Government's Trial Brief — United States v. Rico Tomas Garcia (D. Colo., Dkt. 270)
Summary
A Trial Brief filed 02/19/26 as Document 270 by the government in United States of America v. Rico Tomas Garcia, Criminal Action No. 1:24-cr-00106-NYW, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. It states that the Indictment returned on April 9, 2024 charged nine counts of wire fraud and six counts of spending money laundering proceeds, describing a scheme in which the defendant agreed to provide 9 million bottles of hand sanitizer but diverted approximately $2.5 million. The government asks to exclude evidence of ancillary civil litigation, proposes a limiting jury instruction on the arbitration, argues for admission of a summary exhibit under Rule 1006, and addresses hearsay and blame-the-victim arguments.
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Cite this document
“Government's Trial Brief — United States v. Rico Tomas Garcia (D. Colo., Dkt. 270).”
Original at ecf.cod.uscourts.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-usa-v-garcia-dkt-270-d-colo-4dfa011784/
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Case No. 1:24-cr-00106-NYW Document 270 filed 02/19/26 USDC Colorado pg 1
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Criminal Action No. 1:24-cr-00106-NYW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICO TOMAS GARCIA,
Defendant.
TRIAL BRIEF
The government respectfully submits this trial brief to alert the Court to potential legal
issues that may arise during trial.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A federal grand jury in the District of Colorado returned the Indictment on April 9, 2024,
which charged the defendant with nine counts of wire fraud and six counts of spending money
laundering proceeds. ECF 1. The Indictment describes a complicated scheme wherein the
defendant agreed to provide 9 million bottles of hand sanitizer but instead diverted approximately
$2.5 million for personal use and then lied by providing fraudulent documents in an arbitration
proceeding about how he spent the money.
II. POTENTIAL LEGAL ISSUES
A. Evidence or argument about any ancillary civil litigation is irrelevant and
prejudicial and may open the door to rebuttal.
The government believes that the defendant intends to illicit testimony or present evidence
of ancillary civil litigation to argue either that he lacked the requisite criminal intent or that his
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conduct only rises to the level of a civil breach of contract. In support of this strategy, numerous
defense exhibits have been submitted for trial from litigation between IPF Sourcing, LLC, and
SZY Holdings, LLC, which later added Botani-Labs and the defendant Rico Garcia as civil
defendants. See Trial Ex. 2202-2242, 2270, 2291. A review of most of these exhibits reveal that
they are typical filings made by lawyers during civil litigation, including complaints, answers, and
transcripts of non-evidentiary hearings. Although the government believes that most of these
exhibits are inadmissible hearsay, the Court should likewise exclude this type of evidence or
testimony because it is wholly irrelevant and is prejudicial and will mislead or confuse the jury.
See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403.
In a recent and instructive case, United States v. Nolde, No. 24-cr-23, 2026 WL 128169
(D. Neb. Jan. 16, 2026), a district court addressed a similar defense. The defendant was both
plaintiff and defendant in numerous civil cases related to facts underlying his criminal case. Id. at
*4. The defendant sought to introduce evidence of those civil cases to show that he did not have
the requisite intent to defraud and to establish that his conduct was not criminal. Id. The Court,
however, excluded any evidence of the actual civil litigation and any testimony or argument that
the case should have been a civil matter instead of a criminal prosecution. Id. at *4. The Court
determined that it was “not relevant that the underlying facts of [the] criminal case could
potentially support a civil breach of contract” because the government had to prove wire fraud, not
a violation of civil law. Id. In addition, the Court further excluded any actual evidence of the civil
litigation because the existence of those lawsuits did “not have any tendency to make the
defendant’s guilt or innocence more or less probable, and they [were] of no consequence in
determining whether the Government [had] met its burden to prove the elements of the charged
wire fraud offenses.” Id. at *5 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402). In addition, the Court found that
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“any probative value [of such argument and evidence] would be substantially outweighed by the
dangers of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid.
403).
Likewise, the sole issue in this criminal case is whether the defendant committed wire fraud
and money laundering beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil litigation and whether civil remedies exist
are not relevant to this case. See, e.g. United States v. Stegman, No. 14-20109-JAR, 2016 WL
845256, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 3, 2016) (“Defendants may not introduce testimony that this case
should have been brought as a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding. Additionally, Defendants
may not inquire into differences between civil and criminal audits or differences in the burden of
proof standards in civil and criminal cases.”); United States v. Merrick, 464 F.2d 1087, 1093 (10th
Cir. 1972) (“the trial court refused to instruct the jury that a civil case might be brought against
defendant to recover unpaid taxes, interest and penalties. We see no relevance in such an
instruction.”).
Much like Nolde, the defendant has been involved in litigation related to the conduct
alleged in the Indictment, but his other cases are wholly irrelevant as to whether the defendant
violated the wire fraud or money laundering statutes. An argument that the factual basis of the
present criminal charges should be resolved in a civil forum or admission of documents from those
proceedings in this criminal case would likewise confuse and mislead the jury about the narrow
issues involved. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Accordingly, the government seeks to preclude such evidence
and argument if raised by the defendant.
In addition, the government is concerned that the defendant may seek to introduce aspects
of the arbitration proceedings in opening statements or in testifying, or that he will use only
portions of the documents from those proceedings he deems favorable to him. He may also simply
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attempt to relitigate issues decided by the arbiter such as interpretation of the contract under civil
law. By doing so, the defendant could open the door to the subject matter of the arbitration
proceeding and produce a misleading account of those proceedings that were ultimately decided
in favor of IPF Sourcing, LLC. See Ex. 2228, 2237, 2238. 1
“When a party opens the door to a topic, the admission of rebuttal evidence on that topic
becomes permissible,” within discretion of the court. Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1166
(10th Cir. 2005). To correct any misleading impressions should the defendant open the door, the
government may seek to rebut, either affirmatively or by impeachment, by offering evidence such
as the defendant’s hostile conduct during those proceedings, the ultimate outcome of the arbitration
in favor of IPF Sourcing, LLC, or the fact that he did not return the money when ordered by the
arbitration judgment. See United States v. Jones, 151 F.4th 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2025) (the
defendant “put his criminal history at issue even though he did not have to, and as already
explained, the government is not required to sit back and allow the defendant to give a misleading
picture of his credibility.”); see also Fed. Rule Evid. 106; Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S.
153, 171, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988) (the rule of completeness allows a party “against
whom a part of an utterance has been put in, may in his turn complement it by putting in the
remainder.” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 735 (10th Cir.
2010) (“the purpose of Rule 106 is to prevent a party from misleading the jury”).
1
The government addresses its own limited use of the arbitration proceedings in the next
section.
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B. A jury instruction prohibiting the jury from speculating on the outcome of the
arbitration is appropriate.
The Indictment alleges that the defendant provided false documents and made
misrepresentations during the arbitration with IPF Sourcing, LLC. ECF 1, at ¶¶ 14-16. Although
there are certain exhibits from the arbitration proceedings that the government intends to introduce
to support the allegations in the Indictment, the government only intends to introduce those
exhibits that were fraudulent or depict the misrepresentations made by the defendant, which are
relevant because they were made to cover up his scheme. The government does not intend to
introduce additional information related to the arbitration in its case in chief, including the arbiter’s
final order, because that would be prejudicial to the defendant. 2 Accordingly, the government
believes a limiting instruction informing the jury that they are not to speculate on the outcome of
the arbitration is appropriate. The government proposes the following language:
Members of the jury, during the trial, you heard testimony about and observed
certain exhibits from an civil arbitration case between Mr. Garcia and IPF Sourcing,
LLC. That matter is separate from this case, and each case must be decided on its
own individual merits. You are not to speculate on the outcome of the arbitration
case when you reach a verdict in this case.
C. The government’s summary exhibit is admissible under Fed. R. Crim. P. 1006.
The government intends to admit a summary exhibit through the testimony of FBI Forensic
Accountant Lindsay Fryer under Fed. R. Evid. 1006. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that
they are to be construed to “eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.” Fed. R. Evid. 102. Over
2
The defendant lost the arbitration, and the Final Order and Award discusses the acts
committed by the defendant throughout the proceeding. That arbitration award has been upheld
in this district. See IPF Sourcing, LLC v. Botani-Labs, LLC, No. 22-CV-0307-WJM-SKC, 2022
WL 4182409, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 13, 2022). The defendant has indicated his desire to admit the
Final Order and Award as an exhibit. See Trial Ex. 2228, 2237, 2238 (Corrected Final Order and
Award), 2293 (Corrected Final Order and Award).
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the last several years, the government has been providing the defendant with discovery including
voluminous bank records, business formation records, title company records, and other records
with accompanying business records certifications pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 806(b), 902, and 18
U.S.C. § 3505. See ECF 243, 257, 266 (the government’s Notices of Intent to Introduce Business
Records by Certification).
Without conceding that Ms. Fryer’s testimony falls into the category of expert testimony
under Fed. R. Evid. 702, the government, in an abundance of caution, provided expert disclosures
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) in July 2025. The disclosure explained that Ms. Fryer
would be called to testify regarding the “summaries, charts, and calculations she performed for
exhibits the government will seek to admit under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 related to
thousands of pages of bank and related financial records.” The defendant has not filed a motion to
exclude her testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702.
At trial, the government will call Ms. Fryer to testify. In part, the government intends to
illicit testimony and admit the summary exhibit Ms. Fryer created. The visual depictions of Ms.
Fryer’s summary calculations are attached and are marked as trial exhibit 2201. See Ex 1 (attached
trial exhibit 2201). All financial transactions set forth in the Indictment are depicted in the exhibit.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 1006(a), “[t]he court may admit as evidence a summary, chart, or
calculation offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or
photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court, whether or not they have been
introduced into evidence.” The proponent must make the “originals or duplicates available for
examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. And the court
may order the proponent to produce them in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006(b). The underlying
evidence supporting the summary need not be admitted into evidence but must be admissible.
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United States v. Samaniego, 187 F.3d 1222, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999). This prevents litigants from
using Rule 1006 to admit evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. Id.
After laying proper foundation, the government intends to admit the attached summary
exhibit based on the admissible voluminous self-authenticating documents. Ms. Fryer’s testimony
and the proffered exhibit is clearly relevant. As set forth above, the defendant orchestrated a
scheme to defraud where he obtained approximately $2.5 million in wire fraud proceeds and
moved them through various accounts and financial transactions while deceiving the victims by
providing false information and documents in the JAMS proceeding. Based on Ms. Fryer’s review
of the voluminous documents, she created the proffered exhibits summarizing transactions through
the use of domestic and foreign accounts and real estate purchases that are charged in the
Indictment.
Second, the exhibits and Ms. Fryer’s testimony summarize thousands of pages of
admissible business records. See ECF 243, 257, 266. The proffered exhibits show data from
numerous bank accounts and title company records that cannot be “conveniently examined in
court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006(a). The summaries provide admissible data in a digestible manner for
the jury. And it will not require days of testimony reviewing thousands of documents. Indeed, the
summary testimony and exhibits are the type that are routinely admitted. See, e.g., United States
v. Stewart, No. 21-CR-034-WJM, 2024 WL 1811603, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 25, 2024) (permitting
summary exhibits of FBI Financial Analyst Lindsay Fryer based on voluminous bank and
brokerage records); United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148, 1212 (10th Cir. 2025), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 31, 2025) (No. 25-772) (testimony and exhibit explaining financial
transactions and tracing through numerous accounts is “precisely the kind of testimony that Rule
1006 contemplates.”); United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 2002) (financial
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analysis testified as a lay person when she summarized business records and presented them in
condensed form).
Third, the underlying records have been provided in discovery, along with business records
declarations as set forth in ECF 243, 257, and 266. Therefore, the defendant has had the
opportunity to inspect the documents in accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 1006(b). Any dispute the
defendant may have with the summary testimony and/or exhibits are not a basis for exclusion, but
rather a matter to address on cross-examination of the witness. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart,
No. 21-CR-034-WJM, 2024 WL 1811603, at *2 (admitting summary exhibits noting the defendant
“may convince the jury to give the summaries considerably, or somewhat, less weight than other
evidence, or to discount them entirely.”); United States v. Hoffman, No. CRIM.A. 14-022, 2015
WL 1509488, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2015) (“Any prejudice . . . will be minimized by cross-
examination of the forensic accountant who will testify alongside this sort of exhibit.”). Indeed,
any objection to the summary goes to its weight, not its admissibility. See, e.g., Iowa Pac.
Holdings, LLC v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1102 (D. Colo. 2012).
D. Many of the defendant’s exhibits are hearsay.
It appears that defendant wishes to admit exhibits purportedly showing he attempted to
contact various individuals for the purpose of obtaining hand sanitizer. Most of these exhibits are
emails, unsigned contracts or quotes, and other unrelated documents. See Trial Ex. 2262-2269;
2271-2290; 2292-2293; and 2295-2296. Many of the documents post-date the initiation of
arbitration between the defendant and IPF Sourcing, LLC. See Trial Ex. 2268, 2271, 2273, 2284,
2286, 2295, 2296.
The defendant appears to be attempting to offer these exhibits without a sponsoring witness
because none of the email communications or invoices are made with the individuals listed on the
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defense exhibit or witness lists. See ECF 249, 260. But even if the defendant testifies and sponsors
the documents himself, many of these documents simply contain inadmissible hearsay, as they are
being offered to prove the truth of matters asserted by others or contain the defendant’s own self-
serving hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. Larsen, 175 Fed. App’x 236, 241 (10th
Cir. 2006) (Rule 801(d)(2) does not permit self-serving, exculpatory statements made by a party
and offered by that same party).
Since receiving the defense exhibits, the government has sought to independently
investigate the exhibits and simultaneously disclose its findings to defense counsel. At this time,
the government suspects many of these exhibits may be inauthentic due to misspellings,
incomplete or inconsistent communications, and lack of sponsoring witnesses designated in the
exhibit or witness lists. Thus, the government believes that many of the exhibits will fail to have
“evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is” under
Fed. R. Evid. 901(a), separate and apart from inadmissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 801(c).
E. The defendant may cast blame on the victims.
The government anticipates that the defendant may attempt to blame witnesses from IPF
Sourcing, LLC, or argue that they were negligent. But such arguments are not a defense to the
charges against the defendant and will mislead, waste time, or confuse the jury. See Fed. R. Evid.
403.
The criminal statutes focus on the defendant’s conduct. “If a scheme to defraud has been
or is intended to be devised, it makes no difference whether the persons the schemers intended to
defraud are gullible or skeptical, dull or bright. These are criminal statutes, not tort concepts.”
United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 903 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Brien, 617
F.2d 299, 311 (1st Cir. 1980)). Any argument that IPF Sourcing is to blame for the defendant’s
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conduct is wholly irrelevant to the crimes charged and will likewise confuse the issues for the jury.
Dated: February 19, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
PETER MCNEILLY
United States Attorney
By: s/ Alyssa Mance
ALYSSA MANCE
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office
1801 California St. Suite 1600
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 454-0100
Alyssa.Mance@usdoj.gov
By: s/ Albert Buchman
ALBERT BUCHMAN
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office
1801 California St. Suite 1600
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 454-0100
Al.Buchman@usdoj.gov
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