unanimously upheld by the
Nevada Supreme Court.130
In Pennsylvania, a Federal judge dismissed Donald Trump for President v.
Boockvar, finding that the Trump Campaign had presented nothing but
“strained legal arguments without merit and speculative accusations
unpled in the operative complaint and unsupported by evidence.” 131 The
dismissal was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which held: “[C]alling an election unfair does not make it so.
Charges require specific allegations and then proof. We have neither
here.” 132 That opinion was authored by another Trump appointee.133
Lastly, in Wisconsin, another judge dismissed a lawsuit accusing the
Wisconsin Elections Commission of “constitutional violations” that “likely
tainted more than 50,000 ballots.” 134 The judge ruled: “This Court has
allowed plaintiff the chance to make his case and he has lost on the mer-
its,” failing to show that the outcome was affected by Commission rules
about drop boxes, ballot addresses, or individuals who claimed “indefinitely
confined” status to vote from home.135 The ruling was upheld by a three-
judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, all
of whom were Republican appointees, including one appointed by President
Trump himself.136
In all, the judges who heard these post-election cases included 22 Fed-
eral judges appointed by Republican presidents.137
President Trump and his lawyers were well-aware that courts were
consistently rejecting his claims. During a December 18th meeting in the
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THE BIG LIE 213
Oval Office with President Trump, Sidney Powell and others, White House
Senior Advisor Eric Herschmann pointed out that President Trump’s law-
yers had their opportunity to prove their case in court, and failed. Powell
fired back that “the judges are corrupt.” Herschmann responded: “Every
one? Every single case that you’ve done in the country you guys lost, every
one of them is corrupt, even the ones we appointed?” 138
President Trump was faced with another choice after having his day in
court. He could accept that there was no real evidence of voter fraud, or he
could continue to amplify conspiracy theories and lies. He chose the latter.
1.8 PRESIDENT TRUMP REPEATEDLY PROMOTED CONSPIRACY THEORIES
Instead of accepting his defeat, President Trump attempted to justify his
Big Lie with a series of increasingly preposterous claims. The President was
not simply led astray by those around him. The opposite was true. He
actively promoted conspiracy theories and false election fraud claims even
after being informed they were baseless. Millions of President Trump’s
supporters believed the election was stolen from him. Many of them still
do, but President Trump knew the truth and chose to lie about it.
The power of the President’s bully pulpit should not be underestimated,
especially in the digital age.139 President Trump’s relentless lying sowed
seeds of distrust in America’s election system. Researchers who studied this
election-denial phenomenon have noted: “President Trump didn’t just
prime his audience to be receptive to false narratives of election fraud—he
inspired them to produce those narratives and then echoed those false
claims back to them.” 140 Social media played a prominent role in amplify-
ing erroneous claims of election fraud. Shortly after election day, the “Stop
the Steal” campaign, discussed more fully in Chapter 6, went viral. “Stop
the Steal” influencers echoed President Trump’s premature declaration of
victory, asserting that he won the election, the Democrats stole it from him,
and it was the responsibility of American “patriots” to combat this sup-
posed injustice.141
This resulted in what Attorney General Barr has described as an “ava-
lanche” of false claims, as President Trump’s supporters attempted to jus-
tify his “Big Lie.” 142 The post-election allegations of fraud or other
malfeasance were “completely bogus,” “silly” and “usually based on com-
plete misinformation,” Barr explained.143 Nonetheless, many of President
Trump’s supporters wanted to believe them. The stolen election narrative
has proven to be remarkably durable precisely because it is a matter of
belief—not evidence, or reason. Each time a claim was debunked, more
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Photo by Michael Ciaglo/Getty Images
claims emerged in its place. Barr later complained that this dynamic forced
him and others to play “whack-a-mole.” 144
The United States Department of Justice, under Barr’s leadership and
then Acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen, was forced to knock down one
lie after another. As discussed in Chapter 4, Barr took unprecedented steps
to investigate the “avalanche” of lies. Claims of election fraud were referred
to United States Attorney’s offices and the FBI for investigation. Deputy
Attorney General Richard Donoghue tracked dozens of investigations. None
of them were found to have merit.145 The top officials in President Trump’s
Justice Department personally told the President that the claims he was
promoting were false. But that did not matter to the President. As Barr told
the Select Committee, President Trump never showed any “indication of
interest in what the actual facts were.” 146
For example, on December 27th, Rosen and Donoghue spent approxi-
mately two hours on the phone with President Trump. They debunked a
litany of claims regarding the election, explaining that each had been
investigated and found to be baseless.147 According to Donoghue, President
Trump “had this arsenal of allegations that he wanted to rely on.” Dono-
ghue thought it was necessary to explain to the President “based on actual
investigations, actual witness interviews, actual reviews of documents, that
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THE BIG LIE 215
these allegations simply had no merit.” Donoghue wanted “to cut through
the noise” and be “very blunt” with the President, making it clear “these
allegations were simply not true.” 148
During their December 27th conversation with President Trump, Rosen
and Donoghue rebutted false claims regarding: suitcases of ballots in Geor-
gia, Dominion’s voting machines in Antrim County, a truckload of ballots in
Pennsylvania, ballots being scanned multiple times, people voting more
than once, dead people voting, Native Americans being paid to vote, and
more votes than voters in particular jurisdictions.149 As the officials
debunked each claim, President Trump “would just roll on to another
one.” 150 Donoghue told President Trump that Federal law enforcement
officials had conducted dozens of investigations and hundreds of inter-
views, and they had concluded that the major allegations were not sup-
ported by the evidence developed.151 Donoghue and Rosen told President
Trump “flat out” that “much of the information he [was] getting [was]
false and/or just not supported by the evidence.” 152 President Trump
responded: “You guys may not be following the internet the way I do.” 153
The Department of Justice was not alone in trying to contain the Presi-
dent’s conspiracy-mongering. President Trump’s lies were often debunked
in real-time by State authorities, judges, experts, journalists, Federal offi-
cials, and even members of his own legal team. As discussed above, the
President’s campaign team found that there was no significant fraud in the
election. So, the President pushed them aside. The courts rejected nearly
every claim brought by the President’s legal team. Even though courts
rejected the claims as speculative, unsupported and meritless, President
Trump, Rudy Giuliani, and others continued to assert them as truth to
Trump’s followers in speeches, tweets, and podcasts.154
The burden of refuting the false claims made by President Trump and
his surrogates often fell on State and local officials. For example, in Michi-
gan, the Secretary of State’s office posted thorough and prompt responses
to the claims of election fraud on a “Fact Check” page on its website.155 In
Georgia, the Secretary of State’s office issued news releases and held fre-
quent press conferences in the weeks following the election to respond to
claims of fraud.156 County clerks in the contested States also spoke out pub-
licly to refute allegations. Even as the President undermined the public’s
confidence in how votes are cast and counted, these clerks assured voters
that their elections were secure and they could have confidence in the
results.157 Outside experts also publicly denounced and dismantled the
claims being raised and amplified by President Trump. This was done in the
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216 CHAPTER 1
context of litigation, congressional hearings, and press releases.158 Presi-
dent Trump simply ignored these authoritative sources and continued to
promote false claims that had been soundly discredited.
Below, the Select Committee presents two case studies demonstrating
how President Trump and his surrogates lied in the face of overwhelming
evidence. The first case study deals with Dominion Voting Systems. Presi-
dent Trump repeatedly claimed that Dominion’s software “switched votes”
and “rigged” the election well after the leaders of campaign and Justice
Department officials told him that these claims were baseless. The Presi-
dent’s smear of Dominion was central to his “Big Lie.”
The second case study examines video footage recorded in Fulton
County on election night. President Trump and his representatives con-
cocted a fictional narrative based on a deceptively edited version of the
footage. After these two case studies, the Select Committee examines a
variety of other claims the President repeatedly made. Once again, these
claims had no basis in truth.
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS
Between election day and January 6th, President Trump repeatedly spread
conspiracy theories about Dominion voting machines. The President
tweeted or retweeted false claims about Dominion more than 30 times.159
He also repeatedly lied about the company’s software during his post-
election speeches and interviews.160 President Trump’s own campaign staff,
administration officials, and State officials, all told him the claims had no
merit. Hand recounts confirmed the fidelity of the machines. But none of
this overwhelming evidence mattered. President Trump demonstrated a
conscious disregard for the facts and continued to maliciously smear
Dominion.
President Trump’s allies began spreading false claims regarding
Dominion within days of the election. On November 8th, the day after net-
works called the election for Joe Biden, Sidney Powell claimed on Fox News
that Dominion machines “were flipping votes in the computer system or
adding votes that did not exist.” 161 On November 12th, Rudy Giuliani
appeared on Fox News to claim that Dominion was connected to Venezuelan
dictator Hugo Chavez and its software was created “in order to fix elec-
tions.” 162 The same day, President Trump retweeted a “REPORT” claiming
that Dominion had “DELETED 2.7 MILLION TRUMP VOTES NATIONWIDE”
and switched hundreds of thousands of votes in key swing states.163
By that time, the Trump Campaign team had looked into allegations
regarding Dominion and its software and concluded that the claims were
false. An internal campaign memo, dated November 12, said that Domin-
ion’s software “did not lead to improper vote counts” and cited reports
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THE BIG LIE 217
concluding that, among other things, Dominion machines “Did Not Affect
The Final Vote Count.” 164 The memo also addressed various claims of for-
eign influence regarding Dominion.165 Jason Miller told the Select Commit-
tee that by November 12th he had told President Trump the results of the
analysis of the Dominion claims by the campaign’s internal research team,
specifically telling him “that the international allegations for Dominion
were not valid.” 166 Emails and text messages show that this same analysis
was shared with Mark Meadows, President Trump’s chief of staff.167 White
House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany told the Select Committee that
she found herself “waving [President Trump] off of the Dominion theory,”
encouraging him to use more “fact-driven” arguments.168 But it was to no
avail.
Even though members of the Trump Campaign team reported that the
result of the election was not compromised by any problems with Dominion
machines, the President continued to assail Dominion on Twitter in the
days that followed, for example retweeting a false claim that Dominion’s
machines were “engineered by China, Venezuela, [and] Cuba” and claiming
that Dominion had “[r]igged” the election.169
Officials in the Trump administration also worked to debunk the false
rumors about vote manipulation. The United States Department of Home-
land Security’s Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
released a joint statement of election security officials on November 12,
reassuring voters that the election was “the most secure in American his-
tory.” CISA emphasized: “There is no evidence that any voting system
deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised.” 170
This was another decision point for the President. He could choose to
endorse the findings of his administration’s own cyber security experts, or
he could continue to promote baseless fictions about Dominion. President
Trump chose the lies. The President and his supporters never did produce
any evidence showing that Dominion’s machines affected the results of the
election. But President Trump was undeterred by the facts. Indeed, the
President and his supporters seized upon a simple human error in a small
Michigan county as their initial pretense for these allegations as well as to
keep the Dominion conspiracy theory alive.
During the early-morning hours of November 4th, Sheryl Guy, a clerk
in Antrim County, Michigan, reported the unofficial results of the vote
count.171 Guy’s online report was odd. It showed that former Vice President
Biden had somehow won Antrim, a county that is majority-Republican and
President Trump was expected to easily win. Trump’s supporters quickly
pointed to Biden’s improbable win as evidence that Dominion had tampered
with the votes.172 That wasn’t true. Guy had made a mistake in updating the
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218 CHAPTER 1
election counting software after a late addition of a local candidate to the
ballot in some of the county’s precincts, which caused her unofficial counts
to be off when she tallied the votes reported by the various precincts.173
Guy, a Republican, was informed of the odd result and began to investigate
immediately. The result was corrected, and President Trump won Antrim
just as was expected.174
Within days, local and State officials in Michigan explained to the public
what had happened. On November 7th, the Michigan Secretary of State’s
office issued a detailed description of Guy’s error and assured the public
that the official results were not impacted.175 The Michigan Senate’s Com-
mittee on Oversight, led by Republican Senator Ed McBroom, conducted its
own comprehensive review of the claims related to Antrim County and con-
firmed that the initial reporting error was entirely attributable to an honest
mistake by the county clerk.176
The mix-up in Antrim County was quickly corrected. A human erred—
not the voting machines. But President Trump used it as a pretext to con-
tinue lying about Dominion.
On November 12th, the same day CISA released its statement on election
security, President Trump asked Tim Walberg, a Republican Congressman
from Michigan, to “check with key leadership in Michigan’s Legislature as
to how supportive they could be in regards to pushing back on election
irregularities and potential fraud.” 177 That night, President Trump asked
his Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, to look into allega-
tions of election irregularities in Michigan.178 The next day, President
Trump’s assistant sent Wolf a letter from Michigan State legislators raising
claims about the election, including an incorrect claim that flawed Domin-
ion software had caused votes to be counted for the wrong candidate.179
Administration officials quickly knocked down the Dominion claim.
Wolf forwarded the allegations to the leadership of CISA, including CISA
Director Christopher Krebs.180 Krebs provided Wolf with a press release
from the Michigan Secretary of State that debunked the false claim about
Antrim County and Dominion’s software in detail.181 Wolf shared an update
about the information he received from Krebs with White House Chief of
Staff Mark Meadows.182
On November 17th, Krebs tweeted out a statement issued by the
nation’s leading election scientists that dismissed claims that election sys-
tems had been manipulated as either “unsubstantiated” or “technically
incoherent.” 183 President Trump fired Krebs that same day.184 President
Trump claimed the statement released by Krebs was “highly inaccurate, in
that there were massive improprieties and fraud.” 185 The President had no
evidence for his claim.
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THE BIG LIE 219
On November 19th, Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, and Jenna Ellis held a
press conference at the Republican National Committee (RNC) headquarters
in Washington, DC. Powell asserted that there was “massive influence of
communist money through Venezuela, Cuba, and likely China in the inter-
ference with our elections here in the United States.” 186 She pointed a fin-
ger at Dominion, claiming its software was “created in Venezuela at the
direction of Hugo Chavez to make sure he never lost an election,” and Giu-
liani echoed her claims.187
Hope Hicks told the Select Committee how that press conference was
received in the White House. The day after the press conference, President
Trump spoke by phone with Sidney Powell from the Oval Office. During the
call, Powell repeated the same claims of foreign interference in the election
she had made at the press conference. While she was speaking, the Presi-
dent muted his speakerphone and laughed at Powell, telling the others in
the room, “This does sound crazy, doesn’t it?” 188
A few days later, the Trump Campaign issued a statement claiming
Powell was not part of the Trump Campaign’s legal team.189 But Powell’s
outlandish claims were no different from those President Trump was mak-
ing himself. On November 19th, the same day as Powell’s appearance at the
RNC, President Trump tweeted and retweeted a link to a segment on One
America News Network (OAN) that was captioned, “Dominion-izing the
Vote.” 190 The segment claimed that Dominion had switched votes from
Trump to Biden. OAN featured a supposed cyber expert, Ron Watkins, a key
figure in the QAnon conspiracy movement.191 On his own Twitter account,
Watkins celebrated and thanked his supporters just minutes after President
Trump tweeted the clip, and President Trump went on to share the clip
again several times in the days that followed.192
Officials inside the Trump administration continued to debunk the
Dominion conspiracy theory, including during in-person meetings with
President Trump. Attorney General Bill Barr met with President Trump
face-to-face on three occasions after the election.193 Barr told the Select
Committee, “every time I was with the President, I raised the machines as
sort of Exhibit A of how irresponsible this was.” 194 During the first of these
meetings, on November 23rd, Barr explained to the President that the con-
spiracy theory about Dominion’s voting machines had “zero basis,” and
was “one of the most disturbing allegations.” Barr stressed that this was
“crazy stuff” and was poisoning Americans’ confidence in the voting sys-
tem for no reason. This “complete nonsense” was “doing [a] great, great
disservice to the country,” Barr said.195
President Trump ignored Barr’s grave concerns. On November 29th,
President Trump was interviewed by Fox News’ Maria Bartiromo. It was the
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220 CHAPTER 1
President’s first interview since he lost his bid for reelection. He claimed
the election was “rigged” and rife with “theft” and “a total fraud.” 196 He
repeated various conspiracy theories, leading with the claim that Domin-
ion’s voting machines had “glitches,” which he alleged moved “thousands
of votes from my account to Biden’s account.” 197 He claimed that there had
been “big, massive dumps” of votes—a reference to the Red Mirage.198 He
rambled off various other, spurious allegations, including that dead people
voted in significant numbers.199 None of it was true.
On December 1st, Attorney General Barr met again with President
Trump and told him that “the stuff his people were shoveling out to the
public was bullshit.” 200 Attorney General Barr specifically told President
Trump that the claims about Dominion voting machines were “idiotic
claims.” 201 President Trump was still not dissuaded from continuing the
lie. The day after his meeting with the Attorney General, President Trump
released a video in which he repeated several claims of election fraud,
including a claim that “votes had been wrongly switched from Trump to
Biden” using Dominion voting machines.202
By early-December, courts had assessed and rejected claims that
Dominion machines were manipulated to affect the outcome of the 2020
election. In Michigan, a Federal judge found that claims, including those
related to fraud due to the use of Dominion voting machines, were based on
“nothing but speculation and conjecture that votes were destroyed, dis-
carded or switched. . . .” 203 In Arizona, a Federal judge dismissed claims that
Dominion machines had deleted, switched, or changed votes.204 But Presi-
dent Trump and his supporters refused to accept denunciations of the fab-
ricated Dominion claims.
Through December, President Trump and his legal team tried to echo
the Dominion conspiracy theory by claiming to have found evidence that
votes were switched in Antrim County. The clerk’s unintentional error was
fixed weeks earlier and there was no evidence showing that Dominion had
altered the vote tally in Antrim, or anywhere else.205 But President Trump’s
legal team used a case challenging a local marijuana ordinance that had
passed by one vote to gain access to Dominion’s voting machines. An
Antrim County judge issued an order granting the plaintiff’s experts access
to the county’s computer, Dominion voting machines, thumb drives and
memory cards.206 Although the purpose of the order was to allow the plain-
tiff to seek evidence related to his ordinance challenge, it soon became clear
that President Trump’s legal team was behind the effort.207
An organization named Allied Security Operations Group (“ASOG”), led
by Russell Ramsland, conducted an analysis of Antrim County’s voting
machines and related systems. On December 13th, ASOG released a report
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THE BIG LIE 221
on its findings. The inspection yielded no evidence of vote manipulation.
Still, the report included an unsubstantiated assertion that the Dominion
voting machines used in Antrim County and throughout Michigan were
“purposefully designed with inherent error to create systemic fraud and
influence election results” and that a malicious algorithm was used to
manipulate the results of the 2020 election.208 Documents obtained by the
Select Committee show that President Trump and Vice President Mike
Pence were briefed on ASOG’s findings by Giuliani’s team.209 On December
14th, President Trump widely disseminated the ASOG report and accompa-
nying talking points prepared by Giuliani’s team.210 He also trumpeted the
report on Twitter, writing on December 14th: “WOW. This report shows
massive fraud. Election changing result!” 211
During a meeting with Attorney General Bill Barr that day, President
Trump claimed the ASOG report was “absolute proof that the Dominion
machines were rigged” and meant he was “going to have a second
term.” 212 Barr told the Select Committee that he believed the ASOG report
was “very amateurish,” its authors lacked “any real qualifications,” and it
failed to provide any supporting information for its sweeping conclusions
about Dominion.213 Barr told President Trump he would look into the
report, but that the DOJ already had a good idea of what happened in
Antrim County and it was human error, not a problem with the machines.214
In any event, Barr promised President Trump they would have a definitive
answer within a couple of days because a hand recount was being con-
ducted.215
In the ensuing days, as Barr predicted, the ASOG report was swiftly and
soundly criticized by experts within and outside the Trump Administration,
including the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security.216 The initial analysis of election security experts at the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security was that the ASOG report was “false and mis-
leading” and “demonstrates a callous misunderstanding of the actual
current voting certification process.” 217 Subsequent analyses of the ASOG
report and the underlying data from Antrim County were even more criti-
cal.218 These thorough assessments of the Antrim County data and the ASOG
report demonstrate that virtually every one of the claims that President
Trump and his surrogates made about the report was false.219 ASOG’s
inspection did not reveal any malicious software or algorithms or any other
evidence that the voting machines had been compromised.220
Most importantly, as Attorney General Barr had promised President
Trump, within days of the release of the ASOG report, a full hand recount of
every ballot cast in Antrim County confirmed the results reported by the
Dominion machines and refuted ASOG’s assertion that an algorithm has
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222 CHAPTER 1
manipulated the vote count.221 Giuliani’s chief investigator, Bernie Kerik,
acknowledged that his team was not able to find any proof that a Dominion
voting machine improperly switched, deleted, or injected votes during the
2020 election.222
President Trump was not swayed by these basic facts. The President
continued to promote the ASOG report, hounding DOJ to investigate the
matter further. He returned to ASOG’s claims during a December 27th call
with Acting Attorney General Rosen and Acting Deputy Attorney General
Donoghue, citing the report’s claimed error rate of 68 percent in Antrim
County. Donoghue pointed out to the President that the difference between
the computer and hand count was only one vote and that he “cannot and
should not be relying on” ASOG’s fraudulent claim, because it was simply
“not true.” 223
President Trump’s fixation on Dominion’s voting machines and the
baseless theory that the machines had manipulated votes led to a concerted
effort to gain access to voting machines in States where President Trump
was claiming election fraud. On the evening of December 18th, Powell, Lt.
Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.) and Patrick Byrne met with the President at the
White House. Over several hours, they argued that President Trump had the
authority, under a 2018 executive order, to seize voting machines. Several
administration officials joined the meeting and forcefully rejected this
extreme proposal.224 Multiple lawyers in the White House, including Eric
Herschmann, Derek Lyons, and White House Counsel Pat Cipollone “pushed
back strongly” against the idea of seizing voting machines. Cipollone told
the Select Committee it was a “horrible idea,” which had “no legal
basis,” 225 and he emphasized that he had “seen no evidence of massive
fraud in the election.” 226 White House advisor Eric Herschmann similarly
told the Select Committee that he “never saw any evidence whatsoever” to
sustain the allegations against Dominion.227 National Security Adviser Rob-
ert O’Brien phoned into the December 18th meeting and was asked if he had
seen “any evidence of election fraud in the voting machines or foreign
interference in our voting machines.” O’Brien responded that his team had
“looked into that, and there’s no evidence of it.” 228
Around the same time, President Trump, Mark Meadows, and Rudy
Giuliani were repeatedly asking the leadership of DHS whether the agency
had authority to seize voting machines, and they were repeatedly told that
DHS has no such unilateral authority.229 Giuliani and Powell were also
engaged in efforts to access voting machines in multiple States with the
assistance of sympathetic local election officials.230 Those efforts turned up
no evidence of any vote manipulation by any Dominion machine, but Presi-
dent Trump continued to press this bogus claim.
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THE BIG LIE 223
On January 2, 2021, President Trump had a lengthy phone call with
Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger. The President repeatedly
brought up Dominion’s voting machines, alleging that they were at the
heart of a conspiracy against him.231 Raffensperger was incredulous. “I
don’t believe that you’re really questioning the Dominion machines,”
Raffensperger said. “Because we did a hand re-tally, a 100 percent re-tally
of all the ballots, and compared them to what the machines said and came
up with virtually the same result. Then we did the recount, and we got vir-
tually the same result.” 232 In other words, the story in Georgia was the
same as the story in Antrim County, Michigan: Officials performed a hand
recount to put to rest any allegations that Dominion’s machines had
manipulated the vote. But once again, President Trump consciously disre-
garded these basic facts and persisted with his lies.
During a January 4, 2021, speech in Dalton, Georgia, President Trump
chose to ignore Secretary Raffensperger’s straightforward observations.
The President rhetorically attacked Dominion once again, claiming that a
“crime” had been “committed in this state” and it was “immeasurable.” 233
The President called for an “immediate forensic audit of an appropriate
sampling of Dominion’s voting machines and related equipment.” 234 His
allegations were both false and nonsensical. Georgia had already performed
a statewide hand recount of all ballots.
President Trump and his allies have never provided any evidence show-
ing that Dominion’s voting software altered votes in the 2020 presidential
election. In fact, some of the most vocal proponents of the Dominion claims
harbored their own misgivings about the claims they were making in public.
For example, Rudy Giuliani repeatedly claimed in public that Dominion vot-
ing machines stole the election, and that foreign countries had interfered in
the election, but the evidence uncovered by the Select Committee reveals
that he did not believe either of those things to be true. Giuliani testified
that he did not believe that voting machines stole the election.235 He also
acknowledged that he had seen no evidence that foreign countries had
interfered in the election or manipulated votes.236
This testimony is consistent with his lead investigator Bernie Kerik’s
acknowledgment that he had not come across proof that voting machines
were used to switch, delete, or inject votes improperly.237 Christina Bobb,
an attorney who worked with Giuliani, similarly could not point to any evi-
dence of wrongdoing by Dominion.238 Even Sidney Powell, perhaps the
most committed proponent of the Dominion falsehoods, was unable to pro-
vide the Select Committee with any evidence or expert report that demon-
strated that the 2020 election outcome in any State had been altered
through manipulation of voting machines.239 And Powell defended herself
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224 CHAPTER 1
in a defamation suit brought by Dominion by claiming that “no reasonable
person would conclude that her statements were truly statements of
fact.” 240
By January 6, 2021, President Trump’s claims regarding Dominion had
been debunked time and again. The President knew, or should have known,
that he had no basis for alleging that Dominion’s voting machines had cost
him the election.
THE STATE FARM ARENA VIDEO
President Trump also recklessly promoted allegations that video footage
from a ballot counting center in Fulton County, Georgia, was proof of major
election fraud. He was repeatedly informed that these allegations were
false, but he pressed them anyway.
On December 3rd, Rudy Giuliani presented State legislators with selec-
tively edited footage of ballots being counted on Election Night at Fulton
County’s State Farm Arena.241 Giuliani misrepresented the video as “a
smoking gun” proving election fraud.242 The President repeatedly claimed
that he would have won Georgia, if not for a supposed conspiracy that
unfolded on election night. President Trump and some of his supporters
alleged that political operatives faked a water main rupture to expel Repub-
lican poll watchers.243 These same operatives then supposedly took illegal
ballots from suitcases hidden under tables and added those ballots to the
official count multiple times over by scanning them more than once.244 Not
one of these allegations was true.
In a speech on December 5th, President Trump made the false claim
about the State Farm Arena and claimed that “if you just take the crime of
what those Democrat workers were doing . . . [t]hat’s 10 times more than I
need to win this state.” 245 During a December 22nd speech, he played the
same deceptive footage presented by Giuliani several weeks earlier.246
President Trump also repeatedly scapegoated one of these Fulton County
election workers during his January 2nd phone call with Georgia’s Secretary
of State, repeatedly referencing her by name and calling her “a professional
vote scammer and hustler.” 247 It was a malicious smear.
President Trump was directly notified at least four different times that
the allegations he was making were false. On December 15th, then-Deputy
Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen told him: “It wasn’t a suitcase. It was a bin.
That’s what they use when they’re counting ballots. It’s benign.” 248
Rosen’s deputy, Richard Donoghue, also debunked this claim, including on
a phone call on December 27th and in a meeting in the Oval Office on
December 31st: “I told the President myself . . . several times, in several con-
versations, that these allegations about ballots being smuggled in in a
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THE BIG LIE 225
suitcase and run through the machines several times, it was not true, that
we had looked at it, we looked at the video, we interviewed the witnesses,
and it was not true.” 249
Likewise, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger told President
Trump that his allegations about the video were false. During his January
2nd call with the President, Raffensperger explained that Giuliani’s team
“sliced and diced that video and took it out of context” and that “the events
that transpired are nowhere near what was projected” once one looks at
more complete footage.250 Raffensperger also explained to the President
that his team “did an audit of that, and we proved conclusively that they
were not scanned three times.” 251 Yet, when Raffensperger said he would
send President Trump a link to the television segment, the President
refused: “I don’t care about the link. I don’t need it.” 252
The actual evidence contradicted all of President Trump’s claims about
what the Fulton County video depicted. For example, the chief investigator
for Raffensperger’s office explained in a December 6th court filing that
“there were no mystery ballots that were brought in from an unknown
location and hidden under tables. . . .” 253 As the investigator noted, the
security footage showed there was nothing under the table when it was
brought into the room. Hours later, with reporters and observers present,
the “video shows ballots that had already been opened but not counted
placed in the boxes, sealed up, [and] stored under the table.” 254 This find-
ing was affirmed by the FBI, DOJ, and the Georgia Bureau of Investigation,
which interviewed witnesses and reviewed the full video footage and
machine data from the site.255
The ballots in question were not double counted. This was confirmed by
a full hand recount in November, as well as a subsequent review by investi-
gators.256 They found that although one of the workers was shown in the
video scanning certain batches multiple times, this was for a valid reason:
her scanner kept jamming. The investigators confirmed from scanner logs,
as well as the footage, that she only hit the “accept” button once per
batch.257 Investigators also found that staff likely did not tell the observers
to leave, let alone forcefully eject them from the facility.258
Despite this conclusive evidence and testimony, President Trump con-
tinued to point to the Fulton County video as evidence of a grand con-
spiracy. On January 5th, for instance, President Trump’s executive assistant
emailed a document “from POTUS” to Senator Josh Hawley (R-MO), Sena-
tor Ted Cruz (R-TX), and Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) that cited
“Suitcase Gate” among the “worst fraud incidents” in Georgia.259
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226 CHAPTER 1
During his January 6th speech, President Trump told the crowd that “in
Fulton County, Republican poll watchers were ejected, in some cases,
physically from the room under the false pretense of a pipe burst.” The
President continued:
. . . then election officials pull boxes, Democrats, and suitcases of
ballots out from under a table. You all saw it on television, totally
fraudulent. And illegally scanned them for nearly two hours, totally
unsupervised. Tens of thousands of votes. This act coincided with a
mysterious vote dump of up to 100,000 votes for Joe Biden, almost
none for Donald Trump.260
No part of President Trump’s story was true. He had already been
informed that it was false.
In June 2021, when Giuliani’s law license was revoked by a New York
State appellate court, the court’s ruling cited his statements about sup-
posed suitcases of ballots in Georgia as one of its reasons for doing so. “If,
as respondent claims, he reviewed the entire video, he could not have rea-
sonably reached a conclusion that illegal votes were being counted,” the
court’s ruling reads.261
President Trump's conspiracy-mongering endangered innocent public
servants around the country, including in Fulton County. For example, dur-
ing a December 10, 2020, appearance in Georgia, Giuliani falsely accused
Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, two Black public servants shown in the
Fulton County video, of “surreptitiously passing around USB ports as if
they’re vials of heroin or cocaine.” 262 In fact, Moss had been given a ginger
mint by her mother, Freeman.263 As described in Chapter 2, baseless accu-
sations like these forever changed the lives of election workers like Free-
man and Moss. All in service of President Trump's Big Lie.
THE FAKE BALLOT MYTH
The Trump Campaign’s distortion of the State Farm Arena video is just one
example of the “fake ballots” lie. President Trump frequently claimed that
“fake ballots” for Biden were injected into the vote-counting process. To
hear the President tell it, there were truckloads of ballots delivered in the
middle of the night to vote-counting centers and millions more votes were
cast than there were registered voters. Judges, Trump administration offi-
cials, State authorities, and independent election experts found each itera-
tion of the “fake ballot” claim to be just that: fake. The Trump Campaign
and its surrogates brought nine cases that raised some version of a “fake
ballots” claim. Every one of those cases was promptly dismissed.264 For
example, in Costantino v. City of Detroit, a Michigan court ruled that the
plaintiff’s claims regarding forged, backdated and double-counted votes in
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THE BIG LIE 227
Detroit were “incorrect and not credible” and “rife with speculation and
guess-work about sinister motives.” 265
Many of the fake ballot claims were publicly raised and repeated by
President Trump, but never included in any lawsuit. For example, a truck
driver for the U.S. Postal Service claimed that he delivered hundreds of
thousands of completed ballots from Bethpage, New York to Lancaster,
Pennsylvania.266 President Trump repeated this allegation numerous
times.267 The DOJ and FBI interviewed the relevant witnesses, including the
truck driver, and reviewed the loading manifests. They determined that the
allegation was not true.268 Both Attorney General Barr and his successor,
Jeffrey Rosen, told President Trump this claim was false. But that didn’t
stop the President from repeating it.
Another alleged “truckload of ballots” was supposedly delivered to the
Detroit counting center at 4:30 a.m. on election night. This truck allegedly
carried 100,000 ballots in garbage cans, wastepaper bins, cardboard boxes,
and shopping baskets.269 A widely circulated video purportedly showed an
unmarked van dropping off ballots, which were then wheeled into the
counting center on a wagon.270 In fact, the only ballot delivery in Detroit
after midnight on election night was an official delivery of 16,000 ballots,
stacked in 45 well-organized trays of approximately 350 ballots each.271
The wagon depicted in the video contained camera equipment being pulled
by a reporter.272 The claim of 100,000 fake ballots being smuggled into the
counting center in the middle of the night is even more ridiculous in light
of the fact that only 174,384 absent voter ballots were recorded in the City
of Detroit in the 2020 election.273 The addition of 100,000 fake ballots to
approximately 74,000 legitimate ballots would certainly have been obvious
to election officials.274
President Trump also repeatedly claimed that more votes were cast
than there were registered voters in certain States, cities, or precincts. It
was easy to fact-check these allegations and demonstrate they were false.
For example, in Pennsylvania, approximately nine million people were
registered to vote and approximately 6.8 million votes were cast in the 2020
presidential election.275 Nevertheless, President Trump and his allies made
numerous “more votes than voters” claims in Pennsylvania. Citing 2020
mail-in voting data tweeted by Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano,
President Trump claimed that 1.1 million ballots had been “created” and
counted improperly.276 In fact, there was no discrepancy in the actual
numbers—Mastriano erroneously compared the 2.6 million mail-in ballots
cast in the November general election to the 1.5 million ballots that were
returned in the June primary election.277
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228 CHAPTER 1
President Trump also promoted a false claim by a different Pennsylva-
nia legislator that Pennsylvania had 205,000 more votes than voters.278
This claim was based on a flawed comparison by State Representative Frank
Ryan of the votes recorded by State election authorities as having been cast
and those reflected in a separate State registry.279 In fact, the discrepancy
was a result of some counties not yet uploading their official results to the
registry.280 In late-December 2020, Acting Deputy Attorney General Dono-
ghue told President Trump that this allegation was baseless.281 President
Trump kept repeating it anyway.282
The President and his surrogates made similar false claims concerning
excess votes in Michigan. Many of those claims originated with a grossly
inaccurate affidavit submitted by Russell Ramsland, the person behind the
“very amateurish” and “false and misleading” ASOG report regarding
Dominion voting machines in Antrim County.283 Ramsland claimed in a
similar affidavit filed in Federal court in Georgia that 3,276 precincts in
Michigan had turnout of between 84% and 350%, with 19 precincts report-
ing turnout in excess of 100%.284 Ramsland’s affidavit was widely ridiculed,
in part, because he relied on data for dozens of precincts that are located in
Minnesota, not Michigan.285 Even after he corrected his affidavit to remove
the Minnesota townships, his Michigan data remained wildly off-base.286
THE “MULTIPLE COUNTING OF BALLOTS” FICTION
The President and his surrogates repeatedly claimed that ballots for former
Vice President Biden were counted multiple times.287 These claims origi-
nated when some noticed election officials re-running stacks of ballots
through counting machines. But the allegation is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of the vote-counting process—it is routine and appro-
priate for election officials to re-scan ballots if they are not properly
scanned and tabulated in the initial effort. In Costantino v. City of Detroit, the
court rejected the “incorrect and not credible” affidavits speculating that
ballots were run through scanners and counted multiple times in favor of
the “more accurate and persuasive explanation of activity” put forward by
the “highly-respected” election official with 40 years of experience.288
As with other misguided claims of election fraud, the claim that ballots
were counted multiple times disregards the safeguards in the voting pro-
cess. In particular, as noted above, it would certainly have been apparent in
the canvassing process if hundreds of ballots were counted multiple times
in Detroit because the total number of ballots would greatly exceed the
number of voters who voted. But that was not the case.
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THE BIG LIE 229
THE IMAGINARY “DEAD” AND “INELIGIBLE” VOTERS
In addition to their false claims regarding fake ballots, President Trump
and his surrogates also relentlessly asserted that tens of thousands of bal-
lots were cast by dead or otherwise ineligible voters. For example, President
Trump and Giuliani frequently alleged that more than 66,000 unregistered
juveniles voted in Georgia.289 In fact, no underage people voted in Geor-
gia.290 Giuliani offered several different made-up figures of the number of
non-citizens who supposedly voted in Arizona, but provided no evidence to
substantiate his claims.291 In fact, Arizona requires every new voter to pro-
vide proof of citizenship in order to register to vote—or to complete a Fed-
eral voter registration form that requires the individual to sign an
attestation to citizenship status under penalty of perjury—and no person
can vote without being registered.292 By mid-November, Trump Campaign
staff determined this allegation that thousands of non-citizens voted in
Arizona was based on “highly unreliable” information, and it is one of the
false claims that led to Giuliani losing his New York law license.293 These
“ineligible” voters did not exist.
Nor were thousands of votes cast in the names of dead Americans.
During his January 2nd, call with Georgia Secretary of State Raffensper-
ger, the President claimed that “close to about 5,000 [dead] voters” cast
ballots in the election. Raffensperger quickly informed the President this
wasn’t true. 294 But the “dead voter” lie wasn’t limited to Georgia. President
Trump wanted Americans to believe that “dead voters” contributed to his
defeat in several battleground States.295
But even the Trump Campaign and its lawyers recognized early on that
the claims regarding “dead voters” were grossly exaggerated, to say the
least. By early November, Trump lawyers discovered that many people
listed by the campaign as having died were actually alive and well.296 In
early December, Eric Herschmann advised Chief of Staff Meadows by text
message that the Trump legal team had determined that the claim of more
than 10,000 dead people voting in Georgia was not accurate.297 The ensuing
exchange makes clear that both men knew that Giuliani’s claims were
absurd:
Herschmann: Just an FYI. Alex Cannon and his team verified that
the 10k+ supposed dead people voting in GA is not accurate
Meadows: I didn’t hear that claim. It is not accurate. I think I found
22 if I remember correctly. Two of them died just days before the
general
Herschmann: It was alleged in Rudy's hearing today. Your number
is much closer to what we can prove. I think it's 12
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230 CHAPTER 1
Meadows: My son found 12 obituaries and 6 other possibles
depending on the Voter roll acuracy [sic]
Herschmann: That sounds more like it. Maybe he can help Rudy find
the other 10k ??
Meadows: lol 298
Shortly thereafter, a Georgia court dismissed the claim that there were
tens of thousands of votes cast by ineligible voters, noting the claims “rest
on speculation rather than duly pled facts.” 299
The Trump Campaign’s own expert on the supposed “dead voters”
admitted that the Campaign lacked the necessary data to make any conclu-
sions about whether any (or how many) votes were cast in the name of a
deceased person.300 State officials did have such data, however, and were
able to conduct the type of matching analysis required. These State authori-
ties determined that there were only a handful of cases in which people
voted on behalf of deceased individuals.301
Even in those cases where the person who voted actually did die, Presi-
dent Trump’s lawyers knew that the vast majority of the voters included on
their list of dead voters actually cast their votes before they passed.302 In
early-January 2021, just days before January 6th, Republican Senator Lind-
sey Graham asked several Trump lawyers to provide evidence to support the
Campaign’s claims regarding dead voters.303 As Giuliani’s team investi-
gated, they concluded that they could not find evidence of dead voters any-
where near the number that Giuliani and President Trump were claiming
publicly. After noting the shortcomings in their evidence, Katherine Friess,
a lawyer working with the Giuliani legal team, warned that Senator Graham
would “push back” on their evidence.304 As predicted by Friess, Senator
Graham was not impressed by the information provided by Giuliani’s team.
In his speech on the Senate floor on January 6th, Graham explained why he
would not object to the certification of electoral votes. Senator Graham
referred to the failure of the Trump attorneys to provide the evidence he
requested:
They said there’s 66,000 people in Georgia under 18 voted. How
many people believe that? I asked, ‘Give me 10.’ Hadn’t had one.
They said 8,000 felons in prison in Arizona voted. Give me 10.
Hadn’t gotten one. Does that say there’s—There’s problems in
every election. I don’t buy this. Enough’s enough. We’ve got to end
it. 305
Documents obtained by the Select Committee reveal that President
Trump and his lawyers knew that the claims being made in court about
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THE BIG LIE 231
dead or ineligible voters in Georgia were inaccurate, and the lawyers were
concerned that if the President vouched for those claims in another court
pleading he might be criminally prosecuted. On December 31st, as the law-
yers rushed to file a Federal lawsuit in Georgia, some of the lawyers raised
concerns about the President signing a “verification” under oath that the
allegations regarding voter fraud in Georgia, including claims regarding
dead people voting, were true. As Eastman noted in an email to his col-
leagues on December 31st:
Although the President signed a verification [regarding the Georgia
claims] back on Dec. 1, he has since been made aware that some
of the allegations (and evidence proffered by the experts) has
been inaccurate. For him to sign a new verification with that
knowledge . . . would not be accurate. And I have no doubt that an
aggressive DA or US Atty someplace will go after both the President
and his lawyers once all the dust settles on this.306
Despite these concerns, President Trump and his attorneys filed a com-
plaint that incorporated the same inaccurate numbers, and President
Trump signed a verification swearing under oath that the inaccurate num-
bers were “true and correct” or “believed to be true and correct” to the best
of his knowledge and belief.307 A Federal judge reviewing the relevant
emails and pleadings recently concluded:
The emails show that President Trump knew that the specific num-
bers of voter fraud were wrong but continued to tout those num-
bers, both in court and to the public. The Court finds that these
emails are sufficiently related to and in furtherance of a conspiracy
to defraud the United States.308
1.9 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S JANUARY 6TH SPEECH
At noon on January 6, 2021, President Trump addressed thousands of his
supporters at a rally just south of the White House. The election had been
decided two months earlier. The courts found there was no evidence of sig-
nificant fraud. The States certified their votes by mid-December. It was
over—President Trump lost. But that’s not what the President told those in
attendance. He delivered an incendiary speech from beginning to end,
arguing that nothing less than the fate of America was at stake.
“Our country has had enough,” President Trump said. “We will not take
it anymore and that's what this is all about.” 309 He claimed that his follow-
ers had descended on Washington to “save our democracy” and “stop the
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232 CHAPTER 1
Photo by Samuel Corum/Getty Images
steal.” 310 He refused, once again, to concede. And he proclaimed that
“[t]oday I will lay out just some of the evidence proving that we won this
election and we won it by a landslide.” 311
For months, President Trump had relentlessly promoted his Big Lie.312
He and his associates manufactured one tale after another to justify it. For
more than an hour on January 6th, the President wove these conspiracy
theories and lies together.313
By the Select Committee’s assessment, there were more than 100 times
during his speech in which President Trump falsely claimed that either the
election had been stolen from him, or falsely claimed that votes had been
compromised by some specific act of fraud or major procedural violations.
That day, President Trump repeated many of the same lies he had told for
months—even after being informed that many of these claims were false.
He lied about Dominion voting machines in Michigan, suitcases of ballots
in Georgia, more votes than voters in Pennsylvania, votes cast by non-
citizens in Arizona, and dozens of other false claims of election fraud.314
None of those claims were true.
As explained in the chapters that follow, the Big Lie was central to
President Trump’s plan to stay in power. He used the Big Lie to pressure
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THE BIG LIE 233
State and local officials to undo the will of the people. His campaign con-
vened fake electors on the baseless pretense that former Vice President
Biden won several States due to fraud or other malfeasance. The President
tried to subvert the Department of Justice by browbeating its leadership to
endorse his election lies. And when the DOJ’s senior personnel did not
acquiesce, President Trump sought to install a loyalist who would.
When all those efforts failed, President Trump betrayed his own Vice
President. He pressured Vice President Pence to obstruct the joint session of
Congress on January 6th, falsely claiming that he had the power to refuse to
count certain electoral votes. President Trump knew this was illegal but
attempted to justify it with lies about the election.
On December 19, 2020, President Trump summoned a mob to Washing-
ton, DC on the same day that Congress was set to certify former Vice Presi-
dent Biden’s victory by claiming the election was stolen and promising a
“wild” protest.315
And the bogus stolen election claim was the focus of President Trump’s
speech on January 6th. The litany of lies he told riled up a mob that would
march to the U.S. Capitol to intimidate Vice President Pence and Members
of Congress.
“And we fight. We fight like hell. And if you don't fight like hell, you're
not going to have a country anymore,” President Trump told the crowd.316
He incited them with these words just after praising his own election night
lie—the Big Lie.
President Trump told his followers to “fight” to “save” their country
from a bogus specter of supposed election fraud.317 And many of them did.
ENDNOTES
1. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
2. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 54, 60.
3. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 74-75.
4. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 75, 78.
5. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
6. We note that Bannon refused to testify and has been convicted of criminal contempt by a
jury of his peers. See “Stephen K. Bannon Sentenced to Four Months in Prison on Two
Counts of Contempt of Congress,” Department of Justice, (Oct. 21, 2022), available at
49-937_text.pdf 257 12/23/22 9:11 AM
234 CHAPTER 1
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/stephen-k-bannon-sentenced-four-months-prison-
two-counts-contempt-congress; Dan Friedman, "Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon
Said Trump Planned to Falsely Claim Victory," Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-
election-declare-victory/.
7. At his interview, Stone invoked his Fifth Amendment Right not to incriminate himself,
including to questions regarding his direct communications with Donald Trump and his
role on January 6th. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Business Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess.,
(Oct. 13, 2022), at 39:15 - 39:33 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
IQvuBoLBuC0.
8. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 27.
9. Jennifer Agiesta and Marshall Cohen, “CNN Poll: Questions about Accuracy of Vote Counting
Rise as Most Want to Vote before Election Day,” CNN, (Aug. 18, 2020), available at https://
www.cnn.com/2020/08/18/politics/cnn-poll-trump-biden-election-security-mail-in-voting/
index.html; Mark Murray, “Biden Leads Trump by 10 points in Final Pre-Election NBC News/
WSJ poll,” NBC News, (Nov. 1, 2020, updated Nov. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/biden-leads-trump-10-points-final-pre-
election-nbc-news-n1245667.
10. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
11. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
12. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 44.
13. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.
14. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
15. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/. During
our October 13 hearing, Robert Costa tweeted: "CBS News has confirmed that Oct. 31, 2020,
was a key date in the pre-election maneuvers by Trump. Set off alarm with WH counsel
and Herschmann, among others. I’ve seen texts from that night from some aides and they
knew it was no joke; declaring victory was Trump’s plan. Period." Maggie Haberman
retweeted Costa, writing: "Trump told a conference call of a bunch of lawyers and informal
advisers working for him earlier that month that he was going to go up and say he won,
first reported by @jonathanvswan." Robert Costa (@costareports), Twitter, Oct. 13, 2022
1:29 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/costareports/status/
1580611586674151424?lang=en; see also Maggie Haberman (@maggieNYT), Twitter, Oct. 13,
2022 1:35 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/maggienyt/status/1580613143637635072
(“Trump told a conference call of a bunch of lawyers and informal advisers working for
him earlier that month that he was going to go up and say he won, first reported by
@jonathanvswan”).
16. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
49-937_text.pdf 258 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 235
17. Fox Business, “Steve Bannon: Trump Won’t Allow the Election to Be Stolen,” YouTube, at
3:24, Nov. 3, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDdxoyAUqoo.
18. “Steve Bannon: Donald Trump Will Claim Victory ‘Right Before the 11 O'clock News’,” Media
Matters, (Nov. 3, 2020), available at https://www.mediamatters.org/steve-bannon/steve-
bannon-donald-trump-will-claim-victory-right-11-oclock-news-0.
19. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
20. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
21. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
22. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
23. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010020_0001 (Email chain
between Tom Fitton and Molly Michael, starting on October 31, 2020, and ending on
November 3, 2020, discussing a draft victory statement for President Trump).
24. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Busi-
ness Meeting on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (Oct. 13, 2022), at 38:18
- 39:32, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQvuBoLBuC0.
25. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election
Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-
election-victory-ballots.
26. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election
Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-
election-victory-ballots.
27. Jonathan Swan, “Trump Plans to Declare Premature Victory If He Appears on Election
Night,” Axios, (Nov. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/11/01/trump-claim-
election-victory-ballots.
28. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
29. Months prior to the election, Josh Mendelsohn, the CEO of Hawkfish, a Democratic data
and analytics firm, warned that President Trump would try to take advantage of the Red
Mirage. See Margaret Talev, “Exclusive: Dem Group Warns of Apparent Trump Election Day
Landslide,” Axios, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at https://www.axios.com/2020/09/01/
bloomberg-group-trump-election-night-scenarios. For other accounts warning that elec-
tion night would see a Red Mirage, see Marshall Cohen, “Deciphering the ‘Red Mirage,’ the
‘Blue Shift,’ and the Uncertainty Surrounding Election Results This November,” CNN, (Sept.
1, 2020), available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/01/politics/2020-election-count-red-
mirage-blue-shift/index.html; Darragh Roche, “Trump Is Heading for a ‘Red Mirage’ Win on
Election Night, Bloomberg-Funded Data Firm Says,” Newsweek, (Sept. 1, 2020), available at
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-phantom-win-election-1528948; Tom McCarthy, “‘Red
49-937_text.pdf 259 12/23/22 9:11 AM
236 CHAPTER 1
Mirage’: The ‘Insidious’ Scenario If Trump Declares Victory,” The Guardian, (Oct. 31, 2020),
available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-
election-scenario-victory.
30. “Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task
Force in Press Briefing,” White House, April 7, 2020, available at https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-vice-
president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-briefing-april-7-2020/.
31. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Apr. 8, 2020 8:20 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201201162757/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1247861952736526336 (archived).
32. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, May 24, 2020 10:08 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20200701075716/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1264558926021959680 (archived).
33. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Sept. 17, 2020 7:56 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201115164217/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1306562791894122504 (archived).
34. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol,
(National Archives Production), 076P-R000010941_0001-2, 076P-R000010940_0001-6 (July 23,
2020, emails regarding scheduling a meeting for the President with McCarthy, Stepien, and
others).
35. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 36.
36. Fox News, “President Trump Goes One-on-One with Chris Wallace,” YouTube, July 19, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6XdpDOH1JA; Pat Ward (@WardDPatrick),
Twitter, July 19, 2020 10:15 a.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/WardDPatrick/status/
1284854318575878144.
37. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
press-briefing-092420/.
38. “Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing,” White House, Sept. 23, 2020, available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
press-briefing-092420/.
39. Barbara Sprunt, “Trump Questions Election Again after White House Walked Back His Ear-
lier Remarks,” NPR, (Sept. 24, 2020), available at https://www.npr.org/2020/09/24/
916440816/republican-leaders-reject-trump-hedging-on-transfer-of-power-amid-war-over-
confi.
40. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 12:49 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201105044240/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1323864823680126977 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov.
4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201104153504/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1324004491612618752 (archived).
41. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 44-45.
42. “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
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THE BIG LIE 237
43. See “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 12:49 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20201104060648/https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1323864823680126977 (archived).
44. Dan Friedman, “Leaked Audio: Before Election Day, Bannon Said Trump Planned to Falsely
Claim Victory,” Mother Jones, (July 12, 2022), available at https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2022/07/leaked-audio-steve-bannon-trump-2020-election-declare-victory/.
45. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, at esp. 1:42-3:35, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163;
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:17 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324007806694023169.jpg (archived);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 4, 2020 10:04 a.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1324004491612618752.jpg (archived);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 18, 2020 8:22 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329233502139715586.jpg (archived);
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 8:49 p.m. ET, available at
https://media-cdn.factba.se/realdonaldtrump-twitter/1329602736053252107.jpg (archived).
46. For example, one widely shared post claimed that, in the early-morning hours of Novem-
ber 4, hundreds of thousands of mail in ballots were “found” in Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania, and all of the ballots were for Biden. Nick Adams (@NickAdamsinUSA), Twit-
ter, Nov. 4, 2020 4:48 p.m., available at https://web.archive.org/web/20201110150437/
https://twitter.com/NickAdamsinUSA/status/1324151663641448448 (archived).
47. In many metropolitan areas, absentee ballots are counted in centralized locations and
reported in batches. For example, the ballots that were supposedly “found” in Wisconsin
were absentee ballots reported by Milwaukee County when that county completed its tally.
Of the approximately 181,000 votes reported between 3:26 and 3:44 a.m., Biden received
approximately 83% of the votes and Trump received approximately 17%. See Eric Litke and
Madeline Heim, “Fact check: Wisconsin Did Not 'Find' 100K Ballots around 4 a.m. the Morn-
ing after the Election, or Take Break from Counting Votes,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
(Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/
11/04/wisconsin-didnt-find-ballots-stop-count-voter-fraud-claims-untrue-politifact/
6165435002/. In Michigan, no ballots were “found” between 3:30-5:00 a.m. Rather,
approximately 200,000 votes were reported by Wayne County shortly after 6:00 a.m., the
vast majority of which were for Biden. See Geoffrey Skelley, “Live Bog: 2020 Election
Results Coverage: Michigan’s Morning Update,” FiveThirtyEight, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://fivethirtyeight.com/live-blog/2020-election-results-coverage/#294294. Overall,
Biden won 68% of the vote in Wayne County, to 30% for Trump. However, among absentee
voters, Biden won 75% to Trump’s 23%. See “November 3, 2020 - General Election Results,”
Charter County of Wayne, Michigan, available at https://www.waynecounty.com/elected/
clerk/november-3-2020-general-election-results.aspx.
48. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 45; See also John Curiel, Charles
Stewart III, and Jack Williams, One Shift, Two Shifts, Red Shift, Blue Shifts: Reported Election
Returns in the 2020 Election, MIT Election Data and Science Lab, (July 9, 2021), p. 40, avail-
able at https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2021-07/
curiel_stewart_williams_blue_shift_esra_final.pdf, (detailed analysis of timed reporting
data shows that “smaller and more rural counties, which favored Trump, could report their
ballots before the counties with hundreds of precincts and hundreds of thousands of vot-
ers”).
49. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
50. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 8.
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238 CHAPTER 1
51. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119, 124-26, 174.
52. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 174.
53. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 22–23.
54. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), pp. 23, 26.
55. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudy Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 35 (describing Ellis as “a co-counsel” and “my
number two person” so “generally, if you got an opinion from Jenna, it would be just like
getting an opinion from me”).
56. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 10, 15–18.
57. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 92.
58. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 111–112.
59. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 134; Documents on file with the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Mark
Meadows Production), MM007288, (November 13, 2020, email from Bill Stepien to Mark
Meadows, Justin Clark, and Jason Miller titled “Fwd: AZ Federal ID Voters”).
60. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 19–23.
61. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 38–39.
62. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Alex Cannon, (Apr. 13, 2022), pp. 33-34.
63. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 119.
64. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 117–18.
65. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 112–13.
66. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 88–91.
67. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM010951-52 (November 3, 2020, Jason
Miller text message to Mark Meadows at 10:27 pm); Documents on file with the Select Com-
mittee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows
Production), MM010972 (November 3, 2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark Mead-
ows and David Bossie at 11:53 pm); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Inves-
tigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production),
MM011343 (November 6, 2020, Jason Miller group text message to Mark Meadows, Ivanka
Trump, Bill Stepien, Hope Hicks, Dan Scavino, and Jared Kushner at 11:10 am).
68. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
69. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller (Feb. 3, 2022), p. 91.
49-937_text.pdf 262 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 239
70. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115–17; Brian Slodysko, “Explainer:
Why AP Called Pennsylvania for Biden,” Associated Press (Nov. 7, 2020), available at
https://apnews.com/article/ap-called-pennsylvania-joe-biden-why-
f7dba7b31bd21ec2819a7ac9d2b028d3.
71. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 115–20.
72. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 118.
73. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 119.
74. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
75. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.; Federal Election Commission,
“Federal Elections 2020 – Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the
U.S. House of Representatives,” Oct. 2022, p. 12, available at https://www.fec.gov/
resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf.
76. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
77. “Risk-Limiting Audit Report – Georgia Presidential Contest, November 2020,” Georgia Secre-
tary of State, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/
11.19_.20_risk_limiting_audit_report_memo_1.pdf.
78. See “Summary of Hand Count Audits – 2020 General Election,” Arizona Secretary of State,
(Nov. 17, 2020), available at https://azsos.gov/2020-general-election-hand-count-results;
“Agreed Upon Procedures Report – Evaluation of the Accuracy of Voting Machine Tabula-
tors Used for the 2020 General Elections Held on November 3, 2020 (Voting System Check),”
New Mexico Secretary of State, (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://
api.realfile.rtsclients.com/PublicFiles/ee3072ab0d43456cb15a51f7d82c77a2/f740346c-7b6b-
4479-acd6-068829382307/
2020%20Post%20Election%20Voting%20System%20Check%20Audit%20Results.pdf. Similar
audits conducted by Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin also affirmed the results in
those states, but their results are excluded from this list because in those instances their
audit results were not available until after January 6th. Shortly after the election, Nevada
also conducted some post-election checks that supported the validity of the results there
too, including testing a sample of the voting machines to make sure votes were accurately
recorded. Deposition of Joseph Gloria at 33, Law v. Whitmer, No. A-22-858609-W (Nev. Ct.,
Clark Cty. Dec. 1, 2020), p. 33, available at https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/
uploads/2022/09/2022.10.31-NV-Poll-Worker-Response-to-Application-for-Mandamus-
STAMPED.pdf; Rex Briggs, “Trump Supporters Asked me to Look into Voter Fraud in Nevada;
What I found Debunked What They were Alleging,” Nevada Independent, (Dec. 22, 2020),
available at https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/trump-supporters-asked-me-to-
look-into-voter-fraud-in-nevada-what-i-found-debunked-what-they-were-alleging.
79. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
80. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK00117-132 (November 12, 2020,
email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
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240 CHAPTER 1
81. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12,
2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
82. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12,
2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
83. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Jared Kushner Production), JK_00115, JK_00117-132 (November 12,
2020, email from Matt Oczkowski, and attached analysis of battleground states).
84. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
85. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
86. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 22-23.
87. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 106-107. Sidney Powell and Jenna
Ellis accompanied Giuliani. The campaign was represented by Jared Kushner, Bill Stepien,
David Bossie (a former senior official on President Trump’s 2016 campaign), Derek Lyons,
and Justin Clark. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United
States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Jared Kushner, (Mar. 31, 2022), pp. 50-51; Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed
Interview of Derek Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 64-65. Eric Herschmann also arrived at the
campaign headquarters as the meeting was underway. See Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Eric Her-
schmann, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 160-61.
88. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.
89. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 109.
90. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), p. 107.
91. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Matthew Morgan,
(Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 34-35.
92. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 14-16.
93. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 14-16.
94. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.
95. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
96. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 34-35, 41-42.
97. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), p. 41.
98. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
49-937_text.pdf 264 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 241
99. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 63.
100. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Philadelphia Press Conference at Four Seasons Total Land-
scaping,” Rev, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-
giuliani-trump-campaign-philadelphia-press-conference-november-7.
101. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 30-32.
102. “Memorandum from Attorney General William Barr on Post-Voting Election Irregularity
Inquiries to the United States Attorneys, to the Assistant Attorneys General for the Crimi-
nal Division, Civil Rights Division, and National Security Division, and to the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation,” Department of Justice, (Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/20403358-william-barr-election-memo-november-9.
Longstanding DOJ policy had been not to conduct such investigations prior to certification
to avoid impacting election results. See Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, 8th ed.
Department of Justice, December 2017, at 84, available at https://www.justice.gov/
criminal/file/1029066/download.
103. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67; Mike Pence, So Help Me God,
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431-432.
104. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), pp. 66-67.
105. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Justin Clark, (May 17, 2022), p. 67; Mike Pence, So Help Me God, (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2022), at pp. 431.
106. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 15, 2020 7:11 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201117115935/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1327811527123103746 (archived).
107. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Matthew Morgan, (Apr. 25, 2022), pp. 37-38.
108. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Stepien, (Feb. 10, 2022), pp. 174-175.
109. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from
Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner
describing Rudy Giuliani's surrogate briefing).
110. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from
Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner
describing Rudy Giuliani's surrogate briefing).
111. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007112 (Nov. 14, 2020 email from
Jason Miller to Bill Stepien, Justin Clark, David Bossie, Mark Meadows, and Jared Kushner
describing Rudy Giuliani's surrogate briefing).
112. Factba.se, “Interview: Brian Kilmeade of Fox News Interviews Donald Trump - December 13,
2020,” Vimeo, at 7:47, Dec. 13, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/490517184.
113. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 13, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
114. Select Committee staff analyzed the lawsuits. See also, Brendan Williams, Did President
Trump’s 2020 Election Litigation Kill Rule 11?, 30 Pub. Interest L. J. 181, 189 (2021), available
at https://www.bu.edu/pilj/files/2021/06/Williams.pdf.
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242 CHAPTER 1
115. The only case that involved a victory for the campaign was the Pennsylvania case of Trump
v. Boockvar. In that case, the court found that the Pennsylvania Secretary of State could
not extend the deadline for voters to cure their failure to provide proper identification for
absentee ballots. This decision affected just a few thousand votes, which were not
included in any tallies. Trump v. Boockvar, No. 602 MD 2020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 12, 2020),
available at https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/602-MD-20-
1.pdf.
116. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B. Griffith, et al., Lost, Not Stolen: The Con-
servative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election, (July 2022), p.
3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
117. Complaint at 2, Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2020) (No. 2:20-cv-
02321), ECF No. 1.
118. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 706, 723 (D. Ariz. 2020).
119. Minute Entry and Order at 6-9, Ward v. Jackson, No. CV2020-015285 (Az. Sup. Ct. Dec. 4,
2020).
120. See Ward v. Jackson, No. CV-20-0343-AP, 2020 Ariz. LEXIS 313, at *6 (Ariz. 2020), also avail-
able at https://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/1984/
637437053596970000; Howard Fischer, “State Supreme Court rejects GOP bid to void
election,” Arizona Capitol Times, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://azcapitoltimes.com/
news/2020/12/08/federal-judge-hears-arguments-in-election-challenge/; “Meet the Jus-
tices,” Arizona Judicial Branch, (Dec. 8, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20201208032900/https://www.azcourts.gov/meetthejustices/ (archived); “Brutinel Elected
as Next Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice,” Associated Press, (Nov. 20, 2018), available at
https://apnews.com/article/27b725d44d384e2cb7a0e491ac82fe7f; Bob Christie, “Ducey
Names 2 to New Arizona Supreme Court Seats,” Associated Press, (Nov. 28, 2016), available
at https://apnews.com/article/26fc7f154b0e4b4fb358987941ded8d0; “Arizona Governor
Appoints New Supreme Court Justice,” Associated Press, (Apr. 26, 2019), available at
https://apnews.com/article/4ce4bf1d79724c03b1d4cf36f4b97cf1; Jonathan J. Cooper, “Ducey
Appoints Montgomery to Arizona Supreme Court," Associated Press, (Sep. 4, 2019), available
at https://apnews.com/article/bac43d42185c4b8bb9e8c465a59792c8.
121. Complaint at 1-2, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 2020),
available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-
Raffensperger-Complaint.pdf.
122. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. No. 2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 8,
2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-
Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.
123. Order Denying Appeal, Boland v. Raffensperger, No. S21M0565 (Ga. Dec. 14, 2020), available
at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-Raffensperger-
GA-SC-Order-Denying-Appeal.pdf; Jonathan Ringel, “Deal Picks Krause, Richardson for Ful-
ton Superior,” Law.com, (Dec. 28, 2018), available at https://www.law.com/
dailyreportonline/2018/12/28/deal-picks-krause-richardson-for-fulton-superior/; “Chief
Justice Harold D. Melton,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (Oct. 16, 2020), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201016174745/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/
biographies/justice-harold-d-melton/ (archived); “Presiding Justice David E. Nahmias,”
Supreme Court of Georgia, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20201120204518/https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-david-
e-nahmias/ (archived); “Chief Justice Michael P. Boggs,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (last
accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/
biographies/justice-michael-p-boggs/; “Presiding Justice Nels S.D. Peterson,” Supreme
Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://www.gasupreme.us/
court-information/biographies/justice-nels-s-d-peterson/; “Justice Sarah Hawkins Warren,”
Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at https://
www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-sarah-hawkins-warren/; “Justice
Charles J. Bethel,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), available at
49-937_text.pdf 266 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 243
https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-charles-j-bethel/; “Jus-
tice Carla Wong McMillian,” Supreme Court of Georgia, (last accessed Dec. 3, 2022), avail-
able at https://www.gasupreme.us/court-information/biographies/justice-carla-wong-
mcmillian/.
124. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317, 1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
125. Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
126. Complaint for Declaratory, Emergency, and Permanent Injunctive Relief, King v. Whitmer,
Case No. 2:20-cv-13134-LVP-RSW, (E.D. Mich. Nov. 25, 2020), ECF No. 1; King v. Whitmer, 505 F.
Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020). In a subsequent decision, the judge called the case “a
historic and profound abuse of the judicial process” and sanctioned the attorneys who
filed the lawsuit King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d 680, 688-89 (E.D. Mich. 2021).
127. Opinion and Order at 1, 4, Stoddard v. City Election Commission, No. 20-014604-CZ, (Mich.
Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/
Websites/AG/releases/2020/november/
Stoddard_et_al_v_City_Election_Commission_et_al_-_11-06-2020.pdf?rev=
2fa32f93caa94365a1ee8c1c492a4e75.
128. Opinion and Order at 12-13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW, (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov.
13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.
129. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *1, 29-31, 33, 48-49, 52,
54 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching
and affirming lower court decision).
130. Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC 00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8,
2020), available at https://casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming
lower court decision).
131. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
132. Donald J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 803 Fed. App'x. 377, 381 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
133. “Eleven Nominations Sent to the Senate Today,” Trump White House Archives, (June 19,
2017), available at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/eleven-
nominations-sent-senate-today-3/.
134. Complaint at 72, Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620 (E.D. Wis.
2020) (No. 2:20-cv-01785), ECF No. 1; Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp.
3d 620, 625 (E.D. Wis. 2020) (dismissing case with prejudice).
135. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 506 F. Supp. 3d 620, 637-39 (E.D. Wis. 2020).
136. Trump v. Wisconsin Election Commission, 983 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2020); Bill Glauber, “Fed-
eral Appeals Court Turns Down Donald Trump Push to Overturn Election Results in Wiscon-
sin,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, (Dec. 24, 2020), available at https://www.jsonline.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2020/12/24/federal-appeals-court-rejects-trump-bid-
overturn-wisconsin-results/4043650001/.
137. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
138. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), pp. 170-71.
139. For example, Select Committee data analysts found that certain legacy media networks
played a role in promoting false claims of voter fraud and other election conspiracies. See
Staff Memorandum from Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol Data Analysts, "Legacy Media Analysis," (Dec. 3, 2022).
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244 CHAPTER 1
140. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet
Observatory, The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15, 2021), p. 173,
available at https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.
141. Center for an Informed Public, Digital Forensic Research Lab, Graphika, & Stanford Internet
Observatory, The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election, (Jun. 15, 2021), p. 82,
available at https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf.
142. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9.
143. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 10.
144. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), p. 9; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter
Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 67.
145. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021) pp. 59-60.
146. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (June 2, 2022), pp. 36-37.
147. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
148. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th; see also Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Jeffrey Rosen, (Oct. 13, 2022), p. 60.
149. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 60-61, 63-64.
150. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 53, 67.
151. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 59-60.
152. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 61-62.
153. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 54-55.
154. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press,
(Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Law v. Whitmer, No. 10 OC
00163 1B, 2020 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1160, at *3-4 (Nev. Dec. 8, 2020), available at https://
casetext.com/case/law-v-whitmer-1 (attaching and affirming lower court decision); Donald
J. Trump for President v. Boockvar, 502 F. Supp. 3d 899, 906 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Wood v. Raffen-
sperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1317, 1327, 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Donald J. Trump (@realDon-
aldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 26, 6:23 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20201228020228/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1342974373632876545
(archived); Rudy Giuliani’s Common Sense, “WATCH this BEFORE January 6th | Rudy Giu-
liani’s Common Sense | Ep. 100,” Rumble, at 29:30, available at https://rumble.com/
embed/vcrv8j/?pub=4.
155. “Fact Checks,” Michigan Department of State, (last accessed on Dec. 3, 2022), available at
https://www.michigan.gov/sos/faqs/elections-and-campaign-finance/fact-checks.
49-937_text.pdf 268 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 245
156. See, e.g., “Secretary of State's Office Debunks Ware County Voting Machine Story,” Georgia
Secretary of State, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://sos.ga.gov/news/secretary-states-
office-debunks-ware-county-voting-machine-story; “News Conference on Georgia Vote
Count,” C-SPAN, Nov. 9, 2020, available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?477943-1/news-
conference-georgia-vote-count; “Georgia Election Security,” C-SPAN, Jan. 4, 2021, available
at https://www.c-span.org/video/?507710-1/georgia-election-official-refutes-president-
trumps-voter-fraud-allegations.
157. See, e.g., PBS NewsHour, "WATCH: Wisconsin Elections Commission Gives Vote Counting
Update,” YouTube, Nov. 4, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
Yg5liyyrObc.
158. See, e.g., Declaration of Charles Stewart III, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255 (Ga.
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14, 2020) (expert declaration of political scientist at MIT); Examining
Irregularities in the 2020 Election Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, 116th Cong. (Dec. 16, 2020) (statement of Chris Krebs, former Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency); “Scientists Say No Credible Evidence of
Computer Fraud in the 2020 Election Outcome, But Policymakers Must Work with Experts to
Improve Confidence,” Matt Blaze's Exhaustive Search, (Nov. 16, 2020), available at https://
www.mattblaze.org/blog/election-letter/.
159. Search results for “Dominion,” Trump Twitter Archive V2, (last accessed Dec. 12, 2022),
available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion%22.
160. See, e.g., “Remarks by President Trump During Thanksgiving Video Teleconference with
Members of the Military,” Trump White House archives, (Nov. 27, 2020), available at
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
thanksgiving-video-teleconference-members-military/; Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bar-
tiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News – November 29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020,
available at https://factba.se/trump/transcript/donald-trump-interview-fox-news-sunday-
morning-futures-maria-bartiromo-november-29-2020; “Donald Trump Speech on Election
Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-
december-2; Factba.se, “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results – December 22,
2020,” (Dec. 22, 2020), available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-
contesting-election-results-december-22-2020; “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dal-
ton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/
blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-
election; “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press,
(Jan. 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
161. J.M. Rieger, “The False Claims from Fox News and Trump Allies Cited in Dominion’s $1.6 Bil-
lion Lawsuit,” Washington Post, (Mar. 26, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/26/fox-trump-election-dominion/.
162. Elahe Izadi and Sarah Ellison, “Fox News Has Dropped ‘Lou Dobbs Tonight,’ Promoter of
Trump’s False Election Fraud Claims,” Washington Post, (Feb. 5, 2021), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/media/2021/02/05/lou-dobbs-canceled-fox/; 60 Minutes,
“Dominion Voting Systems and the Baseless Conspiracy Theories about the 2020 Election |
60 Minutes,” YouTube, at 2:12 – 3:20, (Oct. 23, 2022), at 2:12-2:51, available at https://
youtu.be/492jILlPtlA?t=132.
163. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 12, 2020 11:34 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201112163413/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1326926226888544256 (archived).
164. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407 (Internal Trump
Campaign memo dated November 12, 2020); Select Committee to Investigate the January
6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Andrew Zachary “Zach” Parkinson,
(May 18, 2022), pp. 46-47.
49-937_text.pdf 269 12/23/22 9:11 AM
246 CHAPTER 1
165. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Zach Parkinson Production), Parkinson0388-0407 (Internal Trump
Campaign memo dated November 12, 2020).
166. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Jason Miller, (Feb. 3, 2022), pp. 117, 133.
167. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Production), MM007666, MM007669 (November 12,
2020, email and attachment from Jason Miller to Mark Meadows transmitting abridged and
full internal Trump Campaign memo); Documents on file with the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Mark Meadows Produc-
tion), MM011902, MM011974 (Nov. 12 and 13, 2020 text messages from Jason Miller to Mark
Meadows discussing the investigation into Dominion and the lack of evidence of foreign
interference).
168. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Kayleigh McEnany, (Jan. 12, 2022), pp. 143, 291.
169. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 8:22 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22engineered+by+china%22
(archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 16, 2020 8:26 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20201116132750/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1328328547598000130 (archived).
170. “Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the
Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees,” Department of Home-
land Security's Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, (Nov. 12, 2020), available at
https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-
government-coordinating-council-election.
171. Mark Bowden and Matthew Teague, “How a County Clerk in Michigan Found Herself at the
Center of Trump’s Attempt to Overthrow the Election,” Time, (Dec. 15, 2021), available at
https://time.com/6128812/the-steal-antrim-county-michigan/; Emma Brown, Aaron C.
Davis, Jon Swaine, and Josh Dawsey, “The Making of a Myth,” Washington Post, (May 9,
2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/
trump-election-fraud-texas-businessman-ramsland-asog/.
172. Steven Nelson, “Michigan Republicans Claim Software Issue Undercounted Trump Votes,”
New York Post, (Nov. 6, 2020), available at https://nypost.com/2020/11/06/michigan-gop-
claims-software-issue-undercounted-trump-votes/.
173. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on
Other Counties or States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=
7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf; “Hand Audit of All Presidential Election Votes in
Antrim County Confirms Previously Certified Results, Voting Machines Were Accurate,”
Michigan Secretary of State, (Dec. 17, 2020), available at https://www.michigan.gov/sos/
resources/news/2020/12/17/hand-audit-of-all-presidential-election-votes-in-antrim-
county-confirms-previously-certified-result; J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim
County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 17-27, available at
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=
fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9; Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the
November 2020 Election in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), pp. 14-19, 36-55, available at https://
misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/
SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
174. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan,
(June 23, 2021), pp. 14-15, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
175. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on
Other Counties or States,” Michigan Secretary of State website, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at
49-937_text.pdf 270 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 247
https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/
Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
176. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan,
(June 23, 2021), pp. 14-19, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
177. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010292_0001 (November 12,
2020, email from Tim Walberg to Molly Michel re: Additional Presidential Phone call follow
up).
178. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 70-74; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department
of Homeland Security Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan Letter”).
179. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 72-74; Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Department
of Homeland Security Production), CTRL0000033284, (Nov. 13, 2020, email from Molly
Michael to Chad Wolf titled “Re: Michigan Letter”); Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan.
21, 2022), Exhibit 44, CTRL0000926977 (Nov. 13, 2020 letter to Michigan Secretary of State
Jocelyn Benson from Michigan State Senators Lana Theis and Tom Barrett).
180. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77 Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf
(Jan. 21, 2022), Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from Christopher Krebs
responding to Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis, and Brandon Wales entitled “RE: Allegations”).
181. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 74-77; Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Chad Wolf
(Jan. 21, 2022), Exhibit 45, CTRL0000926978, (Nov. 16, 2020 email from Christopher Krebs to
Chad Wolf, Matthew Travis, and Brandon Wales entitled “RE: Allegations”); “Isolated User
Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on Other Counties
or States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=
7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
182. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 78-80. Even as the acting Secretary of
DHS was providing Meadows information he received from his Director of CISA debunking
the Dominion claims, the acting Assistant Secretary of DHS, Ken Cuccinelli, was providing
back channel information to Meadows in a possible effort to promote the false Dominion
claims. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), TEXT0000072,
TEXT0000073, (Nov. 12, 2020 text messages from Ken Cuccinelli to Mark Meadows) (Cuc-
cinelli: “I have the dominion list of everywhere the machines are deployed that we know
of. [I]t is pretty extensive. It is in my DHS email account. Where do you want me to send
it?” Meadows then provided Cuccinelli with his personal email address.)
183. Chris Krebs #Protect2020 (@CISAKrebs), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020 11:45 a.m. ET, available at
https://twitter.com/CISAKrebs/status/1328741106624901120.
184. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000010360_0001, 076P-
R000010361_0001, (November 17, 2020 email and attached letter to Christopher Krebs from
White House Office of Presidential Personnel, stating respectively that “the President has
49-937_text.pdf 271 12/23/22 9:11 AM
248 CHAPTER 1
terminated your appointment” and that “Pursuant to the direction of the President, your
appointment… is hereby terminated, effective immediately”).
185. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 17, 2020 7:07 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201118040513/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1328852352787484677 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 17,
2020 7:07 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201118040930/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1328852354049957888 (archived).
186. “Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud
Claims,” Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-
giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.
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Claims,” Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/rudy-
giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-election-fraud-claims.
188. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Hope Hicks, (Oct. 25, 2022), pp. 88-91. See also Tucker Carlson: “Time
for Sidney Powell to Show Us Her Evidence: We Asked the Trump Campaign Attorney for
Proof of her Bombshell Claims. She Gave Us Nothing,” Fox News, (Nov. 19, 2020), available
at https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-rudy-giuliani-sidney-powell-election-
fraud.
189. Jenna Ellis (@JennaEllisEsq), Twitter, Nov. 22, 2020, 5:23 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/JennaEllisEsq/status/1330638034619035655.
190. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:41 a.m. ET and 3:47 p.m. ET,
available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-izing%22
(archived).
191. One America News Network, “Cyber Analyst on Dominion Voting: Shocking Vulnerabilities,”
YouTube, at 0:41-1:14, 1:37-2:23, 2:42-3:36, Nov. 15, 2020, available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKcPoCNW8AA.
192. Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020 12:45 a.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201121092200/https://twitter.com/CodeMonkeyZ/status/
1329299640848584710 (archived); Ron Watkins, (@codemonkeyz), Twitter, Nov. 19, 2020
12:46 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201175413/https://twitter.com/
CodeMonkeyZ/status/1329300069623820289 (archived); Donald J. Trump, Twitter, Nov. 21,
2020 11:30 p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:31 p.m. ET, Nov. 21, 2020, 11:32 p.m. ET, Nov. 22, 2020,
3:35 p.m. ET, available at https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22dominion-
izing%22&dates=%5B%222020-11-20%22%2C%222020-11-24%22%5D (archived).
193. Barr met with President Trump between election day and January 6th on November 23,
December 1, and December 14. See Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 16, 22,
28.
194. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 25, 27, 50; William Barr, One Damn
Thing After Another: Memoirs of an Attorney General, (New York: HarperCollins, 2022), at pp.
539, 554.
195. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 19.
196. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, Nov. 29, 2020, at. 1:00-1:43, 3:23-4:36, available at https://vimeo.com/
485180163.
197. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 1:00-1:43, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.
49-937_text.pdf 272 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 249
198. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 1:50-2:40, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://vimeo.com/485180163.
199. Factba.se, “Interview: Maria Bartiromo Interviews Donald Trump on Fox News - November
29, 2020,” Vimeo, at 3:50-4:24, 22:40-23:52, 24:26-24:50, Nov. 29, 2020, available at https://
vimeo.com/485180163.
200. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.
201. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 22, 25-26.
202. “Donald Trump Speech on Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2,” Rev, (Dec. 2,
2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-
election-fraud-claims-transcript-december-2.
203. King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2020)
204. Bowyer v. Ducey, 506 F. Supp. 3d 699, 723 (D. Ariz. 2020) (finding the complaint “void of
plausible allegations that Dominion voting machines were hacked or compromised in Ari-
zona during the 2020 General Election”).
205. “Isolated User Error in Antrim County Does Not Affect Election Results, Has No Impact on
Other Counties or States,” Michigan Secretary of State, (Nov. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim_Fact_Check.pdf?rev=
7a929e4d262e4532bbe574a3b82ddbcf.
206. Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining
Order, Show Cause Order and Preliminary Injunction, No. 2020009238CZ (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 4, 2020).
207. Rudy W. Giuliani (@RudyGiuliani), Twitter, Dec. 4, 2020 7:12 p.m. ET, available at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1335014224532221952?s=20&t=20AZkk4gS2DeBo6q6QR-mw;
Ronn Blitzer, “Trump Legal Team Celebrates after Michigan Judge Allows Probe of Domin-
ion Voting Machines,” Fox News, (Dec. 6, 2020), available at https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/trump-legal-team-michigan-antrim-county-judge-order-dominion-machines;
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), pp. 19, 147.
208. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001368_00001, pp. 1, 6
(Allied Security Operations Group Antrim Michigan Forensics Report, dated Dec. 13, 2020).
209. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R00001254_00001 (December 14,
2020, email from Joanna Miller to Peter Navarro attaching the ASOG Report and noting that
"POTUS and VPOTUS are briefed").
210. See, e.g., Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production), HouseSelect-Jan6-
PartII-01132022-000798(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael re: From POTUS asking
the AG to look at ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate
the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-
R000001337_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Acting Attorney General
Jeffrey Rosen re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select
Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National
Archives Production), 076P-R000001367_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael
to Michigan Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production) 076P-R000001361_00001(December 14,
2020, email from Molly Michael to Senator Kelly Loeffler re: From POTUS attaching ASOG
report); Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
49-937_text.pdf 273 12/23/22 9:11 AM
250 CHAPTER 1
on the United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-
R000001358_00001(December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Arizona Governor Doug
Ducey re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report); Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (National Archives
Production), 076P-R000001370_00001 (December 14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to
Republican Party Chairwoman Ronna McDaniel re: From POTUS attaching ASOG report);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (National Archives Production), 076P-R000001378_00001 (December
14, 2020, email from Molly Michael to Pennsylvania State Senator Doug Mastriano re: From
POTUS attaching ASOG report).
211. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 2:59 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201214214435/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1338574268154646528 (archived).
212. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 28-29.
213. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29.
214. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
215. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
216. See, e.g., Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, Transcribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 29-30.
217. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol (Department of Homeland Security Production) CTRL0000915111,
CTRL0000915117-CTRL0000915118 (draft analyses of ASOG report). Notably, the final version
of this review, which had been requested by the Attorney General, was edited by senior
DHS officials to remove the language most critical of ASOG before being sent to the
Department of Justice by Acting Assistant Secretary Ken Cuccinelli. See Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol (Department of Homeland Security Production) CTRL0000915120 (emails circulating
draft analyses), CTRL0000926941 (noting report was “currently in the Secretary’s office”);
Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Department of Justice Production) HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-
07262021-000687-HCOR-Pre-CertificationEvents-07262021-000688 (email and report pro-
vided to Donoghue by Cuccinelli); Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1,
2021), pp. 29-31.
218. See Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in Michi-
gan, (June 23, 2021), p. 16, available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf; J. Alex
Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident,”
(Mar. 26, 2021), available at https://www.michigan.gov//media/Project/Websites/sos/
30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
219. For example, President Trump and others frequently cited ASOG’s finding that the Domin-
ion machines had a “68% error rate,” but that conclusion was based on a complete misun-
derstanding of the scanner log files reviewed by ASOG. Their report also claimed that, due
to these perceived “errors,” a “staggering number of votes” were determined through an
adjudication process that allowed for manipulation of votes, but no adjudication software
was installed on the Dominion machines. J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County,
Michigan November 2020 Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), pp. 40-41, available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=
fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
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THE BIG LIE 251
220. Halderman concluded that “I am not aware of any credible evidence that any security
problem was ever exploited against Antrim County's election system. As my analysis
shows, the anomalies that occurred in the November 2020 results are fully explained by
human error.” J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020
Election Incident, (Mar. 26, 2021), p. 46, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/
Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9.
221. "Audits of the November 3, 2020 General Election," Michigan Secretary of State, (April 21,
2021), p. 32, available at https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/
30lawens/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=
a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.; “Hand Count Calculation Sheet (Office: President of
the United States, County: Antrim),” Michigan Secretary of State, available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/
AntrimCounty_Presidential_Race_Full_Hand_Count_November2020.pdf?rev=
0bf12f08c33444c59bd145fbcfbb3e40.
222. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik, (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182.
223. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 23, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
224. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Derek Lyons, (Mar. 17, 2022), pp. 21-22, 99; Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Pasquale
Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 44-50.
225. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), pp. 42-43.
226. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Pasquale Anthony “Pat” Cipollone, (Jul. 8, 2022), p. 50.
227. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Eric Herschmann, (Apr. 6, 2022), p. 129.
228. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Robert O'Brien, (Aug. 23, 2022), pp. 163-65.
229. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Chad Wolf, (Jan. 21, 2022), pp. 97-98, 102-103; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
Ken Cuccinelli, (Dec. 7, 2021), pp. 49-54.
230. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani (May 20, 2022), pp. 157-59; Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Deposition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022),
pp. 102-03; Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, (Jenna Ellis Production), J.007465Ellis, J.007467Ellis
(December 28-29, 2020, emails with Katherine Freiss, Doug Mastriano, Christina Bobb, Giu-
liani, and others about accessing voting machines); Emma Brown and Jon Swaine, “Inside
the Secretive Effort by Trump Allies to Access Voting Machines,” Washington Post, (Oct. 28,
2022), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/10/28/coffee-
county-georgia-voting-trump/.
231. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript);Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
232. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
49-937_text.pdf 275 12/23/22 9:11 AM
252 CHAPTER 1
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
233. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan.
4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-
transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
234. “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev, (Jan.
4, 2021), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-rally-speech-
transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election.
235. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 111.
236. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Rudolph Giuliani, (May 20, 2022), p. 166.
237. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Bernard Kerik (Jan. 13, 2022), p. 182. Kerik also emailed President
Trump’s chief of staff, Mark Meadows, on December 28, 2020, writing: “We can do all the
investigations we want later, but if the president plans on winning, it’s the legislators that
have to be moved, and this will do just that.” Document on file with the Select Committee
(National Archives Production) 076P-R000004125_0001.
238. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Christina Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), p. 46.
239. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Depo-
sition of Sidney Powell, (May 7, 2022), pp. 89-96.
240. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 27-28, U.S. Dominion, Inc. v. Powell, No. 1:21-cv-00040
(D.D.C. filed Mar. 22, 2021), ECF No. 22-2.
241. Justin Gray, “Georgia Election Officials Show Frame-by-Frame What Happened in Fulton
Surveillance Video,” WSB-TV, (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.wsbtv.com/news/politics/georgia-
election-officials-show-frame-by-frame-what-really-happened-fulton-surveillance-video/
T5M3PYIBYFHFFOD3CIB2ULDVDE/.
242. 11Alive, “Second Georgia Senate election hearing,” YouTube, at 5:31:50-5:32:45, Dec. 3, 2020,
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRCXUNOwOjw.
243. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 14, 2020 8:57 a.m. ET, avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20201217181730/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1338483200046354434; Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproducing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi,
“Here’s the Full Transcript and Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Wash-
ington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-
raffensperger-call-transcript-georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-
322644d82356_story.html.
244. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
245. Ryan Taylor, “Donald Trump Georgia Rally Transcript Before Senate Runoff Elections
December 5,” Rev, (Dec. 5, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
donald-trump-georgia-rally-transcript-before-senate-runoff-elections-december-5.
246. “Donald Trump Vlog: Contesting Election Results—December 22, 2020,” Factba.se, (Dec. 22,
2020), at 9:11 – 9:31, available at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-vlog-
contesting-election-results-december-22-2020.
49-937_text.pdf 276 12/23/22 9:11 AM
THE BIG LIE 253
247. Ryan Taylor, “Donald Trump Georgia Phone Call Transcript with Sec. of State Brad Raffens-
perger: Says He Wants to ‘Find’ Votes,” Rev, (Jan. 4, 2021), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-georgia-phone-call-transcript-brad-
raffensperger-recording.
248. U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Jeffrey Rosen, (Aug. 7,
2021), pp. 30-31, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Rosen%20Transcript.pdf.
249. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), pp. 42-43.
250. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
251. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
252. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
253. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No.
1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1.
254. Declaration of Frances Watson at 1-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No.
1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1.
255. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed Interview of Byung J. “BJay” Pak, (Aug. 11,
2021), pp. 14-25, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Pak%20Transcript.pdf; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court's Order of
September 20, 2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12,
2021).
256. “Georgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results
Today,” Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-
today; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court's Order of September 20,
2021 at 4-6, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021).
257. “Georgia Election Officials Briefing Transcript December 7: Will Recertify Election Results
Today,” Rev, (December 7, 2020), available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
georgia-election-officials-briefing-transcript-december-7-will-recertify-election-results-
today; Response of the Georgia Secretary of State to the Court's Order of September 20,
2021, at 4-6 and Exhibit A: Videotaped Deposition of James P. Callaway (Deputy Chief Inves-
tigator of the Office of the Secretary of State) at 29-35, Favorito v. Wan, No. 2020CV343938
(Ga. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 12, 2021) available at, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/
21084096/favorito-sos-brief-in-response-to-order-of-92021-with-exs-a-and-b.pdf.
258. Declaration of Frances Watson at 2-3, Pearson v. Kemp, 831 F. App'x. 467 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (No.
1:20-cv-04809), ECF No. 72-1; U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Transcribed Interview of
Byung J. “BJay” Pak, (August 11, 2021), pp. 14-25, available at https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pak%20Transcript.pdf.
49-937_text.pdf 277 12/23/22 9:12 AM
254 CHAPTER 1
259. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000004670_0001-0013, 076P-
R000004888_0001-0013, 076P-R000004948_0001-0013 (January 5, 2021, emails from Molly
Michael re: “from POTUS” to Senators Josh Hawley and Ted Cruz and to Representative Jim
Jordan attaching Background Briefing on 2020 Fraud).
260. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-
capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
261. In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *2, 22 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
262. GA House Mobile Streaming, Governmental Affairs 12.10.20, Vimeo – Livestream, at 2:09:03
to - 2:13:10, available at https://livestream.com/accounts/25225474/events/9117221/
videos/214677184.
263. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Hear-
ing on the January 6th Investigation, 117th Cong., 2d sess., (June 21, 2022), available at
https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-january6th.
264. See John Danforth, Benjamin Ginsberg, Thomas B. Griffith, et al., “Lost, Not Stolen: The
Conservative Case that Trump Lost and Biden Won the 2020 Presidential Election,” (July
2022), p. 3, available at https://lostnotstolen.org/download/378/.
265. Opinion and Order at *6, 13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed
Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf.
266. Complaint, Exhibit 2: Affidavit of Jesse Richard Morgan at 2, 10, Mecalfe v. Wolf, 2020 Pa.
Commw. LEXIS 794 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2020) (No. 636 MD 2020), available at https://
www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210603/212420-file-10836.pdf.
267. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec. 1, 2020 2:31 p.m. ET, available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20201202014959/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/
status/1333856259662077954 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec.
1, 2020 3:49 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201201221335/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1333875814585282567 (archived); Donald J. Trump
(@realdonaldtrump), Twitter, Dec 2, 2020 6:42 p.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20201203024425/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1334327204847775744
(archived).
268. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of Richard Peter Donoghue, (Oct. 1, 2021), p. 60; Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of
William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), pp. 45-46.
269. FOX News, “Sean Hannity,” Nov. 19, 2020, available at https://archive.org/details/
FOXNEWSW_20201120_060000_Hannity?start/1983.1.end/2077.5.
270. Brandon Waltens, “VIDEO: Wagons, Suitcases, and Coolers Roll into Detroit Voting Center at
4 AM [UPDATED],” Texas Scorecard, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at https://texasscorecard.com/
federal/video-wagons-suitcases-and-coolers-roll-into-detroit-voting-center-at-4-am/;
“Rudy Giuliani Trump Campaign Press Conference Transcript November 19: Election Fraud
Claims,” Rev, (Nov. 19, 2020), at 22:29-26:53, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/
transcripts/rudy-giuliani-trump-campaign-press-conference-transcript-november-19-
election-fraud-claims.
271. Affidavit of Christopher Thomas ¶ 18, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describ-
ing ballot delivery), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/
163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf; see also Opinion and Order at *6, 13,
Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020), available at
49-937_text.pdf 278 12/23/22 9:12 AM
THE BIG LIE 255
https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-
and-Order.pdf (relying on Christopher Thomas’ affidavit to deny a petition for various
relief related to allegations that the November 3, 2020 election in Michigan was fraudu-
lent).
272. “How a WXYZ Wagon Sparked False Election Fraud Claims in Detroit,” WXYZ, (Nov. 5, 2020),
available at https://www.wxyz.com/news/how-a-wxyz-wagon-sparked-false-election-fraud-
claims-in-detroit.
273. “Election Summary Report,” City of Detroit, (Nov. 19, 2020), available at https://
detroitmi.gov/document/november-3-2020-general-election-official-results.
274. A canvassing process in every State verifies that the number of voters indicated as having
voted matches the number of ballots cast. If, as claimed, tens of thousands of illegitimate
ballots were counted at the TCF Center in Detroit, the total number of ballots counted
would be substantially higher than the total number of voters who voted, but in Detroit
slightly fewer ballots were counted than voters who were listed as having voted. The net
number of ballots for the City of Detroit counting boards was 21 more names than ballots,
out of approximately 174,000 absentee votes cast. Michigan Secretary of State, “Audits of
the November 3, 2020 General Election,” (Apr. 21, 2021), p. 20, available at https://
www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/
BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf?rev=
a3c7ee8c06984864870c540a266177f2.
275. Approximately 4.2 million ballots were cast in-person on election day and 2.6 million mail
and absentee ballots were cast. See “Pennsylvania's Election Stats,” Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://www.dos.pa.gov/
VotingElections/BEST/Pages/BEST-Election-Stats.aspx;“Official Returns – 2020 Presidential
Election,” Pennsylvania Department of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022), available at https://
www.electionreturns.pa.gov/General/SummaryResults?ElectionID=83&ElectionType=
G&IsActive=0.
276. Donald J. Trump, (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Nov. 28, 2020 12:09 a.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201128080915/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1332552283553476608 (archived), retweeting Senator Doug Mastriano (@SenMastriano),
Twitter, Nov. 27, 2020, 1:59 p.m. ET, available at https://twitter.com/SenMastriano/status/
1332398733401591808.
277. Jessica Calefati, “Fact-Checking False Claims about Pennsylvania's Presidential Election by
Trump and His Allies,” Philadelphia Inquirer, (Dec. 7, 2020), available at https://
www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-election-results-trump-fraud-fact-check-
20201206.html.
278. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 28, 2020, 4:00 p.m. ET, available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20201228211304/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1343663159085834248 (archived); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 29,
2020, 8:59 a.m. ET, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201229205204/https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1343919651336712199 (archived); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 29, 2020, 5:55 p.m. ET, available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20201229225512/https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1344054358418345985. Note that timestamps in archived tweets may reflect a time zone
different from that where the tweet originated.
279. See Pennsylvania House Republican Caucus, “PA Lawmakers: Numbers Don’t Add Up, Certi-
fication of Presidential Results Premature and In Error,” (Dec. 28, 2020), available at
https://www.pahousegop.com/News/18754/Latest-News/PA-Lawmakers-Numbers-
Don%E2%80%99t-Add-Up,-Certification-of-Presidential-Results-Premature-and-In-Error.
Representative Ryan also promoted the groundless claim of an unexplained discrepancy of
400,000 mail-in ballots in the state’s database, which was based entirely on his ignorance
of the fact that the database in question accounts for mail-in ballots and absentee ballots
separately. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Examining
Irregularities in the 2020 Election, (Dec. 16, 2020), Written Testimony of Pennsylvania State
49-937_text.pdf 279 12/23/22 9:12 AM
256 CHAPTER 1
Representative Frank Ryan, available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Testimony-Ryan-2020-12-16.pdf; Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental
Affairs, Examining Irregularities in the 2020 Election, (Dec. 16, 2020), Letter Submitted by
Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth Kathy Boockvar, available at https://
www.dos.pa.gov/about-us/Documents/statements/2020-12-16-Senator-Johnson-and-
Peters.pdf.
280. “Dept. of State: Republicans' Election Claims Are ‘Repeatedly Debunked Conspiracy Theo-
ries’,” WJAC-TV, (Dec. 29, 2020), available at https://wjactv.com/news/local/dept-of-state-
republicans-election-claims-are-repeatedly-debunked-conspiracy-theories.
281. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Transcribed Interview of Richard Donoghue, (Aug. 6,
2021), p. 156, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Donoghue%20Transcript.pdf.
282. See “Donald Trump Rally Speech Transcript Dalton, Georgia: Senate Runoff Election,” Rev,
(Jan. 4, 2021), at 58:09, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-
rally-speech-transcript-dalton-georgia-senate-runoff-election; “Transcript of Trump’s
Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press (January 13, 2021), available at
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-
e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
283. Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Tran-
scribed Interview of William Barr, (Jun. 2, 2022), p. 29; Affidavit of Russell James Ramsland,
Jr., 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724 (E.D. Mich. 2021), ECF 6-24, available at https://
www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/6/24/king-v-whitmer/. Ramsland submitted a
similar affidavit in a case in Georgia. See Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffens-
perger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020), ECF No. 7-1.
284. Affidavit of Russell Ramsland, Wood v. Raffensperger, 501 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2020),
ECF No. 7-1.
285. Aaron Blake, “The Trump Campaign’s Much-Hyped Affidavit Features a Big, Glaring Error,”
Washington Post, (Nov. 20, 2020), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2020/11/20/trump-campaigns-much-hyped-affidavit-features-big-glaring-error/.
286. For example, Ramsland claimed 781.91% turnout in North Muskegon (actual turnout:
77.78%); 460.51% turnout in Zeeland Charter Township (actual turnout: 80.11%); and 139.29%
turnout in Detroit (actual turnout: 50.88%). See King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d. 680, 724
(E.D. Mich. 2021); Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Elec-
tion in Michigan, (June 23, 2021), available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
287. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press,
(Jan. 13, 2021), available athttps://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; “Donald Trump Speech on
Election Fraud Claims Transcript December 2” Rev (Dec. 2, 2020), available at https://
www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-on-election-fraud-claims-transcript-
december-2; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 3, 2020, 4:11 p.m. ET,
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20201203211154/https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/1334606278388277253 (archived); “Trump Lawyers Rudy Giuliani &
Jenna Ellis Testify Before Michigan House Oversight Committee: Full Transcript,” Rev, (Dec.
3, 2020), at 26:13, available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/trump-lawyers-rudy-
giuliani-jenna-ellis-testify-before-michigan-house-oversight-committee-transcript; Affida-
vit of Mellissa A. Carone, King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (E.D. Mich. 2020), ECF No. 1-5,
available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18693929/1/5/king-v-whitmer/.
288. See, e.g., Opinion and Order at *3, 12-13, Costantino v. Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Mich. Cty.
Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2020/11/Costantino-v-Detroit-Opinion-and-Order.pdf; Affidavit of Christopher
Thomas ¶¶ 2-18, Texas v. Pennsylvania, 592 U.S. ____ (2020) (describing his experience and
49-937_text.pdf 280 12/23/22 9:12 AM
THE BIG LIE 257
the process for tabulating votes), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/
22/22O155/163387/20201210145418055_22O155%20MI%20APP.pdf.
289. See, e.g., “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press
(January 13, 2021), available at https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-
donald-trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; Rudy Giuliani’s
Common Sense, “I CAN’T SAY THIS On National Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,” Rumble,
at 13:10 – 13:25, Dec. 30, 2020, available at https://rumble.com/vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-
national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html.
290. Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Georgia House Hearing on Election Fraud, Brad
Raffensperger to Participate 12/23/20,” YouTube, at 27:28, 43:02-43:28, Dec. 23, 2020, avail-
able at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4cuakECmuA&t=2582s (Testimony of Ryan Ger-
many, counsel to Georgia Secretary of State, before Georgia legislature stating: “The total
number of underage people who voted is zero. We were able to look at everyone who
voted and look at their birthdate in the voter registration system, and I think there was
four people who requested a ballot before they turned 18, and they all turned 18 prior to
November 3rd, which means they’re allowed to vote.”).
291. See, e.g. Bannon’s War Room, “Episode 980 – The Border Tipping Point … Peter Navarro on
the Stolen Election and Desperation in Del Rio,” Rumble, May 27, 2021, available at https://
rumble.com/vhpam3-episode-980the-border-tipping-pointpeter-navarro-on-the-stolen-
election-and.html; Bannon’s War Room, “Episode 979 – The HQ of the Runaway Train …
Rachel Maddow’s Anna Karenina Moment,” Rumble, May 27, 2021, available at https://
rumble.com/vhp8yn-episode-979-the-hq-of-the-runaway-train-rachel-maddows-anna-
karenina-moment.html; Right Side Broadcasting Network, “LIVE: Arizona State Legislature
Holds Public Hearing on 2020 Election,” YouTube, at 2:06:33-2:07:02, Nov. 30, 2020, available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rri6flxaXww.
292. “Proof of Citizenship Requirements,” Arizona Secretary of State, (accessed Dec. 4, 2022),
available at https://azsos.gov/elections/voting-election/proof-citizenship-requirements.
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down Arizona’s “evidence-of-citizenship” requirement as
applied to federal elections. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 4,
19 (2013). Arizona law allows voters to register as “federal only” voters without proof of
citizenship, but those voters must provide a driver’s license or Social Security Number,
which is then checked by election officials against immigration records before the person
is added to voter registration rolls. Daniel González, “Are Undocumented Immigrants Vot-
ing Illegally in Arizona?,” Arizona Republic, (Oct. 27, 2016), available at https://
www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/10/27/voter-fraud-undocumented-
immigrants-voting-illegally-arizona-donald-trump/91703916/.
293. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Mark Meadows Production), MM007288, (November 13, 2020, email
from Bill Stepien to Mark Meadows, Justin Clark, and Jason Miller re: AZ Federal ID Voters);
In the Matter of Rudolph W. Giuliani, No. 2021-00506, slip op at *23-25 (N.Y. App. Div. May 3,
2021), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/giuliani-law-license-
suspension/1ae5ad6007c0ebfa/full.pdf.
294. Brad Raffensperger, Integrity Counts (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021), p. 191 (reproduc-
ing the call transcript); Amy Gardner and Paulina Firozi, “Here’s the Full Transcript and
Audio of the Call Between Trump and Raffensperger,” Washington Post, (Jan. 5, 2021), avail-
able at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-transcript-
georgia-vote/2021/01/03/2768e0cc-4ddd-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
295. For example, the President alleged in his January 6th speech that large numbers of ballots
were cast on behalf of dead people not just in Georgia but also in Michigan, Nevada, and
Pennsylvania. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated
Press (January 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-
trump-capitol-siege-media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27; See also Rudy Giuliani’s
Common Sense, “I CAN’T SAY THIS On National Television | Rudy Giuliani | Ep. 98,” Rumble,
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258 CHAPTER 1
at 15:10-15:46, (Dec. 30, 2020, reposted Mar. 22, 2021), available at https://rumble.com/
vex72l-i-cant-say-this-on-national-television-rudy-giuliani-ep.-98.html (making similar
claims).
296. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Alex Cannon Production) AC-0013946, (November 12, 2020, email
from Alex Cannon to Matt Wolking, Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, Ali Pardo, Matthew Mor-
gan, and Andrew Clark titled “Re: dead voters”); Documents on file with the Select Commit-
tee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, (Tim Murtaugh
Production) XXM-0009451 (November 8, 2020, email from Jason Miller to Zach Parkinson,
Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re: PA Death Data stating that quality control checks will
“significantly decrease[]” the number of “possible dead voters”), XXM-0009467 (November
8, 2020, email from Jason Miller to Zach Parkinson, Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re: GA
Dead Voters), XXM-0009566 (November 9, 2020 email from Zach Parkinson to Jason Miller,
Tim Murtaugh, and Matt Wolking re PA Death Data noting there “may be errors” with their
data about people who were dead voters); Mark Niesse, “Alleged ‘Dead’ Georgia Voters
Found Alive and Well after 2020 Election,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 27, 2021),
available at https://www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-
well-after-2020-election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/.
297. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198, (December 3, 2020, text
message from Eric Herschmann to Mark Meadows).
298. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (National Archives Production), TEXT0000198-203, (December 3, 2020,
text messages between Eric Herschmann and Mark Meadows).
299. Final Order at 5-6, Boland v. Raffensperger, No.2020CV343018 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 14
2020), available at https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Boland-v-
Raffensperger-Order-Dismissing-Complaint.pdf.
300. The expert, Bryan Geels, based his claims on a comparison of public voter information to
public death records. See Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000683-
84, 692-93, 706-07 (Affidavit of Bryan Geels dated Dec. 1, 2020, in Trump v. Barron, a case
filed by the Trump Campaign in a Georgia Superior Court in Fulton County). However, the
records reviewed included only name and year of birth for each individual listed. Id. at ¶
28. Based on this limited information, it was impossible for Geels (or anyone else) to con-
clude that the person with a particular name and birth year was the same person listed in
public death records with that name and birth year. See id., at ¶ 50 (only the Secretary of
State has the information to conduct a full analysis of this issue); see also Declaration of
Charles Stewart III at 22, Trump v. Raffensperger, No. 2020CV33255 (Ga. Super. Ct. filed Dec.
14, 2020).
301. In Georgia, the Secretary of State found four cases where people voted in the names of
deceased individuals. Mark Niesse, “Alleged ‘Dead’ Georgia Voters Found Alive and Well
after 2020 Election,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, (Dec. 27, 2021), available at https://
www.ajc.com/politics/alleged-dead-georgia-voters-found-alive-and-well-after-2020-
election/DAL3VY7NFNHL5OREMHD7QECOCA/; In Arizona, the Attorney General recently
concluded its investigation into claims of supposed dead voters in the 2020 election and
found only one instance in which a vote was cast on behalf of a person who died prior to
the election. Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General to The Honorable Karen Fann, Ari-
zona Senate President, (Aug. 1, 2022), available at https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/
files/2022-08/Letter%20to%20Fann%20-%20EIU%20Update%20080122.pdf. In Michigan, the
Senate Oversight Committee found only two instances in which votes were cast in the
names of dead people: one was a clerical error (poll worker attributed vote to deceased
father of person with same name residing at same address) and the other was a woman
who died four days before the election but had sent in her absentee ballot before her
death. Michigan Senate Oversight Committee, Report on the November 2020 Election in
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THE BIG LIE 259
Michigan, (June 23, 2021), available at https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-
1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf.
302. In an email obtained by the Select Committee, Katherine Friess, a lawyer who worked
closely with Giuliani, shared this information with Giuliani and noted, “I don’t think this
makes a particularly strong case.” Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB-
_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead
votes memo for your consideration).
303. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
U.S. Capitol (Cleta Mitchell Production), CM00026036 (January 5, 2021 email from Cleta
Mitchell to Richard Perry re: GA Data request by Senator Graham); Documents on file with
the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the U.S. Capitol (Christina
Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email from Katherine Friess re:
Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your consideration); Select Committee to Investi-
gate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, Transcribed Interview of Christina
Bobb, (Apr. 21, 2022), pp. 141-42.
304. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
U.S. Capitol (Christina Bobb Production), BOBB_CONG_00000621 (January 4, 2021, email
from Katherine Friess re: Chairman Graham dead votes memo for your consideration).
305. ABC News, “Lindsey Graham Delivers Remarks on Capitol Breach,” YouTube, at 3:05-3:30,
Jan. 6, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKHkYlRm_XM.
306. Documents on file with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol, (Chapman University Production), Chapman060742, (Dec. 31, 2020
email from John Eastman to Alex Kaufman and Kurth Hibert); see also Documents on file
with the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capi-
tol, (National Archives Production), 076P-R000008384_0001 (December 31, 2020, email from
Eric Herschmann to Cleta Mitchell and cc’ed to Mark Meadows and Molly Michael in which
Herschmann wrote: “I was concerned about the President signing a verification about facts
that may not be sustainable upon detailed scrutiny.”).
307. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson, No. 8:22-cv-99-
DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19, 2022), ECF no. 372, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/
62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.
308. Order Re Privilege of Remaining Documents at 17, Eastman v. Thompson, Case 8:22-cv-
00099-DOC_DFM, (Oct. 19, 2022), ECF no. 372, available at https://www.courtlistener.com/
docket/62613089/372/john-c-eastman-v-bennie-g-thompson/.
309. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
310. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
311. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
312. See “Donald Trump 2020 Election Night Speech Transcript,” Rev, (Nov. 4, 2020), available at
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-2020-election-night-speech-
transcript.
313. See “Donald Trump Speech ‘Save America’ Rally Transcript January 6,” Rev, (Jan. 6, 2021),
available at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/donald-trump-speech-save-america-
rally-transcript-january-6.
314. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
49-937_text.pdf 283 12/23/22 9:12 AM
260 CHAPTER 1
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
315. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter, Dec. 19, 2020, 1:42 a.m. ET, available at
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22wild+protest%22 (archived).
316. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
317. “Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before US Capitol Riot,” Associated Press, (Jan. 13,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-
media-e79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27.
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Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
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2
“I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES”
In a now infamous telephone call on January 2, 2021, President Trump
pressured Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger for more than an
hour. The President confronted him with multiple conspiracy theories
about the election—none of which were true. Raffensperger and other
Georgia officials debunked these allegations, one after another, during their
call. Under Raffensperger’s leadership, Georgia had, by that time, already
conducted a statewide hand recount of all ballots. That recount and other
post-election reviews proved that there was no widespread fraud, and that
voting machines didn’t alter the outcome of the election.1 This should have
put President Trump’s allegations to rest. But, undeterred by the facts, the
President badgered Raffensperger to overturn the Georgia results.
President Trump insisted that “the ballots are corrupt” and someone
was “shredding” them.2 He issued a thinly veiled threat, telling Raffens-
perger, “it is more illegal for you than it is for them because you know what
they did and you’re not reporting it.” 3 Of course, the Georgia officials
weren’t doing anything “illegal,” and there was nothing to “report.” Even
so, President Trump suggested that both Raffensperger and his general
counsel, Ryan Germany, could face criminal jeopardy.4 “That’s a criminal,
that’s a criminal offense. And you can’t let that happen,” the President
said.5 “That’s a big risk to you and to Ryan, your lawyer . . . I’m notifying
you that you’re letting it happen.” 6
And then the President made his demand. “So look. All I want to do is
this. I just want to find 11,780 votes, which is one more than we have,”
President Trump told Raffensperger.7
It was a stunning moment. The President of the United States was ask-
ing a State’s chief election officer to “find” enough votes to declare him the
winner of an election he lost.
Raffensperger saw the President’s warning to him on January 2nd as a
threat. “I felt then—and I still believe today—that this was a threat,”
Raffensperger wrote in his book.8 And this threat was multifaceted: first,
263
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264 CHAPTER 2
the President “notifying” Raffensperger and his team of criminal activity
could be understood as directing the law-enforcement power of the Federal
Government against them. While Raffensperger did not know for certain
whether President Trump was threatening such an investigation, he knew
Trump had “positional power” as President and appeared to be promising
to “make [my] life miserable.” 9
But the threat was also of a more insidious kind. As Raffensperger wrote
in his book: “Others obviously thought [it was a threat], too, because some
of Trump’s more radical followers have responded as if it was their duty to
carry out this threat.” 10 Raffensperger's deputy held a press conference and
publicly warned all Americans, including President Trump, that President
Trump's rhetoric endangered innocent officials and private citizens, and
fueled death threats against Georgia election workers, sexualized threats
directed towards Raffensperger's wife, and harassment at the homes of
Georgia election officials.11 The January 2nd call promised more of the
same. The upshot of President Trump’s message to Raffensperger was: do
what I ask, or you will pay.
President Trump’s phone call with Secretary Raffensperger received
widespread coverage after it was leaked. But Georgia was not the only State
targeted by President Trump and his allies. The call was one element of a
larger and more comprehensive effort—much of it unseen by and unknown
to the general public—to overturn the votes cast by millions of American
citizens across several States.
As Chapter 1 explained, the root of this effort was the “Big Lie”: Presi-
dent Trump and his allies publicly claiming that the election was rife with
fraud that could have changed the result, even though the President’s own
advisors, and the Department of Justice, told the President time and time
again that this was not the case.12 But in parallel with this strategy, Presi-
dent Trump and his allies zeroed in on key battleground States the Presi-
dent had lost, leaning on Republican State officials to overrule voters,
disregard valid vote counts, and deliver the States’ electoral votes to the
losing candidate. Had this scheme worked, President Trump could have, for
the first time in American history, subverted the results of a lawful election
to stay in power. His was a deeply anti-democratic plan: to co-opt State
legislatures—through appeals to debunked theories of election fraud, or
pure partisan politics—to replace Biden electors with Trump electors, so
President Trump would win the electoral vote count in the joint session of
Congress on January 6th.
Had enough State officials gone along with President Trump’s plot, his
attempt to stay in power might have worked. It is fortunate that a critical
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“I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 265
mass of honorable officials withstood President Trump’s pressure to par-
ticipate in this scheme. They and others who stood up to him closed off
avenues for thwarting the election so that, by noon on January 6th, Presi-
dent Trump was left with one desperate, final gambit for holding on to
power: sending his armed, angry supporters to the U.S. Capitol.
2.1 THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, AND PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ATTEMPT TO SUBVERT IT
When Americans vote for a presidential candidate on election day, they are
actually casting votes for that candidate’s proposed presidential electors to
participate in the electoral college. After a State certifies its election results
and announces a winner, it also issues a “certificate of ascertainment,”
which contains the names of the duly chosen electoral college electors. The
electors whose names appear as having received the most votes on the cer-
tificate of ascertainment will go on to participate in the electoral college,
while a losing candidate’s proposed electors have no role to play and no
standing to participate in the electoral college. This happens after every
Presidential election, in each of the fifty States and the District of Columbia.
This process comes from a clause in the U.S. Constitution that gives
States the power to choose electoral college electors according to State
law.13 That clause says that each State “shall appoint” electoral college
electors “in such [m]anner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” All 50
States have decreed that electors will be selected by popular vote.
Tuesday, November 3rd, was the day established by Federal law as elec-
tion day in 2020. Each State’s rules had been set—and courts had weighed
in when certain rules were challenged. Polls opened around the country and
votes came in, whether in person or via the mail, according to each State’s
laws.
Over 154 million voters cast votes according to the rules in place on
election day.14 President Trump lost. He and his supporters went to court,
filing long-shot legal challenges to the election, but they failed in courts
around the country, before judges appointed by executives of both parties
(including President Trump himself), and, for those judges who were
elected, that are members of both parties.
Rather than abiding by the rule of law and accepting the courts’ rulings,
President Trump and his advisors tried every which way to reverse the out-
come at the State level. They pressured local and State elections officials to
stop counting votes once it became clear that former Vice President Joseph
Biden would prevail in the final count. They pressured Governors, secretar-
ies of State, and local officials not to certify the popular vote in several
swing States that former Vice-President Biden had won. And, when that did
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266 CHAPTER 2
not work, they pressured State legislators to disregard the vote counts and
instead appoint Trump electors to vote in the electoral college.
This fundamentally anti-democratic effort was premised on the incor-
rect theory that, because the Constitution assigns to State legislatures the
role of directing how electoral college electors are chosen (which every
State legislature had done before the election, giving that power to the
people at the ballot boxes) then the State legislatures could simply choose
Trump/Pence electors after seeing the election results. In effect, President
Trump and his advisors pushed for the rules to be changed after the
election—even if it meant disenfranchising millions of Americans.
2.2 THE PLAN EMERGES
More than a month before the Presidential election, the media reported that
the Trump Campaign was already developing a fallback plan that would
focus on overturning certain election results at the State level. An article
published on September 23, 2020, in The Atlantic explained, “[a]ccording to
sources in the Republican Party at the State and national levels, the Trump
Campaign is discussing contingency plans to bypass election results and
appoint loyal electors in battleground States where Republicans hold the
legislative majority.” 15 Ominously, the same reporting predicted, almost
exactly, what would later come to pass: “With a justification based on
claims of rampant fraud, Trump would ask State legislators to set aside the
popular vote and exercise their power to choose a slate of electors
directly.” 16
Numerous senior Trump Campaign advisors—including Campaign
Manager William Stepien, Deputy Campaign Manager and Senior Counsel
Justin Clark, and President Trump’s lead attorney Rudolph Giuliani—all
told the Select Committee that there was, indeed, a State-focused “strat-
egy” or “track” to challenge the outcome of the election, which included
pressing State legislators to challenge results in key States and to appoint
new electoral college electors.17
“You know, in the days after election day, later in that first week,
bleeding into the second, as our numbers and data looked bleaker, inter-
nally we knew that,” Stepien told the Select Committee.18 “As the AP [Asso-
ciated Press] called the race, I think some surrounding the President were
looking for different avenues to pursue.” That’s when Stepien remembered
the concept first coming up.19
Those around President Trump were pushing this idea, and pushing it
hard.
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Just two days after the election, President Trump’s son, Donald Trump,
Jr., forwarded to White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows a suggestion
that “State Assemblies can step in and vote to put forward the electoral
slate[,] Republicans control Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, North
Carolina, etc. we get Trump electors” and so “we either have a vote WE
control and WE win OR it gets kicked to Congress 6 January . . .” 20 Chief of
Staff Meadows responded: “Working on this for pa, ga and nc already.” 21
Within one week after the election, Meadows had also sent or received
several other similar messages:
“The state legislature can take over the electoral process”—Mark
Meadows’s text to Georgia State Senator Marty Harbin.22
“Agreed”—Mark Meadows’s text to a different sender, who sug-
gested that the Trump Administration “should get that out there” if
they were “seriously considering the state legislature strategy.” 23
“I will tell him”—Mark Meadows’s text to a sender who suggested
President Trump “[s]tart building momentum for the state legisla-
tures.” 24
“I love it”—Mark Meadows’s text to Representative Andy Biggs,
who relayed what he acknowledged as a “highly controversial” idea
to have “Republican legislature’s (sic)” “appoint a look doors (sic)
[electors].” 25
“. . . Why can’t the states of GA NC PENN and other R controlled
state houses declare this is BS (where conflicts and election not
called that night) and just send their own electors . . . I wonder if
POTUS knows this . . .”—former Secretary of Energy Rick Perry to
Mark Meadows.26
Another White House official exploring such a plan less than a week
after the election was Vince Haley, Deputy Assistant to the President for
Policy, Strategy and Speechwriting. He suggested:
“. . . Imagine if every red state legislature slated zero electors. It
would reveal that we are a red country. To do this we would have to
jack this to the nth degree as a battle of tribes . . . .” 27
Haley pushed this strategy in several texts and emails, including to
Assistant to the President and Director of Presidential Personnel Johnny
McEntee,28 an individual Haley characterized as “a very trusted lieutenant”
for President Trump, “a direct conveyor to Boss with ideas,” and “[a]t his
side almost all the time.” 29
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For Haley, however, purported election fraud was a way to justify Presi-
dent Trump-friendly legislatures changing the outcome of the election, but
there were other reasons for doing so, too. Election fraud was “only one
rationale for slating Trump electors,” Haley told McEntee, and “[w]e
should baldly assert” that State legislators “have the constitutional right to
substitute their judgment for a certified majority of their constituents” if
that prevents socialism.30 Haley added, “[i]ndependent of the fraud—or
really along with that argument—Harrisburg [Pennsylvania], Madison
[Wisconsin], and Lansing [Michigan] do not have to sit idly by and submit
themselves to rule by Beijing and Paris,” proposing that radio hosts “rally
the grassroots to apply pressure to the weak kneed legislators in those
states . . .” 31
McEntee replied “Yes!” and then: “Let’s find the contact info for all
these people now.” 32 Hours later, Haley sent him names and—in most
cases—cell phone numbers for top GOP legislators in six States, suggesting
“. . . for POTUS to invite them down for a WH meeting . . .” 33 The President
would later call several named in that message, including Rusty Bowers and
Karen Fann in Arizona; Lee Chatfield and Mike Shirkey in Michigan; and
Jake Corman in Pennsylvania.34
Others weighed in with the President about a State-focused plan, too.
Some were already looking ahead to January 6th.
On November 8th, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich met
President Trump at the White House.35 Two days later, he sent a follow-up
note to the President’s executive assistant titled “please give to POTUS[,]
newt.” 36 It suggested that “[t]he only way Trump loses is rigged system”
and added that President Trump could encourage “GOP legislatures elect
not to send in electors,” forcing a House vote by State delegations on Janu-
ary 6th that Gingrich expected President Trump would win.37 Meadows
replied: “Thanks Speaker.” 38
Newsmax CEO Christopher Ruddy had President Trump’s ear and
reportedly spoke with him by phone at least four times before December.39
He forwarded a memo to other close advisors of the President recommend-
ing that the Trump team persuade one or more Republican-led chambers in
Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and even Minnesota
to “pick a separate competitive State slate of Electors,” which the memo
predicted might turn January 6th into “a cat-fight in Congress wherein VP
Pence is Presiding.” 40
Attorney and conservative activist Cleta Mitchell was recruited by Mark
Meadows immediately after the election to assist the Trump Campaign’s
legal work.41 By November 5th, she emailed Dr. John Eastman of Chapman
University,42 who would later play an outsized role pushing a theory about
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“I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 269
Photo by Alex Wong/Getty Images
what Vice President Pence could or couldn’t do during the January 6th joint
session of Congress that is detailed in Chapter 5 of this Report. In her email,
Mitchell asked Eastman to write a memo justifying an idea that State legis-
lators “reclaim” the power to pick electors and asked, rhetorically, “Am I
crazy?” 43 Dr. Eastman wrote the memo, entitled “The Constitutional
Authority of State Legislatures to Choose Electors,” and sent it along for
sharing “widely.” 44
According to the Office of Presidential Scheduling, President Trump was
scheduled to meet in the Oval Office on November 10th with Morgan Warst-
ler and John Robison, Texas entrepreneurs close to former Governor Rick
Perry.45 The next day, Warstler tweeted that he “[w]as in Oval yester-
day,” 46 and months later wrote that “I told whole Trump team in Oval”
that “State legislatures can choose the electors-no matter what current
state law OR state courts say.” 47
After this apparent meeting, John Robison sent the White House an
email entitled “URGENT follow up to our Tuesday Meeting with POTUS,”
that he asked be printed out for the President to “explain the move forward
plan for what was discussed.” 48 The email stated that “[President Trump]
liked the plan we presented to use a parallel path of state legislators,” and
the attached memo proposed hundreds of briefings for State lawmakers by
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270 CHAPTER 2
President Trump’s surrogates and members of the Freedom Caucus.49 The
email envisioned President Trump hosting “4+ MONSTER RALLY-TRIALS”
with “[t]ens of thousands of Trump voters staring up at the GOP state leg-
islators from their districts who ALONE control which slate of electors their
state will submit,” a proposal that seemed to foreshadow the State hearings
that Rudolph Giuliani and President Trump championed less than a month
later.50
Deputy White House Chief of Staff Dan Scavino called Robison’s mes-
sage “Bat. Shit. Crazy,” but the President’s executive assistant, who was
asked to print it for the President, wrote “Printed,” and may have shared it
with the President anyway.51
By then, President Trump was engaged. According to Stepien, his Cam-
paign Manager, the State-focused strategy came up in a November 11th
meeting among close advisors as “something to consider.” 52 At that point,
the election had been called, but the President “was very interested in
keeping pathways to victory open, so [Stepien] believe[d] [the President]
found the concept intriguing.” 53 Then, the plan “just started happening”
even though it was something Stepien, “honestly, kind of dismissed at
hand,” characterizing it as one “of the crazy, crazier ideas that w[as]
thrown out, in and around that time.” 54
But not everyone was convinced. On November 19th, the prior Republi-
can Presidential nominee, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT), issued a harsh
public condemnation of President Trump’s open and notorious efforts to
overturn the election:
Having failed to make even a plausible case of widespread fraud or
conspiracy before a court of law, the President has now resorted to
overt pressure on state and local officials to subvert the will of the
people and overturn the election. It is difficult to imagine a worse,
more undemocratic action by a sitting American President.55
Senator Romney was right to identify and decry President Trump’s
actions. And yet, in hindsight, it is clear that the effort to pressure State and
local officials by the Trump team was only just getting started.
2.3 OUTREACH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN
Just one day after the State-focused plan came up in the Oval Office with
the President and his top lieutenants, President Trump started taking con-
crete steps aimed at State legislators. And in the weeks that followed, the
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“I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 271
President spearheaded outreach aimed at numerous officials in States he
lost but that had GOP-led legislatures, including in Michigan, Pennsylva-
nia, Georgia, and Arizona.
The Select Committee estimates that in the two months between the
November election and the January 6th insurrection, President Trump or
his inner circle engaged in at least 200 apparent acts of public or private
outreach, pressure, or condemnation, targeting either State legislators or
State or local election administrators, to overturn State election results.
This included at least:
• 68 meetings, attempted or connected phone calls, or text messages,
each aimed at one or more State or local officials;
• 18 instances of prominent public remarks, with language targeting one
or more such officials;56 and
• 125 social media posts by President Trump or senior aides targeting one
or more such officials, either explicitly or implicitly, and mostly from
his own account.57
Furthermore, these efforts by President Trump’s team also involved
two other initiatives that tried to enlist support from large numbers of State
legislators all at once:
• The Trump Campaign contacted, or attempted to contact, nearly 200
State legislators from battleground States between November 30, 2020
and December 3, 2020, to solicit backing for possible Statehouse reso-
lutions to overturn the election. At least some messages said they were
“on behalf of the president.” 58
• Nearly 300 State legislators from battleground States reportedly par-
ticipated in a private briefing with President Trump, Rudolph Giuliani,
John Eastman, and others on January 2nd. The President reportedly
urged them to exercise what he called “the real power” to choose
electoral votes before January 6th, because, as President Trump said on
the call, “I don’t think the country is going to take it.” 59
It may be impossible to document each and every meeting, phone call,
text message, or other contact that President Trump and his allies had with
State and local officials in various battleground States. What follows is a
summary that focuses on four States and that demonstrates the lengths to
which President Trump would go in order to stay in power based on lies—
the Big Lie—about the election.
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272 CHAPTER 2
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EARLY PRESSURE ON PUBLIC SERVANTS
To carry out his plan, President Trump, Rudolph Giuliani, and other surro-
gates of President Trump publicly and privately sought assistance from
State and local officials whom they assumed would help as Republicans on
the same team with the “same goal.” 60 Some helped. Others didn’t.
On November 12th, U.S. Representative Tim Walberg (R-MI) sent an
email to President Trump’s Executive Assistant Molly Michael, describing a
request he had received earlier that day:
During my conversation with the President this morning he asked
me to check with key leadership in Michigan’s Legislature as to how
supportive they could be in regards to pushing back on election
irregularities and potential fraud. He wanted me to gauge their will-
ingness to talk with him about efforts to bring about transparency
and integrity in Michigan’s election and report back to him.61
Representative Walberg added that he had already acted on this request:
“I’ve had conversations with [Michigan] Speaker Lee Chatfield, Senate
Majority Leader Mike Shirkey, and Senate President Pro Tempore Aric Nes-
bitt. They all assured me they would look forward to speaking with the
President to report on their continuing efforts” related to overseeing the
election “and receiving any suggestions from President Trump.” 62 The
President would soon host Chatfield, Shirkey, Nesbitt, and four other
Michigan State lawmakers at the White House.63
In Arizona, on November 13, 2020, the day after officials finished
counting ballots cast in Maricopa County, Chairwoman Kelli Ward, of the
Arizona Republican Party, texted Mark Meadows that she had “[j]ust talked
to POTUS” and that “[h]e may call the Chairman of the Maricopa Board of
Supervisors,” Clint Hickman.64 Ward also left a message for Hickman that
said, “I just talked to President Trump, and he would like me to talk to you
and also see if he needs to give you a call to discuss what’s happening on
the ground in Maricopa. Give me a call back when you can.” 65 According to
Hickman, Ward was unusually active after the election, even for a party
chair, and was the first person to pressure him. One of her first messages to
Hickman before trying to connect him with President Trump was: “We
need you to stop the counting.” 66
In Georgia, the President initially took a more public approach. After the
Associated Press called the race there on November 12th, President Trump
tweeted harsh criticisms of Governor Brian Kemp and Secretary of State
Brad Raffensperger.67 Often these tweets called for them to take specific
actions that would have shifted the election results in his favor, such as
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“I JUST WANT TO FIND 11,780 VOTES” 273
rejecting a court settlement (which he referred to as a consent decree) that
dictated the procedures for verifying signatures on absentee ballots. And he
was relentless.
In November alone, President Trump tweeted that Raffensperger was “a
so-called Republican (RINO)” and asked “Where is @BrianKempGA,” 68
before suggesting that “They knew they were going to cheat.” 69 He called
to “Break the unconstitutional Consent Decree!” 70 and urged stricter sig-
nature matches with a demand to “Get it done! @BrianKempGA.” 71 He
called Kemp “hapless” and asked why he wouldn’t use emergency powers
to overrule Raffensperger on the signature-verification procedures, declar-
ing that “Georgia Republicans are angry.” 72 President Trump also
retweeted posts asking, “Who needs Democrats when you have Republicans
like Brian Kemp,” and “why bother voting for Republicans if what you get
is Ducey and Kemp?” 73
Pennsylvania was an early, but not unique, example of how President
Trump’s State-pressure campaign affected the lives of the public servants
running this country’s elections.
On November 7th, Rudy Giuliani headlined a Philadelphia press confer-
ence in front of a landscaping business called Four Seasons Total Landscap-
ing, near a crematorium and down the street from a sex shop.74
Standing in front of former New York Police Commissioner and
recently-pardoned convicted felon, Bernard Kerik, Giuliani gave opening
remarks and handed the podium over to his first supposed eyewitness to
election fraud, who turned out to be a convicted sex offender.75 Giuliani
claimed “at least 600,000 ballots are in question” in Pennsylvania and
falsely suggested that large numbers of ballots in the State had been cast
for dead people, including boxer Joe Frazier and actor Will Smith’s father.76
Within days, Republican Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidt
and others publicly debunked Giuliani’s specific allegations of election
fraud, including the claims about dead people voting in Pennsylvania elec-
tions.77 In reaction, President Trump tweeted on the morning of November
11th that “[a] guy named Al Schmidt, a Philadelphia Commissioner and
so-called Republican (RINO), is being used big time by the Fake News
Media to explain how honest things were with respect to the Election in
Philadelphia. He refuses to look at a mountain of corruption & dishonesty.
We win!” 78
That statement targeting Schmidt led to a deluge of threatening and
harassing phone calls and emails by people who heard President Trump and
falsely held out hope that Schmidt or someone else could overturn the
results of Pennsylvania’s election.79
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274 CHAPTER 2
As a public official, Schmidt was no stranger to threats. But being tar-
geted by the President of the United States was different. In Schmidt’s pub-
lic testimony to the Select Committee, he described why. “[P]rior to that
the threats were pretty general in nature. ‘Corrupt election officials in
Philadelphia are going to get what’s coming to them’” and other similar
threats.80 “After the President tweeted at me by name, calling me out the
way that he did,” Schmidt explained, “the threats became much more spe-
cific, much more graphic, and included not just me by name but included
members of my family by name, their ages, our address, pictures of our
home. Just every bit of detail that you could imagine.” 81
As the President continued to push the Big Lie and vilify public officials,
such threats multiplied.
EFFORTS TO PREVENT STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS FROM CERTIFYING THE ELECTION
Some of President Trump’s early outreach was part of an effort to prevent
State and local officials from certifying his loss. One example comes from
Michigan, and the other from Arizona.
Wayne County, Michigan, includes Detroit and its surrounding areas. On
November 17th, the county’s Board of Canvassers met to certify election
results, a process the Michigan Supreme Court described over a century ago
as ministerial and clerical.82
The meeting started at 6:00 p.m. and lasted over three hours.83 Its two
Republican members, Board Chair Monica Palmer and Board Member Wil-
liam Hartmann, first voted to block the certification of the election.84 After
a brief break, Palmer and Hartmann returned, changed their votes, and cer-
tified the election results.85 Just over twenty minutes later, Palmer and
Hartmann received a call from President Trump and RNC Chair Ronna
McDaniel.86
Palmer claimed that the call “was not pressure.” Rather, she said, “[i]t
was genuine concern for my safety” and “there were general comments
about different States, but we really didn’t discuss the details of the certifi-
cation.” 87
The Select Committee doesn’t know exactly what President Trump pri-
vately said on that phone call.88 By the next evening, however, Palmer and
Hartmann had each issued signed affidavits reassuming their earlier posi-
tion that Wayne County’s results should not be certified.89 Palmer’s affida-
vit even declared that “I rescind my prior vote,” though rescinding wasn’t
possible and her statement had no legal effect.90 And, President Trump
apparently knew before it was public that Hartmann and Palmer would try
to change their votes; almost eight hours before either of these affidavits
were publicly released, President Trump tweeted that these “two harassed
patriot Canvassers refuse to sign the papers!” 91
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Republicans in Arizona experienced similar treatment. In the most
populous and electorally significant county in Arizona, Maricopa County’s
Board of Supervisors met on November 20th to certify the county’s election
results. Their Board, made up of four Republicans and one Democrat, care-
fully reviewed the official canvass, asked questions for approximately two
hours, then unanimously voted to certify the results.92
Earlier that day, Kelli Ward contacted two of the board’s members, Jack
Sellers and Bill Gates, and asked them to delay the certification on the basis
of supposed improprieties.93 According to Sellers and Gates, however, Ari-
zona law required certification that day and they had no information (nei-
ther then, nor ever) to doubt the county’s election results.94
When Arizona certified its 2020 statewide election results on November
30th, it fell to Governor Doug Ducey, a Republican, to sign the certification.
While on camera during the signing ceremony, Governor Ducey’s phone
played a ringtone for the song “Hail to the Chief,” which he immediately
silenced.95
The Governor later confirmed it had been President Trump calling and
that he returned the President’s call shortly afterwards, but declined to say
what the two discussed other than saying that President Trump did not ask
him to withhold certification.96 The Select Committee does not know
whether that is true, but that evening President Trump blasted Ducey on
Twitter, accusing him of “rushing to put a Democrat in office,” and warn-
ing that “Republicans will long remember!” 97 The President also retweeted
posts bashing Ducey and his Georgia counterpart Brian Kemp, which asked
“Who needs Democrats when you have Republicans like Brian Kemp and
Doug Ducey?”, “why bother voting for Republicans if what you get is Ducey
and Kemp?”, and “Brian Kemp: ‘My state ran the most corrupt election in
American history.’ Doug Ducey: ‘Hold my beer.’” 98 President Trump even
commented “TRUE!” when retweeting a post that “Gov Ducey has betrayed
the people of Arizona.” 99
Governor Ducey pushed back, writing on Twitter that, “I’ve been pretty
outspoken about Arizona’s election system, and bragged about it quite a bit,
including in the Oval Office . . . In Arizona, we have some of the strongest
election laws in the country . . . The problems that exist in other states sim-
ply don’t apply here.” 100 Governor Ducey explained the law for certifying
elections in Arizona and pointed out that the certification now triggered a
“5-day window for any elector to bring a credible challenge to the election
results in court. If you want to contest the results, now is the time. Bring
your challenges.” 101 And, Governor Ducey referenced his oath of office:
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