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117th Congress Second Session
House Report 117-652
P R E PA R I N G F O R A N D
PREVENTING THE NEXT PUBLIC
H E A LT H E M E R G E N C Y:
Lessons Learned from the
Coronavirus Crisis
FINAL REPORT
DECEMBER 2022
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
INTRODUCTION 7
HEIGHTENED SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PUBLIC HEALTH 12
THREATS AND THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S
MISMANAGEMENT OF THE CRISIS RESULTED IN THE
I UNITED STATES HAVING A HIGHER CORONAVIRUS
MORTALITY RATE THAN THE MAJORITY OF ITS PEER
COUNTRIES
Long-term Underinvestment in Public Health Infrastructure and Longstanding 12
Health Disparities Put the Nation at Increased Risk from the Coronavirus.
Before the Coronavirus Crisis, the United States Had Not Sufficiently Invested in 13
Pandemic Preparedness, Despite Well-Known Risks.
The Trump Administration’s Failed Stewardship Over the Pandemic Response and 16
Persistent Pattern of Political Interference Undermined the Nation’s Ability to
Respond to the Pandemic.
The Toll of the Coronavirus Fell Disproportionately on the Most Vulnerable. 49
Life-Saving Vaccinations and the Biden Administration’s Stewardship Helped the 63
Nation Emerge from the Coronavirus Crisis, Yet Decisions Made by the Trump
Administration, Actions Taken by Private Companies, and Predatory Actors
Spreading Misinformation Have Undermined These Efforts.
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS CAUSED BY THE PANDEMIC— 75
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTING THOSE ALREADY
STRUGGLING—WAS AMELIORATED BY AGGRESSIVE
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, BUT THE TRUMP
II ADMINISTRATION’S POOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
EMERGENCY PROGRAMS LIMITED THEIR
EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY, AND EQUITY WHILE
C O N T R I B U T I N G T O W A S T E , F R A U D! A N D A B U S E
As the Coronavirus Crisis Upended the U.S. Economy, Longstanding Inadequate 76
Protections for Workers Put America’s Families at Increased Risk.
Congress Passed Rapid, Aggressive Federal Relief to Save Lives and Reduce 81
Economic Damage, Which Compensated for Structural Weaknesses.
The Trump Administration Failed to Prioritize and Effectively Deliver Relief for 83
Working Americans.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Poor Implementation and Oversight of Federal Aid Programs, Combined with 85
Unscrupulous Private Actors, Led to Significant Waste, Fraud, and Abuse and a Less
Effective Pandemic Response.
Congress and the Biden Administration Improved the Federal Implementation of 109
Pandemic Programs, Addressed Earlier Failures, and Supported a Robust and
Equitable Jobs Recovery.
MOVING FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 114
CONTINUING ONGOING MANAGEMENT OF THE
III CORONAVIRUS AND PREVENTING AND ADDRESSING
FUTURE PUBLIC HEALTH AND ECONOMIC CRISES
Critical Investments Are Needed to Sustain the Ongoing Response to the 114
Coronavirus, Reinvigorate a Chronically Underfunded Public Health Infrastructure,
and Bolster the Nation’s Ability to Prevent and Respond to Future Public Health
Emergencies.
Critical Changes Must Be Made to Ensure that Responses to Future Crises Assist 125
Working Americans Equitably, to Decrease Our Economic Vulnerabilities to Future
Crises in the First Place, and to Guard the Integrity of Relief Programs.
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS
950K+ DOCUMENTS
REVIEWED
394+ LETTERS SENT
42 HEARINGS & PUBLIC
BRIEFINGS HELD
37 STAFF REPORTS
PUBLISHED
24TRANSCRIBED INTERVIEWS
CONDUCTED
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HEARINGS & BRIEFINGS
2020
MAY 13 | Testing, Tracing, and Targeted Containment
MAY 21 | Heroes of the Coronavirus Crisis: Protecting Frontline and Essential Workers
During the Pandemic
MAY 29 | Supporting America’s Cities: What Mayors Need to Safely Reopen
JUNE 4 | An Unequal Burden: Addressing Racial Health Disparities in the Coronavirus
Pandemic
JUNE 11 | The Devastating Impact of the Coronavirus Crisis in America’s Nursing Homes
JUNE 18 | The Unemployment Pandemic: Addressing America’s Jobs Crisis
JUNE 26 | Accountability in Crisis: GAO’s Recommendations to Improve the Federal
Coronavirus Response
JULY 2 | The Administration’s Efforts to Procure, Stockpile, and Distribute Critical Supplies
JULY 17 | Former Federal Reserve Chairs on Responding to Our Nation’s Economic Crisis
JULY 31 | The Urgent Need for a National Plan to Contain the Coronavirus
AUGUST 6 | Challenges to Safely Reopening K-12 Schools
SEPTEMBER 1 | Hearing with Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin
SEPTEMBER 9 | Ensuring a Free, Fair, and Safe Election During the Coronavirus Pandemic
SEPTEMBER 23 | Hearing with Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell
OCTOBER 2 | Hearing with Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar II
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HEARINGS & BRIEFINGS
2021
FEBRUARY 19 | Ensuring Equity in Coronavirus Vaccinations
MARCH 17 | From Rescue to Recovery: Building a Thriving and Inclusive Post-Pandemic
Economy
MARCH 25 | Rooting Out Fraud in Small Business Relief Programs
APRIL 15 | Reaching the Light at the End of the Tunnel: A Science-Driven Approach to
Swiftly and Safely Ending the Pandemic
MAY 19 | Examining Emergent BioSolutions’ Failure to Protect Public Health and Public
Funds
JUNE 22 | Lessons Learned: The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic
JULY 1 | Building Trust and Battling Barriers: The Urgent Need to Overcome Vaccine
Hesitancy
JULY 27 | Oversight of Pandemic Evictions: Assessing Abuses by Corporate Landlords and
Federal Efforts to Keep Americans in Their Homes
JULY 29 | Briefing with CDC Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky and National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases Director Dr. Anthony Fauci Regarding the Spread
of the Delta Variant
SEPTEMBER 15 | Briefing with Director of the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research at the
Food and Drug Administration Dr. Peter Marks Regarding the Current Vaccine
Landscape in the United States
SEPTEMBER 22 | Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs
SEPTEMBER 29 | Upgrading Public Health Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and
Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments
OCTOBER 27 | How the Meatpacking Industry Failed the Workers Who Feed America
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HEARINGS & BRIEFINGS
2021
NOVEMBER 10 | Building Vaccine Confidence: Our Shot at Curbing the Pandemic in Chicago
and Beyond
NOVEMBER 17 | Combating Coronavirus Cons and the Monetization of Misinformation
DECEMBER 14 | A Global Crisis Needs a Global Solution: The Urgent Need to Accelerate
Vaccinations Around the World
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HEARINGS & BRIEFINGS
2022
JANUARY 11 | Briefing with CDC Director Dr. Rochelle Walensky, HHS Chief Science Officer for
the COVID-19 Response Dr. David Kessler, and HHS Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response Ms. Dawn O’Connell
JANUARY 20 | A View from the States: Governors Respond to the Omicron Variant
MARCH 2 | COVID Child Care Challenges: Supporting Families and Caregivers
MARCH 16 | Moving Beyond the Coronavirus Crisis: Perspectives from Public Health Experts
MARCH 30 | Moving Beyond the Coronavirus Crisis: The Biden Administration’s Progress in
Combating the Pandemic and Plan for the Next Phase
APRIL 29 | Ensuring Scientific Integrity at Our Nation’s Public Health Agencies
MAY 17 | Underpaid, Overworked, and Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy
Disproportionately Harmed Low-Wage Women Workers
JUNE 14 | Examining Federal Efforts to Prevent, Detect, and Prosecute Pandemic Relief
Fraud to Safeguard Funds for All Eligible Americans
JUNE 23 | Hearing with Trump White House Coronavirus Response Coordinator Dr.
Deborah Birx
JULY 19 | Understanding and Addressing Long COVID and Its Health and Economic
Consequences
SEPTEMBER 21 | Examining Long-Term Care in America: The Impact of the Coronavirus in
Nursing Homes
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STAFF REPORTS, MEMOS & ANALYSES
2020
AUGUST 6 | A Failure to Lead: The Trump Administration’s Disastrous Response to the
Coronavirus Pandemic
AUGUST 31 | Coronavirus Task Reports Kept Secret by the White House
SEPTEMBER 1 | Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection Program Data
SEPTEMBER 9 | Examination of States’ Preparedness for the November Election
SEPTEMBER 23 | Prioritizing Wall Street: The Fed’s Corporate Bond Purchases During the
Coronavirus Pandemic
OCTOBER 2 | The Trump’s Administration Pattern of Political Interference in the Nation’s
Coronavirus Response
OCTOBER 9 | Unnecessary Costs: How the Trump Administration Allowed Thousands of
Aviation Workers to Lose Their Jobs
OCTOBER 16 | Underserved and Unprotected: How the Trump Administration Neglected the
Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP
OCTOBER 20 | White House Reports Contradicting President Trump on Testing, Masks
OCTOBER 30 | Inefficient, Ineffective, and Inequitable: The Trump Administration’s Failed
Response to the Coronavirus Crisis
DECEMBER 16 | Supplemental Memorandum on Investigation into Political Interference with
Coronavirus Response
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STAFF REPORTS, MEMOS & ANALYSES
2021
MARCH 25 | Lowering the Guardrails: How the Trump Administration Failed to Prevent Billions
in Pandemic Small Business Fraud
MAY 19 | Preliminary Findings from Investigation into Emergent BioSolutions, Inc.
JUNE 17 | Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC
JULY 26 | The Trump Administration’s Pattern of Political Interference in the Nation’s
Coronavirus Response
SEPTEMBER 22 | The Pandemic Recovery: The American Rescue Plan’s Impact on Alleviating
Hardship and Supporting Economic Recovery
OCTOBER 13 | Farmers to Families? An Investigation into the Trump Administration’s Food Box
Program
OCTOBER 26 | Initial Findings from Transcribed Interview with Dr. Deborah Birx
OCTOBER 27 | Coronavirus Infections and Deaths Among Meatpacking Workers at Top Five
Companies Were Nearly Three Times Higher than Previous Estimates
DECEMBER 17 | More Effective, More Efficient, More Equitable: Overseeing an Improving and
Ongoing Pandemic Response
DECEMBER 21 | Investigation of One Medical’s Administration of Coronavirus Vaccines
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STAFF REPORTS, MEMOS & ANALYSES
2022
APRIL 27 | “We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar”: The Trump Administration’s $700 Million
“National Security” Loan to Yellow Corporation
APRIL 29 | New Findings Detailing Trump Administration’s Political Interference in Early
Pandemic Response
MAY 10 | The Coronavirus Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions
MAY 12 | “Now to Get Rid of Those Pesky Health Departments!”: How the Trump
Administration Helped the Meatpacking Industry Block Pandemic Worker
Protections
MAY 17 | New Finding of Disproportionate Impact of Coronavirus Pandemic on Working
Women
JUNE 13 | The Biden Administration’s Efforts to Root Out Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs
and Bring Wrongdoers to Justice
JUNE 14 | Idle on EIDL Fraud: How the Trump Administration Wasted Taxpayer Dollars by
Leaving the COVID-19 EIDL Program Vulnerable to Fraud
JUNE 21 | The “Atlas Dogma”: The Trump Administration’s Embrace of a Dangerous and
Discredited Herd Immunity via Mass Infection Strategy
JUNE 23 | New Evidence of Trump Administration’s Prioritization of Politics over Public
Health
JULY 28 | Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses by Four Corporate Landlords
During the Coronavirus Crisis
AUGUST 11 | Quality Failures by Emergent BioSolutions Rendered 135 Million Additional
Coronavirus Vaccine Doses Unusable
AUGUST 24 | A “Knife Fight” with the FDA: The Trump White House’s Relentless Attacks on
FDA’s Coronavirus Response
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STAFF REPORTS, MEMOS & ANALYSES
2022
SEPTEMBER 21 | Dire Conditions at For-Profit Nursing Home Chains in 2020
OCTOBER 17 | “It Was Compromised”: The Trump Administration’s Unprecedented Campaign to
Control CDC and Politicize Public Health During the Coronavirus Crisis
OCTOBER 25 | America’s Pandemic Workforce: Persistent Structural Inequities Harm Workers
and Threaten Future Crisis Response
DECEMBER 1 | “We Are Not the Fraud Police”: How Fintechs Facilitated Fraud in the Paycheck
Protection Program
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since it was established on April 23, 2020, the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis has been investigating the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of the nation’s response to
the coronavirus pandemic. The Select Subcommittee’s work has produced an extensive
investigative record. The committee has released 37 investigative reports and other disclosures
examining topics that range from how financial technology companies facilitated fraud in
pandemic relief programs to how meatpacking companies prioritized profits over the health of
their workers. The Select Subcommittee has held 42 hearings and Member briefings, exploring a
similarly broad range of issues to understand the many challenges presented by the coronavirus
crisis and how best to address them.
This report reflects the culmination of the Select Subcommittee’s work, as authorized and
directed in the 117th Congress by House Resolution 935. 1 The Select Subcommittee’s findings—
based on firsthand accounts, contemporaneous records, expert testimony and other evidence—
identify pre-existing vulnerabilities, failures in leadership and program implementation, and
predatory actions by private actors that contributed to extraordinary loss of life, economic
suffering, and waste, fraud, and abuse during the crisis. The findings also detail elements of the
federal government’s response that succeeded in ameliorating the crisis. All of these lessons
should inform preparations for and responses to future public health and economic emergencies.
The United States was underprepared for a major public health crisis for years before the
coronavirus pandemic. Chronic underfunding and longstanding health disparities put many
Americans at heightened risk of becoming infected and developing severe illness as a result of the
coronavirus. The United States had long failed to invest in measures necessary to prepare for a
global pandemic, including failing to maintain the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and to adapt
to indications that federal agencies were likely to be stymied by a lack of cooperation and
communication failures in the event of a major public health calamity. These factors were
exacerbated by the Trump Administration’s disastrous initial response in 2020. The Trump
Administration failed to recognize the looming threat as reports of a novel pathogen emerged in
early January and failed to take sufficient measures to prepare the country by developing adequate
testing or acquiring sufficient personal protective equipment (PPE) and other critical supplies.
Once the coronavirus outbreak erupted into a full-blown crisis, the Trump Administration
engaged in an unprecedented campaign to control and even manipulate the work of scientists
leading the public health response. The Trump White House blocked the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) from conveying accurate information to the public, installed
political operatives who sought to downplay the pandemic, and even attempted to alter and
manipulate CDC guidance, scientific studies, and public health orders to serve political goals. The
Trump White House also sought to interfere in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
authorization of coronavirus treatments and vaccines, pressuring FDA officials to reauthorize
hydroxychloroquine as a coronavirus treatment after it was shown to be ineffective and potentially
dangerous, rushing FDA to accelerate the authorization of convalescent plasma, and even blocking
the release of coronavirus vaccine guidance out of fear that recommended safety protocols would
delay the authorization of a vaccine until after the 2020 presidential election. On top of all of this,
1
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the Trump Administration embraced a dangerous and discredited herd immunity via mass infection
strategy many months before vaccines were available.
The Trump Administration’s reckless pandemic response resulted in devastating and
lasting harm. The toll of the coronavirus fell hardest on those who were already most vulnerable.
Communities of color suffered disproportionally high rates of coronavirus infection,
hospitalization, and death. Nursing home residents suffered high levels of infections and deaths,
exacerbated by understaffing and meager wages and benefits for their workers.
Upon taking office, the Biden Administration led a historic vaccination campaign,
administering 200 million coronavirus vaccine doses within 100 days. Yet corporate entities that
failed to live up to their obligations to address the public health crisis threatened to undermine this
effort, as did predatory actors who promoted misinformation, fueled by right-wing extremists and
others seeking to profit by selling discredited and dangerous treatments. The rampant spread of
misinformation has led to damaging distrust in public health expertise. It has also contributed to
harassment, threats, and attacks on public health officials working on the coronavirus response and
convinced far too many Americans to decline lifesaving coronavirus vaccines—resulting in
hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths.
***
The economic toll of the coronavirus crisis also brought devastation to American families,
inflicting particular harm on those who were already struggling. The pandemic-induced economic
crisis led to 20 million Americans losing their jobs in April 2020 alone, pushing the unemployment
rate from 2.5% to 14.7% in just two months. This devastation fell hardest on low-income workers
and their families, who were disproportionately women and people of color and were more likely
to work in hard hit sectors that experienced closures and disruptions. These workers were also
more likely to lack the financial protection needed to cope with sudden losses of income and
critical workplace benefits like paid leave needed to withstand a health crisis.
Congress acted swiftly to address the sudden economic devastation, enacting the
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act (CARES Act) in March 2020. Yet the Trump Administration’s implementation undermined
the effectiveness of many relief programs and kept badly needed aid out of the hands of struggling
Americans while lining the pockets of wealthy corporations and those seeking to profit off of the
economic crisis.
Early in the crisis, the Trump Administration failed to get Economic Impact Payments
(EIPs) enacted by the CARES Act into the hands of approximately nine million Americans who
were entitled to them. It failed to ensure that payroll support programs that went to businesses
were equitably distributed and could save the jobs of the workers who they were intended for. The
Trump Administration also failed to ensure that large-scale financial relief programs served
citizens and mid-sized businesses, rather than just large corporations. It similarly failed to take
effective action to prevent vulnerable Americans from losing their homes.
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The Trump Administration’s poor implementation of economic programs also failed to
safeguard taxpayer funds and protect them from fraud. Substantial fraud was committed against
pandemic relief programs, possibly well into the tens of billions of dollars. Programs operated by
the Small Business Administration (SBA) were particularly vulnerable to fraud. Approximately
$86 billion in potential fraud has been identified as having been committed against the Economic
Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. The Trump Administration failed to implement basic
safeguards against fraud during the early operation of that program, likely contributing to this high
level of potential fraud. The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) was similarly vulnerable to fraud
because of poor oversight and heavy delegation of applicant screening to unqualified and
unscrupulous financial technology (fintech) companies.
In addition to exposing relief programs to high risks of fraud, the Trump Administration
gave generous benefits to large companies, while other greedy actors simply sought to benefit from
the crisis. In one case, senior Trump Administration officials overrode career officials to give a
$700 million CARES Act national security loan to a company that the Department of Defense
(DOD) had determined not to be critical to national security. The Trump Administration also
awarded contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to inexperienced companies to administer the
Farmers to Families Food Box Program (Food Box Program), leading to waste and abuse of
taxpayer dollars in a program designed to feed hungry Americans. In similar acts of greed,
corporate landlords acted aggressively to evict tenants, notwithstanding eviction moratoriums and
federal programs available to disburse aid to tenants in need.
After assuming office, the Biden Administration worked with Democrats in Congress to
swiftly enact the American Rescue Plan (ARP), which immediately decreased hunger and other
hardships for struggling Americans. The new administration also worked to improve the
implementation of pandemic relief programs, thus making the distribution of relief more equitable
and reducing exposure to fraud. The Biden Administration’s vaccine rollout aided a historic
economic recovery in which all of the jobs that had been lost at the onset of the pandemic were
rapidly regained. The United States added more than 10 million jobs between January 2021 and
November 2022, surpassing the pre-pandemic total and bringing the unemployment rate down to
3.7%.
***
Informed by the Select Subcommittee’s oversight work and extensive investigative record,
today’s report also provides recommendations to strengthen the nation’s ability to prevent and
respond to public health and economic emergencies. These 30 recommendations focus on
mitigating ongoing risks still posed by the coronavirus, making critical investments in the nation’s
public health and economic relief infrastructures, decreasing vulnerabilities to future crises, and
guarding the integrity of relief programs. They include the following:
! Increase bivalent booster uptake through a targeted booster campaign in order to prevent
thousands of deaths and hospitalizations and save billions in direct medical costs.
! Accelerate the development of pan-coronavirus vaccines and nasal vaccines to address the
ongoing evolution of coronavirus variants.
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! Accelerate the development of new anti-viral treatments to create a robust pipeline of
effective options for vulnerable Americans.
! Maintain testing capacity to ensure convenient and efficient at-home testing options, while
developing better tests to detect a range of common respiratory viruses.
! Promote ventilation and filtration systems to mitigate the spread of respiratory viruses.
! Continue to evaluate the role, responsibilities, staffing and contents of the SNS,
particularly with respect to emerging and infectious disease outbreaks.
! Ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to adequately stock the SNS, to maintain and
replenish supplies for medical countermeasures, and to allow for shifting investments and
resources as appropriate.
! Review and close gaps in federal agency diligence processes for awarding procurement
contracts to reduce the risk of waste, fraud, and abuse.
! Increase funding for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial public health agencies,
ensuring that annual funding is predictable and sufficient to build long-term capabilities.
! Invest in modernizing public health data systems at the federal, state, and local level to
make them more flexible, dynamic, and interoperable.
! Make sustained investments to grow and retain a culturally competent public health
workforce trained in surveillance and detection, risk communications, laboratory science,
data systems, and disease containment.
! Develop procedures and training to protect scientific decision-making at federal agencies
from political interference.
! Modernize public health communications to ensure critical, accurate information reaches
all Americans, including underserved populations.
! Examine opportunities to protect the public health workforce, including by establishing a
national reporting system for incidents of violence against public health officials and
providing legal protections for workers facing harassment and threats.
! Explore opportunities to limit the spread of harmful misinformation.
! Pass legislation to ensure that individuals with Long COVID can access the critical
services that they need.
! Expedite and fund clinical treatment trials and educate health care providers and the public
on Long COVID.
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! Increase the federal government’s collaboration with international partners to strengthen
its ability to protect people from future threats and mount a coordinated, effective, and
equitable response to major global health crises when they do occur.
! Pass legislation to ensure government institutions and public health agencies are fully
equipped to prevent and respond to future challenges.
! In advance of future emergencies, assess and improve the federal government’s ability to
distribute emergency federal relief equitably, particularly to the lowest-income Americans
who are extraordinarily vulnerable to disasters.
! Tailor any relief programs that are implemented by private-sector institutions more
effectively to prioritize businesses or workers who lack other means of accessing credit.
! Support the permanent maintenance of new state and local government infrastructure for
distributing emergency rental assistance, in order to deliver future emergency aid in a
timely manner and to provide a consistent, effective lifeline to prevent evictions and
homelessness.
! Invest in housing affordability for lower-income American families, including by ensuring
that they must pay no more than 30% of their income on housing, to reduce Americans’
vulnerabilities to losing their homes in a crisis.
! Require or encourage states to modernize and reform their unemployment systems to
reduce Americans’ vulnerability in future crises.
! Provide SBA with resources to expand its capacity to address surges in applications for
Economic Injury Disaster Loans during catastrophes or national crises.
! Enact a program of universal paid sick, medical, and family leave to advance economic
recovery, equity, and public health preparedness.
! Make permanent investments in the child care sector to improve affordability for families,
increase wages for caregivers and early educators, and expand the sector’s capacity so
child care challenges do not remain a barrier for parents’ participation in the labor market.
! Expand and improve federal agencies’ economic data collection tools and methods,
building on advances made during the coronavirus crisis in highlighting economic
vulnerabilities and inequities.
! Ensure the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) continues to have resources to surge the
processing of partial tax transcripts to prevent fraud and ensure integrity in SBA’s EIDL
program.
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! Include proactive fraud controls in future relief programs, including but not limited to
rigorous vetting and oversight of all private-sector entities with delegated responsibilities
for administering the programs and safeguarding taxpayer dollars.
6
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INTRODUCTION
On December 30, 2019, an alert appeared in ProMED—a crowdsourced disease alert
website and newsletter—describing an outbreak of an unexplained respiratory disease in Hubei
Province, China.2 This alert turned out to be one of the earliest reports outside of China of a
pathogen that would be identified by January 10% S"S"% as a novel coronavirus, spreading to
multiple continents within weeks, killing over 100,000 Americans within six months and over a
million in two-and-a-half years.3
ProMED’s alert caught the immediate attention of top scientists at CDC. Dr. Nancy
Messonnier, Director of CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Disease at the
time, told the Select Subcommittee during a transcribed interview that she convened a virtual team
and directed others to go out and collect more information. CDC employees in China who were
12 hours ahead of Atlanta-based staff had seen the alert and “were already working on trying to
gather additional information.” 4 Dr. Anne Schuchat—then Principal Deputy Director of CDC—
told the Select Subcommittee during a transcribed interview that, upon seeing the report of “five
or seven cases,” she “sent an email to a number of staff who scientifically or organizationally
might have known more about this situation and asked did they know anything and could they let
me know.” 5 A few hours later, she discovered that there were “something like 27 cases … more
than was in the [ProMED] report.” 6
Dr. Messonnier called then-CDC Director Robert Redfield shortly thereafter. He told the
Select Subcommittee that he heard the news while gathered with his family on New Year’s Eve:
I received a phone call from CDC, and I think it also involved CDC China … And
the gist of that call … was that there were 27 cases of an undefined respiratory
illness or what they called non-specified respiratory illness which were linked to a
wet market in Wuhan. And it was not flu, and they didn’t have all the other data at
the time. 7
CDC employees learned that the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention “was
sending a group of their own, mostly influenza staff, to evaluate the epidemiology, to understand
who was getting sick, where they were getting sick” and “to collect new specimens and also verify
that the full breadth of testing of various pathogens was underway.” 8 Dr. Daniel Jernigan, CDC’s
Deputy Director for Public Health Science and Surveillance and Incident Manager for CDC’s
coronavirus response from January to March 2020, told the Select Subcommittee during a
transcribed interview that by December 31:
[T]he staff had received information from colleagues that were at the Wuhan
consulate regarding concerns about a seafood market and potential for respiratory
disease transmission in that setting. That information got from the embassy’s
consulate there to others at the embassy, and then to our own staff which were
embedded at the embassy. 9
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Dr. Jernigan recalled, “within a day or so we understood that the usual pathogens that might be a
cause, influenza, RSV, parainfluenza et cetera,” had been ruled out and that the outbreak was in
“a category of unrecognized or unexplained.” 10
Dr. Redfield spoke with Dr. George Gao, Director of the Chinese Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, on January 3, 2020. Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he
had a “good relationship” with Dr. Gao from their previous work as virologists. 11 During their
initial call, Dr. Gao said that China had detected 27 cases of a non-specified respiratory illness.
According to Dr. Redfield, Dr. Gao said “that he didn’t feel there was evidence of human-to-
human transmission, and that all of the cases came from a wet market and that was it. We didn’t
get into any more detail.” 12
A few days later, Dr. Gao provided Dr. Redfield with more information on the 27 known
cases. Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he “noticed that three of them were in what
we call clusters. So like a husband and a child, or brother and sister.” He recalled:
And I said, George, the clusters bother me, because you really think they all walked
by the same animal and all got infected, or do you think it’s possible one of them
got infected, and then they transmitted to others in the cluster? 13
Dr. Redfield spoke with Dr. Gao again several days later. Dr. Gao reported that he had
looked outside of the wet market and found “hundreds of cases and they had nothing to do with
the wet market.” Dr. Redfield recalled that Dr. Gao “was distraught when he went out and
followed up on my request to look at people with non-specified pneumonia that had nothing to do
with the wet market. He told me, Bob, we have hundreds of cases, it’s already out of control.” 14
Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he pledged the “full support of CDC,”
telling Dr. Gao he “would be ready to send the CDC team to augment his ability if he would invite
us, which he said he wanted.” In what Dr. Redfield described as an “unusual” request, Dr. Gao
asked for a formal offer to the Chinese government:
[N]ormally he would just invite us and we would go. In this circumstance, he told
me I had to write a formal letter because he had to get approval up his chain of
command, which I did as an email I think on the 3rd or 4th of January. When I
returned to the office on Monday, I think it was January 6th, I wrote a formal letter
on CDC stationery offering to provide support. 15
Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he attempted to follow up with Dr. Gao “a
number of times,” but received no response. He said, “I still assumed that they were going to be
inviting us in during that period of time, and I kept – I kept asking George when our invitation was
coming.” 16
Within the first two weeks after reports of the coronavirus emerged, Dr. Redfield asked
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Alex Azar to call his own Chinese
counterpart to request that CDC be granted access to China to obtain information on the unknown
pathogen and lend assistance. Dr. Redfield said that Secretary Azar made that call, and that he
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also “asked Secretary Azar and eventually directly asked President Trump to reach out the
President of China to request it.” 17 When asked whether he received reports back on either of the
phone calls, Dr. Redfield, responded, “No.” 18 Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he
was uncertain as to whether CDC’s requests to access China were denied or simply ignored. He
said:
I think Secretary Azar, and I don’t remember the specifics, … I know I felt that
there wasn't a response. And I know President Trump made the call, I wasn’t on it,
but there was no invitation. 19
Dr. Redfield said that, apart from his calls to Dr. Gao and outreach to the World Health
Organization (WHO), he did not make further attempts to obtain access to China.20
Although an incident management structure was formed on January 7, 2020 to execute
CDC’s preparedness plan, little information about the outbreak came from elsewhere in the federal
government. 21 Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he struggled to obtain updates on
the developing crisis: “I didn’t get any information coming to me from the intelligence
community. If anything, we may have given what information we had to the intelligence
community.” 22 Then-Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) Dr. Robert
Kadlec similarly recalled during his transcribed interview:
My information from our intelligence sources in HHS were, quite frankly, lousy.
… I was making requests, saying, ‘What does the IC [Intelligence Community]
know, tell me what can we glean on this.’ And in frank honesty, even if we were
in a SCIF, top secret thing, I wouldn’t tell you more than what was known by CDC
at that time. 23
Media reports indicate that, within the Trump White House, a National Security Council
(NSC) staff member began collecting information—largely from informal personal channels—and
convened an interagency meeting to assess the situation. 24 But the Trump Administration,
including the President himself, failed to follow up on Dr. Redfield’s requests or otherwise seek
critical information about the emerging pathogen. Instead, the President met with Xi Jinping on
January 15, 2020, to sign a $200 billion trade deal, easing a months-long trade war that had
followed the United States’ imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods. 25 On January 24, after the
second coronavirus case was confirmed in the United States, President Trump tweeted:
China has been working very hard to contain the Coronavirus. The United States
greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency. It will all work out well. In
particular, on behalf of the American People, I want to thank President Xi! 26
CDC officials told the Select Subcommittee that the lack of critical information and failure
to quickly mount a coordinated effort hampered the country’s ability to respond. Dr. Messonnier
described having “incomplete information about transmission patterns in China” in January 2020,
saying that she felt “frustrated that we didn’t understand everything that we wanted to understand
about the virus.” 27 According to public reporting in early 2020, CDC advisors said that a lack of
information about the coronavirus was curtailing efforts to quell the outbreak. 28
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On top of its failures to obtain critical information, the Trump Administration delayed
action. Despite reports of a state of emergency in Wuhan that drove Chinese officials to construct
new hospitals in a matter of days, 29 confirmed coronavirus cases outside of China on January 13
and 15, and the first confirmed case in the United States on January 20, 30 the Trump White House
did not establish its own Coronavirus Task Force until January 29. 31 Even with that structure in
place, Dr. Schuchat told the Select Subcommittee that early task force meetings remained “tactical
about the small issues rather than the big … tsunami that was coming.” She said:
[D]uring this relatively chaotic period there wasn’t strategic level guidance. . . . I
don’t think we had a strategic convening happening that allowed the highest priority
issues to get settled. I think there was pretty much—that was a problem, not just in
those first couple months, but probably in the first—maybe the first year. 32
This “chaotic period” manifested itself in a multitude of failures, including a failure to
strategically deploy resources, to obtain critical supplies, to develop necessary and functional
testing, to identify the fact that the virus was replicating itself through asymptomatic spread, and
to recognize the way in which the country’s largest global health crisis in a century would upend
American lives.
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PUBLIC HEALTH | ECONOMIC IMPACT & CORPORATE CONDUCT | RECOMMENDATIONS
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I. Heightened Susceptibility to Public Health Threats and the Trump
Administration’s Mismanagement of the Crisis Resulted in the United States
Having a Higher Coronavirus Mortality Rate Than the Majority of Its Peer
Countries
At least 1,077,000 Americans have died of the coronavirus—more than any other country
in the world. 33 The United States has a mortality rate of 328 deaths for every 100,000 residents,34
greater than all but five other members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, and all but 15 other countries worldwide. 35 By comparison, Germany has lost 191
of every 100,000 residents to the coronavirus, Australia has lost 64 residents out of every 100,000,
and Japan just 40. 36
These comparatively poor outcomes were in no small part attributable to the Trump
Administration’s mishandling of the crisis response in 2020, including its failure to recognize and
respond to the threat posed by the virus in early weeks, its political interference in the public health
response, and its pursuit of herd immunity via mass infection strategy that sought to amplify the
spread of the virus in the months before vaccines became available. The Trump Administration’s
rejection of proven public health measures enabled predatory actors who spread misinformation
and who continue to impede the nation’s response by sowing distrust in proven public health tools,
especially vaccines. However, the United States was ill-prepared for the pandemic even before
the virus was identified. Decades of health disparities—particularly in rural communities and
communities of color—underinvestment in public health, and barriers to access to health care—
on top of the Trump Administration’s failures—contributed to the tragic toll, which fell
disproportionately on vulnerable groups.
A. Long-term Underinvestment in Public Health Infrastructure and
Longstanding Health Disparities Put the Nation at Increased Risk from
the Coronavirus.
Fawn Sharp, President of the National Congress of American Indians, told Select
Subcommittee Members during a June 4, 2020, briefing:
Long before the pandemic hit this country, we were already in a crisis. [W]hat
we’ve found is that not only do we have an inability to protect ourselves during this
pandemic, but … every sector of the funding that we receive from the federal
government is chronically underfunded, whether that’s law enforcement, health
care, education. Every part of our public life is deeply impacted. 37
The United States entered the coronavirus crisis with an underfunded public health
infrastructure, impeding federal, state, and local governments’ ability to rapidly respond to the
virus. 38 Chronic underfunding of the country’s public health system jeopardized the country’s
ability to mount an effective response to infectious disease threats, combat chronic illnesses, and
promote overall good health. 39 Public health agencies were forced to use data systems that were
“antiquated and in dire need of security upgrades,” and were “blamed [by governors and other
elected officials] for unreliable data.” 40 As Dr. Redfield said in April 2020,“our nation failed over
decades to effectively invest in public health.” 41
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The nation also faced a shortage of health care workers. A 2016 study anticipated that, by
2020, the country would face a shortage of 150,000 registered nurses. 42 As the population ages,
so does the demand for nurses; however, not enough individuals are becoming nurses, while many
are leaving the profession. Over half of registered nurses are over 50, and 19% are over the age
of 65. As these nurses retire, they are not being replaced in sufficient capacity to meet demand
because of lack of space in nursing programs and faculty shortages. In 2019, nursing programs
rejected over 80,000 qualified applicants due to lack of capacity or resources. 43
Similarly, the country faced a pre-pandemic shortage of physicians that continues to
worsen. A 2021 survey found that 20% of physicians plan to leave their jobs within two years.
Another one-third plan to reduce their work hours within one year. 44 These physicians are not
being replaced, and the country is falling further behind in keeping up with demand from an aging
population. 45 As of May 2022, 37 states are predicted to have physician shortages as soon as 2025,
with rural areas having less availability of care than urban and suburban locations. 46
The coronavirus crisis exacerbated this problem: many health care facilities became short
staffed when health care workers became infected with the coronavirus themselves. 47 While
hospitals struggled to find capacity for patients in need, health care staff experienced “burnout,
exhaustion, and trauma.” 48 As Dr. Joseph Kanter, State Health Officer and Medical Director at
the Louisiana Department of Health testified during a September 2021 Select Subcommittee
hearing, “state and local health departments need help shoring up their workforces before they
buckle under the weight of a … long pandemic.” 49
This underinvestment and lack of capacity has been particularly dangerous for communities of
color, which have experienced systemic health care disparities that had long gone unaddressed.50
People in some racial and ethnic minority groups experience higher rates of poor health and disease
for a range of health conditions, including diabetes, hypertension, obesity, asthma, heart disease,
cancer, and preterm birth, when compared to their white counterparts. 51 The pre-pandemic life
expectancy of American Indians and Alaskan Natives was 5.5 years less than for Americans
overall. 52 People of color are more likely to have higher rates of underlying medical conditions,
have less access to healthy food and clean water, and more exposure to environmental pollutants.53
They may also delay seeking care due to health care discrimination and cost of care, and when
they do seek care, they have less access to quality clinics and hospitals. These systemic health
care and socioeconomic disparities leave communities of color vulnerable in normal times and at
heightened risk in any public health emergency. 54
B. Before the Coronavirus Crisis, the United States Had Not Sufficiently
Invested in Pandemic Preparedness, Despite Well-Known Risks.
1. The Strategic National Stockpile was drastically undersupplied and
inadequately equipped to respond to the coronavirus crisis.
Well before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, government officials had contemplated
a public health emergency requiring readiness and response on a national scale. Following the
first Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003, the H1N1 flu pandemic in 2009,
and the Ebola crisis of 2013, American public health leaders launched readiness programs and
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issued blunt warnings about the need to prepare for the next inevitable public health emergency.55
Nevertheless, lapses in pandemic planning across numerous prior administrations left the country’s
strategic reserves of medical equipment undersupplied and public health officials underprepared
for the coronavirus outbreak.
Beginning in 1999, the federal government established a stockpile of medical and
protective supplies at a network of sites across the country now known as the SNS. The SNS was
established to provide for the health security of the United States in the event of a bioterrorist
attack or other public health emergency. 56 It was designed to assemble large quantities of essential
medical supplies that could be deployed to states and communities during an emergency within
hours of a decision to do so. Since its inception, the SNS has responded to multiple large-scale
emergencies including floods, hurricanes, and influenza pandemics. 57 But in 2020, the stockpile
proved to be inadequate to supply the PPE and medical equipment needed to respond to the early
months of the coronavirus crisis. 58
The state of the SNS in 2020 can be attributed, in part, to a failure to replenish the stockpile
following past public health crises. By the late 2000s, the federal government had deployed
substantial supplies of protective and medical equipment to assist with numerous emergencies but
failed over time to replenish the SNS inventory. For instance, by 2009, the federal government
had distributed more than 85 million N95 respirators—nearly 80% of the stockpile’s supply at the
time—without continuously resupplying the SNS with those products. That trend continued under
the Trump Administration and, by 2020, the majority of the SNS’s N95 stockpile was depleted
and many of the remaining respirators had expired. The heavily depleted N95 respirator supply
proved inadequate for the demands of the coronavirus pandemic, remaining in short supply for
months and forcing health care practitioners to use expired products and reuse single-use
equipment multiple times. 59
The SNS was also not equipped with diagnostic equipment necessary to respond to the
novel coronavirus. Several senior officials from HHS explained to the Select Subcommittee that
both before and after the H1N1 influenza pandemic, federal pandemic planning was narrowly
focused on an outbreak of symptomatic influenza, in which tests and testing equipment would not
be necessary to evaluate whether individuals were infected with the disease. As a result, testing
supplies and equipment in the SNS—which became vital to controlling the spread of the
coronavirus due to the asymptomatic nature of its spread—were severely lacking at the time of the
coronavirus outbreak.
Dr. Kadlec, the ASPR at the onset of the coronavirus crisis, explained during a transcribed
interview with the Select Subcommittee that the federal government’s pandemic preparedness
efforts were “focused on pandemic influenza preparedness” and that those efforts were “devoted
to creating a strategy and implementation plan that were very detailed on the nature of the response
to influenza pandemic” and which did not require diagnostic testing. Dr. Kadlec described that
approach as, “a significant hallmark and a flaw, if you will, of the planning assumptions of our
historic influenza planning pandemic plan.” 60 Admiral Brett Giroir—who served as HHS
Assistant Secretary for Health at the onset of the coronavirus pandemic and was named the Trump
Administration’s “Testing Czar”—said that a longstanding focus on symptom-based pandemic
influenza was “the underlying issue.” He said: “[W]e planned for pandemic influenza, and testing
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just wasn’t that important for flu. . . . So testing had not been a major focus of any pandemic plan,
and that is the ultimate root.” He emphasized that this problem had been building for many years,
noting that if there had been “15 or 20 years of diagnostics preparation, there probably wouldn’t
have been a need for a ‘testing czar,’ but there wasn’t, and so we need[ed] to do it in real time.” 61
In 2018, HHS shifted control of the SNS from CDC to ASPR, which coincided with a shift
in prioritization of SNS spending away from medical countermeasures designed to respond to
infectious disease outbreaks and toward biological and chemical weapons defense. 62 According
to a recent analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in the years immediately
preceding the coronavirus pandemic, HHS expended the majority of its SNS budget—
approximately 75%, or $3.5 billion—on the purchase of medical countermeasures related to
anthrax and smallpox. During that period, HHS obligated only $33 million for ventilators and
made no obligations over $1 million for PPE, further exacerbating the shortages of supplies
integral to controlling the spread of the coronavirus. 63
These failures to replenish the SNS over time, plan for infectious disease outbreaks beyond
pandemic influenza, and inventory supplies to respond to a broad array of possible public health
emergencies left the SNS drastically undersupplied at the inception of the coronavirus outbreak.
In December 2019, the SNS contained only 16.9 million gloves, 12.6 million N95 respirators, 4.8
million gowns, 19,000 ventilators, and no nasal swabs, transport media, or pipette tips used for
diagnostic testing. 64 The lack of national inventory of PPE and medical supplies in the early
months of 2020 contributed to widespread and prolonged shortages of equipment needed to protect
health care workers and first responders from infection.
2. A 2019 pandemic simulation alerted Trump Administration officials
to preparedness challenges, yet these challenges remained
unremedied at the onset of the coronavirus crisis.
In 2019, HHS ran a series of interagency exercises involving officials from 12 states and
at least a dozen federal agencies dubbed Crimson Contagion with the goal of evaluating the federal
government’s readiness for a global influenza-like pandemic. According to Dr. Kadlec, who led
the exercise with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the simulation identified
numerous deficiencies in the federal government’s plans to respond to a real-life pandemic
scenario. Despite the government’s notice of these pandemic readiness deficiencies, many of the
warnings that came out of this simulation proved to be challenges that impeded the nation’s
response to the coronavirus crisis. 65
Dr. Kadlec told the Select Subcommittee during his transcribed interview that Crimson
Contagion identified “a lot of problems” including “lack of integration” across federal agencies in
charge of emergency preparedness and response. 66 According to public reporting, friction
emerged, for instance, between agencies within HHS, like ASPR and FEMA, which is traditionally
in charge of disaster response. The exercise also identified a lack of coordination between federal
agencies and state and local public health officials. 67
The simulation further identified shortages of medications, PPE, and ventilators, as well as
weaknesses in the United States’ capability to quickly manufacture essential medical equipment,
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supplies, and medicines. In December 2019, Dr. Kadlec briefed Congress on some of these
findings, including that the “U.S. lacks sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity and/or raw
materials for almost all pandemic influenza medical countermeasures, including vaccines and
therapeutics, the needles and syringes needed to administer them, and personal protective
equipment, including masks, needles, and syringes.” He continued, stating that “in a pandemic,
global manufacturing capacity will likely not be sufficient to meet demand, resulting in an inability
to import adequate quantities of medical countermeasures.” 68
During his transcribed interview, Dr. Kadlec elaborated on the point that Crimson
Contagion revealed that “everything that we probably would need in a pandemic, PPE—all PPE,
and other things, critical health care stuff, were sourced from China. And whether it emanated
from China or somewhere else, the likelihood would be the supply chains would be disrupted and
we just have just-in-time supplies.” He further highlighted that:
[W]hat we found is that the distributors didn’t have visibility into the hospitals. The
distributors had marginal visibility upstream to the manufacturers. If they didn’t
have—some like [C]ardinal [Health] has its own manufacturers, its own stuff, but
not everybody does. And nobody had really [sic] visibility into the raw materials
and precursors that would be needed from this, which we source largely from India
and China. 69
Notwithstanding the supply chain and manufacturing problems modeled by the Crimson
Contagion exercise, the national coronavirus response was plagued throughout 2020 by a lack of
domestic manufacturing capabilities and persistent shortages of PPE and medical supplies. 70
C. The Trump Administration’s Failed Stewardship Over the Pandemic
Response and Persistent Pattern of Political Interference Undermined
the Nation’s Ability to Respond to the Pandemic.
1. Trump Administration officials failed to adapt the government’s
pandemic response as public health experts’ understanding of the
virus evolved.
Government scientists’ and public health experts’ understanding of the coronavirus
evolved rapidly in late January and February 2020. While scientists and experts obtained emerging
information about the virus through deployments on the ground, clinical observations, and peer-
reviewed publications, the nation’s public health agencies were slow to tailor coronavirus response
strategies to reflect experts’ prevailing understanding of the virus.
a. The focus on symptomatic transmission of the coronavirus
hampered the country’s ability to control and mitigate its
spread.
On January 17, 2020, CDC and Customs and Border Protection instituted an enhanced
entry risk assessment and management program to screen air passengers arriving in the country
with the goal of reducing the importation and spread of the coronavirus. The process began at
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three airports in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York City, targeting passengers arriving
from Wuhan, China presenting with symptoms so that they could be separated and tested for the
coronavirus. 71 One CDC quarantine medical officer who served at one of those airports starting
in mid-January spoke with Select Subcommittee staff on the condition of anonymity. The officer
said that frontline CDC officials who were assigned to screen travelers as they deplaned were
instructed not to wear PPE, including masks, gloves, and face shields, so as not to alarm arriving
passengers. 72 At the same time, CDC personnel conducting tertiary screenings—evaluating
passengers in secondary areas who had been flagged by frontline workers as a potential risk—
were allowed, and even required, to use protective equipment. 73 According to the officer, on
February 2, CDC updated its policies and required frontline workers conducting the initial
screenings to wear surgical face masks but not face respirators. 74 The officer told Select
Subcommittee staff that CDC officials were concerned that if the public observed health officials
using full protective equipment it “might cause fear” and that they were “concerned how this might
appear politically.” 75 While the airport screening policy expanded over the next two months to
incorporate more airports and travelers arriving from additional countries, government efforts to
contain and mitigate the spread of the coronavirus failed to evolve in response to the growing
understanding that the virus could spread—and was spreading—asymptomatically. 76
As early as January 2020, public health experts reported that the coronavirus could spread
through contact with asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic carriers. On January 24, a study appeared
in the Lancet discussing a familial cluster of cases in China associated with the coronavirus, noting
that it is “crucial to isolate patients and trace and quarantine contacts as early as possible because
asymptomatic infection appears possible.” 77 During a press conference held by HHS on January
28, Dr. Redfield acknowledged that “[t]he Chinese have reported transmission in the asymptomatic
phase” but said “CDC has not been given the opportunity to review that data.” He said: “We’re
going to present the data that we have and we’re not necessarily going to reaffirm someone else’s
conclusion.” 78 During his transcribed interview, Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that,
at the time of that press conference, he believed that asymptomatic spread “was not the major way”
that the virus was spreading and, as a result, health officials “were still operating under the SARS-
MERS model” which projected spread based on symptomatic transmission. 79 On January 30,
scientists published a study in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) examining
asymptomatic transmission of the coronavirus to a German businessman and his coworkers. The
authors explained the implications of their findings, writing: “The fact that asymptomatic persons
are potential sources of 2019-nCoV infection may warrant a reassessment of transmission
dynamics of the current outbreak.” 80
In February 2020, additional studies showed that focusing on asymptomatic and pre-
symptomatic spread would be a critical factor in mitigating the impact of the pandemic. Authors
of a February 18, 2020, correspondence in NEJM wrote about asymptomatic infections in travelers
returning from Wuhan, stating:
In this effort to evacuate 126 people from Wuhan to Frankfurt, a symptom-based
screening process was ineffective in detecting SARS-CoV-2 infection in 2 persons
who later were found to have evidence of SARS-CoV-2 in a throat swab. We
discovered that shedding of potentially infectious virus may occur in persons who
have no fever and no signs or only minor signs of infection. 81
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A February 19 correspondence in NEJM that measured the viral load of SARS-CoV-2 in upper
respiratory specimens stated that: “The viral load that was detected in the asymptomatic patient
was similar to that in the symptomatic patients, which suggests the transmission potential of
asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic patients.” 82
As research was beginning to show that asymptomatic spread was occurring, it was
becoming apparent that symptom-based airport screening was insufficient to slow the spread of
the coronavirus. A study published on February 6, 2020, in a European infectious disease journal
found thermal screening of travelers at airports infected with the coronavirus to be an ineffective
means of detection, finding that an estimated 46% of infected travelers may not be detected by
screening at airport entry or exit. 83
As early as February 2020, CDC career scientists advised government officials that
asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic transmission was a driving factor of coronavirus spread,
warning that government policy to contain the virus based solely on symptomatic transmission
was insufficient. Dr. Daniel Wozniczka, a veteran of the Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public
Health Service and Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) submitted a whistleblower complaint to
the Select Subcommittee about his experience working on CDC’s pandemic response, including
his role working on tertiary screening at Honolulu International Airport. Dr. Wozniczka said that,
in late February, he “began to raise concerns that CDC policy was only accounting for symptomatic
spread of the virus,” telling his EIS supervisors in Hawaii that “this was not an appropriate or
rational response in light of the scientific research available at the time.” 84 According to Dr.
Wozniczka, throughout late February and March, many of his EIS colleagues raised similar
concerns during their deployments at other airport screening stations throughout the country,
warning: “In order to slow the spread of the virus, the CDC needed to lead public policy to address
the more important concern of asymptomatic/presymptomatic spread.” 85
On February 29, 2020, an EIS response team was deployed to Seattle, Washington to
respond to coronavirus outbreaks at various health care facilities. Dr. Wozniczka recounted that
within a week of the deployment, his EIS colleagues in Seattle reported internally that “the data
was clear: Many of the cases fueling the Seattle outbreak were the result of
asymptomatic/presymptomatic spread.” 86 Despite these warnings, CDC continued to expand
symptomatic airport screening procedures. Effective March 14, as Europe became a new epicenter
of coronavirus outbreaks, travelers from 26 countries in the European Schengen Area, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland were added to airport screening procedures, and the number of airports
conducting screenings expanded to 13. 87
According to Dr. Wozniczka, his EIS supervisor received the concerns expressed by Dr.
Wozniczka and his colleagues and did not express any contradictory beliefs regarding the
prevailing science. In fact, CDC updated its own internal guidance to reflect the new
understanding of asymptomatic spread. Dr. Wozniczka explained:
To protect its own staff, CDC was using the correct, science-based guidance before
they made it public. On March 9, 2020, the CDC issued internal guidance that staff
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returning from COVID deployments must quarantine for 14 days before returning
to the office, regardless of if they were presenting symptoms.88
Nevertheless, CDC’s external facing policies remained unchanged. Dr. Wozniczka said he “felt
trapped” because “[t]he data was telling them what it would take to slow the virus and protect the
public, but their agency—the global leader in health science—was not acting accordingly.” 89
On March 27, 2020, the Seattle EIS deployment team published a Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report (MMWR) detailing asymptomatic spread in Washington State—the first time CDC
independently demonstrated asymptomatic spread, approximately two months after the first
Lancet and NEJM publications and a month after Dr. Wozniczka and his colleagues first raised
the alarm about recognizing asymptomatic transmission. 90 In a call with Select Subcommittee
staff, Dr. Wozniczka said that CDC’s failure to recognize the prevailing science and acknowledge
asymptomatic spread earlier was “not only scientifically incorrect but cost billions of dollars and
tens of thousands of American lives.” 91 Ultimately, the resource-intensive screening program
yielded just nine positive test results, representing 0.001% of all travelers screened, or one case
per 85,000 travelers. 92
Other officials within CDC and at the White House shared the belief that syndromic border
screenings were misguided and contributed to community spread. Dr. Deborah Birx told the Select
Subcommittee during a transcribed interview that, when she began her position as White House
Coronavirus Response Coordinator on March 2, 2020, she was “concerned very much about
asymptomatic spread and the depth and breadth of asymptomatic spread” including concerns that
airport screening “was symptom-based and that people were relying on fever and symptoms both
for screening and for reporting later.” She believed that, as a result of symptomatic airport
screening, “50% or more of the cases were being missed that were responsible for community
transmission.” 93
Dr. Martin Cetron, Director of CDC’s Division of Global Management and Quarantine,
told the Select Subcommittee during a transcribed interview that he was frustrated by CDC’s focus
on symptomatic evaluation rather than mitigation strategies. According to Dr. Cetron, public
health officials’ reliance on airport screening came “at the expense of thinking about the level of
domestic mitigation that was going to be necessary” which “[w]as becoming very, very clear by
February.” Dr. Cetron told the Select Subcommittee that “[t]hings weren’t being taken seriously
enough” and “weren’t moving quickly enough,” and that he “just didn’t feel like there was enough
listening going on.” Dr. Cetron explained that the nation’s “overreliance on border measures
alone” detracted from ramping up other necessary preparedness measures like “testing, isolation,
quarantine, cohorting, mask use, all of that other stuff” which “could mitigate the impact,”
“alleviate the strain on health care systems,” and “save lives.” He concluded that expanding
containment and mitigation efforts in February “would have helped significantly alleviate a lot
of—a lot more suffering and death.” 94
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b. Trump Administration officials’ prioritization of repatriation
detracted from efforts to implement mitigation measures.
In the initial months of 2020, multiple agencies across the federal government, including
CDC and the Department of State, led efforts to repatriate Americans who were working and
traveling abroad. Beginning in January, the United States chartered flights to evacuate American
diplomats, consulate staffers, and private citizens from the coronavirus epicenter in Wuhan, China,
implementing health screening and quarantine measures for those passengers. 95 In February and
March, repatriation efforts expanded to include Americans traveling on cruise ships around the
world—efforts that required coordination and cooperation from numerous senior officials and
federal agencies. 96
One of those efforts included repatriation of Americans traveling on the Diamond Princess
cruise ship which had docked outside of Japan in mid-February due to a coronavirus outbreak
onboard the vessel. As was widely reported at the time, the decision regarding the proper method
of transporting Americans home, and how to best maintain infection control, was fraught due to
numerous positive test results obtained prior to the departure of the return flight. 97 Repatriation
efforts consumed the time of numerous senior officials from multiple agencies, including the
White House Coronavirus Task Force itself. 98
Dr. Schuchat told the Select Subcommittee during a transcribed interview that, while
important, the focus of public health leaders on repatriation in late February—when the
coronavirus was beginning to spread widely around the United States—instead of on initiating
mitigation measures detracted from the “bigger priority” of ensuring that the nation was adequately
prepared for the eventual spread of the virus. Dr. Schuchat said:
I don’t think I can convey how much technical, policy, and human resources were
focused on repatriation in February. As you can imagine, every location, cruise
ship, had a jurisdictional issue with multiple departments and state as well as federal
level authorities, and a good number of ASPR, CDC, and the leadership, HHS or
other departments, were focused on repatriation at a time when the virus was
spreading, and the issue of initiating mitigation and other measures in affected
communities in the U.S. I believe was a higher priority. 99
As a result of the government’s narrow focus on repatriation, Dr. Schuchat explained that
“there were key areas, like scaling up PPE and getting our arms around the supply chain and
protecting the health care system and so forth,” that “didn’t get sufficient attention because of the
leadership and policy time that was going into the repatriation mission.” She said, the “whole of
government . . . should have been focused on those bigger picture items”:
[W]e were trying to queue up the planning for community mitigation for—you
know, in our efforts to delay the spread, we were trying to queue up the health care
preparedness in terms of PPE and reusables, and what was the strategy to get
enough where we knew we didn’t have enough supply. That couldn’t get onto the
agenda because most of the conversations were, how are we going to deal with this
batch of cruise ship people. 100
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Dr. Schuchat expressed that officials’ disproportionate focus on repatriation was “another sign of
how underprepared we were, you know, frontline public health organizations and on certainly the
policy level.” As a result of “the focus on the repatriation challenges and the cruise ship issues,”
“we didn’t have the right policy governance to get the key issues escalated and decisions made.”101
2. A lack of coordination between public health agencies contributed
to the nation’s impaired coronavirus response efforts.
a. CDC failed to develop and deploy an accurate test for the
coronavirus in the earliest weeks of the pandemic.
As reported cases of the coronavirus began to grow throughout January 2020, the need for
countries to develop an accurate test for the virus became increasingly apparent. 102 On January
11, the genetic sequence of the coronavirus was posted online by Chinese researchers and shared
directly with WHO. 103 Two days later, the WHO publicly released a protocol for designing a test
for the coronavirus. 104 The United States elected to forgo using that protocol and instead
developed its own test at CDC. However, initial tests experienced well-documented validation
issues that hampered the country’s early testing capabilities and materially impaired the federal
government’s ability to track and mitigate the spread of the virus in the earliest weeks of the
pandemic. 105
The Select Subcommittee obtained an October 2020 Root-Cause Analysis (RCA)
conducted by CDC’s Office of Laboratory Science and Safety, which examined the factors
contributing to CDC’s failure to detect the performance problems with the initial tests. This
document confirms earlier reporting detailing the findings of the analysis and that CDC formally
requested an emergency use authorization (EUA) for its test from FDA on February 3, 2020.106
FDA granted the EUA the following day, clearing its use in any CDC-qualified public health lab
in the country. 107 On February 6, as public health labs began receiving the test kits, CDC’s
Respiratory Viruses Branch made two important discoveries: First, the quality control testing
previously performed on the kits did not follow the EUA procedure. Second, after the correct
quality control procedure was performed on three kits, one of the kit’s controls, called the “No
Template Control,” was positive with the “N3 molecular target,” which should have been
negative—indicating that there could be a 33% kit failure rate. 108 In a transcribed interview with
the Select Subcommittee, Rear Admiral Michael Iademarco, Director of CDC’s Center for
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Services, said that a 33% kit failure rate constituted
a “significant” performance issue. 109
Despite these discoveries, CDC did not halt delivery of its test kits or issue a performance
alert to public health labs that received its kits. 110 On February 8, 2020, labs began reporting test
kit verification failures. 111 Over the next several days, more labs reported problems with the N3
component of the test, causing many to forgo coronavirus testing until CDC remediated the
issue. 112 In a newly released February 15 email, Jeff Shuren, Director of FDA’s Center for Devices
and Radiological Health, told FDA Commissioner Dr. Stephen Hahn and other FDA leadership
that approximately 26 public health labs had reported false positive results and informed them that
there were “two new issues regarding the CDC’s test.” Dr. Shuren explained that some labs were
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now reporting potential false positives with the N1 component of the test, indicating that there
were possible design issues beyond the N3 component. He also told FDA leadership that it was
“particularly concerning” to learn that the test CDC validated for purposes of the EUA “used a
different lot of components than the test that was manufactured for public health labs, i.e., they
were made by two different entities (and they clearly perform differently)”—a finding that is
consistent with one of the RCA’s conclusions. According to Dr. Shuren, CDC “shouldn’t have
done that” and, after they did so, “should have told us [FDA] at the outset.” 113
Ten days later, Dr. Shuren informed FDA Chief of Staff Keagan Lenihan that “CDC hasn’t
settled on what they want to do with their test (e.g., use test using N1 and N2 or also use N3).” Dr.
Shuren said that his team “can’t get a straight answer” from CDC on how to proceed. 114 During
his transcribed interview with the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Hahn acknowledged that FDA was
frustrated with CDC at this time over CDC’s approach for remediating the issues with the test
kits. 115 With progress on testing stalled for weeks, FDA advised that public health labs could use
CDC’s test kit without the problematic N3 component. On February 28, 2020, Dr. Messonnier
announced that labs “can start testing” using “revised instructions” from CDC that excluded
reliance on the N3 component. 116 By the end of February, the United States had conducted fewer
than 500 tests. By comparison, South Korea—which made significant investments in commercial
development of diagnostic tests following lessons learned from the Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome (MERS) outbreak in 2015—had tested at least 65,000 people. 117
CDC’s internal RCA ultimately identified “process failures, a lack of appropriate
recognized laboratory quality standards, and organizational problems related to the support and
management of a laboratory supporting an outbreak response” as root causes of the test kit
failure. 118 It concluded that “CDC’s failure to detect the EUA Test Kit verification problem prior
to distribution is a quality process failure of incalculable cost.” 119 A CDC analysis published on
December 15, 2021, determined that the test kits were impacted by both a design flaw and
contamination issues. 120 In his transcribed interview with the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Redfield
acknowledged the early challenges with the test kits and disclaimed responsibility for the design
flaw, stating: “had I been involved in those decisions at the time, I would have recommended a
contract manufacturing company manufacture those” primer components instead of having CDC
produce the components in house. 121
Multiple experts have cited the extended delay between the release of the genetic sequence
of the coronavirus on January 11, 2020, and the deployment of a reliable test in the United States
as a critical factor that allowed the virus to spread throughout the country largely unchecked in the
earliest weeks of the pandemic. It has also been recognized as a misstep that contributed to public
distrust in CDC. 122 Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that it was “a personal
disappointment to me that CDC wasn’t patted on the back for developing a test rapidly and
deploying it.” 123
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b. The federal government did not promptly engage diagnostic
test manufacturers or adequately incentivize test
development early in the pandemic.
Multiple senior officials told the Select Subcommittee that the early response effort was
impaired by the federal government’s failure to fully engage diagnostic test manufacturing
companies or incentivize the rapid development of tests at the outset of the coronavirus outbreak.
According to Dr. Hahn, FDA wanted to conduct formal outreach to diagnostic manufacturing
companies to encourage them to develop and seek authorization of coronavirus tests as early as
late January 2020 but was advised “that HHS was not in favor of it” at that time, citing potential
ethical and legal concerns. Instead, FDA eventually began proactively communicating with
industry regarding test development around mid-to-late February 2020, after Secretary Azar told
Dr. Hahn in a meeting that FDA was allowed to “go ahead” with such outreach. 124
Echoing Dr. Hahn’s statements, Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that the first
time that he was part of “a serious discussion” about the federal government working with
commercial diagnostic companies to scale up testing was after the Vice President took over the
White House Coronavirus Task Force in late February 2020. According to Dr. Redfield, this
conversation occurred during a meeting at the White House where large diagnostic companies
were finally urged by the Administration “to get engaged in this.” 125 Dr. Birx likewise confirmed
that no one in the federal government had contacted some of the largest diagnostic companies
operating in the United States to coordinate on testing until after she arrived at the White House
on March 2, 2020. 126
Reflecting on this timeline, Dr. Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he believes
“there was a missed opportunity” in January 2020 for the federal government to “stimulate” private
sector development of coronavirus tests by incentivizing production with funding from the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Agency (BARDA) and working in partnership
with FDA “to accelerate tests for commercial use.” 127 Dr. Redfield explained that he believed
industry was initially reluctant to invest in the development of coronavirus tests after their
experience with outbreaks of MERS and SARS, “where they converted all this money and
developed these tests and there was no market for them.” As a result, Dr. Redfield said the private
sector initially operated under the assumption that the coronavirus “was going to be another SARS
and MERS” and “was not going to go anywhere.” He acknowledged that this thinking contributed
to “a severe shortage” of tests during the early months of the pandemic. 128 Additionally, according
to Dr. Hahn, as CDC was struggling to develop a reliable coronavirus test, there was a
misconception among some public health laboratories that FDA had “chose to work solely with
CDC” on developing a coronavirus test and had advised outside labs to stop developing other tests.
Dr. Hahn told the Select Subcommittee that these perceptions were not true and reflected “a
fundamental misunderstanding of what the agency does,” while contributing to delays in scaling
up production of diagnostic tests in the United States. 129
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c. HHS revoked FDA’s authority to conduct premarket reviews
of lab-developed tests.
Amid CDC’s stalled efforts to develop and distribute a reliable coronavirus test during the
earliest weeks of the pandemic, some clinical laboratories expressed frustration about what they
perceived as the lack of speed in FDA’s authorization of lab-developed tests (LDTs) for the
coronavirus. 130 Historically, FDA often waived premarket requirements for LDTs via agency
enforcement discretion, allowing most of these tests to be used without premarket review or other
formal agency clearance. 131 During the coronavirus public health emergency, however, FDA
required diagnostic test developers to seek premarket review of their coronavirus tests, so the
agency could validate the accuracy and reliability of the tests before they were put to use.132
According to Dr. Hahn, FDA’s goal for these requirements was to ensure potentially inaccurate
coronavirus tests would not reach the market and drive incorrect public health decisions. 133 Dr.
Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that he “had a number of calls” with Dr. Hahn around this
time in which he argued that FDA “needs to grant regulatory discretion” so that LDTs could be
deployed for the coronavirus prior to FDA completing its premarket review. 134
FDA ultimately issued an enforcement policy on February 29, 2020, under which certain
labs were permitted to market coronavirus LDTs prior to receiving FDA authorization once the
developer validated the test and notified FDA of its intention to start testing patient samples. As
part of this policy, FDA said that it expected labs to submit an EUA request within 15 business
days from the date they began using the test. 135 According to an FDA document obtained by the
Select Subcommittee summarizing the agency’s role in early diagnostic test development, this
policy “put these labs on the honor system, and prioritized early access.” 136 Dr. Hahn told the
Select Subcommittee that, in hindsight, “it would have been ideal” had FDA made this policy
change sooner because potentially “really good tests would have been put on the market” earlier,
which “would have expedited testing.” 137
In the spring of 2020, HHS undertook a legal review of FDA’s authority to regulate LDTs.
This review culminated in a June 22 memorandum from HHS’s General Counsel concluding that
the legal authority relied on by FDA to regulate LDTs had “several weaknesses” that made its
policy vulnerable to a legal challenge. The memorandum also noted that “some stakeholders,
including many state university laboratories, have complained that this policy hindered their ability
to develop and use LDTs to detect the virus that causes COVID-19.” 138
Dr. Hahn told the Select Subcommittee that HHS officials raised the prospect of revoking
FDA’s premarket review authority over LDTs in early July 2020. 139 Specifically, Dr. Hahn said
that HHS Chief of Staff Brian Harrison expressed concerns that FDA “was stifling innovation and
making it more difficult for LDTs to be commercially available.” 140 Dr. Hahn said that he
disagreed with these concerns, and that HHS and FDA initially brokered a compromise in which
FDA would continue regulating LDTs during the coronavirus public health emergency, but would
support revisiting the broader issue of FDA’s legal authority over LDTs at a legislative and policy
level once the emergency ended. 141 Consistent with these statements, in a newly released August
21, 2020, email to Dr. Hahn under the subject “LDT Next Steps,” Stacy Amin, FDA’s Chief
Counsel, recounted that she sent a “draft compromise” to HHS’s General Counsel on July 6 and
spoke with him that same day, after which he told Ms. Amin that “[h]e agreed with the compromise
and asked me to brief it to WHCO [White House Counsel’s Office].” 142 However, according to
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Dr. Hahn, HHS subsequently “went back to the original proposal” and drafted a statement for FDA
stating that FDA “would no longer require mandatory reviews of LDTs” and that FDA “had
determined that they were illegal.” 143
Dr. Hahn told the Select Subcommittee that he and Secretary Azar had a “tense” telephone
conversation regarding these issues on August 6, 2020. 144 According to Dr. Hahn, Secretary Azar
wanted FDA to publicly announce that it no longer had jurisdiction over the premarket review of
LDTs. Dr. Hahn said that he refused, citing FDA’s longstanding position that the agency had the
requisite legal authority to regulate LDTs and concerns with allowing unvalidated coronavirus
tests onto the market. 145 Dr. Hahn said that Secretary Azar “raised his voice” and was “very vocal
and demonstrative” during the call.” 146
On August 19, 2020, HHS unilaterally issued a one-paragraph announcement stating that
FDA may not require premarket review of any LDTs—including coronavirus LDTs—absent a
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. 147 The announcement was posted on HHS’s website,
not FDA’s, and indicated that it was created by HHS’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs, led at the time by Michael Caputo—a close political ally of President Trump who, as
previously reported, bullied and threatened career CDC officials who contradicted Trump
Administration messaging on the coronavirus. 148 According to a newly released email from Ms.
Amin, HHS also instructed FDA’s Chief Counsel not to be involved in the matter moving forward,
after Ms. Amin “voic[ed] disagreement over the web statement.” 149 Dr. Hahn said he raised
objections to HHS’s unilateral action with White House Domestic Policy Council Director Joe
Grogan and Dr. Birx, but to no avail. 150 According to press reports, Secretary Azar decided to
revoke FDA’s premarket review authority over LDTs—despite strong objections from FDA
leadership—as part of an effort to deflect responsibility for the federal government’s inability to
scale up testing capacity more rapidly during the earliest months of the pandemic. 151
On November 15, 2021, HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra announced that HHS was
withdrawing the Trump Administration’s policy limiting FDA’s ability to require premarket
review for LDTs, explaining that in doing so, “HHS is helping to ensure that COVID-19 tests work
as intended.” 152
3. The Trump Administration failed to implement a successful strategy to
manage the supply chain and acquire sufficient PPE in the critical early
months of the coronavirus crisis.
a. The Trump Administration ignored early calls to mobilize supply
chains and domestic manufacturing.
Documents and information obtained by the Select Subcommittee demonstrate that
numerous individuals, including those appointed by President Trump, were aware of the need to
shore up the manufacturing and procurement of PPE and other medical supplies in the early months
of the coronavirus crisis. As early as January 2020, there were multiple warnings about the
potential impact of the coronavirus and the need to implement a national strategy to alleviate
shortages of critical supplies. Despite these warnings, the Trump Administration was slow to
mobilize the supply chain and scale up testing capabilities, putting the nation at a severe
disadvantage in its ability to control the spread of the coronavirus.
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By January 30, 2020, reports publicly warned that the United States would quickly run out
of protective equipment like masks in the event of a full-blown pandemic—which it also lacked
the capacity to produce at scale. 153 On February 7, WHO warned of a potential “chronic shortage
of personal protective equipment.” 154 Reports throughout February continued to warn about the
need to increase domestic production of medical supplies. 155
A memorandum released by the Committee on Oversight and Reform in July 2020 detailed
how industry leaders reached out to Trump Administration officials in early 2020 regarding the
need to ramp up manufacturing of critical medical supplies in response to the coronavirus.
Representatives from the Health Industry Distributors Association (HIDA), an industry group
representing medical distribution companies that acted as a conduit between members of the health
care distribution industry and the Trump Administration, told Oversight Committee staff that the
organization facilitated calls with federal agencies as early as January 30, 2020. During those
calls, HIDA member companies raised concerns about supply chain issues resulting from the
coronavirus. For example, one company—Owens & Minor—stated that as early as February 2020,
its internal projections showed that the demand for PPE would outpace available supply sources,
even assuming PPE usage at the relatively conservative rate associated with the seasonal flu. Calls
coordinated by HIDA continued throughout February and March and included representatives
from ASPR, CDC, HHS, FEMA, NSC, and the SNS. HIDA representatives stated that, although
“folks in the industry saw that things were getting worse, and their requests for guidance w[ere]
increasing week by week,” “guidance wasn’t coming” from the Trump Administration regarding
how to project or prepare for the increasing demands for PPE and medical supplies. 156
Even officials within the White House warned about the potentially devasting impacts of
the coronavirus and the need to increase supplies of PPE and other medical equipment vital to
protecting American lives. In both January and February 2020, internal White House memoranda
warned about the possible harms of coronavirus spread, including that infection could put millions
of Americans at risk of illness or death and described expected needs for PPE over the next four-
to-six month period.157 Documents and information previously released by the Select
Subcommittee in March 2021 revealed that at least one senior White House advisor, Director of
the White House Office of Manufacturing and Trade Policy, Peter Navarro, warned of the expected
need for PPE and advised the Trump Administration to strengthen domestic supply chains in early
2020. 158
Although the Trump Administration was advised by numerous parties and stakeholders
early in 2020 of the significant risk posed by the coronavirus, it failed to heed advice about how
to adequately prepare for the imminent emergency. Instead, President Trump downplayed the
seriousness of the looming crisis, and his Administration failed to develop and execute an effective
strategy to combat the pandemic. 159 This led to competing and chaotic efforts to acquire
supplies—both inside and outside the Trump White House—with inadequate results.
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b. President Trump delegated management of the supply chain
to senior White House Advisor Jared Kushner, who relied on
a team of inexperienced volunteers and consultants.
On March 29, 2020, President Trump announced the creation of a White House supply-
chain task force that would be led by White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner with the goal of
augmenting the domestic supply and availability of PPE and medical supplies. 160 Instead of using
experienced federal procurement officials, the task force was staffed, in part, by a team of young
volunteers overwhelmingly drawn from venture capital and private equity firms, who sourced and
followed incoming leads for PPE. 161 One volunteer, Max Kennedy, who served on the task force
and provided information about that experience to the Select Subcommittee, explained: “None of
the volunteers working on the sourcing team had any significant experience in procurement or
distribution. Every volunteer on the sourcing team came from a finance background and was under
28.” 162 Jessica Stone, a partner at Boston Consulting Group (BCG) who worked on efforts related
to the supply chain task force, affirmed the presence of these volunteers, saying during a
transcribed interview that “they came from like private equity or places in New York, companies
in New York” and they “were vetting leads on PPE.” 163
In addition to these volunteers, the task force was comprised of contractors from
management consulting firms, including BCG and McKinsey & Company (McKinsey) which
worked on the task force in a consulting capacity. During a transcribed interview, Daniel
Moskovic, a partner in McKinsey’s health care practice, explained that his “main role [was] to
advise the government in analyzing data and providing information and recommendations to
inform the government’s decision-making” and conduct “research on best practices that health
systems were using to preserve PPE.” When asked about his prior experience before joining the
task force, Mr. Moskovic said that he “didn’t know anything about government contracting when
[he] started.” Mr. Moskovic characterized his work for the task force as being “quite unusual,”
saying “this type of work is atypical—or was atypical for me” because he had not previously
performed any consulting work for a government entity. 164 Sonya Hoo, a partner at BCG, told the
Select Subcommittee that BCG’s work involved “getting a sense of where PPE was manufactured
and where it was likely to be coming from into the U.S., and sort of how, you know, the physical
goods would be distributed within the U.S.” 165 Prior to their work for the task force, neither Ms.
Hoo nor Ms. Stone had experience in federal procurement or distribution. 166 Nevertheless, Ms.
Hoo, Ms. Stone, and Mr. Moskovic all told the Select Subcommittee that no training was provided
to them by FEMA or the federal government prior to or during their work. 167
According to Mr. Kennedy, the task force struggled to keep up with the voluminous
number of incoming leads regarding possible PPE suppliers. Mr. Kennedy explained: “Our team
was relatively small compared to the number of leads. There were hundreds if not thousands of
leads, and only about 10 volunteers. This overloading made it more difficult to be responsive to
every lead, slowing down response times and causing confusion.” 168 Furthermore, volunteers were
told to prioritize tips from “VIPs” including political allies, associates of President Trump, and
Republican Members of Congress. At the same time, other leads provided by medical
professionals with longtime manufacturing contacts, but no political connections, were passed over
or ignored. For instance, Mr. Kennedy described how he was told to prioritize leads from Avi
Berkowitz, Mr. Kushner’s Chief of Staff, Charlie Kirk, Jeanine Pirro, a Fox News Channel host,
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Tana Goertz, creator of the “Women for Trump” coalition, and Albert Hazzouri, a friend of
President Trump. 169 Mr. Kennedy said the work of the task force was further impeded as
volunteers were instructed to use personal email accounts when sourcing leads, causing confusion
among distributors and manufacturers. 170
Ultimately, the task force’s efforts do not appear to have resulted in a meaningful increase
in procurement of PPE or medical supplies. According to public reporting, federal officials with
years of experience devising emergency plans said that it was difficult to identify specific contracts
that the task force had successfully sourced. Multiple FEMA officials familiar with these efforts
said they were largely ineffective in securing life-saving equipment for the government and led to
missed opportunities to procure PPE from legitimate sources. 171 Mr. Kennedy similarly said:
I was not aware of FEMA directly procuring any PPE while I was there. I know
the government did procure some PPE for the national stockpile, but most of it was
due in late 2020 or 2021. Numerous leads were sent to procurement, but they did
not move forward as far as I know. 172
The McKinsey and BCG contractors who spoke with the Select Subcommittee did not
contradict this account, saying they had no visibility into the amount of PPE ultimately sourced by
the task force. When asked what the results were of his efforts on the task force, Mr. Moskovic
said, “I don’t know, and I didn’t have visibility into anything—into anything going on outside of
the purview of folks who [we] were interacting with and topics we were directly engaging with.”
Despite his work with the task force, Mr. Moskovic did not have a sense of the amount of PPE, if
any, that was procured, saying, “I couldn’t tell you if it was zero to any, I have no idea.” 173 Ms.
Stone confirmed that, while she understood the purpose of the task force was “to bring in as much
PPE as possible,” she “can’t speak to the overall success or not” of the task force. 174
Mr. Kennedy attributed FEMA’s failure to procure PPE to the fact that “[n]o one on the
sourcing team had any procurement experience, which likely slowed down the process.” Mr.
Kennedy called the task force’s procurement efforts a “hugely inefficient operation,” saying the
process was “highly iterative and confusing, with many missteps and frequently duplicated
work.” 175 Mr. Moskovic echoed that sentiment, saying that the efforts “lacked some organization”
as there were “competing efforts that ran parallel to one another.” Mr. Moskovic expressed: “I
think there was inefficiencies, absolutely.” He elaborated, saying:
There was a lot of effort focused on purchasing. And to the discussion we had
earlier, that was—that was time that was spent trying to take whatever supply was
in the system and corral it. When, as we discussed, the real fundamental solutions
were supply expansion, either by making more stuff or reusing stuff and demand
mitigation. So, you know, if you asked me my opinion on it … I don’t know if
those efforts saw success. 176
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c. Project Airbridge wasted taxpayer money and had a
negligible impact on supplies distributed in the early months
of the pandemic.
At the end of March 2020, rather than procuring PPE directly, the Trump Administration
established “Project Airbridge,” which allocated taxpayer funds to provide free transportation for
PPE procured by private sector companies. 177
The short-lived program was unfocused and shrouded in secrecy. 178 The Trump
Administration declined to make any substantive decisions about which recipients would receive
the PPE brought in by Project Airbridge or the amounts they could be charged—for upwards of
50% of the PPE imported at taxpayer expense, private companies had full discretion regarding
where to sell it, to whom, and at what price. The only guidance for pricing was that PPE should
be sold “at a reasonable price (i.e., the price that a prudent and competent buyer would be willing
to pay given available data on market conditions).” 179 Mr. Kennedy confirmed that “[f]or goods
that were shipped by the air bridge, 50% of the materials had to be distributed to hot spots” but he
“was not aware of any pricing controls.” 180 Where the supplies that were ultimately delivered by
Project Airbridge were distributed remains largely unknown. 181
Notwithstanding the Administration’s ambitious claims about the success of Project
Airbridge, it had a negligible effect on the nation’s capacity to respond to the pandemic. 182 While
the Trump Administration widely touted the project’s role in distribution efforts, the project
imported a relatively small number of supplies that were ultimately distributed around the country.
On June 16, 2020, Vice President Pence stated: “Our administration launched a partnership with
private industry that, as of June 12, had delivered more than 143 million N95 masks, 598 million
surgical and procedural masks, 20 million eye and face shields, 265 million gowns and coveralls,
and 14 billion gloves.” In reality, only about 7% of that PPE came through Project Airbridge. 183
When asked about his thoughts regarding the success of the project, Dr. Kadlec expressed that
Project Airbridge would have been more effective “if we could have gotten more product. The
problem was not flying it over. We had the means between the military and FedEx and UPS to do
that.” 184
d. Former White House Director of Trade and Manufacturing
Policy Peter Navarro circumvented proper procurement
channels and sought contracts without adequate diligence or
competition.
Former White House Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Peter Navarro led his
own secretive supply acquisition efforts, without clear results. Rather than relying on experienced
federal procurement officials and public health experts, Mr. Navarro utilized unaccountable
outside advisors to negotiate multi-million-dollar contracts without adequate competition or due
diligence. In 2021, the Select Subcommittee released evidence showing how Mr. Navarro
pressured agency officials to award lucrative contracts to companies he preferred, instead of
pursuing traditional routes through experienced government contract officials, leading to two
contracts of questionable utility and a failed loan agreement. 185
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i. Contract with Phlow Corporation
In one case, Mr. Navarro pushed BARDA to award a multi-million-dollar no-bid contract
to manufacture pharmaceutical ingredients to Phlow Corporation—a first-time government
contractor that had been incorporated just months earlier, in January 2020. 186 The Select
Subcommittee obtained emails showing that on March 20, 2020, Mr. Navarro wrote to BARDA
Director Rick Bright and Dr. Kadlec, saying:
My head is going to explode if this contract does not get immediately approved.
This is a travesty. I need PHLOW noticed by Monday morning. This is being
screwed up. Let’s move this now. We need to flip the switch and they can’t move
until you do. FULL funding as we discussed. 187
A week later, on March 26, Mr. Navarro sent an email to Phlow’s CEO and officials at FEMA and
HHS, writing: “Phlow needs to be greenlit as soon as humanly possible. … Please move this
puppy in Trump time.” 188 Following Mr. Navarro’s efforts, BARDA awarded a four-year, $354
million contract to Phlow on May 18, 2020, to manufacture active pharmaceutical ingredients
(API) and generic drugs. The contract included options worth an additional $458 million, for a
total value of up to $812 million over 10 years—the largest contract ever awarded by BARDA at
the time. 189
ii. Contract with Airboss Defense Group
The Select Subcommittee also uncovered evidence that Mr. Navarro pushed a separate,
$96 million sole-source contract for powered respirators and filters from AirBoss Defense Group
(ADG), without any apparent due diligence or competition. On March 22, 2020, retired General
John “Jack” Keane—a paid consultant to ADG whom President Trump had recently awarded the
Presidential Medal of Freedom—sent an email to Mr. Navarro stating, “sent you a catalog of items
that ADG can provide, all needed for fight vs CV19. They can surge.” Mr. Navarro replied, “On
it.” 190 The next day, ADG submitted a $96 million proposal to the White House to supply powered
respirators. 191 Mr. Navarro responded that the company should “consider it done” and instructed
ADG to begin delivery, even though no contract had been executed. 192 An ADG executive later
sent an email describing a March 25 call, saying:
I received a call from Mr. Navarro and Dr. Hatfield [sic] telling me that ‘your
government appreciates what you can do, and now we need you to trust your
government and begin to execute.’ ‘We will get you on contract as quick as we
can. Everything you have requested is ok.’ 193
On March 31, FEMA executed the final contract as a sole-source award—even though multiple
manufacturers made those same products—agreeing to pay the full $96.4 million requested by
ADG. 194 This award contributed to a 327% increase in ADG’s net sales between April and June
2020 over the previous year and to a more than $12 million increase in gross profit for ADG’s
parent company for the same period. 195
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iii. Proposed Loan to Eastman Kodak Company
On August 4, 2020, the Select Subcommittee launched a joint investigation with the
Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on Oversight and Reform regarding a letter
of intent signed on July 28 between the Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) and the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) for a $765 million loan to manufacture
pharmaceutical ingredients. 196 The amount of the loan raised immediate questions due to the fact
that Kodak had no prior experience manufacturing pharmaceutical ingredients. 197 Further
questions were raised after it was reported that Kodak’s CEO had purchased Kodak shares and
been awarded 1.75 million stock options by the company’s board in the weeks before the loan was
announced. 198 Two days after the Select Subcommittee launched its joint investigation, the Trump
Administration placed the deal on hold, conceding that “allegations of wrongdoing raise serious
concerns.” 199
The Select Subcommittee investigated the circumstances that led to Kodak’s receipt of the
letter of intent from DFC, and identified evidence that Trump White House officials, led by Mr.
Navarro, had pushed Kodak to significantly increase the scope of the loan it sought to domestically
manufacture APIs. The Select Subcommittee found that, on March 20, 2020, Kodak wrote to the
White House to offer assistance with manufacturing hydroxychloroquine—a drug that had
received an EUA from FDA one day prior after President Trump touted it as a powerful
coronavirus treatment. 200 Kodak estimated that it would need $15.3 million to produce a chemical
used in hydroxychloroquine and sought a loan from the federal government to do so. Kodak
acknowledged in emails to HHS and FDA that it lacked the capacity to meet FDA’s requirements
for current good manufacturing practices (cGMP) and would “need a waiver from the FDA’s
cGMP requirements” to manufacture hydroxychloroquine. 201 Despite the company’s own
admission that it had no experience in pharmaceutical manufacturing, Mr. Navarro’s staff entered
into active discussions with Kodak executives about increasing the size of Kodak’s loan request.
A report by a Special Committee of Kodak’s Board of Directors indicates that Mr. Navarro’s office
encouraged Kodak to “think bigger” in seeking a loan substantial enough to develop capacity to
produce pharmaceutical ingredients. 202 Mr. Navarro’s office then introduced Kodak executives to
officials at DFC, who would ultimately be responsible for the proposed loan. 203 Mr. Navarro
praised the announcement of the loan on July 28, saying it posed “minimal risk to the taxpayer”
and had been executed with “the greatest of due diligence.” 204 The loan was put on hold less than
two weeks later and ultimately never issued.
e. The Trump Administration’s inability to alleviate supply
chain shortages created a heightened risk of waste, fraud,
and abuse of taxpayer resources as federal agencies rushed
to award contracts to unvetted suppliers like Federal
Government Experts.
Skyrocketing demand for PPE and other critical medical equipment caused global supply
shortages after the onset of the coronavirus crisis in early 2020. These shortages jeopardized the
health of frontline workers, patients, their families and caregivers, and the public. 205 Federal
agencies, states, and private parties were left to fend for themselves during the early months of the
pandemic. 206 This led to fierce competition on the open market for limited supplies—resulting in
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increased prices and a rush to award contracts to unvetted suppliers as quickly as possible. These
conditions created a heightened risk of waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer resources. 207
The Select Subcommittee released a report in June 2021 detailing its investigation into
federal contracts awarded to Federal Government Experts, LLC (FGE) by FEMA and the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for N95 masks in the early months of the coronavirus crisis.
208
This investigation found that FGE’s Chief Executive Officer and owner, Robert Stewart, Jr.,
fraudulently acquired $38.7 million in federal contracts by lying to FEMA and VA officials,
claiming that he was in possession of large quantities of N95 masks when, in reality, he had none
and no realistic plan to obtain any. Evidence obtained by the Select Subcommittee also revealed
that federal procurement officials failed to perform adequate due diligence prior to awarding these
contracts, despite clear red flags. 209
As detailed in the Select Subcommittee’s report, VA awarded FGE a $35.4 million contract
for six million N95 masks on April 10, 2020. Mr. Stewart was able to drive up the price VA would
pay per mask—a price that was more than three times the manufacturer’s price—by claiming
FEMA officials intended to purchase millions of masks. 210 After FGE failed to deliver the
promised masks, VA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) opened a criminal investigation into
Mr. Stewart with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Eastern District of Virginia, and DHS OIG. VA and FEMA ultimately terminated their contracts
with FGE on April 29, 2020, and May 26, 2020, respectively. 211
Additional evidence obtained by the Select Subcommittee reveals that a VA official
involved in the agency’s contract negotiations with Mr. Stewart forwarded several internal emails
to VA OIG prior to the award of the contract, saying that they were “[s]truggling with potential
price gouging.” On April 4, 2020, the official told the OIG:
We’ve had multiple fraudulent vendors I’ve caught and have disappeared as we
continue perform [sic] due diligence on these people. My concern is people at
individual VAMCs [VA Medical Centers] who are let careful [sic] are going to get
had. More and more people are asking for money up front as the market tightens.
I[’]d love to have a conversation. We got some solicitations that even appear to
have fraudulent masks. 212
VA OIG replied, stating: “This sounds like some of the exact type of cases our Investigative
Development Division is interested in.” Despite this apparent concern, VA awarded FGE a
multimillion-dollar contract. Soon after, VA officials “became less and less confident” in Mr.
Stewart and found “working with FGE post-award was very hard.” 213
Additional evidence shows that these officials warned a supply chain officer in VA’s
Rocky Mountain Network not to place an order with FGE on April 16, 2020, stating “there is about
a 0% probability that VA will receive any of the 6 million N95 masks” from the first contract. 214
ProPublica published findings from an investigation into Mr. Stewart’s inability to procure N95
masks on May 1, 2020, which reported that VA had canceled its contract with Mr. Stewart due to
his failure to perform. 215 Despite this, Mr. Stewart continued to seek federal contracts and sent
another email on May 3, 2020, offering to provide N95 masks. In an internal email, VA officials
remarked: “Didn’t we just terminate an order with them?” 216
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The Select Subcommittee revealed in 2021 that the Carl Vinson VA Medical Center in
Dublin, Georgia awarded Mr. Stewart a second contract on May 15, 2020, under which Mr.
Stewart promised to deliver 85,000 masks for $249,900. 217 Newly released evidence shows that
Mr. Stewart secured this second VA contract using the same fraudulent scheme he used to obtain
the FEMA contract and first VA contract––specifically, by falsely representing that he had
millions of N95 masks and was already supplying them to other federal agencies.
For example, on April 30, 2020, a VA procurement official at the Carl Vinson VA Medical
Center contacted FGE, stated: “I am in need of a bulk order of N95 Mask…please let me know
immediately if you can provide these items.” 218 Mr. Stewart quickly confirmed “we have 1860s
available” and that FGE could fulfill an order of 80,000 N95 masks for a total of $239,200 or $2.99
per mask. 219 Mr. Stewart’s quote mirrored the false information he provided to VA in April 2020
in order to secure the first contract, including that FGE could provide “pre-covid19 pricing”
through a “production line contract with 3M, Inc” and that “[t]ypically, these orders are delivered
with[in] 12-17 business days after award of contract.” 220 Internal emails released in 2021 show
that VA headquarters officials contacted 3M on April 29, 2020, confirming that FGE “was NOT
an authorized reseller of 3M products.” Agency officials acknowledged to each other privately:
“One lie after another with this company.” 221
Newly released documents show that Mr. Stewart also lied to VA officials by claiming that
FGE could provide disposable disinfectant wipes used in health care settings. Internal emails show
that Mr. Stewart told VA they were “on back order until mid month” but that he would have “up
to 800 tubs when they come in and there are 50 or so in each tub.” 222 As detailed in the Select
Subcommittee’s June 2021 report, Mr. Stewart never possessed any PPE and had no realistic plan
to obtain any. 223
On May 5, 2020, Mr. Stewart told VA that “the min order we can support is 100,000 units,”
offering to “combine this order with a larger order” in an attempt to entice the procurement official
into awarding the contract. 224 After failing to receive a response, Mr. Stewart followed up with
VA the next day:
Good Afternoon – I wanted to follow up on our last email exchange as I am placing
an order for GSA currently and wanted to see if you had determined if you still
needed N95 mask(s). As stated we place orders on production run basis – if Im
[sic] able to combine you order [sic] with the current GSA one I am placing I’ll be
able to expedite the shipping to you. 225
When asked by VA whether Mr. Stewart had “the capabilities to supply large quantities of the
1860s face masks,” Mr. Stewart doubled down on his lies by claiming: “Yes we currently are
supplying masks to several hospitals at 500k a week to three different locations. As well as Fema
for 1m every 15 days.” 226 Email communications show that Mr. Stewart then spoke with a
procurement official on the phone, who followed up via email stating: “Thanks again for speaking
with me a moment ago and confirming that you do have capabilities to provide the N95 1860s
facial mask.” 227
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A ProPublica reporter reached out to VA’s Press Secretary on May 12, 2020, inquiring
about “contractors the VA has hired to procure PPE who had no previous government contracts,”
specifically mentioning the cancellation of FGE’s first $34.5 million contract on April 29. 228
Deborah Kramer, the Acting Assistant Under Secretary for Health for Support, asked her
procurement and logistics staff at VA headquarters to pull the information needed to respond to
the reporter’s questions. Separately, the Carl Vinson VA Medical Center in Georgia awarded Mr.
Stewart the $249,900 contract on May 15, 2020. 229
After the contract was awarded, Mr. Stewart provided false and misleading updates to
officials—just as he did with his first VA contract and the FEMA contract. For example, on May
27, 2020, Mr. Stewart emailed officials at the Carl Vinson VA Medical Center stating:
Good morning – I wanted to let you know I should have shipping information on
this order within the next few days. After the president invoked the Defense
Production Act (DPA Title III) 3M has requested that all companies have a DPAS
number in order to verify they are registered in SAM and with the Department of
Commerce to receive these goods and deliver them to federal agencies. This is a
new requirement and I am unsure the time frame on it however, our 3M distributor
advised it is required due to the fraud surrounding PPE. … I will advise once I hear
back from Department of Commerce – we may need a letter or a call from you
verifying this is for the VA – I sent them the letter but It [sic] may need further
information. 230
The Select Subcommittee’s investigation previously found that DHS OIG interviewed 3M officials
five days prior, and that those officials confirmed that FGE was not an “authorized channel
[partner] of 3M in the United States” and would not have “access to any respirator products directly
from 3M.” Mr. Stewart had tried to contact 3M earlier in the month by reaching out to the
company’s Chief Executive Officer via email and LinkedIn. 231
Mr. Stewart continued to make false statements to VA officials to cover up his inability to
deliver PPE, including on June 1, 2020, when he wrote to a contracting officer: “In the event we
are not able to secure the DPAS number this week—we will have to terminate the PO as we wont
[sic] be able to make the delivery time.” 232 One procurement official seemed concerned about this
response, asking for a recommendation based on Mr. Stewart’s email. The next day, another
contract officer seemingly dismissed the concern, stating:
There’s a problem with these Masks worldwide, most all the vendors are having
Problem [sic] getting these mask [sic] at a certain time frame do [sic] to 3M. 3M
no [sic] that there is a lot of vendors getting these mask [sic] and increasing the
prices, These Masks if the [sic] were bought from 3M is probably 10.45 a box. 233
On June 4, 2020, Mr. Stewart blamed his delay on FEMA and the Department of
Commerce for not approving his DPAS application. In response, VA officials discussed
terminating FGE’s contract, stating:
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We can cancel this order, which we will not be able to get the N95 masks, because
this is problem [sic] globally, GSA doesn’t have them. …To put it, [sic] there’s no
N95 Mask, even if these vendors say they have them…it’s probably not true. 234
On June 5, the VA procurement official who initially reached out to FGE on April 30 sent an
internal email with a subject line of “Heads Up!,” stating: “Please do not certify the invoice for a
bulk order for N95 masks unless the masks are delivered.” 235
VA officials found themselves in a desperate situation as they tried to find alternatives to
FGE. On June 9, 2020, an official from the Carl Vinson VA Medical Center stated they were “in
a crunch” for N95 masks. Another official responded:
I hate to say this but everyone is in a crunch for these particular Mask’s [sic]. I
spoke to some of my Contracting Counterparts across the Nation [sic] Most are
ordering the KN95 Masks. As you can see from the vendor you forward [sic] me
yesterday. They are selling these 3M N95 Masks at a higher rate. …are we willing
to Pay $8.50 dollars for one Mask, if these were in Stock at GSA, these mask’s [sic]
sell for 0.89 cent each. This is a call that you will have to address with your
leadership, what are they willing to pay and what are they willing to accept? 236
On June 15, 2020, after many follow-up communications regarding delivery time, Mr.
Stewart told VA that FGE had not received any updates from FEMA or the Department of
Commerce and was therefore unable “to fulfil [sic] the order as 3M will not release product to us
to fulfil the order.” VA terminated the contract for convenience the following day. 237
Mr. Stewart pleaded guilty to making false statements to VA and FEMA, and to wire fraud
and theft of government funds, on February 3, 2021, and was sentenced to 21 months in prison
and three years of supervised release by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
on June 16, 2021. 238 He was released on July 22, 2022.
Although no taxpayer dollars were ultimately paid to Mr. Stewart under these contracts,
officials admitted that working with Mr. Stewart was “a waste of time for the government” and
cost the agency labor hours. The risk of waste could have been reduced or prevented through
adequate preparation and planning. Instead, however, the Trump Administration refused to
implement a coordinated national strategy to alleviate PPE shortages during the pandemic and left
federal agencies and states unprepared and unable to protect vulnerable populations from the risk
of the virus. As a result, federal agencies had to pay “a premium for the supply” and rush to award
multimillion-dollar contracts “as quickly as possible,” including to an unvetted supplier that they
had concerns about. 239
As VA OIG has recognized, “the need for expedited contracts for medical supplies and
other life-saving resources”—coupled with “the challenges of monitoring billions of dollars in
pandemic-related emergency spending” and “the ingenuity and speed exhibited by bad actors”—
created “a trifecta of high-risk conditions” that increased the risk of waste, fraud, and abuse during
the pandemic. 240 Like Mr. Stewart, many bad actors tried to take advantage of the pandemic by
seeking large supply contracts that they knowingly could not fulfill. 241 One high-level VA
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contracting officer who approved the termination of Mr. Stewart’s first contract told the FBI in
June 2020 that he was personally involved in “about 15 investigations” related to potentially
fraudulent contracts awarded during the pandemic, noting: “The level of foolishness during
COVID-19 had become pure ridiculousness.” 242
4. Trump Administration officials waged an unprecedented campaign
to control CDC and politicize public health during the coronavirus
crisis.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations found that the Trump Administration
compromised CDC’s scientific integrity during the coronavirus crisis in an attempt to serve the
former President’s political goals. The Select Subcommittee detailed in an October 2022 staff
report how Trump Administration officials usurped control of CDC communications and blocked
public health officials from providing accurate information about the coronavirus to the American
people; installed political operatives who sought to downplay the seriousness of the pandemic and
retaliated against career officials who contradicted Trump Administration talking points; overruled
scientists to weaken multiple CDC guidance documents and to exploit and counteract CDC’s
public health authorities to achieve political goals; and attempted to manipulate the content and
block the publication of CDC’s scientific reports and destroy evidence of that interference. 243
a. The Trump White House blocked CDC from conveying
accurate information to the public and installed political
operatives who sought to downplay the pandemic and attack
CDC scientists who told the truth about the coronavirus.
After a February 25, 2020, CDC telebriefing “angered” President Trump, the White House
wrested control of coronavirus communications away from CDC and ordered that all media
requests related to the pandemic be approved by the Office of the Vice President prior to release.
Thereafter, Trump Administration officials blocked CDC from conducting telebriefings on critical,
emerging public health issues for three months and restricted scientists from participating in
interviews––at a time that coincided with a rapid explosion in coronavirus cases. Then-CDC
Director Dr. Robert Redfield told the Select Subcommittee that “for a while, none of our briefings
were approved” and that he believed the American people “should have heard from the public
health leaders” during this time. Then-CDC Principal Deputy Director Dr. Schuchat similarly said
that “there was a point where they [CDC staff] stopped asking because they [Trump
Administration officials] kept saying no” to public appearances. According to Kate Galatas, a
senior communications official at CDC, the requirement that CDC obtain clearance for its public
messaging “created big confusion” at CDC and caused “delays in being able to share
information.” 244
In April 2020, as the number of coronavirus cases grew exponentially and hospitals in
many cities became overwhelmed, President Trump installed Michael Caputo—his close political
ally—as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at HHS, allowing him to take over approval of
coronavirus communications. According to Ms. Galatas, Mr. Caputo used “bully-ish behavior”
designed to make CDC personnel “feel threatened” in order to control CDC messaging. In one
incident, Mr. Caputo expressed that he was “very displeased” with statements made by CDC’s
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Deputy Director of Infectious Diseases Dr. Jay Butler during a June 12, 2020, telebriefing that he
felt were “too alarming.” Dr. Butler told the Select Subcommittee that he “was not really asked
back to do telebriefings” after the incident. In another incident, Dr. Paul Alexander—a Senior
Advisor to Mr. Caputo—attacked a forthcoming CDC report as “garbage” and designed “to hurt
the public and the administration.” He advocated for CDC officials to be fired, saying “he [Dr.
Redfield] gots [sic] to start firing people in large numbers there! This agency is working against
the President daily!” Trump Administration officials also repeatedly sought to alter CDC and HHS
press materials to promote misleadingly positive news, downplay coronavirus risks, and attempt
to redirect blame away from the Trump Administration for its poor handling of the pandemic. For
instance, on May 8, 2020, Dr. Alexander sought to edit talking points about a CDC report, telling
Mr. Caputo in an email: “this is how I am supporting the messaging . . . . Any way to help you
and showcase your work for this great President.” 245
b. Trump Administration officials “compromised” public
health guidance and brazenly interfered with CDC’s public
health authorities to achieve political goals.
Trump Administration officials repeatedly interfered in the process for drafting and issuing
CDC coronavirus guidance––overruling CDC scientists to weaken public health recommendations
in an apparent effort to benefit President Trump’s perceived political interests. The Select
Subcommittee’s investigations found that Trump Administration political appointees altered or
otherwise interfered in a series of coronavirus guidance documents, including CDC’s guidance for
faith communities, a meatpacking plant, polling locations and voters, restaurants and bars, and
testing. Dr. Redfield acknowledged in a transcribed interview that Trump Administration officials
“compromised” CDC’s coronavirus guidance documents on multiple occasions. He said that the
process for developing coronavirus guidance “got complicated” during the pandemic and that it
gave him “PTSD.” Dr. Redfield also noted that White House officials in the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) effectively wielded veto power over CDC’s coronavirus guidance, explaining:
“we didn’t get the approval usually to issue the guidance until OMB gave it a thumb’s up.” 246
In addition to compromising public health guidance, Trump Administration officials also
interfered with CDC’s public health authorities. The Select Subcommittee found that Trump
Administration officials exploited CDC’s Title 42 authority to effectively close the southern
border—a decision with an attenuated public health rationale that advanced the Trump
Administration’s longstanding anti-immigration and anti-asylum agenda. Dr. Cetron told the
Select Subcommittee that the Title 42 order issued on March 20, 2020, “was not drafted by me or
my team,” but was instead “handed to us”––and that he recalled participating on calls about the
order during which White House Senior Advisor Stephen Miller “was speaking.” Dr. Cetron said
that he “excused” himself from working on the Title 42 order, which was ultimately signed by Dr.
Redfield, due to his concerns with the lack of a public health justification for the order. 247 Trump
Administration officials also blocked CDC from deploying a mask requirement on mass transit
ahead of the fall and winter 2020 surge, despite clear evidence justifying the requirement and the
private sector pressing for “the federal government being more clear or strong about” using masks
in these settings, according to Dr. Schuchat. The Select Subcommittee further found that Trump
Administration officials rejected CDC’s plan to extend its No Sail Order through the winter of
2020-2021, following lobbying from the cruise line industry and their allies. CDC instead issued
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a Conditional Sail Order, which Dr. Redfield said made “a lot of people” “angry,” including “your
Florida Governor,” who questioned why any CDC regulation was needed. Dr. Redfield recounted
that he “felt very strongly” about standing firm against calls to let the No Sail Order expire without
any replacement, stating: “if signing the Conditional Sail Order meant that I was resigning or
being fired as CDC Director, that was going to happen.” 248
c. Trump Administration officials sought to manipulate the
substance and block the dissemination of CDC scientific
reports.
Trump Administration appointees sought to influence the process, manipulate the content,
or block the dissemination of at least 19 different CDC scientific reports that they deemed to be
politically harmful to President Trump. Trump HHS political appointees ultimately succeeded in
altering or delaying the release of at least five scientific reports, as well as pressuring CDC to
change the editorial process for MMWR series—the agency’s primary vehicle for scientific
publication of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health
information and recommendations. The Select Subcommittee revealed that HHS Secretary Alex
Azar directed CDC to change the MMWR editorial process in May 2020, following a conference
call where Secretary Azar and other Trump Administration officials made it clear they were “not
happy” that one of these reports did not draw a politically advantageous conclusion they desired,
according to Dr. Redfield. CDC Chief of Staff Kyle McGowan and Deputy Chief of Staff Amanda
Campbell informed the Select Subcommittee that Secretary Azar warned that “if the CDC would
not get in line, then HHS would take control of approving the publication of the MMWRs.” CDC
ultimately acceded to Secretary Azar’s directive. 249
CDC employees also told the Select Subcommittee that they were ordered to destroy
evidence of a Trump Administration appointee’s political interference. During a transcribed
interview, Dr. Christine Casey, Editor of the MMWR, stated that Dr. Michael Iademarco—who
oversaw the MMWR—directed her to delete an email from Dr. Alexander threatening to put a stop
to the MMWR publication, and that she understood the instruction came from Dr. Redfield. Dr.
Casey’s statements confirmed a prior account from MMWR Editor-in-Chief Dr. Charlotte Kent.
Dr. Redfield and Dr. Iademarco subsequently denied giving this direction. 250
d. The Trump Administration’s assault on the nation’s public
health institutions resulted in lasting harm.
The Trump Administration’s politicization of CDC took a significant toll on the career
scientists working tirelessly to protect the nation during a once-in-a-century pandemic. In his
transcribed interview, Dr. Butler described how Trump Administration officials’ “intentional
discrediting” of CDC’s integrity adversely impacted agency morale: “when people have
committed to public service, it’s really demoralizing to be characterized as a villain in the public
health response, or even in the future of our country.” The degree of control and hostility that the
Trump Administration exerted on CDC fundamentally undermined Americans’ trust in public
health. Dr. Cetron explained that this “erosion of credibility and trust really harms the ability to
persuade people to take sometimes difficult steps that’s in our joint collective interest.” 251
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When asked if she believed that allowing CDC to convey accurate scientific advice to the
public would have resulted in fewer Americans dying during the early months of the pandemic,
Dr. Schuchat told the Select Subcommittee: “Yes, I do.” Echoing Dr. Schuchat, Dr. Cetron said
that “there are people, you know, who are no longer with us that would have benefited from that
kind of very clear messaging.” 252
5. The Trump White House relentlessly attacked FDA’s coronavirus
response.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations documented multiple instances where Trump
White House officials executed coordinated pressure campaigns that sought to bend FDA’s
coronavirus decision making to the White House’s political will. Evidence uncovered by the
Select Subcommittee and detailed in an August 2022 staff report revealed that the Trump White
House exerted extreme and inappropriate pressure on FDA to reauthorize hydroxychloroquine
after it was shown to be ineffective and potentially dangerous; strongarmed FDA to deliver
misleadingly positive news about convalescent plasma as a coronavirus treatment on the eve of
the 2020 Republican National Convention; and blocked FDA from issuing guidance on
coronavirus vaccine authorizations for weeks in an attempt to ensure that the first vaccine could
be authorized before the 2020 presidential election. 253
a. Trump White House Officials pressured FDA to reauthorize
hydroxychloroquine as a coronavirus treatment after it was
shown to be ineffective and potentially dangerous.
Dr. Hahn told the Select Subcommittee that Mr. Navarro exerted inappropriate pressure on
him to reissue an EUA for hydroxychloroquine after FDA revoked its EUA for the drug on June
15, 2020, due to its inefficacy as a coronavirus treatment and potential safety issues. The Select
Subcommittee’s investigation revealed that Mr. Navarro and Dr. Steven Hatfill—then-an adjunct
assistant professor at George Washington University whom Mr. Navarro brought into the White
House in January 2020 to work as a full-time volunteer on the coronavirus response—engaged in
what Dr. Hatfill called a “knife fight” with Dr. Hahn and other federal officials over
hydroxychloroquine. 254
Mr. Navarro and Dr. Hatfill coordinated with representatives at the Henry Ford Health
System (HFHS) in an effort to reauthorize hydroxychloroquine while obscuring the White House’s
involvement. The Select Subcommittee found that Dr. Hatfill drafted “a new EUA request” at Mr.
Navarro’s direction, “selected” HFHS to be the submitting institution, and then “transferred the
EUA reinstatement letter over to … the Ford System,” which allowed the renewed EUA request
to be submitted by HFHS instead of someone affiliated with the White House. HFHS submitted
the renewed EUA petition to FDA on July 6, 2020, but FDA denied the petition the following
month. Meanwhile, Dr. Hatfill courted researchers to pursue a study to show the purported benefits
of hydroxychloroquine by dangling millions of taxpayer dollars in promised funding. 255
Working from inside the White House, Mr. Navarro and Dr. Hatfill sought to generate
outside support for hydroxychloroquine by engaging known extremists and prolific conspiracists
like former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, Dr. Jerome Corsi, and the Association of
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American Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS), which, among other radical conspiracies, propagated
the theory that President Barack Obama used a covert form of hypnosis to win the 2008 presidential
election. Under Mr. Navarro’s supervision, Dr. Hatfill coordinated with AAPS Executive Director
Dr. Jane Orient and Mr. Bannon to gather support for a petition he drafted to “keep pressure on
the FDA and the new EUA request” that he was spearheading with HFHS. Dr. Hatfill also engaged
Senator Ron Johnson to push the White House to pressure FDA into renewing the
hydroxychloroquine EUA. Senator Johnson met personally with White House Chief of Staff Mark
Meadows in late August 2020 to advocate for the reauthorization. He reported back to Mr. Navarro
and Dr. Hatfill that “Meadows said he would ask Sec Azar to issue whatever approval HHS can
issue.” Outside the United States, Dr. Hatfill and Mr. Navarro coordinated on hydroxychloroquine
with Dr. Paolo Zanotto, a virologist who the Brazilian Senate has since recommended be charged
criminally for promoting false coronavirus cures. 256
As their efforts stalled, Mr. Navarro and Dr. Hatfill escalated their pressure campaign by
attacking federal officials who they believed stood in the way of their attempts to reauthorize
hydroxychloroquine––including publicly discrediting these officials, pushing for federal
investigations into their actions, and advocating for their termination. For example, after an
August 5, 2020, meeting of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) COVID-19 Treatment
Guidelines Panel—where Mr. Navarro was scheduled to present “Perspectives on
Hydroxychloroquine,” despite lacking any relevant scientific expertise—Dr. Hatfill outlined a plan
to have the Department of Justice (DOJ) “start an investigation of the Fauci Panel.” Dr. Hatfill
described this plot as designed to “shut them up for a bit,” after which White House officials would
“pull Hahn in and ask him to re-establish the EUA,” contending Dr. Hahn was “weak and will fold
when he sees what is going on.” Dr. Hatfill expressly tied the timing of these actions to when
voting in the November presidential election would begin, assuring Mr. Navarro: “Within 10-14
days of the start of HCQ outpatient treatment—figures should start to decrease,” concluding: “Is
that not about the same time that some sort of voting goes on ??” 257
Throughout their coordinated pressure campaigns, Mr. Navarro and Dr. Hatfill took steps
to conceal the White House’s involvement, including by using private email accounts, including
encrypted ProtonMail accounts, to conduct official government business, apparently without
properly preserving these records in accordance with the Presidential Records Act. 258
b. President Trump expressed “dismay” about perceived delays
in an EUA for convalescent plasma, while the White House
hastily convened a press conference that grossly misstated
the data.
During his transcribed interview with the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Hahn recounted that
NIH Director Dr. Francis Collins told him during a White House meeting in the weeks before the
Republican National Convention that President Trump had “express[ed] dismay over NIH
potentially putting up roadblocks” to the timeline for FDA’s authorization of convalescent plasma
as a coronavirus treatment, after NIH officials raised concerns about insufficient efficacy data to
support an EUA. After President Trump accused FDA of being part of the “deep state” and
deliberately stalling progress on therapeutics like convalescent plasma, Dr. Hahn said he called the
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president on August 22, 2020, and told him that “we either were nearing a decision or had made a
decision” on an EUA. FDA issued an EUA for convalescent plasma the next day. 259
On August 23, 2020—the day before the start of the Republican National Convention—
the White House hastily convened a press conference to tout the convalescent plasma EUA. Ahead
of the press conference, FDA Associate Commissioner for Media Affairs Emily Miller sent an
email to Dr. Hahn advising on his talking points for the press conference, telling him to “[m]essage
positive always” and to “phrase it in real language.” Dr. Hahn proceeded to grossly misstate the
implications of the efficacy data on plasma during the press conference, after which he issued a
public apology. Dr. Hahn told the Select Subcommittee that he did not seek to clear his apology
through the “normal channels” in the Trump Administration. 260
c. Trump Administration political appointees blocked FDA
coronavirus vaccine guidance due to “objections” over how
it would impact the authorization timeline ahead of the
presidential election.
By September 2020, FDA had drafted guidance advising coronavirus vaccine
manufacturers that they should submit phase three trial data in their EUA applications that included
a median follow-up duration of at least two months (60 days) after the completion of the primary
vaccination series. According to Dr. Hahn, officials in Secretary Azar’s office expressed concerns
about whether it was “appropriate” for FDA’s proposed guidance to advise manufacturers to
submit 60 days of surveillance data. Beginning around mid-September, Dr. Hahn said FDA had
multiple meetings and calls with Secretary Azar, HHS Chief of Staff Brian Harrison, and HHS
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy Paul Mango—none of whom are doctors or otherwise specialized
in immunology or vaccinology—regarding the “timeline” and the “scientific and clinical rationale
for the guidance.” By that time, it was clear that the guidance would likely result in FDA not
authorizing a vaccine until after the presidential election. 261
After FDA’s guidance was sent to the White House for review, Dr. Hahn said “[t]here were
objections about it” from Mr. Meadows and other White House officials, including “pushback
about the issue of the 60 days” of surveillance data. Dr. Hahn said he “objected” to attempts to
change the guidance because “any changes would be obviously reported and would further reduce
vaccine confidence.” During a September 23, 2020, press conference, President Trump decried
the guidance as “a political move” that “has to be approved by the White House,” which “may or
may not approve it.” With its formal vaccine EUA guidance stalled for weeks by the White House,
FDA unilaterally released an informal set of briefing materials on October 6, which included an
appendix that summarized advice that FDA had provided to industry regarding vaccine EUA
applications. The advice listed in this appendix publicly revealed that FDA sought two months of
surveillance data in an EUA application, despite the ongoing “objections” from the White
House. 262
Dr. Hahn told the Select Subcommittee that FDA did not seek approval from HHS or the
White House before releasing the informal guidance but noted that he “proactively reached out to
the White House to let them know that this was going.” Later that day, Dr. Hahn said he was
called by Mr. Meadows and told that FDA’s formal vaccine EUA guidance was now approved. 263
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d. The Trump Administration’s crusade against FDA resulted
in damaging consequences for the coronavirus response.
As a result of the Trump Administration’s nearly year-long crusade against FDA, morale
inside the agency cratered, and public confidence in FDA’s scientific integrity was shaken in the
midst of a once-in-a-century pandemic. In his transcribed interview with the Select Subcommittee,
Dr. Hahn elaborated on the concerns he held regarding the public’s waning confidence in FDA’s
work during the pandemic:
I was concerned about the entire environment: A presidential election, bitter
divisions in the country and in Congress. And, to me, it was a pretty significant
combination of factors that led to a decrease in science and confidence in science
and medicine, et cetera. 264
Reflecting on President Trump disparaging FDA scientists as being part of the “deep state”—when
they were working to ensure that safe and effective coronavirus vaccines, treatments, and
diagnostics would be made available to the American people as quickly as the science allowed—
Dr. Hahn explained the toll these relentless attacks had taken on the civil servants inside his
agency:
[T]hey had been working really hard, our workload had doubled, and they also were
worried about the potential impact that it would have on the public perception of
the agency. There’s a lot of pride at the agency and what they do. 265
6. Trump Administration political appointees intervened at the behest
of meatpacking companies to limit coronavirus protections in an
industry where workers faced high risks of infection, death, and
community spread.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations found that Trump Administration political
appointees acted at the behest of corporate actors to limit worker protections in a major industry
with high coronavirus risk. Public reports indicated that workers in the meatpacking industry faced
particularly high risks from the coronavirus early in the pandemic. The Select Subcommittee
conducted an investigation of the largest companies in the industry—JBS USA Food Company
(JBS), Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson), Smithfield Foods (Smithfield), Cargill Meat Solutions
Corporation (Cargill), and National Beef Packing Company, LLC (National Beef)—and the Trump
Administration’s response to the risks faced by these companies’ workers. 266
The Select Subcommittee found that the toll of the coronavirus on meatpacking workers
was even greater than previously known, with more than 59,000 workers at the five companies
contracting the virus in the pandemic’s first year, and at least 269 dying as a result. 267 These large
meatpacking companies prevented additional protections from being put in place to protect
workers in part by engaging in a concerted effort with Trump Administration political officials to
insulate themselves from oversight, to force workers to remain in dangerous conditions, and to
shield themselves from liability for any resulting worker illness or death.
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a. Meatpacking companies successfully enlisted Trump
political appointees to advocate against health protections
for workers.
As tens of thousands of meatpacking workers fell ill and hundreds died in the early months
of the coronavirus crisis, Trump Administration political appointees advocated for the interests of
meatpacking companies—not their workers or the public. As described in a report by Select
Subcommittee staff released on May 12, 2022, senior Trump Administration officials prioritized
the concerns of meatpacking executives in implementing coronavirus policies that affected
meatpacking workers’ safety, and even intervened to prevent state and local governments from
guarding workers against coronavirus risks. 268
The Select Subcommittee obtained emails showing that the meatpacking industry had a
close relationship with a key Trump Administration appointee with influence over coronavirus
policy and used that influence to halt policies that would have provided greater protection for
meatpacking workers. In mid-March 2020, a meatpacking industry representative spoke with
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Under Secretary for Food Safety Mindy Brashears about the
White House Coronavirus Task Force, saying that the industry “would certainly like” for Ms.
Brashears “to be involved in any discussion regarding meat.” 269 By the following day, USDA was
reportedly “in the leadership role” on the Task Force, which “delighted” the representative. 270 A
few weeks later, industry representatives discussed how they were “fortunate” to have USDA as
their “primary regulator” because it was “representing [the] industry’s interests in every important
interagency conversation.” 271
In March 2020, a Tyson executive emailed the head of the North American Meat Institute
about requests from state and local health authorities to improve coronavirus safety measures at
Tyson plants: “So far, we’ve been able to handle these situations, but at some point we may need
to get Mindy involved if we are forced to shut down a plant.” 272 A few months later, a meatpacking
lobbyist told a Foster Farms executive that Ms. Brashears “hasn’t lost a battle for us” in connection
with efforts to block a local health department order to implement coronavirus measures in a Foster
Farms facility. 273 Career USDA officials told the Select Subcommittee that Ms. Brashears’ and
her subordinates’ pattern of interference with state and local health departments in issues of plant
safety was “exclusively handled at the political level,” with career staff being “walled off,” and
leaving “no paper trail” of such meetings. 274 Internal meatpacking industry emails similarly show
Ms. Brashears personally calling and texting with industry representatives, giving them her
personal cell phone number, and using her personal email account to communicate with them. 275
Trump Administration officials also did the industry’s bidding by weakening federal
guidance and directives intended to keep workers safe. As meatpacking workers realized that
working conditions were unsafe, meatpacking companies enlisted Trump Administration officials
to prevent workers from staying home out of fear of coronavirus infection. In April 2020, the
CEOs of JBS USA, Smithfield, Tyson, and other meatpacking companies had a call with Secretary
of Agriculture Sonny Perdue, during which they asked him to “elevate the need for messaging
about the importance of our workforce staying at work to the POTUS or VP level” and separately
stressed the need to make clear that “being afraid of COVID-19 is not a reason to quit your job
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and you are not eligible for unemployment compensation if you do.” 276 These efforts led to Vice
President Pence issuing a direct message to meatpacking workers in a press conference that “we
need you to continue . . . to show up and do your job,” admonishing recent “incidents of worker
absenteeism.” 277
Also in April 2020, Trump Administration officials weakened CDC guidance on
coronavirus protections for meatpacking workers at the behest of industry executives. Smithfield
CEO Ken Sullivan obtained early draft CDC guidance on safety precautions for meatpacking
workers. 278 Sullivan marked up the draft by hand with comments criticizing recommendations to
“physically separate employees” and to have flexible attendance policies. 279 Sullivan emailed
complaints about worker protections in CDC’s guidance to USDA Under Secretary for Marketing
and Regulatory Programs Greg Ibach, a Trump political appointee, who quickly responded: “We
are on it.” 280 Within a few hours of sending these revisions to USDA officials, a Smithfield
executive was told by his colleague to “Expect a call” from “one of Perdue’s deputies, important
guy” and “an ally.” 281 Dr. Redfield did ultimately weaken the guidance for meatpacking worker
safety after USDA Secretary Perdue relayed Smithfield’s critiques. One CDC scientist told the
Select Subcommittee that Dr. Redfield “water[ed] down” this guidance by adding qualifiers like
“if feasible” in front of safety measures. 282
b. Meatpacking companies successfully lobbied the Trump
USDA and White House to issue an order purporting to
insulate them from state and local regulations and liability
for worker infections and deaths.
When Trump appointees were unable to stop local health departments from intervening to
protect meatpacking workers, the industry convinced the Trump White House to issue an executive
order that purported to absolve the industry from responsibility for workers’ safety related to the
coronavirus. By mid-April 2020, meatpacking companies expressed anxiety that their allies at
USDA and the White House were unable to block a handful of state and local public health
measures. For example, an industry representative lamented that:
Plants are being closed. Health depts. are making decisions (Greeley [Colorado]),
governors are making surprise decisions (Sioux Falls [South Dakota]), health
departments are showing up unannounced at plants (Waterloo IA), and the media
reporting is going to create more attention from health departments and governors
in other communities IMO. It seems to be cascading and our friends at USDA and
the VP’s office are not able to stop it. 283
To combat local health department efforts, Smithfield and Tyson proposed that the Trump
Administration issue an executive order signed by the President that would insulate meatpacking
companies from oversight by state and local health departments and provide protection against
lawsuits for worker illnesses and deaths. Tyson’s legal department drafted the proposed order and
the companies, through their industry representative, shared it with allied USDA political
appointees who had previously helped them lobby or interfere with decision-making by other arms
of federal and state government. 284 Meatpacking industry representatives and companies—
Smithfield and Tyson in particular—then engaged in regular communications with political
appointees at the White House and USDA in the days leading up to President Trump’s issuance of
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Executive Order 13917. 285 This contact between the industry and high-level Trump
Administration officials included calls between Smithfield CEO Ken Sullivan and White House
Chief of Staff Mark Meadows; a joint call with Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Meadows, and Tyson CEO Noel
White; a call between White and Vice President Pence’s Chief of Staff Marc Short; and a call from
Mr. Meadows to Mr. White asking if White would be willing to meet with President Trump.286
President Trump’s ultimate order adopted the themes and statutory directive laid out in Tyson’s
proposed draft, invoking the Defense Production Act (DPA) to ensure meatpacking plants
“continue operations.” 287
7. The Trump Administration embraced a dangerous and discredited
herd immunity via mass infection strategy.
In a June 2022 staff report, the Select Subcommittee revealed extensive evidence that
senior Trump Administration officials embraced a dangerous and discredited herd immunity via
mass infection strategy as they failed to curb the spread of the coronavirus. This strategy enabled
Trump Administration officials to convince themselves that they were right to do nothing to limit
the spread of the virus in the second half of 2020 and likely resulted in many deaths that could
have been prevented by an effective national mitigation strategy. 288
a. The Trump White House secretly hired a herd immunity
proponent and gave him sweeping access to top officials.
In July 2020, then-White House Senior Adviser Jared Kushner furtively hired Dr. Scott
Atlas—a radiologist and Senior Fellow at the conservative think tank the Hoover Institution who
had no background in infectious diseases—to “help advise the president” on pandemic policy. The
Select Subcommittee found that Mr. Kushner initially took steps to conceal Dr. Atlas’s hiring for
several weeks. After his role as a Special Advisor to the President was publicly announced, Dr.
Atlas received extensive access to the highest levels of government and “had the ear” of the
president on pandemic policy, according to Dr. Redfield. Mr. Kushner included Dr. Atlas in a
series of high-level meetings referred to as “China Virus Huddles,” which were used to hone the
White House’s coronavirus messaging and address key “operational aspects” of the response
outside of the White House Coronavirus Task Force structure. Dr. Birx told the Select
Subcommittee that she had reason to believe that President Trump received “parallel data streams”
from Dr. Atlas that differed from the coronavirus data provided by the White House Coronavirus
Task Force, and that this information influenced President Trump to downplay the severity of the
virus and reject many mainstream mitigation measures. 289
The Select Subcommittee uncovered internal memoranda used by Dr. Atlas to push the
Trump Administration to jettison mitigation measures and deliberately reduce coronavirus
testing—months before the first coronavirus vaccines were available to the public. Dr. Atlas used
his White House position to recruit herd immunity proponents to come to Washington, D.C., to
meet with multiple senior Trump Administration officials and, according to Dr. Redfield,
“convince people that herd immunity was going to save us, and this thing was going to go bye-
bye.” In August 2020, Dr. Atlas successfully arranged for three herd immunity proponents to meet
with President Trump and Vice President Mike Pence to discuss their views on the pandemic
response. Dr. Birx refused to attend these meetings, telling Mr. Short:
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Dr. Birx wrote that the group of doctors Dr. Atlas invited to the White House were part of
“a fringe group without grounding in epidemics, public health or on the ground common sense
experience.” In October 2020, Dr. Atlas also coordinated a meeting between Secretary Azar and
the authors of the discredited “Great Barrington Declaration,” which advocated for the herd
immunity strategy that Dr. Atlas was actively promoting. Secretary Azar issued a tweet after the
meeting recognizing that the approach articulated by the Great Barrington Declaration authors was
a “strong reinforcement” of the Trump Administration’s ongoing response strategy. 290
b. Dr. Scott Atlas successfully pressed the Trump
Administration to weaken CDC’s testing guidance and
reduce coronavirus testing, without any countervailing
mitigation measures, well before vaccines were available.
Dr. Atlas set in motion significant changes to CDC’s testing guidance within days of
arriving in the White House that would upend CDC’s public health recommendations by
minimizing the need for widespread testing and undercutting policies that could mitigate the spread
of the coronavirus. On August 3, 2020, Dr. Atlas prepared a memorandum which argued that
testing was playing an outsized role in the response, contending: “people have been convinced that
‘testing, testing, testing’ is urgent for everyone—that is false.” He claimed that it was “harmful to
do massive testing, especially since actions on many positive tests are not always necessary.” 291
Dr. Redfield revealed to the Select Subcommittee that “significant people” inside the
Trump Administration made clear shortly after Dr. Atlas arrived that “there needed to be some
curtailment of the amount of testing that was done as relating to evaluating people that were
exposed.” Dr. Redfield and other former Trump Administration officials told the Select
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Subcommittee that Dr. Atlas spearheaded changes to CDC’s testing guidance to stop
recommending that all close contacts of individuals with coronavirus get tested. Admiral Brett
Giroir, the Trump Administration’s “Testing Czar,” told the Select Subcommittee that the White
House Coronavirus Task Force approved a draft version of this weakened testing guidance that
included a recommendation that all close contacts isolate for 14 days. The weakened testing
guidance was published on August 24, 2020—without any isolation recommendation. Weeks
later, after an intense backlash by public health experts, CDC restored its original recommendation
that all close contacts be tested and added a 14-day isolation recommendation—prompting Dr.
Atlas to become enraged and to speak “aggressively” at Dr. Redfield for overseeing these changes.
Admiral Giroir told the Select Subcommittee that he recognized the potential that “somebody
wanted to fire me” for his involvement in restoring the original testing recommendation. 292
Dr. Birx told the Select Subcommittee that the August 24, 2020, testing guidance ultimately
resulted in a “dramatic decline of the number of tests performed during the end of August and the
beginning of September.” In a September 16, 2020, email obtained by the Select Subcommittee,
Dr. Atlas acknowledged to other senior White House officials that testing had decreased but argued
that “the ‘alarm’ of fewer tests makes no sense” and that “pushing more testing is destructive to
opening:” 293
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c. Top Trump Administration officials embraced Dr. Atlas’s
herd immunity strategy, resulting in preventable illness and
death.
Dr. Atlas told the Select Subcommittee that Mr. Meadows, Mr. Short, Assistant to the
President Hope Hicks, and Mr. Mango, among others, came to support at least some of the
pandemic policy views he was urging the Administration to adopt. He also said that he inferred
that President Trump “was in agreement” with his views on the pandemic, given President Trump’s
“own words.” Dr. Redfield acknowledged that Dr. Atlas “successfully got a lot of people within
the Task Force and the White House to believe that all we had to do was get to herd immunity” in
order to contain the virus. Doctors on the White House Coronavirus Task Force took their
concerns about Dr. Atlas and his views to Mr. Kushner and Mr. Short, but no action was taken.
Dr. Birx told the Select Subcommittee that Vice President Pence was “well aware” of her concerns
regarding Dr. Atlas’s impact on the coronavirus response. 294
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With Dr. Atlas’s influence entrenched, the Trump White House did little to attempt to curb
the spread of the coronavirus in the fall and winter of 2020 and early 2021—even as outbreaks
surged across the country. Using Dr. Atlas to provide a veneer of scientific backing for inaction,
the Trump Administration instead focused on downplaying the threat of the virus leading up to the
November presidential election—while also allowing the pandemic response to take a “back-seat”
as senior officials focused their efforts on campaigning and promoting former President Trump’s
false claim that the election results were fraudulent. In late October 2020, White House aide Dr.
Hatfill acknowledged in an email that, “with the election so close, COVID is taking a back-seat”
despite the fact that “the disease is rearing it [sic] ugly head again.” 295 Dr. Birx informed the Select
Subcommittee that Trump White House officials “were actively campaigning” for the presidential
election in the fall of 2020, and that this narrow focus on campaigning “took people’s time away
from and distracted them away from the pandemic.” 296
As the outbreak continued to worsen nationwide in November and December 2020, Dr.
Hatfill noted that his focus “shifted over to the election fraud investigation in November”—chasing
baseless conspiracy theories about voter fraud instead of taking steps to ensure the nation was
responding effectively to the pandemic. When asked by a university colleague on January 5, 2021,
why he was not “fixing the virus,” Dr. Hatfill admitted: “Because the election thing got out of
control. I go where my team goes.” 297
Dr. Birx informed the Select Subcommittee that more than 130,000 American lives could
have been saved after the first wave of the pandemic if President Trump and his Administration
had implemented “optimal mitigation across this country.” More Americans died from the
coronavirus from November 2020 through February 2021 than during any other four-month period
throughout the entirety of the pandemic to date. 298
D. The Toll of the Coronavirus Fell Disproportionately on the Most
Vulnerable.
1. The coronavirus had a devastating effect in already overburdened
nursing homes.
In June 2020, the Select Subcommittee initiated an investigation into the impact of the
coronavirus crisis on nursing home residents and staff at five for-profit nursing home chains in the
United States: Consulate Health Care (Consulate), Ensign Group (Ensign), Genesis Healthcare,
Inc. (Genesis), Life Care Centers of America (Life Care), and SavaSeniorCare (Sava). 299 These
five companies were the largest for-profit nursing home chains in the country at the onset of the
coronavirus pandemic. They collectively operated over 850 skilled nursing facilities around the
country and were charged with caring for 80,000 residents as of June 2020. 300
Reports had shown that nursing homes had experienced severe coronavirus outbreaks in
the early months of the pandemic, resulting in the deaths of thousands of residents, as well as
research showing that for-profit companies tend to receive lower ratings, provide lower quality of
care, and experience more safety deficiencies than non-profit facilities. 301 As of 2016,
approximately 70% of nursing homes in the United States were for profit, and more than half of
all nursing homes were chain-affiliated. 302
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The Select Subcommittee collected data on total infections and deaths across the five
companies and documented a total of 81,775 coronavirus infections and 10,362 deaths among
residents, and 67,140 infections and 118 deaths among staff.
The Select Subcommittee also sought to understand how staffing practices, wages and
benefits, and administration of vaccinations and boosters have impacted nursing home residents
and staff throughout the pandemic. Due to the large number of facilities operated by each
company, the Select Subcommittee collected data for each of these categories for a sample of 15
facilities per company. Where possible, these facilities were selected to ensure diversity in size,
geography, and historical ratings. 303 The Select Subcommittee’s analysis of data from these
facilities found that the five companies investigated have each had significant staffing deficiencies
throughout the course of the pandemic, have often provided low wages and poor benefits to their
front-line workers, and have continued to lag in coronavirus booster vaccination rates, despite
having initially robust primary series vaccination rates. The Select Subcommittee’s findings are
based on documents obtained from the five companies, staff briefings provided by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), discussions with dozens of public health experts and
nursing home advocates, and sworn testimony obtained at a public hearing.
a. Nursing homes operated by the for-profit chains investigated
faced severe outbreaks during the coronavirus crisis.
From its onset, the coronavirus pandemic wreaked havoc in nursing homes across the
country, with devastating effects for residents and staff in many facilities. 304 Internal company
records of Consulate, Ensign, Genesis, Life Care, and Sava obtained by the Select Subcommittee
reveal that facilities owned and/or operated by these companies experienced at least 148,915 total
coronavirus cases and 10,480 deaths among residents and staff from the onset of the pandemic
through June 2022.
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Total confirmed infections and deaths from the coronavirus at five investigated companies between
February 2020 and June 2022. 305 *Sava has divested the majority of the 174 long-term care
facilities that it owned in June 2020. As of June 2022, Sava owned a total of 18 facilities. This
number was reduced to 12 as of November 2022. 306 Consulate has also been restructured since
2020. 307
Formal counts of coronavirus infections and deaths across these companies have not
previously been made public at the corporate owner level. While weekly counts of coronavirus
infections and deaths at for-profit long-term care facilities are reported to CMS, this data is only
provided at the facility level—often under names and corporate structures that can obscure
common ownership—thus making it difficult for the public to understand how many residents and
staff under the care of a common corporate manager have fallen ill or died. 308 The table above
presents, for the first time, a clear picture of coronavirus infections and deaths at facilities owned
and/or operated by the five for-profit nursing home chains under investigation.
b. Nursing home facilities have been understaffed throughout
the pandemic.
Adequate staffing––both in terms of the total number of staff and their level of training and
specialization––is crucial to ensuring nursing homes are able to provide quality care for
residents. 309 Federal law requires that each nursing home has “sufficient nursing staff” to “assure
resident safety” and the “highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being” of
residents. 310 Federal law requires all nursing homes to maintain 24 hours of licensed nursing
coverage per day, including a registered nurse (RN) on-site for eight hours, but does not otherwise
specify staffing requirements. Under current regulations, larger facilities are not required to have
more nursing staff on-site than smaller facilities. 311 A 2001 CMS study recommended that RNs
dedicate at least 0.75 working hours, or 45 minutes, to each resident each day, and that Certified
Nursing Assistants (CNAs) dedicate at least 2.8 hours, or two hours and 48 minutes, to each
resident each day. 312 This means that a 100-person facility where staff work in eight-hour shifts
should have more than nine RNs and at least 35 CNAs every day to provide the recommended
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level of care for its residents. As these guidelines are recommendations rather than requirements,
many states have imposed their own rules to ensure residents receive adequate care. 313
Insufficient staffing in the nursing home industry is a longstanding problem that has
continued throughout the coronavirus pandemic. 314 In the second quarter of 2021, according to
staffing data collected by CMS, average staff hours for all nursing homes nationwide failed to
meet the 0.75-hour recommendation for RNs at 0.66 hours per resident per day, and failed to meet
the 2.8-hour recommendation for CNAs at 2.04 hours per resident. 315 When nursing staff dedicate
less time per resident, they typically care for a greater number of residents, thus coming into
contact with more residents and increasing the risk that infections will spread. Additionally, when
nursing homes are understaffed, facilities tend to rely more heavily on workers with lower levels
of training. When a facility has insufficient RNs on staff, a greater volume of resident care may
be left to less trained professionals such as Licensed Practical Nurses or CNAs, who may not be
qualified to perform certain functions that RNs are trained and licensed to do.
As a result of these factors, there is a demonstrated association between inadequate nursing
home staffing and lower quality of care. 316 A CMS study has found that inadequate staffing was
a likely root cause for a “range of serious problems including malnutrition, dehydration, pressure
sores, abuse and neglect.” 317 By contrast, higher staffing levels for CNAs have been associated
with fewer deficiencies during nursing home inspections, while higher staffing levels for RNs have
been associated with lower rates of emergency department use, hospitalization, and
rehospitalization. 318 The impact of insufficient staffing was magnified by the coronavirus crisis.
Multiple studies have found that higher staffing ratios mitigated the effect of coronavirus outbreaks
and resulted in fewer nursing home deaths—yet such circumstances were far too rare. 319
For many years, nursing homes advocates have accused nursing home operators of
maintaining fewer direct care staff on weekends than on weekdays. 320 CMS recently required
nursing homes to submit staffing data for weekends, which confirmed this disparity. 321 Weekend
shifts are often less popular with nursing home staff. 322 In the words of one health policy expert,
“It’s not like the day-to-day life of nursing home residents and their needs vary substantially on a
weekend and a weekday. They need to get dressed, to bathe and to eat every single day.” 323 While
some residents may receive more visitors on weekends, and some of those visitors may be able to
help care for loved ones in the absence of sufficient staff, untrained visitors are far less capable of
providing care, particularly to residents who need assistance with basic daily tasks, and may only
be on-site for relatively brief periods of time. During the coronavirus crisis, visitors were
prohibited for months, eliminating even this inadequate stopgap and leaving residents even more
vulnerable on weekends.
The Select Subcommittee obtained data on staffing ratios showing the average time RNs
and CNAs dedicated to direct resident care at 15 facilities belonging to each company for the
January 2020 through June 2022 period. 324 Staffing ratios for all five companies were separated
by weekdays and weekends. This data underscored the staffing deficiencies that have plagued the
nursing home industry and jeopardized the health and safety of nursing home residents.
The average of all 30 months’ weekday RN staffing ratios for all 15 facilities operated by
the four companies for which data was available (60 facilities total) was 0.66, falling short of the
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recommended minimum of 45 minutes (or .75 of an hour) by approximately five minutes per
resident, per day. 325 At 42 of these 60 facilities, the average of all 30 months’ weekday RN staffing
ratios was below the 45-minute minimum recommendation. There was significant variation
between individual facilities and during different months. For example, one Sava facility had one
month in which the RN staffing ratio was 0.13 on weekdays—meaning that an RN was on-site for
about eight minutes per resident over the course of the entire day on a given weekday––and a total
of nine different months in which the weekday RN ratio was 0.15 or less. 326 The average of the
30 months’ weekday RN staffing ratios at three other Sava facilities, on the other hand, exceeded
the recommendation. 327 Similarly, the average of all 30 months’ weekday RN staffing ratios at
one Consulate facility was 0.22, and this metric fell below 0.30 at four other Consulate facilities,
while at two others this average exceeded the recommended ratio at 0.86 and 1.0, respectively. 328
Weekend RN shortages were even more severe. The average of all 30 months’ weekend
staffing ratios across four companies with data was at 0.34—a shortage of nearly 25 minutes per
day. The average of the 30 months’ weekend staffing ratios fell below the standard at 56 of the 60
facilities reviewed, and each company’s 30-month average weekend staffing ratios across its 15
surveyed facilities failed to meet the standard. This figure was the lowest for Consulate, at only
0.12, and highest for Genesis and Life Care, at 0.45. Shortages were even more severe at certain
facilities in certain months, again revealing tremendous variation in levels of care, even within the
same company. One Sava facility in Texas had eight months in which the weekend RN staffing
ratio was zero. 329 A different Sava facility in Connecticut exceeded the recommended standard
on weekends in every month, with an average of the 30 months’ ratios of 1.04. Such facilities that
exceeded the recommended average were rare, however. One Life Care facility had an RN
weekend staffing ratio of 0.02 in both May and October 2020, while another Life Care facility had
the same ratio on weekends in November 2021. 330 A Consulate facility in Virginia had weekend
RN staffing ratios of 0.03 or lower during 16 of the 30 months for which data were provided—
meaning that on weekends for more than half of the review period, an RN was on-site for at most
one minute and 48 seconds per resident, per day. 331 For one of these months, the ratio was zero.
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Staffing ratios for registered nurses at 15 facilities of Consulate, Genesis, Life Care, and Sava
between January 2020 and July 2022. Averages were calculated by totaling monthly ratios at each
facility and dividing by number of months reviewed. 332 Ensign combined staffing ratios for RNs
with ratios for licensed practical nurses (LPNs) and was therefore excluded from average
calculations. 333
The average of the 30 months’ weekday CNA staffing ratios across all companies was 2.03
hours per resident per day, translating to about two hours and two minutes in which a CNA could
be attending to residents, falling below the recommendation by 46 minutes per day. This shortage
was more drastic on weekends, where the overall average of all months’ ratios fell to 1.69, or about
one hour and 41 minutes in which a CNA was attending to residents each weekend day. None of
the five companies had any month during which the average of the CNA weekday or weekend
staffing ratios across the sampled facilities met the recommended minimum. The average of the
30 months’ weekday CNA staffing ratios at just three facilities met the recommended minimum,
all of which were Ensign facilities. For weekends, this benchmark was met in just a single
facility—one of the same Ensign facilities that had also exceeded an average of 2.8 on weekdays.
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Staffing ratios for nursing assistants at 15 facilities of each investigated company between January
2020 and July 2022. Averages were calculated by totaling monthly ratios at each facility and
dividing by number of months reviewed. 334
The Biden Administration is taking action to address chronic staffing issues at nursing
homes. In February 2022, CMS launched a public input process and research study on nursing
home staffing, with the goal of developing a federal rule concerning minimum staffing
standards. 335 The proposed rule is on track to be released by spring 2023. 336 This rule is an
important step to ensure nursing home residents are given sufficient time and attention for direct
care, which may ultimately curb resident neglect and its attendant health harms, and provide better
quality working conditions to nursing home staff.
c. Many nursing home direct care staff have been paid low
wages.
Low pay and lack of employee benefits, such as paid sick leave, are pervasive problems in
the nursing home industry that predate the coronavirus pandemic. 337 Many workers in the nursing
home industry earn lower wages than they could working in warehouses or in other sectors that do
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not require specialized training. 338 Chris Brown—a CNA who worked at a nursing home in
Chicago, Illinois—told Select Subcommittee Members during a June 11, 2020, public briefing that
he made $13.90 per hour prior to the pandemic until he received a small increase in hazard pay.
Mr. Brown said:
We’re expecting people to come to work and put themselves at risk for a pay that’s
not worth it. … People go to school and they have to take a state board for this.
They need to raise up the pay that these CNAs are getting. I can go to McDonalds
and flip a burger, and I can make more than I’m making … doing the back-breaking
work of taking care of someone’s family member. 339
CNAs—most of whom are women (91%) and people of color (58%)—experience high
rates of poverty, with 12% living below the federal poverty line and 34% relying upon some form
of public assistance. 340
The failure of nursing homes to provide adequate pay and benefits to staff may have
exacerbated the impact of the coronavirus crisis. Due to low pay, some nursing home staff work
in multiple facilities to make ends meet, which increases their risk of contracting infectious
diseases like the coronavirus and spreading them between facilities to nursing home residents and
other workers. 341 The failure of many nursing homes to offer paid sick leave similarly increases
the risk of outbreaks because it puts staff in the difficult position of having to choose whether to
show up to work sick (or after a possible exposure) and get paid or stay home and go unpaid.342
More than 400,000 workers have left the nursing home industry since January 2020, citing poor
pay and benefits, stress and exhaustion, dangerous working conditions, and limited advancement
opportunities––contributing to worker shortages that have impacted resident care. 343
The Select Subcommittee obtained wage data for various job categories on a monthly basis
for the 15 sampled facilities at each company from January 2020 through June 2022. 344 These
data show the often very low hourly pay these essential workers have received over the course of
the pandemic.
All of the companies paid CNAs—who are on the front lines of resident care, often serving
as the backbone of many nursing home facilities—less than $20 an hour, on average, with the
exception of Genesis during the first six months of 2022. At many facilities, these critical workers
were paid near poverty-level wages. All companies had certain facilities that paid CNAs less than
$13.00 per hour in 2020—the year in which the coronavirus ravaged nursing homes across the
country, and nursing staff were asked to put themselves on the front lines of this life-threatening
crisis nearly every day. 345 CNAs at one Sava facility were paid average hourly rates as low as
$9.25 in both October and November 2020, $9.33 in January 2021, and $9.85 in January 2022—
far less than at retailers like Target and Amazon, which paid more than $15 an hour as of 2021. 346
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Average hourly wages for nursing assistants at 15 facilities of Consulate, Ensign, and Sava from
January 2020 through June 2022, and for 15 Genesis facilities from June 2020 through June 2022.
Wage data for Life Care consists of all facilities in 2020, and a sample of 15 facilities from January
2021 through June 2022. Companies produced average hourly wages for nursing assistants at each
of a sample of 15 facilities for each month during the review period. Overall averages were
calculated by totaling month-by-month data and dividing by number of months reviewed to
determine the average. 347
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Average hourly wages for RNs at 15 facilities of Consulate, Ensign, and Sava from January 2020
through June 2022, and for Genesis from June 2020 through June 2022. Wage data for Life Care
consists of all facilities in 2020, and a sample of 15 facilities from January 2021 through June 2022.
Companies produced average hourly wages for RNs at each of a sample of 15 facilities for each
month during the review period. Overall averages were calculated by totaling month-by-month
data and dividing by number of months reviewed to determine the average. 348
Wage data shows that the average of all 30 months’ hourly pay for RNs across the 75
sample facilities was more than $30 per hour. Some RNs received much more—with certain
companies paying RNs an average of as much as $75.05 (Life Care), $71.70 per hour (Genesis),
or $63.41 per hour (Ensign) at certain facilities in certain years. The companies varied
substantially in terms of average wages paid to RNs, although average RN wages tended to
increase each year.
Additionally, paid leave policies at the investigated nursing home companies may have left
out many workers. Before the pandemic, Sava and Consulate only provided paid sick leave to
full-time employees. 349 From April 2020 to October 2020, Sava authorized 112 hours of
coronavirus-specific sick leave for full-time employees and 56 hours for part-time employees.
After that period, Sava granted sick leave based on “individual center needs.” 350 Consulate’s
policy also changed during the pandemic to allow paid time off for on-the-job coronavirus
exposures. 351 Genesis and Ensign provide paid sick leave to full-time employees, but not to other
staff unless required by state or local law, and have not changed these practices during the
pandemic. 352 Life Care does not have a consistent sick leave policy across facilities; some part-
time employees receive paid sick while others do not, a practice that existed before the pandemic
and remains in place. 353
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d. Initial vaccination rates at nursing homes investigated were
high, but booster rates have lagged.
Given the significant role nursing home operators play as caretakers, health care providers,
and employers, vaccinating their residents and staff has largely depended on them. To understand
whether vaccinations have been effectively administered among the nursing homes investigated,
the Select Subcommittee obtained data concerning the percentage of residents and staff who
received coronavirus vaccines and boosters, separated by facility and by primary vaccination series
versus booster doses. 354 The Select Subcommittee found that while rates for primary series
vaccinations were generally high among both residents and staff across all companies, booster
rates were significantly lower.
i. Nursing home residents
Each of the companies investigated had average primary series vaccination rates among
residents between 77% and 84% across the sample of facilities reviewed by the Select
Subcommittee. These rates spanned a wide range. On the high end, the primary series vaccination
rate was 99% among residents at a Sava facility in Connecticut, 97% for residents at a Consulate
facility in Florida, and 95% for residents at a Genesis facility in Kentucky. An Ensign facility in
California also had 99% of residents receive a primary vaccination series, while a Life Care facility
in Massachusetts had a rate of 100%. On the low end, one Consulate facility in Florida had a
vaccination rate of 42%, while a second Genesis facility in Kentucky had only 57% of residents
vaccinated.
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Average primary series and booster rate for residents of 15 facilities of each investigated company
as of July 2022. Booster rates consist of the percentage of residents who have received any vaccine
after a completed primary series. 355
The average booster rate of all facilities across all companies was 63%—a concerningly
low rate given that booster doses have been available for high-risk individuals since September
2021, have been demonstrated to protect against severe illness, hospitalization, and death, and are
particularly important for high-risk individuals such as those residing in nursing homes. 356 Rates
across and within companies were not uniform. Eleven of 15 Genesis facilities reviewed and nine
of 15 Ensign facilities had at least a 70% rate among residents. Seven facilities belonging to both
Life Care and Sava—just under half of sampled facilities for each—had more than 70% of
residents receive boosters during the period reviewed, while only four facilities belonging to
Consulate reached this rate.
On March 29, 2022, FDA authorized second booster doses for patients 50 years of age and
older and certain immunocompromised patients over age 12—populations that are likely to
encompass a large percentage of nursing home residents. 357 Yet data showing resident uptake of
second booster doses reflect an average rate of only 25% across the five companies, with many
facilities having rates as low as 0%. Nearly half of all reviewed facilities had rates lower than
10%. Studies show that immunity derived from primary vaccination series and the initial booster
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eventually wanes, making it essential that nursing home facilities ensure residents are up to date
on coronavirus boosters, which now include the bivalent booster authorized in October. 358
Average second booster rate for residents of 15 facilities of each investigated company as of July
2022. Second booster rates consist of the percentage of residents who have received at least one
dose after completion of both a primary series and one additional dose. 359 Booster rates do not
include bivalent boosters.
ii. Nursing Home Staff
Primary series vaccination rates among nursing home staff were even higher than those of
residents at the facilities reviewed but dropped off even more significantly when it came to
boosters. The average primary series vaccination rate for staff was 89% across the five companies.
Seven facilities across these four companies had 100% primary series staff vaccination rates: three
Sava facilities, two Genesis facilities, one Life Care facility, and one Ensign facility.
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Average primary series and booster rate for staff at 15 facilities of each investigated company as of
July 2022. Booster rates consist of the percentage of staff who have received any vaccine after a
completed primary series. 360
Booster rates, however, saw a substantial drop-off among staff at facilities reviewed. The
average of the facilities’ booster rates across all five companies was 46%. At two Ensign facilities,
booster rates among staff were 0%, while each of the other four companies had facilities with
booster rates as low as 13% to 16%. For four of the five companies—Consulate, Ensign, Genesis,
and Life Care—a majority of facilities reviewed had staff booster rates lower than 50%. Given
the low percentages of staff at these establishments who have received any additional vaccine dose
since their primary series—which could have occurred nearly two years ago—and the eventual
waning of vaccine-induced immunity, it is essential that nursing homes ensure more of their staff
receive coronavirus booster installments. 361
The vaccination and booster trends among the five companies investigated by the Select
Subcommittee are largely consistent with industry-wide vaccination data. According to CMS data,
as of November 2022, approximately 87% of residents and 87% of staff in long-term care facilities
had received full primary series of the coronavirus vaccine, while approximately 41% of residents
and 25% of staff were reported as being up to date on coronavirus boosters. 362
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2. The pandemic’s toll has fallen most heavily on minority
communities.
Chairman Clyburn observed that racial inequity has been “laid bare by the coronavirus
pandemic.” 363 In the first half of 2020, African Americans and Latinos had death rates from
coronavirus that far outweighed those of whites. 364 While 62% of the population age 45-54 in
2020 was white, this population accounted for only 22% of coronavirus deaths in that age range.
In fact, researchers observed in June 2020 that, “in every age category, Black people are dying
from COVID at roughly the same rate as white people more than a decade older.” 365 Disparities
were even more pronounced in some states such as Louisiana, where in April 2020, African
Americans represented 70% of coronavirus deaths despite being only one third of the state’s
population. 366 The rates of death between minorities and non-minorities narrowed through 2021
and 2022 due to a higher opposition to the coronavirus vaccine in white communities. 367 However,
cumulative data shows that minority communities have experienced overall higher rates of
infection, hospitalization, and death from the virus. 368
The racial disparities discussed above with respect to higher rates of underlying medical
conditions, less access to healthy food and clean water, and more exposure to environmental
pollutants all contributed to these higher rates of negative outcomes. 369 A Washington University
St. Louis study identified two factors that had an “overwhelming” impact on how rapidly
coronavirus infections spread throughout a community—population density and long term
exposure to air pollution—factors which disproportionately affect communities of color.370
Another study from Harvard Medical School “found evidence of a synergistic association of poor
diet and increased socioeconomic deprivation with COVID-19 risk that was higher than the sum
of the risk associated with each factor alone.” 371
Black and Hispanic workers also comprise a higher percentage of frontline workers who
were required to interact with the public during the coronavirus crisis, such as public transit
operators and food-service workers, as compared to their overall representation in the
workforce. 372 This put Black and Hispanic workers—and their families—at greater risk of
exposure to the coronavirus. Black and Hispanic Americans are also more likely to live in inter-
generational households, thus putting whole families at risk when one member contracted the
virus. 373
E. Life-Saving Vaccinations and the Biden Administration’s Stewardship
Helped the Nation Emerge from the Coronavirus Crisis, Yet Decisions
Made by the Trump Administration, Actions Taken by Private
Companies, and Predatory Actors Spreading Misinformation Have
Undermined These Efforts.
Upon assuming office, President Biden took immediate action to overcome early
mismanagement of the coronavirus crisis, administering 200 million vaccine doses within its first
100 days—double the Administration’s initial goal of 100 million vaccinations. 374 The Biden
Administration’s robust efforts to increase supply and equitable access to life-saving coronavirus
vaccines resulted in over 228 million Americans having completed a primary vaccination series
today. 375 This historic vaccination campaign profoundly altered the trajectory of the pandemic,
preventing over two million deaths and 17 million hospitalizations through the end of March 2022.
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Researchers at The Commonwealth Fund estimated there would have been an additional 66 million
infections and nearly $900 billion in associated health care costs in the absence of vaccination. 376
Shortly after taking office, President Biden also committed to restoring trust in the federal
government by using a science-driven approach to lead the nation’s pandemic response—a sharp
contrast to the Trump Administration’s pattern of allowing political considerations to overrule and
obstruct the work of career scientists. 377 The Biden Administration took a number of steps that
allowed the country to overcome the crisis phase of the pandemic, including putting forth a
comprehensive national plan to mitigate its spread and working with Democrats in Congress to
pass the American Rescue Plan to ensure that federal, state, local, and tribal governments had the
necessary resources to do so. The American Rescue Plan made significant investments in state
and local public health departments and provided critical funding to support the safe reopening of
99% of schools in America. 378 The Biden Administration also used American Rescue Plan funding
to make historic investments in coronavirus testing capacity, advance equitable access to
coronavirus treatments, and make hundreds of millions of high-quality masks available to
Americans for free. 379
Unfortunately, contracts awarded by the Trump Administration, actions taken by private
companies, and the spread of misinformation by predatory actors have undermined these efforts.
1. Emergent BioSolutions, which received a vaccine manufacturing
contract from the Trump Administration despite red flags, wasted
hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars manufacturing defective
vaccines.
The Select Subcommittee’s joint investigation with the Committee on Oversight and
Reform uncovered extensive failures by Emergent BioSolutions, Inc. (Emergent), which resulted
in the destruction of 525.2 million doses of taxpayer-funded coronavirus vaccines manufactured
between July 2020 and February 2022. 380 Despite clear red flags, the Trump Administration
awarded Emergent a $628 million contract in May 2020 to support the manufacturing of Johnson
& Johnson and AstraZeneca coronavirus vaccines. Emergent’s failures wasted hundreds of
millions of taxpayer dollars and hindered the federal government’s ability to meet the urgent,
global need for coronavirus vaccines. 381
The Committees’ investigation revealed that the Trump Administration was aware, prior
to awarding the contract, of serious problems and deficient controls at Emergent’s Bayview facility
in Baltimore, Maryland that could impact vaccine manufacturing. The Committees released
documents reflecting two inspections conducted by BARDA and FDA in April 2020, which
warned of “substantial evidence” of noncompliance with quality standards, including “inadequate
quality unit oversight,” “failure of quality systems,” persistent problems with mold, poor
disinfection of plant equipment, and inadequate training of employees. Disregarding these
findings, the Trump Administration recommended that Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca
partner with Emergent to manufacture coronavirus vaccines. 382
Over the course of the investigation, the Committees exposed how Emergent executives
privately expressed serious concerns about the company’s manufacturing shortcomings at the same
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time they promoted the capabilities of the Bayview facility and solicited and negotiated
multimillion-dollar contracts with Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca. Emergent’s then-
Executive Vice President of Manufacturing and Technical Operations privately acknowledged that
he had warned Emergent senior executives “for a few years” about the company’s deficient quality
systems, including that “room to improve is a huge understatement.” 383 Internal communications
obtained by the Committees showed that this executive confided to Emergent’s President and
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in June 2020 that the overall state of quality systems at the facility
“keeps me up at night,” yet assured an AstraZeneca senior vice president that Emergent was
“confident Bayview has the appropriate fundamental quality systems and the capable workforce
to successfully execute this acceleration.” This took place after AstraZeneca expressed concerns
in July 2020 that FDA had determined “Emergent isn’t prepared for commercial
manufacturing.” 384
Additional inspections and audits conducted in June, July, and September 2020 by
Operation Warp Speed, BARDA, FDA, Johnson & Johnson, and AstraZeneca identified
numerous, critical deficiencies that Emergent failed to remediate before it began manufacturing
vaccines. 385 In a transcribed interview with the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Kadlec said he was
unaware of these findings, despite his role overseeing BARDA as Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response and involvement with Operation Warp Speed during the Trump
Administration. Dr. Kadlec acknowledged that these findings were “kind of a big deal” and that
“it seems like a drum beat of issues that were being raised.” 386 The Trump Administration added
$30 million to Emergent’s contract in late July 2020 to reserve additional manufacturing
capabilities at Bayview. 387
The Committees’ investigation revealed that Emergent executives continued to internally
acknowledge compliance shortcomings and the lack of commercial manufacturing experience at
the Bayview facility after the company began manufacturing coronavirus vaccines. Internal
communications obtained by the Committees show that Bayview’s Senior Director of Quality
emailed Emergent’s Executive Vice President of Business Operations in advance of an FDA site
visit in September 2020 stating, “Our risk is high!” and, “we lack commercial GMP [good
manufacturing practices] compliance maturity” and “we are not in full compliance yet-BUT-we
are making batches NOW.” Emergent also admitted to HHS in July and August 2020 that its staff
were mostly “temporary employees [with] little or no pharmaceutical experience.” Johnson &
Johnson, AstraZeneca, and FDA repeatedly warned Emergent between September and December
2020 that it was not meeting quality standards and not ready for commercial manufacturing. An
outside consultant to Emergent provided a stark warning about Emergent’s manufacturing in
November 2020: “I am stating very loudly that this work is NON-CGMP compliant. And a direct
regulatory risk.” 388
Emergent failed to remedy these issues, subsequently producing millions of doses of
contaminated vaccines while receiving millions of dollars from Johnson & Johnson, AstraZeneca,
and the federal government. In his transcribed interview, Dr. Kadlec said he was unaware that
roughly 61.2 million Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca coronavirus vaccine doses were rejected
or aborted due to microbial contamination and equipment failure during his tenure as ASPR in the
Trump Administration, although he was generally aware that concerns about Emergent’s
manufacturing had developed during that time. 389 The Committees’ investigation found that
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inexperienced staff and high employee turnover at the Bayview facility impaired Emergent’s
quality systems and contributed to the vaccine contamination. In a briefing to the Committees,
FDA acknowledged, “Clearly, in retrospect, they hired a lot of individuals not as familiar with
vaccine manufacturing, that did not have adequate training to do so.”390
Evidence obtained by the Committees also revealed that Emergent took repeated steps to
hide evidence of its failures from the federal government. Immediately before an FDA site visit
in February 2021, Emergent employees removed quality-assurance “hold tags” from Johnson &
Johnson vaccine batches—which indicated that the containers had a potential quality issue. The
containers were re-tagged after the inspection and “before the end of the evening.” In an email
obtained by the Committees, an outside consultant stated that the tags were removed “to avoid
drawing attention to the two subject containers during the tour by the FDA inspectors.” Multiple
senior leaders at Emergent were aware of the removal of the tags, including the Vice President of
Manufacturing Operations, the Quality Assurance Manager, the Senior Manager in Quality
Systems, and the Senior Director of Quality. 391 Two days before this incident, Emergent awarded
millions in raises and bonuses to its senior executives, praising them for their “exceptional
leadership” and “exemplary” performance in 2020—as vaccines were being destroyed, as revealed
by the Committees. Emergent even rewarded the executive who had previously admitted that
Bayview’s quality systems “keeps me up at night” with a “special bonus” of $100,000—on top of
a regular bonus of $320,000—in recognition of his “exceptional performance” in 2020 “related to
COVID19.” 392
After Emergent notified HHS in March 2021 that it had cross-contaminated millions of
Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca coronavirus vaccines, internal communications show that
Emergent personnel expressed concern that HHS was “getting too involved.” Company executives
strategized on how to evade questions from HHS. 393 The Biden Administration permanently
halted production of AstraZeneca’s vaccine and paused manufacturing of Johnson & Johnson’s
vaccine in April 2021. 394 At a Select Subcommittee hearing on May 19, 2021, Emergent’s
Chairman and CEO apologized and acknowledged some of the company’s failures but continued
to minimize the seriousness of vaccine contamination at the Bayview facility. 395
Emergent claimed to have addressed quality concerns and deficiencies subsequently
identified by FDA during inspections in June and July 2021 and resumed manufacturing for
Johnson & Johnson in August 2021. However, the Biden Administration canceled its partnership
with Emergent and terminated the company’s multimillion-dollar contract on November 1, 2021,
because the company had failed to follow federal manufacturing standards as required by its
contract. 396 Johnson & Johnson representatives later confirmed to the Committees that “there
continued to be issues” with manufacturing at the Bayview facility during the winter of 2021, up
until Emergent stopped manufacturing in early February 2022. The Committees investigation
revealed that foreign regulatory authorities from the European Union, Canada, and South Africa
conducted audits of the Bayview facility between February and April 2022, documenting “adverse
regulatory findings” and noting “that contamination issues are still present and are not under
control”––confirming FDA’s findings that Emergent had not remediated issues and was not
operating in compliance with quality standards. 397
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Following the release of the Committees’ May 10, 2022, staff report, Johnson & Johnson
notified Emergent on May 31, 2022, that it intended to send a notice terminating its contract,
effective July 6, 2022. Johnson & Johnson representatives told Committee staff that they were
alarmed by the Committees’ findings that Emergent employees hid evidence of potential quality
issues in order to deceive FDA inspectors. According to one senior Johnson & Johnson
representative, this “signaled a shift from capability to misconduct,” explaining that being “unable
to manufacture something” is different than “withholding information.” 398 In total, Emergent
received $330 million in taxpayer dollars under the contract awarded by the Trump Administration
as well as millions from its private contracts with Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca. 399 Despite
repeated claims that it had addressed concerns, the company’s unacceptable and irresponsible
business practices ultimately led to the destruction of 420 million Johnson & Johnson and 105.2
million AstraZeneca coronavirus vaccine doses. 400
2. One Medical failed to follow vaccine prioritization guidelines,
manipulating distribution to benefit its bottom line and those with
connections.
After the first coronavirus vaccines were authorized in December 2020, federal, state, and
local public health departments worked with health care providers to rapidly distribute vaccines
and administer vaccinations. Due to limited supplies in late 2020 and early 2021, CDC and local
public health departments recommended prioritizing vaccinations for certain high-risk populations
such as senior citizens, long-term care facility residents and staff, health care workers, and other
essential workers. During the early vaccine roll out, reports emerged that some health care
providers disregarded vaccine eligibility requirements and sought to profit from the public sense
of urgency surrounding vaccines.
As the Select Subcommittee revealed in a December 2021 report, One Medical, a
nationwide membership-based primary care practice in which members pay an annual fee for
access to its platform in addition to the cost of services provided, 401 took advantage of its access
to scarce coronavirus vaccines to promote the company’s business interests and push vaccine
seekers toward paying for One Medical memberships. In an internal chat message, one senior One
Medical executive said, “maybe i’m being too opportunistic, but we should be really focused on
how to capitalize on this visibility … how can we take advantage of the vacinne [sic] interest to
conver [sic] to our other company objectives.” Another senior executive suggested that “the only
way people can get a vaccine is if they are a member….so we need to make it easy to sign up….and
cheap possibly.” The Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that some users who attempted
to make a vaccination appointment with One Medical were required to enter credit card
information and subscribe to a $199 per year membership plan, despite the fact that vaccines were
free, having been purchased by the federal government. 402
The Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that One Medical and its employees gave
priority access to coronavirus vaccinations to friends and family of executives and non-patient-
facing employees, including remote staff. Instead of going to those with the greatest need,
One Medical helped VIPs, paying members and enterprise clients, business contacts, and friends
and family members of One Medical employees get through the vaccination gate ahead of others.
One Medical also enabled a flood of patients, some of whom were ineligible, to get early access
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to vaccinations. Despite repeated complaints, internal messages obtained by the Select
Subcommittee showed that One Medical’s leadership was slow to act and inconsistent in upholding
vaccine eligibility guidelines, with one employee remarking about the company’s policy: “[W]e
turn nobody away. We aren’t gate keeping.” 403
One Medical’s failure to administer coronavirus vaccines equitably reflects broader
struggles to reach vulnerable communities that plagued the early vaccine rollout. The Company’s
willful disregard of proper vaccination prioritization contributed to a delay in vaccination of
members of vulnerable communities—leaving them at heightened risk from the coronavirus in the
early months of 2021 while vaccines remained in short supply. Upon receipt of complaints and
reports of One Medical’s conduct, several local governments terminated their vaccine distribution
agreements with the company. 404
2. Misinformation and distrust of public health expertise has
contributed to the unnecessary loss of life.
Misinformation and disinformation about the coronavirus undermined the nation’s
pandemic response and cost American lives. Throughout the pandemic, nefarious actors spread
false information about risks posed by the coronavirus, public health measures proven to curb
transmission, and the safety and effectiveness of coronavirus vaccines and treatments. While some
of the figures pushing false information masked their identities by operating online, prominent
politicians and well-known media figures played a significant role in disseminating and amplifying
misinformation. Misinformation led some Americans to endanger their own lives by refusing
coronavirus vaccines and proven treatments in favor of alternative drugs that cannot prevent or
cure coronavirus infections. 405 The rampant spread of coronavirus misinformation also led to
distrust, harassment, and even violence against public health officials, doctors and nurses, store
clerks, flight attendants, and other Americans who have been tasked with preserving public health
during the pandemic. 406
The Biden Administration has made efforts to combat misinformation and politicization,
pledging early on to let scientists lead and elevated scientists and public health experts in
leadership roles, and working to remove partisanship from vaccine messaging. 407 But these
insidious forces have been difficult to dislodge.
a. Fueled by the former President and other right-wing public
figures, science-based public health expertise and guidance
has been under attack.
Much of the phenomenon of coronavirus misinformation can be traced to President Trump
and his efforts to politicize the pandemic. In addition to treating the coronavirus crisis as a political
problem, the former President pushed lies about risks posed by the virus and took steps to
undermine the scientists who were working to address America’s worst public health crisis in a
century. From the earliest weeks of the crisis, President Trump made false promises about the
virus’s spread and the country’s preparedness. Two days after a February 25, 2020, CDC
telebriefing “angered” President Trump by warning Americans about the coming disruption, he
inaccurately claimed: “It’s going to disappear. One day, it’s like a miracle—it will disappear.” 408
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While the nation was experiencing severe shortages in coronavirus tests, President Trump falsely
asserted during a March 6, 2020, visit to the CDC: “Anybody that wants a test can get a test.” 409
The former President’s spread of falsehoods became even more insidious as the pandemic
continued. On April 23, 2020, President Trump suggested that disinfectant or ultraviolet light
could be used to treat the coronavirus, saying, “I see the disinfectant that knocks it out in a minute,
one minute. And is there a way we can do something like that by injection inside or almost a
cleaning?” 410 In October 2020, President Trump falsely asserted that a CDC study had shown
“that 85% of the people wearing masks catch” the coronavirus. 411 The former President repeatedly
advocated for the use of hydroxychloroquine to treat the coronavirus and claimed at one point that
a study finding hydroxychloroquine ineffective as a coronavirus treatment was authored by
“people that aren’t big Trump fans.” 412 He frequently attacked those who were willing to
contradict his lies—increasingly targeting Dr. Anthony Fauci, a career scientist, as the pandemic
dragged on. In October 2020, he stated: “People are tired of hearing Fauci and all these idiots.”413
These falsehoods and attacks on scientists were not limited to the former President himself.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations uncovered extensive evidence revealing how top
advisors to the former President sought to amplify his lies while attacking scientific experts. Mr.
Navarro published an op-ed in July 2020 arguing that Dr. Fauci “has been wrong about everything
I have interacted with him on.” 414 As detailed in an August 2022 Select Subcommittee report, Mr.
Navarro and his top scientific advisor Dr. Stephen Hatfill went on to conduct a furtive campaign
seeking to discredit Dr. Fauci. 415 A Select Subcommittee investigation also revealed that top HHS
officials took steps to further the President’s preferred narrative about coronavirus treatments. In
early July 2020, Dr. Alexander and other political appointees sought to publish an op-ed rebutting
a CDC study on hydroxychloroquine, which had its EUA revoked by FDA on June 15, 2020, due
to its inefficacy as a coronavirus treatment and potential safety issues. 416 In an internal email to
Dr. Hahn on July 19, 2020, previously released by the Select Subcommittee, Dr. Alexander pushed
a study purporting to show the benefits of hydroxychloroquine, asserting: “I want to help the
administration,” and “we are being fought by the other side and media which is horrendous.” 417
Fox News and other conservative media outlets parroted the former President’s lies. Fox
Business anchor Trish Regan said on March 9, 2020, that concerns over the emerging virus were
“yet another attempt to impeach the President.” 418 Fox’s top rated host, Tucker Carlson, repeatedly
attacked Dr. Fauci and other scientific experts on his program, telling viewers in August 2022 that
Dr. Fauci had committed “very serious crimes” and “apparently engineered the single most
devastating event in modern American history.” 419 Another Fox host, Laura Ingraham, repeatedly
touted ivermectin—a disproven coronavirus treatment—on her program, saying on one occasion,
“And you never hear Fauci talk about that, or D3 or ivermectin, because they haven’t even given
emergency use authorization for ivermectin, haven’t even put out anything about that. They’re
way behind all these other countries.” 420 Nationally syndicated conservative radio host Phil
Valentine expressed skepticism about coronavirus vaccines and told his listeners he had begun
taking ivermectin after becoming infected with the virus. 421 He later expressed regret after he was
hospitalized for his infection, from which he later died. 422
Misinformation about the pandemic has become ubiquitous. A November 2021 poll found
that 78% of adults had heard at least one of eight different false statements about the coronavirus
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and either believed one to be true or were unsure if the statement was true or false. 423 Nearly a
third of adults surveyed said that they believed or were uncertain about at least four false statements
about the pandemic. 424 Consumers of Fox News, Newsmax, and One America News were found
to be significantly more likely to believe falsehoods than consumers of CNN, NPR or MSNBC.425
Research has also found direct causal links between the former President’s lies about the
pandemic and the spread of misinformation. A study at Cornell University analyzed 38 million
articles about the pandemic in English-language media around the world and concluded that
President Trump was the single largest driver of coronavirus misinformation between January 1
and May 26, 2020. 426 The researchers found that President Trump’s promotion of “miracle cures”
like hydroxychloroquine significantly contributed to the spread of misinformation. 427 By feeding
the public falsehoods about the coronavirus and coronavirus treatments, the former President made
it more difficult for Americans to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate sources of health
information. This also made it harder for Americans to know how to protect themselves and their
loved ones from the coronavirus, ultimately threatening the health of the American people.
b. Misinformation has led to harassment, threats, and attacks
on public health officials.
Misinformation and the politicization of public health not only undermined public health
but also threatened the safety—and at times the lives—of those charged with protecting it. During
a Select Subcommittee hearing in September 2021, state and local public health officials testified
about their personal experiences dealing with threats during the pandemic. For example, Dr.
Jennifer Bacani McKenney, Health Officer of the Wilson County Health Department in Kansas,
testified about an incident where her home was filmed, and the footage posted on social media.
Louisiana State Health Officer and Medical Director of the Louisiana Department of Health Dr.
Joseph Kanter said that he had experienced “increased anger and threats made to me personally,
some very ugly and with obvious intent to track down my family’s personal identifying
information.” Dr. Mysheika Roberts, Health Commissioner of Columbus Public Health, similarly
testified about threats to multiple state health officers in Ohio, including an assistant medical
director who “had shots fired at her home.”
c. Right-wing extremists contributed to and profited from the
spread of misinformation.
In October 2021, the Select Subcommittee initiated an investigation into two prominent
purveyors of misinformation—America’s Frontline Doctors (AFLDS) and
SpeakWithAnMD.com—that used telemedicine to prescribe disproven and potentially hazardous
coronavirus treatments across the United States. 428 Since at least the spring of 2021,
SpeakWithAnMD.com and its parent company, Encore Telemedicine, collaborated with AFLDS
to provide paid telehealth consultations and sell off-label prescriptions for hydroxychloroquine
and ivermectin, seeking to capitalize off the spread of coronavirus misinformation to market and
sell these disproven and potentially hazardous treatments. 429 AFLDS’s website referred patients
to SpeakWithAnMD.com to provide patients seeking these treatments with telemedicine
consultations with “AFLDS-trained and licensed physicians.” 430
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New information obtained by the Select Subcommittee shows that, in the five-month period
between April 2021 and September 2021, more than 480,000 prospective patients registered for
accounts on SpeakWithAnMD.com’s telemedicine platform seeking consultations. 431 According
to press reports, AFLDS referred over 255,000 individuals to SpeakWithAnMD.com between July
16, 2021, and September 12, 2021. Approximately 72,000 of these prospective patients paid $90
for initial phone consultations, and many also had follow-up consultations for an additional $60.432
One investigation found that some individuals were charged for consultations that never occurred.
In total, prospective patients appear to have paid more than $6.7 million for consultations from
July 2021 to September 2021. 433
These two entities also teamed up with fringe operatives to promote their businesses and
increase their reach. SpeakWithAnMD.com entered a contract with prominent conspiracy theorist
Dr. Jerome Corsi to steer prospective patients to their website in return for lucrative referral fees.
Dr. Corsi was to receive between $5 to $20 for each patient that he referred to
SpeakWithAnMD.com. 434 As described earlier in this report, Trump White House officials
engaged with Dr. Corsi to generate support for and exert inappropriate pressure on FDA to
reauthorize hydroxychloroquine as a coronavirus treatment.
Following these telemedicine consultations, SpeakWithAnMD.com-affiliated medical
providers reportedly prescribed thousands of doses of potentially hazardous coronavirus
treatments, including ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine. 435 FDA, CDC, and NIH recommend
against taking ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine to prevent or treat coronavirus infections
because they are ineffective and can cause severe illness. 436 By encouraging the use of
questionable treatments and discouraging coronavirus vaccination, these entities—along with
others that have spread misinformation—put American lives at risk and threatened our nation’s
ability to overcome the coronavirus crisis.
d. Politicization of the pandemic fueled deadly anti-vaccine
sentiment.
Misinformation has made vaccine refusal a core tenet of the far right. While anti-vaccine
sentiment was once relegated to the fringe, prominent right-wing figures and Republican members
of Congress distorted the life-saving benefits of coronavirus vaccines in order to portray them as
mechanisms of government overreach and threats to freedom. While President Trump himself did
not actively push anti-vaccine rhetoric, his attacks on scientists and scientific institutions had the
effect of making the apolitical experts who urged the public to get vaccinated seem like partisans
to be distrusted. Many of the President’s supporters and political acolytes attacked coronavirus
vaccines as experimental, potentially dangerous, or simply unnecessary.
For example, Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene tweeted false information about
coronavirus vaccines in July 2021, writing: “Thousands of people are reporting very serious life
changing vaccine side effects from taking covid vaccines. 5,946 deaths are reported on the CDC
website. Social media is censoring their stories & the media is silent. Biden is going to homes to
push shots. Just say NO!” 437 Congressman Matt Gaetz echoed this false claim several months
later, tweeting in October 2021: “Post-vaccine breakthrough infection kills more people than
Iraq’s WMD’s ever did.” 438 Senator Ron Johnson similarly said in May 2021, “I'm talking to
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doctors who have, since day one, been concerned about vaccinating people who've already had
Covid, because you die, not of Covid, you die of the immune system overreaction to Covid.”439
Similar lies and distortions were repeated by state-level Republican officials. 440
These sentiments were also echoed in conservative media. In May 2021, Tucker Carlson
used his platform to assert inflammatory information about deaths after coronavirus information,
stating: “Between late December of 2020 and last month, a total of 3,362 people apparently died
after getting the COVID vaccine in the United States … The actual number is almost certainly
higher than that, perhaps vastly higher … It’s clear that what is happening now, for whatever
reason, is not even close to normal.” 441 Mr. Carlson’s false connection between coronavirus
vaccines and unrelated deaths appeared to be designed to stoke fear among the unvaccinated. The
One America News Network took this claim even further, falsely claiming in an October 2022
segment that people vaccinated against the coronavirus are suffering from a “strange new
illness.” 442 Numerous other conservative media figures used their platforms to advocate against
coronavirus vaccines for children. 443
Despite the widespread availability of lifesaving coronavirus vaccines, approximately 20%
of eligible Americans have failed to get vaccinated, resulting in tens of thousands of preventable
hospitalizations and deaths. 444 An October 2021 analysis conducted by The Johns Hopkins’
Center for Health Security estimated that millions of Americans were unvaccinated because of
coronavirus misinformation and disinformation. This analysis found that misinformation and
disinformation caused between $50 and $300 million of harm each day since May 2021, based on
the costs of hospitalizations, valuation of lives lost, and long-term morbidity due to coronavirus
infections among the unvaccinated. 445
A May 2022 analysis conducted by researchers at Brown University and Microsoft AI
Health estimated that nearly half of all coronavirus deaths between January 2021 and April 2022
could have been averted—assuming every eligible adult over the age of 18 had gotten vaccinated
during that time. In other words, if the United States had reached 100% vaccination coverage,
nearly 319,000 adult coronavirus deaths could have been avoided as of April 30, 2022.446 Even
85% vaccination coverage could have prevented 178,000 deaths between January 1, 2021 and
April 30, 2022. 447 A separate analysis conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation and Peterson
Center on Healthcare in April 2022 estimated at least 234,000 adult coronavirus deaths between
June 2021 and March 2022 could have been prevented with a primary vaccination series—roughly
60% of all adult coronavirus deaths during that time. 448
Vaccine hesitancy has increasingly followed traditional political divides. 449 Belief in
coronavirus misinformation has been demonstrated to be linked to both vaccination status and
partisanship—with unvaccinated adults and Republicans more likely to believe or be unsure about
false statements. A November 2021 analysis found that unvaccinated adults are three times more
likely to lean Republican than Democrat, and counties with a higher Republican vote share in the
2020 presidential election experienced greater numbers of coronavirus deaths, compared to those
that voted for Democrats. 450 A September 2022 analysis by the National Bureau of Economic
Research identified political affiliation as a risk factor for the coronavirus, finding that registered
Republicans in Ohio and Florida died at higher rates than registered Democrats, after all adults
were eligible for vaccines. 451 Similar research demonstrated that Republican-leaning states—led
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by West Virginia, Wyoming, Tennessee, and Kentucky—had the most vaccine-preventable deaths
in the nation. 452 Compounding the potential harm, misinformation about the effectiveness of and
risks posed by coronavirus vaccines has also fostered skepticism about other routine vaccinations,
like childhood immunizations and flu shots. 453
4. Long COVID continues to afflict millions of Americans.
Increasing vaccine and booster uptake is critically important as a preventative measure for
Long COVID, which can develop from a coronavirus infection of any severity. 454 Although most
Americans who contract the coronavirus recover from their infections without lingering issues––
especially if they were vaccinated before being infected––millions of Americans have been
affected by Long COVID. 455 This number will only continue to grow as the coronavirus continues
to circulate. 456 Long COVID disproportionately impacts women, Hispanic, Black, bisexual, and
transgender adults, and those who have disabilities, and experts warn that longstanding gaps in
access to health care may drive disparities in diagnosis and treatment among communities of color,
rural, and low-income communities. 457
Many individuals with Long COVID also experience severe employment and financial
consequences, which has significant implications for the broader economy. The country faces up
to $3.7 trillion in economic losses from Long COVID, in the form of approximately $997 billion
in lost earnings by patients who cannot work, approximately $528 billion in increased medical
spending to address symptoms of and conditions created by Long COVID, and an estimated $2.195
trillion in loss of quality of life. 458 Long COVID is also likely to impose disproportionately high
financial harms on women—particularly Hispanic and Black women—as these groups are also
disproportionately represented in low wage jobs that are least likely to provide the support needed
to allow workers to deal with Long COVID. 459
President Biden has initiated a whole-of-government approach to address the impacts of
Long COVID, taking important steps to advance the nation’s understanding and treatment of the
condition, deliver high-quality medical care to patients, and ameliorate the economic and labor
consequences of Long COVID and strengthen support for affected Americans. 460
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PUBLIC HEALTH | ECONOMIC IMPACT & CORPORATE CONDUCT | RECOMMENDATIONS
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II. The Economic Crisis Caused by the Pandemic—Disproportionately Impacting
Those Already Struggling—Was Ameliorated by Aggressive Congressional
Action, but the Trump Administration’s Poor Implementation of Emergency
Programs Limited Their Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Equity While
Contributing to Waste, Fraud! and Abuse
As the coronavirus spread nationwide in the spring of 2020, its economic effects—and its
health consequences—were immediate and devastating. Tens of millions of Americans lost their
jobs, millions more lost work hours and income, and nearly half the nation’s small businesses
closed their doors. Tens of millions of American families were rapidly thrown into economic
precarity as the nation struggled with an unprecedented public health crisis. At the same time,
many workers who retained their jobs faced serious increased health risks from the virus.
The hardships of both job losses and work that involved increased health risks were
concentrated among lower wage, hourly workers whose jobs had to be performed in person. These
workers were the most likely to either be cut by industries hard-hit by the pandemic or to be
essential workers facing heightened coronavirus risks with in-person work that had to continue.
These jobs were disproportionately held by women, people of color, and people with lower levels
of education, meaning that the pandemic’s economic impacts exacerbated preexisting inequities,
with much of the economic harm falling on those who were already vulnerable.
Existing worker benefits and relief programs were not adequate to address these hardships.
State unemployment insurance systems were not equipped to effectively deliver aid to workers
who lost their jobs, and these systems often failed to include many workers or provide sufficient
relief. The lack of paid sick and medical leave put many essential workers at increased risk of
catching the coronavirus and therefore more financially vulnerable when they or family members
contracted the virus. The rapid rise in unemployment also led to millions of Americans falling
behind on housing payments. Small businesses that required in-person interactions, including
those in vital sectors like child care, also faced catastrophic consequences.
Congress expeditiously passed fast-acting, aggressive economic relief measures to
alleviate these hardships during the crisis. In March 2020, Congress enacted FFCRA and the
CARES Act. These laws expanded and enhanced protections that many Americans lacked, such
as medical leave and unemployment benefits, and provided unprecedented direct payments to all
Americans under designated income thresholds. In late December 2020, Congress enacted the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which briefly extended some of these measures months
after they lapsed. In March 2021, Congress enacted the American Rescue Plan Act, which
provided significant additional relief.
Although these programs were very successful at ameliorating the suffering Americans
faced during the crisis, the Trump Administration’s poor implementation of the early measures
weakened the pandemic response. The Trump Administration consistently failed to prioritize the
needs of working Americans and failed to guard against waste, fraud, and abuse. These failures
prevented Americans from getting desperately needed relief and allowed unscrupulous private
actors to profit from the pandemic.
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Congress and the Biden Administration acted to remedy the Trump Administration’s
earlier failures and improved the equity and effectiveness of relief programs while reducing their
fraud vulnerabilities. These steps, with the support provided by the American Rescue Plan and
the Biden Administration’s successful vaccination campaign, have powered a robust jobs recovery
that has added 10 million jobs and reduced unemployment to near record lows.
A. As the Coronavirus Crisis Upended the U.S. Economy, Longstanding
Inadequate Protections for Workers Put America’s Families at
Increased Risk.
1. The onset of the coronavirus crisis caused an unprecedented
economic crisis.
The onset of the pandemic caused an unprecedented economic crisis. More than 20 million
people lost their jobs in April 2020 alone, and the unemployment rate surged from 3.5% to 14.7%
in two months—the highest rate recorded since the federal government began keeping such data
in 1948. 461 At least 2.2 million more people lost hours and were pushed into involuntary part-time
work at the onset of the pandemic, increasing the number of underemployed people to an all-time
high of 10.2 million. 462 In weeks, the pandemic erased more than 10 years of job gains. 463
The service sector and the leisure and hospitality sector were particularly hard-hit, losing
22% and 48% of their respective workforces in April 2020, as many Americans avoided non-
essential in-person activities. 464 Further reflecting the severity of the pandemic’s impact, in late
March and early April 2020, approximately 43% of the nation’s small businesses reported that
they had closed down, at least temporarily. 465 The U.S. economy contracted at a nearly 30%
annual rate in the second quarter of 2020—a larger drop in economic activity than any other
quarter recorded in the last 75 years and likely the largest decline since the Great Depression. 466
2. The economic pain fell hardest on low-income workers and their
families, who were disproportionately women and people of color,
as they were more likely to work in hard-hit sectors that
experienced closures and disruptions as a result of the pandemic.
The Select Subcommittee’s oversight work, through investigations and hearings,
consistently highlighted how this economic pain exacerbated existing inequities, causing the most
harm to those who were already struggling and vulnerable. As Federal Reserve Chair Powell
testified to the Select Subcommittee in June 2021, the impact of this crisis did not fall “equally on
all Americans, and those least able to shoulder the burden” were “the hardest hit.”
A major cause of this unequal impact was that “only 20% of Black workers and 16% of
Latinx workers” were “able to work from home,” according to Rose Godinez, a racial justice expert
who testified to the Select Subcommittee during an October 2021 hearing on the meatpacking
industry. 467 As a result, many lost their jobs as the industries they worked in experienced closures
and business declines. Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell testified to the Select
Subcommittee in June 2021 that pandemic-related unemployment fell “disproportionately on
lower-wage workers in the service sector and on African-Americans and Hispanics.” 468 For
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example, more than a third of workers in the child care sector—who are disproportionately women
of color—lost their jobs in the first two months of the pandemic. 469 These low wage workers were
already vulnerable to economic emergencies, as they were paid less than employees in 98% of
other occupations. 470
The disparate impacts of the pandemic on service sector workers also resulted in dramatic
gender inequities in pandemic job losses. Dr. C. Nicole Mason of the Institute for Women’s Policy
Research testified to the Select Subcommittee in May 2022, “During the early months of the
pandemic, women lost four times as many jobs as men.” 471 The early recovery of lost jobs did not
remedy the gender inequity of initial losses. By the end of 2020, women still had lost over one
million more jobs during the crisis than men on a net basis. For the month of December 2020,
losses of jobs held by women accounted for all net job loss suffered as a surge in coronavirus
infections led to employers to shed additional jobs. 472 Contributing to and compounding these
unequal impacts, the contraction of the child care sector led to an increased child care burden that
fell disproportionately on mothers, forcing many women out of the workforce. 473
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations confirmed that the brunt of the pandemic’s
economic impacts were unequally borne by women and people of color. In December 2021, by
which point women’s labor force participation had declined by 1.5 million (compared to a male
labor force decline of 900,000), the Select Subcommittee initiated an investigation into 12 of the
largest employers in America across multiple industries. 474 The Select Subcommittee sought
demographic data on various employment outcomes (e.g., layoffs, furloughs, terminations,
reductions in hour or pay, and quits or resignations), as well as information regarding the
companies’ workplace policies. 475 In May 2022, the Select Subcommittee released an initial
analysis of the survey data showing that among hourly workers, women disproportionately
experienced negative employment outcomes during the first year of the pandemic as compared to
their male coworkers—discrepancies that were amplified by but predated the pandemic, and that
also impacted racial minorities. Data obtained from the surveyed companies showed at least 25
instances in 2020 in which a company’s female hourly workforce disproportionately experienced
given negative employment outcome compared to their male counterparts, while the reverse
occurred in only 12 instances. 476 The investigation further found that hourly workers of color had
worse outcomes than their white peers and salaried workers, with Black workers being fired at
higher rates and promoted at lower rates than white workers. 477
3. Before the pandemic, American workers and families, particularly
those with low incomes, lacked the financial protections needed to
cope with job losses.
Before the onset of the pandemic, many lower-income Americans lacked the resources to
weather a crisis without emergency relief. Pre-pandemic data showed that nearly 40% of
Americans reported that they could not cover an unexpected expense of just $1,000. 478 Were these
Americans to lose their jobs, they would be heavily reliant on unemployment insurance. Yet state
unemployment insurance systems, suffering from underinvestment and, in some states, overly
restrictive eligibility requirements and low benefit levels, were not equipped to meet the
unprecedented job loss inflicted by the pandemic.
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States weakened and failed to invest in unemployment insurance systems for decades,
particularly since the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 479 Antiquated technological systems and lack of
administrative capacity for processing unemployment claims harmed state effectiveness in
distributing badly needed relief, prevented state and local governments from effectively adjusting
benefit levels to reflect lost earnings, made it difficult to pay benefits in a timely manner during
the crisis, and left programs vulnerable to fraud. 480
Before the pandemic, as Indivar Dutta-Gupta of the Center on Poverty and Inequality at
Georgetown Law testified to the Select Subcommittee in September 2021, many states also cut
eligibility for and benefit payments from unemployment insurance to such an extent that fewer
than three in 10 workers were actually eligible for benefits when unemployed. Benefits became
so low in some states that workers fell below the poverty line even when they received benefits. 481
Indeed, in some states, as few as 9% of unemployed workers received unemployment insurance
when unemployed due to increasingly stringent eligibility rules regarding the number of quarters
of previous earnings required in traditional employment and the high earnings required to receive
eligibility.482 For those who did receive benefits, those benefit levels averaged below 50% in the
majority of states. 483 Gig workers and self-employed individuals were ineligible to receive any
unemployment insurance at all, even as the number of workers in such roles surged dramatically
in the years leading up to the pandemic. 484
Many working Americans and their families also lacked health insurance, which created a
critical vulnerability during the pandemic for the uninsured, who may have been forced to choose
between avoiding badly-needed care or falling into debt after contracting the virus. At the end of
2019, 28.9 million nonelderly people were uninsured, even as 85% of those uninsured lived in
households where someone was employed and working. 485 Upon losing employment, even those
workers who previously had health insurance would be unable to continue to pay for insurance
while unemployed. 486 This vulnerability was caused, in significant part, by the refusal of 12 states
to expand Medicaid to cover low-income workers and families. 487
4. Many workers who avoided immediate job losses—often lower-
income workers who were disproportionately people of color—
faced increased health risks and lacked critical workplace benefits
and protections.
Even workers who avoided losing their jobs immediately with the onset of the coronavirus
crisis and its resulting layoffs often faced significant hardships. This was particularly true for
essential workers who had to perform their roles in person at the height of the crisis. Many of
these workers also lacked the sick, medical, and family leave necessary to cope with the illness
and caregiving responsibilities caused by the pandemic, and many also lacked affordable health
insurance necessary to ensure health care access during a public health emergency.
Essential workers who needed to work in person, and their family members, were
significantly more likely to contract the coronavirus early in the crisis. 488 These essential workers
disproportionately earned low wages and were more likely to be people of color. 489 Black and
Latina women were particularly “overrepresented as essential workers” at greater risk of
coronavirus infection “with Latina women making up 22% of women grocery store workers and
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Black women making up 27% of women home health aide workers,” according to the October
2021 testimony from Godinez. 490
Many of these workers also lacked critical benefits that would have allowed them to better
cope with the illnesses and caregiving responsibilities caused by the pandemic, and which would
have made their workplaces safer. Professor Dutta-Gupta testified in September 2021 that
“[u]nlike other wealthy nations, we had no national paid family and medical leave program, no
sick leave guarantee, no child allowance or robust cash assistance, no unemployment assistance
for new job seekers or returning workers, and no health coverage guaranteed.” 491 Dr. Mason
testified in May 2022 that vulnerable workers in “the hardest hit sectors did not have health
insurance, paid family and sick leave, job security, predictable scheduling, or flexibility.” 492
The lack of paid sick, medical, and family leave took a particularly large toll on American
workers’ finances and health during the coronavirus crisis. Before the pandemic, 24% of all
American workers had no paid sick leave and 81% had no paid family or medical leave for
extended medical problems. 493 That limited flexibility and leave for workers contributes to
negative health outcomes. Paid leave expert Vicki Shabo of New America explained to the Select
Subcommittee during a May 2022 hearing:
[W]hen workers have access to paid sick time, they are more likely to take
themselves out of the workforce for a shorter period of time. They’re more likely
to get healthcare they need in an acute way. They’re more likely to get preventative
healthcare. 494
Indeed, Census data shows that during the early months of the pandemic, only 12% of low-income
workers were able to use paid leave upon contracting the coronavirus or while caring for a family
member with the virus. Even for workers with incomes over $100,000, less than half were able to
use paid leave for these absences caused by the coronavirus. 495 These workers not only
experienced increased health risks, but also saw sharp increases in food insecurity after being
forced to miss work without paid leave, with almost 50% of low-income workers without paid
leave lacking enough food to eat after missing work for coronavirus illness. 496
A Walmart worker, Cynthia Murray, testified in a May 2022 hearing about how a lack of
paid leave had affected herself and her colleagues, and explained: “We need to stop pushing
workers to come to work sick because they get penalized for missing a day.” 497 Similarly, at an
October 2021 hearing on pandemic-related infections and deaths at meatpacking plants, Martin
Rosas, President of District Union Local Two, United Food and Commercial Workers, testified
about the impact of limited leave and flexibility on meatpacking workers and their communities:
They were afraid to miss work because they do not have sufficient leave benefits
and indeed in some plants were penalized for missing work. They were afraid to
go to work and be exposed to the virus and bring home the disease to their family
members, especially those family members who were most vulnerable. Sadly,
those fears became a reality. 498
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He called for universal paid leave, including sick leave, adding that all workers “benefit when
those who are sick stay home and do not circulate viruses in the workplace.” 499
The lack of paid leave was a significant cause of women leaving the workforce
disproportionately. Rev. Dr. Starsky Wilson, President of the Children’s Defense Fund, explained
to the Select Subcommittee during a September 2021 hearing, “Most parents and caregivers who
are in low-income families don’t have paid leave to care for their children or older adults at all,
and never have had access. And this, of course, disproportionately impacts Black and brown
parents.” 500 Dr. Mason similarly testified in May 2022: “Black and Latina women, because of
caretaking responsibilities and demands and the lack of paid sick and family leave, were more
likely than other women to exit the workforce.” 501
5. The lack of critical workplace protections—particularly paid
leave—harmed the broader economy as well as the workers directly
impacted.
The Select Subcommittee’s oversight work, investigative findings, and hearings
consistently made clear that the absence of guaranteed paid leave, in addition to harming the
workers directly affected, also harms the economy as a whole. Paid leave improves worker
retention, making the economy stronger and more resilient, and more extensive paid leave could
have increased the economy’s resilience in facing the pandemic. Ms. Shabo testified at the May
2022 hearing: “We know from states that have paid family and medical leave programs in place
… that women are better able to stay employed, they have wages that go up over time …. We
know that women who are caregivers to older people or disabled adults are able to come back to
work.” 502
The Select Subcommittee’s investigation into the employment practices of 12 large
corporations also found that paid sick, medical, and caregiving leave was valuable not only to
individual workers, but to their employers and, by extension, the economy as a whole. It showed
that paid sick, medical, and caregiving leave, where available, likely helped workers stay in their
jobs during the pandemic. Employers who offered those benefits saw reduced turnover. By
contrast, workers whose employers failed to provide paid sick leave quit their jobs at significantly
higher rates than workers with access to such leave. 503
Dr. Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, Professor of Labor Studies and Employment Relations
at Rutgers University, explained how the increase in pandemic departures from the workforce
impacted the economy as a whole: “One of the fundamental inputs into economic growth is the
input of workers…. So when women are withdrawing from the labor force because of constraints
that they face, that … puts a damper on economic growth.” 504 Professor Dutta-Gupta, Co-Director
of the Georgetown Center on Poverty & Inequality, testified in September 2021 that medical and
family leave increase productivity to the benefit of employers:
Offering protections for workers to be able to prioritize their own health and the
health of their loved ones as well, including potentially sick kids and others they
care for, can absolutely allow people to focus more on productive economic activity
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and avoid some of those substantial health costs that we have been facing in this
country. 505
The Select Subcommittee’s more than two years of oversight work consistently showed
that, had universal paid leave been in effect during the crisis, the policy would have reduced
inequities, improved workplace safety, and increased employee retention—benefiting workers,
their families, employers, and the nation as a whole.
B. Congress Passed Rapid, Aggressive Federal Relief to Save Lives and
Reduce Economic Damage, Which Compensated for Structural
Weaknesses.
At the onset of the coronavirus crisis, Congress swiftly enacted legislation to address the
economic impacts of the pandemic, mitigate the suffering caused by the pandemic’s economic
fallout, and partially compensate for weaknesses in the existing safety net and benefits available
to working Americans. In March 2020, Congress enacted the Coronavirus Preparedness and
Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, the FFCRA, and the CARES Act, unprecedented
relief measures that were signed into law on March 6, March 18 and March 27 respectively.
FFCRA and the CARES Act expanded and enhanced protections that many Americans lacked,
such as sick leave and unemployment benefits, and provided unprecedented direct payments to
help Americans meet their financial needs.
The FFCRA included a limited temporary paid leave policy, which prevented an estimated
15,000 cases of COVID per day nationwide early in the crisis. 506 The CARES Act relief provisions
immediately reduced economic hardship and suffering. Data collected by the Urban Institute
showed that household food insecurity declined by nearly 20% between March and May of 2020
(although increasing the maximum Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefit
would have alleviated it significantly more). 507 CARES Act measures supported Americans for
much of the year: an Urban Institute survey found that despite substantial job losses, the share of
adults reporting material hardships in 2020 actually dropped below pre-pandemic levels, with
significant declines between December 2019 and December 2020 in food insecurity (from 23.9%
to 20.5%), utility shutoffs (from 3.8% to 2.6%), and problems paying medical bills (from 18.8%
to 14.9%). 508 The CARES Act’s enhanced unemployment benefits, which increased benefit levels
substantially and extended eligibility to impacted gig workers, were particularly impactful in
relieving hardships, despite states’ administrative delays in disbursing the benefits. In the spring
and summer of 2020, these benefits delivered relief to tens of millions of newly unemployed
workers and kept at least 5.5 million people from falling into poverty. 509 In testimony before the
Select Subcommittee in September 2021, Professor Dutta-Gupta explained: “The $600 weekly
CARES Act [unemployment] supplement supported 30 million workers, helped keep poverty from
rising, and prevented hunger . . . and even death.” 510 Testifying at the same hearing, Professor
Luke Shaefer of the University of Michigan’s School of Public Policy described his research into
hardship rates following the CARES Act’s passage:
[W]e found that despite historically high unemployment, rates of hardship were
stable—and in some cases declining—following the roll-out of the CARES Act.
That hardship did not spike during the summer months of 2020 is remarkable. 511
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By the closing months of the Trump Administration, however, many of the direct relief
measures in the CARES Act had expired, and food insecurity rates began to climb. 512 Although
House Democrats had passed two different versions of the Health and Economic Recovery
Omnibus Emergency Solutions Act (HEROES Act), which included the resources necessary to
meet the ongoing challenges, Republican opposition delayed further relief. This delay in
emergency congressional action, while Americans increasingly suffered, underscored the need for
a durably improved permanent system to provide needed assistance. In late December 2020,
Congress ultimately agreed on a significantly smaller relief package in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, which extended expanded unemployment insurance benefits for several
months, included additional direct payments to Americans, extended other relief for small
businesses, and provided $25 billion for emergency rental assistance. 513
After the Biden Administration assumed office, congressional Democrats promptly
enacted the American Rescue Plan. The ARP rapidly relieved suffering across America,
immediately decreasing hunger and other hardships. One analysis found that between early March
and late April—as the bulk of the ARP’s relief payments were distributed—the percentage of
Americans that lacked sufficient food declined from 10.7% to 8.1%, with sharp declines for
families with children. The share of Americans reporting difficulty paying basic expenses declined
from 14.4% to 9.8%, and those behind on rent or mortgage payments declined from 9.5% to 7.4%.
This analysis also found that the share of people reporting anxiety, depression, or hopelessness
dropped significantly following the ARP’s enactment. 514 The ARP also replenished the pandemic
unemployment relief program with increased benefits and expanded eligibility, keeping at least
2.3 million people out of poverty as the job market began to recover. 515
The ARP also provided critical relief by making health insurance more affordable for low-
and middle-income Americans. Supported by the American Rescue Plan’s expansion of premium
tax credits for the purchase of health insurance on Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges, nearly
three million people gained health insurance during the 2021 special enrollment period opened by
the Biden Administration. 516 The expanded premium tax credits lowered premiums and out-of-
pocket health costs for individuals across the income spectrum. An increased share of middle-
income Americans bought health insurance as the tax credits were expanded to those making above
400% of the federal poverty line for the first time. This expansion was designed to prevent middle
class Americans from spending over 8.5% of their income on health coverage. 517 This expansion
led to a decline in the uninsured rate to a historic low by 2022, filling part of the critical gap in
benefits faced my many workers. 518
The American Rescue Plan also provided housing assistance, including $21 billion
additional in rental assistance, which helped keep millions of people in their homes. In total,
pandemic rental assistance funds allocated by the American Rescue Plan and the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 delivered aid to more than 6.5 million American families. 519 In
combination with eviction moratoriums, this aid contributed to as many as 1.55 million fewer
eviction cases than would have occurred at pre-pandemic eviction filing rates, keeping families
housed during a health and economic crisis. 520 The American Rescue Plan also created an
Emergency Housing Voucher program that prevented 35,000 at-risk households—including
domestic violence and human trafficking victims—from becoming homeless during the
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pandemic. 521 The pandemic also included a homeowners’ assistance fund that, along with
emergency mortgage forbearance and foreclosure moratoriums, appears to have aided in
preventing the pandemic from causing homeowners from falling into foreclosure. 522 This success
may have sustained increases in Black and Hispanic homeownership levels, as pandemic
emergency measures and ARP relief prevented the coronavirus crisis from causing vulnerable
families to lose their homes as a result of pandemic disruptions that would have wiped out the
progress other Black and Hispanic families made in purchasing homes. 523
The broad, wide-ranging success of the pandemic relief legislation in reducing poverty,
alleviating economic distress, and improving health care access amidst an unprecedented crisis
demonstrated the ability of a strengthened safety net to reduce vulnerabilities in future crises.
C. The Trump Administration Failed to Prioritize and Effectively Deliver
Relief for Working Americans.
Congress’s aggressive efforts to relieve economic hardship and to fill gaps in the safety net
early in the coronavirus crisis were critical, but their effectiveness was hampered by the Trump
Administration’s poor implementation of emergency programs. Many early relief programs were
less effective at preserving jobs, delivering aid, and serving the most vulnerable than they could
have been with better implementation. In some cases, these failures to prioritize working
American families were caused by a focus on aiding corporations or gaining political benefits.
These implementation failures show both the need for a more durable, improved permanent
support structure to assist Americans during times of crisis, and the need for effective oversight of
relief programs.
1. The Trump Administration left millions of vulnerable Americans
without access to vital Economic Impact Payments in 2020.
Given the gaps in the safety net, particularly in state unemployment insurance programs,
one key relief measure in the CARES Act were EIPs of up to $1,200 per person. As millions of
Americans faced delays or eligibility hurdles in receiving unemployment, these payments were
intended to keep people out of poverty and desperation early in the crisis. Following an oversight
letter from the Select Subcommittee, however, the Trump Administration revealed that
approximately 9 million Americans eligible for EIPs had not yet received them nearly six months
after the CARES Act’s passage. Those who experienced delays in receiving these vital relief funds
were disproportionately those who needed them most: low-income people who generally earned
too little to be required to file tax returns. 524 After repeated calls from Chairman Clyburn to
Treasury Secretary Mnuchin to quickly send notices to those eligible for EIPs and to extend the
deadline for eligible individuals to claims their benefits, the Trump Administration ultimately
extended the deadline to claim these benefits to November 21, 2020. 525 The day after assuming
office, President Biden issued an executive order directing Treasury and the Internal Revenue
Service to redouble their efforts to ensure additional eligible Americans received EIPs. 526
2. The Trump Administration failed to ensure that payroll support
funds for businesses were equitably distributed and actually saved
workers’ jobs.
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When implementing programs designed to support companies in order to keep workers
employed, the Trump Administration similarly failed to ensure that programs were effective. For
example, the CARES Act authorized the Trump Administration to preserve aviation jobs by
providing up to $32 billion in funds to air carriers and their contractors to pay employees’ wages,
salaries, and benefits through the Payroll Support Program (PSP). 527 The Select Subcommittee
found, however, that more than 16,000 workers at eligible companies were laid off due to the
Trump Administration’s delays in delivering the funds. Moreover, the Trump Administration
allowed PSP recipient companies to lay off workers right up to the day they executed the PSP
agreement, which allowed companies with pending PSP applications to lay off workers and still
receive federal relief funds. 528 The Trump Administration’s failure to ensure that PSP funds were
used to maintain employment may not only have cost workers their jobs, but may also have
contributed to flight delays due to diminished capacity in the pandemic recovery despite the
provision of billions of dollars in taxpayer-funded aid. 529
The Trump Administration also implemented the PPP in a manner that deprived
underserved businesses, disproportionately minority- and women-owned, of access to desperately
needed aid. The CARES Act directed SBA to issue guidance to ensure that PPP lenders prioritized
small businesses in underserved markets, including businesses owned by women and socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals. 530 The Trump Administration’s Treasury Department,
however, directed lenders to “go to their existing customer base” when issuing PPP loans, even
though this created a substantial risk that underserved small businesses would be left without
access to the program. Defying the Cares Act’s urgings, the Trump Administration also failed to
issue meaningful guidance to lenders on how to prioritize these underserved businesses. 531 And
under the Trump Administration’s implementation of PPP, some lenders processed PPP loans
substantially faster for wealthier businesses than for the neediest small businesses applying for
relief. 532
3. The Trump Administration also failed to ensure large-scale
financial relief programs served small- and mid-sized businesses,
rather than just large corporations.
Pandemic relief programs that the Treasury Department under the Trump Administration
jointly implemented with the Federal Reserve similarly failed to effectively deliver aid where it
was needed, while large corporations received significant relief. Through the first seven months
of the coronavirus crisis, the Trump Administration and the Federal Reserve made only 252 loans
under the Main Street Lending program that Congress authorized to aid small-to-medium sized
businesses, totaling less than $3 billion of the $600 billion available. 533 Treasury Secretary
Mnuchin ultimately directed that the program be closed when the program had lent only 3% of its
capacity. 534 The Trump Administration and the Federal Reserve similarly made little use of the
available funds authorized to aid states and municipalities through the Municipal Liquidity Facility
because the Federal Reserve required distressed local governments to pay relatively high interest
rates on unfavorable terms, including a short repayment period. 535 By the time Secretary Mnuchin
directed that the program wind down, the Municipal Liquidity Facility had only delivered
financing to one state and one local government entity that totaled less than 2% of the $500 billion
in available funds. 536
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In contrast with programs for state and local governments and small-to-medium-sized
businesses, the Trump Administration Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve acted to
provide robust support for large corporations through an unprecedented program—the Secondary
Market Corporate Credit Facility—which bought the corporate bonds of large companies. In total,
the Federal Reserve purchased approximately $14 billion worth of corporate debt of about 500
large companies, easing those firms access to affordable credit. 537 The Select Subcommittee
found, however, that the Federal Reserve’s method of providing this relief did not provide
guardrails to protect workers and taxpayers. Companies that benefited from the program laid off
more than a million workers in the first six months of the pandemic, and 383 of the companies that
benefited paid dividends to shareholders during that period. 538
4. The Trump Administration also failed to take effective action to
prevent vulnerable Americans from losing their housing during the
crisis.
The Trump Administration also failed to take prompt action to effectively protect
Americans from losing their homes as a result of the coronavirus crisis. The economic dislocations
caused by the pandemic pushed millions of Americans to the brink of homelessness, with as many
as 12 million Americans falling behind on rent by December 2020. 539 These hardships were
preventable, as House Democrats passed bills with tens of billions of dollars in emergency rental
assistance in both May and September of 2020, but the Trump Administration did not support any
such measures until the end of December 2020. 540 Even after eventually agreeing to allocate $25
billion for emergency rental assistance in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, the Trump
Administration seriously hindered the distribution of those vital funds. The Select Subcommittee
heard testimony that the Trump Administration’s guidance on the disbursement of this assistance
to state and local governments was unnecessarily restrictive, discouraged eligible families from
seeking assistance, and laid out timeline and documentation requirements that made distribution
difficult and slow. 541 The Biden Administration rescinded this guidance and issued improved
guidance, but the Trump Administration’s delays in agreeing to allocate rental assistance and
initial missteps in implementing the program left millions impacted by the crisis in danger of losing
their housing for many months. 542
D. Poor Implementation and Oversight of Federal Aid Programs,
Combined with Unscrupulous Private Actors, Led to Significant
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse and a Less Effective Pandemic Response.
Oversight and implementation of federal pandemic relief programs in many cases failed to
safeguard taxpayer funds and ensure that those in need received aid. The Select Subcommittee’s
investigations and hearings identified numerous instances where the Trump Administration’s early
pandemic response involved insufficient oversight or poor execution, which made programs
particularly vulnerable to fraud in 2020. In other cases, private companies exploited a lack of
sufficient oversight by state or federal agencies to profit from the pandemic at the expense of
suffering Americans and the broader public. These implementation failures underscore the need
to develop a durable permanent infrastructure for delivering relief, one that would not need to be
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created on short notice and that would not promptly become overwhelmed by a surge in crisis-
driven need for relief.
1. Substantial fraud was committed against pandemic relief programs.
Government watchdogs and independent researchers alike have identified potential fraud
against pandemic programs ranging from tens to hundreds of billions of dollars. Data provided to
the Select Subcommittee by the Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General (SBA
OIG) identified more than $86 billion in potentially fraudulent EIDL loans and grants made during
the pandemic. SBA OIG similarly estimated that the PPP had “strong indicators of widespread
potential abuse and fraud,” 543 and independent researchers at the University of Texas have
estimated that that between $64.2 billion and $117.3 billion worth of PPP loans were questionable
and potentially fraudulent, in light of fraud indicators such as multiple loans to the same address
or missing business registry data. 544 The Department of Labor OIG (DOL OIG) has estimated the
amount of pandemic Unemployment Insurance fraud was also significant with potentially
improper payments totaling $163 billion or more. 545 The Select Subcommittee heard testimony
from Inspectors General and prosecutors responsible for identifying and tracking pandemic relief
fraud, who acknowledged that it was difficult to assess the full extent of pandemic relief fraud, but
agreed that the amount of fraud has been substantial. 546
2. SBA failed to prevent widespread fraud against its pandemic
programs, as the Trump Administration failed to implement basic
safeguards.
A Select Subcommittee investigation uncovered evidence that the Trump Administration’s
implementation of the PPP and EIDL programs made them vulnerable to substantial fraud and
overpayment. The vital funds allocated to these programs to provide aid to struggling small
businesses were prematurely exhausted partly as a result of the administration’s failure to
effectively guard the funds against misuse and fraud.
a. The Trump Administration’s operation of the Economic
Injury Disaster Loan program made it vulnerable to
substantial fraud.
The SBA OIG has identified $86 billion in potential fraud committed against the EIDL
program. 547 A Select Subcommittee investigation found that the Trump Administration failed to
implement basic safeguards against fraud during the early operation of the program, which likely
contributed to the high level of potential fraud. 548 The failure of the Trump Administration SBA
to plan for the demand that would be created by a nationwide disaster contributed to this failure,
as SBA lacked the technology and trained staff necessary to quickly deliver relief at the beginning
of the pandemic without unacceptable fraud risk.
Through the CARES Act, the American Rescue Plan Act, and other pandemic relief
legislation, Congress directed SBA to provide EIDLs and EIDL advance grants to small businesses
harmed by the pandemic, which SBA refers to as its “COVID-19 EIDL” program. 549 In total, the
COVID-19 EIDL program approved more than 3.9 million COVID-19 EIDL applications and a
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total of over $378 billion in EIDLs for American businesses. 550 5.8 million EIDL advance grants
and one million targeted and supplemental targeted EIDL advance grants totaling $27.5 billion
were also disbursed. 551
In addition to the SBA OIG’s estimate that $86 billion of these funds were potentially
disbursed to fraudulent applicants, there are other significant indications that fraud against the
COVID-19 EIDL program was widespread. GAO found that financial institutions filed more than
20,000 suspicious activity reports (SARs) related to COVID-19 EIDL transactions. 552 SBA also
disbursed more than 112,000 COVID-19 EIDL loans and 98,000 advance grants that it later
referred to SBA OIG as being related to an identity theft complaint. As of January 2021, SBA
estimated that it had received over 150,000 returned loan statements related to incorrect or
fraudulent addresses, indicating that COVID-19 EIDL identity theft fraud may have been even
more extensive. 553 SBA OIG also found that, in 2020, SBA distributed approximately $4.5 billion
in up to 10,000 EIDL advance grants to sole proprietors and independent contractors that they
were categorically ineligible for given the $1,000 per employee advance grant limit. 554 These
findings taken together show that the Trump Administration likely permitted the COVID-19 EIDL
program to disburse billions of taxpayer dollars in response to fraudulent applications.
The Trump Administration SBA created the conditions for this widespread fraud by failing
to implement basic safeguards in its early operation of the COVID-19 EIDL program. The
administration created a “batch” approval mechanism that allowed SBA team lead loan reviewers
to approve dozens of loan applications at once “with little to no vetting of the loan information”
or “with little to no additional review by the team leaders.” 555 SBA specifically requested that its
contractor add this “batch” functionality, which did not previously exist in the contractor’s
software. 556
In practice, applications in batches received no review at all from any SBA employee.
SBA’s Processing and Disbursement Center Director told the Select Subcommittee that the EIDL
application processing system did not even allow SBA Team Leads to open individual EIDL
application files in batches recommended for approval 557—making approval without review
essentially automatic without any human review of application details. Data from SBA’s
contractor obtained by the Select Subcommittee shows that as many as 1.6 million EIDL
applications may have been included in “batches” recommended for approval and received no
actual review by an SBA employee in the COVID-19 EIDL program’s early months.558
Additionally, there are strong indications that some EIDL applications included for “batch”
approval without review contained fraud alerts—including emails that failed to pass validation,
phone numbers that weren’t associated with the relevant business or owner, international locations,
and businesses whose registration could not be confirmed. SBA instructed a subcontractor (Rapid,
discussed below) to include applications in batches even when they contained as many as two
indicators of potential fraud. 559
Even when EIDL applications were not included in “batches,” and were manually reviewed
by staff, SBA directed loan reviewers to simply approve applications with serious indications of
fraud. Specifically, SBA’s Guide for loan officers directed them to simply “Approve” applications
that “failed online identity verification,” and directed loan reviewers to “Approve” applications
where the “Owner/Client information failed validation (info doesn’t go together, person is listed
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as deceased, etc.)” without taking action to address the fraud flag. 560 During the Biden
Administration, SBA included more detailed instructions that also directed the loan reviewer to
call the applicant and further confirm their identity by asking for personally identifying
information. 561
The Select Subcommittee analyzed DOJ prosecutions of COVID EIDL fraud and found
that the overwhelming majority of prosecutions involved fraud committed against the program
during the Trump Administration. 95% of the prosecutions involved EIDL applications submitted
between March 2020 and August 2020, and 98% of prosecutions involved EIDL applications
submitted during the Trump Administration. 562 These findings accord with the Select
Subcommittee’s findings that the Trump Administration failed to employ basic safeguards to
protect the COVID-19 EIDL program from fraud.
b. In addition to failing to prevent fraud, the Trump
Administration awarded a $750 million Economic Injury
Disaster Loan (EIDL) processing contract to a company that
relied on a subcontractor for nearly all the work required, yet
still accrued windfall profits.
The windfall reaped by a small contractor that did little actual work to support the EIDL
program illustrates another way in which existing weaknesses in emergency infrastructure allowed
private actors to profit at the public’s expense. The Trump Administration awarded the $750
million COVID-19 EIDL loan recommendation contract—the largest individual contract across
the entire federal government to respond to the pandemic’s economic impact—to small company
RER Solutions without a competitive process or an adequate assessment of the reasonable cost of
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the services provided. 563 SBA modified RER’s much smaller pre-pandemic contract without
competitive bidding. Contractor RER, through subcontractor Rapid, primarily provided
automated services that required relatively little labor, and which reviewed COVID-19 EIDL
application information in less than a second to provide fraud alerts, credit checks, and approval
or denial recommendations. 564 Despite this, SBA agreed to pay RER more than $40 per EIDL
application reviewed without assessing whether this price was reasonable in light of the actual
costs the contractor would incur. 565 RER then assigned only six employees to work on the contract
but netted more than $340 million after paying its subcontractors and vendors. 566 Documents
produced to the Select Subcommittee indicate the company provided merely “contractual
administrative duties,” 567 and hundreds of millions of dollars of taxpayer funds were wasted in a
contract that provided a windfall to a company that contributed little actual work to a vital
government program.
This windfall was partly the consequence of SBA’s pre-pandemic decision to award the
processing contract for a vital disaster relief program to a small company that could not handle a
catastrophic surge in applications without relying extensively on a subcontractor. This decision
created a weakness in the program by relying on a small firm that would have to act as an inefficient
middleman and that received, under federal regulations, around 50% of the contract’s value for
very little work. Here, the preexisting weakness in the relief infrastructure resulted in a private
windfall at taxpayers’ expense.
c. The Paycheck Protection Program was highly vulnerable to
fraud because of poor oversight and heavy delegation to
unvetted private companies.
The PPP was intended to give small businesses impacted by the pandemic forgivable loans,
with forgiveness contingent on maintaining workers on their payrolls for specific periods of time.
The Select Subcommittee’s early analysis of loans made under PPP raised serious concerns about
the effectiveness of program controls and the potential level of waste, fraud, and abuse under the
Trump Administration. The Select Subcommittee’s subsequent investigation fintech companies
and lenders that assisted in disbursing a substantial share of the loans under PPP revealed that these
private companies enriched themselves with taxpayer fees while failing to guard effectively
against fraud risks.
The Select Subcommittee’s September 2020 analysis of PPP loans identified more than
10,000 that were made to likely ineligible companies or were otherwise potentially improper, due
the Trump Administration’s failure to effectively implement the program. The Select
Subcommittee identified 10,856 loans in which the same borrower received multiple loans despite
SBA’s guidance stating that one business could not apply “for more than one loan.” 568 More than
600 PPP loans were also made to businesses that were suspended or debarred from doing business
with the federal government, and 353 loans were approved for businesses with a history of
performance and integrity issues when operating as government contractors. 569 The Select
Subcommittee also found indications that substantial numbers of PPP loans were approved despite
indications that they were potentially fraudulent, with over 11,000 applications totaling nearly $3
billion showing through the federal System for Award Management (SAM) database that
companies had presented inconsistent identifying information, provided only a P.O. box, or
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contained indications that the companies were not eligible because they were not in operation
before February 15, 2020. 570
The Select Subcommittee’s findings regarding the role of fintech companies in facilitating
PPP loans, released in December 2022, identified significant vulnerabilities in the government’s
reliance on unvetted, underregulated private-sector companies to implement the program. 571 The
Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that fintechs were given extraordinary responsibility
in administering the nation’s largest pandemic relief program, as certain SBA lenders heavily
delegated applicant screening to companies that claimed to employ effective and innovative fraud
control technology. 572 However, many of these companies appear to have failed to stop obvious
and preventable fraud, leading to the needless loss of taxpayer dollars. The Select Subcommittee’s
investigation found that several fintechs, largely existing outside of the regulatory structure
governing traditional financial institutions and with little to no oversight, took billions in fees from
taxpayers while becoming easy targets for those who sought to defraud the PPP. 573
Two fintechs investigated by the Select Subcommittee—Womply and Blueacorn—
together facilitated nearly one in every three PPP loans funded in 2021. 574 Blueacorn received
over $1 billion in taxpayer-funded processing fees, while Womply had a 2021 net revenue of over
$2 billion. 575 Several Blueacorn loan reviewers, who spoke to the Select Subcommittee on
condition of anonymity, reported receiving poor training and of being pressured to “push through”
PPP loans, even if the reviewers doubted the authenticity of the loan’s supporting
documentation. 576 Multiple Womply lending partners criticized Womply’s fraud prevention
practices, in one case describing its systems as “put together with duct tape and gum” and accusing
Womply of allowing “rampant fraud” to infiltrate the PPP. 577 Womply’s CEO Toby Scammell—
who was convicted of insider trading in 2014 and has been permanently barred from participating
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in the securities industry—led Womply’s fraud prevention efforts and instructed his company not
to cooperate with federal investigators who were attempting to identify PPP fraud in real time.578
Multiple lenders who had subcontracted with these entities described their oversight as being
limited to “spot checks” conducted at random on a small percentage of fintech-referred
applications. 579
These companies also appear to have abused their positions of public trust to benefit
themselves and their executives. For example, Blueacorn executives gave priority and reduced
scrutiny to high-dollar loans, while instructing contractors regarding smaller-value loans: “delete
them … who fucking cares.” 580 Despite their companies receiving billions of dollars in taxpayer-
funded loan fees, both Blueacorn and Womply executives also obtained PPP loans to benefit
themselves and their companies. 581 The Select Subcommittee identified questionable details in
some Blueacorn executives’ loan applications that may be indicative of fraud, and a Blueacorn
loan reviewer informed the Select Subcommittee that at least one executive directed a family
member to submit a fraudulent PPP loan application. 582 The Select Subcommittee also uncovered
evidence that Womply may have transferred the sensitive personal and financial data of hundreds
of thousands of PPP borrowers to a new business, for unclear purposes. 583
The investigation determined that the PPP lacked sufficient incentives for fintechs to
implement strong fraud prevention controls. For example, although employees of fintech
Kabbage—which facilitated over 310,000 PPP loans—expressed that they were “really
uncomfortable with the review procedures” for PPP loans and that “the level of fraud … [was]
wildly underestimated,” a Kabbage supervisor told his team that the level of diligence for PPP
loans differed from Kabbage’s standard lending program because “the risk here is not ours—it is
SBA[’]s risk.” 584 However, another fintech known as Bluevine initially approved outsized
quantities of fraudulent loans, but improved its controls over the course of the PPP under pressure
from its federally-regulated bank partners. 585
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The conduct of these program participants make clear that minimally-regulated entities
should not have been permitted to participate in administering a federal program of the PPP’s
magnitude without strong oversight mechanisms to safeguard taxpayer funds.
3. The Trump Administration USDA also failed to guard taxpayer dollars and
effectively deliver aid in operating the Food Box Relief program, awarding
contracts to unqualified companies and failing to monitor their
performance for potential fraud.
In operating a critical program designed to alleviate hunger and suffering at the beginning
of the coronavirus pandemic, the Trump Administration failed to guard taxpayer dollars and ensure
that funds were used efficiently and effectively to aid those in need, while also using the program
for political advantage. 586 In the early months of the pandemic, the Trump Administration’s
USDA administered the Food Box Program to provide food for families in need, but directed
substantial contracts to implement the new program to unqualified companies that did not deliver
relief effectively and efficiently. These failures did not stop Trump Administration officials from
attempting to use the program for political gain. These failures only further demonstrate the need
to build an established, durable relief infrastructure to ensure families in need have enough to eat
in a crisis without wasting funds and resources on ineffective companies.
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a. The Food Box program was intended to purchase food from
American farmers for distribution to those in need.
At the beginning of the coronavirus crisis, more than 20 million Americans lost their jobs
and food prices surged as grocery supply chains were disrupted. 587 Tens of millions of Americans,
including nearly 13.9 million children, lived in households without enough food to eat in June
2020. 588 In response to these critical hunger needs, Congress authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to “purchase commodities for emergency distribution in any area of the United States
during a public health emergency designation,” and appropriated funds for that purpose. 589
Secretary Perdue exercised this authority nearly a month later to create the Farmers-to-Families
Food Box Program. Under the Program, USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) would
select regional and local distributors to purchase agricultural products at market rates, package
them into family-sized boxes, and deliver them “to food banks and other nonprofits . . . that can
receive, store and distribute food items.” 590
The Food Box Program was significant in size and scope. In May 2020, the Trump
Administration announced contracts worth more than $1.2 billion with 198 food providers through
the Food Box Program. 591 These contracts covered delivery of food boxes across the country from
May 15, 2020, through June 30, 2020. 592 The program was extended for four additional rounds
for deliveries through the end of May 2021. 593 According to a GAO analysis of the federal
government’s contract obligations through the end of February, purchases of fruits and vegetables
“made primarily in support of the USDA’s Farmers to Families Food Box Program” represented
the third-largest set of contract obligations made in response to the coronavirus pandemic,
exceeded only by “drugs and biologicals” and “medical equipment and supplies.” 594 In total, the
federal government entered into Food Box Program contracts worth approximately $6 billion. 595
b. The Trump Administration awarded Food Box contracts to
unqualified companies and failed to monitor the contractors’
performance for fraud.
The Select Subcommittee initiated an investigation of the Food Box Program in August
2020, after the first round of the program had concluded, in light of reports that the Program had
been mismanaged. 596 In conducting this investigation, the Select Subcommittee conducted and
intensive review of three of the companies that had received among the largest contracts in the
first round of the program—Yegg, CRE8AD8, and Ben Holtz Consulting which respectively
received the 19th, seventh, and sixth largest overall contract awards. 597 While Ben Holtz
Consulting had its contract terminated approximately two weeks after it was awarded, Yegg and
CRE8AD8 were ultimately paid $16.5 million and $31.5 million respectively by USDA.
Reviewing these companies’ contract awards and performance allowed the Select Subcommittee
to examine the design and operation of the Food Box Program.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that the Trump Administration USDA
awarded contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to contractors that were unqualified to carry
out program demands. The Trump Administration awarded a contract worth over $39 million to
CRE8AD8, a company focused on wedding and event planning without significant food
distribution experience, 598 and whose owner reportedly compared coordinating the Program to his
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usual work of “stuffing little tchotchkes into bags.” 599 CRE8AD8 was ultimately paid $31.5
million of this contract. The Trump Administration also awarded contracts worth $16.5 million to
Yegg, a self-described “Export Management, Trading, and Trade Finance company” 600 that had
listed its most recent annual sales as $250,000 and limited relevant experience. 601 The Trump
Administration awarded a $40 million contract 602—which was later canceled before any payments
were made—to Ben Holtz Consulting. 603 In its references section, Ben Holtz’s bid proposal had
stated: “I don’t have any.” 604
After awarding these substantial contracts to unqualified companies, the Trump
Administration failed to adequately monitor them for fraud and allowed the firms to obtain
windfall profits. The Trump Administration continued payments to one contractor—Yegg—
despite troubling business practices and evidence suggesting that the company submitted false
records to USDA and may have engaged in self-dealing during its performance of the contract.
For example, the administration reimbursed Yegg for more than $2.85 million worth of milk and
dairy boxes purportedly delivered to “Helping Feet,” a nonprofit operated by the wife of the
company’s CEO, who was also Yegg’s majority shareholder. 605 Records for that nonprofit raise
serious questions about its suitability to handle dairy shipments as it operated out of office space
rented by Yegg. 606 Its stated mission was “to provide Debt Consolidation, Educational and
Recreational Purpose,” and to engage in “Acquisition of Vacant Land for Construction of
Residential Dwellings and Subsequent Sale or Rent to Low-Income Persons.” 607 The Trump
Administration also paid Yegg for $1.3 million in deliveries that were not supported by proper
documentation and $584,400 for deliveries to a nonprofit organization that the Select
Subcommittee confirmed were not received by the recipient organization. 608
The Select Subcommittee also found that the Trump Administration did not structure or
administer the Food Box Program to meet its stated goal of feeding hungry Americans and
eliminating food waste. Although then-Secretary of Agriculture Perdue promised that the Food
Box Program would distribute food “to communities across the country where it’s needed
most,” 609 the initial design of the program heavily prioritized the needs of the food industry and
neglected to prioritize hungry Americans. Emails from the agriculture industry show the National
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Chicken Council proposed USDA create “a special purchase of chicken in light of COVID-19,”
and subsequent distribution of such chicken products to “worthy recipients,” to Secretary Perdue’s
office on April 6, 2020. 610 The Trump Administration USDA decided to run the program through
its Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) which specializes in “marketing opportunities for U.S.
producers of food, fiber, and specialty crops,” rather than the Food and Nutrition Service, which
focuses on reducing hunger and food insecurity. 611 The Trump Administration did not have a
process in place to evaluate whether nonprofit organizations that received the food boxes had the
necessary operational and financial capacity to store and distribute them to people in need, and
failed to meaningfully screen first-round contractors for their ability to safely and competently
deliver food in the amounts awarded. Recipient nonprofits of food from the companies examined,
told the Select Subcommittee, for example, that some contractors delivered “rotten food and wet
or collapsing boxes,” provided large amounts of commercially-packaged meat inappropriate for
family consumption, or delivered produce at temperatures that the nonprofits identified as
presenting a “food safety issue.” 612 Another recipient nonprofit described its experience with
Yegg, one of the contractors examined by the Select Subcommittee, as “a disaster” with wasteful
practices by Yegg, which “did a horrible job.” 613
c. The Trump Administration allowed unqualified contractors
to reap windfall profits.
In operating the new Food Box program ineffectively, the Trump Administration also
allowed private contractors to reap windfall profits and waste taxpayer dollars on excessive
margins. One significant Food Box program contractor, event planning company CRE8AD8, was
ultimately paid $31.5 million in taxpayer funds. CRE8AD8 acknowledged to Select Subcommittee
staff that it collected profits of between 10% and 25%—a total of anywhere from $3.1 million to
$7.75 million—for just one month’s worth of food deliveries. 614 CRE8AD8 confirmed that
contractors in the Food Box Program sometimes paid well above market prices, with farmers and
producers receiving from CRE8AD8 up to 10 times the price they would normally get from
grocery stores. 615 Another contractor that received a contract in excess of $16 million, Yegg Inc.,
repeatedly charged taxpayers a 50% markup on the amount that it paid to a dairy. For example,
Yegg charged USDA $20,979 for one delivery of 2,100 two-gallon boxes of milk to the Liberian
American Community Organization of Southern California (LACOSC) in early June, representing
$9.99 per box of milk. 616 These milk boxes had been purchased from and delivered by the dairy
for $13,272, or $6.32 apiece. 617 Yegg made $7,707, or $3.67 per box, on that single delivery.
Because the deliveries were being made—and at times arranged—by the dairy itself, Yegg appears
to have been paid for acting as little more than a middleman. If sufficient existing food relief
infrastructure existed to link food suppliers with those in need—such as through a longstanding
program with standards, controls, and oversight—it likely would have been more difficult for
unqualified contractors to profit handsomely at taxpayer expense.
c. The Trump Administration also manipulated the Food Box
Program for political advantage.
Even as the Select Subcommittee’s investigation found that the Trump Administration
failed to effectively implement the Food Box program to serve the needs of those harmed by the
pandemic, the Trump Administration sought to use the program for political advantage.
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Most conspicuously, the Trump Administration used taxpayer dollars to include a letter
signed by President Trump in food boxes, in which the President took credit for feeding hungry
families. 618 Emails show that the chief of staff to Ivanka Trump, the President’s daughter and
advisor, contacted Secretary Perdue’s chief of staff on the day before Secretary Perdue announced
initial extensions for Food Box vendor contracts: “Ivanka touched base with me this morning
about the letter [sic] idea of getting a letter from POTUS in every food box that’s delivered—she
had raised this previously with the Secretary I believe. Can we get that going?” 619 While a White
House official later suggested the letter was meant to highlight public health guidance, the email
implied that this health justification originated from a separate source and later in time: “Dr[.]
Birx also had an idea about putting COVID guidance in each box as the people that are receiving
these boxes are the most vulnerable.” 620 The resulting letter read, in part: “As part of our response
to the coronavirus, I prioritized sending nutritious food from our farmers to families in need
throughout America.” 621 Six weeks before the presidential election, USDA emailed all active
Food Box Program contractors to reinforce that the letter was mandatory: “[T]he attached letter
must be included in all food boxes being distributed.” 622 Nonprofit organizations distributing the
boxes informed Select Subcommittee staff that the letters, in which President Trump credited
himself for the program, created frustration among the people they served. 623
In addition to distributing President Trump’s letter, President Trump and Secretary Perdue
appear to have planned major program developments based on electoral strategy, rather than policy
considerations. On August 24, 2020, the opening day of the Republican National Convention,
President Trump announced $1 billion in additional funding for the third round of the Food Box
Program from the battleground state of North Carolina. 624 An email from Ivanka Trump’s assistant
laying out the schedule for the event noted: “The President’s letter will be featured during the
packaging [of the food boxes].” 625 The event was promoted both on official government accounts
and on the Trump campaign’s Twitter account. 626 USDA later informed Select Subcommittee
staff that the former President’s announcement was made without notifying USDA in advance of
his determination. 627
At this announcement event, despite appearing in his official capacity, Secretary Perdue
gave a speech encouraging viewers to “get[] out and vote[] for this man, Donald J. Trump” for
“four more years.” 628 The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) subsequently found that Secretary
Perdue’s comments were illegal under the Hatch Act, explaining, “if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent,” Secretary Perdue and other
government officials must avoid “giving the impression that the government itself has a preference
for one candidate over another.” 629 In this event, purportedly about a government-sponsored
program to feed hungry Americans, Secretary Perdue’s “first words were not about USDA, but
about the president’s 2016 and 2020 campaigns.” 630 As OSC concluded: “[I]t is hard to imagine
a better example of campaign rhetoric.” 631
4. Senior Trump Administration political appointees overrode career
officials’ recommendation—likely with President Trump’s
involvement—to approve a $700 million CARES Act national
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security loan to a company of questionable eligibility facing a DOJ
lawsuit for defrauding the government.
Trump Administration political appointees also interfered in the nation’s economic
response to the pandemic, seemingly motivated by perceived political benefits. Even as millions
of small businesses struggled to get relief and millions of low-income Americans had not yet
received payments to which they were entitled, senior Trump Administration officials prioritized
pushing a substantial loan on generous terms for a corporation that likely should not have received
taxpayer funds. The CARES Act created a loan program for companies “critical to maintaining
nation security.” 95% of the funds disbursed by the Trump Administration Treasury Department
went to a single trucking company—a $700 million loan to the Yellow Corporation (Yellow). A
Select Subcommittee investigation found that Trump Administration political appointees overrode
career officials’ assessment that the company was not eligible for a national security loan and made
the loan on interest rate, risk, and use of funds terms that violated CARES Act requirements. 632
a. The National Security Loan Program, designed to protect the
viability of businesses critical to national security, provided
a significant majority of all its funds to a single company.
Congress created the national security loan program in the CARES Act to ensure that
companies critical to America’s national security had access to funds necessary to offset losses
caused by pandemic disruptions. Specifically, the CARES Act directed Treasury to make national
security loans and loan guarantees available to “provide liquidity” to “businesses critical to
maintaining national security” that were experiencing “losses incurred as a result of
coronavirus.” 633 Treasury guidance stated that companies could be determined by the Treasury
Secretary to be eligible for national security loans if they secured a “recommendation and
certification by the Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intelligence” that “the
applicant business is critical to maintaining national security.” 634
On July 1, 2020, the Trump Administration announced that Yellow would receive a $700
million loan through this program. 635 No other company received a national security loan until
late October 2020. The loan to Yellow constituted over 95% of the $725.9 million total loaned
under the program. 636 In support of its decision to approve this substantial loan to Yellow,
Treasury asserted that its “determination was based on a certification by the Secretary of Defense
that YRC is critical to maintaining national security” and that Yellow “provides 68% of less-than-
truckload services to the Department of Defense.” 637
Treasury’s loan to Yellow was made at an interest rate of 3.5% plus LIBOR, with $300
million to be used for “near-term contractual obligations and non-vehicle capital expenditures”
and $400 million to be used for long term capital investments in its truck and trailer fleet. 638
Treasury took a third-priority security interest in Yellow’s existing collateral assets, putting
taxpayers behind Yellow’s bank creditors in an Asset-Backed Lending (ABL) facility and a group
of private creditors led by Apollo Global Management (Apollo). 639
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b. White House officials—likely with President Trump’s
involvement—intervened as Yellow’s application for a
national security loan was being evaluated.
The Select Subcommittee obtained evidence suggesting that political pressure from the
Trump White House may have contributed to Treasury and DOD’s decisions to support and
approve the loan to Yellow, despite career DOD officials’ recommendation that Yellow not be
certified as eligible to receive a loan, and despite the fact that Yellow failed to comply with CARES
Act loan term requirements. Documents obtained by the Select Subcommittee show that senior
White House officials, 640 including White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, 641 repeatedly
communicated with Treasury on Yellow’s behalf as Treasury evaluated Yellow’s application for
a national security loan. Emails obtained by the Select Subcommittee also indicate that President
Trump personally discussed Yellow’s loan application with a union leader coordinating with the
company in its efforts to obtain relief, and that the fact of President Trump’s call concerning
Yellow’s loan application was relayed to Secretary Mnuchin and Secretary Esper. 642 Secretary
Mnuchin’s subsequent emails to President Trump’s closest aides, highlighting praise for the
issuance of the loan, appear to confirm the President’s involvement. 643
c. Trump Administration political appointees overrode the
recommendation of career officials in certifying that Yellow
was “critical” to national security.
Senior career DOD officials concluded, after collecting and analyzing information about
the services that Yellow provided to DOD, that Yellow should not be certified as “critical to
maintaining national security” for the purposes of obtaining a CARES Act loan. Yet within a day
of receiving the recommendation of career officials, senior political appointees—including
Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, Defense Secretary Esper, and Defense Under Secretary Ellen Lord—
conferred about Yellow and quickly decided to certify that the company was “critical” to national
security and eligible for a national security loan. 644 This certification overrode the
recommendations of career officials who found that Yellow should not be certified because the
trucking services the company provided to DOD could be carried out by “plenty of other trucking
companies” and because the company was being sued for fraudulently overcharging DOD for the
very services that Yellow argued made it critical to national security. 645 Secretary Esper’s
certification that Yellow was “critical” to national security contained no data or analysis, 646 and
Treasury’s announcement that Yellow would receive a national security loan asserted, in a
repetition of the company’s own talking points, that Yellow provided 68% of DOD’s less-than-
truckload [LTL] 647 shipments—twice the share found by DOD career officials. 648 Without the
intervention of political appointees, Yellow would not have been deemed eligible to receive a
national security loan.
d. The Trump Administration approved the loan to Yellow on
terms that violated CARES Act risk and use of funds
requirements.
The Trump Administration’s loan to Yellow violated CARES Act requirements intended
to protect taxpayers and ensure that loan funds only went to aid companies in coping with the
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impacts of the coronavirus crisis. The Trump Administration agreed to loan terms that allowed
Yellow to use more than half its pandemic loan funds for long-term capital investments in
replacing an aging truck and trailer fleet, despite the CARES Act specification that loans were to
offset “losses incurred as a result of the coronavirus.” 649 Further, despite CARES Act requirements
that national security loans either be “sufficiently secured” or made at an interest rate reflective of
the risk and comparable to pre-pandemic market rates, the loan to Yellow was made at an interest
rate well below that charged to Yellow by private creditors led by Apollo only six months before
the onset of the pandemic, even though Apollo received higher-ranking collateral interests than
Treasury. 650 Before Treasury agreed to such generous terms, Yellow’s own counsel had concluded
that Yellow would likely be required to pay a higher interest rate and give a higher-priority
collateral interest to Treasury because of the CARES Act risk and interest rate requirements. 651
Yellow’s application for the national security loan included a request for $365 million for
capital investment and justified the request’s connection to pandemic losses with the vague
statement that Yellow had “cut a significant portion of its capital plan for 2020.” 652 Moreover,
Yellow’s application made plain that these funds were largely being sought to remedy an existing
problem—an aging truck and trailer fleet—that pre-dated the pandemic, stating that Yellow’s
“average age for tractors is ~11 years; industry average is 5 years.” 653 The application further
emphasized the financial benefits to Yellow of increased capital expenditures, but did not
substantiate the claim that the funds would be used for losses caused by the pandemic. 654
Yellow executives knew they were seeking to take advantage of American taxpayers.
Yellow’s CFO made clear to Yellow’s existing creditors, including Apollo Global Management,
that the company’s request for a $710 million national security loan went beyond what was needed
to offset pandemic losses and included a request for additional capital funds. In a May 1, 2020
email titled “Treasury App Sources & Uses of Cash,” Yellow CFO Jamie Pierson sent the
company’s existing creditors a summary of its $710 million loan request, with $365 million of the
request designated for capital investments in new tractors, trailers, and technology. 655 Pierson
explained: “While we had our hand in the cookie jar, we thought we would try to get a little ‘catch
up’ capex [capital expenditures] while we were at it.” 656
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Although Yellow represented that its capital investment funds request would merely allow
it to fulfill its pre-pandemic investment plan, 657 the company’s actual capital expenditures
preceding the pandemic were far lower than the amount the company sought and received for
capital investment through the Treasury loan. 658 After receiving the Treasury funds earmarked for
capital investments, Yellow’s capital expenditures increased dramatically. 659 Ultimately, the
Trump Administration approved this significant taxpayer loan of funds—meant for companies that
were critical to national security—to a company that intended to use most of its funds for its long-
term profitability. 660
5. Technology company ID.me subjected Americans in need to
extraordinary wait times for pandemic relief benefits, while the
company used exaggerated claims to secure contracts with dozens
of states and the federal government.
Existing weaknesses in the safety net and relief infrastructure that made vital programs
vulnerable to fraud also gave private actors an opportunity to profit from federal and state agencies’
desperate need to implement fraud controls on an emergency basis. Even before the pandemic,
unemployment insurance systems had suffered from decades of underinvestment and utilized
antiquated technology that was both too slow and vulnerable to fraud. 661 To fill these gaps, dozens
of state unemployment agencies, as well as the Internal Revenue Service, turned to ID.me—a
company that purported to offer a quick, high-tech solution to verify identities remotely and
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thereby prevent fraud through identity theft. ID.me used facial recognition technology that
required a phone or computer camera to compare the face of a person seeking benefits to their
government identification photo. A Select Subcommittee investigation found, however, that
ID.me ultimately subjected many citizens to endure exorbitant wait times as they sought funds
necessary to sustain themselves after being laid off, while inaccurately downplaying those wait
times as it sought to provide services to the IRS in connection with the ARP’s Child Tax Credit
payments. Meanwhile, ID.me made self-serving claims that the extent of pandemic fraud in
unemployment programs was much higher than other expert estimates, without employing any
underlying methodology or analysis, in an apparent attempt to increase demand for its services.
a. ID.me downplayed its wait times to the IRS while it forced
Americans who could not automatically verify their
identities to wait for up to nine hours to provide evidence of
their identity in video chats.
ID.me contracted with at least 25 states’ unemployment insurance agencies to provide
identity verification using facial recognition technology, which purported to verify that an
individuals’ appearance by phone or computer camera matched to their photo identification card,
in order to guard against identity theft fraud being committed against pandemic unemployment
relief and other programs. 662 The company received contracts worth nearly $45 million from state
workforce and labor agencies for these services. 663 ID.me informed the Select Subcommittee that
10% to 15% of users were unable to verify their identities with the company’s automated facial
recognition technology. These individuals were directed to show proof of their identities to ID.me
employees through video chats. 664 Given that more than 22 million Americans lost their jobs
during the crisis and that ID.me provided services to approximately half the country, a substantial
share—potentially hundreds of thousands—of unemployed workers during the pandemic were
routed to verify their identities through video chats with ID.me employees. 665
Data obtained by the Select Subcommittee shows that people who were unable to verify
their identities automatically with facial recognition technology were regularly forced to wait for
multiple hours to have a video chat to verify their identities. In late April 2021, when the IRS was
considering using ID.me’s services in connection with the enhanced Child Tax Credit (CTC), a
group of ID.me representatives that included multiple executives met with representatives of IRS’s
Secure Access Digital Identity team and informed them that its current wait times were “about 2
hours as of today.” The company also noted that its “users have to wait online” as it had removed
the “callback feature” it had previously offered. The company attributed its decision to stop
offering a callback option to the perceived inefficiency of offering appointments. 666
In describing how users were forced to wait online for an average of two hours, ID.me
inaccurately minimized the difficulty Americans seeking vital benefits were facing when using
ID.me. According to data from ID.me, users actually had to wait more than four hours on average
in 14 of 21 states where the company provided unemployment benefit verification services in April
2021. Sixteen of 21 states had wait times exceeding 3.5 hours. For those seeking verification in
North Dakota, average wait times were nearly 10 hours that month. 667 This affected a significant
share of the population as those states where individuals faced wait times in excess of four hours
included the nation’s three most populous: California, Texas, and Florida. 668 These long average
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wait times also fail to capture additional delays for applicants who had to leave the lines
prematurely due to lack of steady internet access or commitments like caregiving. It is unclear
why ID.me failed to hire adequate staff or infrastructure to decrease wait times as it elected to enter
a high number of new contracts during the pandemic.
These wait times are particularly concerning given the equity concerns that ID.me’s
technology raises. Many individuals with low incomes, who need support urgently when they lose
employment, cannot afford the necessary devices and internet access in the first place or must
share devices with other family members using them for work, job applications or school. As of
2021, approximately 15% of American adults did not own a smart phone, and 23% did not own a
desktop or laptop computer. 669 These individuals already faced significant barriers in verifying
their identities while lacking the necessary technology, which may have been impossible without
the ability to access borrowed or public technology for long durations.
b. ID.me’s CEO provided estimates of pandemic
unemployment fraud that dramatically exceeded figures
assessed by experts and were not supported by evidence, in
an apparent attempt to increase demand for ID.me’s services.
Even as ID.me was unable to handle the programs it was already providing identification
services for without excessive delays for Americans seeking pandemic relief, the company’s CEO
made claims about the extent of pandemic unemployment fraud that far exceeded the estimates of
state and federal agencies and watchdogs in an apparent effort to increase demand for ID.me’s
services. In June 2021, Axios reported: “Blake Hall, CEO of ID.me, a service that tries to prevent
this kind of fraud, tells Axios that America has lost more than $400 billion to fraudulent claims.
As much as 50% of all unemployment monies might have been stolen, he says.” 670 This asserted
total lost to fraud is nearly 10 times higher than the $45.6 billion in potential unemployment fraud
DOL OIG assessed through an analysis of the data associated with unemployment claims.671
ID.me’s assertion is nearly three times larger than the DOL OIG’s broader assessment of all
potential improper pandemic unemployment payments, which encompasses fraud as well as non-
fraudulent payments made due to compliance failures (largely reflecting inaccurate earnings,
separation, or work search information regarding bona fide unemployed workers). 672 ID.me
subsequently promoted the press coverage of this estimate on its own news page, alongside
ID.me’s press releases. 673
The Select Subcommittee repeatedly asked ID.me to explain its methodology for its public
assertions in June 2021 that “more than $400 billion,” and up to “as much as 50%” (which would
be about $414 billion), of pandemic unemployment benefits were lost to “fraudulent claims.”674
ID.me did not identify any method for calculating its assessment of pandemic unemployment
fraud. Instead, ID.me stated that it relied on federal, state, and independent assessments and its
own “observations”:
ID.me’s understanding of the extent of improper payments for pandemic-related UI
claims draws on a number of sources, including public statements by state and
federal officials responsible for administering and overseeing UI programs,
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estimates put forward by third-party analysts assisting state governments in
detecting potential fraud, and the company’s own observations . . . . 675
But the sources ID.me cited simply do not support ID.me’s $400 billion fraud total. ID.me
cited DOL OIG’s March 2022 estimate of $163 billion in improper payments (about 19% using a
measure broader than “fraud”), Arizona’s September 2021 estimate that between $4.3 and $4.4
billion was lost to fraud (about 27%), California’s October 2021 estimate that $20 billion was lost
to fraud (about 11%), Michigan’s December 2021 estimate that between $8.4 and $8.5 billion was
lost to fraud (about 22%), and the Heritage Foundation’s July 2021 estimate that $357 billion was
lost to fraud, which itself cited ID.me’s own assessment. 676 Each of the assessments ID.me
referenced as having been used to support its assessment were made after ID.me’s June 2021
assertion that more than $400 billion had been lost to fraud. 677
ID.me’s inability to articulate any methodology for its $400 billion fraud estimate and its
representation that it relied on federal, state, and independent estimates that both post-dated
ID.me’s assertion and reflected lower levels of fraud demonstrate that the company had no reliable
foundation for the exaggerated estimates of fraud it offered publicly.
6. Some large corporate landlords aggressively filed to evict tenants
despite eviction moratoriums, even as federal rental assistance
programs began to disburse billions in aid.
A Select Subcommittee investigation found that some large corporate landlords were
among the corporate actors that exacerbated the impacts of the pandemic on American families
and undermined pandemic response efforts. Despite the protections of CDC’s eviction moratorium
and Congress’s appropriation of more than $46 billion in emergency rental assistance, four large
landlord companies investigated by the Select Subcommittee continued to file thousands of
eviction actions—nearly 15,000 during the pandemic’s first 16 months—even as many struggling
tenants waited for pending rental assistance applications to be approved. The Select
Subcommittee’s investigation found troubling practices at some companies and a widespread
practice of filing to evict even tenants who were only a month behind on rent or who had pending
rental assistance applications. These findings demonstrate the need to invest in a relief
infrastructure that can more effectively help people keep their homes and avoid evictions in the
next crisis.
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a. Congress and the federal government took unprecedented
measures to prevent the pandemic’s economic fallout from
causing an eviction crisis, including the appropriation of
billions in rental assistance and eviction moratoriums.
The onset of the coronavirus pandemic resulted in enormous economic dislocation as 22
million Americans lost their jobs. 678 This crisis put tens of millions of people at risk of losing their
homes through eviction. 679 In response to this potential catastrophe, which threatened to further
exacerbate the spread of and deaths from the coronavirus, Congress enacted an eviction
moratorium in the CARES Act that applied to properties with federally backed mortgages and
tenants with federally supported housing vouchers from March 27, 2020 through July 24, 2020.680
After the expiration of the CARES Act moratorium, CDC issued a moratorium on evictions for
nonpayment of rent for those impacted by the pandemic that applied to all residential rental
properties and was in force from September 4, 2020 through July 31, 2021. 681
To further prevent a housing crisis while also ensuring landlords were still paid, Congress
appropriated $46.5 billion in rental assistance to pay back rent of tenants impacted by the
pandemic, including $21.5 billion in the American Rescue Plan. 682 State and local governments,
charged with disbursing these funds to aid renters, required significant time to create the necessary
infrastructure and were initially slow to distribute funds. 683 The CARES Act had also previously
provided states with funds that could be used for rental assistance earlier in the pandemic, and state
and local governments devoted at least $3.9 billion to rental assistance between March 2020 and
October 2020, with at least $2.9 billion of those funds coming from the CARES Act. 684
Despite the difficulties state and local governments faced in creating new infrastructure to
disburse rental assistance funds, the CARES Act and CDC eviction moratoriums, rental assistance
programs, and other sources of pandemic financial assistance were ultimately successful at keeping
millions of families in their homes. Even with the economic crisis faced by many Americans,
pandemic eviction filings were significantly lower than their historic averages in most
metropolitan areas where data was available, resulting in as many as 1.55 million fewer eviction
cases than would have occurred at pre-pandemic eviction filing rates. 685 Pandemic rental
assistance funds have delivered aid to more than 6.5 million American families. 686 Still, during
the first 16 months of the pandemic, estimates suggest households faced approximately 1.3 million
eviction filings, putting millions of people at risk of homelessness during a national health and
economic crisis. 687 Consistent with these figures, a Select Subcommittee investigation found that
some large corporate landlords employed aggressive eviction filing practices throughout the
coronavirus crisis.
b. Some large corporate landlords continued to file to evict tenants in
large numbers even as rental assistance began to roll out and CDC’s
eviction moratorium was in place.
At the time the Select Subcommittee initiated its investigation, publicly available data from
select jurisdictions showed that Pretium Partners (through its companies Progress Residential and
Front Yard Residential, hereafter Pretium), Invitation Homes, Ventron Management (Ventron),
and the Siegel Group (Siegel) had collectively filed 5,413 eviction actions from March 2020
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through July 2021. 688 The Select Subcommittee obtained evidence showing that these companies
in fact filed at least 14,744 eviction actions during this period—nearly three times the previously
reported total. 689 Pretium filed 6,264 eviction actions, compared to the 1,730 actions previously
identified. 690 Invitation homes filed 3,305 actions, compared to 932 previously identified.691
Ventron Management filed 4,401 eviction actions, compared with 2,178 that were previously
identified. 692 Siegel filed at least 774 actions compared with 573 that were previously identified.693
These data show that the four corporate landlords that were the subject of the Select
Subcommittee’s investigation filed eviction cases at a substantial rate from March 15, 2020,
through July 31, 2021, as Americans faced the health and economic crisis brought by the
coronavirus pandemic. Most of these companies’ eviction filings took place while CDC’s eviction
moratorium was in place, and the filings continued even after Congress appropriated $46 billion
in rental assistance funds and state and local governments began working to create the
infrastructure to distribute this relief. 694
CDC’s moratorium did not bar all evictions and included specific substantive and
procedural requirements for tenants to gain protection, including declaring that tenants had
suffered an adverse impact as a result of the pandemic and were undertaking efforts to obtain
assistance. 695 Nevertheless, Pretium, Invitation Homes, Siegel, and Ventron filed eviction cases
against many tenants who almost certainly met these criteria, putting them at risk of losing their
housing, particularly if they did not understand available protections or did not have access to
counsel.
c. Investigated companies filed to evict tenants with pending
rental assistance applications, and sometimes used
misleading or potentially unlawful tactics to force renters out
of their homes during the crisis.
All of the corporate landlords the Select Subcommittee investigated had policies or
practices of filing to evict tenants with pending rental assistance applications, and the companies
employed other troubling practices during the first 16 months of the coronavirus crisis. Siegel was
uniquely egregious, as executives directed employees to deceive tenants about protections under
the CDC eviction moratorium. The other companies used low thresholds before initiating eviction
filings, downplayed the impact of pandemic eviction filings, and sometimes refused to accept
rental assistance, even as these companies thrived financially or received millions in government
aid.
i. Siegel used uniquely egregious tactics to evict
tenants during the crisis
Siegel engaged in deceptive and potentially unlawful practices to prevent tenants from
understanding their protection from eviction under CDC’s eviction moratorium. Documents
obtained by the Select Subcommittee show that executives aimed to “bluff” tenants out of their
apartments by ordering that subordinates post and distribute copies of a court order holding that
CDC lacked authority to impose the eviction moratorium—deliberately hiding the fact that the
court had also ordered that the moratorium’s protections would remain in effect as the case was
appealed. 696 A Siegel executive specifically directed that the stayed order be brought to a tenant
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“after 5pm” on a Friday “so the courts and constable office are closed and she cannot call to verify
anything” and “see if she vacates over the weekend.” 697 The executive followed up with the
company’s regional managers to ensure that the deceptive strategy of distributing the order was
being followed, writing that “properties [] have been using this order to bluff people out,” and “I
hope you all are doing the same.” 698 Property managers carried out this directive with evident
glee, with one writing to an executive and a regional manager that he “love[d] getting to say that
this means the eviction may happen sooner than expected and seeing the look on their faces$ !.”699
#
"
A regional manager similarly reported to executives that his region had been distributing the order
and was “seeing positive results,” indicating that people were leaving their homes as a result, which
he described as “to our advantage.” 700 These practices may have been unlawfully deceptive under
federal laws governing business and collection practices in light of CFPB and FTC guidance and
CFPB’s regulation requiring landlords’ agents make tenants affirmatively aware of their rights
under CDC’s moratorium, and the Select Subcommittee referred Siegel for further investigation. 701
In addition to Siegel’s deceptive practices regarding CDC’s eviction moratorium, the
Select Subcommittee obtained an email showing that a Siegel executive also directed employees
to use harassing and unlawful tactics to evict or otherwise push out at least one tenant. The Siegel
executive’s May 21, 2021, directive to bring a copy of the court order suggesting CDC’s
moratorium was no longer in effect to a tenant after the courts and constable office had closed for
the weekend, discussed above, also articulated the executive’s “list” of strategies for coercing the
tenant to leave without obtaining a legal eviction order. The list includes directions to call “Child
Protective Services to come out” if children were present in a crowded apartment, threatening to
call “animal control to come pick up her abandoned pet” if the tenant was not present in the
apartment, and having security “knock[] on her door at least twice at night.” The executive’s
preface to this list said, “I do not know anything about this person so I am just going to go down
my list of things to make sure you have tried everything possible to get rid of them.” This statement
suggests that the executive may have directed employees to use these strategies on other
occasions. 702
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As Siegel used these abusive tactics to force people from their homes during the crisis,
Siegel benefited significantly from government aid. Company documents show Siegel also
received $1.785 million in rental assistance funded through the CARES Act in 2020 for tenants
behind on rent, even before Congress authorized $46.5 billion additional dollars to aid in paying
tenant rental arrears. 703 Company records also show that Siegel received at least an additional
$1.44 million in rental assistance funds through July 2021, with approximately $87,000 in
additional payments approved as of that time and approximately $769,000 in additional pending
applications for assistance. 704 In total, Siegel received at least $5.5 million in federal assistance to
offset pandemic costs and tenant rental arrears as it flouted tenant protections.
.
ii. Pretium, Invitation Homes, and Ventron filed to evict
tenants aggressively during the crisis despite the
increasing availability of rental assistance
Investigated companies were quick to file eviction cases against tenants during the first 16
months of the pandemic, even as states and localities began to roll out rental assistance programs
distributing tens of billions of dollars in rental assistance intended to compensate landlords and
prevent people from losing their homes. Ventron and Pretium, for example, applied a low
threshold for initiating eviction filings. Ventron documents show that 91% of the eviction actions
Ventron filed during the first 16 months of the pandemic involved tenants who were only one
month behind on rent. 705 Pretium’s policies, similarly, placed tenants into its eviction filing
process after they fell as little as $500 behind on rent. 706 Both Pretium and Invitation Homes,
moreover, decided not to accept rental assistance as an alternative to eviction filings if the
companies determined that the rental assistance programs were not offering to pay a sufficient
portion of a tenant’s rental arrears or otherwise imposed conditions the companies deemed
unacceptable (such as funding premised on the landlord agreeing not to evict the tenant for a period
of time). 707
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7. Nationwide consumer reporting agencies (NCRAs) failed to protect
Americans’ credit reports from errors during the crisis.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigation of credit reporting companies identified
longstanding problems with nationwide consumer reporting agencies’ (NCRA) responsiveness to
consumers disputing inaccurate information in their credit reports. 708 Errors in credit reports are
often quite serious, as they can reduce consumers’ credit scores, potentially blocking access to
loans, housing, and employment, among other harmful consequences. However, these errors
become even more significant during crises like the pandemic, when Americans may need access
to credit more than ever to weather difficult economic circumstances. 709
Data provided to the Select Subcommittee revealed that consumers have disputed a
massive amount of information in their credit reports, yet the top three NCRAs—Equifax,
Experian, and TransUnion—have often failed to investigate. Between 2019 and 2021, consumers
disputed nearly 336 million items—such as names, addresses, and credit information—in their
credit reports. 710 However, this does not include the 13.8 million or more dispute submissions—
containing an unknown number of disputed items—that the NCRAs discarded without
investigation during this time period. 711 The NCRAs disregard these disputes on the suspicion that
they have not been authorized by the consumer, but the Select Subcommittee found that they use
such speculative criteria to reach this conclusion that they may also be throwing out legitimate,
authorized disputes—meaning consumers may find themselves stuck with an inaccurate credit
report and penalized by lenders when they seek credit. Even when the NCRAs did investigate,
they made no change at all to the consumer’s credit report around half the time (53-57% each year
for Equifax, around 48% each year for Experian, and 47-51% each year for TransUnion). 712 While
some disputes are likely meritless, the Select Subcommittee’s investigation also identified
potential issues with the NCRAs’ investigations, calling into question whether such a high
percentage of disputes should have resulted in no change.
To help address long-standing issues with the NCRAs’ error resolution and prevent more
needless economic harm, Chairman Clyburn requested that the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) further review the NCRAs’ dispute investigation processes. 713 Following this
request, the CFPB issued new industry guidance “to emphasize that certain practices involving the
failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of disputes can violate” the Federal Credit Reporting
Act in light of data showing apparent failures to conduct reasonable investigations. 714 This
guidance is an important first step. To build a more resilient, equitable economy and to reduce
Americans’ vulnerabilities to harmful shocks in future crises, continued scrutiny of NCRAs’
practices is essential.
8. Social media company Telegram facilitated fraud against critical
relief programs, threatening the effectiveness of government aid.
The Select Subcommittee found that one large social media company—Telegram—with
more than 500 million users, and a reported valuation of more than $30 billion,715 acted as a
platform for sharing information to aid the commission of fraud against pandemic relief programs
in light of the company’s bare content moderation policies and scant interventions to prevent the
facilitation of criminal activity. Telegram’s platform served as a hub for people to discuss ways
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to commit large-scale criminal fraud against numerous federal and state relief programs. 716
Individuals used Telegram channels to advertise the sale of detailed instructions—often referred
to as “methods” or “sauces”—for successfully submitting fraudulent relief claims to numerous
relief programs. 717 These channels—which can reach thousands of members at a time—were used
to disseminate what some reports have called “step-by-step playbook[s]” that scammers follow to
commit fraud. 718 Telegram’s strikingly limited terms of service raise further concerns that the
company does not intend to undertake serious efforts to prevent its platform from being used for
illegal activity. Telegram’s very brief terms of service only prohibit users from “scam[ming]”
other Telegram users, appearing to permit the use of the platform to conspire to commit fraud
against others. 719 The terms also only bar users from promoting illegal content on “publicly
available” channels even though “private” channels are often far from private, permitting up to
200,000 users. The company explicitly says it “do[es] not process any requests related to [illegal
content on “private” group chats].” 720
Following an inquiry from the Select Subcommittee, Apple reported that it identified
“content on the Telegram app related to potentially fraudulent activity directed toward pandemic
relief and other government programs,” and “communicated with Telegram about this content, and
Telegram committed to remove it from the app.” Apple reported that it “subsequently searched the
app to confirm Telegram’s actions.” 721 Although the Select Subcommittee’s inquiry did prompt
remedial action, interventions to prevent large scale facilitation of fraud against relief programs
will be vital to protecting program integrity in future crises.
E. Congress and the Biden Administration Improved the Federal
Implementation of Pandemic Programs, Addressed Earlier Failures,
and Supported a Robust and Equitable Jobs Recovery.
1. Following Trump Administration failures to equitably deliver relief
and guard taxpayer funds, Congress and the Biden Administration
improved the federal implementation of pandemic programs,
making the distribution of relief more equitable and reducing fraud
vulnerabilities.
The Biden Administration and Congress undertook significant measures to improve the
federal response to the pandemic’s economic impact by ensuring that relief programs were
available to vulnerable and marginalized communities and by taking steps to reduce the
vulnerabilities of critical programs to fraud. Following reports, including from the Select
Subcommittee, that federal relief programs in 2020 prioritized large businesses and failed to reach
small, minority-owned businesses 722 and very low-income people, 723 the Biden Administration
took action to improve the equity of the federal response. Within a month of assuming office, the
Biden Administration removed barriers to smaller businesses receiving PPP loans.724 The
American Rescue Plan subsequently authorized EIDL supplemental targeted grants specifically to
support small businesses in low-income communities. 725 The Biden Administration also
prioritized vulnerable and marginalized communities in other programs, including the Restaurant
Revitalization Fund (RRF). GAO determined that 72% of businesses supported by the RRF self-
reported as being “owned by women, veterans, or members of socially and economically
disadvantaged groups.” 726
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At the same time, the Biden Administration took crucial steps to protect critical relief
programs from fraud and to ensure that taxpayer dollars were protected. Shortly after assuming
office, President Biden moved to protect the PPP program from fraud by directing that loan
approval be “contingent on passing SBA fraud checks, Treasury’s Do Not Pay database, and public
records.” 727 Similarly, in the EIDL program, the Biden Administration strengthened fraud controls
by requiring that fraud indicators be addressed by loan officers (including with detailed directions
to loan officers on actions that must be taken when identity theft indicators are present), validating
applications against Treasury’s Do Not Pay List, obtaining Internal Revenue Service tax transcripts
to verify EIDL applicant information, and checking Employer Identification Numbers (EINs). 728
The Biden Administration and Congress also prioritized combating fraud in the American
Rescue Plan, appropriating more than $204 million to combat waste, fraud, and abuse, including
$25 million to SBA OIG for necessary expenses including PPP and EIDL oversight and $40
million to the PRAC. 729 The ARP further included $2 billion to improve state Unemployment
Insurance systems, and the Biden Administration Department of Labor (DOL) has announced
grants of hundreds of millions of dollars to states to upgrade their technology to deliver better
service with less fraud risk. DOL has deployed teams of experts to states to provide assistance
and make recommendations on fraud, equity, technology, and payment timeliness, has awarded
grants to states to help address potential fraud, and has awarded purchase agreements to vendors
that states can use to combat identity-theft related fraud. 730
The Biden Administration and Congress have also taken action to hold those who
committed fraud against relief programs to account. President Biden directed DOJ to appoint a
chief prosecutor for pandemic relief fraud, and in a June 2022 Select Subcommittee hearing that
prosecutor testified that DOJ had charged approximately 1,481 individuals with pandemic fraud
and was conducting civil investigations of more than 2,300 additional individuals and entities in
connection with pandemic fraud, with additional confidential investigations ongoing beyond.731
In August 2022, Congress passed and President Biden signed the Paycheck Protection Program
and Bank Fraud Enforcement Harmonization Act and the COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster
Loan Fraud Statute of Limitations Act, which extended the statutes of limitations for DOJ to
investigate and prosecute fraud against the PPP and EIDL programs. 732
2. The Biden Administration’s vaccine rollout and the American
Rescue Plan supported a historically rapid jobs recovery that
dramatically reduced unemployment and regained all the jobs lost
at the onset of the pandemic.
In addition to providing desperately needed relief to reduce hardship, the Biden
Administration and Congress also acted to ensure a rapid and equitable recovery of the millions of
jobs lost during the coronavirus crisis. When the American Rescue Plan was enacted in March
2021, there were still 8 million fewer jobs than there had been at the onset of the pandemic a year
prior. 733 But with the accelerated vaccine rollout led by the Biden Administration supported with
ARP funds, and the ARP’s relief and investment provisions, the United States has experienced a
robust job recovery. Since January 2021, the country has added more than 10 million jobs,
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surpassing the pre-pandemic total and regaining a historically low unemployment rate of 3.7%. 734
This recovery has been particularly strong for Black and Hispanic Americans. The
unemployment rate for Black Americans dropped from 10% in December 2020 to 5.7% in
November 2022, and Hispanic Americans saw a similar decline from 9.4% to 3.9% in November
2022. 735 This rapid job growth has nearly returned the United States to full employment and has
been widely credited with increasing worker power and affording more vulnerable Americans,
including people with disabilities and prior criminal convictions, job opportunities. 736
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After shrinking by 3.4% in 2020, the economy grew by 5.7% in 2021. 737 Positive trends
have generally continued, with real Gross Domestic Product estimated to have increased at an
annual rate of 2.9% in the third quarter of 2022. 738
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PUBLIC HEALTH | ECONOMIC IMPACT & CORPORATE CONDUCT | RECOMMENDATIONS
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III. Moving Forward: Recommendations for Continuing Ongoing Management
of the Coronavirus and Preventing and Addressing Future Public Health and
Economic Crises
A. Critical Investments Are Needed to Sustain the Ongoing Response to
the Coronavirus, Reinvigorate a Chronically Underfunded Public
Health Infrastructure, and Bolster the Nation’s Ability to Prevent and
Respond to Future Public Health Emergencies.
Decades-long underinvestment and longstanding health disparities left the nation’s health
care system and public health workforce inadequately prepared to respond to the coronavirus,
exacerbating the pandemic’s impact, particularly among communities of color, rural communities,
and low-income communities. As the coronavirus continues to spread, it is important for the
federal government to invest in new tests, treatments, and vaccines, help combat misinformation,
and accelerate research and treatment into Long COVID. Policy changes and sustained
investments are also critically needed to strengthen the nation’s ability to prevent and respond to
future public health crises. These measures include safeguarding scientific integrity,
reinvigorating core public health programs, modernizing public health infrastructure, and
addressing persistent health inequities.
1. A targeted bivalent booster campaign could prevent thousands of
deaths and hospitalizations and save billions of dollars.
Despite the resounding evidence that the coronavirus vaccines authorized in the United
States are safe and effective, millions of Americans are currently not up to date with their vaccines,
including many who are only partially vaccinated or vaccinated but not yet boosted. 739 Earlier this
year, FDA authorized updated mRNA bivalent booster shots developed by Pfizer and Moderna to
target the Omicron BA.4/BA.5 subvariants. 740 According to FDA and CDC, these bivalent
boosters offer better protection against Omicron subvariants than the original monovalent
vaccines. 741 Yet uptake of these bivalent boosters has lagged with only 13% of adults having
received a bivalent booster as of late November 2022. 742 With waning population immunity and
the threat of new variants, surges in hospitalizations and deaths during the upcoming winter are
increasingly likely. 743
Recommendation: Increase bivalent booster uptake. Research shows that an
aggressive booster campaign could prevent tens of thousands of deaths and hundreds of thousands
of hospitalizations as well as generate billions of dollars in savings in direct medical costs by the
end of March 2023. 744 The Biden Administration has dedicated significant resources to offer free
bivalent booster shots at tens of thousands of locations across the country, including by standing
up new community vaccination centers, focusing outreach to older Americans and
immunocompromised individuals, and launching a comprehensive public education campaign
with national and local organizations. 745
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2. Congress should act to accelerate next-generation coronavirus
countermeasures.
Sustained investment in research and development of next-generation coronavirus vaccines
and treatments will allow the country to pre-emptively combat a constantly evolving virus, rather
than reactively respond to the newest variants or the effects of waning immunity. 746
Recommendation: Accelerate the development of pan-coronavirus vaccines and
nasal vaccines. Variants of the coronavirus have become more transmissible and immune evasive
since the first strain reached the United States in early 2020. 747 While bivalent boosters perform
well against currently circulating strains of the coronavirus, this effectiveness may wane over time
as the virus continues to evolve. Experts have therefore called for a concerted mobilization to
develop true next-generation vaccines, such as pan-coronavirus vaccines that target a wide range
of variants and nasal vaccines that may better prevent transmission than intramuscular shots. 748 In
recent months, China and India have approved and begun deploying nasal coronavirus vaccines.
U.S. researchers have created several promising nasal vaccines that have been tested in animals,
but these are still several years away from being deployed in the United States. Continued
investments in vaccine research and development are necessary to decrease infections and reduce
the spread of the coronavirus. 749
Recommendation: Accelerate the development of new anti-viral treatments. The
Biden Administration took significant action to accelerate the highly effective oral antiviral
treatment Paxlovid to market by approximately seven months and to make the drug widely
available for free. Although Paxlovid continues to serve as a powerful therapeutic, the overall
number of effective treatment options has dwindled as the coronavirus mutated. FDA authorized
six monoclonal antibody treatments for the coronavirus, but emerging strains of the Omicron
variant have rendered these drugs less effective. FDA has rescinded each of these authorizations,
meaning no more monoclonal antibody treatments remain available in the United States. FDA
also recently announced that Evusheld, the monoclonal antibody prophylaxis used to prevent
infection in immunocompromised individuals, may not be effective against circulating Omicron
variants. 750 While immunocompromised patients who cannot take Paxlovid have other options,
such as the antiviral drug remdesivir or convalescent plasma, these treatments are more
complicated to administer and oversee, leaving some increasingly vulnerable. 751 Further, the
coronavirus may continue to develop resistance to antiviral treatments like Paxlovid over time,
underscoring the need to cultivate a robust pipeline of new effective treatment options without
delay. 752
Recommendation: Maintain testing capacity while developing better tests. The Biden
Administration made investments that helped bring hundreds of millions of rapid at-home tests to
households nationwide—offering Americans a convenient and efficient way to test themselves for
the coronavirus, rather than traveling to testing sites and waiting for laboratory results to be
processed and returned. 753 However, there is significant risk of backsliding on this progress.
Without continued support from Congress, the nation’s pandemic response will shift away from
public countermeasures and instead rely on the commercial market for manufacturing,
procurement, and pricing. This could lead to challenges if sufficient supplies are not available,
likely curtailing access for those with limited resources. 754 The federal government should also
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invest in and support the development of at-home tests that can detect a range of common
respiratory viruses in addition to the coronavirus, like influenza and RSV. 755
Recommendation: Promote ventilation and filtration systems. Improved ventilation
and filtration systems—if deployed at scale—could contribute significantly to mitigating the
spread of the coronavirus and other respiratory viruses, particularly during cold-weather seasons
when people spend more time indoors. 756 The American Rescue Plan provided hundreds of
billions of dollars for state and local governments and schools nationwide that could be used to
improve indoor air quality. 757 Earlier this year, the Biden Administration launched the Clean Air
in Buildings Challenge, a key component of President Biden’s National COVID-19 Preparedness
Plan. Recently, the Administration solicited public comments on actions, strategies, tools, and
approaches that will lead to sustainable, systems-based improvements in the nation’s building
stock that can reduce disease transmission over the longer term. 758 The federal government must
continue to support these efforts and ensure that the resources provided by Congress are used
appropriately and expeditiously.
3. The federal government must evaluate its domestic manufacturing
capabilities and investment in the nation’s Strategic National
Stockpile.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations have identified pre-pandemic lapses in
infectious disease preparedness, which contributed to the federal government’s inability in the
early months of 2020—and beyond—to procure and distribute PPE and medical supplies vital to
protecting Americans against the coronavirus. 759 The coronavirus pandemic highlighted
challenges hindering the country’s ability to mobilize domestic supply chains and maintenance of
the SNS during a public health emergency. Ensuring that the United States is adequately prepared
for a future public health crisis will require ongoing examination of and investment in the country’s
domestic manufacturing capabilities and operation of the SNS.
Recommendation: To ensure that the United States is adequately prepared for the
next public health emergency, federal agencies must continue to evaluate the proper role of
the SNS, including additional responsibilities related to emerging and infectious disease
outbreaks. This may require incorporating new responsibilities to shape SNS operations,
including managing the contracts, storage, and inventory requirements of new PPE,
pharmaceuticals, and other products; rethinking the role of the SNS, especially areas outside its
traditional work responsibilities such as supply chain management; hiring new staff with specific
medical countermeasures and supply chain expertise; and improving coordination between
government entities, domestic manufacturers, and public health experts to decide what is stocked
in the SNS. 760
By March 2020, as the virus spread around the world, numerous governments had placed
export restrictions on PPE, which in turn contributed to higher costs and greater supply shortages.
The United States—as the world’s largest importer of PPE—was highly susceptible to, and acutely
felt, the harm caused by these supply shortages. 761 Severe shortages of PPE and other medical
supplies throughout 2020 underscore the need for significant changes and corrective actions to
ensure that Americans have access to needed supplies in the event of a future public health
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emergency. The pandemic also served as a catalyst for examining SNS operations moving
forward. The near depletion of PPE in the SNS inventory early in the pandemic response raised
questions about the role, transparency, and inventory of the SNS during a nationwide public health
threat.
Recommendation: Congress should ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to
adequately stock necessary supplies in the SNS, cover the costs of ongoing responsibilities
such as maintenance and replenishment for medical countermeasures, and allow for shifting
investments and resources as appropriate. To better protect health care workers and all
Americans in the event of another crisis, policymakers should consider strategic industrial policy
to increase domestic manufacturing of PPE and medical supplies, reduce the nation’s dependence
on the global supply chain for PPE, and generate effective institutional capacity to quickly
mobilize domestic supply chains in the event of a public health threat. 762 The bipartisan Prepare
for and Respond to Existing Viruses, Emerging New Threats, and Pandemics Act (or the
PREVENT Pandemics Act), introduced in March 2022, focuses on strengthening the nation’s
public health and medical preparedness and response systems in the wake of the coronavirus
pandemic. Of particular importance, the PREVENT Pandemics Act seeks to strengthen supply
chains and government stockpiles of medical products and improve coordination among public
health preparedness agencies.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations found that, due to the urgent need to obtain life-
saving PPE during the pandemic and the widespread competition to obtain limited supplies, federal
agencies expedited multimillion-dollar contracts to unvetted suppliers with minimal diligence—
leading to greater risk of waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer resources. An effective medical
supply chain—delivering the right item or service, at the right time, to the right place, at the right
cost—would help ensure that federal agencies are prepared for future public health emergencies
and positioned to carry out mission critical work. 763
Recommendation: Federal agencies must review and close gaps in their diligence
processes so they can more effectively identify bad actors before awarding procurement
contracts. Federal agencies with significant needs for PPE and other critical medical supplies
must be well prepared and have supplies stockpiled in advance of future public health emergencies
so that they are not vulnerable to supply shortages and the heightened risk of waste, fraud, and
abuse that follows. Federal agencies should also address longstanding supply chain management
issues. For example, GAO added VA’s acquisition management to its High-Risk list in 2019, yet
the agency has made limited progress in addressing these challenges in the intervening years.764
The vetting of any prospective federal contractors should include a careful consideration of a
company’s ability to perform under a contract. The Select Subcommittee’s investigations into
private companies like FGE and Emergent demonstrated how significant lapses in performance
can waste millions of taxpayer dollars and raises questions as to whether additional federal
contracting controls could have prevented such loss. Federal agencies must ensure they are
adequately monitoring companies’ compliance with and performance on government contracts.
Congress must ensure that federal agencies have sufficient resources to address these challenges
and prevent such widespread abuse in future crises.
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4. Sustained, long-term investments are necessary to bolster the
nation’s public health infrastructure, modernize public health data
collection, expand the public health workforce, and protect public
health officials from attacks.
The Select Subcommittee’s September 29, 2021, hearing on “Upgrading Public Health
Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health
Departments” made clear that the United States has failed to adequately invest in the nation’s
public health infrastructure and workforce for decades. 765 Chronic underfunding of core public
health programs slowed the response to the coronavirus pandemic and exacerbated its impact
among low-income communities, communities of color, and other populations with fewer
resources needed during health emergencies. This resulted in a public health system with a
declining workforce stretched thin long before the pandemic that could not address the nation’s
health security needs or its persistent health inequities. 766
a. The federal government must invest in core public health
infrastructure.
Recommendation: Congress should increase funding for federal, state, local, tribal,
and territorial public health agencies, ensuring that it is predictable from year to year.
Billions of dollars in relief funding have been made available during the pandemic, but most of it
has been geared toward stemming the emergency, rather than building long-term capabilities.
Government funding for core public health functions is grossly insufficient. Many experts agree
that $4.5 billion of new and permanent annual funding—an investment of $32 per person—is
needed to ensure equitable and sustained foundational public health services for all. 767
Substantially increasing core public health funding would give public health departments
the tools they need to control outbreaks of infectious diseases, reduce injuries, prevent chronic
illness, enhance access to the health care system, protect the health of families and children, and
respond to emergencies. 768 Increased funding would reinvigorate key public health and emergency
preparedness programs that have experienced budget cuts over the years, such as the Prevention
and Public Health Fund, the Hospital Preparedness Program, and the Public Health Emergency
Preparedness Cooperative Agreement. 769 Additional funding from Congress could also support
the expansion and modernization of state and local public health laboratories, which would
improve testing and response capacity, genomic sequencing of pathogens, and biosecurity
capacity. 770 Experts testified to the Select Subcommittee during its September 29, 2021, hearing
that sustained, predictable, and robust investments—decoupled from disease-specific program
lines—are critical to achieving federal public health goals. 771
c. The federal government must modernize public health data
collection and improve the nation’s disease surveillance
infrastructure.
Recommendation: Invest in modernizing public health data systems to make them
more flexible, dynamic, and interoperable. Public health requires modernized data systems that
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both communicate with other systems and include sufficiently detailed and actionable information.
Congress should grant CDC the authority to require standardized data collection within and across
localities and to coordinate and compel data-sharing. 772 Both federal and state governments need
sufficient, ongoing funding to ensure they have the technology and data systems necessary to carry
out critical functions.
Accurate and timely data and a robust public health surveillance infrastructure are critical
to monitoring the spread of infection and disease progression and responding to health
emergencies. CDC, for example, uses numerous surveillance systems to collect, analyze, share,
and publish data on coronavirus cases, deaths, test results, hospitalizations, and vaccinations from
hospitals, health care providers, and laboratories. However, CDC relies on health departments and
health care facilities to collect and voluntarily report this data. 773 As a result, the nation’s response
to the coronavirus crisis was weakened by fractured and outdated public health data
infrastructure. 774
GAO has identified numerous longstanding challenges in the federal government’s
management of public health data, including: the lack of common data standards, which leads to
inconsistent data and challenges in identifying or analyzing trends; the lack of interoperability
among different public health data systems, which slows down decision-making when health
officials and hospitals must manually input data into multiple systems; and the complete lack of a
public health IT infrastructure, which forced some states in the early stages of the pandemic to
manually collect, process, and transfer data from one place to another—sometimes by fax
machine. 775 HHS OIG has also identified limitations in how CDC collected racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic data during the pandemic, which could make understanding and addressing
disparities more difficult. 776 Public health surveillance systems lack timely and reliable data to
protect against health threats. 777
Congress has provided $1.1 billion to CDC in support of the agency’s Data Modernization
Initiative, which will improve data collection and sharing, strengthen data reporting and analytics,
and advance surveillance to monitor the spread of the coronavirus and other public health threats.
One goal of this initiative is to make important data, including racial and ethnic data, more
complete. Similarly, CDC’s newly created Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics will
improve the government’s ability to forecast and model emerging health threats, expand
collaboration by increasing capacity for data-sharing and interoperability, and support
policymakers by communicating forecasts to inform decisions. 778
Wastewater surveillance is a promising infectious disease surveillance tool that can help
scientists track how viruses evolve and mutate and inform the location of testing and vaccination
sites as well as the distribution of resources to areas of need. 779 Yet some experts have observed
that the national reporting system for collecting and testing samples from wastewater treatment
systems for the coronavirus remains limited, uncoordinated, and insufficiently standardized for a
robust national surveillance system. 780
Both GAO and HHS OIG have recommended actions CDC must take to ensure its data
modernization efforts reach their full potential. Health departments need access to affordable,
standardized software and data. The United States needs to fully modernize its public health data
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systems not just at the federal level, but all the way down to the local health department level, so
that officials can use timely, comprehensive data to educate the public and inform policymaking.781
c. The federal government must invest in the public health
workforce.
Recommendation: Make sustained investments to grow a culturally competent
workforce trained in surveillance and detection, risk communications, laboratory science,
data systems, and disease containment. Experts testified to the Select Subcommittee during its
September 29, 2021, hearing that state and local health departments often struggle to attract
competitive candidates and fresh talent in today’s job market. Further, the provision of short-term,
emergency funding leads to boom-and-bust cycles, where public health agencies and departments
hire staff but then do not have the funds to keep them permanently and cannot invest or plan for
long-term challenges. 782
It is important to incentivize public health workers to join and remain in the workforce as
well as to build strategic partnerships and training pathways that can be leveraged during
emergencies to meet surging demand for workers. 783 These recruitment and retention efforts must
recognize that communities will typically be best served by public health workers who are from
those communities; it is therefore important to raise awareness and interest in public health
professions among underrepresented groups, expand recruitment, and create pipeline programs in
underserved communities. Experts testified to the Select Subcommittee in September 2021 that
increased funding should support training for those with an interest in public health careers as well
as those at risk for leaving for other sectors of the economy. 784
Congress and the Biden Administration have made strong investments in the nation’s
public health workforce through the American Rescue Plan. For example, the Administration
invested $7.4 billion from the American Rescue Plan to train and recruit public health workers to
respond to the pandemic and prepare for future public health challenges. 785 The American Rescue
Plan also provided a total of over $1.1 billion for community health, outreach, and health education
workers—the largest ever one-time investment in the nation’s community health workforce. 786
While these funds were critical in addressing acute workforce shortages after years of budget cuts,
emergency funding cannot replace or address systemic weaknesses created by 20 years of
underinvestment in state and local public health departments across the country. 787 Rather than
continuing to deprioritize public health funding in normal times and then scrambling during a
crisis, the federal government should make forward-looking investments to strengthen public
health infrastructure and the public health workforce. 788
4. The federal government must take action to protect public health
institutions from political interference.
The Select Subcommittee’s investigations found extensive evidence that the Trump
Administration engaged in a persistent pattern of political interference in the nation’s pandemic
response, prioritizing politics over protecting American lives. The Select Subcommittee also held
a number of hearings to explore these issues. For example, the Select Subcommittee’s April 29,
2022, hearing on “Ensuring Scientific Integrity at Our Nation’s Public Health Agencies” detailed
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how political interference by the Trump Administration led to the suppression and alteration of
accurate scientific information. Witnesses from GAO, including the Honorable Gene L. Dodaro,
Comptroller General of the United States, testified that career scientists feared retaliation and
doubted whether appropriate action would be taken. Other witnesses, including a former Editor-
in-Chief of CDC’s MMWR series, testified that this assault on science undermined Americans’
trust in public health institutions—leaving the nation vulnerable to misinformation and future
public health threats. 789
Dr. Birx also testified before the Select Subcommittee on June 23, 2022, on how President
Trump’s failure to accurately and effectively communicate the severity of the coronavirus
hampered the country’s ability to prepare for and respond to the pandemic. Dr. Birx testified that
the former President’s reelection campaign and efforts to overturn the election results distracted
the White House and detracted from the pandemic response, and that the Trump Administration
justified its disastrous handling of the pandemic response by relying on misinformation, rather
than sound science. 790 More must be done to protect science from political interference and restore
public trust in public health institutions.
Recommendation: Federal agencies must ensure that scientific decision-making is
protected from political interference. During the Select Subcommittee’s April 29, 2022,
scientific integrity hearing, witnesses discussed multiple recommendations for how HHS can
improve its response to public health emergencies, strengthen public trust, ensure scientific
integrity, and safeguard against political interference. Numerous career scientists at CDC, FDA,
and NIH reported that political interference in scientific decision-making resulted in the alteration
or suppression of scientific findings during the coronavirus pandemic, but that they did not report
these incidents because they “feared retaliation,” “thought leadership was already aware,” or were
“unsure how to report issues.” 791 To prevent a future recurrence, HHS can develop procedures
and train staff on reporting and addressing political interference. If officials contemplating
political interference within scientific decision-making are aware that it will be reported, they will
be less likely to engage in it.
6. Combating health misinformation requires dedicated federal
resources and a multi-pronged approach that supports public health
officials and emphasizes oversight and accountability.
The Select Subcommittee’s hearings and investigations highlighted how the spread of
misinformation regarding the coronavirus and coronavirus vaccines undermined the nation’s
response to the pandemic and cost American lives. Government officials, social and traditional
media companies, public health officials, and other stakeholders must work together to identify
and limit the spread of misinformation while also maintaining flexible policies that are not overly
restrictive, change as new information emerges, and balance the rights of individuals to express
themselves.
Recommendation: Modernize public health communications to ensure critical
information is accessible to all Americans, including communities that are often missed or
ignored. 792 Americans must have access to and trust in accurate public health information.
However, during the pandemic, public health messages did not resonate with certain communities,
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particularly those whose trusted voices were spreading misinformation. Federal agencies must
increase resources and technical assistance to state and local public health agencies to help better
address misinformation, increase investment in research on misinformation, and expand efforts to
educate the public on how to recognize misinformation as well as how it spreads. 793
Expert testimony provided to the Select Subcommittee described how misinformation
“seeds doubt and skepticism in the minds of people that may be less likely to understand or believe
reputable research” and “can cause direct patient harm.” 794 Rebuilding an infrastructure of trust
is vital for many Americans who feel like they have no trusted messengers. Surgeon General Dr.
Vivek Murthy issued a formal advisory in July 2021 declaring misinformation a serious public
health threat and recommending that the federal government convene federal, state, local,
territorial, tribal, private, nonprofit, and research partners to explore the impact of misinformation,
identify best practices to prevent and address it, issue recommendations, and find common ground
on difficult questions. 795 Similarly, the Presidential COVID-19 Health Equity Task Force issued
a report in November 2021 highlighting the threat posed by coronavirus misinformation and
recommending that the federal government “lead a multipronged, public-private awareness,
education, and communications campaign focused on clarifying misinformation associated with
vaccines and rebuilding trust in government,” particularly in communities of color and other
underserved populations. 796
Recommendation: Examine opportunities to protect the public health workforce,
including by establishing a national reporting system for incidents of violence against public
health officials and providing legal protections for workers facing harassment and violence.
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health identified 1,500 incidents of harassment and
violence against public health workers across the nation between March 2020 and January 2021.
Dr. Resnick, Senior Scientist at Johns Hopkins, elaborated on this research during a September 29,
2021, Select Subcommittee hearing, testifying that many public health officials were leaving their
jobs in the wake of these attacks and harassment. Dr. Resnick noted that her research team had
identified over 300 leadership departures from state and local health departments during the same
time frame. 797 These threats—and other efforts to delegitimize officials’ expertise during health
emergencies—erode confidence in public health professionals and will make it harder to control
the spread of illness and disease in the future. Congress may consider requiring state and local
monitoring and mandatory reporting of incidents of violence against state and local public health
workers for performing their official duties. The federal government could also implement legal
strategies and fund incentives to support strong public health authorities at the state and local
levels, and support state and local prosecutors to use existing statutes and legal protections, as
appropriate, to prosecute those who threaten violence against state and local public health
workers. 798 State and local public health workers need more support from local, regional, and
federal leaders—borne out in policies that recognize their expertise and provide enhanced
resources to continue to combat the coronavirus and prepare for future pandemics. 799
Recommendation: Explore opportunities to limit the spread of misinformation.
Experts testified to the Select Subcommittee during a November 17, 2021, hearing on “Combating
Coronavirus Cons and the Monetization of Misinformation” that the federal government should
strengthen consumer protections within the virtual world to protect against fraud victimization and
recommended investigations and possible repercussions for those who consistently propagate viral
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vaccine misinformation, especially those who do so for personal gain. 800 As one expert testified,
the pandemic created “an opportune environment for fraud to proliferate” and that “the harms that
come from [coronavirus-related] fraud … are not equally distributed throughout society and the
focused nature of them can create disproportionate harms within those marginalized
communities.” 801 Of course, when misinformation is spread in furtherance of fraud, the fraud is
illegal and should be prosecuted.
In the absence of fraud, using governmental action to combat misinformation is rightly
limited by the First Amendment, but the misinformation can still cause significant harm.
Opportunities may exist for the federal government to act to protect Americans without infringing
First Amendment rights. Most major platforms utilize algorithms that manipulate what people see
online—often feeding misinformation to users without their seeking it out purposely. 802 The
Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act, introduced in 2021, would remove
platforms’ existing liability protections for the algorithmic promotion of content (while
maintaining the liability protections for hosting non-promoted content).
Social media companies are not bound by the First Amendment and should act responsibly
to minimize the spread of misinformation on their platforms. Dr. Murthy’s July 2021 health
advisory also recommended that technology platforms strengthen the monitoring of
misinformation; prioritize early detection of misinformation super-spreaders and repeat offenders;
evaluate the effectiveness of internal policies and practices in addressing misinformation and be
transparent with findings; and amplify communications from trusted messengers and subject
matter experts. 803 Additional oversight and enforcement is needed to understand and address the
substantial impact of misinformation. 804
7. The federal government should take urgent action to mitigate the
health and economic impacts of Long COVID.
Recommendation: Congressional action is needed to ensure that individuals with
Long COVID can access the care they need. Multiple pieces of legislation have been introduced
in both the House and the Senate that would authorize funding and programs to help public health
officials and providers better understand Long COVID and provide critical services for affected
individuals. For example, the Targeting Resources for Equitable Access to Treatment (TREAT)
for Long COVID Act would support and expand Long COVID clinics that are stretched to
maximum capacity—alleviating long wait times and increasing access to care. Dr. Monica
Verduzco-Gutierrez testified to the Select Subcommittee during a July 17, 2022, Select
Subcommittee hearing on “Understanding and Addressing Long COVID and Its Health and
Economic Consequences” that the “multidisciplinary, organized care” offered by Long COVID
clinics is vital to patients suffering from Long COVID but that accessing these clinics can be
difficult, expensive, and “a barrier for many.” Ms. Hannah Davis, Co-founder of the Patient-Led
Research Collaborative, also testified that “Long COVID clinics are extremely necessary,” but that
“the vast majority of patients who can’t get into these clinics are socioeconomically disadvantaged
patients and women.” According to Dr. Verduzco-Gutierrez, “the most vulnerable with the most
barriers to access to care will be at increased risk of disability and poor outcomes” from Long
COVID. 805
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If enacted, the TREAT Long COVID Act would also: authorize funding to establish new
multidisciplinary clinics; prioritize funding for providers that engage with medically underserved
populations and those disproportionately impacted by the coronavirus; ensure Long COVID
treatment; and encourage ongoing medical training for physicians in Long COVID clinics and
other health care providers. Other legislation, such as the Comprehensive Access to Resources
and Education (CARE) for Long COVID Act, would advance critical research, authorize a patient
registry developed by HHS, collect data through Medicaid on items and services furnished to
beneficiaries with Long COVID, and authorize a grant program to support legal and social service
assistance for individuals with Long COVID.
Recommendation: In addition to expanding and improving clinical care access and
quality, the federal government should expedite and fund clinical treatment trials and
educate health care providers and the public on Long COVID. Ms. Katie Bach testified to the
Select Subcommittee that the federal government must also work to better understand and reduce
the economic burden of Long COVID, stating that “there is essentially no way this could not have
a significant impact on the economy.” Both Ms. Bach and Ms. Davis recommended critical
interventions the federal government could support, including paid sick leave, greater access to
Social Security Disability Insurance, related Medicare benefits, and financial assistance, improved
employer accommodations, and better data collection to fully assess the labor market and public
health impacts of Long COVID and to track the efficacy of any interventions. 806
8. The federal government must collaborate with global partners and
make sustained investments to be better prepared to prevent and
respond to future global health emergencies.
Recommendation: The federal government should increase its collaboration with
international partners to strengthen its ability to protect people from future threats and
mount a coordinated, effective, and equitable response to major global health crises when
they do occur. The coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated just how crucial multilateral
institutions and worldwide cooperation are to our collective health, prosperity, and security. In
response to the coronavirus pandemic, several international initiatives have been proposed to
strengthen and reform the global architecture for pandemic preparedness and response, including
suggestions for a pandemic treaty, a global pandemic fund, and mechanisms for equitable access
to medical countermeasures. These initiatives seek to make use of crucial lessons gleaned from
the ongoing pandemic by addressing gaps in health security and traditional public health functions.
The Biden Administration recently requested funding from Congress to combat the virus globally
by supporting vaccine uptake and expanding access to treatments and testing, stating that a failure
to provide more funding “would lead to needless infections and deaths across the nation and around
the world.” 807
Dr. Krishna Udayakumar, founding Director of the Duke Global Health Innovation Center,
testified before the Select Subcommittee in December 2021 that there is a continuing need for
“bold American leadership” in response to the coronavirus, stressing that the global pandemic has
been “both an international humanitarian crisis and also a threat to our own nation’s security,
health, and economic interests.” 808 One fact remains certain: pandemics know no borders. While
significant progress has been made in the fight against the coronavirus, sustained Congressional
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support is critical to a full domestic and global recovery. The United States cannot fully emerge
from the coronavirus pandemic until the whole world emerges.
Recommendation: Congress must pass legislation to ensure government institutions
and public health agencies are fully equipped to prevent and respond to future challenges.
Many provisions contained in the PREVENT Pandemics Act represent necessary and important
steps for preventing and responding to future public health crises and would improve capabilities
to detect and monitor emerging infectious diseases and other threats; enhance the development and
review of tests, treatments, and vaccines; improve public health communication and address
misinformation; and address disparities that make public health emergencies harder on at-risk
populations and communities. 809
B. Critical Changes Must Be Made to Ensure that Responses to Future
Crises Assist Working Americans Equitably, to Decrease Our
Economic Vulnerabilities to Future Crises in the First Place, and to
Guard the Integrity of Relief Programs.
The coronavirus crisis exposed and exacerbated vulnerabilities and inequities in our
economy. Even though the robust relief delivered by pandemic legislation compensated for these
weaknesses to reduce suffering and foster a rapid recovery, long-term structural changes are
necessary to make our economy more equitable and resilient. From strengthening unemployment
insurance systems and programs that deliver crisis relief, to improving the sustainability and
affordability of key sectors like child care and housing, to ensuring broad and equitable access to
paid sick and medical leave and credit, long-term changes are required to allow our economy to
weather future crises and to support working families. These changes will also strengthen program
integrity and ensure that aid goes to Americans in need rather than to bad actors seeking ill-gotten
gains.
1. The federal government must take proactive steps to ensure
equitable access to relief programs.
The Select Subcommittee’s work has identified significant underlying inequities in access
to federal relief programs through traditional pathways, such as IRS processes and private financial
institutions. Both in advance of and then during any future crisis, the government must take
proactive steps to reach already underserved individuals and businesses who may not be reached
by traditional means.
a. The federal government must maintain means of reaching
non-filers, who are likely to be the lowest-income and most
needy Americans.
Recommendation: In advance of future emergencies, the federal government should
assess and improve its ability to distribute emergency federal relief equitably, particularly
to the lowest-income Americans who are extraordinarily vulnerable to disasters. These
efforts should include plans for emergency information-sharing across federal and state benefit
programs and databases that typically do not interact. When emergencies arise, the federal
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government must also prioritize clear and rapid communication to underserved Americans to
ensure they are aware of their eligibility, regardless of their tax filing status. Among other
improvements, universal access to broadband internet would help to facilitate rapid contact with
Americans in rural areas and less-wealthy urban areas, who may then access online tools similar
to those created by the IRS for non-filers to apply for and receive EIPs. The investments included
in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act will enable significant progress in this
area.
Expert analyses and testimony provided to the Select Subcommittee indicate that CARES
Act and American Rescue Plan relief provisions—particularly direct payments such as EIPs and
the Child Tax Credit—dramatically and immediately reduced household food insecurity rates
during a period of economic crisis. 810 However, millions of low-income Americans who do not
file taxes and do not access certain other federal benefit programs may have missed out on timely
payments, if not failed entirely to receive relief for which they were eligible. 811 At the Select
Subcommittee’s urging, the IRS identified nine million non-filers who had not yet received an EIP
in September 2020, and agreed to notify them on an accelerated timeframe of their eligibility.812
It is nevertheless virtually certain that many Americans were passed over for much-needed relief
payments. Such exclusion must never be repeated.
b. When the government relies on private actors to manage
relief programs, it must structure relief programs to
maximize equity and conduct rigorous program oversight.
Recommendation: If the federal government continues to leverage private-sector
institutions to implement relief programs, it must tailor such programs more effectively from
the outset to prioritize businesses or workers who lack other means of accessing credit. So
long as inequities persist in the private sector, the government should pair any delegation to private
actors with rigorous oversight to ensure that profit motives do not interfere with the primary goals
of the program. Outside of any crisis, the government should also conduct ongoing work to
improve equitable access to credit across the financial sector.
The Select Subcommittee’s examination of SBA programs illuminated how systemic
inequities in the financial system created obstacles to aiding workers and small businesses at risk.
For example, contrary to the intent of many of its proponents, the Paycheck Protection Program
initially benefited mostly larger businesses, which had the inherent advantage of being established
banking customers, and which banks appeared to prefer due to the program fee structure (which
initially awarded higher fees for larger loan values). 813 The Trump Administration also failed to
push banks to administer the program more equitably, and even originally encouraged them to
serve larger businesses first. 814 At least some lenders accordingly delivered PPP relief faster for
wealthier businesses than for the neediest small business applicants. 815 An independent study by
the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) further found that black small business
owners and women received less assistance and information from lenders to aid in accessing PPP
loans than white male business owners. 816 A Federal Reserve Bank of New York study similarly
found that areas with high concentrations of black-owned businesses received disproportionately
little PPP relief in the early months of the pandemic. 817 Meanwhile, 75% of loans in PPP’s first
phase went to businesses in majority-white census tracts (where only 8% of the population
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lives). 818 The Biden Administration took aggressive action to remedy these inequities in pandemic
relief programs, including with supplemental EIDL grants for disadvantaged communities and a
PPP priority period for the smallest businesses. 819 PPP fee structures were also later adjusted to
incentivize lending to smaller businesses. 820 However, SBA did not pair these improvements with
sufficient oversight of new, unregulated loan facilitators, which ostensibly entered the program to
help underserved markets. 821 Limited and inequitable access to traditionally regulated sources of
capital in the financial sector therefore contributed to significant waste of taxpayer dollars through
unvetted newcomers. 822
2. It is essential to improve and maintain the infrastructure to deliver
critical relief effectively, efficiently, and equitably in a crisis.
The Select Subcommittee’s hearings, investigations, and briefings have repeatedly made
clear that it is important for Congress, as well as state and local governments, to support the
improvement and maintenance of the infrastructure needed to deliver critical relief in a crisis.
Unemployment insurance, newly created emergency rental assistance programs, and Small
Business Administration relief programs like EIDL are vital components of this infrastructure and
must be maintained and strengthened.
a. Congress should support state and local governments’
maintenance of the emergency rental assistance programs
created with pandemic assistance, while also making other
crucial investments in housing security.
Recommendation: Now that state and local governments have created the
infrastructure for distributing emergency rental assistance, Congress should support its
permanent maintenance so that in future crises aid can be delivered in a timely manner, and
to provide a consistent, effective lifeline to prevent evictions and homelessness. To prevent
millions of Americans from losing their homes as a result of the economic fallout of the
coronavirus crisis, Congress took decisive action to appropriate more than $46 billion in
emergency rental assistance to help impacted tenants. Unfortunately, because state and local rental
assistance programs had to be created from scratch to distribute the assistance in early 2021, it
took many tenants far too long to receive needed assistance. 823 Permanent programs would
provide the infrastructure to prevent such delays in future crises.
The National Low-Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), which has studied the functioning
of emergency rental assistance programs, explained to Select Subcommittee staff during a briefing
that Congress could effectively build on the progress made during the pandemic by providing
ongoing funding to the rental assistance programs that have been created with pandemic relief
funds. NLIHC also offered that a permanent program could also provide centralized technical
support to state and local programs, including in the form of standard technology, forms, and basic
policies. 824 To prepare for future crises, a permanent program could contain provisions that allow
for increased eligibility and larger benefits during times of crisis, with assistance targeted to the
lowest income renters under normal conditions.
State and local governments could also be encouraged to continue innovative strategies to
improve the effectiveness of rental assistance programs, such as through outreach and the
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development of eviction diversion programs. The Select Subcommittee’s pandemic evictions
investigation identified the troubling practice of large landlords filing to evict tenants with pending
rental assistance applications. 825 NLIHC noted that some courts handling evictions had required
landlords to confirm that tenants had not applied for rental assistance before filing to evict, a
requirement that a permanent program could encourage state and local governments to adopt. 826
b. Congress should make additional investments in housing to
reduce Americans’ vulnerability to losing their homes in
future crises.
Recommendation: Congress can reduce Americans’ vulnerabilities to losing their
homes in a crisis by investing in housing affordability for lower-income American families—
ensuring they have access to housing without having to pay more than 30% of their income.
Congress should expand the number of Housing Choice Vouchers, which provide assistance so
that renters only pay 30% of their income in rent, as current funding levels only allow about 25%
of those eligible to receive assistance. 827 Congress should also invest in supporting more
affordable housing construction for people at lower incomes, and in rehabilitating and preserving
public housing units, because these forms of housing also reduce rent burdens and have rents that
adjust downward when renters’ incomes fall in a crisis. 828 Further, in light of abuses the Select
Subcommittee identified in its investigation of corporate landlords’ pandemic eviction practices,
Congress should also consider increasing funding to provide tenants at risk of eviction with access
to counsel by building on the $20 million it has appropriated annually for that purpose in recent
years. 829
Making these investments would reduce the number of families vulnerable to losing their
homes in an economic downturn and would consequently reduce the strain on emergency rental
assistance programs during a crisis. Existing vulnerabilities in our economy are one reason that
as many as 12 million Americans were pushed to the brink of homelessness during the pandemic,
and why such significant rental assistance was needed to avoid an eviction crisis. 830 Even before
the pandemic, 48% of renter households were cost-burdened (paying more than 30% of their
income in rent), putting the more than 50 million Americans at serious risk of losing their homes
with an economic shock. 831 With the onset of the pandemic, tens of millions of American families
experienced such a shock at once, threatening a systemic eviction crisis. In addition to direct
investments in housing affordability, providing access to counsel has been associated with
significantly lower eviction rates and improved success in obtaining emergency rental
assistance. 832
c. Congress should enact reforms to strengthen the
unemployment insurance systems and continue investments
to improve those systems.
Recommendation: Congress should take action to require or encourage states to
reform their unemployment systems to reduce Americans’ vulnerability in future crises.
Congress can support these efforts by building on its $2 billion in funding in the American Rescue
Plan for modernization and improvement of unemployment insurance systems, including by
supporting the Biden Administration’s request that Congress significantly increase grant funds to
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support for state administration of unemployment insurance. 833 With this funding support, states
must invest in creating programs that can more quickly deliver benefits to the unemployed while
guarding against fraud. In light of GAO’s finding that some states have significant racial
disparities in approving benefits, Congress should consider requiring states to report additional
data about claim processing. Congress should also encourage states not to impose overly strict
eligibility requirements, provide a full 26 weeks of benefits, and increase minimum benefits so
they are not so low that workers are pushed into poverty upon job loss. Congress should also
consider how “gig economy” workers can be included in the unemployment insurance system so
that quickly created programs like pandemic unemployment compensation are not required in the
next crisis. Taking these steps would strengthen one of the most important systems for crisis
response and would ensure a more rapid and equitable delivery of relief in the next crisis.
The Select Subcommittee’s oversight work explored weaknesses in the unemployment
systems operated at the state level, which required pandemic relief legislation to create a pandemic
unemployment insurance program and to supplement state payments. Many states’ unemployment
insurance systems have very strict eligibility requirements that leave large shares of the workforce
unprotected. Many also have outdated technical systems and a lack of administrative capacity that
slows the processing of benefits in a crisis. Some states have significantly shortened the duration
of benefits, and some states pay such small benefits that unemployed workers receive benefits
below the poverty line. As the number of individuals working in the “gig economy” has grown,
these weaknesses affect the economic security of millions of working Americans. Improvement
and reforms are necessary to ensure adequate unemployment insurance benefits are delivered
effectively, efficiently, and equitably in the next crisis.
d. Congress should consider action to improve the capacity of
the EIDL program to handle large surges in a crisis.
Recommendation: Congress should provide SBA with resources to expand its
capacity for a surge during a national crisis or catastrophe. This could include maintaining a
larger staff trained in evaluating EIDL applications, as well as maintaining technological systems
capable of handling enormous surges in loan application volumes. Improving this infrastructure
would allow SBA to provide relief more quickly in the next crisis, with less fraud risk. SBA should
plan for nationwide disasters and crises on an order of magnitude greater than the one million
EIDL applications in a catastrophe that it planned for prior to the pandemic. This would include
ensuring that it had trained staff, training materials, technological systems, and contractors capable
of quickly surging capacity to handle millions of EIDL applications on a monthly basis.
The Select Subcommittee found that the EIDL program relied on a contractor that did not
have capacity to scale dramatically in a crisis without relying on a subcontractor for almost all
substantive work. Further, the Select Subcommittee found that EIDL application reviewers had
minimal training, which increased the program’s fraud vulnerabilities. SBA documents also
revealed that the anticipated surge in applications in a crisis, only one million in 60 days, was much
lower than occurred early in the pandemic. 834 SBA’s original EIDL portal and processing system
simply could not handle the influx, and a new system was constructed during the crisis.835
Congress and SBA must work to ensure that these delays and fraud vulnerabilities do not recur in
a future nationwide crisis.
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3. Congress should take steps to protect and support workers.
The Select Subcommittee’s hearings and investigations concerning worker well-being
identified higher turnover and other clear disadvantages for the hourly workers, female workers,
and workers of color who were most likely to serve as essential workers during the pandemic.
They also confirmed that the pattern of workplace inequities that occurred during the height of the
economic crisis largely predated the pandemic. 836 Achieving an equitable and more resilient
economy will require permanent protections to ensure working Americans can support themselves
and their families through times of personal or economic upheaval without being forced to leave
the labor force.
a. Congress should enact a program guaranteeing universal
paid sick, medical, and family leave.
Recommendation: Congress should advance economic recovery, equity, and public
health preparedness by enacting a program of universal paid sick, medical, and family leave.
Ensuring all working Americans have access to these forms of paid leave would improve the lives
of the essential workers who were so vital during the coronavirus crisis, and would also promote
a robust, equitable economic recovery. Moreover, expanding these forms of paid leave would also
reduce vulnerabilities in future public health crises.
The Select Subcommittee consistently found that lack of access to paid sick, medical, and
caregiving leave put workers in a position of economic precarity, while also making workplaces
less safe as working people could not take time off when they were infected with or exposed to the
coronavirus. This was the case for meatpacking workers, who the Select Subcommittee found
suffered significant risks during the crisis, as well as workers in other industries. 837 The Select
Subcommittee’s survey of 12 major corporations found that workers without paid sick leave quit
their jobs at far higher rates than workers with such leave during the first two years of the
pandemic, indicating that the absence of sick leave harms workers forced to leave their jobs as
well as the broader economy. 838 Workers who had access to and used paid family and caregiving
leave also weathered the economic challenges without an increase in adverse employment
outcomes and, benefiting employers, had higher retention rates than workers without such leave. 839
It is possible that these forms of leave during a public health crisis—where the need to take time
for illness, the illness of a family member, or to care for children was significantly increased—
reduced burnout and increased productivity. 840 Expanding paid sick and medical leave to ensure
all workers have access to these critical benefits is a necessary step in building a more equitable
economy that is resilient to crises and public health emergencies like the coronavirus pandemic.
A universal paid sick leave program would be particularly beneficial to essential lower-
paid hourly workers, who often lack the ability to stay home when they or their family members
are sick—even during a global pandemic. Ensuring that all American workers have access to these
benefits would also enhance the nation’s preparedness for any future health crises.
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b. Congress should make sustained investments in the child
care sector.
Recommendation: Congress should make a permanent investment in the child care
sector to improve affordability for families, increase wages for caregivers and early
educators, and expand the sector’s capacity so child care challenges are not a barrier for
parents’ participation in the labor market.
The coronavirus pandemic has showed that women, who are most likely to have
disproportionate caregiving responsibilities and be concentrated in low-wage and hourly jobs, are
extremely vulnerable to job loss during a public health crisis and economic downturn. The Select
Subcommittee’s survey found that, in 2020, women working for hourly wages tended to
experience worse employment outcomes than their male colleagues. 841 This was likely attributable
in part to a steep reduction in the availability of child care, which created significant obstacles for
working parents, particularly the mothers of young children.
The American Rescue Plan, and earlier the CARES Act and Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021, provided tens of billions of dollars in critical relief to support the child care sector
during the coronavirus crisis. These funds have provided crucial support for a sector that is
unaffordable for many parents, but that also pays very low wages to its heavily female workforce
that is disproportionately made up of women of color. 842 As Lynnette Fraga of Child Care Aware
testified to the Select Subcommittee, these relief funds have provided a “lifeline” to the child care
sector, supporting tens of thousands of child care providers. 843 But American Rescue Plan child
care funds will run out after 2024, and child care will remain unaffordable for parents and
unsustainably poorly compensated without further investment. As Dr. Lea Austin testified to the
Select Subcommittee, child care workers have been “among the lowest-paid workers in every state
with an average wage of about $12 an hour.” 844 It is critical for parents, child care workers, and
our economy as a whole that we expand investments in child care to ensure it is both affordable
and high-quality so that a lack of child care does not prevent parents from participating in the labor
force or children from receiving a strong start in life. As Professor Betsey Stevenson testified to
the Select Subcommittee, investing quality, affordable child care both results in “higher lifetime
earnings for the children,” and counters “low labor force participation” of parents which is part of
“the biggest economic problem the U.S. currently faces.” 845
Sustained investments are critical to an equitable economy today and in the future.
Significant federal investment will allow parents who wish to participate in the workforce to do
so, while also ensuring their children receive high-quality care and education that prepares them
to contribute to the economy in the future. The same investments will also help remedy serious
inequities by raising the wages in a critical sector predominantly employing women, and
disproportionately women of color, at very low wages.
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5. The federal government should build on improvements to its
economic data collection tools.
Recommendation: Federal agencies should expand and improve their economic data
collection tools and methods, building on advances in highlighting economic vulnerabilities
and inequities.
The U.S. Census Bureau has obtained rapid, real-time data samples through the Household
Pulse Survey in order to collect critical data during the pandemic, beginning in April 2020 and
continuing today. Among other government and expert groups that leveraged this data to track the
recovery, the Select Subcommittee monitored Pulse Survey data to assess the success of various
federal relief programs in real time. 846 The data also helped to identify significant systemic
inequities across race and gender lines in terms of the economic impacts of, and recovery from,
the pandemic-induced economic downturn.
Other work by the Select Subcommittee highlighted the need for updates to federal data
collection practices to monitor such inequities more effectively. For example, a number of
companies surveyed by the Select Subcommittee did not track data on workers with certain
protected characteristics, because such reporting was not required by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. 847 The lack of data on various protected demographic characteristics
likely limits EEOC’s ability to enforce civil rights law. By collecting data on additional protected
characteristics—such as disability, sexual orientation, and gender identity—EEOC could better
enforce the full range of federal laws protecting Americans from discrimination in the workplace,
and help private companies identify areas where they may be falling short.
Additionally, if employers were required to report outcomes data—such as terminations,
raises, and promotions—on data collection instruments (or even if employers were simply required
to track and maintain such outcomes data in case of potential investigations), then EEOC,
researchers, and employers would be better able to ensure not just that workplaces are hiring a
representative number of people from various protected classes, but also that workplaces are
treating protected employees equitably. Such data would also be helpful to employers who may
better understand the impact of their workplace policies and practices by collecting and reviewing
such data.
5. Future emergency programs must require that agencies implement
reasonable fraud safeguards.
a. Congress, SBA, and the IRS must ensure that tax transcripts
can be processed quickly in a crisis to provide a vital fraud
control.
Recommendation: Congress must, as it has with the Inflation Reduction Act,
continue to ensure the IRS has the resources to maintain the ability to surge the processing
of partial tax transcripts for SBA’s use to prevent fraud and ensure integrity in the EIDL
program. SBA and the IRS should maintain the relationship and process they created during the
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operation of pandemic programs so the EIDL program can effectively use partial tax transcripts in
another crisis that results in a dramatic surge in the number of applicants for relief.
Both SBA and independent watchdogs have credited SBA’s use of tax transcripts to verify
EIDL applicants’ information is not fraudulent as a critical change that reduced fraud against the
program. In a briefing with the Select Subcommittee, SBA explained that it took time to work
with the IRS to create a streamlined process for sharing these tax transcripts in partial form, which
allowed SBA to both verify the existence of a business applicant and its recent revenues.848
Congress and the Biden Administration have taken an important step to strengthen the IRS’s ability
to respond in a crisis by providing $33 billion for operations support, taxpayer services, and system
modernization over the next decade, and continued support for the IRS’s administrative capacity
through the next crisis is vital. 849 Ensuring that SBA can quickly access partial tax transcripts
from the IRS in a future emergency will allow the agency to deliver relief quickly with significantly
lower fraud risks.
b. Rigorous oversight must be conducted of any private-sector
entities involved in safeguarding taxpayer dollars from
criminal actors.
Recommendation: Future relief programs must include proactive fraud controls, and
to the extent that the federal government continues to delegate responsibilities for
safeguarding taxpayer dollars to the private sector, rigorous vetting and oversight must be
conducted of all entities acting in a position of public trust. The Select Subcommittee
determined that unvetted and underregulated companies were given extraordinary responsibility
in administering public relief programs, then either failed in effectively preventing fraud or abused
the relief programs for personal gain. 850 Companies acting in a capacity that involves stewardship
of taxpayer funds should be thoroughly reviewed to ensure that they have appropriate conflict-of-
interest policies and procedures, well-developed mechanisms to identify and report fraud to law
enforcement, management with appropriate qualifications and a history of business integrity,
adequately developed governance structures, and sufficient capitalization and capabilities to
achieve satisfactory performance.
Despite widespread reports of fraud in PPP loans, including concerns identified by the
Select Subcommittee, 851 the SBA forgave many loans before reviewing them for eligibility and
fraud. SBA OIG has previously “expressed concerns regarding the impact this change will have
on SBA’s ability to recover funds for forgiven loans later determined to be ineligible.” 852 In any
future relief programs involving forgivable loans, the SBA must ensure that loans are fully
reviewed for eligibility and fraud before granting forgiveness so that taxpayer dollars are
safeguarded, and fraudulent loans are identified for investigation and possible prosecution.
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1
H. Res. 935 (116th Cong) (2020); H. Res. 8 (117th Cong.).
2
International Society for Infectious Diseases, COVID-19 (online at https://isid.org/2019-novel-
coronavirus/) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022); How ProMED Crowdsourced the Arrival of Covid-19 and SARS, Wired
(Mar. 23, 2020) (online at https://wired.com/story/how-promed-crowdsourced-the-arrival-of-covid-19-and-sars/).
3
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Museum COVID-19 Timeline (online at
www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html); A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, New York Times (Mar.
17, 2021) (online at www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html); U.S. Officially Surpasses 1 Million
COVID-19 Deaths, Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Research Center (May 22, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/from-our-experts/u-s-officially-surpasses-1-million-covid-19-deaths).
4
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Nancy Messonnier (Oct. 8,
2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.08%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Nancy%20Messonnier%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
5
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Anne Schuchat (Oct. 1, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.01%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Anne%20Schuchat%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
6
Id.
7
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
8
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Daniel Jernigan (Dec. 13, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.12.13%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Daniel%20Jernigan%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
12
Id.; The Plague Year, New Yorker (Dec. 28, 2020) (online at
https://newyorker.com/magazine/2021/01/04/the-plague-year).
13
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
14
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed
Interview of Nancy Messonnier (Oct. 8, 2021) (online at
134
50-100_text_.pdf 146 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.08%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Nancy%20Messonnier%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
15
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Museum COVID-19 Timeline (online at
www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
22
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
23
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
24
Lawrence Wright, The Plague Year, The New Yorker (Dec. 28, 2020) (online at
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/01/04/the-plague-year).
25
Trump Signs China Trade Deal, Putting Economic Conflict on Pause, New York Times (Jan. 15, 2020)
(online at www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/business/economy/china-trade-deal.html).
26
Trump Thanks China’s Xi Jinping for Handling of Coronavirus, CNBC (Jan. 24, 2020) (online at
www.cnbc.com/2020/01/24/trump-thanks-chinas-xi-jinping-for-handling-of-coronavirus.html).
27
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed
Interview of Nancy Messonnier (Oct. 8, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.08%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Nancy%20Messonnier%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
28
CDC Advisers Concerned About Lack of Basic Information About New Wuhan Coronavirus, CNN (Jan.
23, 2020) (online at https://cnn.com/2020/01/23/health/wuhan-coronavirus-cdc-advisers/index.html); The C.D.C.
Waited ‘Its Entire Existence for this Moment.’ What Went Wrong?, New York Times (June 3, 2020) (online at
https://nytimes.com/2020/06/03/us/cdc-coronavirus.html).
29
See, e.g., China Builds Hospital in 5 Days After Surge in Virus Cases, Associated Press News (Jan. 16,
2020) (online at https://apnews.com/article/beijing-health-coronavirus-pandemic-wuhan-china-
c555525ecdaea032b6d1bc1ec2894513).
30
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Museum COVID-19 Timeline (online at
www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
135
50-100_text_.pdf 147 2/15/23 2:48 PM
31
The White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Coronavirus Task Force
(Jan. 29, 2020) (online at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-
regarding-presidents-coronavirus-task-force/).
32
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Anne Schuchat (Oct. 1, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.01%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Anne%20Schuchat%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
33
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID Data Tracker: Trends in Number of COVID-19
Cases and Deaths in the US Reported to CDC, by State/Territory (online at https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-
tracker/#trends_weeklydeaths_select_00) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022); Our World in Data, United States: Coronavirus
Pandemic Country Profile (online at https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/united-states#what-is-the-
cumulative-number-of-confirmed-deaths) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
34
Mortality Analysis, Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center (online at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Briefers Call for Racial Equities in
Testing, Treatment, and Investment (June 5, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/health-experts-decry-disparate-impact-coronavirus-outbreak-communities-color).
38
See., e.g., Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “Upgrading Public Health
Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments”, (Sept. 29,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-upgrading-public-
health-infrastructure-need-protect); Confronting A Legacy of Scarcity: A Plan For Reinvesting in U.S. Public
Health, STAT, (online at www.statnews.com/2021/06/28/confronting-a-legacy-of-scarcity-a-plan-for-reinvesting-in-
u-s-public-health/); Meeting America’s Public Health Challenge, The Commonwealth Fund Commission on a
National Public Health System (June 2022) (online at www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2022-
06/TCF-002%20National%20Public%20Heath%20System%20Report-r4-final.pdf).
39
The Impact of Chronic Underfunding on America’s Public Health System: Trends, Risks, and
Recommendations, 2020, Trust for America’s Health (April 2020) (online at www.tfah.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/TFAH2020PublicHealthFunding.pdf); Nason Maani & Sandro Galea, COVID-19 and
Underinvestment in the Public Health Infrastructure of the United States, Milbank Quarterly (June 2020) (online at
www.milbank.org/quarterly/articles/covid-19-and-underinvestment-in-the-public-health-infrastructure-of-the-
united-states).
40
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Surveillance and Data (Mar. 10, 2022) (online
at www.cdc.gov/surveillance/projects/dmi-initiative/how-did-we-get-here.html); Pew Charitable Trusts, Public
Health Systems Still Aren’t Ready for the Next Pandemic (Jan. 27, 2021) (online at www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/01/27/public-health-systems-still-arent-ready-for-the-next-pandemic).
41
Hollowed-out Public Health System Faces More Cuts amid Virus, Kaiser Health News (July 1, 2020)
(online at https://khn.org/news/us-public-health-system-underfunded-under-threat-faces-more-cuts-amid-covid-
pandemic/).
42
Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Impact of
the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Hospital and Outpatient Clinician Workforce (May 3, 2022) (online at
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/9cc72124abd9ea25d58a22c7692dccb6/aspe-covid-workforce-
report.pdf).
43
Why is There a Nursing Shortage?, NurseJournal (Aug. 29, 2022) (https://nursejournal.org/articles/why-
is-there-a-nursing-shortage/).
136
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44
Christine A. Sinsky, et al., COVID-Related Stress and Work Intentions in a Sample of US Health Care
Workers, Mayo Clinic (Dec. 1, 2021) (online at https://www.mcpiqojournal.org/article/S2542-4548(21)00126-
0/fulltext); How an Aging Nation, COVID-19 Stretch the Doctor Workforce Thin, American Medical Association
(Apr. 6, 2022) (online at www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/sustainability/how-aging-nation-covid-19-
stretch-doctor-workforce-thin)
45
The U.S. Physician Shortage Is Only Going to Get Worse. Here Are Potential Solutions, TIME (July 25,
2022) (online at https://time.com/6199666/physician-shortage-challenges-solutions/).
46
Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Impact of
the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Hospital and Outpatient Clinician Workforce (May 3, 2022) (online at
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/9cc72124abd9ea25d58a22c7692dccb6/aspe-covid-workforce-
report.pdf).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “Upgrading Public Health Infrastructure:
The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments” (Sept. 29, 2021) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-upgrading-public-health-
infrastructure-need-protect).
50
Elizabeth Ann Andraska, et al., Health Care Disparities During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Seminars in
Vascular Surgery (Aug. 9, 2021) (online at https://doi.org/10.1053%2Fj.semvascsurg.2021.08.002).
51
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, What is Health Equity?, (July 1, 2022) (online at
www.cdc.gov/healthequity/whatis/index.html#:~:text=Across%20the%20country%2C%20people%20in,compared%
20to%20their%20White%20counterparts).
52
Indian Health Service, Fact Sheets: Disparities (Oct. 2019) (online at
www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/disparities/).
53
Why are Blacks Dying at Higher Rates from COVID-19?, Brookings Institute (April 9, 2020) (online at
www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/04/09/why-are-blacks-dying-at-higher-rates-from-covid-19/).
54
Id.
55
Inside America’s 2-Decade Failure to Prepare for Coronavirus, Politico (Apr. 11, 2020) (online at
https://politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/11/america-two-decade-failure-prepare-coronavirus-179574; Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Brett Giroir (May 3, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Transcribed%20Interview%20of%20Brett
%20Giroir.pdf).
56
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Nation’s Medical Countermeasure
Stockpile: Opportunities to Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Sustainability of the CDC Strategic National
Stockpile (Oct. 24, 2016) (online at https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK396378/).
57
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response,
Stockpile Responses (online at https://aspr.hhs.gov/SNS/Pages/Stockpile-
Responses.aspx#:~:text=In%202003%2C%20the%20National%20Pharmaceutical,%2C%20hurricanes%2C%20and
%20influenza%20pandemics) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
58
George Busenberg, Policy Lessons from the History of Pandemic Preparedness, Edmond & Lily Safra
Center for Ethics, Harvard University (Sept. 3, 2020) (online at https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-
ethics/files/23pandemicpreparedness.pdf?m=1599224522).
59
Id.
60
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
137
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https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
61
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Brett Giroir (May 3, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Transcribed%20Interview%20of%20Brett
%20Giroir.pdf).
62
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
63
Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Addressees: HHS Should Address Strategic
National Stockpile Requirements and Inventory Risks, (Oct. 17, 2022) (GAO-23-106210) (online at
https://gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106210.pdf).
64
Id.
65
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf); Before Virus Outbreak, A Cascade of Warnings Went
Unheeded, New York Times (Mar. 19, 2020) (online at https://nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/trump-
coronavirus-outbreak.html).
66
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
67
Before Virus Outbreak, A Cascade of Warnings Went Unheeded, New York Times (Mar. 19, 2020)
(online at https://nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-outbreak.html).
68
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Testimony of
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Robert Kadlec, Department of Health and Human Services,
Hearing on Flu Season: U.S. Public Health Preparedness and Response, 116th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2019) (online at
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20191204/110278/HHRG-116-IF02-Wstate-KadlecMDMTMHMSR-
20191204.pdf).
69
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf). Cardinal Health is a large medical equipment
distribution company. See CardinalHealth, About Us (accessed Dec. 6, 2022) (online at
https://cardinalhealth.com/en/about-us.html).
70
See, e.g., Here’s How Some of the Countries Worst Hit by Coronavirus Are Dealing with Shortages of
Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers, Forbes (Mar. 31, 2020) (online at
https://forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/03/31/heres-how-some-of-the-countries-worst-hit-by-coronavirus-are-
dealing-with-shortages-of-protective-equipment-for-healthcare-workers/?sh=72e7adb82c13); Why America Ran out
of Protective Masks – And What Can Be Done About It, Vox (Mar. 27, 2020) (online at https://vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2020/3/27/21194402/coronavirus-masks-n95-respirators-personal-protective-equipment-ppe).
71
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Press Release: Public Health Screening to Begin at 3 U.S.
Airports for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (“2019-nCov”) (Jan. 17, 2020) (online at
https://cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0117-coronavirus-screening.html).
138
50-100_text_.pdf 150 2/15/23 2:48 PM
72
Disclosure from Anonymous CDC Quarantine Medical Officer to Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee
on the Coronavirus Crisis (Nov. 29, 2022).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Philip Dollard, et al., Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at
Designated U.S. Airports, January 17 – September 13, 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Nov. 13,
2020) (online at https://cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6945a4.htm).
77
Jasper Fuk-Woo Chan, et al., A Familial Cluster of Pneumonia Associated with the 2019 Novel
Coronavirus Indicating Person-to-Person Transmissions: A Study of a Family Cluster, The Lancet (Jan. 24, 2020)
(online at https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30154-9).
78
Department of Health and Human Services, Coronavirus News Conference (Jan. 28, 2020) (online at
www.c-span.org/video/?468647-1/hhs-secretary-azar-update-us-response-coronavirus).
79
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
80
Camilla Rothe, et al., Transmission of 2019-nCoV Infection from An Asymptomatic Contact in
Germany, New England Journal of Medicine, (Mar. 5, 2020) (online at https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmc2001468).
81
Sebastian Hoehl, et al., Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Returning Travelers from Wuhan, China,
New England Journal of Medicine (Mar. 26, 2020) (online at https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmc2001899).
82
Liroung Zou, et al., SARS-CoV-2 Viral Load in Upper Respiratory Specimens of Infected Patients, New
England Journal of Medicine (Mar. 19, 2020) (online at https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmc2001737). A research letter
dated February 21, 2020, in the Journal of the American Medical Association described asymptomatic spread to five
relatives from one carrier that never showed symptoms, concluding that further study of asymptomatic spread was
required. See Yan Bai, et al., Presumed Asymptomatic Carrier Transmission of COVID-19, Journal of the
American Medical Association (Feb. 21, 2020) (online at https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.2565).
83
Billy Quilty et al., Effectiveness of Airport Screening at Detecting Travellers Infected with Novel
Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), Eurosurveillance (Feb. 6, 2020) (online at https://doi.org/10.2807%2F1560-
7917.ES.2020.25.5.2000080).
84
Letter from Kyle Gardiner and Andrew Bakaj, Counsel to Dr. Daniel Wozniczka, to Christi Grimm,
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services (May 31, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Wozniczka%20Complaint%20w%20cove
r%20letter%20and%20enclosures.pdf).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Philip Dollard, et al., Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at
Designated U.S. Airports, January 17 – September 13, 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Nov. 13,
2020) (online at https://cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6945a4.htm).
88
Letter from Kyle Gardiner and Andrew Bakaj, Counsel to Dr. Daniel Wozniczka, to Christi Grimm,
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services (May 31, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Wozniczka%20Complaint%20w%20cove
r%20letter%20and%20enclosures.pdf).
89
Id.
139
50-100_text_.pdf 151 2/15/23 2:48 PM
90
Id.
91
Disclosure from Dr. Daniel Wozniczka to Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
(Aug. 9, 2022).
92
Philip Dollard, et al., Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving at
Designated U.S. Airports, January 17 – September 13, 2020, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Nov. 13,
2020) (online at https://cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6945a4.htm).
93
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Deborah Birx (Oct. 12, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.12%20Birx%20TI%20Transcript
%20%2B%20Errata.pdf).
94
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Martin Cetron (May 2, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.02%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Martin%20Cetron%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
95
US Evacuation Flight from China’s Coronavirus Zone Rerouted to March Air Reserve Base, ABC News
(Jan. 29, 2020) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/US/us-chartering-evacuation-flight-wuhan-coronavirus-zone-
california/story?id=68571310); Two Flights Leave Wuhan Headed for the United States, State Department Says,
CNN (Feb. 4, 2020) (online at https://cnn.com/2020/02/04/us/us-wuhan-evacuation-flight-coronavirus/index.html).
96
Coronavirus-Infected Americans Flown Home Against CDC’s Advice, Washington Post (Feb. 20, 2020)
(online at https://washingtonpost.com/health/coronavirus-diamond-princess-cruise-americans/2020/02/20/b6f54cae-
5279-11ea-b119-4faabac6674f_story.html).
97
Id.; Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Anne Schuchat (Oct. 1,
2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.01%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Anne%20Schuchat%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
98
White House Coronavirus Task Force Agendas (Feb. 6, 2020 – Jan. 11, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/WHCTF%20Agendas-small.pdf).
99
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Anne Schuchat (Oct. 1, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.01%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Anne%20Schuchat%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
World Health Organization, Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19 (online at
www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
103
Congressional Research Service, Covid-19 and China: A Chronology of Events (December 2019-
January 2020) (May 13, 2020) (online at
www.everycrsreport.com/files/20200513_R46354_1fa921a2ce644b74c9de9dd2e96cc470ee1dc395.pdf).
104
World Health Organization, Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19 (online at
www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022); The United States Badly Bungled
Coronavirus Testing—but Things May Soon Improve, Science (Feb. 28, 2020) (online at
www.science.org/content/article/united-states-badly-bungled-coronavirus-testing-things-may-soon-improve).
105
See How Testing Failures Allowed Coronavirus to Sweep the U.S., Politico (Mar. 8, 2020) (online at
www.politico.com/news/2020/03/06/coronavirus-testing-failure-123166).
140
50-100_text_.pdf 152 2/15/23 2:48 PM
106
Early CDC Coronavirus Test Came with Inconsistent Instructions and Cost the U.S. Weeks, National
Public Radio (May 21, 2021) (online at https://npr.org/2021/05/21/999194177/early-cdc-coronavirus-test-came-
with-inconsistent-instructions-cost-u-s-weeks).
107
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Laboratory Science and Safety, Root-Cause
Analysis: Unanticipated Failures of the ‘CDC 2019-Noval Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Real-Time RT-PCR
Diagnostic Panel’ at 6 (updated Oct. 5, 2020) (SSCC-0022290) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.10.05%20SSCC-0022290%20-
%20NR.pdf); Food and Drug Administration, Press Release: FDA Takes Significant Step in Coronavirus Response
Efforts, Issues Emergency Use Authorization for the First 2019 Novel Coronavirus Diagnostic (Feb. 4, 2020)
(online at www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-significant-step-coronavirus-response-efforts-
issues-emergency-use-authorization-first).
108
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Laboratory Science and Safety, Root-Cause
Analysis: Unanticipated Failures of the ‘CDC 2019-Noval Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Real-Time RT-PCR
Diagnostic Panel’ at 2, 4, 6 (updated Oct. 5, 2020) (SSCC-0022290) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.10.05%20SSCC-0022290%20-
%20NR.pdf).
109
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Michael Iademarco (Oct. 29,
2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.29%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Michael%20Iademarco%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
110
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Laboratory Science and Safety, Root-Cause
Analysis: Unanticipated Failures of the ‘CDC 2019-Noval Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Real-Time RT-PCR
Diagnostic Panel’ at 2, 6 (updated Oct. 5, 2020) (SSCC-0022290) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.10.05%20SSCC-0022290%20-
%20NR.pdf).
111
Id. at 6.
112
See The CDC’s Failed Race Against Covid-19: A Threat Underestimated and a Test Overcomplicated,
Washington Post (Dec. 26, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/cdc-
covid/2020/12/25/c2b418ae-4206-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html).
113
Email from Jeff Shuren, Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug
Administration, to Stephen Hahn, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, et al. (Feb. 15, 2020) (SSCC-
0038049-52) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.02.15_SSCC-0038049-
52_Redacted.pdf).
114
Email from Jeff Shuren, Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug
Administration, to Keagan Lenihan, Chief of Staff, Food and Drug Administration (Feb. 25, 2020) (SSCC-0038055-
56) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.02.25%20SSCC-
0038055-56_Redacted.pdf).
115
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
116
The CDC’s Failed Race Against Covid-19: A Threat Underestimated and a Test Overcomplicated,
Washington Post (Dec. 26, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/cdc-
covid/2020/12/25/c2b418ae-4206-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html); Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Transcript for the CDC Telebriefing Update on COVID-19 (Feb. 28, 2020) (online at
www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0228-COVID-19-update.html).
141
50-100_text_.pdf 153 2/15/23 2:48 PM
117
Jeffrey Shuren & Timothy Stenzel, South Korea’s Implementation Of A COVID-19 National Testing
Strategy, Health Affairs (May 25, 2021) (online at www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210521.255232/);
The United States Badly Bungled Coronavirus Testing—but Things May Soon Improve, Science (Feb. 28, 2020)
(online at www.science.org/content/article/united-states-badly-bungled-coronavirus-testing-things-may-soon-
improve); see also Our World in Data (online at https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/full-list-total-tests-for-covid-
19?time=2020-02-20..2020-03-01&country=USA~KOR) (accessed Dec. 07, 2022).
118
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Laboratory Science and Safety, Root-Cause
Analysis: Unanticipated Failures of the ‘CDC 2019-Noval Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Real-Time RT-PCR
Diagnostic Panel’ at 11 (updated Oct. 5, 2020) (SSCC-0022290) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.10.05%20SSCC-0022290%20-
%20NR.pdf).
119
Id. at 12.
120
Justin S. Lee et al., Analysis of the Initial Lot of the CDC 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Real-
Time RT-PCR Diagnostic Panel, PLoS ONE (Dec. 15, 2021) (online at
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0260487).
121
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
122
CDC’s Early Covid-19 Test Hampered by Design Flaw, Contamination, Wall Street Journal (Dec. 15,
2021) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/cdcs-early-covid-19-test-hampered-by-design-flaw-contamination-
11639594801); C.D.C. Virus Tests Were Contaminated and Poorly Designed, Agency Says, New York Times (Dec.
15, 2021) (online at www.nytimes.com/2021/12/15/health/cdc-covid-tests-contaminated.html); see also Email From
Keagan Lenihan, Chief of Staff, Food and Drug Administration, to Anne Schuchat, Principal Deputy Director,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, et al. (Mar. 5, 2020) (SSCC-0038035-36) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.03.05_SSCC-0038035-
36_Redacted.pdf) (FDA contacting CDC to propose ideas “that would help get more diagnostic tests to market”).
123
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
124
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf). Dr. Hahn noted that other FDA officials may have been in
communication with certain diagnostic test manufacturers in January 2020, but he was not part of those discussions.
125
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
126
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Deborah Birx (Oct. 12, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.12%20Birx%20TI%20Transcript
%20%2B%20Errata.pdf).
127
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf). Consistent with these statements, a timeline of “FDA’s Role
142
50-100_text_.pdf 154 2/15/23 2:48 PM
in SARS-CoV-2 Diagnostic Development” produced to the Select Subcommittee by HHS indicates that BARDA
first announced funding opportunities for developing coronavirus tests on February 15, 2020. FDA’s Role in SARS-
CoV-2 Diagnostic Development (SSCC-0037750) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Undated_SSCC-
0037750%20%28NR%29.pdf).
128
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
129
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
130
Email from Jeff Shuren, Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug
Administration, to Stephen Hahn, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, and Kegan Lenihan, Chief of
Staff, Food and Drug Administration (Feb. 25, 2020) (SSCC-0037762) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.02.25_SSCC-
0037762_Redacted.pdf); ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How Delays in Testing Set Back the U.S. Coronavirus
Response, New York Times (Mar. 10, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/us/coronavirus-testing-
delays.html); Letter from Karas Gross, Associate Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, Food and Drug
Administration, to Chairman Lamar Alexander, Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (SSCC-
0038144) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Undated_SSCC-
0038144%20-%20NR.pdf).
131
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf); Congressional Research Service, HHS Announcement on FDA
Premarket Review of Laboratory-Developed Tests (LDTs) (Dec. 3, 2020) (online at
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11548).
132
Food and Drug Administration, Press Release: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Issues New
Policy to Help Expedite Availability of Diagnostics (Feb. 29, 2020) (online at www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-issues-new-policy-help-expedite-availability-diagnostics); Draft
Timeline of FDA’s Role in SARS-CoV-2 Diagnostic Development (Undated_ SSCC-0037750) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Undated_SSCC-
0037750%20%28NR%29.pdf).
133
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf). This concern that was later reflected in a review published by FDA,
which analyzed 125 EUA requests for coronavirus LDTs and found that 82 had design or validation problems.
Jeffrey Shuren & Timothy Stenzel, Covid-19 Molecular Diagnostic Testing — Lessons Learned, The New England
Journal of Medicine (Oct. 22, 2020) (online at https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmp2023830).
134
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Redfield (Mar. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.17%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Robert%20Redfield%20-%20REDACTED.pdf).
135
FDA’s Role in SARS-CoV-2 Diagnostic Development (SSCC-0037750) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Undated_SSCC-
0037750%20%28NR%29.pdf); Letter from Karas Gross, Associate Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, Food and
143
50-100_text_.pdf 155 2/15/23 2:48 PM
Drug Administration, to Chairman Lamar Alexander, Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (SSCC-
0038144) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Undated_SSCC-
0038144%20-%20NR.pdf).
136
Letter from Karas Gross, Associate Commissioner for Legislative Affairs, Food and Drug
Administration, to Chairman Lamar Alexander, Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (SSCC-
0038144) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Undated_SSCC-
0038144%20-%20NR.pdf).
137
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
138
Memorandum from Robert Charrow, General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, to
Stephen Hahn, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, Federal Authority to Regulate Laboratory Developed
Tests (June 22, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/f/?id=00000174-e9b2-d951-a77f-f9fe04fa0000); Memo Details
HHS Push to Upend FDA’s Testing Oversight, Politico (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at
www.politico.com/news/2020/10/02/hhs-memo-fda-testing-oversight-425139).
139
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Email from Stacy Amin, Chief Counsel, Food and Drug Administration, to Stephen Hahn,
Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration (Aug. 21, 2020) (SSCC-0037955) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.08.21_SSCC-
0037955_Redacted.pdf).
143
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
144
Id.; see also Email from Kegan Lenihan, Chief of Staff, Food and Drug Administration, to Stephen
Hahn, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration (Aug. 6, 2020) (SSCC-0037982) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.08.06_SSCC-
0037982_Redacted.pdf).
145
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
146
Id. Contrary to Secretary Azar’s statements to the media, Dr. Hahn claimed that he never threatened to
resign over the dispute regarding LDTs. See id. at 301:7477 – 302:7487.
147
Id.; Congressional Research Service, HHS Announcement on FDA Premarket Review of Laboratory-
Developed Tests (LDTs) (Dec. 3, 2020) (online at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11548). HHS’s
announcement specified that “premarket review” included premarket approval, premarket notification, and
Emergency Use Authorization.
148
Letter from Chairman Frank Pallone, Committee on Energy and Commerce, et al. to Alex M. Azar II,
Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services (Oct. 7 2020) (online at
https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/HHS.2020.10.7.Let
144
50-100_text_.pdf 156 2/15/23 2:48 PM
ter%20re%20LDT%20policy%20change.pdf); Email from Robert Charrow, General Counsel, Department of Health
and Human Services, to Stephen Hahn, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration (Aug. 20, 2020) (SSCC-
0037960) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.08.20_SSCC-
0037960_Redacted.pdf) (HHS providing FDA its legal rationale for “yesterday’s posting on LDTs”). More than a
month after HHS posted its announcement regarding LDTs, FDA updated its website’s “frequently asked questions”
page on October 7, 2020, clarifying that the agency would decline to review any EUA requests for LDTs at that
time. Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf); Food and Drug Administration, FAQs on Testing for SARS-CoV-2
(Oct. 7, 2020) (online at https://web.archive.org/web/20201008024622/https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/coronavirus-covid-19-and-medical-devices/faqs-testing-sars-cov-2); Email from Jeff Shuren, Director,
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Food and Drug Administration, to Stephen Hahn, Commissioner, Food
and Drug Administration, Anand Shah, Deputy Commissioner for Medical and Scientific Affairs, Office of the
Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, and Kegan Lenihan, Chief of Staff, Food and Drug Administration
(Oct. 7, 2020) (SSCC-0037749) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.10.07_SSCC-
0037749_Redacted.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “It Was Compromised”: The Trump
Administration’s Unprecedented Campaign to Control CDC and Politicize Public Health During the Coronavirus
Crisis (Oct. 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.17%20The%20Trump%20Admi
nistration%E2%80%99s%20Unprecedented%20Campaign%20to%20Control%20CDC%20and%20Politicize%20Pu
blic%20Health%20During%20the%20Coronavirus%20Crisis.pdf).
149
Email from Stacy Amin, Chief Counsel, Food and Drug Administration, to Stephen Hahn,
Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration (Aug. 21, 2020) (SSCC-0037955) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.08.21_SSCC-
0037955_Redacted.pdf).
150
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Stephen Hahn (Jan. 28, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.01.28.SSCC%20Interview%20of%2
0Stephen%20Hahn%20-%20Redacted.pdf); HHS Chief Overrode FDA Officials to Ease Testing Rules, Politico
(Sept. 15, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/hhs-alex-azar-overrode-fda-testing-rules-415400).
151
HHS Chief Overrode FDA Officials to Ease Testing Rules, Politico (Sept. 15, 2020) (online at
www.politico.com/news/2020/09/15/hhs-alex-azar-overrode-fda-testing-rules-415400).
152
Department of Health and Human Services, Press Release: Statement by HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra
on Withdrawal of HHS Policy on Laboratory-Developed Tests (Nov. 15, 2021) (online at
www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/11/15/statement-hhs-secretary-xavier-becerra-withdrawal-hhs-policy-laboratory-
developed-tests.html).
153
We Don’t Have Enough Masks, The Atlantic (Jan. 30, 2020) (online at
https://theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/01/viral-masks/605761/).
154
Coronavirus Fears Lead to Worldwide Mask Shortages, CNN Business (Feb. 7, 2020) (online at
https://cnn.com/2020/02/07/business/coronavirus-mask-shortage/index.html).
155
As Demand Spikes for Medical Equipment, this Texas Manufacturer is Caught in Coronavirus’s Supply
Chain Panic, Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2020) (online at
https://washingtonpost.com/business/2020/02/15/coronavirus-mask-shortage-texas-manufacturing/); Health Care
Braces for Shortages of Supplies Due to Coronavirus, CNN (Feb. 29, 2020) (online at
https://cnn.com/2020/02/29/health/fda-medical-device-mask-hospital-shortage/index.html).
156
Memorandum from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform, to
Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Information Provided by Medical
145
50-100_text_.pdf 157 2/15/23 2:48 PM
Distribution Companies on Challenges with White House Supply Chain Task Force and Project Airbridge (July 2,
2020) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-releases-memo-with-new-
information-ontrump-administration-s).
157
Navarro Memos Warning of Mass Coronavirus Death Circulated in January, Axios (Apr. 7, 2020)
(online at https://axios.com/2020/04/07/exclusive-navarro-deaths-coronavirus-memos-january); Trump Advisor
Warned White House in January of Risks of A Pandemic, New York Times, (Apr. 6, 2020) (online at
https://nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/navarro-warning-trump-coronavirus.html).
158
Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to David S.
Ferriero, Archivist of the United States, National Archives and Records Administration (Mar. 30, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021-03-
30.Select%20Sub%20to%20Ferriero%20re%20NARA%20Supply%20Chain%20.pdf).
159
A Timeline of What Trump Has Said on Coronavirus, CBS News (Apr. 3, 2020) (online at
www.cbsnews.com/news/timeline-president-donald-trump-changing-statements-on-coronavirus/).
160
U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Italy, Remarks by President Trump in a Meeting with Supply Chain
Distributors on COVID-19 (online at https://it.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-president-trump-in-a-meeting-with-
supply-chain-distributors-on-covid-19/) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
161
Kushner Coronavirus Effort Said to Be Hampered by Inexperienced Volunteers, Washington Post (May
5, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kushner-coronavirus-effort-said-to-be-hampered-by-
inexperienced-volunteers/2020/05/05/6166ef0c-8e1c-11ea-9e23-6914ee410a5f_story.html).
162
Written Whistleblower Responses from Max Kennedy to Questions from Committee on Oversight and
Reform (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20investigation%20que
stions%20%28Kennedy%29.pdf).
163
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Jessica Stone (July 21, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.21%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Jessica%20Stone%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
164
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Daniel Moskovic (June 10,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.06.10%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Daniel%20Moskovic%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
165
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Sonya Hoo (July 25, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.25%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Sonya%20Hoo%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
166
Id.; Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Jessica Stone (July 21,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.21%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Jessica%20Stone%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
167
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Jessica Stone (July 21, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.21%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Jessica%20Stone%20-%20Redacted.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed
Interview of Daniel Moskovic (June 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.06.10%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Daniel%20Moskovic%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
146
50-100_text_.pdf 158 2/15/23 2:48 PM
168
Written Whistleblower Responses from Max Kennedy to Questions from Committee on Oversight and
Reform (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20investigation%20que
stions%20%28Kennedy%29.pdf); Kushner’s Inexperienced COVID-19 Volunteers Bungled Hunt for Medical
Supplies: Reports, HuffPost (May 6, 2020) (online at www.huffpost.com/entry/kushner-volunteer-coronavirus-ppe-
whistleblower_n_5eb25572c5b6f8deb4e95546).
169
Written Whistleblower Responses from Max Kennedy to Questions from Committee on Oversight and
Reform (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20investigation%20que
stions%20%28Kennedy%29.pdf); How Kushner’s Volunteer Force Led a Fumbling Hunt for Medical Supplies,
New York Times (May 5, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/us/jared-kushner-fema-coronavirus.html);
Kushner Coronavirus Effort Said to Be Hampered by Inexperienced Volunteers, Washington Post (May 5, 2020)
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kushner-coronavirus-effort-said-to-be-hampered-by-inexperienced-
volunteers/2020/05/05/6166ef0c-8e1c-11ea-9e23-6914ee410a5f_story.html).
170
Written Whistleblower Responses from Max Kennedy to Questions from Committee on Oversight and
Reform (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20investigation%20que
stions%20%28Kennedy%29.pdf); Disclosure from Max Kennedy to Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Jan. 5, 2022).
171
How Kushner’s Volunteer Force Led a Fumbling Hunt for Medical Supplies, New York Times (May 5,
2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/us/jared-kushner-fema-coronavirus.html); Kushner Coronavirus
Effort Said to Be Hampered by Inexperienced Volunteers, Washington Post (May 5, 2020) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kushner-coronavirus-effort-said-to-be-hampered-by-inexperienced-
volunteers/2020/05/05/6166ef0c-8e1c-11ea-9e23-6914ee410a5f_story.html).
172
Written Whistleblower Responses from Max Kennedy to Questions from Committee on Oversight and
Reform (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20investigation%20que
stions%20%28Kennedy%29.pdf).
173
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Daniel Moskovic (June 10,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.06.10%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Daniel%20Moskovic%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
174
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Jessica Stone (July 21, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.21%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Jessica%20Stone%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
175
Written Whistleblower Responses from Max Kennedy to Questions from Committee on Oversight and
Reform (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20investigation%20que
stions%20%28Kennedy%29.pdf).
176
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Daniel Moskovic (June 10,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.06.10%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Daniel%20Moskovic%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
177
Memorandum from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform to
Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Information Provided by Medical
Distribution Companies on Challenges with White House Supply Chain Task Force and Project Airbridge (July 2,
2020) (online at
147
50-100_text_.pdf 159 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/Project%20Airbridge%
20Memo%2007-02-20.pdf).
178
White House’s Pandemic Relief Effort Project Airbridge Is Swathed in Secrecy and Exaggerations,
Washington Post (May 8, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/white-house-pandemic-supply-
project-swathed-in-secrecy-and-exaggerations/2020/05/08/9c77efb2-8d52-11ea-a9c0-73b93422d691_story.html).
179
Memorandum from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform to
Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Information Provided by Medical
Distribution Companies on Challenges with White House Supply Chain Task Force and Project Airbridge (July 2,
2020) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/Project%20Airbridge%
20Memo%2007-02-20.pdf).
180
Written Whistleblower Responses from Max Kennedy to Questions from Committee on Oversight and
Reform (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Response%20to%20investigation%20que
stions%20%28Kennedy%29.pdf).
181
White House’s Pandemic Relief Effort Project Airbridge Is Swathed in Secrecy and Exaggerations,
Washington Post (May 8, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/white-house-pandemic-supply-
project-swathed-in-secrecy-and-exaggerations/2020/05/08/9c77efb2-8d52-11ea-a9c0-73b93422d691_story.html).
182
Jared Kushner’s Highly Scrutinized ‘Project Airbridge’ to Begin Winding Down, NBC News (May 11,
2020) (online at www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/jared-kushner-backed-project-airbridge-be-largely-
grounded-n1204646).
183
Pence Overstates Coronavirus Supplies Delivered by Administration’s ‘Airbridge’ Program, Wall Street
Journal (June 19, 2020) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/pence-overstates-coronavirus-supplies-delivered-by-
administrations-airbridge-program-11592584447).
184
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
185
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Releases New
Evidence of Trump Administration Failure to Heed Early Pandemic Warnings (Aug. 10, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-committees-inquiry-trump-administration-puts-765-
million-kodak-loan); Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to
David S. Ferriero, Archivist of the United States, (Sept. 14, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.12.11.Clyburn%20to%20Peter%20
Navarro%20re%20Subpoena%20Compliance.pdf).
186
Generic Drugmaker Gets Contract to Make Covid-19 Medicines in U.S., Wall Street Journal (May 19,
2020) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/generic-drugmaker-gets-contract-to-make-covid-19-medicines-in-u-
s11589920608).
187
Email from Peter Navarro, Director, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, to Eric
Edwards, Chief Executive Officer, Phlow, et al. (Mar. 20, 2020) (PHLOW_SSCC_0011872) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PHLOW_SSCC_0011872_Redacted.pdf).
188
Email from Peter Navarro, Director, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, to Eric
Edwards, Chief Executive Officer, Phlow, Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, Lead, Supply Chain Stabilization Task
Force, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Christopher Abbott, Deputy Director, White House Office of
Trade and Manufacturing Policy, Lieutenant Colin Amerau, Joint Staff J4, Department of Defense, and Robert
Kadlec, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Department of Health and Human Services (Mar. 26,
148
50-100_text_.pdf 160 2/15/23 2:48 PM
2020) (PHLOW_SSCC_0003719 – 20) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PHLOW_SSCC_0003719_Redacted.pdf).
189
USASpending.com, Contract Summary: Phlow Corp. (online at
www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_75A50120C00092_7505_-NONE-_-NONE-) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022);
Generic Drugmaker Gets Contract to Make Covid-19 Medicines in U.S., Wall Street Journal (May 19, 2020) (online
at https://wsj.com/articles/generic-drugmaker-gets-contract-to-make-covid-19-medicines-in-u-s-11589920608).
190
Email from John Keane, Consultant, AirBoss Defense Group, to Peter Navarro, Director, White House
Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (Mar. 22, 2020) (ADG_00009382) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ADG_00009382_Redacted.pdf).
191
Email from Michael McCormack, Chief Strategy Officer, AirBoss Defense Group, to Christopher
Abbott, Deputy Director, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, et al. (Mar. 23, 2020)
(ADG_0000941 – 56) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ADG_00000941_Redacted.pdf).
192
Email from Peter Navarro, Director, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, to Patrick
Callahan, Chief Executive Officer, AirBoss Defense Group, Brian McCormack, Associate Director, Office of
Management and Budget, and Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Department of
Health and Human Services (Mar. 24, 2020) (ADG_00000898) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ADG_00000898_Redacted.pdf).
193
Email from Michael McCormack, Chief Strategy Officer, AirBoss Defense Group, to Sam Ansani,
Branch Chief, Incident Support and Field Operations, Department of Homeland Security, et al. (Mar. 29, 2020)
(ADG_00000661 – 76) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ADG_00000661-676_Redacted.pdf).
194
USASpending.gov, Contract Summary: Immediate Response Technologies, LLC (online at
www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_70FB7020C00000007_7022_-NONE-_-NONE-) (accessed Dec. 6,
2022).
195
AirBoss of America Corp., 2020 Second Quarter Interim Report (Aug. 10, 2020) (online at
https://airboss.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/2020_Second_Quarter_Interim_Report.pdf).
196
Letter from James E. Clyburn, Chairman, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Carolyn B.
Maloney, Chairwoman, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Maxine Waters, Chairwoman, Committee on
Financial Services, to James V. Continenza, Executive Chairman, Eastman Kodak Company (Aug. 4, 2020) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-08-
04.Clyburn%20CBM%20Waters%20to%20Kodak%20re%20Loan%201.pdf).
197
Id.
198
Kodak Executive Chairman Addresses Jump in Trading Activity Before Government Deal Was
Announced, CNBC (July 29, 2020) (online at www.cnbc.com/2020/07/29/kodak-executive-chairman-
addressesjump-in-trading-activity-before-government-deal-was-announced.html).
199
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Committees’ Inquiry, Trump
Administration Puts $765 Million Kodak Loan on Hold (Aug. 10, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-committees-inquiry-trump-administration-puts-765-
million-kodak-loan); U.S. Agency Sidelines Planned $765 Million Load to Kodak Amid Probes, Wall Street Journal
(Aug. 9, 2020) (online at https://wsj.com/articles/u-s-agency-sidelines-planned-765-million-loan-to-kodak-amid-
probes-11597018204).
200
Email from Kristin Williams, Vice President of Public Affairs, Eastman Kodak Company, to Joseph
Russo, Special Assistant to the President and Director of Business Outreach, The White House (Mar. 20, 2020) (EK-
SSCC-0002731) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.03.20%20EK-SSCC-
149
50-100_text_.pdf 161 2/15/23 2:48 PM
0002731_Redacted.pdf); Timeline: Tracking Trump Alongside Scientific Developments on Hydroxychloroquine,
ABC News (Aug. 8, 2020) (online at www.abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-tracking-trump-alongside-
scientificdevelopments-hydroxychloroquine/story?id=72170553). By June 15, 2020, FDA revoked its emergency
use authorization for hydroxychloroquine, citing in a statement that the drug was “unlikely to be effective in treating
COVID-19 for the authorized uses.” Id.; Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, A “Knife Fight” with the
FDA: The Trump White House’s Relentless Attacks on FDA’s Coronavirus Response, at 10-11 (Aug. 2022) (online
at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.08.24%20The%20Trump%20White
%20House%E2%80%99s%20Relentless%20Attacks%20on%20FDA%E2%80%99s%20Coronavirus%20Response.
pdf).
201
Email from Nagraj Bokinkere, General Manager, MES & Commercial Films, Eastman Kodak
Company, to Carmelo Rosa, Director, Division of Drug Quality 1, CDER-Office of Compliance, Office of
Manufacturing and Product Quality, Food and Drug Administration, et al. (Apr. 10, 2020) (EK-SSCC-0003152 –
60) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.04.10A%20EK-
SSCC-0003152_Redacted%20and%202020.04.10B%20EK-SSCC-0003156_Redacted.pdf); Email from John
Tegeris, TechWatch Program Manager, Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, to Kristin
Williams, Vice President of Public Affairs, Eastman Kodak Company (Mar. 23, 2020) (EK-SSCC-0002806 – 07)
(online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.03.23%20EK-SSCC-
0002806_Redacted.pdf); Email from Kristin Williams, Vice President of Public Affairs, Eastman Kodak Company,
to Leo Zadecky, Senior Program Management Officer, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug
Administration (Mar. 22, 2020) (EK-SSCC-0002799 – 800) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.03.22%20EK-SSCC-
0002799_Redacted.pdf).
202
Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Eastman Kodak Company Regarding the
Events Surrounding the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Letter of Interest Announcement, Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, at 12 (Sept. 15, 2020) (online at https://kodak.com/content/products-
brochures/Company/Report-to-the-Special-Committee-09.15.2020.pdf).
203
Email from Terry Taber, Chief Technical Officer, Eastman Kodak Company, to Christopher Abbott,
Deputy Director, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (May 28, 2020) (EK-SSCC-0003645 – 62)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.05.28A%20EK_SSCC_0003645-
3662_Redacted.pdf); Text message from Christopher Abbott, Deputy Director White House Office of Trade and
Manufacturing Policy, to Terry Taber, Chief Technical Officer, Eastman Kodak Company (May 31, 2020)
(EKSSCC-0014278) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.05.31%20EK-SSCC-
0014278_Redacted.pdf); Email from Terry Taber, Chief Technical Officer, Eastman Kodak Company, to
Christopher Abbott, Deputy Director at White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (June 3, 2020)
(EKSSCC-0003773) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/EK-
SSCC-0003773--EK-SSCC-0003834_Redacted.pdf); Email from Terry Taber, Chief Technical Officer, Eastman
Kodak Company, to David Glaccum, Counsel to the Chief Executive, U.S. International Development Finance
Corporation (June 4, 2020) (EK-SSCC-0003841) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/EK-SSCC-0003841--EK-SSCC-
0003903_Redacted.pdf); Email from David Glaccum, Counsel to the Chief Executive, U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation, to Terry Taber, Chief Technical Officer, Eastman Kodak Company (June 11,
2020) (EK-SSCC-0003956) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.06.11%20EK-SSCC-
0003956_Redacted.pdf); Meeting invitation from Jim Continenza, Executive Chairman, Eastman Kodak Company,
to David Penna, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, et al. (June 11, 2020) (EK-SSCC-0003965)
(online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.06.11%20EK-SSCC-
0003965_Redacted.pdf).
150
50-100_text_.pdf 162 2/15/23 2:48 PM
204
Tactics of Fiery White House Trade Adviser Draw New Scrutiny as Some of His Pandemic Moves
Unravel, Washington Post (Sept. 2, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/us-
policy/2020/09/02/navarropandemic-coronavirus/).
205
Miscalculation at Every Level Left U.S. Unequipped to Fight Coronavirus, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 29,
2020) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/miscalculation-at-every-level-left-u-s-unequipped-to-fight-coronavirus-
11588170921); U.S. Exported Millions in Masks and Ventilators Ahead of the Coronavirus Crisis, USA Today
(Apr. 2, 2020) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2020/04/02/us-exports-masks-ppe-china-
surged-early-phase-coronavirus/5109747002/); Health Care Workers Still Face Daunting Shortages of Masks and
Other P.P.E., New York Times (Dec. 20, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/12/20/health/covid-ppe-
shortages.html); Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Inspector General, Reporting and Monitoring Personal
Protective Equipment Inventory During the Pandemic (Feb. 24, 2021) (online at
www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/VA/VAOIG-20-02959-62.pdf).
206
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on the Administration’s Efforts to Procure,
Stockpile, and Distribute Critical Supplies (July 2, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-
activity/hearings/administration-s-efforts-procure-stockpile-and-distribute-critical-0).
207
Congressional Research Service, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and
Policy Options (Dec. 7, 2020) (R46628) (online at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46628).
208
Memorandum from Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, to Members, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 17, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.06.17%20SSCC%20Staff%20Mem
o%20-%20Fed%20Government%20Experts%20Investigation.pdf).
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Email from Supervisory Contract Specialist, Program Contracting Activity Central, Department of
Veterans Affairs, to VA Office of Inspector General (Apr. 5, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/4.6.20_NP_Redacted.pdf).
213
Email from VA Office of Inspector General to Supervisory Contract Specialist, Program Contracting
Activity Central, Department of Veterans Affairs (Apr. 5, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/4.6.20_NP_Redacted.pdf); Memorandum
from Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, to Members, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis, Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 17, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.06.17%20SSCC%20Staff%20Mem
o%20-%20Fed%20Government%20Experts%20Investigation.pdf).
214
Email from National Director, VHA Medical Supply Program (Acting), VHA Procurement and
Logistics Office (10NA2), Department of Veterans Affairs, to Chief Supply Chain Officer, VA Rocky Mountain
Network, VISN 19 (Apr. 16, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/4.16.20_NT_Redacted.pdf).
215
How Profit and Incompetence Delayed N95 Masks While People Died at the VA, ProPublica (May 1,
2020) (online at www.propublica.org/article/how-profit-and-incompetence-delayed-n95-masks-while-people-died-
at-the-va).
216
Email from Executive Director, Procurement, Procurement and Logistics Office (10NA2), Veterans
Health Administration to National Director, VHA Medical Supply Program (Acting), VHA Procurement and
Logistics Office (10NA2), Department of Veterans Affairs, et al. (May 4, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.4.20_NT_Redacted.pdf).
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217
Memorandum from Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, to Members, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 17, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.06.17%20SSCC%20Staff%20Mem
o%20-%20Fed%20Government%20Experts%20Investigation.pdf).
218
Email from Acquisition Utilization Specialist-Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center, to Robert S.
Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC (Apr. 30, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/4.30.20_BF_Redacted.pdf).
219
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to
Acquisition Utilization Specialist-Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (Apr. 30, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/NEW%20-%20BF_Redacted.pdf); Letter
from Robert Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to Acquisition Utilization
Specialist-Logistics Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (May 4, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.5.20_BF_Redacted_2.pdf).
220
Letter from Robert Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to
Acquisition Utilization Specialist-Logistics Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (May 4, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.5.20_BF_Redacted.pdf).
221
Memorandum from Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, to Members, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 17, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.06.17%20SSCC%20Staff%20Mem
o%20-%20Fed%20Government%20Experts%20Investigation.pdf).
222
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC (May
4, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.4.20_TR_Redacted.pdf).
223
Memorandum from Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, to Members, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 17, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.06.17%20SSCC%20Staff%20Mem
o%20-%20Fed%20Government%20Experts%20Investigation.pdf).
224
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to
Acquisition Utilization Specialist-Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (May 5, 2020, at 8:42 a.m. and 8:57
a.m.) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.5.20_BF_Redacted_2.pdf).
225
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC (May
6, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.6.20_BF_Redacted.pdf).
226
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to
Acquisition Utilization Specialist, Supply/Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (May 6, 2020, at 5:15 p.m.)
(online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.6.20_BF_Redacted.pdf).
227
Email from Acquisition Utilization Specialist, Supply/Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center, to
Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC (May 6, 2020, at 6:07 p.m.)
(online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.6.20_BF_Redacted.pdf).
228
Email from J. David McSwane, Reporter, ProPublica, to Christina Noel (Mandreucci), Press Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs (May 12, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.12.20_TR_Redacted.pdf).
152
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229
Email from Contract Officer, Network Contracting Office 7, to Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director
– CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC (May 15, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.15.20_BP_Redacted.pdf).
230
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to
Contract Officer, Network Contracting Office 7 (May 27, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.27.20_BF_Redacted.pdf).
231
Memorandum from Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, to Members, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 17, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.06.17%20SSCC%20Staff%20Mem
o%20-%20Fed%20Government%20Experts%20Investigation.pdf).
232
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to
Contract Officer, Network Contracting Office 7 (June 1, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.1.20_BP_Redacted.pdf).
233
Email from Contract Officer, Network Contracting Office 7, to Acquisition Utilization Specialist-
Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (June 2, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.2.20_BP_Redacted.pdf).
234
Email from Contract Officer, Network Contracting Office 7, to Acquisition Utilization Specialist-
Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (June 4, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.4.20_BP_Redacted.pdf).
235
Email from Acquisition Utilization Specialist-Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center, to VHADUB
Warehouse (June 5, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.5.20_BF_Redacted.pdf).
236
Email from Contract Officer, Network Contracting Office 7, to Acquisition Utilization Specialist-
Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.9.20_BP_Redacted.pdf).
237
Email from Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director – CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC, to
Acquisition Utilization Specialist-Logistics, Carl Vinson VA Medical Center (June 15, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.15.20%20and%206.16.20_BP_Redacte
d.pdf); Email from Contract Officer, Network Contracting Office 7, to Robert S. Stewart, Jr, Managing Director –
CEO, Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 16, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.15.20%20and%206.16.20_BP_Redacte
d.pdf).
238
Memorandum from Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus, to Members, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Investigation into Federal Government Experts, LLC (June 17, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.06.17%20SSCC%20Staff%20Mem
o%20-%20Fed%20Government%20Experts%20Investigation.pdf).
239
Id.
240
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, Testimony of Inspector
General Michael Missal, Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Inspector General, Hearing on the Pandemic and
VA’s Medical Supply Chain: Evaluating the Year-Long Response and Modernization (Mar. 24, 2021) (online at
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/VR/VR08/20210324/111332/HHRG-117-VR08-Wstate-MissalM-20210324-
U3.pdf); Department of Veterans Affairs, Fiscal Year 2020 Agency Financial Report (Nov. 24, 2020) (online at
www.va.gov/finance/docs/afr/2020VAafrFullWeb.pdf) (noting that “the pandemic is creating novel opportunities
for bad actors, particularly because of the need to facilitate rapid purchases of essential goods and services.”).
153
50-100_text_.pdf 165 2/15/23 2:48 PM
241
Department of Veterans Affairs, Fiscal Year 2020 Agency Financial Report (Nov. 24, 2020) (online at
www.va.gov/finance/docs/afr/2020VAafrFullWeb.pdf) (“As VA has struggled to expand its supply chain fast
enough to curtail the spread of COVID-19, many companies—some nefarious and some neophytes—have sought
contracts for PPE and other medical supplies worth millions of dollars that they cannot fulfill. Some of these
potential fraudsters have been identified by VA leaders and referred to the OIG, underscoring the challenges for VA
to be vigilant in a chaotic environment.”).
242
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Interview (May 18, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/%281%29%202020.05.18%20-
%20Interview_of_Nathan_Turnipseed_Redacted.pdf).
243
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “It Was Compromised”: The Trump Administration’s
Unprecedented Campaign to Control CDC and Politicize Public Health During the Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.17%20The%20Trump%20Admi
nistration%E2%80%99s%20Unprecedented%20Campaign%20to%20Control%20CDC%20and%20Politicize%20Pu
blic%20Health%20During%20the%20Coronavirus%20Crisis.pdf).
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, A “Knife Fight” with the FDA: The Trump White
House’s Relentless Attacks on FDA’s Coronavirus Response (Aug. 24, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.08.24%20The%20Trump%20White
%20House%E2%80%99s%20Relentless%20Attacks%20on%20FDA%E2%80%99s%20Coronavirus%20Response.
pdf).
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, A “Knife Fight” with the FDA: The Trump White
House’s Relentless Attacks on FDA’s Coronavirus Response (Aug. 24, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.08.24%20The%20Trump%20White
%20House%E2%80%99s%20Relentless%20Attacks%20on%20FDA%E2%80%99s%20Coronavirus%20Response.
pdf).
258
Id. The Select Subcommittee uncovered evidence showing that Trump White House officials like Mr.
Navarro and Dr. Hatfill communicated about the pandemic response using nongovernmental accounts, including
accounts on ProtonMail—an encrypted email service hosted by a Swiss-based technology firm that promises to keep
user data outside the jurisdiction of the United States government as a “security” feature. The Select Subcommittee
saw no indication that these officials took the requisite steps to preserve these records in accordance with the
Presidential Records Act—meaning that potentially numerous federal records bearing directly on why senior
officials made key decisions during the early coronavirus response may be forever lost. Whether this was
inadvertent or by design, Trump Administration officials’ flagrant use of personal accounts to communicate about
154
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the federal pandemic response undermined transparency and may have prevented Congress from obtaining a full
investigatory record. See Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis, Issuance of Subpoena to Dr. Steven J. Hatfill (Sept. 23, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.09.23%20Memorandum%20from%
20Chairman%20Clyburn%20re%20S.%20Hatfill%20Subpoena.pdf); Memorandum from Majority Staff to
Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Issuance of Subpoena to Peter Navarro (Nov. 18,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021-11-
18%20Memo%20re%20Peter%20Navarro%20Subpoena.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, A
“Knife Fight” with the FDA: The Trump White House’s Relentless Attacks on FDA’s Coronavirus Response (Aug.
24, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.08.24%20The%20Trump%20White
%20House%E2%80%99s%20Relentless%20Attacks%20on%20FDA%E2%80%99s%20Coronavirus%20Response.
pdf).
259
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, A “Knife Fight” with the FDA: The Trump White
House’s Relentless Attacks on FDA’s Coronavirus Response (Aug. 24, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.08.24%20The%20Trump%20White
%20House%E2%80%99s%20Relentless%20Attacks%20on%20FDA%E2%80%99s%20Coronavirus%20Response.
pdf).
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Launches
Investigation Into Widespread Coronavirus Infections and Deaths in Meatpacking Plants (Feb. 1, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-launches-investigation-widespread-
coronavirus-infections-and); Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis, Coronavirus Infections and Deaths Among Meatpacking Workers at Top Five Companies Were
Nearly Three Times Higher than Previous Estimates (Oct. 27, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.27%20Meatpacking%20Report.F
inal_.pdf).
267
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
Coronavirus Infections and Deaths Among Meatpacking Workers at Top Five Companies Were Nearly Three Times
Higher than Previous Estimates (Oct. 27, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.27%20Meatpacking%20Report.F
inal_.pdf).
268
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “Now to Get Rid of Those Pesky Health Departments!”
How the Trump Administration Helped the Meatpacking Industry Block Pandemic Worker Protections (May 12,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.5.12%20-
%20SSCC%20report%20Meatpacking%20FINAL.pdf).
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
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273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.; Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis, Coronavirus Infections and Deaths Among Meatpacking Workers at Top Five Companies Were Nearly Three
Times Higher than Previous Estimates (Oct. 27, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.27%20Meatpacking%20Report.F
inal_.pdf).
280
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “Now to Get Rid of Those Pesky Health Departments!”
How the Trump Administration Helped the Meatpacking Industry Block Pandemic Worker Protections (May 12,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.5.12%20-
%20SSCC%20report%20Meatpacking%20FINAL.pdf).
281
Id.
282
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Henry Walke (Feb. 18, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.02.18%20SSCC%20Interview%20o
f%20Henry%20Walke%2C%20M%20%5BExcerpted%5D.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
“Now to Get Rid of Those Pesky Health Departments!” How the Trump Administration Helped the Meatpacking
Industry Block Pandemic Worker Protections (May 12, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.5.12%20-
%20SSCC%20report%20Meatpacking%20FINAL.pdf).
283
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “Now to Get Rid of Those Pesky Health Departments!”
How the Trump Administration Helped the Meatpacking Industry Block Pandemic Worker Protections (May 12,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.5.12%20-
%20SSCC%20report%20Meatpacking%20FINAL.pdf).
284
Id.
285
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “Now to Get Rid of Those Pesky Health Departments!”
How the Trump Administration Helped the Meatpacking Industry Block Pandemic Worker Protections (May 12,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.5.12%20-
%20SSCC%20report%20Meatpacking%20FINAL.pdf); Exec. Order 13917, 85 Fed. Reg. 26313 (May 1, 2020).
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, The “Atlas Dogma”: The Trump Administration’s
Embrace of a Dangerous and Discredited Herd Immunity via Mass Infection Strategy (June 21, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.06.21%20The%20Trump%20Admi
nistration%E2%80%99s%20Embrace%20of%20a%20Dangerous%20and%20Discredited%20Herd%20Immunity%
20via%20Mass%20Infection%20Strategy.pdf).
289
Id.; China Virus Huddle Agendas (July 20, 2020 – Jan. 4, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/China%20Virus%20Huddle%20Agendas.
pdf).
290
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, The “Atlas Dogma”: The Trump Administration’s
Embrace of a Dangerous and Discredited Herd Immunity via Mass Infection Strategy (June 21, 2022) (online at
156
50-100_text_.pdf 168 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.06.21%20The%20Trump%20Admi
nistration%E2%80%99s%20Embrace%20of%20a%20Dangerous%20and%20Discredited%20Herd%20Immunity%
20via%20Mass%20Infection%20Strategy.pdf).
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Memorandum from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to
Members, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Issuance of Subpoena to Dr. Steven J. Hatfill (Sept. 23,
2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.09.23%20Memorandum%20from%
20Chairman%20Clyburn%20re%20S.%20Hatfill%20Subpoena.pdf).
296
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Deborah Birx (Oct. 13, 2021)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.13%20Birx%20TI%20Transcript
%20%2B%20Errata.pdf).
297
Memorandum from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to
Members, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Issuance of Subpoena to Dr. Steven J. Hatfill (Sept. 23,
2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.09.23%20Memorandum%20from%
20Chairman%20Clyburn%20re%20S.%20Hatfill%20Subpoena.pdf).
298
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, The “Atlas Dogma”: The Trump Administration’s
Embrace of a Dangerous and Discredited Herd Immunity via Mass Infection Strategy (June 21, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.06.21%20The%20Trump%20Admi
nistration%E2%80%99s%20Embrace%20of%20a%20Dangerous%20and%20Discredited%20Herd%20Immunity%
20via%20Mass%20Infection%20Strategy.pdf).
299
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn Launches Sweeping
Investigation into Widespread Coronavirus Deaths in Nursing Homes (Jun. 16, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-launches-sweeping-investigation-widespread-
coronavirus-deaths-nursing).
300
Id. Two of these companies have made significant changes to their corporate structures since the Select
Subcommittee’s investigation began in June 2020. Sava owned or operated approximately 174 long-term care
facilities in June 2020 but has since divested most of its facilities and retained operations over only 18 as of June
2022 and 12 as of November 1, 2022. Email from Executive Vice President for Compliance, Ethics and Customer
Experience, SavaSeniorCare Administrative and Consulting, LLC to Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Nov. 1, 2022). Consulate’s management company was dissolved after the company filed for
bankruptcy in 2021. Six Nursing Home Entities File for Bankruptcy Following $258M FCA Ruling, McKnights
Long-Term Care News (Mar. 4, 2021) (online at www.mcknights.com/news/six-nursing-home-affiliates-file-for-
bankruptcy-following-258m-fca-ruling/). Consulate facilities that were initially the subject of the Select
Subcommittee’s investigation were dispersed across four different management companies as of August 2022, with
some facilities having been divested to entirely different companies outside of the legacy Consulate corporate
family. Post-bankruptcy data in this report includes data from facilities owned by four management companies.
Letter from Counsel for Consulate Health Care, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Chair, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Aug. 12, 2022).
301
Reading the Stars: Nursing Home Quality Star Ratings, Nationally and by State, Kaiser Family
Foundation (May 14, 2015) (online at www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/reading-the-stars-nursing-home-quality-
star-ratings-nationally-and-by-state/); Atul Gupta, et al., Does Private Equity Investment in Healthcare Benefit
Patients? Evidence from Nursing Homes, New York University Stern School of Business (Nov. 2020) (online at
157
50-100_text_.pdf 169 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3537612); Kai You, et al., Do Nursing Home Chain Size and
Proprietary Status Affect Experiences with Care?, Medical Care (Mar. 1, 2016) (online at
https://doi.org/10.1097%2FMLR.0000000000000479); Charlene Harrington, et al., Nurse Staffing and Deficiencies
in the Largest For-Profit Nursing Home Chains and Chains Owned by Private Equity Companies, Health Services
Research (Aug. 30, 2011) (online at https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1475-6773.2011.01311.x).
302
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, Long-term Care
Providers and Services Users in the United States, 2015-2016 (Feb. 2019) (online at
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_03/sr03_43-508.pdf).
303
As Sava had divested all but 18 of its facilities by June 2022, selections were based on the company’s
remaining ownership.
304
‘A National Disgrace’: 40,600 Deaths Tied to US Nursing Homes, USA Today (June 1, 2020) (online at
www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2020/06/01/coronavirus-nursing-home-deaths-top-40-
600/5273075002/); Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, COVID-19 Nursing Home Data as of Week
Ending: May 31, 2020 (online at https://data.cms.gov/covid-19/covid-19-nursing-home-data); 10 Things About
Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS), Kaiser Family Foundation (Sept. 15, 2022) (online at
www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/10-things-about-long-term-services-and-supports-ltss/). See also Ram Gopal, et
al., Compress the Curve: A Cross-Sectional Study of Variations in COVID-19 Infections Across California Nursing
Homes, BJM Open (Jan. 5, 2021) (online at https://doi.org/10.1136%2Fbmjopen-2020-042804) (finding that as of
May 1, 2020, the size of coronavirus outbreaks was 12.7 times larger in for-profit nursing homes in California than
in their non-profit counterparts).
305
Data on Coronavirus Infections and Deaths at Consulate Facilities as of June 2022 (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Consulate%20COVID%20Incident%20D
ata%20%28Feb.%202021%29%20-%20SSOCC%20016132.xlsx and
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000002.xlsx)
(Consulate data through February 2, 2021 may also include COVID-19 positive patients transferred from other
facilities or hospitals to Consulate facilities.); Data on Coronavirus Infections and Deaths at Ensign Facilities as of
June 2022 (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-
00009850.xlsx and https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-
00012403.xlsx); Data on Coronavirus Infections and Deaths at Genesis Facilities as of June 2022 (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004663.xlsx and
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004686.xlsx) (Genesis data
includes coronavirus infections and death counts for all Genesis long-term care facilities, not limited to skilled
nursing facilities, from the onset of the pandemic through October 22, 2020, and for skilled nursing facilities only
from October 23, 2020, through June 30, 2022. Genesis’ tally of coronavirus cases and deaths excludes those at
facilities owned in part by Genesis but operated by other companies, or facilities not owned by Genesis but for
which it has a consulting or management agreement.); Data on Coronavirus Infections and Deaths at Life Care
Facilities as of June 2022 (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/LCCA-
Congress010927_Confidential%20Commercial%20or%20Financial%20Information.ods); Data on Coronavirus
Infections and Deaths at Sava Facilities as of June 2022 (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/COVID-
19%20Cases%20and%20Deaths%20%28Item%208%269%29%20final%2011.1.22.pdf and
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SAVA_00076811.xlsx).
306
Email from Executive Vice President for Compliance, Ethics and Customer Experience, SavaSeniorCare
Administrative and Consulting, LLC to Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Nov. 3,
2022).
307
Consulate facilities that were initially the subject of the Select Subcommittee’s investigation were
dispersed across four different management companies as of August 2022, with some facilities having been divested
to entirely different companies outside of the legacy Consulate corporate family. Post-bankruptcy data in this report
158
50-100_text_.pdf 170 2/15/23 2:48 PM
includes data from facilities owned by four management companies. Letter from Counsel for Consulate Health Care
to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Chair, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Aug. 12, 2022).
308
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, COVID-19 Nursing Home Data (online at
https://data.cms.gov/covid-19/covid-19-nursing-home-data) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022); Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Ahead of Hearing, Select Subcommittee Releases New Evidence of Dire
Conditions at For-Profit Nursing Home Chains in 2020 (Sept. 21, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-corporate-nursing-home-pandemic-analysis).
309
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The National Imperative to Improve
Nursing Home Quality: Honoring Our Commitment to Residents, Families, and Staff (Apr. 2022) (online at
https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26526/the-national-imperative-to-improve-nursing-home-quality-
honoring-our).
310
QS A$5$+$ 1 QMR$RP$
311
42 U.S.C. § 1395i–3(C)(i).
312
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Report to Congress: Appropriateness of Minimum Nurse
Staffing Ratios in Nursing Homes: Phase II Final Report (Dec. 24, 2001) (online at
https://theconsumervoice.org/uploads/files/issues/CMS-Staffing-Study-Phase-II.pdf). See also Charlene Harrington,
et al., Appropriate Nurse Staffing Levels for U.S. Nursing Homes, Health Services Insights (June 29, 2020) (online
at https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1178632920934785).
313
Charlene Harrington, et al., The Need for Higher Minimum Staffing Standards in U.S. Nursing Homes,
Health Services Insights (Apr. 12, 2016) (online at https://doi.org/10.4137/hsi.s38994); Charlene Harrington,
Nursing Home Staffing Standards in State Statutes and Regulations, University of California San Francisco (Jan.
2008) (online at
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/nursing_home_staffing_standards_in_state_statutes_and_regulations.pdf).
314
Covid-19 Exposed the Devastating Consequences of Staff Shortages in Nursing Homes. But the
Problem Isn’t New, CNN (July 6, 2021) (online at www.cnn.com/2021/06/27/us/nursing-homes-staff-
shortages/index.html).
315
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The National Imperative to Improve
Nursing Home Quality: Honoring Our Commitment to Residents, Families, and Staff (Apr. 2022) (online at
https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26526/the-national-imperative-to-improve-nursing-home-quality-
honoring-our).
316
Id.
317
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Appropriateness of Minimum Nurse Staffing Ratios in
Nursing Homes: Overview of the Phase II Report: Background, Study Approach, Findings, and Conclusions (Dec.
2001) (online at
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/elderjustice/legacy/2015/07/12/Appropriateness_of_Minimum_Nurse_Staffing_
Ratios_in_Nursing_Homes.pdf).
318
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The National Imperative to Improve
Nursing Home Quality: Honoring Our Commitment to Residents, Families, and Staff (Apr. 2022) (online at
https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26526/the-national-imperative-to-improve-nursing-home-quality-
honoring-our).
319
Id.
320
Is Your Loved One's Nursing Home Staffed Well on Weekends? The Feds Want to Know, Tampa Bay
Times (Dec. 3, 2018) (online at www.tampabay.com/health/is-your-loved-ones-nursing-home-staffed-well-on-
weekends-the-feds-want-to-know-20181204/).
159
50-100_text_.pdf 171 2/15/23 2:48 PM
321
‘Like A Ghost Town’: Erratic Nursing Home Staffing Revealed Through New Records, Kaiser Health
News (July 13, 2018) (online at https://khn.org/news/like-a-ghost-town-erratic-nursing-home-staffing-revealed-
through-new-records/).
322
Weekends Are a Nursing Home Danger Zone. A Syracuse Home’s Staffing Is Among NY’s Worst,
Syracuse.com (Feb. 14, 2022) (online at www.syracuse.com/health/2022/02/notorious-syracuse-nursing-homes-
weekend-staffing-level-among-worst-in-new-york.html).
323
Id.
324
Fangli Geng, et al., Daily Nursing Home Staffing Levels Highly Variable, Often Below CMS
Expectations, Health Affairs (July 2019) (online at https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05322).
325
Ensign provided staffing data showing combined ratios for RNs and Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs).
As the training, certification, and skill sets of LPNs is lower than that of RNs, the combined data for these two
categories does not present an accurate picture of RN-level resident care at Ensign facilities. CMS’s 2001 study
recommends different staffing ratios for LPNs than RNs, so measuring both of those categories against the
benchmark for RNs alone presents a misleading picture of the quality of staffing at Ensign’s nursing homes. See
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Report to Congress: Appropriateness of Minimum Nurse Staffing Ratios
in Nursing Homes: Phase II Final Report (Dec. 24, 2001) (online at
https://theconsumervoice.org/uploads/files/issues/CMS-Staffing-Study-Phase-II.pdf); Fangli Geng, et al., Daily
Nursing Home Staffing Levels Highly Variable, Often Below CMS Expectations, Health Affairs. (July 2019)
(online at https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05322). As a result, Ensign data was excluded from the analysis of
RN staffing.
326
Staffing Data at Sava Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SAVA_00128296-
SAVA_00128313_Redacted.pdf). An average staffing ratio of zero does not necessarily indicate that there were no
RNs on staff over the relevant time period. Rather, it may be that there were so few RNs staffed in relation to the
number of residents that the ratio of RNs to residents was less than 0.005, and thus would round to zero.
327
Id.
328
Staffing Data at Consulate Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000008%20Cons
ulate%20Staffing%20Data_Redacted.pdf).
329
Id. An average staffing ratio of zero does not necessarily—though may—indicate that there were no
RNs staffed over the relevant time period. Rather, it may be that there were so few RNs staffed in relation to such a
high number of residents that the ratio of RNs to residents was less than 0.005, and thus would round to zero.
330
Staffing Data at Life Care Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/LCCA-
Congress010739_CONFIDENTIAL_Redacted.xlsx).
331
Staffing Data at Consulate Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000008%20Cons
ulate%20Staffing%20Data_Redacted.pdf).
332
Staffing Data at Consulate Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000008%20Cons
ulate%20Staffing%20Data_Redacted.pdf); Staffing Data at Genesis Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004688.xlsx); Staffing
Data at Life Care Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/LCCA-
Congress010739_CONFIDENTIAL_Redacted.xlsx); Staffing Data at Sava Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SAVA_00128296-
SAVA_00128313_Redacted.pdf).
160
50-100_text_.pdf 172 2/15/23 2:48 PM
333
Ensign provided the Select Subcommittee staffing data showing ratios for RNs and Licensed Practical
Nurses (LPNs) combined. See Staffing Data at Ensign Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-00012402.xlsx).
However, as the training, certification, and skill sets of LPNs are not interchangeable with those of RNs, the
combined staffing for these two categories does not present an accurate picture of the level of staff dedicated to RN-
level resident care at Ensign facilities. Moreover, CMS’s 2001 study recommends different staffing ratios for LPNs
than RNs, so measuring both of those categories against the benchmark for RNs alone presents a misleading picture
of the quality of staffing at nursing homes. See, e.g., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Report to
Congress: Appropriateness of Minimum Nurse Staffing Ratios in Nursing Homes: Phase II Final Report (Dec. 24,
2001) (online at https://theconsumervoice.org/uploads/files/issues/CMS-Staffing-Study-Phase-II.pdf); Fangli Geng,
et al., Daily Nursing Home Staffing Levels Highly Variable, Often Below CMS Expectations, Health Affairs (July
2019) (online at www.healthaffairs.org/doi/epdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05322).
334
Staffing Data at Consulate Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000008%20Cons
ulate%20Staffing%20Data_Redacted.pdf); Staffing Data at Ensign Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-00012401.xlsx);
Staffing Data at Genesis Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004688.xlsx); Staffing
Data at Life Care Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/LCCA-
Congress010739_CONFIDENTIAL_Redacted.xlsx); Staffing Data at Sava Facilities (Jan. 2020 - June 2022) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SAVA_00128296-
SAVA_00128313_Redacted.pdf).
335
Pauline Karikari-Martin, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Staffing Study to Inform Minimum
Staffing Requirements for Nursing Homes (Aug. 22, 2020) (online at www.cms.gov/blog/centers-medicare-
medicaid-services-staffing-study-inform-minimum-staffing-requirements-nursing-homes).
336
The White House, Fact Sheet: Biden-4V::E9 CJ>E=E98:V8E<= C==<7=KI9 /I. *8I;9 8< 3>;:<6I ,7VDE8-
of Nursing Homes (Oct. 21, 2020) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/10/21/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-steps-to-improve-quality-of-nursing-
homes/).
337
Inside the 'Staffing Apocalypse' Devastating U.S. Nursing Homes, AARP (June 9, 2022) (online at
www.aarp.org/caregiving/health/info-2022/labor-shortage-nursing-homes.html),
338
Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates
(May 2021) (online at www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_623100.htm#31-0000) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022); Nursing
Homes Bleed Staff as Amazon Lures Low-Wage Workers with Prime Packages, Kaiser Health News (Dec. 23,
2021) (online at https://khn.org/news/article/nursing-homes-staff-shortages-amazon-lures-low-wage-workers/).
339
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Briefing on “The Devastating Impact of the
Coronavirus Crisis in America’s Nursing Homes” (June 11, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/briefings/devastating-impact-coronavirus-crisis-america-s-
nursing-homes).
340
PHI National, Direct Care Workers in the United States: Key Facts (Sept. 7, 2021) (online at
www.phinational.org/resource/direct-care-workers-in-the-united-states-key-facts-2/).
341
Employees Who Work at Multiple Nursing Homes May Have Helped Spread the Coronavirus, National
Public Radio, (Oct. 24, 2020) (www.npr.org/2020/10/24/927384339/employees-who-work-at-multiple-nursing-
homes-may-have-helped-spread-the-coronavi).
342
Center for Medicare Advocacy, CDC’s Report on Coronavirus in a Seattle Nursing Facility: What It
Tells Us About Staffing Problems Nationwide; What We Must Do to Address Lessons Learned (Apr. 9, 2020)
161
50-100_text_.pdf 173 2/15/23 2:48 PM
(online at https://medicareadvocacy.org/cdcs-report-on-coronavirus-in-a-seattle-nursing-facility-what-it-tells-us-
about-staffing-problems-nationwide-what-we-must-do-to-address-lessons-learned/).
343
The Crisis Facing Nursing Homes, Assisted Living and Home Care for America’s Elderly, Politico (July
28, 2022) (online at www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/07/28/elder-care-worker-shortage-immigration-crisis-
00047454); Inside the ‘Staffing Apocalypse’ Devastating U.S. Nursing Homes, AARP (June 9, 2022) (online at
www.aarp.org/caregiving/health/info-2022/labor-shortage-nursing-homes.html).
344
Pay data may not distinguish between direct employees and workers who are contractors or otherwise
employed by nursing home staffing agencies. Agency-contracted staff do not necessarily get paid the same rates as
full-time employees. Worker shortages during the pandemic have reportedly led to agency contract staff receiving
substantially higher wages than their full-time facility employee counterparts. See Beyond the Byline: Providers
Accuse Staffing Agencies of Price Gouging, Modern Healthcare (Mar. 17, 2022) (online at
www.modernhealthcare.com/labor/beyond-byline-providers-accuse-staffing-agencies-price-gouging); Pressures
Mount for Staffing Agencies Accused of Price Gouging Long-Term Care Operators, McKnight’s Senior Living
(Jan. 31, 2022) (online at www.mcknightsseniorliving.com/home/news/pressures-mount-for-staffing-agencies-
accused-of-price-gouging-long-term-care-operators/). Genesis wage data begins in June 2020; wage data for all
other companies begins in January 2020.
345
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, COVID-19 Nursing Home Data (online at
https://data.cms.gov/covid-19/covid-19-nursing-home-data) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022). See also Select Subcommittee
on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Ahead of Hearing, Select Subcommittee Releases New Evidence of Dire
Conditions at for-Profit Nursing Home Chains in 2020 (Sept. 21, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-corporate-nursing-home-pandemic-analysis).
346
Wage Data at Sava Facilities (Jan. 2020 – June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Congressional%20Inquiry%20Regular%2
0Wage%20Trends2_Redacted.xlsx); Nursing Homes Bleed Staff as Amazon Lures Low-Wage Workers with Prime
Packages, Kaiser Health News (Dec. 23, 2021) (online at https://khn.org/news/article/nursing-homes-staff-
shortages-amazon-lures-low-wage-workers/); Target Is Raising Its Minimum Wage to as Much as $24 an Hour,
National Public Radio (Mar. 1, 2022) (online at www.npr.org/2022/03/01/1083720431/target-minimum-wage).
347
Wage Data at Consulate Facilities (Jan. 2020 – June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000011_Redacte
d.pdf); Wage Data at Ensign Facilities (Jan. 2020 – June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-00012400.xlsx); Wage
Data at Genesis Facilities (June 2020 – June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004684_Redacted.xlsx);
Wage Data at Life Care Facilities (Jan. 2020 – June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/RedactedLCCA-
Congress010662_SENSITIVE%20PERSONAL%20INFORMATION%20AND%20CONFIDENTIAL%20COMM
ERCIAL%20OR%20FINANCIAL%20INFORMATION.xlsx and
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/RedactedLCCA-
Congress010916_Confidential%20Commercial%20or%20Financial%20Information.xlsx); Wage Data at Sava
Facilities (Jan. 2020 – June 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Congressional%20Inquiry%20Regular%2
0Wage%20Trends2_Redacted.xlsx).
348
Id.
349
Letter from Counsel for SavaSeniorCare, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Aug. 9, 2022); Letter from Counsel for Consulate, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Aug. 12, 2022).
350
Email from Executive Vice President, Compliance, Ethics and Customer Experience, SavaSeniorCare
Administrative and Consulting, LLC, to Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Nov. 7,
2022).
162
50-100_text_.pdf 174 2/15/23 2:48 PM
351
Letter from Counsel for Consulate, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Aug. 12, 2022).
352
Letter from Counsel for Genesis to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 31, 2022); Letter from Counsel for Ensign to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Aug. 30, 2022).
353
Sick Leave Policies of Life Care Facilities reviewed by Select Subcommittee staff.
354
Primary vaccination series is defined as receipt of two primary doses of an mRNA vaccine (Pfizer-
BioNTech or Moderna) or one primary dose of Ad26.COV2 (Johnson & Johnson) vaccine. A booster dose is
defined as any additional installment of the coronavirus vaccine beyond the primary series. Data regarding booster
doses do not include bivalent boosters, which were authorized by the FDA in October 2022. See Food and Drug
Administration, COVID-19 Vaccines (online at www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-
disease-2019-covid-19/covid-19-vaccines#authorized-vaccines).
355
Vaccination Data for Consulate Residents and Staff (as of July 3, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000006-
07_Redacted%202.pdf); Vaccination Data for Ensign Residents and Staff (as of July 31, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-00012399.xlsx);
Vaccination Data for Genesis Residents and Staff (as of July 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004685_Redacted.xlsx);
Vaccination Data for Life Care Residents and Staff (as of July 31, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/LCCA-
Congress010740_CONFIDENTIAL_Redacted.xlsx); Vaccination Data for Sava Residents and Staff (as of July 22,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SAVA_00128314-
SAVA_00128315_Redacted.pdf).
356
Namrata Prasad, et al., Effectiveness of a COVID-19 Additional Primary or Booster Vaccine Dose in
Preventing SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Nursing Home Residents During Widespread Circulation of the Omicron
Variant — United States, February 14–March 27, 2022, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (May 6, 2022)
(online at www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7118a4.htm).
357
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, COVID-19 (Toolkit for Health Care Providers) (online at
www.cms.gov/covidvax-
provider#:~:text=2%2Ddose%20primary%20series%20for,patients%2012%20years%20and%20older) (accessed
Dec. 7, 2022).
358
Namrata Prasad, et al., Effectiveness of a COVID-19 Additional Primary or Booster Vaccine Dose in
Preventing SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Nursing Home Residents During Widespread Circulation of the Omicron
Variant — United States, February 14–March 27, 2022, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (May 6, 2022)
(online at www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7118a4.htm).
359
Vaccination Data for Consulate Residents and Staff (as of July 3, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000006-
07_Redacted%202.pdf); Vaccination Data for Ensign Residents and Staff (as of July 31, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-00012399.xlsx);
Vaccination Data for Genesis Residents and Staff (as of July 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004685_Redacted.xlsx);
Vaccination Data for Life Care Residents and Staff (as of July 31, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/LCCA-
Congress010740_CONFIDENTIAL_Redacted.xlsx); Vaccination Data for Sava Residents and Staff (as of July 22,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SAVA_00128314-
SAVA_00128315_Redacted.pdf).
360
Vaccination Data for Consulate Residents and Staff (as of July 3, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/BSLLP%20SSOCC%20000006-
07_Redacted%202.pdf; Vaccination Data for Ensign Residents and Staff (as of July 31, 2022) (online at
163
50-100_text_.pdf 175 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENSIGN-COVID-00012399.xlsx);
Vaccination Data for Genesis Residents and Staff (as of July 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/GEN_SSCC_0004685_Redacted.xlsx);
Vaccination Data for Life Care Residents and Staff (as of July 31, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/LCCA-
Congress010740_CONFIDENTIAL_Redacted.xlsx); Vaccination Data for Sava Residents and Staff (as of July 22,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SAVA_00128314-
SAVA_00128315_Redacted.pdf);
361
Namrata Prasad, et al., Effectiveness of a COVID-19 Additional Primary or Booster Vaccine Dose in
Preventing SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Nursing Home Residents During Widespread Circulation of the Omicron
Variant — United States, February 14–March 27, 2022, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (May 6, 2022)
(online at www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7118a4.htm).
362
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, COVID-19 Nursing Home Data (online at
https://data.cms.gov/covid-19/covid-19-nursing-home-data) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
363
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Briefers Call for Racial Equities in
Testing, Treatment, and Investment (June 5, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/health-experts-decry-disparate-impact-coronavirus-outbreak-communities-color).
364
Race Gaps in COVID-19 Deaths are Even Bigger Than They Appear, The Brookings Institution (June
16, 2020) (online at https://brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/16/race-gaps-in-covid-19-deaths-are-even-bigger-
than-they-appear/).
365
Id.
366
Why are Blacks Dying at Higher Rates from COVID-19?, The Brookings Institute (April 9, 2020)
(online at https://brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/04/09/why-are-blacks-dying-at-higher-rates-from-covid-19/).
367
Whites Now More Likely To Die From COVID Than Blacks: Why The Pandemic Shifted, Washington
Post (Oct. 19, 2022) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/10/19/covid-deaths-us-race/).
368
COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by Race/Ethnicity: Current Data and Changes Over Time, Kaiser Family
Foundation (Aug. 22, 2022) (online at www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/covid-19-cases-and-deaths-by-
race-ethnicity-current-data-and-changes-over-time/).
369
Why are Blacks Dying at Higher Rates from COVID-19?, Brookings Institute (April 9, 2020) (online at
www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/04/09/why-are-blacks-dying-at-higher-rates-from-covid-19/); Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by Race/Ethnicity, (Nov.
8, 2022) (online at www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-
by-race-ethnicity.html); New York City Department of Health, Racial Inequities in COVID-19 Hospitalizations
During the Omicron Wave in NYC (Mar. 2, 2022) (www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/pdf/covid/black-
hospitalizations-omicron-wave.pdf); David A. Asch, et al., Patient and Hospital Factors Associated with Differences
in Mortality Rates Among Black and White US Medicare Beneficiaries Hospitalized with COVID-19 Infection,
JAMA Network Open (June 17, 2021) (online at https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.12842).
370
Payton Beeler and Rajan K. Chakrabarty, Disparities in PM2.5 Exposure and Population Density
Influence SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Among Racial and Ethnic Minorities, Environmental Research Letters (Oct.
12, 2021) (online at https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac29ea#erlac29eas5).
371
Jordi Merino, et al., Diet Quality and Risk and Severity of COVID-19: A Prospective Cohort Study,
Gut (Sept. 2021) (online at https://gut.bmj.com/content/70/11/2096).
372
A Basic Demographic Profile of Workers in Frontline Industries, Center for Economic and Policy
Research (April 7, 2020) (online at www.cepr.net/a-basic-demographic-profile-of-workers-in-frontline-industries/).
164
50-100_text_.pdf 176 2/15/23 2:48 PM
373
One Home, Many Generations: States Addressing Covid Risk Among Families, NBC News (March 26,
2021) (online at www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latino-multigenerational-households-risk-covid-states-address-
vaccine-rcna511).
374
Biden Says Goal Of 200 Million COVID-19 Vaccinations In 100 Days Has Been Met, National Public
Radio (Apr. 21, 2021) (online at www.npr.org/2021/04/21/989487650/biden-says-goal-of-200-million-covid-19-
vaccinations-in-100-days-has-been-met);‘We Did It’: Biden Celebrates U.S. Hitting Milestone of 200 Million
Doses in His First 100 Days, NBC News (Apr. 21, 2021) (online at www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-
push-more-vaccinations-administration-reaches-200-million-dose-milestone-n1264782).
375
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https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations_vacc-people-onedose-pop-5yr) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
376
Impact of U.S. COVID-19 Vaccination Efforts: An Update on Averted Deaths, Hospitalizations, and
Health Care Costs Through March 2022, The Commonwealth Fund (Apr. 8, 2022) (online at
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377
The White House, Memorandum on Restoring Trust in Government Through Scientific Integrity and
Evidence-Based Policymaking (Jan. 27, 2021) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2021/01/27/memorandum-on-restoring-trust-in-government-through-scientific-integrity-and-evidence-
based-policymaking/).
378
The White House, Fact Sheet: Biden-4V::E9 CJ>E=E98:V8E<= 8< 3=6I98 ?N BEDDE<= H:<> C>I:EKV= +I9K7I
Plan to Hire and Train Public Health Workers in Response to COVID-TL '0V- TR% S"ST& '<=DE=I V8
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/13/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-to-
invest-7-billion-from-american-rescue-plan-to-hire-and-train-public-health-workers-in-response-to-covid-19/);
Schools Got $122 Billion from the American Rescue Plan — and Have a Deadline to Spend It, Marketplace (online
at www.marketplace.org/2022/01/31/schools-got-122-billion-from-the-american-rescue-plan-and-have-a-deadline-
to-spend-it/); The White House, Fact Sheet: How The American Rescue Plan Is Keeping America’s Schools Open
Safely, Combating Learning Loss, And Addressing Student Mental Health (Mar. 11, 2022) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/11/fact-sheet-how-the-american-rescue-plan-is-
keeping-americas-schools-open-safely-combating-learning-loss-and-addressing-student-mental-
health/#:~:text=Schools%20have%20gone%20from%2046,time%2C%20in%2Dperson%20instruction).
379
Department of Health and Human Services, Press Release: Biden Administration to Invest $650 Million
in Rapid Diagnostic Testing in Latest Action to Increase Access to Tests (Nov. 10, 2021) (online at
www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/11/10/biden-administration-invest-650-million-rapid-diagnostic-testing-latest-
action-increase-access-
tests.html#:~:text=As%20part%20of%20the%20Biden,American%20Rescue%20Plan%20to%20strengthen); The
White House, Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Outlines Plan to Get Americans an Updated COVID-TL (VKKE=I
Shot and Manage COVID-TL 8FE9 5VDD '*I;8$ M% S"SS& '<=DE=I V8 ...$.FE8IF<79I$G<6#U:EIHE=G-room/statements-
releases/2022/09/08/fact-sheet-biden-administration-outlines-plan-to-get-americans-an-updated-covid-19-vaccine-
shot-and-manage-covid-19-this-fall/); Biden Will Make 400 Million N95 Masks Available to Americans for Free,
CNBC (Jan. 19, 2022) (online at www.cnbc.com/2022/01/19/biden-will-make-400-million-n95-masks-available-to-
americans-for-free.html).
380
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairs Clyburn, Maloney Reveal That
Quality Failures By Emergent BioSolutions Rendered 135 Million Additional Coronavirus Vaccine Doses Unusable
(Aug. 11, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-maloney-trump-emergent-
biosolutions-vaccines); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and
Reform, The Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf).
381
Id.
382
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and Reform, The
Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
165
50-100_text_.pdf 177 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf).
383
Id.
384
Id.
385
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and Reform, The
Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf); Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and Members of the Committee on Oversight and Reform,
Preliminary Findings from Investigation into Emergent BioSolutions, Inc. (May 19, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Memo%20re%20Emergent%20-
%20FINAL.pdf).
386
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
387
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
and Members of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, Preliminary Findings from Investigation into Emergent
BioSolutions, Inc. (May 19, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Memo%20re%20Emergent%20-
%20FINAL.pdf).
388
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and Reform, The
Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf).
389
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Robert Kadlec (May 19, 2022)
(online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19%20SSCC%20Transcribed%2
0Interview%20of%20Dr%20Kadlec%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
390
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and Reform, The
Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf).
391
Id.
392
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
and Members of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, Preliminary Findings from Investigation into Emergent
BioSolutions, Inc. (May 19, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Memo%20re%20Emergent%20-
%20FINAL.pdf).
393
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and Reform, The
Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf).
394
Id.
395
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hybrid Hearing on “Examining Emergent
BioSolutions’ Failure to Protect Public Health and Public Funds” (May 19, 2021) (online at
166
50-100_text_.pdf 178 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-examining-emergent-
biosolutionsfailure-protect-public).
396
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and Reform, The
Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf).
397
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairs Clyburn, Maloney Reveal That
Quality Failures By Emergent BioSolutions Rendered 135 Million Additional Coronavirus Vaccine Doses Unusable
(Aug. 11, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-maloney-trump-emergent-
biosolutions-vaccines).
398
Id.
399
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and the Committee on Oversight and Reform, The
Coronavirus Vaccine Manufacturing Failures of Emergent BioSolutions (May 10, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Coronavirus%20Vaccine%20Manufacturi
ng%20Failures%20of%20Emergent%20BioSolutions.pdf).
400
Id.; Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Chairs Clyburn, Maloney Reveal
That Quality Failures By Emergent BioSolutions Rendered 135 Million Additional Coronavirus Vaccine Doses
Unusable (Aug. 11, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-maloney-trump-
emergent-biosolutions-vaccines).
401
One Medical, About Us (online at www.onemedical.com/about-us) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
402
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
Investigation of One Medical’s Administration of Coronavirus Vaccines (Dec. 21, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.12.21.Staff%20Memo%20re%20Inv
estigation%20of%20One%20Medical_0.pdf).
403
Id.
404
Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Amir Dan
Rubin, Chair, Chief Executive Officer, and President, One Medical (Mar. 1, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021-03-
01.Clyburn%20to%20Rubin%20re%20One%20Medical.pdf).
405
How Ivermectin Became the New Focus of the Anti-Vaccine Movement, National Public Radio (Sept.
19, 2021) (online at www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/09/19/1038369557/ivermectin-anti-vaccine-
movement-culture-wars).
406
National Priorities to Combat Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public
Health Threats: A Call for a National Strategy, Johns Hopkins Center for Health and Security (Mar. 2021) (online at
www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2021/210322-misinformation.pdf); Michelle M.
Mello, et al., Attacks on Public Health Officials During COVID-19, Journal of the American Medical Association
(Aug. 5, 2020) (online at https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2769291); Doctors Grow Frustrated over
COVID-19 Denial, Misinformation, Associated Press (Oct. 4, 2021) (online at
www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2021-10-04/doctors-grow-frustrated-over-covid-19-denial-misinformation);
Flight Attendants Fear Being ‘Punched in the Face’ Over Mask Enforcement, Union President Says, CNBC (Sept.
13, 2021) (online at www.cnbc.com/2021/09/13/flight-attendants-worry-about-fighting-passengers-on-mask-
mandates-union-president-says.html).
407
At Biden Administration's 1st COVID-19 Briefing, A Pledge to Let Scientists Lead, National Public
Radio (Jan. 27, 2021) (online at www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/01/27/961155874/watch-
bidens-coronavirus-team-gives-first-briefing); Biden’s Latest Covid Challenge: Making the Pandemic Fight
Nonpolitical, Politico (Oct. 26, 2022) (www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/10/26/biden-covid-politics-vaccines-
booster-shots-00063550).
167
50-100_text_.pdf 179 2/15/23 2:48 PM
408
All the President’s Lies About the Coronavirus, The Atlantic (Nov. 2, 2020) (online at
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/11/trumps-lies-about-coronavirus/608647/).
409
Donald Trump’s Wrong Claim That ‘Anybody’ Can Get Tested for Coronavirus, Kaiser Health News
(Mar. 12, 2020) (online at https://khn.org/news/donald-trumps-wrong-claim-that-anybody-can-get-tested-for-
coronavirus/).
410
Trump Suggests ‘Injection’ of Disinfectant to Beat Coronavirus and ‘Clean’ The Lungs, NBC News
(Apr. 23, 2020) (online at www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-suggests-injection-disinfectant-beat-
coronavirus-clean-lungs-n1191216).
411
Fact Check: Digging into Trump’s False Claim That CDC Found That 85% of People Who Wear Masks
Get the Coronavirus, CNN (Oct. 16, 2020) (online at www.cnn.com/2020/10/16/politics/fact-check-trump-cdc-
masks-85-percent/index.html).
412
All the President’s Lies About the Coronavirus, The Atlantic (Nov. 2, 2020) (online at
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/11/trumps-lies-about-coronavirus/608647/); AP Fact Check: Trump
Trashing Virus Science He Doesn’t Like, Associated Press (May 23, 2020) (online at
https://news.wttw.com/2020/05/23/ap-fact-check-trump-trashing-virus-science-he-doesn-t).
413
Trump Trashes Fauci and Makes Baseless Coronavirus Claims in Campaign Call, CNN (Oct. 19, 2020)
(online at www.cnn.com/2020/10/19/politics/donald-trump-anthony-fauci-coronavirus).
414
Anthony Fauci Has Been Wrong About Everything I Have Interacted with Him on: Peter Navarro, USA
Today (July 14, 2020) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/todaysdebate/2020/07/14/anthony-fauci-wrong-
with-me-peter-navarro-editorials-debates/5439374002/).
415
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, A “Knife Fight” with the FDA: The Trump White
House’s Relentless Attacks on FDA’s Coronavirus Response (Aug. 24, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.08.24%20The%20Trump%20White
%20House%E2%80%99s%20Relentless%20Attacks%20on%20FDA%E2%80%99s%20Coronavirus%20Response.
pdf).
416
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “It Was Compromised”: The Trump Administration’s
Unprecedented Campaign to Control CDC and Politicize Public Health During the Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 17,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.17%20The%20Trump%20Admi
nistration%E2%80%99s%20Unprecedented%20Campaign%20to%20Control%20CDC%20and%20Politicize%20Pu
blic%20Health%20During%20the%20Coronavirus%20Crisis.pdf).
417
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Releases New
Evidence of Trump Administration’s Political Meddling in Coronavirus Guidance, Testing and Treatments (Feb. 8,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-releases-new-evidence-
trump-administration-s-political).
418
How Right-Wing Pundits Are Covering Coronavirus, New York Times (Mar. 11, 2020) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/us/politics/coronavirus-conservative-media.html).
419
Almost Everything Tucker Carlson Said about Anthony Fauci this Week Was Misleading or False,
Science (Aug. 25, 2022) (online at www.science.org/content/article/almost-everything-tucker-carlson-said-about-
anthony-fauci-week-was-misleading-or-false).
420
Transcript of The Ingraham Angle, Fox News (Mar. 5, 2021) (online at
www.mediamatters.org/media/3965961).
421
Talk Radio Host with COVID Regrets Vaccine Hesitancy, AP (July 23, 2021) (online at
https://apnews.com/article/entertainment-health-coronavirus-pandemic-talk-radio-
2a8308e2f6625ec3ec038d664a184079)
168
50-100_text_.pdf 180 2/15/23 2:48 PM
422
Phil Valentine, Radio Host Who Regretted Vaccine Skepticism, Dies of Covid-19, NBC News (Aug. 21,
2021) (online at www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/phil-valentine-radio-host-who-regretted-vaccine-skepticism-
dies-covid-n1277395).
423
KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor: Media and Misinformation, Kaiser Family Foundation (Nov. 8,
2021) (online at www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/poll-finding/kff-covid-19-vaccine-monitor-media-and-
misinformation/?utm_campaign=KFF-2021-polling-surveys&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=2&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-
9GML9cqLSoctrRMrrtNNrXq7pHcdJtchRMPpEVvhNpUhvrxck8FY39teBeSQ_kHSbHgigk9jCDSX-
u5SVPsycQDwAkQQ&utm_content=2&utm_source=hs_email).
424
Id.
425
COVID-19 Misinformation Is Ubiquitous: 78% of the Public Believes or Is Unsure About at Least One
False Statement, and Nearly a Third Believe at Least Four of Eight False Statements Tested, Kaiser Family
Foundation (Nov. 8, 2021) (online at www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/press-release/covid-19-misinformation-is-
ubiquitous-78-of-the-public-believes-or-is-unsure-about-at-least-one-false-statement-and-nearly-at-third-believe-at-
least-four-of-eight-false-statements-tested/).
426
Sarah Evanega, et al., Coronavirus Misinformation: Quantifying Sources and Themes in the COVID-19
‘Infodemic’, Cornell University (Oct. 1, 2020) (online at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/evanega-et-al-
coronavirus-misinformation-submitted-07-23-20-1/080839ac0c22bca8/full.pdf); Study Finds ‘Single Largest
Driver’ of Coronavirus Misinformation: Trump, New York Times (Sept. 30, 2020) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-misinformation.html).
427
Id.
428
Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Dr. Simone
Gold, Founder, America’s Frontline Doctors (Oct. 29, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.29%20Letter%20to%20%20AFL
DS%20re%20Misinformation.pdf); Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis, to SpeakWithAnMD.com (Oct. 29, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.10.29%20Lettrer%20to%20SpeakW
ithAnMD%20re%20Misinformation.pdf); Clamoring for Ivermectin, Some Turn to a Pro-Trump Telemedicine
Website, NBC News (Aug. 26, 2021) (online at www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/ivermectin-demand-drives-
trump-telemedicine-website-rcna1791); Fringe Doctors’ Groups Promote Ivermectin for COVID Despite a Lack of
Evidence, Scientific American (Sept. 29, 2021) (online at www.scientificamerican.com/article/fringe-doctors-
groups-promote-ivermectin-for-covid-despite-a-lack-of-evidence/).
429
Letter from Cadence Health, LLC to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Mar. 16, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.16_Cadence%20Health_Redacte
d.pdf); Network of Right-Wing Health Care Providers Is Making Millions off Hydroxychloroquine and Ivermectin,
Hacked Data Reveals, The Intercept (Sept. 28, 2021) (online at https://theintercept.com/2021/09/28/covid-
telehealth-hydroxychloroquine-ivermectin-hacked/).
430
America’s Frontline Doctors, How Do I Get COVID-19 Medication? (online at
https://web.archive.org/web/20210927195426/https://americasfrontlinedoctors5.com/treatments/how-do-i-get-covid-
19-medication/) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
431
Letter from Cadence Health, LLC to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Mar. 16, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.03.16_Cadence%20Health_Redacte
d.pdf).
432
Network of Right-Wing Health Care Providers Is Making Millions off Hydroxychloroquine and
Ivermectin, Hacked Data Reveals, The Intercept (Sept. 28, 2021) (online at
https://theintercept.com/2021/09/28/covid-telehealth-hydroxychloroquine-ivermectin-hacked/); Right-Wing
169
50-100_text_.pdf 181 2/15/23 2:48 PM
Physicians Profit Off of Fake COVID-19 Treatments, Report Finds, Fierce Healthcare (Sept. 30, 2021) (online at
www.fiercehealthcare.com/practices/right-wing-physicians-profit-off-fake-covid-19-treatment-new-data-finds).
433
How ‘America’s Frontline Doctors’ Sold Access to Bogus COVID-19 Treatments –and Left Patients in
the Lurch, TIME (Aug. 26, 2021) (online at https://time.com/6092368/americas-frontline-doctors-covid-19-
misinformation/); Far-Right Health Care Companies Made Millions Prescribing Unproven Covid Remedies,
The Intercept (Oct. 13, 2021) (online at https://theintercept.com/2021/10/13/intercepted-podcast-covid-ivermectin-
profits/).
434
Marketing Affiliate Agreement between LT Medical Services, Inc. and Dr-JeromeCorsi.com (Feb. 3,
2021) (ENCORE000180 – 88 at ENCORE000184) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ENCORE000180-184_Redacted.pdf).
435
Network of Right-Wing Health Care Providers Is Making Millions off Hydroxychloroquine and
Ivermectin, Hacked Data Reveals, The Intercept (Sept. 28, 2021) (online at
https://theintercept.com/2021/09/28/covid-telehealth-hydroxychloroquine-ivermectin-hacked/).
436
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Rapid Increase in Ivermectin Prescriptions and Reports of
Severe Illness Associated with Use of Products Containing Ivermectin to Prevent or Treat COVID-19 (Aug. 26,
2021) (online at https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2021/han00449.asp); Food and Drug Administration, FDA Cautions
Against Use of Hydroxychloroquine or Chloroquine for COVID-19 Outside of the Hospital Setting or a Clinical
Trial Due to Risk of Heart Rhythm Problems (July 1, 2020) (online at www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-
availability/fda-cautions-against-use-hydroxychloroquine-or-chloroquine-covid-19-outside-hospital-setting-or);
National Institutes of Health, Chloroquine or Hydroxychloroquine and/or Azithromycin (July 8, 2021) (online at
www.covid19treatmentguidelines.nih.gov/therapies/antiviral-therapy/chloroquine-or-hydroxychloroquine-and-or-
azithromycin/).
437
Marjorie Taylor Greene Uses 'Just Say No' in Urging Americans to Reject COVID Vaccine, Newsweek
(July 11, 2021) (online at www.newsweek.com/marjorie-taylor-greene-uses-just-say-no-urging-americans-reject-
covid-vaccine-1608638).
438
Matt Gaetz (@mattgaetz), Twitter (Oct. 18, 2021) (online at
https://twitter.com/mattgaetz/status/1450090629208363012).
439
Fact-Checking Sen. Ron Johnson's Anti-Vaccine Misinformation, CNN (May 7, 2021) (online at
www.cnn.com/2021/05/07/politics/ron-johnson-vaccine-misinformation-fact-check/index.html).
440
DeSantis, Social Media Posts Mislead on COVID-19’s Toll in Florida, FactCheck.org (Nov. 5, 2021)
(online at www.factcheck.org/2021/11/scicheck-desantis-comments-social-media-posts-mislead-on-covid-19s-toll-
in-florida/); S.D. Gov. Kristi Noem Says She Nailed the Pandemic Response. Fauci: The Numbers ‘Don’t Lie’,
Washington Post (Feb. 28, 2021) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/02/28/noem-fauci-cpac/).
441
Tucker Carlson Said 3,362 People Have Died from The COVID Vaccine. Is He Right?, Austin
American-Statesman (May 7, 2021) (online at www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/politifact/2021/05/07/tucker-
carlson-misleading-claim-deaths-after-covid-19-vaccine-covid/4989132001/).
442
Vaccinated Populations Suffering Strange New Illness, Doctors Report Foreign Compounds Found in
Vaccines, OAN News Network (Oct. 5, 2022) (online at www.oann.com/video/pearsonsharpreports/vaccinated-
populations-suffering-strange-new-illness-doctors-report-foreign-compounds-found-in-vaccines/).
443
Fox News Responds to Pfizer Announcement by Propagandizing Against Vaccination of Children for
COVID-19, Media Matters (Sept. 21, 2021) (online at www.mediamatters.org/coronavirus-covid-19/fox-news-
responds-pfizer-announcement-propagandizing-against-vaccination).
444
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States (online at
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations_vacc-people-onedose-pop-5yr) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
170
50-100_text_.pdf 182 2/15/23 2:48 PM
445
COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation and Disinformation Costs an Estimated $50 to $300 Million Each
Day, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (Oct. 20, 2021) (online at www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-
work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2021/20211020-misinformation-disinformation-cost.pdf).
446
Ming Zhong, et al., Estimating Vaccine-Preventable COVID-19 Deaths Under Counterfactual
Vaccination Scenarios in the United States (preprint study) (May 21, 2022) (online at
https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.19.22275310).
447
Id.; See also Vaccine Preventable Deaths Analysis, Brown School of Public Health (online at
https://globalepidemics.org/vaccinations/) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022).
448
COVID-19 Mortality Preventable by Vaccines, Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker (Apr. 21, 2022)
(online at www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/covid19-and-other-leading-causes-of-death-in-the-us/#COVID-
19%20deaths%20among%20unvaccinated%20adults%20that%20likely%20could%20have%20been%20prevented
%20with%20vaccinations,%20June%202021-March%202022).
449
Toby Bolsen and Risa Palm, Politicization and COVID-19 Vaccine Resistance in the U.S., Progress in
Molecular Biology and Translational Science (online at https://doi.org/10.1016%2Fbs.pmbts.2021.10.002); The
Red/Blue Divide in COVID-19 Vaccination Rates, Kaiser Family Foundation (Sept. 14, 2021) (online at
www.kff.org/policy-watch/the-red-blue-divide-in-covid-19-vaccination-rates/).
450
Unvaccinated Adults Are Now More Than Three Times as Likely to Lean Republican than Democratic,
Kaiser Family Foundation (Nov. 16, 2021) (online at www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/press-
release/unvaccinated-adults-are-now-more-than-three-times-as-likely-to-lean-republican-than-democratic/); KFF
COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor: Media and Misinformation, Kaiser Family Foundation (Nov. 8, 2021) (online at
www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/poll-finding/kff-covid-19-vaccine-monitor-media-and-misinformation/); Neil
Jay Sehgal, et al., The Association Between COVID-19 Mortality and the County-Level Partisan Divide in the
United States, Health Affairs (June 2022) (online at https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2022.00085).
451
Study Finds ‘Single Largest Driver’ of Coronavirus Misinformation: Trump, New York Times (Sept.
30, 2020) (online at www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-misinformation.html); Excess
Death Rates for Republicans and Democrats During the COVID-19 Pandemic, National Bureau of Economic
Research (Sept. 2022) (online at www.nber.org/papers/w30512).
452
This Is How Many Lives Could Have Been Saved with COVID Vaccinations in Each State, National
Public Radio, (May 13, 2022) (online at www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2022/05/13/1098071284/this-is-how-
many-lives-could-have-been-saved-with-covid-vaccinations-in-each-sta).
453
A Wave of Anti-Vaccine Legislation Is Sweeping the United States, Vox (Oct. 6, 2022) (online at
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2022/10/6/23389145/covid-19-anti-vaccine-legislation).
454
This COVID Winter Will be Different, The Atlantic (Dec. 1, 2022) (online at
www.theatlantic.com/podcasts/archive/2022/12/covid-winter-will-be-different/672326/).
455
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Long COVID (Sept. 1, 2022) (online at
www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/long-term-effects/index.html).
456
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health, Health+ Long
COVID Human-Centered Design Report (Nov. 2022) (online at www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/healthplus-long-
covid-report.pdf).
457
Id.; Researchers Fear People of Color May Be Disproportionately Affected by Long COVID, STAT
News (May 10, 2021) (online at www.statnews.com/2021/05/10/with-long-covid-history-may-be-repeating-itself-
among-people-of-color/); Why Even Healthy Low-Income People Have Greater Health Risks than Higher-Income
People, The Commonwealth Fund (September 27, 2018) (online at
www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/healthy-low-income-people-greater-health-risks).
458
Long COVID May Be ‘The Next Public Health Disaster’ — With a $3.7 Trillion Economic Impact
Rivaling the Great Recession, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2022) (online at www.cnbc.com/2022/11/30/why-long-covid-could-
be-the-next-public-health-disaster.html); David Cutler, Long COVID is a Major Economic Cost (online at
171
50-100_text_.pdf 183 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cutler/files/long_covid_update_7-22.pdf). This estimate is based on people with
three or more symptoms lasting 12 weeks or longer. Dr. Cutler estimates that 12% to 17% of people who have
COVID-19 will experience three or more symptoms lasting 12 or more weeks. Loss of “quality of life” is defined
by Professor Cutler as the reduction in quality years of life due to long COVID multiplied by the value of a year of
good health, which he values as $100,000.
459
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, Long COVID (online
at www.cdc.gov/nchs/covid19/pulse/long-covid.htm); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Nearly One in
Five American Adults Who Have Had COVID-19 Still Have “Long COVID” (June 22, 2022) (online at
www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/nchs_press_releases/2022/20220622.htm); Why Has COVID-19 Been Especially
Harmful for Working Women?, Brookings (Oct. 2020) (online at www.brookings.edu/essay/why-has-covid-19-
been-especially-harmful-for-working-women/).
460
The White House, Fact Sheet: The Biden Administration Accelerates Whole-of-Government Effort to
Prevent, Detect, and Treat Long COVID (Apr. 5, 2022) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-the-biden-administration-accelerates-whole-of-government-effort-to-prevent-detect-
and-treat-long-covid/).
461
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Press Release: The Employment Situation—April 2020 (May 8, 2020)
(online at www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.pdf); US Food Prices See Historic Jump and are
Likely to Stay High (May 30, 2020) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/us-food-prices-historic-
jump-stay-high-70969164); Unemployment Rate (Jan. 1 1948 to Nov. 1, 2022), Federal Reserve Economic Data,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Dec. 2, 2022) (online at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE).
462
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review; Unemployment Rises in 2020, as the Country
Battles the COVID-19 Pandemic (June 2021) (online at /www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2021/article/unemployment-rises-
in-2020-as-the-country-battles-the-covid-19-pandemic.htm).
463
The Economic Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the United States, Michigan Journal of
Economics (Jan. 9, 2022) (online at https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2022/01/09/the-economic-impact-of-the-covid-
19-pandemic-on-the-united-states/).
464
Which Jobs Have Been Hit Hardest by COVID-19?, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Aug. 17, 2022)
(online at www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/third-quarter-2020/jobs-hit-hardest-covid-19).
465
The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business Outcomes and Expectations, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences (July 10, 2020) (online at www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2006991117).
466
Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Real Gross Domestic Product
(Nov. 30, 2022) (online at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A191RL1Q225SBEA); Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Department of Commerce, Press Release: Gross Domestic Product, Third Quarter 2022 (Advance Estimate) (Oct.
27, 2022) (online at www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/gdp3q22_adv.pdf); The Economic Impact of the
COVID-19 Pandemic on the United States, Michigan Journal of Economics (Jan. 9, 2022) (online at
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mje/2022/01/09/the-economic-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-the-united-states/).
467
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Rose Godinez, American Civil Liberties
Union of Nebraska, Hearing on How the Meatpacking Industry Failed the Workers Who Feed America (Oct. 27,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-how-meatpacking-
industry-failed-workers-who-feed).
468
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Chairman Jerome Powell, Federal
Reserve, Hearing on Lessons Learned: The Federal Reserve’s response to the Coronavirus Pandemic (June 22,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-lessons-learned-
federal-reserve-s-response-coronavirus).
469
Employment Situation: All Employees, Child Day Care Services (Jan. 1 1985 to Oct. 1, 2022), Federal
Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Nov. 4, 2022) (online at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CES6562440001); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of
Dr. Lynette M. Fraga, Child Care Aware of America, Hearing on COVID Child Care Challenges: Supporting
172
50-100_text_.pdf 184 2/15/23 2:48 PM
Families and Caregivers (Mar. 2, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-
activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-covid-child-care-challenges-supporting-families-and).
470
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Dr. Lynette M. Fraga, Child Care Aware
of America, Hearing on COVID Child Care Challenges: Supporting Families and Caregivers (Mar. 2, 2022) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-covid-child-care-challenges-
supporting-families-and); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Dr. Lea J.E. Austin, Center
for the Study of Child Care Employment, University of California, Hearing on COVID Child Care Challenges:
Supporting Families and Caregivers (Mar. 2, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-
activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-covid-child-care-challenges-supporting-families-and).
471
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Dr. C. Nicole Mason, Institute for
Women’s Policy Research, Hearing on Underpaid, Overworked, and Underappreciated: How the Pandemic
Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-Wage Women Workers (May 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-underpaid-overworked-and-
underappreciated-how-pandemic).
472
When Women Lose All the Jobs: Essential Actions for a Gender-Equitable Recovery, Center for
American Progress (Feb. 1, 2021) (online at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/women-lose-jobs-essential-
actions-gender-equitable-recovery/).
473
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Pandemic Pushes Mothers of Young Children Out of the Labor
Force (online at www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2021/pandemic-pushes-mothers-of-young-children-out-of-the-
labor-force) (accessed Jan. 31, 2022).
474
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee to Examine
Economic Impact of Pandemic on Working Women (Dec. 13, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-examine-economic-impact-pandemic-
working-women).
475
See In One Year, Coronavirus Pandemic Has Wreaked Havoc on Working Women, U.S. News (Mar. 8,
2021) (online at www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2021-03-08/in-one-year-coronavirus-pandemic-has-
wreaked-havoc-on-working-women); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select
Subcommittee to Examine Economic Impact of Pandemic on Working Women (Dec. 13, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-examine-economic-impact-pandemic-
working-women).
476
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
Memorandum: New Finding of Disproportionate Impact of Coronavirus Pandemic on Working Women, Majority
Staff of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (May 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/22.05.17%20SSCC%20Gender%20Equit
y%20Analysis.pdf).
477
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, America’s Pandemic Workforce: Persistent Structural
Inequities Harm Workers and Threaten Future Crisis Response (Oct. 25, 2022) (online at https://edit-democrats-
coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.25%20Persistent%20Structural%20Ineq
uities%20Harm%20Workers%20and%20Threaten%20Future%20Crisis%20Response.pdf).
478
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Georgetown Center
on Poverty & Inequality, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept.
22, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-
building-success-pandemic-relief).
479
Id.
480
Brookings Institution, The Hamilton Project, A Plan to Reform the Unemployment Insurance System in
the United States (Apr. 2021) (online at https://brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Unemplyment-
InsurancePP-v4.2-1.pdf).
173
50-100_text_.pdf 185 2/15/23 2:48 PM
481
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Georgetown Center
on Poverty & Inequality, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept.
22, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-
building-success-pandemic-relief).
482
Brookings Institution, The Hamilton Project, A Plan to Reform the Unemployment Insurance System in
the United States (Apr. 2021) (online at https://brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Unemplyment-
InsurancePP-v4.2-1.pdf).
483
Brookings Institution, The Hamilton Project, A Plan to Reform the Unemployment Insurance System in
the United States (Apr. 2021) (online at https://brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Unemplyment-
InsurancePP-v4.2-1.pdf).
484
Benjamin Della Rocca, Unemployment Insurance for the Gig Economy, The Yale Law Journal (Jan. 26,
2022) (online at https://yalelawjournal.org/forum/unemployment-insurance-for-the-gig-economy).
485
Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, Kaiser Family Foundation (Nov. 6, 2020) (online at
https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/).
486
See, e.g., How Laid-Off Americans May “Fall Through the Cracks” of the Health Care System During
COVID-19, PBS (July 22, 2020) (online at www.pbs.org/newshour/health/how-laid-off-americans-may-fall-
through-the-cracks-of-the-health-care-system-during-covid-19).
487
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Georgetown Center
on Poverty & Inequality, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept.
22, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-
building-success-pandemic-relief).
488
Risk of SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Essential Workers in a Community-Based Cohort in the United
States, Frontiers in Public Health (May 17,2022) (online at
www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2022.878208/full); Measuring the Virus Risk of Essential Workers and
Dependents, National Bureau of Economic Research (Mar. 2021) (online at
www.nber.org/digest/202103/measuring-virus-risk-essential-workers-and-dependents); Risk of Severe COVID-19
Among Workers and Their Household Members, JAMA Internal Medicine (Nov. 9, 2020) (online at
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2772328); Why are Blacks Dying at Higher
Rates from COVID-19, Brookings (Apr. 9, 2020) (online at www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/04/09/why-are-
blacks-dying-at-higher-rates-from-covid-19/).
489
Essential and Frontline Workers in the COVID-19 Crisis, EconoFact (Mar. 22, 2022) (online at
https://econofact.org/essential-and-frontline-workers-in-the-covid-19-crisis).
490
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Rose Godinez, American Civil Liberties
Union of Nebraska, Hearing on How the Meatpacking Industry Failed the Workers Who Feed America (Oct. 27,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-how-meatpacking-
industry-failed-workers-who-feed).
491
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Georgetown Center
on Poverty & Inequality, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept.
22, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-
building-success-pandemic-relief).
492
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of President and Chief Executive Officer Dr.
C. Nicole Mason, Institute for Women’s Policy Research, Hearing on Underpaid, Overworked, and
Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-Wage Women Workers (May 17,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-underpaid-
overworked-and-underappreciated-how-pandemic).
174
50-100_text_.pdf 186 2/15/23 2:48 PM
493
Julia R. Raifman et al., Paid Leave Policies Can Help Keep Businesses Open and food on Workers’
Tables, Health Affairs (Oct. 25, 2021) (online at
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20211021.197121/).
494
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Vicki Shabo, Hearing on Underpaid,
Overworked, and Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-Wage Women
Workers (May 17, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-
underpaid-overworked-and-underappreciated-how-pandemic).
495
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, America’s Pandemic Workforce: Persistent Structural
Inequities Harm Workers and Threaten Future Crisis Response (Oct. 25, 2022) (online at https://edit-democrats-
coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.25%20Persistent%20Structural%20Ineq
uities%20Harm%20Workers%20and%20Threaten%20Future%20Crisis%20Response.pdf)
496
Id.
497
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on Underpaid, Overworked, and
Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-Wage Women Workers (May 17,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-underpaid-
overworked-and-underappreciated-how-pandemic).
498
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of
Martin Rosas, United Food and Commercial Workers Local Union 2, Hearing on How the Meatpacking Industry
Failed the Workers Who Feed America (Oct. 27, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Rosas%20Testimony.pdf).
499
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of
Martin Rosas, United Food and Commercial Workers Local Union 2, Hearing on How the Meatpacking Industry
Failed the Workers Who Feed America (Oct. 27, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Rosas%20Testimony.pdf).
500
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on
Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 22, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-building-success-
pandemic-relief).
501
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on
Underpaid, Overworked, and Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-
Wage Women Workers (May 18, 2022) (online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7EPU_sjhHE).
502
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on
Underpaid, Overworked, and Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-
Wage Women Workers (May 18, 2022) (online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7EPU_sjhHE).
503
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, America’s Pandemic Workforce: Persistent Structural
Inequities Harm Workers and Threaten Future Crisis Response (Oct. 25, 2022) (online at https://edit-democrats-
coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.25%20Persistent%20Structural%20Ineq
uities%20Harm%20Workers%20and%20Threaten%20Future%20Crisis%20Response.pdf).
504
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on
Underpaid, Overworked, and Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-
Wage Women Workers (May 18, 2022) (online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7EPU_sjhHE).
505
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on
Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 22, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-building-success-
pandemic-relief); COVID-19 Emergency Sick Leave Has Helped Flatten the Curve in the United States, Health
Affairs (Oct. 15, 2020) (online at www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00863).
175
50-100_text_.pdf 187 2/15/23 2:48 PM
506
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on Underpaid, Overworked, and
Underappreciated: How the Pandemic Economy Disproportionately Harmed Low-Wage Women Workers (May 18,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-underpaid-
overworked-and-underappreciated-how-pandemic).
507
Food Insecurity Edged Back Up After COVID-19 Relief Expired, Urban Institute (Oct. 2020) (online at
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/103117/food-insecurity-edged-back-up-after-covid-19-relief-
expired.pdf).
508
Average Decline in Material Hardship During the Pandemic Conceals Unequal Circumstances, Urban
Institute (Apr. 14, 2021) (online at www.urban.org/research/publication/average-decline-material-hardship-during-
pandemic-conceals-unequal-circumstances/view/full_report).
509
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, CARES Act Measures Strengthening Unemployment Insurance
Should Continue While Need Remains (June 9, 2020) (online at www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/cares-act-
measures-strengthening-unemployment-insurance-should-continue); Census Bureau, Press Release: Income,
Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2020 (Sept. 14, 2021) (online at
www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/income-poverty-health-insurance-coverage.html).
510
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Georgetown Center
on Poverty & Inequality, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept.
22, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-
building-success-pandemic-relief).
511
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of H. Luke Shaefer, Center Director,
Poverty Solutions, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 22,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-
building-success-pandemic-relief).
512
Food Insecurity Edged Back Up After COVID-19 Relief Expired, Urban Institute (Oct. 2020) (online at
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/103117/food-insecurity-edged-back-up-after-covid-19-relief-
expired.pdf).
513
Congress Passes $900 Billion Coronavirus Relief Bill, Ending Months-Long Stalemate, NPR (Dec. 21,
2020) (online at www.npr.org/2020/12/21/948862052/house-passes-900-billion-coronavirus-relief-bill-ending-
months-long-stalemate).
514
Material Hardship and Mental Health Following the COVID-19 Relief Bill and American Rescue Plan
Act, University of Michigan Poverty Solutions (May 2021) (online at
http://sites.fordschool.umich.edu/poverty2021/files/2021/05/PovertySolutions-Hardship-After-COVID-19-Relief-
Bill-PolicyBrief-r1.pdf).
515
Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, Poverty in the United States: 2021 (Sept. 2022) (online at
(www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2022/demo/p60-277.pdf); Census Poverty Numbers May
Underestimate Pandemic UI Impact by Half, Niskanen Center (Oct. 6, 2022) (online at
www.niskanencenter.org/census-poverty-numbers-may-underestimate-pandemic-ui-impact-by-half/).
516
Given that the original ACA provisions prevented significant increases in the number of uninsured
before the American Rescue Plan, the three million people who selected plans with additional support from the
American Rescue Plan almost certainly led to a significant decline in the number of uninsured. Special Enrollment
for ACA Health Plans Attracts Nearly 3 Million Consumers, Washington Post (Sept. 15, 2021) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/health/aca-record-enrollment-pandemic/2021/09/15/068bd29e-160d-11ec-b976-
f4a43b740aeb_story.html); Little Change in Number of Uninsured in Pandemic's First Year, U.S. News (Aug. 23,
2021) (online at www.usnews.com/news/health-news/articles/2021-08-23/little-change-in-number-of-uninsured-in-
pandemics-first-year).
176
50-100_text_.pdf 188 2/15/23 2:48 PM
517
Id.; How the American Rescue Plan Will Improve Affordability of Private Health Coverage, Kaiser
Family Foundation (Mar. 17, 2021) (online at www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/how-the-american-rescue-plan-
will-improve-affordability-of-private-health-coverage/).
518
Department of Health and Human Services, Press Release: New HHS Report Shows National Uninsured
Rate Reached All-Time Low in 2022 (Aug. 2, 2022) (online at www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/08/02/new-hhs-
report-shows-national-uninsured-rate-reached-all-time-low-in-2022.html).
519
Department of the Treasury, Emergency Rental Assistance Program (online at
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/emergency-
rental-assistance-program) (accessed Oct. 6, 2022); Federal Moratorium on Evictions for Nonpayment of Rent,
National Housing Law Project (Aug. 2021) (online at https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Overview-of-National-
Eviction-Moratorium.pdf).
520
Preliminary Analysis: Eviction Filing Trends After the CDC Moratorium Expiration, Eviction Lab
(Dec. 9, 2021) (online at https://evictionlab.org/updates/research/eviction-filing-trends-after-cdc-moratorium/);
Preliminary Analysis: 11 months of the CDC Moratorium, Eviction Lab (Aug. 21, 2021) (online at
https://evictionlab.org/eleven-months-cdc/).
521
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fact Sheet: HUD Marks Important New Milestone in
American Rescue Plan’s Emergency Housing Voucher Program (Oct. 13, 2022) (online at
www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/HUD_No_22_213).
522
Department of the Treasury, Homeowner Assistance Fund (online at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/homeowner-assistance-fund); Mortgage
Borrowers’ Use of COVID-19 Forbearance Programs, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Aug. 16, 2022) (online
at www.clevelandfed.org/publications/economic-commentary/2022/ec-202211-mortgage-borrowers-use-of-covid19-
forbearance-programs); Federal Moratorium on Evictions for Nonpayment of Rent, National Housing Law Project
(Aug. 2021) (online at https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Overview-of-National-Eviction-Moratorium.pdf).
523
Pandemic Led to Sharp Spike in Black, Asian and Latino Homeownership, Washington Post (Nov. 1,
2022) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/11/01/minority-homeownership-spikes-post-pandemic/).
524
Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Secretary
Steven T. Mnuchin, Department of the Treasury, and Commissioner Charles P. Rettig, Internal Revenue Service
(July 8, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-07-
08.Clyburn%20to%20Treasury%20IRS%20re%20Stimulus%20Checks.pdf); Internal Revenue Service, News
Release: IRS to Mail Special Letter to Estimated 9 Million Non-Filers, Urging Them to Claim Economic Impact
Payment by Oct. 15 at IRS.gov (Sept. 8, 2020) (online at www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-to-mail-special-letter-to-
estimated-9-million-non-filers-urging-them-to-claim-economic-impact-payment-by-oct-15-at-irsgov).
525
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Treasury and IRS: Give 9
Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Sept. 11, 2020) (online at
coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-treasury-and-irs-give-9-million-americans-more-time-
claimstimulus); 2 Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Select Subcommittee
Investigation, IRS Gives 9 Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Oct. 7, 2020) (online at
coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-select-subcommittee-investigation-irs-gives-9-
millionamericans-more); Internal Revenue Service, News Release: IRS Extends Economic Impact Payment
Deadline to Nov. 21 to Help Non-filers (Oct. 5, 2020) (online at www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-extends-economic-
impact-payment-deadline-to-nov-21-to-help-non-filers).
526
The White House, Fact Sheet: President Biden’s New Executive Actions Deliver Economic Relief for
American Families and Businesses Amid the COVID-TL A:E9I9 '2V= SS% S"ST& 'online at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/22/fact-sheet-president-bidens-new-
executive-actions-deliver-economic-relief-for-american-families-and-businesses-amid-the-covid-19-crises/); Biden
Directs Treasury, IRS to Find 8M Who Haven't Claimed Stimulus, Politico (Jan 22, 2021) (online at
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/22/biden-treasury-unclaimed-stimulus-461466).
177
50-100_text_.pdf 189 2/15/23 2:48 PM
527
CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4112(a) (2020).
528
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, ‘Unnecessary Costs’: How the trump Administration
Allowed Thousands of Aviation Workers to Lose Their Jobs, 116th Cong. (Oct. 9, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PSP%20Report%20Final.pdf).
529
Letter from Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman
James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Deputy Inspector General, Richard K. Delmar,
Department of the Treasury (Sept. 8, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022-09-
08.CBM%20JEC%20to%20Delmar-Treasury%20OIG%20re%20Pilot%20Shortage.pdf).
530
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 1102, 1106
(2020).
531
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Underserved and Unprotected: How the Trump
Administration Neglected the Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP, 116th Cong. (Oct.
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PPP%20Report%20Final%20%283%29.p
df).
532
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Underserved and Unprotected: How the Trump
Administration Neglected the Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP, 116th Cong. (Oct.
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PPP%20Report%20Final%20%283%29.p
df).
533
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Inefficient, Ineffective and Inequitable: The Trump
Administration’s Failed Response to the Coronavirus Crisis, 116th Cong. (Oct. 30, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/InterimStaffReport10.30.20.pdf).
534
Fed’s Aid Program for Midsize Businesses Spent Only 3% of Its Total, Bloomberg (Feb. 9, 2021)
(online at (online at https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:EstT---
7og8J:https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-09/fed-s-main-street-program-ends-with-just-17-5-billion-in-
loans&cd=14&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us).
535
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Inefficient, Ineffective and Inequitable: The Trump
Administration’s Failed Response to the Coronavirus Crisis, 116th Cong. (Oct. 30, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/InterimStaffReport10.30.20.pdf).
536
Brookings Institution, How Well Did the Fed’s Intervention in the Municipal Bond Market Work? (Aug.
31, 2021) (online at https://brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/08/31/how-well-did-the-feds-intervention-in-the-
municipal-bond-market-work/); Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Cuts Off Several Federal Reserve Emergency Aid
Programs, Sparking Unusual Rebuke from Fed, Washington Post (online at
https://washingtonpost.com/business/2020/11/19/emergency-lending-programs-fed-treasury/).
537
Yale School of Management, Program on Financial Stability, Fed Announces Wind-Down of
Emergency Corporate Credit Facility (July 13, 2021) (online at https://som.yale.edu/blog/fed-announces-wind-
down-of-emergency-corporate-credit-facility);
538
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Prioritizing Wall Street: The Fed’s Corporate Bond
Purchases During the Coronavirus Pandemic, 116th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Report%20%289-23-
2020%29_FINAL.pdf).
539
Millions of Americans Are Heading into the Holidays Unemployed and Over $5,000 Behind on Rent,
Washington Post (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/07/unemployed-debt-rent-
utilities/).
540
H.R. 8406, 116thCong. (2020); Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260.
178
50-100_text_.pdf 190 2/15/23 2:48 PM
541
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Diane Yentel, National Low Income
Housing Coalition, Hearing on Oversight of Pandemic Evictions: Assessing Abuses by Corporate Landlords and
Federal Efforts to Keep Americans in Their Homes (July 27, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-oversight-pandemic-evictions-
assessing-abuses).
542
Id.
543
Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, SBA’s Paycheck Protection Program Loan
Review Processes (Feb. 28, 2022) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
02/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2022-09.pdf).
544
John M. Griffin, Samuel Kruger, and Prateek Mahajan, Did FinTech Lenders Facilitate PPP Fraud?
(May 19, 2022) (online at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3906395).
545
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of Inspector General
Larry D. Turner, Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, Hearing on Pandemic Response and
Accountability: Reducing Fraud and Expanding Access to COVID-19 Relief Through Effective Oversight, 117th
Cong. (Mar. 17, 2022) (online at www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Turner-2022-03-17-
REVISED.pdf).
546
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on Examining Federal Efforts to Prevent,
Detect, and Prosecute Relief Fraud to Safeguard Funds for All Eligible Americans (June 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/covid-pandemic-relief-fraud-ppp-eidl).
547
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
The Biden Administration’s Efforts to Root Out Fraud in Pandemic Relief Programs and Bring Wrongdoers to
Justice (June 13, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/The%20Biden%20Administration%27s%
20Efforts%20to%20Root%20Out%20Fraud%20in%20Pandemic%20Relief%20Programs%20and%20Bring%20Wr
ongdoers%20to%20Justice.pdf).
548
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Idle on EIDL Fraud: How the Trump Administration
Wasted Taxpayer Dollars by Leaving the COVID-19 EIDL Program Vulnerable to Fraud (June 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/reports/select-subcommittee-report-details-trump-administration-s-failure-
prevent-fraud).
549
Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-123 (2020);
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act; Pub. L. 116-136, (2020); Paycheck Protection Program and
Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. 116-139 (2020); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. 116-260
(2020); American Rescue Plan Act, Pub. L. No. 117-2 (2021).
550
Small Business Administration, Disaster Assistance Update Nationwide COVID EIDL, Targeted EIDL
Advances, Supplemental Targeted Advances (Apr. 28, 2022) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
04/COVID-19%20EIDL%20TA%20STA_04282022_Public-508.pdf).
551
Small Business Administration, Disaster Assistance Update EIDL Advance (July 15, 2020) (online at
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/EIDL%20COVID-19%20Advance%207.15.20-508.pdf); Small Business
Administration, Disaster Assistance Update Nationwide COVID EIDL, Targeted EIDL Advances, Supplemental
Targeted Advances (Apr. 28, 2022) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/COVID-
19%20EIDL%20TA%20STA_04282022_Public-508.pdf); Targeted advances were $10,000 grants available to
small businesses in low-income communities that saw more than a 30% reduction in revenue for an eight-week or
longer period during the pandemic, and supplemental targeted advances were $5,000 additional grants available to
businesses in low-income areas that saw a more than 50% economic loss for an eight-week period during the
pandemic. Small Business Administration, About Targeted EIDL Advance and Supplemental Targeted Advance
(online at www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans/covid-19-relief-options/covid-19-economic-injury-disaster-
loan/about-targeted-eidl-advance-supplemental-targeted-advance) (accessed June 9, 2022).
179
50-100_text_.pdf 191 2/15/23 2:48 PM
552
Government Accountability Office, Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program: Additional Actions
Needed to Improve Communication with Applicants and Address Fraud Risks (July 2021) (GAO-21-589) (online at
www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-589.pdf).
553
Small Business Administration, SBA’s Handling of Identity Theft in the COVID-19 Economic Injury
Disaster Loan Program (May 6, 2021) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
05/SBA%20OIG%20%20Report%2021-15.pdf).
554
Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, SBA’s Emergency EIDL Grants to Sole
Proprietors and Independent Contractors (Oct. 7, 2021) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
10/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2022-01%20.pdf).
555
Government Accountability Office, Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program: Additional Actions
Needed to Improve Communication with Applicants and Address Fraud Risks (July 2021) (GAO-21-589) (online at
www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-589.pdf); Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Inspection of
Small Business Administration’s Initial Disaster Assistance Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic (Oct. 28, 2020)
(online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2021-02.pdf).
556
Email from Chief Technology Officer, Rapid Financial Services, LLC, to Staff, Small Business
Administration (Mar. 30, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Rapid%20CTO%20to%20Rivera%20SB
A%203.30.20_Redacted%20%23.pdf); Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Inspection of
Small Business Administration’s Initial Disaster Assistance Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic (Oct. 28, 2020)
(online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2021-02.pdf).
557
Briefing by Staff, Small Business Administration, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis (Feb. 2, 2022).
558
SBA did curtail its use of batch approval in August 2020 after SBA OIG issued a critical report on EIDL
fraud, but 3.3 million EIDLs had already been approved by this time. Small Business Administration, Office of
Inspector General, Inspection of Small Business Administration’s Initial Disaster Assistance Response to the
Coronavirus Pandemic (Oct. 28, 2020) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
10/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2021-02.pdf). As of June 10, 2021, SBA data shows that 3.8 million EIDL
applications had been approved in total. Data provided to the Select Subcommittee by Rapid shows that as of June
11, 2021, approximately 2.2 million applications had been approved following a recommendation for manual
review, and approximately 1.6 million applications had been recommended directly to SBA Team Leads for
approval, indicating that all or almost all applications sent directly to Team Leads for batch approval were ultimately
approved. Small Business Administration, Disaster Assistance Update Nationwide COVID EIDL, Targeted EIDL
Advances, Supplemental Targeted Advances (June 10, 2021) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
06/COVID-19%20EIDL%20TA%20STA_6.10.2021_Public-508_0.pdf); Email from Counsel, Rapid Financial
Services LLC, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (June 23, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Email%20Counsel%20for%20Rapid%20t
o%20SSCC%20Staff_Redacted.pdf).
559
Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Inspection of Small Business
Administration’s Initial Disaster Assistance Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic (Oct. 28, 2020) (online at
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-10/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2021-02.pdf); Memorandum from Director,
Office of Grants Management, Small Business Administration, to Chief Financial Officer, Small Business
Administration, Authorization for Payments from RER Solutions (Apr. 7, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Memorandum%204.7.20%20fraud%20in
dicators_Redacted.pdf); Letter from Counsel, RER Solutions, Inc., to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, and Chairwoman Nydia Velazquez, Committee on Small Business (Mar.
11, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Letter%20Counsel%20RER%20to%20Ch
airman%203.11.21_Redacted.pdf); One SBA staff member told the Select Subcommittee that, to their recollection,
applications with fraud flags were not included in batches, but this conflicts with the memorandum to provided to
SBA’s contractor and subcontractors to implement the batch policy, the findings of the SBA OIG, and the
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representations made to the Select Subcommittee by RER Solutions about the instructions it received regarding the
rules for inclusion in batches. Briefing by Staff, Small Business Administration, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on
the Coronavirus Crisis (Feb. 2, 2022).
560
Small Business Administration, SBA Rapid Decision Reference Guide (May 15, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SBA%20Rapid%20Decision%20Guide%
205.15.20_Redacted.pdf).
561
Small Business Administration, SBA Rapid Decision Reference Guide (April 20, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SBA%20Rapid%20Decision%20Guide%
204.20.21_Redacted.pdf).
562
Complaint, United States v. Nobbe, No. 1:20-MJ-3236 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint,
United States v. One, No. 0:20-MJ-6325 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2020), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Lewis,
No. 1:20-CR-3361 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Casutt, No. 2:20-MJ-666
(D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2020), ECF No. 1; Affidavit, United States v. Redfern, No. 1:20-MJ-256 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 25,
2020), ECF No. 2; Complaint, United States v. Stanley, et al., No. 1:20-MJ-3470 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2020), ECF
No. 3; Information, United States v. Horner, No. 4:21-CR-00242 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint,
United States v. Lavanture, No. 1:20-MJ-452 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint and Affidavit,
United States v. Trapp, No. 1:20-MJ-915 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v.
Carpenter, et al., No. 2:20-CR-179 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 6, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Hsu, No.
2:20-MJ-691 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Ayvazyan, et al., No. 2:20-CR-
579 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Williams, No. 1:20-CR-105 (S.D. Ga. Nov.
5, 2020), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Nelson, et al., No. 1:20-CR-103 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2020), ECF No.
1; Indictment, United States v. Plummer, No. 1:20-CR-106 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2020), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United
States v. Coleman, No. 1:20-CR-107 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2020), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Mack, No.
1:20-CR-104 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2020), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Williams, No. 1:20-CR-109 (S.D.
Ga. Nov. 19, 2020), ECF No.1; Indictment, United States v. Jones, No. 3:20-CR-30073 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2020),
ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Garrido-Baez, No. 3:20-CR-30072 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2020), ECF No. 1;
Complaint, United States v. Kanyike, No. 2:20-MJ-5936 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2020), ECF No.1; Indictment, United
States v. Jones, No. 3:20-CR-438 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2020), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Smith, No.
20-CR-922 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Cruz, No. 1:21-CR-10019 (D. Mass.
Dec. 18, 2020), ECF No. 4; Complaint, United States v. Clawson, No. 3:20-MJ-294 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 2020), ECF
No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Unitan, No. 3:20-MJ-293 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United
States v. Caraballo, No. 1:21-MJ-2014 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2021), ECF No. 1; Affidavit, United States v. Pape, et al.,
No. 5:21-MJ-0007 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2021), ECF No. 2; Complaint, United States v. Oworae, No. 4:21-MJ-4014
(D. Mass. Jan. 20, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Burden, No. 4:21-MJ-70194 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Bolen, No. 3:21-CR-30013 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2021), ECF No. 1;
Indictment, United States v. Prioleau, No. 3:21-CR-49-MOC (W.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment,
United States v. Clifron, No. 3:21-CR-46 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v.
Kirkland, No. 6:21-CR-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Bella, No. 1:21-CR-31
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Cordor, No. 4:21-CR-40016 (D. Mass. Mar. 4,
2021), ECF No. 4; Complaint, United States v. Spierdowis, No. 1:21-MJ-1074 (D. Mass. Mar. 4, 2021), ECF No. 1;
First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Grigoryan, et al., No. 2:20-CR-579 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2021), ECF
No. 154; Indictment, United States v. Kornaker, No. 1:21-CR-37 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 13;
Indictment, United States v. Fiege, No. 0:21-CR-55-MJD-LIB (D. Minn. Mar. 11, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment,
United States v. Lawson, et al., No. 3:21-CR-6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v.
Ayers, et al., No. 7:21-MJ-3110 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 2; Complaint, United States v. Hannah,
No. 2:21-9168 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Venant, No. 8:21-MJ-1295 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 26, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Kwak, et al., No. 1:21-CR-199 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 1,
2021), ECF No. 1; Affidavit, United States v. Brooks, No. 8:21-MJ-695 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 2;
Complaint, United States v. Onah, No. 3:21-MJ-191 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States
v. Isbaih, No. 1:21-CR-208 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Bella, et al., No. 1:21-
CR-247 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2021), ECF No. 3; Indictment, United States v. Hilaire, No. 1:21-CR-39WES-PAS
(D.R.I. Apr. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Zimmerman, No. 2:21-MJ-8050 (D.N.J. Apr. 21,
181
50-100_text_.pdf 193 2/15/23 2:48 PM
2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Pounds, et al., No. 5:21-CR-317-PAB (N.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2021),
ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Bennett, et al., No. 1:21-MJ-7102 (D.N.J. May 14, 2021), ECF No. 1;
Indictment, United States v. Taylor, No. 3:21-CR-132-FDW (W.D.N.C. May 18, 2021), ECF No. 3; Indictment,
United States v. Foreman, et al., No. 1:21-CR-165 (D. Colo. May 18, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States
v. Lysne, No. 3:21-CR-167 (D. Or. May 19, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Hannesyan, No. 2:21-
CR-284 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Lain, No. 1:21-CR-175 (D. Colo. May
26, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Aquino, No. 1:21-CR-144 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2021), ECF No. 1;
Indictment, United States v. Vaughn, No. 6:21-CR-34 (E.D. Ky. May 27, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United
States v. Cherry, No. 4:20-CR-27 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Klasinc,
No. 1:21-CR-5835 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Ahiekpor, No. 2:20-CR-00094
(S.D. Ohio June 23, 2020), ECF No. 22; Complaint, United States v. Sanay, et al., No. 1:21-MJ-668 (E.D.N.Y. June
8, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Zaghab, No. 21-CR-188 (D. Colo. June 8, 2021), ECF No. 1;
Information, United States v. Carter, No. 1:21-CR-204 (D. Md. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States
v. Porch, et al., No. 4:21-CR-23 (M.D. Ga. June 9, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Bush, No. 3:21-
CR-74 (E.D. Tenn. June 10, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Grubb, No. 1:21-CR-175 (M.D. Pa.
June 22, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Soto, No. 1:21-CR-49-CFC (D. Del. July 6, 2021), ECF
No. 2; Indictment, United States v. Miller, No. 1:21-CR-10228-FDS (D. Mass. July 7, 2021), ECF No. 9;
Indictment, United States v. Bolte, No. 1:21-CR-46-SPW (D. Mont. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 2; Indictment, United
States v. Henson, et al., No. 2:21-CR-601DJH (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2021), ECF No. 3; Complaint, United States v.
Mansouri, No. 1:21-MJ-5143 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Eldabbagh,
No. 1:21-CR-523 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Bruey, et al., No. 2:21-CR-74
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2021), ECF No. 3; Information, United States v. Curry, No. 1:21-CR-20415 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5,
2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Savath, No. 1:21-CR-10269 (D. Mass. Sept. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1;
Indictment, United States v. Capps, No. 6:21-CR-10073 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United
States v. Howell, No. 3:21-CR-00109 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Larkins,
No. 21-8190 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Blackman, No. 2:21-CR-00724
(D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2021), ECF No. 55; Complaint, United States v. Okeke, et al., No. 1:21-MJ-1092 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
23, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Jones, No. 2:21-CR-00417 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2021), ECF No.
3; Information, United States v. Cavanaugh, No. 2:21-CR-00155 (D. Me. Sept. 29, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint,
United States v. Carter, et al., No. 21-MJ-9734 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 14, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v.
Knight, No. 2:21-CR-00043 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 5, 2021), ECF No. 3; Indictment, United States v. Casey, No. 1:20-CR-
10202 (D. Mass. Sept. 23, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Levons, No. 3:21-CR-00340 (M.D. Pa.
Nov. 2, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Sparks, et al., No. 2:21-CR-00189-JLR (W.D. Wash. Nov.
10, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Kaeding, No. 1:21-MJ-04220 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2021), ECF
No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Shibley, No. 2:20-MJ-00385-MLP (W.D. Wash. June 29, 2020), ECF No. 1;
Complaint, United States v. Osborne, No. 2:21-CR-00456 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United
States v. Kantar, No. 2:21-MJ-02124 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2021), ECF No. 1; Third Superseding Indictment, United
States v. Greenberg, No. 20-CR-00097 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2021), ECF No. 90; Indictment, United States v. Ilori,
No. 1:21-cr-00746 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2021), ECF No. 6; Indictment, United States v. Encarnacion, No. 2:21-mj-
13427 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Saintvil, No. 1:21-cr-00013 (N.D. Fla.
March 23, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Lloyd, No. 6:21-mj-00001 (D. Or. Jan. 5, 2021), ECF No.
1; Superseding Information, United States v. Fernandez, No. 1:21-cr-10046 (D. Mass. July 9, 2021), ECF No. 37;
Information, United States v. Dorsey, No. 8:21-cr-00370 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United
States v. Thornton, No. 6:21-cr-00098 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2021), ECF No. 1; Information, United States v. Eustache,
No. 6:21-cr-00098 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2021), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Tifekchian, No. 3:21-cr-00244
(D. Or. July 13, 2021), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Laventure, No. 1:20-cr-00290 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3,
2020), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v Darius, No. 2:22-mj-10018 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2022), ECF No. 1;
Complaint, United States v. Garcias, No. 2:21-mj-09344 (D.N.J June 23, 2021), ECF. No. 1; Affidavit in Support of
Complaint, United States v. Phillips, No. 1:21-mj-03581 (D. Md. Dec. 22, 2021), ECF No. 2; Information, United
States v. Rivera, No. 1:22-cr-20028 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2022), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Budamala,
No. 2:22-cr-00077 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2022), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Schoepflin et al., No. 2:22-cr-
00121 (C.D. Cal Apr. 1, 2022), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United States v. Rickerson, No. 5:22-cr-00013 (W.D.N.C
Mar. 5, 2022), ECF No. 3; Indictment, United States v. Hutchins, No. 1:22-cr-00042 (W.D.N.Y Mar. 24, 2022),
ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Daniel Tisone, No. 2:22-cr-00038 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2022), ECF No. 3;
182
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Indictment, United States v. Rybin, No. 4:22-cr-00056 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 14, 2022), ECF No. 1; Indictment, United
States v. Israyelyan, No. 2:21-cr-00425 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2021), ECF No. 1.
563
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Idle on EIDL Fraud: How the Trump Administration
Wasted Taxpayer Dollars by Leaving the COVID-19 EIDL Program Vulnerable to Fraud (June 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/reports/select-subcommittee-report-details-trump-administration-s-failure-
prevent-fraud); USASpending, Contract Summary RER Solutions, Inc. (online at
www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_73351020F0071_7300_73351019D0001_7300) (accessed May 20,
2022); Small Business Administration, Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract (May 15, 2020) (online
at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Amendment%20of%20Solicitation%20M
odification%20of%20Contract%203.29.20%2066.67%20dollars%20per%20rec_Redacte%23.pdf).
564
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Idle on EIDL Fraud: How the Trump Administration
Wasted Taxpayer Dollars by Leaving the COVID-19 EIDL Program Vulnerable to Fraud (June 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/reports/select-subcommittee-report-details-trump-administration-s-failure-
prevent-fraud).
565
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Idle on EIDL Fraud: How the Trump Administration
Wasted Taxpayer Dollars by Leaving the COVID-19 EIDL Program Vulnerable to Fraud (June 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/reports/select-subcommittee-report-details-trump-administration-s-failure-
prevent-fraud).
566
RER Solutions, Inc. Invoices to SBA Office of Disaster Assistance, Contract 73351019D0001 (May 11,
2020 - Feb. 1, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/RER%20Rocket%20invoices%20redacte
d.pdf); Rocket Loans Invoices to RER Solutions, Inc., Task Order 2 (May 11, 2020 - Feb. 4, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/RER%20Rocket%20invoices%20redacte
d.pdf); Rapid Financial Services, LLC Invoices to Rocket Loans (July 2, 2020 - Feb. 2, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Rocket%20and%20Rapid%20Invoices_R
edacted.pdf); Letter from Counsel, RER Solutions, Inc., to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis, and Chairwoman Nydia Velazquez, Committee on Small Business (Mar. 11, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Letter%20Counsel%20RER%20to%20Ch
airman%203.11.21_Redacted.pdf); Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation of
SBA’s Contract for Disaster Assistance Loan Recommendations Services (Apr. 14, 2022) (online at
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2022-10.pdf).
567
Letter from Counsel, Rocket Loans, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis, and Chairwoman Nydia Velazquez, Committee on Small Business (Nov. 24, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-11-
24%20Rocket%20Ltr%20to%20Committees%20from%20Rocket%20Loans%20highlighted.pdf); Letter from
Counsel, RER Solutions, Inc., to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, and
Chairwoman Nydia Velazquez, Committee on Small Business (Oct. 2, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-10-
02%20Ltr%20N%20Eggleston%20to%20Chairpersons%20and%20Committee%20Members%20-
%20signed%20highlighted.pdf).
568
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection Program Data (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-
01.PPP%20Interim%20Report.pdf).
569
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection Program Data (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-
01.PPP%20Interim%20Report.pdf).
183
50-100_text_.pdf 195 2/15/23 2:48 PM
570
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection Program Data (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-
01.PPP%20Interim%20Report.pdf).
571
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “We Are Not the Fraud Police”: How Fintechs
Facilitated Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program (Dec. 1, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.12.01%20How%20Fintechs%20Fac
ilitated%20Fraud%20in%20the%20Paycheck%20Protection%20Program.pdf).
572
Id.
573
Id.
574
How Two Start-Ups Reaped Billions in Fees on Small Business Relief Loans, N.Y. Times (June 27,
2021) (online at www.nytimes.com/2021/06/27/business/ppp-relief-loans-blueacorn-
womply.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage).
575
Blueacorn Group January 1, 2021 – February 28, 2022, Simplified Cash Flow Statement (BA-SSCC-
0000121-22); Letter from Womply, Inc. to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis (Apr. 14, 2022).
576
Conversation between former Blueacorn employee and Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis; Conversation between former Blueacorn employee and Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on
the Coronavirus Crisis.
577
Call between Staff, Fountainhead Commercial Capital, and Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis Conversation (May 2, 2022); Emails Between Toby Scammell, Founder and Chief Executive
Officer, Womply, Inc., and Cory Capoccia, Womply, Inc, and Bernie Navarro, Benworth Capital Partners, LLC
(Apr. 8, 2021 – May 10, 2021) (BWSSCCResp0000034-52).
578
Opinion of the Commission, In the Matter of Toby G. Scammell, No. 3-15271 (S.E.C. Oct. 29, 2014);
see, e.g., Email from Toby Scammell, Womply, Inc., to Michael Bland, Fountainhead Commercial Capital (June 10,
2021) (House_Select_000006066-69); Email from Staff, Small Business Administration, to Toby Scammell,
Womply, Inc. (June 16, 2021) (House_Select_000006750-51).
579
Letter from Prestamos CDFI to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis (Apr. 25, 2022); Briefing by Adam Seery, Chief Operating Officer, Harvest Small Business Finance, LLC, to
Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Apr. 4, 2022).
580
Slack Messages Between Stephanie Hockridge and Kristen Spencer (ELEV8_00000717).
581
See, e.g., ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Nathan Reis (Apr. 27, 2020) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/nathan-reis-3510607208); ProPublica – Tracking PPP,
Stephanie Hockridge (May 1, 2020) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/stephanie-
hockridge-9174497307); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Body Politix, LLC (June 24, 2020) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/body-politix-llc-3391698009); ProPublica – Tracking PPP,
Juuice, Inc. (May 1, 2020) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/juuice-inc-
9174317310); ProPublica – PPP Tracking, Juuice, LLC (Feb. 13, 2021) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/juuice-llc-8143118406); ProPublica – PPP Tracking,
Juuice, LLC (June 19, 2020) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/juuice-llc-
9055237906); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Elev8 Advisors Group LLC (June 30, 2020) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/elev8-advisors-group-llc-6824408003); ProPublica –
Tracking PPP, Adam Spencer (Jul. 16, 2020) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/adam-spencer-4627438101); ProPublica – Tracking PPP,
Adam Spencer (Mar. 20, 2021) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/adam-spencer-
6232778604); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Kristen Spencer (Mar. 16, 2021) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/kristen-spencer-3090888602); ProPublica – Tracking PPP,
Kristen Spencer (July 21, 2020) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/kristen-spencer-
184
50-100_text_.pdf 196 2/15/23 2:48 PM
6269958102); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Jarred Spencer (Mar. 12, 2021)
(https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/jarred-spencer-9383918501); ProPublica – Tracking PPP,
Jordan Spencer (Mar. 15, 2021) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/jordan-spencer-
2616498604); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Sweet P Designs (Mar. 3, 2021) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/sweet-p-designs-6265518505); ProPublica – Tracking
PPP, Sweet P Designs (May 21, 2021) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/sweet-p-
designs-4924429003); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Oto Analytics, Inc. (Apr. 13, 2020) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/oto-analytics-inc-5187557106); ProPublica – Tracking
PPP, Oto Analytics, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2021) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/oto-
analytics-inc-4959988403); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Chasm LLC (May 6, 2020) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/chasm-llc-2717287407); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Cory
Capoccia (March 20, 2021) (online at https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/cory-capoccia-
5769978600); ProPublica – Tracking PPP, Cory Capoccia (April 16, 2021) (online at
https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus/bailouts/loans/cory-capoccia-4874638807).
582
See Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “We Are Not the Fraud Police”: How Fintechs
Facilitated Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program (Dec. 1, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.12.01%20How%20Fintechs%20Fac
ilitated%20Fraud%20in%20the%20Paycheck%20Protection%20Program.pdf) at 38-42; Conversation between
former Blueacorn employee and Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis.
583
Womply, Inc., Privacy Policy (May 20, 2022) (online at https://womply.com/legal/privacy/).
584
Slack Messages between Staff, Kabbage, Inc. (July 16, 2020) (AMEX-SSCC-00019821-25).
585
See generally Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “We Are Not the Fraud Police”: How
Fintechs Facilitated Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program (Dec. 1, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.12.01%20How%20Fintechs%20Fac
ilitated%20Fraud%20in%20the%20Paycheck%20Protection%20Program.pdf) at 73-79.
586
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Farmers to Families? An Investigation Into the Trump
Administration’s Food Box Program (Oct. 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SSCC_Staff_Report-
Farmers_to_Families_Food_Box_Program.pdf).
587
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Press Release: The Employment Situation—April 2020 (May 8, 2020)
(online at www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.pdf); US Food Prices See Historic Jump and Are
Likely to Stay High, ABC News (May 30, 2020) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/us-food-prices-
historic-jump-stay-high-70969164); For the Unemployed, Rising Grocery Prices Strain Budgets Even More,
Washington Post (Aug. 4, 2020) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/04/grocery-prices-
unemployed/).
588
About 14 Million Children in the US Are Not Getting Enough to Eat, Brookings Institution (July 9,
2020) (online at www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/09/about-14-million-children-in-the-us-are-not-getting-
enough-to-eat/); see also Number of Families Struggling to Afford Food Rose Steeply in Pandemic and Remains
High, Especially Among Children and Households of Color, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Apr. 27, 2021)
(online at www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/number-of-families-struggling-to-afford-food-rose-steeply-in-
pandemic-and).
589
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127 (2020).
590
Department of Agriculture, Press Release: USDA to Purchase up to $3 Billion in Agricultural
Commodities, Issue Solicitations for Interested Participants (Apr. 19, 2020) (online at
www.ams.usda.gov/content/usda-purchase-3-billion-agricultural-commodities-issue-solicitations-interested).
591
Department of Agriculture, Press Release: USDA Approves $1.2 billion in Contracts for Farmers to
Families Food Box Program (May 8, 2020) (online at www.ams.usda.gov/press-release/usda-approves-12-billion-
contracts-farmers-families-food-box-program); Department of Agriculture, Press Release: Announcement of
185
50-100_text_.pdf 197 2/15/23 2:48 PM
Contract Awards for the Farmers to Families Food Box Program (May 8, 2020) (online at
www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/AnnouncementofContractAwards.pdf).
592
Department of Agriculture, Press Release: Announcement of Contract Awards for the Farmers to
Families Food Box Program (May 8, 2020) (online at
www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/AnnouncementofContractAwards.pdf).
593
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA Famers to Families Food Box
(online at www.ams.usda.gov/selling-food-to-usda/farmers-to-families-food-box) (accessed on May 14, 2021);
Biden to Cancel Trump’s Pandemic Food Aid After High Costs, Delivery Problems, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2021) (online
at www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-food-aid-insight/biden-to-cancel-trumps-pandemic-food-aid-after-
high-costs-delivery-problems-idUSKBN2C11CY).
594
Government Accountability Office, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic
Enters its Second Year (Mar. 31, 2021) (GAO-21-387) (online at https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-21-
387/index.html).
595
Government Accountability Office, USDA Food Box Program: Key Information and Opportunities to
Better Assess Performance (Sept. 2021) (GAO 21-353) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-353.pdf).
596
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release:
Clyburn Launches Investigation on Reported Mismanagement in USDA Pandemic Food Assistance Program (Aug.
24, 2020) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-launches-investigation-reported-
mismanagement-usda-pandemic-food).
597
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Announcement of Contract Awards for the
Farmers to Families Food Box Program (May 8, 2020) (online at
www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/AnnouncementofContractAwards.pdf).
598
Wedding Planner, Caterer, “Brand Builder”: Trump’s Food Aid Program Is Paying $100+ Million to
Unlicensed Dealers, ProPublica (May 19, 2020) (online at www.propublica.org/article/wedding-planner-caterer-
brand-builder-trumps-food-aid-program-is-paying-100-million-to-unlicensed-dealers); USDA Knocked for
‘Unfathomable’ $39M Contract Awarded to San Antonio Event Planner, San Antonio Express-News (May 14,
2020) (online at www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Federal-food-program-knocked-for-hiring-San-
15270354.php); ‘I Need the Food’: Ag Department Food Box Program Beset by Delays, Politico (May 27, 2020)
(online at www.politico.com/news/2020/05/27/agriculture-department-food-coronavirus-285846). In an email to
Select Subcommittee staff, his attorney stated that Palomino “is not a ‘wedding planner,’ he is a logistics engineer.”
Email from Attorney, LaHood Norton Law Group, to Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
(Sept. 18, 2020).
599
Survey call by Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to President/Chief
Executive Officer, San Antonio Food Bank (Oct. 20, 2020); see also USDA Knocked for ‘Unfathomable’ $39M
Contract Awarded to San Antonio Event Planner, San Antonio Express-News (May 14, 2020) (online at
www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Federal-food-program-knocked-for-hiring-San-15270354.php).
600
Yegg, Inc., Home Page (online at https://web.archive.org/web/20190129003309/https:/yegg-inc.com)
(accessed May 18, 2021).
601
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Interview of George Egbuonu (Mar. 2021); Yegg, Inc.,
Solicitation Proposal for AG-12-3J14-20-R-0377, Offeror Capability (Apr. 30, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Proposal%20Part%202%20%28exhibit%
206%29%20%E2%80%93%20Vendor%20Capability%20Information_Redacted.pdf).
602
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, Announcement of Contract Awards for the
Farmers to Families Food Box Program (May 8, 2020) (online at
www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/AnnouncementofContractAwards.pdf).
186
50-100_text_.pdf 198 2/15/23 2:48 PM
603
Modification of Contract (Stop Work Order 52.242-15), issued by Contracting Officer, Agricultural
Marketing Service, Department of Agriculture, to Ben Holtz Consulting, Inc. (May 15, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/StopWorkOrder_May152020_Redacted.p
df); Letter from Contracting Officer, Agricultural Marketing Service, Department of Agriculture, to Ben Holtz
Consulting, Inc. (May 20, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020.05.20_BenHoltzConsulting_TERMI
NATION_NOTICE__Redacted.pdf).
604
Ben Holtz Consulting, Inc., Solicitation Proposal for AG-12-3J14-20-R-0377, Past References
Reference Information (Apr. 30, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/RFP%20Amendment%20Signed%20by%
20Holtz_Redacted.pdf).
605
See Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Farmers to Families? An Investigation Into the
Trump Administration’s Food Box Program (Oct. 13, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SSCC_Staff_Report-
Farmers_to_Families_Food_Box_Program.pdf).
606
Id.
607
Id.
608
Id.; Survey call by Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Pastor, Greater
New Life Church (Apr. 26, 2021).
609
Department of Agriculture, Press Release: USDA Approves $1.2 Billion in Contracts for Farmers to
Families Food Box Program (May 8, 2020) (online at www.ams.usda.gov/press-release/usda-approves-12-billion-
contracts-farmers-families-food-box-program).
610
Email from President, National Chicken Council to Joby Young, Chief of Staff to Secretary Perdue,
Department of Agriculture, et al. (Apr. 6, 2020) (online at www.documentcloud.org/documents/7204640-USDA-20-
0964-A.html#document/p135).
611
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA Farmers to Families Food Box
(online at www.ams.usda.gov/selling-food-to-usda/farmers-to-families-food-box) (accessed July 27, 2021);
Department of Agriculture, Notice of Funds Availability (NOFA); Purchase of Fruit, Vegetable, Dairy, and Meat
Products Due to COVID-19 National Emergency—USDA Food Box Distribution Program, Doc. No. AMS-CP-20-
0040, 85 Fed. Reg. 81 (Apr. 27, 2020) (Notice) (“[T]he Secretary has determined to use AMS to procure
commodities for such use until the current health emergency is terminated.”); Department of Agriculture,
Agricultural Marketing Service (online at www.ams.usda.gov) (accessed July 27, 2021); Department of Agriculture,
About FNS (online www.fns.usda.gov/about-fns) (accessed July 27, 2021).
612
Survey call by Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to President/Chief
Executive Officer, San Antonio Food Bank (Oct. 20, 2020).
613
Survey call by Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to Director, One Love
Food Ministry (Apr. 13, 2021); Survey call by Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to
President/Chief Executive Officer, San Antonio Food Bank (Oct. 20, 2020).
614
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Interview of Greg Palomino (Aug. 13, 2021);
Department of Agriculture, Copy of Item #3b Invoices by Vendor base to option 2 (Feb. 23, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Item-3b-Invoices-by-Vendor-base-to-
option-2-selected-vendors.pdf).
615
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Interview of Greg Palomino (Aug. 13, 2021).
616
Department of Agriculture, Copy of Item #3b Invoices by Vendor Base to Option 2 (Feb. 23, 2021)
(online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Item-3b-Invoices-by-Vendor-
base-to-option-2-selected-vendors.pdf).
187
50-100_text_.pdf 199 2/15/23 2:48 PM
617
See Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Farmers to Families? An Investigation Into the
Trump Administration’s Food Box Program (Oct. 13, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SSCC_Staff_Report-
Farmers_to_Families_Food_Box_Program.pdf).
618
Letter from Freedom of Information Act Officer, Agricultural Marketing Service, Department of
Agriculture, to Executive Director, American Oversight (Dec. 8, 2020) (online at
www.americanoversight.org/document/usda-records-regarding-farmers-to-families-food-box-program); “Someone’s
Profiting off This”: New Public Records Reveal COVID-19 Hunger Relief Contractors Get Handsome Payouts for
Mediocre Food Boxes, The Counter (Sept. 3, 2020) (online at https://thecounter.org/usda-food-farmers-to-families-
food-boxes-caribbean-produce-exchange).
619
Email from Julie Radford, Chief of Staff, White House Advisor Ivanka Trump, to Joby Young, Chief of
Staff, Secretary Sonny Perdue, Department of Agriculture (June 16, 2020) (online at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20619091/usda-emails-regarding-farmers-to-families-food-box-
program.pdf).
620
Trump to Include Letter on Coronavirus Guidelines in Food Delivery Program for Those in Need, Fox
News (July 31, 2020) (online at www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-to-include-letter-on-coronavirus-guidelines-in-
food-delivery-program-for-those-in-need); Email from Julie Radford, Chief of Staff, White House Advisor Ivanka
Trump, to Joby Young, Chief of Staff, Secretary Sonny Perdue, Department of Agriculture (June 16, 2020) (online
at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20619091/usda-emails-regarding-farmers-to-families-food-box-
program.pdf).
621
Letter from President Donald J. Trump to Farmers to Families Food Box Recipients (online at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/7048751/Farmers-to-Families-Food-Box-Letter.pdf).
622
Email from Contract Specialist, Department of Agriculture, to Farmers to Families Food Box
Distributors (Sept. 17, 2020) (online at www.americanoversight.org/document/usda-records-regarding-farmers-to-
families-food-box-program).
623
Survey call by Majority Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to President/Chief
Operating Officer, Los Angeles Regional Food Bank (Oct. 7, 2020).
624
President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Farmers to Families Food Box Program
Distribution – Mills River, NC (Aug. 24, 2020) (online at
http://web.archive.org/web/20210120111846/www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
farmers-families-food-box-program-distribution-mills-river-nc/); The 8 States Where 2020 Will Be Won or Lost: A
POLITICO Deep Dive, Politico (Sept. 8, 2020) (online at www.politico.com/news/2020/09/08/swing-states-2020-
presidential-election-409000).
625
Email from Rachel Craddock, White House Advisor Ivanka Trump, to Blake Rollins, Director of the
Office of External and Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, and Lauren
Sullivan, Director of Operations, Office of the Secretary, Department of Agriculture (Aug. 21, 2020) (online at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20619091/usda-emails-regarding-farmers-to-families-food-box-
program.pdf).
626
Letter from Deputy Director, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, to Special Counsel,
Office of Special Counsel (Aug. 26, 2020) (online at www.citizensforethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/legacy/2020/08/OSC-Sec-Perdue-08-26-2020-FINAL.pdf).
627
Briefing by Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, Department of Agriculture, et al., to Staff,
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 13, 2020).
628
Department of Agriculture, Secretary Sonny Perdue, Remarks by Secretary Perdue on the Farmers to
Families Food Box Program Distribution – Mills River, NC (Aug. 24, 2020) (online at www.c-
span.org/video/?475118-1/president-delivers-remarks-farmers-families-food-box-program).
188
50-100_text_.pdf 200 2/15/23 2:48 PM
629
Letter from Chief, Hatch Act Unit, U.S. Office of Special Counsel, to Deputy Director, Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (Oct. 8, 2020) (online at www.citizensforethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/HA-20-000394-Closure-Letter-to-CREW.pdf).
630
Id.
631
Id.
632
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, ‘We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar’: The Trump
Administration’s $700 Million ‘National Security’ Loan to Yellow Corporation (Apr. 27, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.4.27%20SSCC%20Report%20We%
20Had%20Our%20Hand%20in%20the%20Cookie%20Jar.pdf).
633
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 (2020) § 4003.
634
Department of the Treasury, Q&A: Loans to Air Carriers and Eligible Businesses and National Security
Businesses (Apr. 10, 2020) (online at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/CARES-Airline-Loan-Support-Q-
and-A-national-security.pdf).
635
Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury to Provide Loan to YRC Worldwide (July 1,
2020) (online at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1049).
636
Department of the Treasury, Loans to Air Carriers, Eligible Businesses, and National Security
Businesses (online at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-industry/loans-to-air-
carriers-eligible-businesses-and-national-security-businesses) (accessed Mar. 10, 2022).
637
Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury to Provide Loan to YRC Worldwide (July 1,
2020) (online at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1049).
638
Department of the Treasury, Transaction Summary (online at
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/YRC-Transaction-Summary.pdf) (accessed Mar. 10, 2022); Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Interview of Adam Lerrick (Feb. 16, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022-02-
16%20SSCC%20Interview%20of%20Adam%20Lerrick.pdf).
639
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Adam Lerrick (Feb. 16, 2022),
at 63 (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022-02-
16%20SSCC%20Interview%20of%20Adam%20Lerrick.pdf); Congressional Oversight Commission, The Seventh
Report of the Congressional Oversight Commission (Nov. 30, 2020) (online at
http://web.archive.org/web/20220207070414/https://coc.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
12/COC%20November%20Report%20with%20Appendix.pdf) (Appendix F).
640
Email from Erskine Wells, Principal, BGR Group, to Darren Hawkins, Chief Executive Officer, Yellow
Corporation (Apr. 8, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Wells%20to%20Hawkins%204.8.20_Red
acted.pdf); Email from Erskine Wells, Principal, BGR Group, to Rohit Kumar, Principal, PwC, and Mike Kelley,
Chief Sustainability Officer and VP External Affairs, YRC Worldwide (May 6, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Email%20from%20Erskine%20Wells%2
C%20BGRC%2C%20to%20Todd%20Metcalf%20and%20Rohit%20Kumar%2C%20PwC%2C%20and%20Mike%
20Kelley%2C%20YRC%20Worldwide%20%28May%206%2C%202020%29.pdf)..
641
Email from Erskine Wells, Principal, BGR Group, to Darren Hawkins, Chief Executive Officer, Yellow
Corporation (May 25, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Wells%20to%20Hawkins%205.25.20_Re
dacted.pdf).
642
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, ‘We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar’: The Trump
Administration’s $700 Million ‘National Security’ Loan to Yellow Corporation (Apr. 27, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.4.27%20SSCC%20Report%20We%
20Had%20Our%20Hand%20in%20the%20Cookie%20Jar.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
189
50-100_text_.pdf 201 2/15/23 2:48 PM
‘We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar’: The Trump Administration’s $700 Million ‘National Security’ Loan to
Yellow Corporation (Apr. 27, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.4.27%20SSCC%20Report%20We%
20Had%20Our%20Hand%20in%20the%20Cookie%20Jar.pdf); Email from Career Staff, Department of Defense, to
Bryan Fenton, Lieutenant General, and Jennifer Stewart, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense (June 26, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/staffer%2C%20Department%20of%20De
fense%2C%20to%20Fenton%206.26.20%209.35AM.pdf); Email from Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Department of
the Treasury, to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows, Executive Assistant to the President Molly A. Michael, and Assistant
to the President Larry Kudlow, White House (July 1, 2020) (online at
www.documentcloud.org/documents/20989594-treas-20-0568-bcd#document/p1); Email from Secretary Steven
Mnuchin, Department of the Treasury, to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and Executive Assistant to the President
Molly Michael, White House (July 1, 2020) (online at www.documentcloud.org/documents/20989594-treas-20-
0568-bcd#document/p1)..
643
Email from Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Department of the Treasury, to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows,
Executive Assistant to the President Molly A. Michael, and Assistant to the President Larry Kudlow, White House
(July 1, 2020) (online at www.documentcloud.org/documents/20989594-treas-20-0568-bcd#document/p1); Email
from Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Department of the Treasury, to Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and Executive
Assistant to the President Molly Michael, White House (July 1, 2020) (online at
www.documentcloud.org/documents/20989594-treas-20-0568-bcd#document/p1).
644
Email from Executive Assistant to the Secretary, Department of the Treasury, to Director of Scheduling,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (June 25, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Executive-Ass-Sec-Treas-Dir-
Scheduling-DOD-62520.pdf); Email from Executive Assistant to the Secretary, Department of the Treasury, to
Director of Scheduling, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (June 26, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Executive-Sec-Treas-Sec-Dir-Scheduling-
dod-confirming-930.pdf); Email from Ellen M. Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment,
to Jennifer Stewart, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (June 26, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Lord%20to%20Stewart%206.25.20%20c
onfirming%20call%20took%20place.pdf); Email from Laura Black, Director, Office of Investment Security, Policy
and International Relations, U.S. Department of the Treasury, to Christine Michienzi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense and Chief Technology Officer, Department of Defense (June 24, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Black%20to%20Michienzi%206.24.20%
20changing%20decision%20briefed%20up%20chain_Redacted.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Christine Michienzi (Jan. 20, 2022), at 54 (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022-01-
20%20SSCC%20Interview%20of%20Dr.%20Christine%20Michienzi.pdf) (Dr. Michienzi clarified that she meant
to convey that DOD likely would not certify Yellow).
645
Email from Christine Michienzi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Chief Technology Officer,
to Scott Baum, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Department of Defense (June 25,
2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Michienzi%20to%20Baum%206.25.20%
20rec%20against%20certification.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Interview of Christine
Michienzi (Jan. 20, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022-
01-20%20SSCC%20Interview%20of%20Dr.%20Christine%20Michienzi.pdf).
646
Letter from Secretary Mark Esper, Department of Defense, to Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Department of
the Treasury (June 26, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Letter%20from%20Mark%20Esper%2C
%20Secretary%20of%20Defense%2C%20to%20Steven%20Mnuchin%2C%20Department%20of%20the%20Treas
ury.pdf).
190
50-100_text_.pdf 202 2/15/23 2:48 PM
647
Less-than-Truckload (LTL) trucking services involve the delivery of small-to-moderately sized
shipments of goods that do not require a full truck and trailer. See generally RAND Corp., Army Stock Positioning
(2017) (online at www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1375.html).
648
Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury to Provide Loan to YRC Worldwide (July 1, 2020)
(online at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1049); Excerpt, Yellow Corporation Application for
CARES Act Loan (Apr. 24, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Excerpt%20Yellow%20App%2068%20p
ercent.pdf); Department of Defense, Analysis of Yellow Corporation Worldwide Utilization and Potential Impact
(June 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/DOD%20analysis%20of%20Yellow%20
Utilization%20and%20Impact.pdf);
649
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, ‘We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar’: The Trump
Administration’s $700 Million ‘National Security’ Loan to Yellow Corporation (Apr. 27, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.4.27%20SSCC%20Report%20We%
20Had%20Our%20Hand%20in%20the%20Cookie%20Jar.pdf).
650
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 (2020) § 4003;
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, ‘We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar’: The Trump
Administration’s $700 Million ‘National Security’ Loan to Yellow Corporation (Apr. 27, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.4.27%20SSCC%20Report%20We%
20Had%20Our%20Hand%20in%20the%20Cookie%20Jar.pdf).
651
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, ‘We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar’: The Trump
Administration’s $700 Million ‘National Security’ Loan to Yellow Corporation (Apr. 27, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.4.27%20SSCC%20Report%20We%
20Had%20Our%20Hand%20in%20the%20Cookie%20Jar.pdf).
652
Id.
653
Id.
654
Id.
655
Email from Jamie Pierson, Chief Financial Officer, Yellow Corporation, to Apollo Global Management
(May 1, 2020) (YRCW-""""LMROMQ& '<=DE=I V8
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Pierson%20to%20Boehmer%20Apollo%
205.1.20%20cookie%20jar_Redacted.pdf).
656
Id.
657
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Transcribed Interview of Adam Lerrick (Feb. 16, 2022),
at 54 (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022-02-
16%20SSCC%20Interview%20of%20Adam%20Lerrick.pdf).
658
Securities and Exchange Commission, Form10-K, YRC Worldwide Inc. (Mar. 11, 2020) (online at
https://investors.myyellow.com/node/27841/html).
659
YRC Worldwide (YRCW) Q1 2021 Earnings Call Transcript, The Motley Fool (May 6, 2021) (online at
https://fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2021/05/06/yrc-worldwide-yrcw-q1-2021-earnings-call-transcrip/);
Presentation, Yellow Corporation Second Quarter 2021 Earnings Conference Call, Yellow Corporation (online at
https://investors.myyellow.com/static-files/a5cdb961-e5e9-4d4b-ae55-695452436d49) (accessed Apr. 8, 2022);
Presentation, Yellow Corporation First Quarter 2021 Earnings Conference Call, Yellow Corporation (online at
https://investors.myyellow.com/static-files/9b3eaab0-cc56-45b5-9c7b-e2e84143de9d) (accessed Apr. 8, 2022).
660
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, ‘We Had Our Hand in the Cookie Jar’: The Trump
Administration’s $700 Million ‘National Security’ Loan to Yellow Corporation (Apr. 27, 2022) (online at
191
50-100_text_.pdf 203 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.4.27%20SSCC%20Report%20We%
20Had%20Our%20Hand%20in%20the%20Cookie%20Jar.pdf).
661
See, e.g., Government Accountability Office, Press Release: GAO Designated Unemployment Insurance
System as ‘High Risk’ (June 7, 2022) (online at www.gao.gov/press-release/gao-designates-unemployment-
insurance-system-high-risk) (citing other sources).
662
Letter from Id.me to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and
Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Appendix A (Apr. 28, 2022).
663
Id.
664
Letter from Id.me to Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and
Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Appendix A (Apr. 28, 2022).
665
U.S. Now Has 22 Million Unemployed, Wiping Out a Decade of Job Gains, Washington Post (Apr. 16,
2020); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Total Nonfarm [PAYEMS] (Apr. 8,
2022) (online at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS).
666
IDME-COR-SSCC-000071
667
Average Wait Time (in Minutes) for Users Entering ID.me’s Supervised Remove Pathway, Provided by
ID.me to Chairman Clyburn, Select Subncommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/ID.me%20wait%20time%20data%20fro
m%204.28.22%20letter.pdf).
668
Id.
669
Mobile Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center (Apr. 7, 2021) (online at www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-
sheet/mobile/).
670
Half of The Pandemic’s Unemployment Money May Have Been Stolen, Axios (June 10, 2021) (online
at www.axios.com/pandemic-unemployment-fraud-benefits-stolen-a937ad9d-0973-4aad-814f-4ca47b72f67f.html).
671
U.S. Watchdog Estimates $45.6 Billion in Pandemic Unemployment Fraud, Washington Post (Sept. 23,
2022) (online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/09/22/unemployment-fraud-coroanvirus-
pandemic/); Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General – Office of Audit, COVID-19: ETA and States Did
Not Protect Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper Payments Including Fraud or from Payment Delays (Sept.
20, 2022) (online at www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2022/19-22-006-03-315.pdf).
672
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of Inspector General
Larry D. Turner, Department of Labor, Office of Inspector General, Hearing on Pandemic Response and
Accountability: Reducing Fraud and Expanding Access to COVID-19 Relief Through Effective Oversight, 117th
Cong. (Mar. 17, 2022) (online at www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Turner-2022-03-17-
REVISED.pdf).
673
ID.me, Half of the Pandemic’s Unemployment Money May Have Been Stolen (July 26, 2021) (online at
https://insights.id.me/news/half-of-the-pandemics-unemployment-fraud-benefits-stolen/).
674
Half of The Pandemic’s Unemployment Money May Have Been Stolen, Axios (June 10, 2021) (online
at www.axios.com/pandemic-unemployment-fraud-benefits-stolen-a937ad9d-0973-4aad-814f-4ca47b72f67f.html).
675
Letter from ID.me to Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and
Chairman James Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (June 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/6.17.22%20ID.me%20letter.pdf).
676
California’s Unemployment Fraud Reaches at Least $20 Billion, L.A. Times (Oct. 25, 2021) (online at
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-10-25/californias-unemployment-fraud-20-billion); Michigan Paid
Up to $8.5 Billion in Fraudulent Jobless Claims During the Pandemic, NPR (Dec. 30, 2021) (online at
www.npr.org/2021/12/30/1069048017/michigan-paid-8-5-billion-in-fraudulent-jobless-claims-during-the-
pandemic); Excessive Pandemic Unemployment Benefits Are a Warning Against Unemployment Program
192
50-100_text_.pdf 204 2/15/23 2:48 PM
Expansions, Heritage Foundation (July 13, 2021) (online at https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-
labor/report/excessive-pandemic-unemployment-benefits-are-warning-against-unemployment).
677
Excessive Pandemic Unemployment Benefits Are a Warning Against Unemployment Program
Expansions, Heritage Foundation (July 13, 2021) (online at https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-
labor/report/excessive-pandemic-unemployment-benefits-are-warning-against-unemployment); Letter from Id.me to
Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Apr. 28, 2022).
678
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Total Nonfarm [PAYEMS] (Apr.
8, 2022) (online at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS).
679
Emily Benfer et al., The COVID-19 Eviction Crisis: An Estimated 30-40 Million People in America
Are at Risk, The Aspen Institute (Aug. 7, 2020) (online at https://aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/the-covid-19-
eviction-crisis-an-estimated-30-40-million-people-in-america-are-at-risk/).
680
National Housing Law Project, Summary and Analysis of Federal CARES Act Eviction Moratorium
(Apr. 28, 2020) (online at www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020.03.27-NHLP-CARES-Act-Eviction-Moratorium-
Summary.pdf).
681
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Temporary
Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19 (Sept. 4, 2020) (online at
https://federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/04/2020-19654/temporary-halt-in-residential-evictions-to-prevent-
the-further-spread-of-covid-19); Supreme Court Ends Biden’s Eviction Moratorium, New York Times (Aug. 26,
2021) (online at www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/us/eviction-moratorium-ends.html.) (In August 2021, the CDC
issued a modified moratorium, which was ultimately overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.).
682
Department of the Treasury, Emergency Rental Assistance Program (online at
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/emergency-
rental-assistance-program) (accessed on July 7, 2022).
683
Department of the Treasury, Emergency Rental Assistance Program April ERA Report, (online at
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/emergency-
rental-assistance-program) (accessed July 14, 2022); Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury Releases
Guidance to Speed the Provision of Emergency Rental Assistance Relief and Support Housing Stability for Renters
at Risk of Evictions (June 24, 2021) (online at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0245).
684
National Low-Income Housing Coalition, Emergency Rental Assistance Programs in Response to
COVID-19 (Oct. 27, 2020) (online at https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Emergency-Rental-Assistance-Programs-
3.pdf).
685
Preliminary Analysis: Eviction Filing Trends After the CDC Moratorium Expiration, Eviction Lab
(Dec. 9, 2021) (online at https://evictionlab.org/updates/research/eviction-filing-trends-after-cdc-moratorium/);
Preliminary Analysis: 11 months of the CDC Moratorium, Eviction Lab (Aug. 21, 2021) (online at
https://evictionlab.org/eleven-months-cdc/).
686
Department of the Treasury, Emergency Rental Assistance Program (online at
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/emergency-
rental-assistance-program) (accessed Oct. 6, 2022); Federal Moratorium on Evictions for Nonpayment of Rent,
National Housing Law Project (Aug. 2021) (online at https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Overview-of-National-
Eviction-Moratorium.pdf).
687
Preliminary Analysis: Eviction Filing Trends After the CDC Moratorium Expiration, Eviction Lab
(Dec. 9, 2021) (online at https://evictionlab.org/updates/research/eviction-filing-trends-after-cdc-moratorium/).
688
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses
by Four Corporate Landlords During the Coronavirus Crisis (July 28, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.28%20SSCC%20Staff%20Repor
t%20Examining%20Pandemic%20Evictions.pdf).
193
50-100_text_.pdf 205 2/15/23 2:48 PM
689
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Investigate Pandemic
Evictions by Corporate Landlords (July 20, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/clyburn-investigate-pandemic-evictions-corporate-landlords); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis, Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses by Four Corporate Landlords During the Coronavirus
Crisis (July 28, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.28%20SSCC%20Staff%20Repor
t%20Examining%20Pandemic%20Evictions.pdf).
690
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Investigate Pandemic
Evictions by Corporate Landlords (July 20, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/clyburn-investigate-pandemic-evictions-corporate-landlords); Pretium Partners Eviction Filing Data (Aug.
7, 2021) (PPLLC-SSOCC-0000098 – 0000651) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Pretium%20Eviction%20Data%20PPLLC
-SSOCC-0000098%20-%200000651.pdf).
691
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses
by Four Corporate Landlords During the Coronavirus Crisis (July 28, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.28%20SSCC%20Staff%20Repor
t%20Examining%20Pandemic%20Evictions.pdf); Invitation Homes Eviction Filing Data (July 29, 2021) (SSCC-IH-
025510) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SSCC-IH-
025510%20IH%20eviction%20data.pdf) As discussed in this report, Invitation Homes represented that it did not
have adequate procedures to precisely identify even the number of eviction cases the company filed. Invitation
Homes counsel represented that the company’s spreadsheet of eviction filings could be both overinclusive and
underinclusive, however the reasons offered for why the spreadsheet could be overinclusive reflected a
misinterpretation of the Select Subcommittee’s request. Invitation Homes Counsel stated that the total could be
overinclusive because a share of the eviction actions were not specifically for nonpayment of rent—but the Select
Subcommittee’s data request was not limited to actions for purported non-payment and the document indicates these
actions were a small share. Email from Counsel, Invitation Homes, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus (June 29, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Email%20from%20IH%20counsel%206.
29.22.pdf).
692
Email from Counsel, Ventron Management, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
(Mar. 30, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Ventron%20eviction%20filing%20numbe
r.pdf); Ventron Eviction Filing Data Combined (Nov. 9, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Combination%20of%20all%20Ventron%
202021.11.09%20Data.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Investigate
Pandemic Evictions by Corporate Landlords (July 20, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/clyburn-investigate-pandemic-evictions-corporate-landlords).
693
Siegel Group Eviction Filing Data Combined (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Siegel%20Eviction%20Data%20PII%20
Redacted.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Clyburn to Investigate Pandemic
Evictions by Corporate Landlords (July 20, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/clyburn-investigate-pandemic-evictions-corporate-landlords).
694
Of the 4,979 eviction filings for which data is available about the date of filing, 4,366, or 88%, were
filed after the CDC eviction moratorium was put in place on September 4, 2020. Invitation Homes Eviction Filing
Data (July 29, 2021) (SSCC-IH-025510) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/SSCC-IH-
025510%20IH%20eviction%20data.pdf); Siegel Group Eviction Filing Data Combined (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Siegel%20Eviction%20Data%20PII%20
Redacted.pdf); Dated Ventron Eviction Filing Data (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Ventron%20dated%20data%20Ventron%
202021.11.09%20Data%20--%20Type%202%20date%20sorted.pdf); Email from Counsel, Ventron Management, to
194
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Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Mar. 30, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Ventron%20eviction%20filing%20numbe
r.pdf); Ventron Eviction Filing Data Combined (Nov. 9, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Combination%20of%20all%20Ventron%
202021.11.09%20Data.pdf).
695
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Temporary
Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19 (Sept. 4, 2020) (online at
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/04/2020-19654/temporary-halt-in-residential-evictions-to-prevent-the-
further-spread-of-covid-19#p-21).
696
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses
by Four Corporate Landlords During the Coronavirus Crisis (July 28, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.28%20SSCC%20Staff%20Repor
t%20Examining%20Pandemic%20Evictions.pdf).
697
Email from Senior Vice President for Operations, Siegel Suites and Siegel Select, to Regional Manager
and San Antonio Property Manager, Siegel Suites (May 21, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.21.21%20SVP%20to%20managers%20
re%20san%20antonio%20list.pdf).
698
Email from Regional Manager, Siegel Suites, to Senior Vice President for Operations, Siegel Suites and
Siegel Select, and Vice President for Operations, The Siegel Group (May 17, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.17.21%20Regional%20Manager%20to
%20SVP%20VP%20re%20orders.pdf).
699
Email from Vice President for Operations, The Siegel Group, to Property Manager, Siegel Suites (May
11, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.11.21%20VP%20Siegel%20to%20Prop
erty%20Manager.pdf).
700
Email from Regional Manager, Siegel Suites, to Senior Vice President for Operations, Siegel Suites and
Siegel Select, and Vice President for Operations, The Siegel Group (May 17, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.17.21%20Regional%20Manager%20to
%20SVP%20VP%20re%20orders.pdf).
701
Federal Trade Commission, Joint Statement by FTC Acting Chairwoman Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and
CFPB Acting Director Dave Uejio (Mar. 29, 2021) (online at https://ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-
releases/2021/03/joint-statement-ftc-acting-chairwoman-rebecca-kelly-slaughter-cfpb-acting-director-dave-uejio);
12 C.F.R. Part 1006 (May 3, 2021) (online at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt_collection-
practices-global-covid-19-pandemic_interim-final-rule_2021-04.pdf).
702
Email from Senior Vice President for Operations, Siegel Suites and Siegel Select, to Regional Manager
and San Antonio Property Manager, Siegel Suites (May 21, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/5.21.21%20SVP%20to%20managers%20
re%20san%20antonio%20list.pdf).
703
The Siegel Group, 2019-2020 Revenue Spreadsheet (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Spreasheet%20showing%20CARES%20p
ayments%2020256.pdf); National Council of State Housing Agencies, Nevada Housing Division (online at
https://ncsha.org/resource/state-hfa-emergency-housing-assistance-programs/article/cares-housing-assistance-
program-chap/?pagenum=2) (Nevada used federal funds from the CARES Act to create a rental assistance program
before Congress specifically appropriated funds for the emergency rental assistance in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 and the American Rescue Plan Act).
704
Email from Director of Community Relations, The Siegel Group, to Managers, The Siegel Group, and
Vice Presidents of Operations, The Siegel Group (July 29, 2021) (online at
195
50-100_text_.pdf 207 2/15/23 2:48 PM
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2021.7.29%20DComm%20Relations%20
to%20Managers%20Executives18637_with%2018691.pdf).
705
Ventron Eviction Filing Spreadsheets Compiled (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Combination%20of%20all%20Ventron%
202021.11.09%20Data.pdf) (This figure represents the portion of tenants a single month behind on rent among those
where Ventron’s records reflected that information. Ventron’s records reflected only 3,970 of the 4,401 eviction
actions the company filed. If the eviction actions where no data was available are included, 88% of eviction filings
involved tenants who were one month behind on rent and 3% are unknown.)
706
Progress Residential (Pretium), April Collection Policy (Apr. 1, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PPLLC-SSOCC-
0000704%20showing%201000%20threshold%20500%20in%20lv%20pretium.pdf).
707
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses
by Four Corporate Landlords During the Coronavirus Crisis (July 28, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.28%20SSCC%20Staff%20Repor
t%20Examining%20Pandemic%20Evictions.pdf).
708
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Launches
Investigations into Credit Reporting Failures During Pandemic (May 25, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-equifax-experian-transunion-cares-act-credit).
709
Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Testimony of Chi Chi
Wu, National Consumer Law Center, Hearing on Consumer Credit Reporting: Assessing Accuracy and Compliance
(May 26, 2021) (online at https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HHRG-117-BA09-Wstate-
WuC-20210526.pdf); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Report of Credit and Consumer Reporting
Complaints: An Analysis of Complaint Responses by Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion, at 5 (Jan. 2022) (online
at https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fcra-611-e_report_2022-01.pdf).
710
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Select Subcommittee Requests CFPB
Review After Investigation Finds Nation’s Top Credit Bureaus Failed to Address Errors in Consumer Credit Reports
(Oct. 14, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-cfpb-chopra-equifax-experian-
transunion).
711
See Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to The
Honorable Rohit Chopra, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Oct. 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.13%20Clyburn%20to%20CFPB
%20re%20Credit%20Reporting.pdf); In January 2022, CFPB reported that the NCRAs were also declining to act on
a large share of CFPB complaints due to their suspicion that an unauthorized third party was involved in the
submission of the complaint—something the NCRAs are not allowed to do for complaints, according to CFPB.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Report of Credit and Consumer Reporting Complaints: An Analysis
of Complaint Responses by Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion, at 28, 46-49 (Jan. 2022) (online at
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_fcra-611-e_report_2022-01.pdf). Notably, months after there
was public scrutiny of this practice, Equifax appears to have adopted a policy that the company will no longer
dismiss CFPB complaints on this basis. An Equifax policy document provided to the Select Subcommittee states:
“In accordance with CFPB guidance, Equifax will assume that all Portal Complaints are submitted by the Consumer
or an authorized representative of the consumer.” This policy document was first effective on May 31, 2022—four
months after CFPB’s report and one week after the Select Subcommittee initiated its investigation. Equifax, CFPB
Portal Complaint Resolution Standard (May 31, 2022) (EFX-C19REQ20220525-000064-78) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/EFX-C19REQ20220525-000064%20-
%20EFX-C19REQ20220525-000078%20-%20Redacted.pdf).
712
Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to The
Honorable Rohit Chopra, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Oct. 13, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.13%20Clyburn%20to%20CFPB
%20re%20Credit%20Reporting.pdf).
196
50-100_text_.pdf 208 2/15/23 2:48 PM
713
Id.
714
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Circular 2022-07 (Nov. 10,
2022) (online at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/compliance/circulars/consumer-financial-protection-circular-
2022-07-reasonable-investigation-of-consumer-reporting-disputes/).
715
Update: Telegram Raises $1BN+, Including $150M from Mubadala and Abu Dhabi CP via Pre-IPO
Convertible Bonds, TechCrunch (Mar. 23, 2021) (online at https://techcrunch.com/2021/03/23/telegram-raises-
150m-from-mubadala-and-abu-dhabi-cp-via-pre-ipo-convertible-bonds/).
716
How Unemployment Insurance Fraud Exploded During the Pandemic, ProPublica (July 26, 2021)
(online at www.propublica.org/article/how-unemployment-insurance-fraud-exploded-during-the-pandemic)
(discussing the use of Telegram to disseminate methods for submitting fraudulent unemployment insurance claims);
An Avalanche of Fraud Buried a Small Business Relief Program, Bloomberg (Oct. 29, 2020) (online at
www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-10-29/small-business-administration-10-000-grant-fraud-went-viral-
hurting-program) (discussing Telegram solicitations of instructions and stolen identities for evading EIDL program
fraud controls); Is Womply Is Getting Whomped with PPP Fraud?, FrankonFraud (May 2, 2021) (online at
https://frankonfraud.com/fraud-trends/is-womply-getting-whomped-with-ppp-fraud/) (including screenshots of
Telegram discussions of methods of committing PPP fraud); Fraudsters Targeting New SBA Restaurant Fund,
FrankonFraud (May 28, 2021) (online at https://frankonfraud.com/fraud-trends/fraudsters-targeting-sbas-restaurant-
fund/) (including screenshots of Telegram posts soliciting instructions and documents for submitting fraudulent RRF
applications to SBA).
717
How Unemployment Insurance Fraud Exploded During the Pandemic, ProPublica (July 26, 2021)
(online at www.propublica.org/article/how-unemployment-insurance-fraud-exploded-during-the-pandemic).
718
How Scammers Siphoned $36B in Fraudulent Unemployment Payments from US, USA Today (Jan. 26,
2021) (online at www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2020/12/30/unemployment-fraud-how-
international-scammers-took-36-b-us/3960263001/).
719
Terms of Service, Telegram (online at https://telegram.org/tos) (accessed Nov. 15, 2021).
720
FAQs, Telegram (online at https://telegram.org/faq#q-there-39s-illegal-content-on-telegram-how-do-i-
take-it-down) (accessed Nov. 17, 2021).
721
Letter from Counsel, Apple, to Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis (May 19, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.05.19--Apple Narrative Response to
Select Subcommittee.pdf).
722
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Underserved and Unprotected: How the Trump
Administration Neglected the Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP, 116th Cong. (Oct. 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PPP%20Report%20Final%20%283%29.p
df).
723
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Select Subcommittee
Investigation, IRS Gives 9 Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Oct. 7, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-select-subcommittee-investigation-irs-gives-9-million-
americans-more).
724
The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Increases Lending to Small Businesses
in Need, Announces Changes to PPP to Further Promote Equitable Access to Relief (Feb. 22, 2021) (online at
https://whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/22/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-
increases-lending-to-small-businesses-in-need-announces-changes-to-ppp-to-further-promote-equitable-access-to-
relief/).
725
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, How Is the COVID-19 Economic Injury
Disaster Loan Program (EIDL) Recorded in the NIPAs? (July 29, 2021) (online at https://bea.gov/help/faq/1463).
197
50-100_text_.pdf 209 2/15/23 2:48 PM
726
Government Accountability Office, Restaurant Revitalization Fund: Opportunities Exist to Improve
Oversight (July 2022) (GAO-22-105442) (online at https://gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105442.pdf).
727
The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Increases Lending to Small Businesses
in Need, Announces Changes to PPP to Further Promote Equitable Access to Relief (Feb. 22, 2021) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/22/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-
increases-lending-to-small-businesses-in-need-announces-changes-to-ppp-to-further-promote-equitable-access-to-
relief/).
728
Government Accountability Office, SBA Has Begun to Take Steps to Improve Oversight and Fraud
Risk Management (Apr. 20, 2021) (GAO-21-498T) (online at https://gao.gov/assets/gao-21-498t.pdf); Small
Business Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the
Small Business Administration Fiscal Year 2022 (Oct. 15, 2021) (online at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-
10/SBA%20OIG%20Report%2022-02.pdf).
729
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2; Pandemic Response Accountability Committee,
American Rescue Plan Infographic (online at https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/media/file/american-rescue-plan-
act-infographicpdf).
730
Government Accountability Office, Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to Improve
Health Data and Address Improper Payments (Apr. 27, 2022) (GAO-22-105397) (online at
https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-22-105397/index.html).
731
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Director of COVID-19 Fraud
Enforcement Kevin Chambers, Department of Justice, Hearing on Examining Federal Efforts to Prevent, Detect, and
Prosecute Pandemic Relief Fraud to Safeguard Funds for All Eligible Americans (June 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/covid-pandemic-relief-fraud-ppp-eidl).
732
The White House, Bills Signed: H.R. 7334 and H.R. 7352 (Aug. 5, 2022) (online at
https://whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/legislation/2022/08/05/bills-signed-h-r-7334-and-h-r-7352/); Small Business
Administration, Press Release: Statement by SBA Administrator Guzman on the Signing of the Paycheck
Protection Program and Bank Fraud Enforcement Harmonization Act and the COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster
Loan Fraud Statute of Limitations Act (Aug. 5, 2022) (online at https://sba.gov/article/2022/aug/05/statement-sba-
administrator-guzman-signing-paycheck-protection-program-bank-fraud-enforcement).
733
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, All Employees, Total Nonfarm (PAYEMS) (online at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS) (accessed Oct. 26, 2022).
734
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, All Employees, Total Nonfarm (PAYEMS) (online at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS) (accessed Oct. 26, 2022); Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, The Employment Situation – November 2022 (Dec. 2, 2022) (online at
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).
735
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Unemployment Rate – Black or African American (LNS14000006)
(online at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS14000006) (accessed Oct. 26, 2022); Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Unemployment Rate – Hispanic or Latino (LNS14000009) (online at
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS14000009) (accessed Oct. 26, 2022); Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, The Employment Situation – November 2022 (Dec. 2, 2022) (online at
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).
736
More Businesses Want to Hire People With Criminal Records Amid Tight Job Market, Wall Street
Journal (Oct. 9, 2022) (online at https://wsj.com/articles/more-businesses-want-to-hire-people-with-criminal-
records-amid-tight-job-market-11665173965); Disabled Americans Reap Remote-Work Reward in Record
Employment, Bloomberg (Oct. 3, 2022) (online at https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-03/disabled-us-
workers-see-highest-ever-employment-figures-from-remote-work); How Workers Gained an Edge – And Why They
Won’t Lose It Soon, Barron’s (May 13, 2022) (online at https://barrons.com/articles/workers-jobs-economy-labor-
market-51652393950); For Disabled Workers, a Tight Labor Market Opens New Doors, New York Times (Oct. 25,
2022) (online at https://nytimes.com/2022/10/25/business/economy/labor-disabilities.html).
198
50-100_text_.pdf 210 2/15/23 2:48 PM
737
Economy Grew 5.7% Last Year, Its Best Showing Since 1984, as Activity Revived Amid Pandemic,
USA Today (Jan. 27, 2022) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2022/01/27/us-economy-2021-
gdp-growth/9236443002/).
738
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Press Release: Gross Domestic Product
(Second Estimate) and Corporate Profits (Preliminary), Third Quarter 2022 (Nov. 30, 2022) (online at
www.bea.gov/news/2022/gross-domestic-product-second-estimate-and-corporate-profits-preliminary-third-quarter).
739
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID Data Tracker (Dec. 1, 2022) (online at
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations_vacc-people-onedose-pop-5yr).
740
Food and Drug Administration, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Authorizes Moderna, Pfizer-
Bivalent COVID-19 Vaccines for Use as a Booster Dose (Aug. 31, 2022) (online at https://fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-authorizes-moderna-pfizer-biontech-bivalent-covid-
19-vaccines-use).
741
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)
(Nov. 22, 2022) (online at www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/71/wr/mm7148e1.htm?s_cid=mm7148e1_w);
Memorandum from Peter Marks, Acting Director, Office of Vaccines Research and Review, Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (June 30, 2022) (online at www.fda.gov/media/159597/download).
742
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, COVID Data Tracker (Dec. 1, 2022) (online at
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccinations_vacc-people-onedose-pop-5yr).
743
A Fall COVID-19 Booster Campaign Could Save Thousands of Lives, Billions of Dollars, The
Commonwealth Fund (Oct. 5, 2022) (online at https://commonwealthfund.org/blog/2022/fall-covid-19-booster-
campaign-could-save-thousands-lives-billions-dollars).
744
Id.
745
The White House, Fact Sheet: Biden Administration Outlines Plan to Get Americans an Updated
COVID-19 Vaccine Shot and Manage COVID-19 this Fall (Sept. 8, 2022) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2022/09/08/fact-sheet-biden-administration-outlines-plan-to-get-americans-an-updated-
covid-19-vaccine-shot-and-manage-covid-19-this-fall/).
746
See, e.g., Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Senior Biden Administration
Officials Testify Before Select Subcommittee on New Pandemic Phase, (Mar. 30, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/covid-clyburn-biden-admin-cdc-hhs-walensky-murthy-hearing-
post).
747
See, e.g., Virus Mutations Aren’t Slowing Down. New Omicron Subvariant Proves It., Washington Post
(May 1, 2022) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/05/01/coronavirus-more-mutations/); Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Variants (Aug. 11, 2021) (online at https://cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/variants/index.html).
748
See, e.g., Operational Nasal Vaccine—Lightning Speed to Counter COVID-19, Science (July 21, 2022)
(online at www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciimmunol.add9947); White House COVID Task Force Calls for
‘Flexibility’ in Order to Combat the Changing Virus, PBS (July 26, 2022) (online at
www.pbs.org/newshour/health/watch-live-white-house-covid-task-force-holds-a-summit-on-future-vaccines).
749
Why the U.S. Doesn’t Have a Nasal Vaccine for COVID-19, TIME (Oct. 31, 2022) (online at
https://time.com/6226356/nasal-vaccine-covid-19-us-update/); China and India Approve Nasal COVID Vaccines—
Are They a Game Changer?, Nature (Sept. 7, 2022) (online at https://nature.com/articles/d41586-022-02851-0);
Biden’s Operation Warp Speed Revival Stumbles Out of the Gate, Politico (Oct. 5, 2022) (online at
www.politico.com/news/2022/10/05/white-house-warp-speed-covid-vaccine-research-funding-00060448).
750
New Coronavirus Variants Rendered the Last Remaining Monoclonal Antibody Treatment Useless,
NBC News (Dec. 3, 2022) (online at www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/coronavirus-variants-monoclonal-
antibody-drugs-ineffective-rcna59797).
199
50-100_text_.pdf 211 2/15/23 2:48 PM
751
Id.
752
Id.; Omicron BQ Variants Resistant to Antibody Treatments are Quickly Becoming Dominant in U.S.,
CNBC (Nov. 11, 2022) (online at www.cnbc.com/2022/11/11/omicron-bq-variants-resistant-to-antibody-treatments-
are-becoming-dominant-in-us.html).
753
See, e.g., Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Walensky, Kessler, and
O’Connell Brief Select Subcommittee Members on Omicron Response (Jan. 11, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/walensky-kessler-and-o-connell-brief-select-subcommittee-
members-omicron); The White House, FACT SHEET: The Biden Administration to Begin Distributing At-Home,
Rapid COVID-TL )I989 8< C>I:EKV=9 H<: 5:II '2V=$ TQ% S"SS& '<=DE=I V8 ...$.FE8IF<79I$G<6#U:EIHE=G-
room/statements- releases/2022/01/14/fact-sheet-the-biden-administration-to-begin-distributing-at-home-rapid-
covid-19-tests-to-americans-for-free).
754
See, e.g., Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Senior Biden Administration
Officials Testify Before Select Subcommittee on New Pandemic Phase (Mar. 30, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/covid-clyburn-biden-admin-cdc-hhs-walensky-murthy-hearing-
post); Kaiser Family Foundation, Press Release: With Government Funding Running out, Americans Could Soon
Face New Challenges in Accessing COVID-19 Treatments and Testing (Oct. 18, 2022) (online at
https://kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/press-release/with-government-funding-running-out-americans-could-soon-
face-new-challenges-in-accessing-covid-19-treatments-and-testing/).
755
See, e.g., HHS Funding Spurs Development of At-Home Test that Identifies COVID, Flu, and Maybe
More, Politico Pro (Sept. 13, 2022) (online at https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2022/09/hhs-funding-spurs-
development-of-at-home-test-that-identifes-covid-flu-and-maybe-more-00056242); Wearable Devices for the
Detection of COVID-19, Nature (Jan. 25, 2021) (online at https://nature.com/articles/s41928-020-00533-1).
756
See, e.g., The White House, Let’s Clear the Air on COVID (Mar. 23, 2022) (online at
https://whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2022/03/23/lets-clear-the-air-on-covid/).
757
See, e.g., The White House, Readout of the White House Summit on Improving Indoor Air Quality
(Oct. 12, 2022) (online at https://whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/10/12/readout-of-the-
white-house-summit-on-improving-indoor-air-quality/); The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden Administration
Launches Effort to Improve Ventilation and Reduce the Spread of COVID-19 in Buildings (Mar. 17, 2022) (online
at https://whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/17/fact-sheet-biden-administration-launches-
effort-to-improve-ventilation-and-reduce-the-spread-of-covid-19-in-buildings/).
758
Environmental Protection Agency, Request for Information: Better Indoor Air Quality Management to
Help Reduce COVID-19 and Other Transmission in Buildings: Technical Assistance Priorities to Improve Public
Health, 87 Fed. Reg. 60396 (Oct. 5, 2022) (notice).
759
See supra Part I.
760
Id.; The National Academies Press, Ensuring an Effective Public Health Emergency Medical
Countermeasures Enterprise (Nov. 3, 2021) (online at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/26373/chapter/1#xvi);
see also A Rare Look Inside the Strategic National Stockpile – and How it Went Wrong at the Start of the Pandemic,
NBC News (July 28, 2022) (online at https://nbcnews.com/health/health-news/rare-look-strategic-national-stockpile-
went-wrong-start-pandemic-rcna32603).
761
Jennifer Cohen and Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, Contributing Factors to Personal Protective
Equipment Shortages During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Preventive Medicine (Dec. 2020) (online at
https://sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0091743520302875?via%3Dihub).
762
Id.
763
Government Accountability Office, VA Acquisition Management: Comprehensive Supply Chain
Management Strategy Key to Address Existing Challenges (Mar. 24, 2021) (GAO-21-445T) (online at
www.gao.gov/assets/720/713430.pdf).
200
50-100_text_.pdf 212 2/15/23 2:48 PM
764
Id.
765
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hybrid Hearing on “Upgrading Public Health
Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments” (Sept.
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-upgrading-public-
health-infrastructure-need-protect).
766
Trust for America’s Health, The Impact of Chronic Underfunding on America’s Public Health System:
Trends, Risks, and Recommendations, 2022 (July 28, 2022) (online at www.tfah.org/report-details/funding-report-
2022/).
767
Center for American Progress, Fact Sheet: How Investing in Public Health Will Strengthen America’s
Health (May 17, 2022) (online at https://americanprogress.org/article/fact-sheet-how-investing-in-public-health-
will-strengthen-americas-health/); The Commonwealth Fund, Meeting America’s Public Health Challenge (June
2022) (online at https://commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/TCF-
002%20National%20Public%20Heath%20System%20Report-r5-final.pdf).
768
Trust for America’s Health, The Impact of Chronic Underfunding on America’s Public Health System:
Trends, Risks, and Recommendations, 2022 (July 28, 2022) (online at www.tfah.org/report-details/funding-report-
2022/).
769
Id.
770
Bolstering the Public Health Infrastructure in the Wake of COVID-19, The Commonwealth Fund (Jan.
25, 2022) (online at www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2022/bolstering-public-health-infrastructure-wake-covid-
19).
771
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hybrid Hearing on “Upgrading Public Health
Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments” (Sept.
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-upgrading-public-
health-infrastructure-need-protect).
772
Id.
773
Government Accountability Office, Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to Improve
Health Data and Address Improper Payments (Apr. 2022) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105397.pdf).
774
Trust for America’s Health, The Impact of Chronic Underfunding on America’s Public Health System:
Trends, Risks, and Recommendations, 2022 (July 28, 2022) (online at www.tfah.org/report-details/funding-report-
2022/).
775
Government Accountability Office, Public Health Emergencies: Data Management Challenges Impact
National Response (Sept. 2022) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-106175.pdf).
776
Department of Health And Human Services Office of Inspector General, CDC Found Ways to Use Data
to Understand and Address COVID-19 Health Disparities, Despite Challenges with Existing Data (July 2022)
(online at www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/OEI-05-20-00540.pdf).
777
Government Accountability Office, Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to Improve
Health Data and Address Improper Payments (Apr. 2022) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105397.pdf).
778
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Press Release: CDC Stands Up New Disease Forecasting
Center (Aug. 18, 2021) (online at www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/p0818-disease-forecasting-center.html).
779
We Advised Biden on the Pandemic. Much Work Remains to Face the Next Crisis, New York Times
(Oct. 19, 2022) (online at www.nytimes.com/2022/10/19/opinion/covid-pandemic-failures.html).
780
Id.
201
50-100_text_.pdf 213 2/15/23 2:48 PM
781
Center for American Progress, Fact Sheet: How Investing in Public Health Will Strengthen America’s
Health (May 17, 2022) (online at www.americanprogress.org/article/fact-sheet-how-investing-in-public-health-will-
strengthen-americas-health/).
782
See Public Health Systems Still Aren’t Ready for the Next Pandemic, The Pew Charitable Trusts (Jan.
27, 2021) (online at www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/01/27/public-health-systems-
still-arent-ready-for-the-next-pandemic).
783
Center for American Progress, Fact Sheet: How Investing in Public Health Will Strengthen America’s
Health (May 17, 2022) (online at www.americanprogress.org/article/fact-sheet-how-investing-in-public-health-will-
strengthen-americas-health/).
784
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hybrid Hearing on “Upgrading Public Health
Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments” (Sept. 29,
2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-upgrading-public-
health-infrastructure-need-protect).
785
The White House, Fact Sheet: Biden-4V::E9 CJ>E=E98:V8E<= 8< 3=6I98 ?N BEDDE<= H:<> C>I:EKV= +I9K7I
Plan to Hire and Train Public Health Workers in Response to COVID-TL '0V- TR% S"ST& '<=DE=I V8
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/13/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-to-
invest-7-billion-from-american-rescue-plan-to-hire-and-train-public-health-workers-in-response-to-covid-19/).
786
The White House, Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces American Rescue Plan’s
Historic Investments in Community Health Workforce (Sept. 30, 2022) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2022/09/30/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-american-rescue-plans-
historic-investments-in-community-health-workforce/).
787
Why Public Health Faces a Crisis Across the U.S., New York Times (Oct. 18, 2021) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2021/10/18/us/coronavirus-public-health.html).
788
Bolstering the Public Health Infrastructure in the Wake of COVID-19, The Commonwealth Fund (Jan.
25, 2022) (online at www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2022/bolstering-public-health-infrastructure-wake-covid-
19).
789
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, GAO And Experts Detail
Trump Administration’s Unprecedented Political Interference in Coronavirus Response (Apr. 29, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-gao-and-experts-detail-trump-administration-s-
unprecedented-political).
790
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: At Hearing, Dr. Deborah Birx Tells
Select Subcommittee that “Dangerous Ideas” Undermined Trump Administration Coronavirus Response (June 23,
2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/hearing-dr-deborah-birx-tells-select-
subcommittee-dangerous-ideas-undermined).
791
Government Accountability Office, HHS Agencies Need to Develop Procedures and Train Staff on
Reporting and Addressing Political Interference (Apr. 2022) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104613.pdf).
792
The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, National Priorities to Combat Misinformation and
Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats: A Call for a National Strategy (March 2021)
(online at www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2021/210322-misinformation.pdf).
793
Office of the U.S. Surgeon General, Confronting Health Misinformation: The U.S. Surgeon General’s
Advisory on Building a Healthy Information Environment (July 2021) (online at
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf).
794
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “Combating Coronavirus Cons and the
Monetization of Misinformation” (Nov. 17, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/hearing-exposes-widespread-harm-caused-coronavirus-misinformation).
202
50-100_text_.pdf 214 2/15/23 2:48 PM
795
Office of the U.S. Surgeon General, Confronting Health Misinformation: The U.S. Surgeon General’s
Advisory on Building a Healthy Information Environment (July 2021) (online at
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf).
796
Presidential COVID-19 Health Equity Task Force, Final Report and Recommendations (Oct. 2021)
(online at www.minorityhealth.hhs.gov/assets/pdf/HETF_Report_508_102821_9am_508Team%20WIP11.pdf).
797
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “Upgrading Public Health Infrastructure:
The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments” (Sept. 29, 2021) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-upgrading-public-health-
infrastructure-need-protect).
798
Id.
799
Id.
800
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “Combating Coronavirus Cons and the
Monetization of Misinformation” (Nov. 17, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-
releases/hearing-exposes-widespread-harm-caused-coronavirus-misinformation).
801
Id.
802
Facebook, Twitter, and Other Social Media Companies Need to Be Treated like Big Tobacco, NBC
News (July 15, 2021) (online at www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/facebook-twitter-other-social-media-companies-
need-be-treated-big-ncna1274000).
803
Office of the U.S. Surgeon General, Confronting Health Misinformation: The U.S. Surgeon General’s
Advisory on Building a Healthy Information Environment (July 2021) (online at
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-general-misinformation-advisory.pdf).
804
Congressional Research Service, Social Media: Misinformation and Content Moderation Issues for
Congress (Jan. 27, 2021) (online at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46662).
805
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on “Understanding and Addressing Long
COVID and Its Health and Economic Consequences” (July 19, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/understanding-and-addressing-long-covid-and-its-
health-and-economic).
806
Id.
807
The White House, Letter Regarding Additional Funding to Address Assistance to Ukraine and to
Support the United States Response to COVID-19 (Nov. 15, 2022) (online at https://whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-
room/2022/11/15/letter-regarding-additional-funding-to-address-assistance-to-ukraine-and-to-support-the-united-
states-response-to-covid-19/).
808
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Krishna Udayakumar, Hybrid Hearing on
“A Global Crisis Needs a Global Solution: The Urgent Need to Accelerate Vaccinations Around the World” (Dec.
14, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/global-crisis-needs-global-
solution-urgent-need-accelerate).
809
U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education Labor & Pensions, Press Release: HELP Committee
Passes Murray-Burr PREVENT Pandemics Act in Overwhelming Bipartisan Vote (Mar. 15, 2022) (online at
www.help.senate.gov/chair/newsroom/press/help-committee-passes-murray-burr-prevent-pandemics-act-in-
overwhelming-bipartisan-vote).
810
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of H. Luke Shaefer, Gerald R. Ford School
of Public Policy, University of Michigan, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the Success of Pandemic Relief
Programs (Sept. 22, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-
recognizing-and-building-success-pandemic-relief).
203
50-100_text_.pdf 215 2/15/23 2:48 PM
811
Letter from Chairman James E. Clyburn, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, to The
Honorable Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, and The Honorable Charles P. Rettig,
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (July 8, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-07-
08.Clyburn%20to%20Treasury%20IRS%20re%20Stimulus%20Checks.pdf).
812
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Press Release: Following Select Subcommittee
Investigation, IRS Gives 9 Million Americans More Time to Claim Stimulus Checks (Oct. 7, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/following-select-subcommittee-investigation-irs-gives-9-million-
americans-more).
813
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Underserved and Unprotected: How the Trump
Administration Neglected the Neediest Small Businesses in the PPP, 116th Cong. (Oct. 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/PPP%20Report%20Final%20%283%29.p
df).
814
Id.
815
Id.
816
National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Lending Discrimination Within the Paycheck Protection
Program (July 15, 2020) (online at https://ncrc.org/lending-discrimination-within-the-paycheck-protection-
program/).
817
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Double Jeopardy: COVID-19’s Concentrated Health and Wealth
Effects in Black Communities (Aug. 2020) (online at
https://newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/smallbusiness/DoubleJeopardy_COVID19andBlackOwnedBusinesses).
818
Black Business Owners Had a Harder Time Getting Federal Aid, a Study Finds, New York Times (July
15, 2020) (online at https://nytimes.com/2020/07/15/business/paycheck-protection-program-bias.html).
819
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, How Is the COVID-19 Economic Injury
Disaster Loan Program (EIDL) Recorded in the NIPAs? (July 29, 2021) (online at https://bea.gov/help/faq/1463);
Smallest Businesses Get Exclusive 2-Week PPP Window, Biden Admin Says, Banking Dive (Feb. 22, 2021) (online
at https://bankingdive.com/news/paycheck-protection-program-small-business-window-biden-2021/595469/).
820
Small Business Administration, SBA Procedural Notice (Feb. 8, 2021) (online at
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/Procedural%20Notice%205000-20091%20-
%202nd%20Updated%20PPP%20Processing%20Fee%20and%201502%20Reporting.pdf).
821
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “We Are Not the Fraud Police”: How Fintechs
Facilitated Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Dec. 1,
2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.12.01%20How%20Fintechs%20Fac
ilitated%20Fraud%20in%20the%20Paycheck%20Protection%20Program.pdf).
822
Id.
823
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses
by Four Corporate Landlords During the Coronavirus Crisis (July 28, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.28%20SSCC%20Staff%20Repor
t%20Examining%20Pandemic%20Evictions.pdf).
824
Briefing by Staff, National Low Income Housing Coalition, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 5, 2022).
825
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Examining Pandemic Evictions: A Report on Abuses
by Four Corporate Landlords During the Coronavirus Crisis (July 28, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.07.28%20SSCC%20Staff%20Repor
t%20Examining%20Pandemic%20Evictions.pdf).
204
50-100_text_.pdf 216 2/15/23 2:48 PM
826
Briefing by Staff, National Low Income Housing Coalition, to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis (Oct. 5, 2022).
827
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, More Housing Vouchers: Most Important Step to Help More
People Afford Stable Homes (May 13, 2021) (online at www.cbpp.org/research/housing/more-housing-vouchers-
most-important-step-to-help-more-people-afford-stable-homes).
828
National Low Income Housing Coalition, Historic Housing Investments in the Build Back Better Act
(Dec. 14, 2021) (online at https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Historic-Housing-Investments-in-the-Build-Back-
Better-Act.pdf).
829
Office of Rep. David E. Price, Press Release: Chairman Price, Whip Clyburn, Rep. Clarke and Rep.
Khanna Secure Funding for Eviction Prevention Demonstration Program in FY21 Government Funding Package
(Dec. 22, 2020) (online at https://price.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/chairman-price-whip-clyburn-rep-clarke-
and-rep-khanna-secure-funding).
830
Millions of Americans Are Heading into the Holidays Unemployed and Over $5,000 Behind on Rent,
Washington Post (Dec. 7, 2020) (online at https://washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/07/unemployed-debt-rent-
utilities/).
831
Center for Economic and Policy Research, Housing Affordability and Insecurity Before and During the
Pandemic (Sept. 29, 2020) (online at https://cepr.net/housing-affordability-and-insecurity-before-and-during-the-
pandemic/).
832
STOUT, Cleveland Eviction Right to Counsel Annual Independent Evaluation, January 1 to December
31, 2021 (Jan. 31, 2022) (online at https://freeevictionhelpresults.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Stouts-2021-
Independent-Evaluation-of-RTC-C_FINAL_1.31.22.pdf).
833
Biden’s Budget Would Significantly Improve Delivery of Unemployment Benefits, The Century
Foundation (Sept. 9, 2022) (online at https://tcf.org/content/commentary/biden-budget-would-significantly-improve-
delivery-of-unemployment-benefits/?agreed=1).
834
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Idle on EIDL Fraud: How the Trump Administration
Wasted Taxpayer Dollars by Leaving the COVID-19 EIDL Program Vulnerable to Fraud (June 14, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/reports/select-subcommittee-report-details-trump-administration-s-failure-
prevent-fraud).
835
Id.
836
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
New Finding of Disproportionate Impact of Coronavirus Pandemic on Working Women (May 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/22.05.17%20SSCC%20Gender%20Equit
y%20Analysis.pdf); Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Hearing on Recognizing and Building on the
Success of Pandemic Relief Programs (Sept. 22, 2021) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-
activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-recognizing-and-building-success-pandemic-relief).
837
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Martin Rosas, United Food and
Commercial Workers Local Union 2, Hearing on How the Meatpacking Industry Failed the Workers Who Feed
America (Oct. 27, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Rosas%20Testimony.pdf).
838
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, America’s Pandemic Workforce: Persistent Structural
Inequities Harm Workers and Threaten Future Crisis Response (Oct. 25, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.25%20Persistent%20Structural%
20Inequities%20Harm%20Workers%20and%20Threaten%20Future%20Crisis%20Response.pdf).
839
Id.
840
Id.
205
50-100_text_.pdf 217 2/15/23 2:48 PM
841
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
New Finding of Disproportionate Impact of Coronavirus Pandemic on Working Women (May 17, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/22.05.17%20SSCC%20Gender%20Equit
y%20Analysis.pdf).
842
University of California-Berkeley, Center for the Study of Child Care Employment, Early Childhood
Workforce Index 2020 (online at https://cscce.berkeley.edu/workforce-index-2020/) (accessed Dec. 7, 2022);
‘Crashing Down’: How the Child Care Crisis Is Magnifying Racial Disparities, Politico (July 22, 2020) (online at
www.politico.com/news/2020/07/22/coronavirus-child-care-racial-disparities-377058) (“Ninety-three percent of
child care workers are women, and 45 percent are Black, Asian or Latino, according to Labor Department data.”).
843
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Dr. Lynette M. Fraga, Child Care Aware
of America, Hearing on COVID Child Care Challenges: Supporting Families and Caregivers (Mar. 2, 2022) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-covid-child-care-challenges-
supporting-families-and).
844
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Dr. Lea J.E. Austin, Center for the study
of Child Care Employment, University of California, Hearing on COVID Child Care Challenges: Supporting
Families and Caregivers (Mar. 2, 2022) (online at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-
activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-covid-child-care-challenges-supporting-families-and).
845
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Testimony of Dr. Betsey Stevenson, University of
Michigan, Hearing on COVID Child Care Challenges: Supporting Families and Caregivers (Mar. 2, 2022) (online
at https://coronavirus.house.gov/subcommittee-activity/hearings/hybrid-hearing-covid-child-care-challenges-
supporting-families-and).
846
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
The Pandemic Recovery: The American Rescue Plan’s Impact on Alleviating Hardship and Supporting Economic
Recovery (Sept. 22, 2021) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/Staff%20Memo%20-
%20The%20American%20Rescue%20Plan%27s%20Impact%20on%20Alleviating%20Hardship%20and%20Suppo
rting%20Economic%20Recovery.pdf).
847
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, America’s Pandemic Workforce: Persistent Structural
Inequities Harm Workers and Threaten Future Crisis Response (Oct. 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.10.25%20Persistent%20Structural%
20Inequities%20Harm%20Workers%20and%20Threaten%20Future%20Crisis%20Response.pdf).
848
Briefing by Staff, Small Business Association to Staff, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
(July 29, 2021).
849
Congressional Research Service, IRS-Related Funding in the Inflation Reduction Act (Oct. 20, 2022)
(online at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11977).
850
See, e.g., Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, “We Are Not the Fraud Police”: How
Fintechs Facilitated Fraud in the Paycheck Protection Program (Dec. 1, 2022) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2022.12.01%20How%20Fintechs%20Fac
ilitated%20Fraud%20in%20the%20Paycheck%20Protection%20Program_0.pdf).
851
Memorandum from Majority Staff to Members of the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis,
Preliminary Analysis of Paycheck Protection Program Data (Sept. 1, 2020) (online at
https://coronavirus.house.gov/sites/democrats.coronavirus.house.gov/files/2020-09-
01.PPP%20Interim%20Report.pdf).
852
Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, SBA’s Handling of Potentially Fraudulent
Paycheck Protection Program Loans (May 26, 2022) (Rept. No. 22-13) (online at
www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-reports/SBA/SBA-OIG-Report-22-13.pdf).
206
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Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crises
Business Meeting Summary – 12-14-2022
Convened: 4:40 p.m.
Adjourned: 5:00 p.m.
Committee Report entitled: Preparing for and Preventing the Next Public Health
Emergency: Lessons Learned from the Coronavirus Crisis
1) Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute (ANS) offered by Mr. Clyburn. The
Amendment was agreed to by Voice Vote.
The Committee Report entitled: Preparing for and Preventing the Next Public Health
Emergency: Lessons Learned from the Coronavirus Crisis, as amended, was ordered
favorably reported to the House by Voice Vote.
Mr. Jordan requested to be recorded as a NO vote on the report’s final passage.
50-100_text_.pdf 219 2/15/23 2:48 PM
MINORITY VIEWS
The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (Subcommittee) was formed on
April 23, 2020, with Chairman James Clyburn (D-SC) promising the Subcommittee would be
“forward looking” and would “look at the totality of the current response.” The Subcommittee
failed on both accounts.
Instead, Congressional Democrats used the Subcommittee as a hatchet against political
adversaries and the former Trump Administration. The most prominent example of this is the
fact that the Subcommittee held five hearings with Trump Administration officials in 2020,
compared to two with Biden Administration officials in 2021 and only two in 2022. Further, the
Subcommittee sent 31 public letters to Trump Administration officials in 2020, compared to 10
letters to Biden Administration officials in 2021 and only three in 2022. Subcommittee
Democrats failed to hold the Biden Administration accountable.
Specifically, Subcommittee Democrats refused to investigate: (1) the origins of COVID-
19, (2) President Biden’s politically motivated decision making, (3) the Biden Administration’s
decision not to purchase more rapid, at-home COVID-19 tests leading up to the holidays in 2021,
and (4) the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) actions sideling scientific experts regarding vaccine booster shots.
While Democrats sat idly by, Subcommittee Republicans uncovered: (1) the United
States likely funded gain-of-function (GOF) research on novel coronaviruses at the Wuhan
Institute of Virology (WIV), (2) the scientific establishment, including Drs. Anthony Fauci and
Francis Collins, worked to suppress the lab leak hypothesis, (3) the Biden Administration
provided uncommon access to teachers unions to draft and edit official CDC guidelines so they
could make it easier to keep schools closed, causing devastating learning loss for America’s
young people, and (4) the governors of certain Democrat-led states, particularly New York,
violated CDC and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) guidance to force
potentially COVID-19 positive patients into nursing homes, causing thousands of unnecessary
deaths.
These minority views detail the efforts from Subcommittee Republicans to uncover the
truth and hold bad actors accountable. It also addresses the failures stemming from
Subcommittee Democrats inaction. Simply, Republicans acted while Democrats failed.
I. The United States likely funded gain-of-function research on novel
coronaviruses at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
On June 1, 2014, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (EcoHealth) received a $3.7 million dollar
grant from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), entitled
“Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence.”1 Through this grant, EcoHealth sent
more than $600,000 to the WIV in Wuhan, China. Also pursuant to this grant, EcoHealth was
required to report to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and “immediately stop all
experiments” if it created a virus that showed evidence of viral growth 1,000 percent that of the
1
Project Grant, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Research, EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. (June 1, 2014).
Page 1 of 9
50-100_text_.pdf 220 2/15/23 2:48 PM
original virus.2 Even if EcoHealth did not immediately report an experiment that met these
parameters as required by the grant, EcoHealth would have to submit its annual progress report
by September 30, 2019.
On October 20, 2021, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform received a letter
from Dr. Lawrence Tabak, Principal Deputy Director of the NIH. According to Dr. Tabak,
EcoHealth “failed” to properly and promptly report an experiment that violated the terms of the
grant.3 In one experiment, EcoHealth created a virus which showed evidence of viral growth
over the stated threshold, but subsequently failed to report it. This experiment qualified as GOF
research since the virus gained enhanced transmissibility.
This is further complicated by the NIH’s revolving and changing definition to GOF to fit
their preferred narrative. Prior to October 20, 2021, GOF was defined as, “research that modifies
a biological agent so that it confers new or enhanced activity to that agent.”4 EcoHealth’s
experiment would clearly fit this definition. However, after October 20, this definition was
stripped from NIH’s website. The only viable explanation for this is to shield NIH from scrutiny
and accountability since Drs. Fauci and Collins have long been proponents of GOF research
stating, “important information and insights can come from generating a potentially dangerous
virus in the laboratory.”5
II. The scientific establishment, including Drs. Anthony Fauci and Francis Collins,
worked to suppress the lab leak hypothesis.
Despite Dr. Fauci claiming otherwise on multiple occasions, he was, in fact, aware of the
monetary relationship between the NIAID, the NIH, EcoHealth, and the WIV by January 27,
2020.6 Dr. Fauci also knew that NIAID worked with EcoHealth to craft a grant policy to sidestep
the gain-of-function moratorium at the time.7 This new policy, designed by EcoHealth and
agreed to by NIAID, allowed EcoHealth to conduct dangerous experiments on novel bat
coronaviruses—with very little oversight—that would have otherwise been blocked by the
moratorium.8 In January 2020, Dr. Fauci was also aware that EcoHealth was not in compliance
with the terms of its grant that funded the WIV.9 EcoHealth was required to submit an annual
progress report to NIAID by September 30, 2019, and failed to timely submit the report.10
2
Letter from Hon. Francis Collins, Dir., Nat’l Insts. Of Health, to Hon. James Comer, Ranking Member, H. Comm.
on Oversight & Reform (July 28, 2021) [hereinafter Collins Letter].
3
Letter from Lawrence Tabak, Deputy Dir., U.S. Nat’l Insts. Of Health, to Hon. James Comer, Ranking Member, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Reform (Oct. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Tabak Letter].
4
Gain-of-Function Research Involving Potential Pandemic Pathogens, U.S. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (last updated
July 12, 2021) (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20211019065407/https:/www.nih.gov/news-events/gain-
function-research-involving-potential-pandemic-pathogens.)
5
Anthony S. Fauci, Gary J. Nabel, & Francis S. Collins, A flu virus risk worth taking, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2011).
6
Email from Greg Folkers to Anthony Fauci, et. al. (Jan. 27, 2020) (On file with Comm. Staff); Zachary Basu,
Fauci and Rand Paul clash over NIH funding for Wuhan Institute of Virology, AXIOS (May 11, 2021).
7
Sharon Lerner & Mara Hvistendahl, NIH Officials Worked with EcoHealth Alliance to Evade Restrictions on
Coronavirus Experiments, INTERCEPT (Nov. 3, 2021).
8
Id.
9
Letter from Lawrence Tabak to James Comer (Oct. 20, 2021).
10
Id.
Page 2 of 9
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On February 1, 2020, Dr. Fauci, Dr. Collins, and at least eleven other scientists convened
a conference call to discuss the origins of COVID-19.11 It was on this conference call that Drs.
Fauci and Collins were first warned that COVID-19 may have leaked from the WIV and, further,
may have been intentionally genetically manipulated:
# Dr. Kristian Andersen said, “The unusual features of the virus make up a really small part of
the genome (<0.1%) so one has to look really closely at all the sequences to see that some of
the features (potentially) look engineered . . . Eddie [Holmes], Bob [Garry], Mike [Farzan],
and myself all find the genome inconsistent with expectations from evolutionary theory.”12
# Dr. Robert Garry said, “I really can’t think of a plausible natural scenario . . . I just can’t
figure out how this gets accomplished in nature . . . Of course, in the lab it would be easy . . .
.”13
# Dr. Michael Farzan said he was “bothered by the furin site and ha[d] a hard time explain[ing]
that as an event outside the lab . . . I am 70:30 or 60:40 [lab].”14
# Dr. Andrew Rambaut said, “[f]rom a (natural) evolutionary point of view the only thing here
that strikes me as unusual is the furin cleavage site.”15
# Dr. Edward Holmes indicated that he was “60-40 lab . . . .”16
# Dr. Jeremy Farrar said, “I am 50-50 [lab].”17
Only three days later, on February 4, 2020, four participants of the conference call
authored a paper entitled “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” and sent a draft to Drs. Fauci
and Collins.18 Prior to final publication in Nature Medicine, the paper was sent to Dr. Fauci for
editing and approval.19 It is unclear what, if any, new evidence was presented or if the underlying
science changed in those three days, but after speaking with Drs. Fauci and Collins, the authors
abandoned their belief COVID-19 was the result of a laboratory leak. It is unclear if Drs. Fauci
or Collins edited the paper prior to publication.
11
Email from Jeremy Farrar to Anthony Fauci, et. al. (Feb. 1, 2020) (On file with Comm. Staff).
12
E-mail from Dr. Kristian Andersen to Dr. Anthony Fauci & Dr. Jeremy Farrar (Jan. 31, 2020) (On file with
Comm. staff).
13
Letter from Hon. James Comer, supra note 2.
14
Id; “Furin” refers to COVID-19’s Furin Cleavage Site. Generally, Furin is a protease enzyme that breaks down
proteins into single amino acids, to then form new proteins. This is done by cleaving bonds within specific proteins.
COVID-19’s unique Furin Cleavage Site enhances transmissibility and ability to infect other tissue types in the
body.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Email from Jeremy Farrar to Anthony Fauci & Francis Collins (Feb. 4, 2020) (On file with Comm. Staff)
19
Email from Kristian Andersen to Anthony Fauci, Francis Collins, & Jeremy Farrar (Mar. 6, 2020) (On file with
Comm. staff).
Page 3 of 9
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On April 16, 2020, more than two months after the original conference call, Dr. Collins
emailed Dr. Fauci expressing dismay that the Nature Medicine article—which they saw and were
given opportunity to edit prior to publication—did not squash the lab leak hypothesis.20 Dr.
Collins asks if the NIH can do more to “put down” the lab leak hypothesis.21 The next day—after
Dr. Collins explicitly asked for more public pressure—Dr. Fauci cited the Nature Medicine paper
from the White House podium likely in an effort to further stifle the hypothesis COVID-19
leaked from the WIV.22
The Biden Administration continues to hide, obfuscate, and shield the truth. By
continuing to refuse to cooperate in the Republican investigation into the origins of COVID-19,
the Administration is choosing to hide information that will help inform the origins of the
pandemic, prevent and respond to future pandemics, inform the United States’ current national
security posture, and restore confidence in our public health experts. This continued obstruction
is likely to cause irreparable harm to the credibility of these agencies.
III. The Biden Administration provided uncommon access to teachers unions to
draft and edit official Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines so
they could make it easier to keep schools closed, causing devastating learning
loss for America’s young people.
On May 11, 2021, after public reports of political interference by American Federation of
Teachers (AFT) in the school re-opening policymaking process, Subcommittee Republicans
wrote to CDC Director Rochelle Walensky to request documents and information regarding the
formulation of the “Operational Strategy for K-12 Schools through Phased Prevention”
(Operational Strategy).23 On July 19, 2021, Director Walensky responded and asserted CDC’s
consultation with AFT was routine and consistent with the agency’s customary process for
issuing guidance.24 Documents and testimony show, however, that Director Walensky
downplayed the degree to which CDC departed from past practice to allow AFT to influence the
policymaking process. In fact, CDC allowed AFT to insert language into the Operational
Strategy that made it more likely schools across the country would remain closed after February
2021.
Contrary to the CDC’s long-standing practice of keeping draft guidance documents
confidential Republicans learned through documents and testimony that senior CDC officials
shared a draft copy of the Operational Strategy with the AFT" a political union with no scientific
expertise but an extensive record of providing financial support to the Biden campaign and other
elected Democrats. After reviewing the draft, AFT staff asked Director Walensky to install a
20
Email from Kristian Andersen to Anthony Fauci, Francis Collins, & Jeremy Farrar (Mar. 6, 2020) (On file with
Comm. staff).
21
Email from Francis Collins to Anthony Fauci, et. al. (Apr. 16, 2020) (On file with Comm. Staff).
22
John Haltiwanger, Dr. Fauci throws cold water on conspiracy theory that coronavirus was created in a Chinese
lab, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2020).
23
Letter from Hon. Steve Scalise, Ranking Member, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Reform, et. al., to Dr. Rochelle Walensky, Director, U.S. Cents. For Disease Control & Prevention
(May 11, 2021).
24
Letter from Dr. Rochelle Walensky, Director, U.S. Cents. For Disease Control & Prevention, to Hon. James
Comer, Ranking Member, Comm. on Oversight & Reform (July 19, 2021).
Page 4 of 9
50-100_text_.pdf 223 2/15/23 2:48 PM
“trigger” in the guidance that would cause schools to close automatically if COVID-19 positivity
rates reached a certain threshold.25 The CDC obliged, and thousands of schools across the
country remained closed throughout the 2020-2021 school year.
On February 18, 2022, Subcommittee staff interviewed Dr. Henry Walke, a career CDC
scientist and medical doctor. Dr. Walke testified this level of coordination between the CDC and
an outside organization was “uncommon.”26 In fact, according to Dr. Walke, the CDC does not
typically share draft guidance outside the agency for any reason, even with other federal
partners.27
The actions by the AFT and the Biden Administration led to more school closures.
Virtual school and school closures will be one of the biggest failures during the pandemic and
they were largely perpetuated by teachers unions and Democrats nationwide. According to
University of Harvard professor Thomas Kane, “…the closures came at a stiff price—a large
decline in children’s achievement overall and a historic widening in achievement gaps by race
and economic status.”28 Further according to Brown University professor Emily Oster, “[t]he
past two years have seen enormous test score declines for kids…these declines were caused, at
least in significant part, by school closures.”29 Professor Oster continued, “…the lack of
resumption of in-person learning was a significant contributing factor to test score declines.”30
Compared to the academic decline, the mental health toll on America’s youth is vast but more
difficult to ascertain.
Because lawyers for the Biden Administration prevented a key witness from explaining
why the CDC allowed AFT to write key portions of its guidance for re-opening schools, there are
still several unanswered questions.31
IV. The governors of certain Democrat-led states, particularly New York, violated
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services guidance to force potentially COVID-19 positive patients into
nursing homes, causing thousands of unnecessary deaths.
On March 13, 2020, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued
guidance “For Infection Control and Prevention of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in
Nursing Homes.”32 This guidance is a blueprint for individual states to follow when determining
how to best control outbreaks of COVID-19 in nursing homes and long-term care facilities. This
25
Email from Ms. Kelly Trautner, American Fed. Of Teachers, to Dr. Rochelle Walensky, Dir., U.S. Cents. for
Disease Control & Prevention, et. al. (Feb. 11, 2021).
26
Transcribed Interview of Dr. Henry Walke, Director, Cent. for Preparedness & Response, U.S. Cents. For Disease
Control & Prevention, by H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform Staff (Feb. 18, 2022) [hereinafter Walke TI].
27
Id.
28
Thomas Kane, Kids Are Far, Far Behind in School, THE ATLANTIC (May 22, 2022).
29
Zachary Rogers, Sharpest learning loss occurred in school districts that stayed remote longer, study says, CBS
(Sept. 15, 2022).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Memorandum from David R. Wright, Director, Quality, Safety & Oversight Group, U.S. Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, to State Survey Agency Directors (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with Comm. Staff).
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guidance does not direct any nursing home to accept a COVID-19 positive patient if they are
unable to do so safely. In fact, it says “nursing homes should admit any individual that they
would normally admit to their facility, including individuals from hospitals where a case of
COVID-19 was/is present” only if the nursing home can follow Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) quarantining guidance.33
CMS Administrator Seema Verma said, “[u]nder no circumstances should a hospital
discharge a patient to a nursing home that is not prepared to take care of those patient’s needs.”34
The most infamous violation of this guidance came from former New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo. On March 25, 2020, the New York Department of Health posted, on their
website, a now deleted directive entitled “Hospital Discharges and Admissions to Nursing
Homes.”35 This directive said “[n]o resident shall be denied re-admission or admission to the
[nursing home] solely based on a confirmed or suspected diagnosis of COVID-19” and “[nursing
homes] are prohibited from requiring a hospitalized resident who is determined medically stable
to be tested for COVID-19 prior to admission or re-admission.”36 For clarity, this advisory
mandated nursing homes accept known COVID-19 positive patients andmandated that nursing
homes not even test patients for COVID-19 prior to admission.
On October 13, Subcommittee staff interviewed former White House COVID-19
Coordinate Dr. Deborah Birx. When asked about Governor Cuomo’s infamous March 25, 2020,
nursing home order, Dr. Birx testified that the order violated CMS guidance and that admitting
potentially positive COVID-19 nursing home residents back into the nursing home could have
led to unnecessary deaths.37
Because the former Cuomo Administration and the current Administration of Governor
Kathy Hochul have refused to share any information with the Subcommittee, several unanswered
questions remain.
V. Subcommittee Democrats failed to investigate the origins of COVID-19.
Select Subcommittee Democrats affirmatively declined to investigate the origins of
COVID-19; a never-before-seen virus that has now killed more than six million people
worldwide. On three occasions, Subcommittee Republicans requested Subcommittee Democrats
investigate the origins of COVID-19. On each occasion, they refused. Finally, on June 11, 2021,
Chairman Clyburn responded to Republicans’ request. He stated, “[w]e are concerned that your
request may be designed…to deflect accountability from the Trump Administration.”38 He
33
Id; (emphasis added).
34
Charles Creitz, Medicare chief Verma blasts Cuomo for trying to deflect blame onto White House fo NY nursing
home deaths, Fox News (May 28, 2020).
35
Memorandum from the New York State Department of Health to Nursing Home Administrators, et. al. (Mar. 25,
2020) (on file with Comm. Staff).
36
Id; (emphasis added).
37
Oct. 13 Birx TI at 119-121.
38
Letter from hon. James E. Clyburn, Chairman, Select Subcomm. On the Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. On
Oversight & Reform, & Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Chairwoman, H. Comm. On Oversight & Reform, to Hon. Steve
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continued, “[y]our apparent effort to use the issue of the origin of the virus in order to shift
accountability from President Trump…is an irresponsible gambit that we urge you to
abandon.”39
Unfortunately for Subcommittee Democrats, investigating the origins of COVID-19 is
not a political pursuit. In fact, on May 14, 2021, Dr. Jesse Bloom and 17 other respected
scientists called for the origins to be investigated. They wrote, “[k]nowing how COVID-19
emerged is critical for informing global strategies to mitigate the risk of future outbreaks.”40 The
authors continued, “[w]e must take hypothesis about both natural and laboratory spillovers
seriously…”41 Additionally, on September 17, 2021, another 16 scientists writing in The Lancet,
said, “[o]verwhelming evidence for either zoonotic or research-related origin is lacking: the jury
is still out.”42
On September 14, 2022, The Lancet COVID-19 Commission said, “[i]dentifiying these
origins would provide greater clarity into not only the causes of the current pandemic but also
vulnerabilities to future outbreaks and strategies to prevent them.”43 The Commission continued,
“…hypothesis about both natural and laboratory spillovers are in play and need further
investigation.”44
Despite these calls from numerous respected scientists for further investigation into the
origins of COVID-19, Subcommittee Democrats chose to play politics and ignore them.
Understanding the origins of COVID-19 is not only about accountability but also about
preparing for and defending against future viral pandemics.
VI. Subcommittee Democrats failed to investigate President Biden’s politically
motivated decision making.
Select Subcommittee Democrats refused to investigate the Biden Administration’s
routine decisions that followed the political science instead of the medical science. For instance,
while campaigning, President Biden promised there would be no vaccine mandate but on
September 9, 2021, through executive order, he imposed a vaccine mandate.45 The Biden
Administration went so far as to blame the pandemic on Republicans and the unvaccinated
without any evidence.46
J. Scalise, Ranking Member, Select Subcomm. On the Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. On Oversight & Reform, &
Hon. James R. Comer, Ranking Member, H. Comm. On Oversight & Reform (June 11, 2021).
39
Id.
40
Jesse D. Bloom, et. al., Investigate the origins of COVID-19, SCIENCE (May 14, 2021).
41
Id.
42
Jacques van Helden, et. al., An appeal for an objective, open, and transparent debate about the origin of SARS-
CoV-2, THE LANCET (Sept. 17, 2022).
43
Jeffrey D. Sachs, et. al., The Lancet Commission on lessons for the future form the COVID-19 pandemic, THE
LANCET (Sept. 14, 2022).
44
Id.
45
See Jacob Jarvis, Fact Check: Did Joe Biden Reject Idea of Mandatory Vaccines in December 2020?, NEWSWEEK
(Sept. 10, 2021); Bloomberg Quicktake (@Quicktake), Twitter (July 23, 2021 02:16 p.m.),
https://mobile.twitter.com/Quicktake/status/1418636102643167235; Zeke Miller, Sweeping new vaccine mandates
for 100 million Americans, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 9, 2021).
46
Remarks, The White House, Remarks by President Biden on Fighting the COVID-19 Pandemic (Sept. 9, 2021).
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Further, on February 24, 2022, polling firm Impact Research argued in a now-public
memoranda that the Democrats need to “declare the crisis phase of COVID over and push for
feeling and acting more normal.”47 The next day, the CDC ended their masking restrictions in
most places despite the fact that just two weeks prior CDC Director Walensky said it was not yet
time.48
In addition, the Biden Administration has repeatedly renewed the COVID-19 public
health emergency, and thus the extension of social welfare programs, despite President Biden
declaring the pandemic over.49 Select Subcommittee Democrats’ have refused to investigate any
of these politically based decisions by the Biden Administration.
VII. Subcommittee Democrats failed to investigate the Biden Administration’s
decision not to purchase more rapid, at-home COVID-19 tests leading up to the
holidays in 2021.
Select Subcommittee Democrats ignored reports that the Biden Administration refused to
purchase more rapid, at-home tests for Americans headed into the 2021 holiday season which
corresponded with a dramatic surge in cases. In July 2020, during the Trump Administration,
Chairman Clyburn said, “[w]ithout widely available, rapid testing, it is nearly impossible to
control the spread of the virus…”50 The Chairman went on to say that the Trump Administration
was “warned” about testing and “failed.”51
However, the Biden Administration was not only warned about a lack of available testing
but flatly rejected an October 22, 2021 proposal to ramp up manufacturing and deliver tests to
Americans prior to Christmas.52 This plan detailed the need for about 400 million tests.53
Ironically, exactly two months later, President Biden said, “I wish I had thought about ordering”
500 million at-home tests “two-months ago.”54 Yet no investigation was launched by the Select
Subcommittee Democrats.
47
Julie Hamill, @hamill_law, Twitter (Feb. 25, 2022),
https://twitter.com/hamill_law/status/1497205184790872065.
48
Julie Hamill, @hamill_law, Twitter (Feb. 25, 2022),
https://twitter.com/hamill_law/status/1497205184790872065; Mitch Smith & Shawn Hubler, Masks Come Off in
More States, but Not Everyone is Grinning, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2022).
49
Declaration, Administration for Strategic Preparedness & Response, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv.,
Renewal of Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists (Oct. 15, 2022); Adam Cancryn & Krista Mahr,
Biden declared the pandemic ‘over.’ His Covid team says it’s more complicated, POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2022).
50
The Urgent Need for a National Plan to Contain the Coronavirus, Hearing Before the Select Subcomm. on the
Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 117th Cong. (July 31, 2020).
51
Id.
52
Katherine Eban, The Biden Administration Rejected an October Proposal for “Free Rapid Tests for the
Holidays”, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 23, 2021).
53
Id.
54
Ben Gittleson, President Biden to ABC’s David Muir on at-home COVID testing: ‘Nothing’s been good enough’,
ABC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2021).
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VIII. Subcommittee Democrats failed to investigate the Food and Drug
Administration’s and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s actions
sidelining scientific experts regarding vaccine booster shots.
Select Subcommittee Democrats disregarded the fact that President Biden’s FDA and
CDC intentionally sidelined or ignored outside vaccine experts that did not support the Biden
Administration’s vaccine only strategy. On August 18, 2021, without evidence and data,
President Biden announced that booster doses of the mRNA vaccines would be available for
Americans starting September 20, 2021.55 Top scientists and researchers were stunned by this
decision—particularly because the CDC and the FDA had not yet conducted their independent
review of the data.56 In fact, two vaccine manufacturers have not yet submitted the relevant data
to the government agencies.57 This political manipulation and pressure to interfere with the
science by President Biden’s White House reportedly contributed to the decision of two top
career scientists, Marion Gruber and Phill Krause, who were key in the vaccine process, to leave
the FDA.58 They felt that the FDA was being sidelined by the Biden Administration and
according to press reports "what finally did it for them was the White House getting ahead of
FDA on booster shots."59
We now know that those same FDA scientists disagreed with the Biden Administration
on the need for booster shots. In a paper published September 13, 2021, both Krause and Gruber
argued that “[c]urrent evidence does not, therefore, appear to show a need for boosting in the
general population, in which efficacy against severe disease remains high.”60 Despite this blatant
disregard of scientific process, Select Subcommittee Democrats refused to investigate allowing
the Biden Administration to engage in politicization of the vaccine approval process.
IX. Conclusion
Subcommittee Republicans will work to uncover the facts in the next Congress and
ensure that America is ready for the next pandemic.
Steve Scalise
Ranking Member
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
55
Bob Herman, FDA’s top vaccine leaders are leaving, Axios (Aug. 31, 2021); Erin Banco, Sarah Owerwohle &
Adam Cancryn, Tensions mount between CDC and Biden health team over boosters, POLITICO (Sept. 13, 2021).
56
Caitlin Owens, The bureaucracy pushes back on Biden's booster plan, AXIOS (Sept. 1, 2021).
57
Erin Banco, Sarah Owerwohle & Adam Cancryn, Tensions mount between CDC and Biden health team over
boosters, POLITICO (Sept. 13, 2021).
58
Caitlin Owens, The bureaucracy pushes back on Biden's booster plan, AXIOS (Sept. 1, 2021).
59
Id.
60
Phillip R Krause, et.al, Considerations in boosting COVID-19 vaccine immune responses, LANCET (Sept. 13,
2021).
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