Keyaira Bostic — Affidavit, Paycheck Protection Program
Summary
Criminal complaint form and attached affidavit against Keyaira Bostic in the Southern District of Florida, dated Aug 3, 2020. The complaint lists wire fraud, bank fraud, and conspiracy or attempt to commit wire and bank fraud for conduct in 2020. In the affidavit, a Special Agent with the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation states that Bostic obtained a PPP loan for a company named in the affidavit, with falsified documents provided by a cooperating person (CHS 2). It states that the conspirators planned or prepared at least 90 applications, and that Bostic told investigators of paying 25% of the loan proceeds to CHS 2.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
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“Keyaira Bostic — Affidavit, Paycheck Protection Program.”
Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/crim-flsd-0-20-cr-60139-u-s-v-keyaira-bostic-docx-complaint-221d4dd98b/
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CRIM INAL COM PLAINT
Isthe com plainantin thiscase, state thatthe tbllowing istrueto the btstofn1y know ledgeand belief.
Onoraboutthedatets)of May 18-Jul
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18U.S.C.âç 1344and2 Bank Fraud
18U.S.C.51349 Conspiracy/Attemptto Commi
tW ire and BankFraud
Thiscriminalcomplaintisbased on thesefacts:
SEE AU ACHED AFFIDAVIT. Troy T. Walker
Aug 3, 2020
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AFFIDAW T
1,M ichaelBenivegna,being firstduly sw orn,hereby depose and state asfollows:
IN TR O DU CH O N A ND A G EN T BA CK G R O UND
l m ake this A ffidavit in support of a crim inal com plaint charging KEYAIRA
BOSTIC (:CBOSTIC''orûtDefendant''),with wire fraud,bank fmud,attemptandconspiracy to
commitwirefraudandbankfraud,inviolationof18U.S.C.jj1343,1344,1349,and2,from on
or about M ay l8,2020 to on or about July 20,2020, in the Southern D istrict of Florida,and
elsewhere (the%tl-argetOffenses'').
2. Defendant has participated in a scheme to obtain by fraud m illions of dollars in
forgivable loans through the Paycheck Protection Program (t$PPP'') and other government
programs,conspiringwithapersonnow cooperatingwiththeinvestigation(I6CHS2*')andothers.
DefendantobtainedafraudulentPPP loanforherowncompany,IAm LiquidInc.(ç:Liquid''),with
CHS 2 providing falsified docum ents and subm itting the application on Defendant's behalf.
Defendantalso conspired to subm ita num ber ofadditionalfraudulentPPP loan applications for
othercompaniesby recruiting otherconfkderate loanapplicants,in orderto m ceivekickbacksfrom
those confedem tes. To inflate the size ofthese PPP Ioans,and the corresponding kickbacks,the
conspirators relied on a variety of false statem ents, including by subm itting falsif-
ied bank
statem entsand payrolltax form s. Forexam ple,the conspiratorsused nearly identicalversionsof
the sam e fabricated bank statements,recycled in the PPP applicationsform ultiple com paniesw ith
m inorchanges.
The conspirators in the scheme planned or prepared at least 90 fraudulent
applications,mostofw hich were subm itted. Based on the evidence investigators have reviewed
to date,CH S 2,Defendant,and theirco-conspiratorsapplied forPPP loansthatare togetherworth
more than $24 million dollars,with atleastapproximately42 ofthoseloansapprovedand funded
foratotalofapproximately $17.4 million.Certain ofthose Ioan recipientsthenwired akickback
of varying am ounts,often approxim ately 25% of the fraudulent loan proceeds,to an account
controlled by CH S 2.
lam a SpecialAgentwith the United Statcs Departm entofThe Treasury,Internal
RevenueService,Criminallnvestigation(étlRS-CI'')andhavebetnemployedinthiscapacitysince
O ctober2016. lam presently assigned to the M iam iField Oftk e. M y dutiesas a SpecialA gent
includethe investigation ofpossible criminalviolationsofthe lnternalRevenueCode(Title26of
theUnitedStatesCode),theBankSecrecyAct(Title31oftheUnitedStatesCode),andtheMoney
Laundering Statutes (Title l8 of the United States Code).l graduated from the Criminal
InvestigatorTraining Prop-am attheFederalLaw Enforcem entTraining Centerin April2017 and
the Special A gent Investigative Techniques program at the N ational Crim inal lnvestigation
Training Academy in July 2017. In these two programs,lsttldied a variety of law enforcement
tacticsand crim inalinvestigatortechniquesrelating to tax and fmancialcrim es.Since becom ing
an IRS-CI SpecialAgent,Ihave personally investigated and assisted in investigationsrelating to
the lntenpalRevenueLaws and financialcrim es. Recently,Ihave been assigned to work w ith the
U.S.D epartm entofJustice and other 1aw enforcem entpartners,including the FederalBureau of
lnvestigation and the SmallBusiness A dm inistration Oftk e of Inspector G enem l,to investigate
possible fraud associated with the stim ulus and econom ic assistance program s created by the
federalgovernm entin response to the COV1D-l9 program .
The facts in this Affidavitcom e from m y personalobservations,my training and
experience,and inform ation obtained from otherm em bersoflaw enforcem entand from w itnesses.
Page 2 of15
This Affidavitis intended to show m erely thatthere is sufficientprobable cause and doesnotset
forth a1lofm y know ledge aboutthism atter.'
PR O BABLE CAU SE
The'Jllc/leck Protection Prozram
6. TheCoronavirusAid,Relief,and Economic Security (ûICARES'')Actisafedeml
law enacted in oraround M amh 2020 and designed to provideemergency financialassistanceto
the m illions of A m ericans who are suffering the econom ic effects caused by the COV1D-19
pandemic.One sourceofreliefprovided bytheCARESActwastheauthorizm ion ofup to $349
billioninforgivableloanstosmallbusinessesforjobretentionandcertainotherexpenses,through
aprogram refen-
edtoasthePPP.In oraround April2020,Congressauthorizedover$300 billion
in additionalPPP funding.
ln order to obtain a PPP loan,a qualifying business m ust stlbm it a PPP loan
application, w hich is signed by an authorized representative of the business. The PPP loan
application requires the business (through its atlthorized representative)
, to acknowledge the
program rulesand m ake certain affinnative certificationsin orderto be eligible to obtain the PPP
loan.lnthePPPloanapplication,thesmallbusiness(throughitsauthorizedrepresentative)must
state,amongotherthings,its:(a)averagemonthlypayrollexpenses;and(b)ntlmberofemployees.
These figuresare used to calculate the am ountof money the sm allbusiness iseligible to receive
under the PPP. In addition,businesses applying for a PPP loan m ust provide docum entation
show ing theirpayrollexpenses.
1 The conductand chargesdescribed in thisAffidavitare partofa largerinvestigation that
is being conducted in this D istrict and elsewhere. A s a result,not a1l num bered sources and
anonymous individualsand entitiesare described in evel.y filing. Ihave included in thisAffidavit
only those individualsand entitieslhave deemed necessary to explain the particularfacts setforth
here.
Page 3 of15
8. A PPP loan application m ustbe processed by a participating lender. Ifa PPP loan
application is approved,the participating lenderfundsthe PPP loan using its own m onies,w hich
are 100% guaranteedby the SmallBusinessAdm inistration ($$SBA''). Datafrom the application,
including inform ation aboutthe borrower,the totalamountofthe loan,and the Iisted num berof
em ployees,istransm itted by the lenderto the SBA in the course ofprocessing the loan,
PPP loan proceedsm ustbe used by the businesson celain perm issible expenses-
payrollcosts,intereston m ortgages,rent,and utilities, The PPP allow sthe interestand principal
on the PPP loan to be entirely forgiven ifthe btlsinessspendsthe loan proceedson these expense
item sw ithin a designated period oftim e afterreceiving the proceedsand usesa certain am ountof
the PPP loan proceedson payrollexpenses.
TheSchem e to Obtain FraudulentPPP Loans
10. On oraboutM ay l3,2020,Phillip J.Augustin tt'Augustin''land CHS2worked
togetherto subm ita fraudulentPPP loan application on behalfofa com pany ow ned by A ugustin.
Augustin submitted a PPP loan of$84,515toa federally insured bank (hereinaftertdBank 3'5),
tlzrough a third-party company processor (hereinafter'iBank Processor 1'').2 Tlw application
included bank statem entsthatareclearforgeries,and CH S 2 hasadm itted thatthe application was
based on docum entsthathe falsified forAugustin.3
2 All banks referenced in this Affidavit are insured by the Federal Deposit lnsurance
Corporation.
On June 25,2020,investigators arrested CH S 2 and anotherperson now cooperating w ith
theinvestigation(ûCCH S3'5)andexecuted searchwarrantsattheirresidences.Followinghisarrest,
CH S 2 chose to cooperate w ith the investigation in the hope ofobtaining favorable consideration
in connection w ith hispending charges. CH S 2 w as interview ed on thatday,and hascontinued to
cooperate w ith the investigation afterobtaining counsel. M ostof his statem ents related herein
have been corrobom ted by records obtained from third parties or recovered from his electronic
devices.
Page 4 of15
ll. Follow ing the successofthatinitialfraudulentPPP application,A ugustin and CH S
2 began to w ork on obtaining more and larger PPP loans fbr A ugustin's associates and others,
generally forseveralhundredthousanddollarsforeach loan,uptoasmuch asapproximately $1.24
m illion. Based on the evidence investigators have reviewed so far, CH S 2 and Augustin
collectively coordinated applicationsforPPP loansthataretogetherworth morethan $24 million
dollars.Theevidencealso showsmanymorePPP loanswereattemptedbutrejectedbybanksor
their partners,or were planned and prepared,but not subm itted before CHS 2's arrest. The
evidence suggests that alIor nearly all of those loan applications were fraudulent, including
Defendant's loan application and the applicationsDefendantorchestrated by referring additional
confederatesto the conspiracy.
lnvestigators have obtained many other PPP loan applications that CH S 2 has
adm itted he subm itted aspartofthisschem e,based on falsified docum ents,and have also obtained
draftdocum entsused orintended to be used in those applicationsorothers. These applicationsa11
follow the sam e pattern of fraud- m any w ith obviously counterfeit February 2020 bank
statelnents,and allwith fabricated IRS Forms941 (titled,iûEmployer'sQuarterly FederalTax
Return'')with thesameindiciaoffraudfoundinAugustin'sinitialapplication butgenerally with
even larger inflated payrollnum bers,thus yielding m uch larger loans.4 CH S 2 has explained to
investigators thatthe figures in the Forms 941w ere the productofa formula thatallowed him to
startw ith a targetloan am ount,and then t%back into''thepayrollfigureson the form . He explained
how he used figuresthatw ould produce an averagem onthly payrollfor2019 that,w hen m ultiplied
by 2.5,would yield the requested loan amount. In turn,the num ber ofem ployees reported w as
4 Some loan applications also included voided checks thatappearto be falsified,such asa
purportedBank5checkthatappearstohavebeenproducedonacomputerand,asthesubjectline
reads,dtconverted to PDF,''ratherthan a scan ofan authentic check.
Page 5 of15
chosen based on fictionalpayrollfigures,chosen to avoid an average em ployee salary thatm ight
raise suspicion.
13. CH S 2 has also explained thathe tried to use bank statem ents showing thatthe
com pany had a large balance. Because so few companies had such a statem ent,and likely also
because itw aseasierthan keeping track oftheirtrue statements,CH S 2 repeatedly subm itted near-
replicasofthe same falsified bank statem ents. In particular,CH S 2 appearsto have recycled one
statem ent each from Bank 1,Bank 6,and Bank 7. In recycling a statem ent, CH S 2 generally
changed only the account number and the accotlnt holder's name and address, such that each
version ofthe statem enthad identicalfiguresand line item sthroughoutthe statem ent.
14. A review ofrecordsforbank accountscontrolled by CH S 2 atBank 5 confqrm CH S
2's adm issionsthathe received num erous kickbacks,often ofapproxim ately 25% ofthe am ount
ofthe loans,and thathe regularly w ired Augustin a share ofthatkickback in the early stagesof
the schem e. CH S 2 explained that they were doing so m any loans by the end of M ay thathe
changed course,instead w iring larger lum p sum s,collecting Augustin's shares ofthe kickbacks
form ultiple loansin one w ire.
lnvestigators are stillreceiving and analyzing records,butbased on a prelim inary
analysis,asofJuly 24,2020,investigatorshad identified a totalof$2,367,765.82 in transfersto
CH S 2'saccounts from entities thateach obtained a sizable PPP loan and thatw ere identified in
the PPP filesseized from CHS 2'sand anotherco-conspirator'sresidences,asdescribed below
orfrom individualsassociated w ith those entities.
The PPP loansidentified above as im plicated in the foregoing kickback paym ents
to CH S 2 representonly a fraction of the overallscheme. ln executing search wanunts at the
respective residences ofCH S 2 and CH S 3,federalagents found stacksofpaperprinted outand
Page 6 of15
organized by entity,containing an ddintake form ,''fabricated Form s 941,or both foreach entity.
The intake fbrm s contained fields for the information needed to fàbricate the docum ents and f5ll
outotheraspectsofthe PPP application:identifying information aboutthe oNvner and company,
aswellasbank accountinfolnmation forreceivingthe loan.A section atthe end m arked SIBELO W
IS O FFICE U SE ON LY''included blank Geldsforthe :iN umberofEmployees,''i*M onthly Payroll
Expense,''and iVSBA Loan Pre-A pprovalAm ount.'' Betw een CH S 2's and CH S 3's residences,
investigatorsseized paperfilesforPPP loan applicationsforapproxim ately 80 differententities.
Data obt ined fronl the SBA show ed additional PPP loan applications from
additionalentities that text message and em ailrecords show had been referred to CH S 2 by
D efendantorotherindividuals.
TheFraudulentPPP Loan toDefendant'sComnanv:Liquid
18. According to Florida'sDivision ofCorporationswebsite (t1Sunbiz''),Liquid was
incorporated in 20l5 by BO STIC,who is listed as the com pany'spresident and registered agent.
The addresslisted on SunbizforLiquid isa residentialaddressin Pem brokePineswhereBO STIC
appearsto reside.s
A ccording to bank records,BO STIC opened a business checking account in the
nam eofLiquid in D ecember2019.1havereviewed the statementsfrom thataccount,which reveal
little in the way ofbusinessactivity and nothing indicating recurring payrollpayments.6
On oraboutM ay 19,2020,a PPP loan application package on behalfofLiquid was
electronically subm itted to Bank 3 through Bank Processor 1. The loan application pacltage
5 As further described hereins on July 17,2020, investigators m et w ith and interviewed
BO STIC atthislocation.
6 On June5 and8,2020,therearecard purchases(fortheGrsttime),forQuickbooksOnline
and lntuitPayroll,respectively. How ever,this is weeks afterBO STIC applied for and received
the PPP loan proceeds.
Page 7 of15
/
included,amongotherdocuments:(1)purportedForms941forallfourquartersof2019;(2)a
companybank statementforLiquid;(3)anapplicationform;and (4)apromissory note.
21. The purported Form s 941 included in the application show quarterly payrollof
morethan$100,000eachquarter,for10employees.ThatquarterlypayrollfigtlreyieldedthePPP
loan application'sétAverage M onthly Payroll''figure of$33,806,which determined the $84,515
amountofthe loan. Each w as signed by hand with the name ttKeyaira Bostic''as the company
owner,and also listed BOSTIC asthe company'sdesignee and asa çlpaid Preparer,''though she is
notapaid taxpreparer.The Iviquid Form s941follow the same styleand pattern asthe m any other
Fonns 941thatCH S 2 falsified in the courseofthe schem e,including in the indiciaoffraud.; IR S
records show thatLiquid did not,in fact,tile any Forms 94l for any quarterof 2019 orthe first
quarter of2020,and Florida DepartmentofRevenue records show thatLiquid did notreportany
wages orem ployeesforthatsame period.
The purported company bank statem ent,w hich was subm itted in electronic,PDF
format,is a clearforgery. First,the statem ent is notfrom Liquid's bank. Second,nearly every
pageofthestatementliststhewrongcompany name(1éIAM LiquidLLC'').Third,accordingto
7 A snoted above,BO STIC was listed asboth owner and paid preparer. D ozens of other
Form s 941 subm itted in this schem e evidence the same error. CH S 2 has adm itted thatthese
documentssharethatfeaturebecausehemisunderstoodtheform,and he(orsomeonefollowing
his instructions)prepared allofthe Forms941atissue. The contentofthe formsalso indicate
falsification. A llfour quarterly form s are nearly identical, and the four forms for Liquid are
identical,down to thepenny,in reported figures.They also evidence a pattern ofpayrollspending
thatislikely false:each ofthequarters show ssignificantincreasesfrom the firstto second to third
month ofthe quarter. Foreach identicalfonm,the same f- iguresare reported fbrthe tax liability
incurred in the firstm onth ofeach qualter,the sam e figure forthe second m onth ofeach quader
(increased substantially from the firstmonth),and the same figure forthe third month ofeach
qual-ter(increasedsubstantiallyfrom thesecondmonth).Theresultisthatthecompanyreportsa
perfectly repeating cycle ofascending payrollcosts w ithin each quarter,dropping dow n again at
the startofthe nextquarter.CH S 2 hasexplained thatthiswasdueto a formulahe used,allocating
differentpercentagesofthe quarterly payrolltax liability to each m onth ofeach quarter.
Page 8 of15
the document'sfile (Cproperties,''the statem entwascreated using :SPD FFILLER,''a program used
to editelectronic PDF files,and was-'m odified using i'
Ikxt.'' Fourth,the statem entisa recycled
version ofthe sam e falsified Bank 7 sttem entused in otherfraudulentapplications subm itted as
partofthisschem e.
23. The application form ,labeled atthe top tkpayment Protection Program Borrowcr
Application Form ,'' listed BOSTIC as the ow ner of Liquid, claim ed the company had 10
employeessand stated thatthe average monthly payrollwas$33,806. Based on thisfigure,the
amountofthe PPP loan requestwas $84,515. The application form required the borrowerto
electronicallyinitialanumberofSicertifkations,''including:(1)thattheapplicantwasinoperation
on February 15,2020and had employeestowhom itpaid salaries/payrolltaxesorpaid independent
contractors,asreportedonlRSFormsl099;(2)thatthefundswouldbeusedtoretainworkers,
m aintain payroll,or m ake m oMgage/interest/lease/utility paym ents as specified by the PPP rule
andthatunauthorizedusecould resultinchargesforfraud;and(3)thattheinformationprovided
in the application, including in supporting docum ents, was ittrue and accurate in all material
respects,''and thatm aking false statements could resultin crim inalcharges.The application was
electronically signed w ith the nam e ûtK eyaira Bostic,''and each certification w as electronically
initialed $bK .B.''
24. The prom issory note,labeled atthe top ûspaycheck Protection Program Loan,''set
forth theamountoftheloan ($84,5l5)and itsterms(includingthatthe proceedscould onlybe
used for businesspurposes). The terms also specified thatthe borrower may apply for loan
forgivenessonly in an am ountequalto the sum ofcertain specified costs:payrollcosts,intereston
mortgageobligations,rentobligations,and utility paym ents.The prom issory note furtherspecified
that not m ore than 25% ofthe am ount of forgiveness can be attributable to non-payrollcosts.
Page 9 of 15
Additionally,the prom issory note contained a tiRepresentations and W arranties''section forthe
borrower to acknow ledge,among other things that'ithe inform ation provided in a11supporting
docum ents and form s to obtain this loan''were true and accumte. The prom issory note was
electronically signed w ith the nam e ttKeyaira Bostic.''
25. Based on the representations m ade in the loan application paperwork and
supporting docum ents,the PPP loan application for Liquid w as approved,and on M ay 20,2020,
Bank 3 wired $84,515in loan proceedsintotheLiquid bank account.
CHS 2 Conf-
lrmedtoLaw EnforcementthattheLlquidPPP Loan rFJ,
CFraudulentandthat
BOSTIC Referred OtherstotheSchente
Investigators spoke w ith CH S 2 aboutthe Liquid PPP Ioan. CH S 2 confirm ed that
the loan application wasfraudulent. CHS 2 stated thathe: (1)created forBOSTIC an online
accountforLiquid with Bank Processor 1;(2)created and submitted the fake Liquid bank
statement;and (3)created,submitted,and signed(on behalfofBOSTIC),thefalseForms94l.
A ccordingto CH S 2,however,he did notsign the application form orprom issory note.
IP session records from Bank Processor l and a consensualsearch ofBO STIC 'S
phone corrobomte CHS 2's accountregarding which actionshe did and did nottake with respect
to BOSTIC'Sloan.Bank Processor 1'sIP recordsforthe subm ission ofthe Liquid loan application
show thata computerwith an IP address(ending in 170)associated with CHS 2'sresidence in
Broward County,Floridaslogged into the Liquid loan accounton M ay 18,2020. A llotherlogins
forthe account,however,including those on M ay l9,2020 (the date the application form and
promissory note were signed and subm itted)came from a differentIP address(ending in 120).
One such login occurred on a date thatCH S 2 is know n to have been incarcerated. Every login
from the IP addressending in 120 also coincided w ith datesand timesw hen BO STIC'Sw eb search
history,as recovered through a consensualsearch of her iphone, show s that she was on Bank
Page 10 of15
Processorl'sw ebsite. Forinstance,theIP logfrom Bank Processorlshow sthe IP addressending
in 120 accessed the w ebsite on M ay 19,2020,at 6:04 PM LJTC,while BO STIC'S web search
history show s thatshe accessed Bank Processor 1'sw ebsite on M ay 19,2020,at 6:04 PM LTTC.
The same istrue forlogin activity regarding the IP addressending in 120 on M ay 24,June 29,and
July 20,2020.
28. CH S 2 also stated that,in addition to the Liquid loan,BO STIC referred to him a
num beroffriends/associatesforthe purpose ofcreating and subm itting additionalfraudulentPPP
Ioans. CH S 2 stated that he and BO STIC reached an agreem entw hereby he w ould give her a
portion ofthe 25% kickback paym ents for each of BO STIC'S successfulreferrals. A s further
described below,CHS 2 confirmed thathe madetwo paymentsto BOSTIC for$20,000 each,on
June 10 and June l5,as her share ofthe kickbacks received from one of BO STIC'S succtssful
referrals.
Emailsand TextM essazesConflrm BOSTIC'SKnowinz Participation in theFraud
As part of its investigation,law enforcem ent obtained com m unications between
CH S 2 and BO STIC,including text m essages and em ails. 1 have reviewed a num ber ofthese
comm unications,w hich discuss,among otherthings,BO STIC 'S PPP loan and the loans for the
individualsshe referred to CH S 2.
30. Forexam ple,on M ay l9,2020,the dateofherown PPP loan subm ission,BO STIC
stated in a textm essage to CH S 2:$$lsigned everything.''
On M ay 20,2020,BOSTIC texted CHS 2:t$Do you acceptreferrals?'' That sam e
day,CH S 2 em ailed BO STIC a blank intake inform ation form to be filled outw ith the personal
and business information forBO STIC 'Sreferrals. On M ay 22,2020,BOSTIC texted CHS 2:çt1
sentthe em ailsfor2 clientssplease give me a callwhen you geta chance.''
Page 11 of15
32. As an exam ple ofone ofherreferrals,on M ay 23,2020,BOSTIC em ailed CH S 2
a completed intake infbrm ation fonm fbr Person 20 and Company 22. The inform ation on the
intake form included,among otherthings:(1) Person 20's name,address,date ofbirth,social
securitynumber,andemailaddress;(2)thenameofCompany22itsbusinessaddress,TaxID,and
businessstartdate;and(3)abankaccountandroutingnumber.
33. Thatsameday,BOSTIC textedanotherperson(whoshehadalsoreferredtoCHS
2andwhohadappliedthatdayforaPPP loan)an internetlinktoan articleand televisionnews
reportregarding fraud charges against an Atlanta-based reality television star for fraudulently
obtaining a PPP loan.BOSTIC then stated:ûi-l-hisisbuddy whathe did and the am ountw asahuge
red flag.''
Less than ten m intltes Iater,BOSTIC texted CHS 2 and stated:ûiKeep him under
300 please.'' Based on the contextofthe conversation,itappearsto m e thatBOSTIC wastalking
aboutPerson 20 and the loan amountforhisentity,Com pany 22.
As another example ofBOSTIC referring othersto the schem e.on M ay 29,2020,
BO STIC sentem ailsto CH S 2 w ith the same kind ofpersonaland businessinform ation regarding
another refbrral,Person 21 and Com pany 23. BO STIC also sent CH S 2 copies of Person 21's
driver license and a voided check from his bank account. That sam e day,regarding this sam e
referral,BOSTIC textedCHS2:dtgperson21)notover325kplease.''
On M ay 31,2020,CH S 2 and BO STIC had a sim ilartextexchange butabout a
differentreferral.CHS2asked:iiKay whatdoyouwantmetoput(Person22)infor300-400?'5
BO STIC responded:':sresthatgood.''CH S 2 stated:(1375.5' BO STIC responded:ç$Yes.''
37. During my review ofBO STIC 'Scom m unicationsw ith CH S2,lfound whatappears
to be inform ation pel-taining to atleasteightdifferentindividuals/com paniesthatshe referred to
Page 12 of15
the schem e. Furtherinform ation,includingreview ofdata collected by the SBA and bank records,
todatehasidentified PPP loanstotalingmorethan $2.5 million correspondingto thesenamesand
entities.
38. l also found textm essage comm unicationsdiscussing the 25% kickback payment
thatthe people BO STIC referred w ould have to m ake.Forexam ple,on M ay 29,2020,BO STIC
textedCHS2:isgperson23)gothis.''CHS2thentextedwiringinstructionsforhisbankaccount.
BOSTIC askedCHS2toçssendamountaswell.''CHS2responded:ûçl-leRecieved (sicl408,232
He needsto send us 102,158.9' BOSTIC stated,ttOk.''
BankRecordsConRrm BOSTIC'SKnowink Participation in theFraud
Ihave also reviewed Liquid'sand CH S 2'sbank records,which confirm BOSTIC'S
receiptofthePPP loan proceedsasw ellasher25% paym entto CH S 2. Specifically,on M ay 20,
2020,Bank 3 wired $84,515 (the amountofthe loan) into the Liquid accotlnt.The nextday,
BOSTIC wired$21,130(approximately25% oftheloanamount)intooneofCHS2'saccounts.
40. The bank recordsalso reflectpaym entsto CH S 2 from BO STIC'Sreferralsasw ell
aspaym entsby CH S 2 to BO STIC .
OnJune5and9,2020,CH S2receivedwiretranstkrsin theamountof$47,000and
$40,000,respectively,from a company to his bank account. On June 10,2020,CHS 2 wked
$20,000 to BOSTIC from thatsame account. On June l5,2020,CH S2 then wired BOSTIC an
additional$20,000 from hisaccount. CHS 2 hasstated thatthose two incomingpaymentsfrom
the company represented the kickbacksowed to him from thatcompany,and thatthetwo outgoing
paym entsto BO STIC 'SLiquid accotmtrepresented hershare ofthose kickback paym ents.
42. M eanwhile,on June 4, 2020, CHS 2 received a $73,000 wire transfer from
Company 24,w hich BO STIC had referred to the scheme. CH S 2 hasstated thathe did notpay a
Page 13 of 15
portion ofthiskickback paym entto BOSTIC. Instead,CH S 2 explained thathe and BOSTIC had
difficulty collecting the fullamountofthe kickback owed from another of BOSTIC 'S refkrrals,
Person 23. He said thathe thereforeagreed with BOSTIC thathe (CHS 2)would keep the full
amountofthe $73,000 kickback paymentfrom Company 24,and thatBOSTIC could then keep
whateveram ountshe wasable to collectfrom Person 23.
43. On June25,2020,CHS 2 received apaymentof$28,800 from anothercompany.
That sam e day,at 1l:45 AM ,BO STIC sentCH S 2 a textin which she wrote:kishe sent28,800
I'm meeting heron Saturday to pick up cash .(siclcan'tmeethertoday because 1'm workingon
aprojectinOrlando'' CHS2hasstatedthatpaymentof$28,800representedaninitialkickback
paym entforthe fraudulent Ioan forthatcompany,and thathe would have paid a share ofthat
am ountto BOSTIC butforthe factthathe wasarrested on the day he received thatpayment.
BOSTIC'SStatementtoLaw Enforcement
44. On July l7,2020, investigators interviewed BO STIC regarding the Liquid PPP
loan. BO STIC adm itted to receiving the loan proceedsand to paying 25% ofthose proceedsto
CH S 2. ButBOSTIC stated thatshe wasunaw are thatherloan application claim ed 10 em ployees
untilat-
ter it was subm itted and the fundsw ere disbursed.8 BO STIC ful-ther stated that CHS 2
prepared allofthe loan docum entsand thatthe only docum entshe signed wasthe prom issory note.
AccordingtoBOSTIC,CHS2hadtoldhertojustscrolltothebottom andsign.BOSTIC claimed
she did notknow herloan wasa PPP loan untilherfriendstold her later.
8BO STIC stated thatshe had only four employees,though even this claim is not supported by
bank orstate records.
Page 14 of 15
/
45. W hen asked about l-et-
errals during t'
he sam e interview , Bostic claimed that she
referrtd only one person to C1'
1S 2. BO STIC said nothing aboutthe other referrals mentioned in
hercommunicationswith CHS 2orthe$40,000 in kickback-sshe received.
CON CLUSIO N
46. Based on the fbrgoing,Irespectfully subm itthatthere isprobablv causv to bclkvc
thatKEYA IRA BOSTIC colnlnitted the l-argttOftknses.
FURTIIER YOUR A FFIANT SA YETIINA U'GH 'I'
.
M ICHAEL BENIVEGN A
SpecialAgent
IRV CI
Attested to by the applicantin accordance
w ith the reqtlirementsofjFed. R.Crim .P.4.l
bytelephoneonthis3 6 DayofAugust,2020
Troy T. Walker
HON.PATRICK M .HUN T Aug 3, 2020
UN ITED STATES M A GISTRATE JUDGE
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