Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint — United States v. Joshua Bellamy (Southern District of Florida)
Summary
Affidavit of Michael Benivegna, a Special Agent with IRS-CI, in support of a criminal complaint charging Joshua Bellamy with wire fraud, bank fraud, and attempt and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, from on or about May 21, 2020, to at least on or about August 3, 2020, in the Southern District of Florida. The affidavit states that Bellamy obtained a PPP loan for Drip Entertainment LLC with CHS 2 providing falsified documents, and that IRS records show Drip Entertainment did not file any Forms 941 for the first quarter of 2020. It also describes a call in which UC3 and Bellamy discuss a new application for $1.2 million, and Bellamy agrees to pay UC3 35% of the new loan proceeds.
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“Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint — United States v. Joshua Bellamy (Southern District of Florida).”
Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/crim-flsd-0-21-cr-60064-u-s-v-joshua-bellamy-docx-complaint-ef2b6292b4/
, SHA-256 141e973f1474118cc38f12b77f5244653d516c51be028ad5cf7726f33cb12c0a.Full text
Tamisha Shotwell
Sep 9, 2020
AFFIDAVIT
I, Michael Benivegna, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
1. I make this Affidavit in support of a criminal complaint charging JOSHUA
BELLAMY (“BELLAMY” or “Defendant”), with wire fraud, bank fraud, attempt and conspiracy
to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, 1349, and 2, from
on or about May 21, 2020, to at least on or about August 3, 2020, in the Southern District of
Florida, and elsewhere (the “Target Offenses”).
2. Defendant has participated in a scheme to obtain by fraud millions of dollars in
forgivable loans through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) and other government
programs, conspiring with a person now cooperating with the investigation (“CHS 2”) and others.
Defendant obtained a fraudulent PPP loan for his own company, Drip Entertainment LLC (“Drip
Entertainment”), with CHS 2 providing falsified documents and assisting in submitting the
application on Defendant’s behalf in exchange for a kickback from the loan proceeds. Defendant
also conspired to submit a number of additional fraudulent PPP loan applications for other
companies by recruiting other confederate loan applicants. To inflate the size of these PPP loans,
and the corresponding kickbacks, the conspirators relied on a variety of false statements, including
by submitting falsified bank statements and payroll tax forms. For example, the conspirators used
nearly identical versions of the same fabricated bank statements, recycled in the PPP applications
for multiple companies with minor changes.
3. The conspirators in the scheme planned or prepared at least 90 fraudulent
applications, most of which were submitted. Based on the evidence investigators have reviewed
to date, CHS 2, Defendant, and their co-conspirators applied for PPP loans that are together worth
more than $24 million dollars, with at least approximately 42 of those loans approved and funded
for a total of approximately $17.4 million. Certain of those loan recipients then wired a kickback
of varying amounts, often approximately 25% of the fraudulent loan proceeds, to an account
controlled by CHS 2.
4. I am a Special Agent with the United States Department of The Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”) and have been employed in this capacity since
October 2016. I am presently assigned to the Miami Field Office. My duties as a Special Agent
include the investigation of possible criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of
the United States Code), the Bank Secrecy Act (Title 31 of the United States Code), and the Money
Laundering Statutes (Title 18 of the United States Code). I graduated from the Criminal
Investigator Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in April 2017 and
the Special Agent Investigative Techniques program at the National Criminal Investigation
Training Academy in July 2017. In these two programs, I studied a variety of law enforcement
tactics and criminal investigator techniques relating to tax and financial crimes. Since becoming
an IRS-CI Special Agent, I have personally investigated and assisted in investigations relating to
the Internal Revenue Laws and financial crimes. Recently, I have been assigned to work with the
U.S. Department of Justice and other law enforcement partners, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General, to investigate
possible fraud associated with the stimulus and economic assistance programs created by the
federal government in response to the COVID-19 program.
5. The facts in this Affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and
experience, and information obtained from other members of law enforcement and from witnesses.
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This Affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause and does not set
forth all of my knowledge about this matter. 1
PROBABLE CAUSE
The Paycheck Protection Program
6. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act is a federal
law enacted in or around March 2020 and designed to provide emergency financial assistance to
the millions of Americans who are suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19
pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of up to $349
billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses, through
a program referred to as the PPP. In or around April 2020, Congress authorized over $300 billion
in additional PPP funding.
7. In order to obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business must submit a PPP loan
application, which is signed by an authorized representative of the business. The PPP loan
application requires the business (through its authorized representative) to acknowledge the
program rules and make certain affirmative certifications in order to be eligible to obtain the PPP
loan. In the PPP loan application, the small business (through its authorized representative) must
state, among other things, its: (a) average monthly payroll expenses; and (b) number of employees.
These figures are used to calculate the amount of money the small business is eligible to receive
under the PPP. In addition, businesses applying for a PPP loan must provide documentation
showing their payroll expenses.
1
The conduct and charges described in this Affidavit are part of a larger investigation that
is being conducted in this District and elsewhere. As a result, not all numbered sources and
anonymous individuals and entities are described in every filing. I have included in this Affidavit
only those individuals and entities I have deemed necessary to explain the particular facts set forth
here.
Page 3 of 15
8. A PPP loan application must be processed by a participating lender. If a PPP loan
application is approved, the participating lender funds the PPP loan using its own monies, which
are 100% guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”). Data from the application,
including information about the borrower, the total amount of the loan, and the listed number of
employees, is transmitted by the lender to the SBA in the course of processing the loan.
9. PPP loan proceeds must be used by the business on certain permissible expenses—
payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent, and utilities. The PPP allows the interest and principal
on the PPP loan to be entirely forgiven if the business spends the loan proceeds on these expense
items within a designated period of time after receiving the proceeds and uses a certain amount of
the PPP loan proceeds on payroll expenses.
The Scheme to Obtain Fraudulent PPP Loans
10. On or about May 13, 2020, Phillip J. Augustin (“Augustin”) and CHS 2 worked
together to submit a fraudulent PPP loan application on behalf of a company owned by Augustin. 2
Augustin submitted a PPP loan of $84,515 to a federally insured bank (hereinafter “Bank 3”),
through a third-party company processor (hereinafter “Bank Processor 1”). 3 The application
included bank statements that are clear forgeries, and CHS 2 has admitted that the application was
based on documents that he falsified for Augustin. 4
2
On or about July 28, 2020, Augustin was charged by complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio on allegations of wire fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy to
commit wire and bank fraud, and obstruction of justice. See United States v. Augustin, Case No.
1:20-mj-227 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2020). The charges remain pending against Augustin.
3
All banks referenced in this Affidavit are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
4
On June 25, 2020, investigators arrested CHS 2 and another person now cooperating with
the investigation (“CHS 3”) and executed search warrants at their residences. Following his arrest,
CHS 2 chose to cooperate with the investigation in the hope of obtaining favorable consideration
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11. Following the success of that initial fraudulent PPP application, Augustin and CHS
2 began to work on obtaining more and larger PPP loans for Augustin’s associates and others,
generally for several hundred thousand dollars for each loan, up to as much as approximately $1.24
million. Based on the evidence investigators have reviewed so far, CHS 2 and Augustin
collectively coordinated applications for PPP loans that are together worth more than $24 million
dollars. The evidence also shows many more PPP loans were attempted but rejected by banks or
their partners, or were planned and prepared, but not submitted before CHS 2’s arrest. The
evidence suggests that all or nearly all of those loan applications were fraudulent, including
Defendant’s loan application and the applications Defendant orchestrated by referring additional
confederates to the conspiracy.
12. Investigators have obtained many other PPP loan applications that CHS 2 has
admitted he submitted as part of this scheme, based on falsified documents, and have also obtained
draft documents used or intended to be used in those applications or others. These applications all
follow the same pattern of fraud—many with obviously counterfeit February 2020 bank
statements, and all with fabricated IRS Forms 941 (titled, “Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax
Return”) with the same indicia of fraud found in Augustin’s initial application—but generally with
even larger inflated payroll numbers, thus yielding much larger loans. 5 CHS 2 has explained to
investigators that the figures in the Forms 941 were the product of a formula that allowed him to
in connection with his pending charges. CHS 2 was interviewed on that day, and has continued to
cooperate with the investigation after obtaining counsel. Most of his statements related herein
have been corroborated by records obtained from third parties or recovered from his electronic
devices.
5
Some loan applications also included voided checks that appear to be falsified, such as a
purported Bank 5 check that appears to have been produced on a computer and, as the subject line
reads, “Converted to PDF,” rather than a scan of an authentic check.
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start with a target loan amount, and then “back into” the payroll figures on the form. He explained
how he used figures that would produce an average monthly payroll for 2019 that, when multiplied
by 2.5, would yield the requested loan amount. In turn, the number of employees reported was
chosen based on fictional payroll figures, chosen to avoid an average employee salary that might
raise suspicion.
13. CHS 2 has also explained that he tried to use bank statements showing that the
company had a large balance. Because so few companies had such a statement, and likely also
because it was easier than keeping track of their true statements, CHS 2 repeatedly submitted near-
replicas of the same falsified bank statements. In particular, CHS 2 appears to have recycled one
statement each from Bank 1, Bank 6, and Bank 7. In recycling a statement, CHS 2 generally
changed only the account number and the account holder’s name and address, such that each
version of the statement had identical figures and line items throughout the statement.
14. A review of records for bank accounts controlled by CHS 2 at Bank 5 confirm CHS
2’s admissions that he received numerous kickbacks, often of approximately 25% of the amount
of the loans, and that he regularly wired Augustin a share of that kickback in the early stages of
the scheme. CHS 2 explained that they were doing so many loans by the end of May that he
changed course, instead wiring larger lump sums, collecting Augustin’s shares of the kickbacks
for multiple loans in one wire.
15. Investigators are still receiving and analyzing records, but based on a preliminary
analysis, as of August 31, 2020, investigators had identified a total of $2,367,765.82 in transfers
to CHS 2’s accounts from entities that each obtained a sizable PPP loan and that were identified
in the PPP files seized from CHS 2’s and another co-conspirator’s residences, as described
below—or from individuals associated with those entities.
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16. The PPP loans identified above as implicated in the foregoing kickback payments
to CHS 2 represent only a fraction of the overall scheme. In executing search warrants at the
respective residences of CHS 2 and CHS 3, federal agents found stacks of paper printed out and
organized by entity, containing an “intake form,” fabricated Forms 941, or both for each entity.
The intake forms contained fields for the information needed to fabricate the documents and fill
out other aspects of the PPP application: identifying information about the owner and company,
as well as bank account information for receiving the loan. A section at the end marked “BELOW
IS OFFICE USE ONLY” included blank fields for the “Number of Employees,” “Monthly Payroll
Expense,” and “SBA Loan Pre-Approval Amount.” Between CHS 2’s and CHS 3’s residences,
investigators seized paper files for PPP loan applications for approximately 80 different entities.
17. Data obtained from the SBA showed additional PPP loan applications from
additional entities that text message and email records show had been referred to CHS 2 by
members of the conspiracy.
The Fraudulent PPP Loan to Defendant’s Company: Drip Entertainment
18. According to Florida’s Division of Corporations website (“Sunbiz”), Drip
Entertainment was incorporated in or around September 2018. BELLAMY is listed as the
company’s sole manager. According to Sunbiz, the principal address of Drip Entertainment
appears to be the same address as that of the law firm that is the company’s listed registered agent.
19. According to Sunbiz, Drip Entertainment was administratively dissolved in or
around September 2019 for failure to file an annual report. It remains inactive to this day.
20. On or about May 27, 2020, a PPP loan application package on behalf of Drip
Entertainment was electronically submitted to Bank 2 through Bank Processor 1. The loan
application package included, among other documents: (1) purported Forms 941 for all four
Page 7 of 15
quarters of 2019 in the name of Drip Entertainment; (2) a company bank statement for Drip
Entertainment; (3) an application form; and (4) a resolution to borrow.
21. The purported Forms 941 included in the application show quarterly payroll of
almost $1.5 million each quarter, for 47 employees. That quarterly payroll figure yielded the PPP
loan application’s “Average Monthly Payroll” figure of $498,626, which determined the
$1,246,565 amount of the loan. Each Form 941 was signed by hand with the name “Joshua
Bellamy” as the company owner, and also listed BELLAMY as the company’s designee and as a
“Paid Preparer,” though he is not a paid tax preparer. The Drip Entertainment Forms 941 follow
the same style and pattern as the many other Forms 941 that CHS 2, described above,
acknowledged that he helped create and submit in the course of the scheme, including in the indicia
of fraud. 6 IRS records show that Drip Entertainment did not, in fact, file any Forms 941 for any
quarter of 2019 or the first quarter of 2020, and Florida Department of Revenue records show that
Drip Entertainment did not report any wages or employees for that same period.
22. The purported company bank statement, which was submitted in electronic format,
is a clear forgery. First, according to the document’s file “properties,” the statement was created
6
As noted above, BELLAMY was listed as both owner and paid preparer. Dozens of other
Forms 941 submitted in this scheme evidence the same error. CHS 2 has admitted that these
documents share that feature because he misunderstood the form, and he (or someone following
his instructions) prepared all of the Forms 941 at issue. The content of the forms also indicate
falsification. All four quarterly forms are nearly identical, and the four forms for Drip
Entertainment are identical, down to the penny, in reported figures. They also evidence a pattern
of payroll spending that is likely false: each of the quarters shows significant increases from the
first to second to third month of the quarter. For each identical form, the same figures are reported
for the tax liability incurred in the first month of each quarter, the same figure for the second month
of each quarter (increased substantially from the first month), and the same figure for the third
month of the quarter (increased substantially from the second month). The result is that the
company reports a perfectly repeating cycle of ascending payroll costs within each quarter. CHS
2 has explained that this was due to a formula he used, allocating different percentages of the
quarterly payroll tax liability to each month of each quarter.
Page 8 of 15
using “PDFFILLER,” a program used to edit electronic PDF files, and was “modified using iText.”
Second, the statement is a recycled version of the same falsified Bank 7 statement used in other
fraudulent applications submitted as part of this scheme.
23. The application form, labeled at the top, “Paycheck Protection Program Borrower
Application Form,” listed BELLAMY as the owner of Drip Entertainment, claimed the company
had 47 employees, and stated that the average monthly payroll was $498,626. Based on this figure,
the amount of the PPP loan request was $1,246,565. The application form required the borrower
to electronically initial a number of “certifications,” including: (1) that the applicant was in
operation on February 15, 2020 and had employees to whom it paid salaries/payroll taxes or paid
independent contractors, as reported on Form(s) 1099; (2) that the funds would be used to retain
workers, maintain payroll, or make mortgage/interest/lease/utility payments as specified by the
PPP rule and that unauthorized use could result in charges for fraud; and (3) that the information
provided in the application, including in supporting documents, was “true and accurate in all
material respects,” and that making false statements could result in criminal charges. The
application was electronically signed with the name “Joshua Bellamy,” and each certification was
electronically initialed “JB.”
24. The resolution to borrow set forth the amount of the loan ($1,246,565), and a
number of certifications by the borrower, Drip Entertainment, including that it was “in good
standing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of its organization.” The document was
electronically signed with the name “Joshua Bellamy.”
25. Based on the representations made in the loan application paperwork and
supporting documents, the PPP loan application for Drip Entertainment was approved, and on or
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about May 28, 2020, Bank 2 wired approximately $1,246,565 in loan proceeds into BELLAMY’s
personal bank account.
CHS 2 Confirmed to Law Enforcement that the Drip Entertainment PPP Loan Was Fraudulent
and that BELLAMY Referred Others to the Scheme
26. Investigators spoke with CHS 2 about BELLAMY and the Drip Entertainment PPP
loan. CHS 2 stated that he had met BELLAMY through Augustin, who had asked him to prepare
the loan application for BELLAMY. CHS 2 also stated that he discussed with BELLAMY the
25% fee that CHS 2 was charging for the loan. CHS 2 confirmed that the Drip Entertainment loan
application was indeed fraudulent and that he had assisted BELLAMY in preparing and submitting
it. Specifically, CHS 2 stated that he: (1) created for BELLAMY an online account for Drip
Entertainment with Bank Processor 1; (2) created and submitted the fake Drip Entertainment bank
statement; and (3) created, submitted, and signed (on behalf of BELLAMY), the false Forms 941.
CHS 2 stated that he did not know who electronically signed the actual loan application paperwork.
However, according to IP records from Docusign, the eSignature platform used by Bank Processor
1, a computer with an IP address (ending in 164) associated with the residence of one of Augustin’s
associates in Broward County, Florida, was used to electronically sign the Drip Entertainment loan
application.
27. CHS 2 also stated that, in addition to the Drip Entertainment loan, BELLAMY
referred to him a number of friends/associates for the purpose of creating and submitting additional
fraudulent PPP loans. CHS 2 explained that he submitted fraudulent PPP loan applications on
behalf of BELLAMY’s referrals but that none of the loans were approved because, he believed,
Bank Processor 1 had caught on to their scheme.
Page 10 of 15
Emails and Text Messages Confirm BELLAMY’s Knowing Participation in the Fraud
28. As part of its investigation, law enforcement obtained communications between
CHS 2 and BELLAMY, including text messages. I have reviewed a number of these
communications, which discuss, among other things, BELLAMY’s PPP loan and the loans for the
individuals and companies he referred to CHS 2.
29. For example, on or about May 28, 2020 (the day the Drip Entertainment loan was
funded), CHS 2 texted BELLAMY wiring instructions and stated that “[t]he amount to wire
$311,641.67 [approximately 25% of the loan amount].” BELLAMY responded, “Sending wire
now.”
30. On June 15, 2020, CHS 2 texted BELLAMY about getting his PPP loan forgiven:
“Josh Its [redacted] we need to start your forgiveness paperwork by wednesday of this week so i
need you to send my 19,000 to complete all your docs your gonna need for all your employees
You can send it to the same company you sent the other money to Let me know when you send it
Thanks.” Later that day, CHS 2 reminded BELLAMY: “[D]on’t forget about the 19k for the
forgiveness for the SBA need to have submitted by wednesday and you have 50 employees we
need to get all there paper work in.” Then, the next day, CHS 2 texted BELLAMY again about
forgiveness: “Josh I have my crew working on the forgiveness package for you let me know when
you can deposit the 19k I need to pay them we have to have all 49 employees entered by the end
of tomorrow let me know.” According to BELLAMY’s bank records, on or about June 19, 2020,
he wired $19,000 to one of CHS 2’s bank accounts.
31. On or about May 30, 2020, BELLAMY sent a text message to CHS 2 with
information about one of his referrals, including: (1) the individual’s name, address, date of birth,
Page 11 of 15
social security number, and e-mail address; (2) the individual’s business name, business address,
Federal Tax ID; and (3) bank account and routing numbers.
32. The next day, BELLAMY sent CHS 2 another text message with similar
information regarding a second referral. BELLAMY then stated as to this referral: “What’s up
[redacted] this is my big brother [redacted] can you help him thru the process and kind of explain
the whole thing[?]”
33. On June 5, 2020, BELLAMY sent CHS 2 a text message, “What’s up [redacted]
how is everything going.” CHS 2 responded to BELLAMY, “Very slow a lot of declines we think
bluevine is out of cash but were still waiting.” BELLAMY replied, “Ok.”
BELLAMY’s Banking Activity Confirms His Knowing Participation in the Fraud
34. I have also reviewed BELLAMY’s bank records, which confirm BELLAMY’s
receipt and use of the PPP loan proceeds. Specifically, on or about May 28, 2020, Bank 2 wired
the loan amount, $1,246,565, into BELLAMY’s personal account, which, at the time, had a
balance of only $2.51. That same day, BELLAMY wired $311,641.67 (approximately 25% of the
loan proceeds) to one of CHS 2’s bank accounts.
35. Thereafter, in just over two months’ time, BELLAMY spent nearly all of the
remaining loan proceeds. Based on my review of the bank records, it does not appear that much,
if any, of the proceeds went to business or payroll related expenditures. For example, there are a
number of large withdrawals, including two withdrawals totaling approximately $69,800 on June
1, 2020, a $30,000 withdrawal on June 2, 2020, a $20,000 withdrawal on June 6, 2020, a $10,000
withdrawal on June 13, 2020, and then two withdrawals totaling approximately $33,000 on June
15, 2020. In total, bank records show BELLAMY withdrew approximately $302,800 between
May 28, 2020 and July 28, 2020.
Page 12 of 15
36. BELLAMY’s bank records also reflect what appear to be purchases of jewelry and
other luxury items. For example, on June 2, 2020, BELLAMY sent a wire transfer of $57,000 to
a custom jewelry store, and on June 3, 2020, he sent a $38,000 wire transfer to another jewelry
store. On June 8, 2020, BELLAMY purchased $5,381.60 in goods at Gucci and $1,020.98 at
Milano Exchange. On June 14, 2020, BELLAMY spent $2,014.80 at Dior.
37. BELLAMY’s bank records also reflect a number of expenditures for what appears
to be travel and hotels. From May 28 to July 24, 2020, BELLAMY spent over $6,630 on
transactions with various airlines. He also spent approximately $62,774 at the Seminole Hard
Rock Hotel and Casino.
BELLAMY’s Phone Call with an Undercover Agent Confirms His Knowing Participation in the
Fraud
38. On or about August 3, 2020, an undercover agent (“UC3”), posing as an associate
of one of the conspirators in the scheme, spoke with BELLAMY by telephone and claimed to be
able to assist him with the forgiveness of his PPP loan and obtaining a second PPP loan for him.
39. During the call, BELLAMY told UC3 that he was trying to have his prior PPP loan
forgiven and obtain another loan. UC3 asked BELLAMY for information about his company,
supposedly in order to prepare the necessary paperwork. For example, UC3 asked about how
many employees Drip Entertainment has. BELLAMY responded, “I got as many employees as I
want.” When UC3 stated he needed to write a specific number of employees on the form,
BELLAMY instructed him to write 15 on the form. UC3 asked how many employees CHS 2 had
put down on his prior application, and BELLAMY replied that he did not know. UC3 also asked
whether, in the first application, CHS 2 told him it was a PPP loan. BELLAMY responded that
CHS 2 did, in fact, tell him it was a PPP loan.
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40. UC3 asked BELLAMY how much money he wanted this time, noting that $1.2
million would require about 50 employees. BELLAMY initially stated that he did not need that
much and was only trying to get around $200,000. BELLAMY then asked if the application was
going to be through Bank Processor 1 again. When UC3 stated that it was, BELLAMY told him
to apply for another $1.2 million. UC3 noted that BELLAMY had previously told him to put down
15 employees on the form and that he would now need to put down 50 employees. BELLAMY
responded, “Put 50 then.” When UC3 mentioned that he would have to come up with 50
employees and BELLAMY would have to “break me off,” BELLAMY responded, “I’m gonna
break you off.” UC3 told BELLAMY that he would come up with names of employees to include
in the paperwork, to which BELLAMY asked, “You’re gonna need some names?” UC3 responded
that he (UC3) would take care of that, and BELLAMY stated, “You can say 50.”
41. When UC3 asked how he had spent the PPP loan funds, BELLAMY stated that he
was “buying stuff”, wiring out money, and withdrawing money. He added that he made purchases
for his “artists . . . doing videos and stuff like that.”
42. During the call, BELLAMY agreed to pay UC3 35% of the new loan proceeds –
10% for his work to obtain forgiveness of the first PPP loan and 25% for obtaining the second PPP
loan – once he receives the funds.
43. At the end of the call, BELLAMY stated he had additional people to refer to UC3
for loans, including his girlfriend, his mom, and his brother. He added that CHS 2 had not done
anything for them yet.
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