Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint — United States v. Tonye Johnson (Southern District of Florida)
Summary
Affidavit of Michael Benivegna, a Special Agent with the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation, in support of a criminal complaint charging Tonye Johnson with wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in the Southern District of Florida. The conduct runs from on or about May 14, 2020, to at least on or about August 25, 2020. The affidavit states that Johnson obtained a PPP loan of $389,627 for Synergy Towing & Transportation LLC, a Pennsylvania limited liability company, based on a purported average monthly payroll of $155,851 for 16 employees. It states that on May 21, 2020, Johnson wired $97,418, approximately 25 percent of the loan proceeds, to an account controlled by CHS 2.
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“Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint — United States v. Tonye Johnson (Southern District of Florida).”
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Tamisha Shotwell
Sep 18, 2020
AFFIDAVIT
I, Michael Benivegna, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
1. I make this Affidavit in support of a criminal complaint charging TONYE
JOHNSON (“JOHNSON”) with wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and
bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, and 1349, from on or about May 14, 2020, to
at least on or about August 25, 2020, in the Southern District of Florida, and elsewhere (the “Target
Offenses”).
2. JOHNSON and conspirators have participated in a scheme to obtain by fraud
millions of dollars in forgivable loans through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) and other
government programs, and have done so by conspiring with a person now cooperating with the
investigation (“CHS 2”) and others. JOHNSON obtained a fraudulent PPP loan for his own
company, Synergy Towing & Transportation LLC (“Synergy”), a Pennsylvania limited liability
company, with CHS 2 providing falsified documents and assisting in submitting the application
on JOHNSON’s behalf in exchange for a kickback from the loan proceeds. To inflate the size of
these PPP loans, and the corresponding kickbacks, the conspirators relied on a variety of false
statements, including by submitting falsified bank statements and payroll tax forms. For example,
the conspirators used nearly identical versions of the same fabricated bank statements, recycled in
the PPP applications for multiple companies with minor changes.
3. The conspirators in the scheme planned or prepared at least 90 fraudulent
applications, most of which were submitted. Based on the evidence investigators have reviewed
to date, CHS 2, JOHNSON, and their co-conspirators applied for PPP loans that are together worth
more than $24 million dollars, with at least approximately 42 of those loans approved and funded
for a total of approximately $17.4 million. Certain of those loan recipients then wired a kickback
of varying amounts, often approximately 25% of the fraudulent loan proceeds, to an account
controlled by CHS 2.
4. I am a Special Agent with the United States Department of The Treasury, Internal
Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (“IRS-CI”) and have been employed in this capacity since
October 2016. I am presently assigned to the Miami Field Office. My duties as a Special Agent
include the investigation of possible criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of
the United States Code), the Bank Secrecy Act (Title 31 of the United States Code), and the Money
Laundering Statutes (Title 18 of the United States Code). I graduated from the Criminal
Investigator Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in April 2017 and
the Special Agent Investigative Techniques program at the National Criminal Investigation
Training Academy in July 2017. In these two programs, I studied a variety of law enforcement
tactics and criminal investigator techniques relating to tax and financial crimes. Since becoming
an IRS-CI Special Agent, I have personally investigated and assisted in investigations relating to
the Internal Revenue Laws and financial crimes. Recently, I have been assigned to work with the
U.S. Department of Justice and other law enforcement partners, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General, to investigate
possible fraud associated with the stimulus and economic assistance programs created by the
federal government in response to the COVID-19 program.
5. The facts in this Affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and
experience, and information obtained from other members of law enforcement and from witnesses.
This Affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause and does not set
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forth all of my knowledge about this matter.1
PROBABLE CAUSE
The Paycheck Protection Program
6. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act is a federal
law enacted in or around March 2020 and designed to provide emergency financial assistance to
the millions of Americans who are suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19
pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of up to $349
billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses, through
a program referred to as the PPP. In or around April 2020, Congress authorized over $300 billion
in additional PPP funding.
7. In order to obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business must submit a PPP loan
application, which is signed by an authorized representative of the business. The PPP loan
application requires the business (through its authorized representative) to acknowledge the
program rules and make certain affirmative certifications in order to be eligible to obtain the PPP
loan. In the PPP loan application, the small business (through its authorized representative) must
state, among other things, its: (a) average monthly payroll expenses; and (b) number of employees.
These figures are used to calculate the amount of money the small business is eligible to receive
under the PPP. In addition, businesses applying for a PPP loan must provide documentation
showing their payroll expenses.
8. A PPP loan application must be processed by a participating lender. If a PPP loan
1
The conduct and charges described in this Affidavit are part of a larger investigation that
is being conducted in this District and elsewhere. As a result, not all numbered sources and
anonymous individuals and entities are described in every filing. I have included in this Affidavit
only those individuals and entities I have deemed necessary to explain the particular facts set forth
here.
Page 3 of 16
application is approved, the participating lender funds the PPP loan using its own monies, which
are 100% guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”). Data from the application,
including information about the borrower, the total amount of the loan, and the listed number of
employees, is transmitted by the lender to the SBA in the course of processing the loan.
9. PPP loan proceeds must be used by the business on certain permissible expenses—
payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent, and utilities. The PPP allows the interest and principal
on the PPP loan to be entirely forgiven if the business spends the loan proceeds on these expense
items within a designated period of time after receiving the proceeds and uses a certain amount of
the PPP loan proceeds on payroll expenses.
The Scheme to Obtain Fraudulent PPP Loans
10. On or about May 13, 2020, Phillip J. Augustin (“Augustin”) and CHS 2 worked
together to submit a fraudulent PPP loan application on behalf of a company owned by Augustin.
Augustin submitted a PPP loan of $84,515 to a federally insured bank (hereinafter “Bank 3”),
through a third-party company processor (hereinafter “Bank Processor 1”).2 The application
included bank statements that are clear forgeries, and CHS 2 has admitted that the application was
based on documents that he falsified for Augustin.3
11. Following the success of that initial fraudulent PPP application, Augustin and CHS
2
All banks referenced in this Affidavit are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
3
On June 25, 2020, investigators arrested CHS 2 and another person now cooperating with
the investigation (“CHS 3”) and executed search warrants at their residences. Following his arrest,
CHS 2 chose to cooperate with the investigation in the hope of obtaining favorable consideration
in connection with his pending charges. CHS 2 was interviewed on that day, and has continued to
cooperate with the investigation after obtaining counsel. Most of his statements related herein
have been corroborated by records obtained from third parties or recovered from his electronic
devices.
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2 began to work on obtaining more and larger PPP loans for Augustin’s associates and others,
generally for several hundred thousand dollars for each loan, up to as much as approximately $1.24
million. Based on the evidence investigators have reviewed so far, CHS 2 and Augustin
collectively coordinated applications for PPP loans that are together worth more than $24 million
dollars. The evidence also shows many more PPP loans were attempted but rejected by banks or
their partners, or were planned and prepared, but not submitted before CHS 2’s arrest. The
evidence suggests that all or nearly all of those loan applications were fraudulent, including
JOHNSON’s loan application.
12. Investigators have obtained many other PPP loan applications that CHS 2 has
admitted he submitted as part of this scheme, based on falsified documents, and have also obtained
draft documents used or intended to be used in those applications or others. These applications all
follow the same pattern of fraud—many with obviously counterfeit February 2020 bank
statements, and all with fabricated IRS Forms 941 (titled, “Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax
Return”) with the same indicia of fraud found in Augustin’s initial application—but generally with
even larger inflated payroll numbers, thus yielding much larger loans.4 CHS 2 has explained to
investigators that the figures in the Forms 941 were the product of a formula that allowed him to
start with a target loan amount, and then “back into” the payroll figures on the form. He explained
how he used figures that would produce an average monthly payroll for 2019 that, when multiplied
by 2.5, would yield the requested loan amount. In turn, the number of employees reported was
chosen based on fictional payroll figures, chosen to avoid an average employee salary that might
4
Some loan applications also included voided checks that appear to be falsified, such as a
purported Bank 5 check that appears to have been produced on a computer and, as the subject line
reads, “Converted to PDF,” rather than a scan of an authentic check.
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raise suspicion.
13. CHS 2 has also explained that he tried to use bank statements showing that the
company had a large balance. Because so few companies had such a statement, and likely also
because it was easier than keeping track of their true statements, CHS 2 repeatedly submitted near-
replicas of the same falsified bank statements. In particular, CHS 2 appears to have recycled one
statement each from Bank 1, Bank 6, and Bank 7. In recycling a statement, CHS 2 generally
changed only the account number and the account holder’s name and address, such that each
version of the statement had identical figures and line items throughout the statement.
14. A review of records for bank accounts controlled by CHS 2 at Bank 5 confirm CHS
2’s admissions that he received numerous kickbacks, often of approximately 25% of the amount
of the loans, and that he regularly wired Augustin a share of that kickback in the early stages of
the scheme. CHS 2 explained that they were doing so many loans by the end of May that he
changed course, instead wiring larger lump sums, collecting Augustin’s shares of the kickbacks
for multiple loans in one wire.
15. Investigators are still receiving and analyzing records, but based on a preliminary
analysis, as of August 31, 2020, investigators had identified a total of $2,367,765.82 in transfers
to CHS 2’s accounts from entities that each obtained a sizable PPP loan and that were identified
in the PPP files seized from CHS 2’s and another co-conspirator’s residences, as described
below—or from individuals associated with those entities.
16. The PPP loans identified above as implicated in the foregoing kickback payments
to CHS 2 represent only a fraction of the overall scheme. In executing search warrants at the
respective residences of CHS 2 and CHS 3, federal agents found stacks of paper printed out and
organized by entity, containing an “intake form,” fabricated Forms 941, or both for each entity.
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The intake forms contained fields for the information needed to fabricate the documents and fill
out other aspects of the PPP application: identifying information about the owner and company,
as well as bank account information for receiving the loan. A section at the end marked “BELOW
IS OFFICE USE ONLY” included blank fields for the “Number of Employees,” “Monthly Payroll
Expense,” and “SBA Loan Pre-Approval Amount.” Between CHS 2’s and CHS 3’s residences,
investigators seized paper files for PPP loan applications for approximately 80 different entities.
The Fraudulent PPP Loan to JOHNSON’s Company: Synergy
17. According to the Certificate of Organization for Synergy filed with the
Pennsylvania Department of State, Bureau of Corporations and Charitable Organizations, Synergy
is a Pennsylvania limited liability company that JOHNSON created on June 29, 2015. The
Certification of Organization reflects that JOHNSON is the organizer of the company, JOHNSON
signed the Certificate of Organization, and both the registered company address for Synergy and
JOHNSON’s address as the organizer match JOHNSON’s address of record with the Pennsylvania
Department of Motor Vehicles.
18. On or about May 14, 2020, a PPP loan application package on behalf of Synergy
was electronically submitted to Bank 3 through Bank Processor 1. Internet protocol (“IP”) session
records from Bank Processor 1 for the loan application show that a computer with an IP address
ending in 164 associated with the Broward County, Florida residence of a co-conspirator now
cooperating with the investigation (“CHS 4”) logged into Synergy’s loan account on Bank
Processor 1’s website multiple times between May 14 and May 18, 2020.5 Furthermore, the IP
5
Following arrest, CHS 4 chose to cooperate with the investigation in the hope of obtaining
favorable consideration in connection with pending charges. As discussed in greater detail below,
CHS 4 collected information for Synergy and passed that information to CHS 2 to create falsified
documents and applications. CHS 4 admitted to law enforcement during an interview that,
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session records show that an IP address ending in 245, which according to records obtained from
Verizon is associated with JOHNSON, logged into Synergy’s loan account on Bank Processor 1’s
website on May 18, 2020. As discussed further below, May 18, 2020 is the date on which
JOHNSON signed the Synergy PPP loan application documents via DocuSign.
19. Synergy’s loan application package included, among other documents: (1) four
purported Forms 941 for each quarter of 2019 in the name of Synergy; (2) a purported company
bank statement for Synergy from Bank 6; and (3) a Borrower Application Form for a PPP loan
request of $389,627 for Synergy based upon a purported average monthly payroll of $155,851 for
16 employees (the “PPP Application Form”).
20. The purported Forms 941 submitted with Synergy’s PPP loan application package
show quarterly payroll of exactly $467,555.19 for each quarter, for 16 employees. That quarterly
payroll figure yielded the PPP loan application’s “Average Monthly Payroll” figure of $155,851,
which determined the $389,627 amount of the loan. Each Form 941 was signed by hand with the
name “Tonye Johnson” as the company owner, and also listed “Tonye Johnson” as the company’s
designee and as a “Paid Preparer,” although JOHNSON is not a paid tax preparer.6
21. The purported Forms 941 submitted with Synergy’s PPP loan application package
follow the same style and pattern, including in the indicia of fraud, as the many other Forms 941
that CHS 2 acknowledged he helped create and submit in the course of the scheme, as described
consistent with the IP session records, CHS 4 submitted Synergy’s fraudulent PPP loan application
and supporting documents to Bank Processor 1 on behalf of JOHNSON.
6
CHS 2 admitted during interviews with law enforcement that CHS 2 signed many of the
Forms 941 included in the PPP applications. The signature on Synergy’s Forms 941 included with
its PPP applications resembles a signature that CHS 2 identified as one that CHS 2 forged.
Page 8 of 16
above.7 Moreover, IRS records show that Synergy did not, in fact, file any Forms 941 for any
quarter of 2019 or the first quarter of 2020, and Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry has
no business or wage record information for Synergy from January 1, 2018 through August 2020.
22. The purported company bank statement for Synergy submitted with its PPP loan
application package, which was submitted in electronic format as a PDF, is a clear forgery. First,
it purports to be a February 2020 bank statement from Bank 6 for an account in the name of
Synergy ending in 7620. Although Synergy did have an account at Bank 6 ending in *7620 (“Bank
6 *7620”), I have compared the actual bank records received from Bank 6 for the Bank 6 *7620
account with the purported February 2020 bank statement submitted with Synergy’s PPP loan
application, and they are not the same. In fact, not a single transaction in the purported February
2020 bank statement submitted with Synergy’s PPP loan application matches the actual February
2020 bank statement for the Bank 6 *7620 account obtained from Bank 6. Second, according to
the PDF file “properties,” the February 2020 statement was created using “PDFFILLER,” a
program used to edit electronic PDF files. The metadata shows the file was created on May 14,
7
As noted above, JOHNSON was listed as both owner and paid preparer. Dozens of other
Forms 941 submitted in this scheme evidence the same error. CHS 2 has admitted that these
documents share that feature because he misunderstood the form, and he (or someone following
his instructions) prepared the Forms 941 at issue. The content of the forms also indicate
falsification. Synergy submitted four identical Forms 941, down to the penny in reported figures.
They also evidence a pattern of payroll spending that is likely false: each of the quarters shows
significant (but identical quarter over quarter) increases from the first to second to third month of
the quarter. For each identical form, the same figures are reported for the tax liability incurred in
the first month of each quarter, the same figure for the second month of each quarter (increased
substantially from the first month), and the same figure for the third month of the quarter (increased
substantially from the second month). The result is that the company reports a perfectly repeating
cycle of ascending payroll costs within each quarter. CHS 2 has explained that this was due to a
formula he used, allocating different percentages of the quarterly payroll tax liability to each month
of each quarter.
Page 9 of 16
2020 and modified on May 14, 2020.
23. The PPP Application Form submitted with Synergy’s loan application package
reflects that Synergy had 16 employees with an average monthly payroll of $155,851, which
resulted in its loan request of $389,627. The PPP Application Form required the borrower to
electronically initial and/or sign (via DocuSign, as explained below) a number of “certifications,”
including: (1) that the applicant was in operation on February 15, 2020 and had employees to
whom it paid salaries/payroll taxes or paid independent contractors, as reported on Form(s) 1099;
(2) that the funds would be used to retain workers, maintain payroll, or make
mortgage/interest/lease/utility payments as specified by the PPP rule and that unauthorized use
could result in charges for fraud; and (3) that the information provided in the application, including
in supporting documents, was “true and accurate in all material respects,” and that making false
statements could result in criminal charges. Based on my review of Synergy’s bank records and
other records discussed further below, Synergy did not have 16 employees or an average monthly
payroll of $155,851 as represented in its PPP Application Form.
24. As a result of the false and fraudulent representations made in Synergy’s PPP
Application Form and supporting documents, Bank Processor 1 approved the PPP loan application
for Synergy. As explained in greater detail below, Bank 3 wired $389,627 in loan proceeds to
Synergy on May 20, 2020.
Records Show that JOHNSON Viewed and Signed the PPP Application Form
25. In connection with this investigation, law enforcement obtained records from
DocuSign pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). The DocuSign records shows that, on May 18, 2020,
at 5:06 a.m., Bank Processor 1 sent the PPP Application Form to the DocuSign user “Tonye
Johnson” at the email address “synergytowingtransport@gmail.com.” Records obtained from
Google show that JOHNSON is the account holder for the email address
Page 10 of 16
“synergytowingtransport@gmail.com,” and that the phone number associated with that email
account is (according to AT&T records) a wireless phone number ending in 7719 assigned to the
AT&T account of Synergy. The contact for Synergy’s AT&T account is JOHNSON, and the 7719
phone number is the phone number listed for Synergy on its PPP Application Form. As discussed
further below, JOHNSON used the 7719 phone number to communicate with Augustin in
connection with the fraudulent PPP loan for Synergy.
26. Based upon these records from DocuSign, Google, and AT&T, JOHNSON viewed
the PPP Application Form on May 18, 2020, at 5:06 am, and JOHNSON signed the PPP
Application Form approximately one minute later.
Text Messages and Emails Demonstrate JOHNSON’s Knowing Participation in the Fraud
27. As part of its investigation, law enforcement obtained communications between
Augustin and JOHNSON, including text messages showing JOHNSON’s knowledge that
Synergy’s PPP loan was submitted to and approved by Bank Processor 1.
28. Specifically, on May 14, 2020, Augustin sent JOHNSON a text message (to the
7719 phone number) asking JOHNSON to “send me a screenshot” of the last emails that
JOHNSON had received from Bank Processor 1. JOHNSON replied with three screenshots of
three emails that JOHNSON received from Bank Processor 1,8 each of which is reproduced on the
following page:
8
The name and contact information of Bank Processor 1 displayed in the screenshots of the
emails is redacted in this Affidavit to protect the privacy interest of Bank Processor 1.
Page 11 of 16
Page 12 of 16
29. As shown above, the three emails from Bank Processor 1 sent to JOHNSON
communicated three events related to Synergy’s PPP loan: (1) a “Paycheck Protection Program
loan” was sent to the SBA to be processed; (2) additional action was required before the loan could
be approved; and (3) the PPP loan was approved.
30. JOHNSON also sent Augustin a screenshot of a mobile phone browser that was
logged into the website of Bank Processor 1, which stated: “To process your application, upload a
voided check.”
31. On May 19, 2020, Augustin sent a text message to JOHNSON that provided the
wire instructions for the kickback payment to CHS 2, including the account and routing numbers
of an account ending in 6828 at Bank 5 (“Bank 5 *6828”) controlled by CHS 2. JOHNSON
responded to Augustin, “Ok how much from this first one.” As explained further below,
JOHNSON wired $97,418 to CH2’s Bank 5 *6828 account on May 21, 2020.
JOHNSON’s Phone Calls with an Undercover Agent Confirm His Knowing Participation in the
Fraud.
32. On August 17, 2020, a federal agent acting in an undercover capacity (“UC4”) had
two phone calls with JOHNSON. Each call lasted approximately 12 minutes in duration and was
recorded by UC4. During these two calls, UC4 purported to be an employee of Bank Processor 1
and stated that Bank Processor 1 wanted to confirm certain information contained in Synergy’s
PPP loan application. Among other things, UC4 asked JOHNSON how many employees were
listed on his PPP application and whether that number was still correct. In response to these
questions, JOHNSON stated that he had listed 16 employees on his PPP application, and that he
still had 16 employees. JOHNSON further stated that his monthly payroll was “about $156,000”
and that his PPP loan amount was approximately $389,000.
33. On August 24, 2020, UC4 sent four (4) text messages to JOHNSON, each of which
Page 13 of 16
contained a DropBox link to an electronic copy of a Form 941 that was submitted with Synergy’s
PPP loan application to Bank Processor 1, that is, Form 941s for Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 2019,
respectively.
34. On August 25, 2020, UC4 made another call to JOHNSON. That call lasted
approximately 15 minutes and was recorded by UC4. Based on JOHNSON’s statements on the
recording of that call, while JOHNSON was on the call with UC4, JOHNSON accessed the
DropBox links previously sent to him via text message from UC4 on August 24, 2020, and viewed
each Form 941 that had been submitted with Synergy’s PPP loan application to Bank Processor 1.
When asked by UC4 during the call if the information in each Form 941 for Q1-Q4 2019 was
correct, JOHNSON answered affirmatively as to each Form 941. As noted above, IRS records
show that Synergy did not, in fact, file any Forms 941 for any quarter of 2019 or the first quarter
of 2020, and Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry records show that Synergy did not
report any wages or employees for that same period.
Bank Records and Text Messages Confirm JOHNSON’s Receipt of the PPP Loan and Further
Demonstrate JOHNSON’s Knowing Participation in the Fraud
35. As noted above, bank records show that Synergy had the Bank 6 *7620 account. A
signature card for the Bank 6 *7620 account shows that JOHNSON opened the account on or about
April 4, 2017 as “Sole Owner” of Synergy, and that JOHNSON is the only signer for the Bank 6
*7620 account. On May 20, 2020, the Bank 6 *7620 account received via bank wire $389,627 in
loan proceeds from Bank 3 as a result of Synergy’s fraudulent PPP loan application.
36. On May 20, 2020, JOHNSON sent Augustin a text message that stated: “Morning
big homie 215 pm my appointment Ill be sending then.” Augustin responded “Ok.” JOHNSON
then sent another message that stated “Im at the bank. [Let you know] when its sent.” Augustin
responded, “Ok Thanks.” The following day, May 21, JOHNSON sent Augustin a message that
Page 14 of 16
stated “Sent,” and Augustin responded “Thanks I will tell him.”
37. Bank records show that on May 21, 2020, JOHNSON wired $97,418, which
equaled approximately 25 percent of the proceeds of Synergy’s PPP loan, from the Bank 6 *7620
account to the Bank 5 *6828 account controlled by CHS 2. That same day, Augustin sent a
message to CHS 2 that stated, “Synergies wire is done,” and CHS 2 responded “97418 synergy
tonye.”
38. A document titled “Wire Full Transaction Report” provided by Bank 6 for the May
21, 2020 wire from JOHNSON to CHS 2 indicates that JOHNSON knew the payment to CHS 2
was not an ordinary commission for a loan because JOHNSON disguised the true nature of the
payment. Specifically, the “Details” section of the transaction report contains the following
description of the kickback wire: “New investment opportunity to expand to a new state.”
39. During a recorded call with another federal agent acting in an undercover capacity
(“UC3”), JOHNSON told UC3 that JOHNSON paid his employees by check. I have reviewed
Synergy’s bank records from January 2019 through July 2020, and those bank records show that,
for a typical week, JOHNSON paid between one and three employees by check in amounts
between approximately $500 and approximately $650. In all of the bank records and other records
that I have reviewed in this investigation, I have not seen any indication that Synergy had a monthly
payroll of $155,851 as represented in its PPP loan application documents.
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Tamisha Shotwell
Sep 18, 2020
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