Government's Post-Hearing Memorandum on Competency — United States v. Edwards (M.D. Fla., Document 218)
Summary
Government's post-hearing memorandum in support of a competency finding in United States v. Joshua Edwards, Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP, Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division. The United States asks the Court to find the defendant competent to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. § 4241, stating that the defendant has malingered significant mental health deficits and has a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings. It recounts the evaluations by Dr. Danziger, Dr. Micono and Dr. Abdelaal and the competency hearing of July 10, 2024, and states that the defendant presented no evidence. It points to 498 calls to the defendant's family during the period at MCC Chicago for competency restoration, and its signature block names Kara M. Wick and James D. Peterson.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Cite this document
“Government's Post-Hearing Memorandum on Competency — United States v. Edwards (M.D. Fla., Document 218).”
Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-united-states-v-joshua-edwards-dkt-218-m-d-fla-6b0dab0f2a/
, SHA-256 bbe3877afa702cf9db2e2b48d0325b691e9c3fb4c2a0ca4680b6d191c499f286.Full text
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 1 of 24 PageID 1259
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. CASE NO. 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP
JOSHUA EDWARDS
GOVERNMENT’S POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
COMPETENCY FINDING
The United States of America, in accordance with this Court’s Order, hereby
files this briefing, and respectfully requests that the Court find the defendant competent
to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. 1 Without question, the defendant has
malingered significant mental health deficits, but he has done so inconsistently and in
a way that doesn’t match with any identifiable mental health diagnosis under the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In fact, the defendant
does not have any established mental health defect or disorder that would rise to a
level which would render him incompetent. Further, the defendant has a factual and
rational understanding of the proceedings, and he has the ability, even though he may
be unwilling, to assist properly in his defense.
1
As an initial matter, the government notes that all the competency exhibits were admitted
into evidence by agreement with the defense, and without any restrictions or objections. See
transcript of hearing, United States v. J. Edwards, 6:22-cr-201-WWB-LHP, July 10, 2024, (“I
have no basis to object and so I don't object, Your Honor”).
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 2 of 24 PageID 1260
BACKGROUND
On December 7, 2022, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against the
defendant, Joshua Edwards, charging him with Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, Bank Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2,
False Statement to Lending Institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1014 and 2, and
Visa Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). The sophisticated scheme involved
multiple frauds to procure more than $8 million in funds from the Federal
Government.
On or about December 14, 2022, the defendant was arrested. Joint Task Force-
DHS Agent Javier Mondejar was one of the officers who arrested the defendant and
escorted him to his initial appearance. Agent Mondejar testified that his interactions
with the defendant were normal and comprehensible:
A: . . . we assisted him and we handcuffed him, patted him down for weapons,
and then we escorted him out.
Q. Okay. And during what you've just described, did Mr. Joshua Edwards speak
to you at all?
A. Yes, ma'am. He was asking what was going on and if his dad was okay.
Q. And you were able to understand and comprehend what he was
saying to you?
A. Yes, ma'am.
* * *
Q. All right. At some point was Mr. Joshua Edwards Mirandized?
A. Yes, ma'am. Mr. Edwards was escorted out of the house by myself, another
task force officer, and at the time was the assistant to the SAC force, Secret
2
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 3 of 24 PageID 1261
Service. We escorted him to one of our vehicles that we had running, with AC
on, placed him in the back seat, read him Miranda warnings verbally. He said
that he understood, and he wanted his lawyer.
Transcript of hearing, United States v. J. Edwards, 6:22-cr-201-WWB-LHP, July 10,
2024, pg. 79.
The judicial record and competency hearing showed that, shortly after that
interaction, the defendant shut down and changed his demeanor completely after
contact with his father in which his father whispered secretively in his ear. The day of
his arrest, the defendant was present in Court for his initial appearance. That
proceeding was transcribed. See Transcript of hearing, December 14, 2022, Doc. 14.
In that hearing, the defendant’s profound change in demeanor was evident:
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Edwards, as to these charges, you have the right to remain silent, not to
make any statements or comments. If you do make any statements or
comments, the Government can use those statements or comments against you.
Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT JOSHUA EDWARDS: (No audible response.)
MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor, if I may. I went downstairs to speak with
Mr. Joshua Edwards before the hearing in the case had started. I had difficulty
explaining the charges to Mr. Edwards. The only thing I got from Mr. Edwards
is that he had another attorney. I reached out to that private attorney. That
attorney indicated that he did not represent Mr. Joshua Edwards. So the most I
could get out of him was he wanted to speak with his attorney, which he did not
have, and his mother and sister who are currently in the courtroom.
Your Honor, this is the first time that I've had this happen. I do believe that there
is a competency issue in this case. So I would be requesting a competency
evaluation. However, I would like one to be done here in the Orlando area so it
would not take as long, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, can you hear me?
3
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 4 of 24 PageID 1262
DEFENDANT JOSHUA EDWARDS: (No audible response.)
THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, stand up. (Pause.)
THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, are you in pain?
DEFENDANT JOSHUA EDWARDS: (No audible response.)
THE COURT: Do you understand where we are?
DEFENDANT JOSHUA EDWARDS: (No audible response.)
THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, do you understand what I'm saying?
DEFENDANT JOSHUA EDWARDS: (No audible response.)
* * *
MS. WICK: I have no objection to that, Your Honor.
I would note for the record, however, that the agents interacted with Mr. Josh
Edwards this morning, and he was speaking and responding to them just fine.
Transcript of hearing, December 14, 2022, Doc. 14, pgs. 6-8.
With regard to the competency proceedings, the Court initially appointed Dr.
Danziger to evaluate the defendant’s competency to stand trial, and Dr. Danziger
interviewed the defendant on February 2, 2023. See Competency Exhibit 4. Dr.
Danziger opined that the defendant’s diagnosis was “Probable Malingering.” Exhibit
4, ¶ 14. The defendant then made an oral motion for a second competency evaluation.
Doc. 71. The Court granted the motion and committed the defendant to the custody
of the Attorney General for an 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) evaluation. Doc. 72. On April 17,
2023, Dr. Micono authored a report concerning the defendant’s competency to stand
trial. See Competency Exhibit 5. Dr. Micono concluded:
4
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 5 of 24 PageID 1263
Based on Mr. Edwards' current presentation and the information available, there
is evidence to suggest he may have a mental disorder (autism spectrum disorder)
that is significantly impairing his present ability to understand the nature and
consequences of the court proceedings against him, and his ability to properly
assist counsel in his defense; however, there is also evidence that he has no
mental disorder impairing his present abilities.
Exhibit 5, pg. 16. Dr. Micono also suggested that the defendant may be malingering.
Id., at 13. Subsequently, the Court ordered the defendant committed to the custody of
the Attorney General for a competency restoration procedure under § 4241(d). Doc.
97. Thereafter, Dr. Abdelaal prepared a report dated January 25, 2024 and rendered
the opinion that:
it is my opinion that the defendant is not currently suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings or to assist
properly in his defense.
Competency Exhibit 2. The Court held a competency hearing on this matter on July
10, 2024. The government introduced, without objection, all of the completed
competency reports, as well as other background information and various Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) records. See Exhibit list, Doc. 213. In addition, the government
presented the testimony of Dr. Abdelaal and Joint Task Force-DHS Agent Javier
Mondejar. The defendant presented no evidence.
MEMORANDUM
I. Competency Legal Standards
“A defendant has a due process right not to be tried or convicted while
incompetent.” United States v. Ramirez, 491 F. App'x 65, 71 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
5
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 6 of 24 PageID 1264
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975)). The federal competency standard is set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which provides:
If, after [a] hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney
General.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
Section 4241 codifies the standard for competency set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824
(1960): "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." See also
United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1371 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[T]he bar for incompetency is high.”
United States v. Miller, 531 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2008). A petitioner “is entitled to no
presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his . . . incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Lawrence v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 700 F.3d 464, 481
(11th Cir. 2012). “[T]he standard of proof is high,” and the facts must “positively,
unequivocally and clearly generate [a] legitimate doubt.” Card v. Singletary, 981 F.2d
481, 484 (11th Cir. 1992), see also Perkins v. United States, 73 F.4th 866, 876 (11th Cir.
2023).
6
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 7 of 24 PageID 1265
Whether a petitioner is substantively competent is a factual determination.
United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit reviews a district court's competency determination for clear error. United States
v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011). Clear error review, which is “highly
deferential,” asks whether a factual finding, supported by evidence, leaves us "with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Eggers v. Alabama,
876 F.3d 1086, 1094 (11th Cir. 2017), see also Perkins v. United States, 73 F.4th 866, 877
(11th Cir. 2023).
Here, the defendant does not argue, forcefully or persuasively, that he is
incompetent. Despite the passage of more than 18 months since he first raised the issue
of competency, the defendant has produced no historical, educational, or third-party
information suggesting or stating that he has any mental health deficiencies, or any
mental disease or defect. To the contrary, the record is replete with examples of the
defendant’s deceit and support a finding that he is malingering mental health
deficiencies and that he is competent to stand trial.
A. Burden of proof
The government does not concede that it bears the burden of proof here, but
also suggests that the evidence is not in equipoise. Without question, at the initial
hearing the defendant bears the burden of proof on the issue of competency. United
States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011). 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) is silent as
to who bears the burden of proof in a competency hearing. There remains a question
7
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 8 of 24 PageID 1266
of who bears the burden of proof in a competency restoration proceeding. See United
States v. Madison, No: 6:17-cr-15-Orl-37LRH, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244730, 2020
WL 8461574 (M.D. Fla., Oct. 29, 2020). The government concedes that there is legal
support in favor of allocating the burden of proof to the government in a restoration
hearing. Id., citing United States v. Cabrera, No. 07-20760-CR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44724, 2008 WL 2374234, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2008) ("[I]f there is an adjudication
of incompetency, and the defendant is committed to the Attorney General . . . the
burden of persuasion shifts; i.e., the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant has recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his
defense.").
Here, the government notes that Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, M.D. opined that
“Defendant was feigning his condition and malingering and therefore competent to
proceed.” See Doc. 97, pg. 1, Government Exhibit 4, Doc. 231. Thereafter, Dr. Jessica
Micono, Psy. D. opined a tentative opinion that:
Based on Mr. Edwards' current presentation and the information available, there
is evidence to suggest he may have a mental disorder (autism spectrum disorder)
that is significantly impairing his present ability to understand the nature and
consequences of the court proceedings against him, and his ability to properly
assist counsel in his defense; however, there is also evidence that he has no
mental disorder impairing his present abilities. While there were indications he
was not presenting an accurate picture of his current legal knowledge and
abilities, no formal assessment of his actual legal knowledge and rational ability
to apply this knowledge to his present legal circumstances was possible. Given
8
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 9 of 24 PageID 1267
he may be experiencing cognitive impairments, it is possible that his actual
abilities are not sufficient enough for him to be considered competent to
proceed. Therefore, I am offering a tentative opinion that Mr. Edwards is not
currently competent to proceed.
See Government Exhibit 5, Doc. 231, pg. 16. The government does not dispute that
the Court found “by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant is not mentally
competent as that term is defined in section 4241(a).” Doc. 97, pg. 2. The government
points this out not to quibble but, rather, to illustrate that this is not “one of the rare
cases in which allocation of the burden will make a difference—where the evidence is
in ‘equipoise.’” United States v. Wilborn, No. 6:13-cr-253-Orl-37GJK, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66304 (M.D. Fla., May 14, 2014).
B. Defendant’s Unwillingness to Cooperate Does not equate to Incompetence
Moreover, a defendant’s unwillingness to participate in the evaluation process,
or the competency hearing, does not necessarily mean that the defendant is
incompetent. See United States v. Perkins, 787 F. 3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015), United States
v. White, 670 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (“it would have been just as reasonable for the
district judge to infer that White had the ability to cooperate with an attorney, but had
decided not to, that is, he was purposely causing the problem for his own reasons”).
Put another way, “[n]ot every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates” that the
defendant is incompetent; “rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to
assist counsel or understand the charges” at the time of the relevant proceeding, such
as trial or sentencing. Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2005)
9
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 10 of 24 PageID 1268
(distinguishing the defendant's behavior in the courtroom at trial with his purported
“history of mental illness”) (emphasis added).
The Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Perkins, is instructive. See Perkins, 787
F. 3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015) (direct appeal), Perkins v. United States, 73 F. 4th 866 (11th
Cir. 2023). Before trial, the defendant as appointed counsel, who subsequently
withdrew, and a second counsel was appointed. The defendant filed a pleading stating
that he wanted “Revocation of Power of Attorney.” Perkins, 787 F. 3d at 1334. At a
hearing, the defendant spoke in somewhat non-sensical language stating “do not
accept your offer” of self-representation and “I do not accept any of your rights ....
How can I waive something that I have never accepted and that does not apply to
me?” Perkins, 787 F. 3d at 1334. At the pre-trial conference when the district judge
began to talk about the date on which trial would begin, the defendant interjected:
“You're not going to tell me anything. You don't control me.” Id., at 1336. On the first
day of trial, the defendant refused to come out of his holding cell. Id. The Court refused
to hold a competency hearing because, the Court stated, the defendant was
“employing a calculated strategy to disrupt proceedings.” Id.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the trial Court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the defendant competent to stand trial. Id., at 1339. Subsequently
at the 2255 hearing, it was revealed that defense counsel was aware that the defendant
had previously been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. Perkins, 73 F.4th at 873.
At least one BOP psychologist diagnosed the defendant with schizophrenia during his
incarceration, and the defendant presented evidence of an additional psychologist who
10
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 11 of 24 PageID 1269
retrospectively opined that the defendant was incompetent during his trial. Id., at 873-
4. Notwithstanding the additional information and evidence, the Eleventh Circuit held
“there is no indication, much less one that would lead to a "definite and firm
conviction" on appeal, that the district court's conclusion that Perkins was competent
during sentencing was wrong. Id., at 876.
The defendant here presents a much less compelling case for incompetence than
the defendant in Perkins. First, there is no documented evidence that the defendant has
ever been diagnosed with any mental disease or defect. The defendant, through
counsel, has had more than a year to produce any evidence of a mental disease or
defect, and has not done so. Second, the defendant has been evaluated by several
mental health professionals, and none have opined that the defendant is incompetent.
Dr. Micono did give a qualified opinion “offering a tentative opinion that Mr.
Edwards is not currently competent to proceed,” but those issues were fully addressed
by Dr. Abdelaal.
C. The suggestion of Autism does not equate to Incompetence
The only suggestion, or claim, put forth by the defendant is that he possibly
suffers from some form of Autism Spectrum Disorder. That claim is weak, and not
supported by any documentary or historical information. Nevertheless, that suggestion
raises the possibility that the defendant suffers from some type of mental health
disorder or disease that is static over time. Any suggestion that the defendant suffers
from some type of mental health disorder that has debilitated him throughout his life
11
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 12 of 24 PageID 1270
to the extent that he is incompetent to stand trial, is in marked contrast to his prior
behavior as a fraudster and lay minister. See Competency Exhibit 7.
Additionally, any suggestion that the defendant suffers from Autism Spectrum
Disorder, even with a low IQ, does not equate to an incompetency finding. See United
States v. Rodriguez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152323 (S.D. FLA, Nov. 10, 2015). In
Rodriguez, the defendant was charged with child pornography offenses. The defendant
was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and borderline intellectual
functioning. The trial court found the defendant incompetent after a hearing in which
an additional psychologist opined that “I do not believe he meets criteria for
competency to stand trial.” Rodriguez, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152323 *8. He was then
committed under 4241(d) for a four-month restoration procedure. The BOP opined
that the defendant was competent to stand trial. After a hearing, the Court ruled that:
notwithstanding Rodriguez's established diagnosis of high functioning autism
spectrum disorder and borderline intellectual function, the undersigned
concludes that he meets the legal standard of competency to stand trial.
Id., at *41. Key to the Court decision was the Skype chats of the defendant, which the
Court found “belie [the defense psychologist’s] assessment that Rodriguez can only
think in concrete terms without the capacity for extrapolation, inferences or
generalizations.” Id., at *40. The Court also rejected the defense argument that the
defendant needed to be able to assist counsel in a more sophisticated way, holding:
The undersigned also finds that defense counsel overshot the mark in his
attempts to show that Rodriguez is not competent by posing questions regarding
Rodriguez's ability to decipher a pre-sentence investigation report, and his
ability to decide which jurors to select at trial. As noted above, the standard does
not require that a defendant be able to assist in preparing the defense, but be able
12
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 13 of 24 PageID 1271
to consult with his lawyer and assist in his defense. Merriweather, 921 F. Supp.
2d at 1301-02 & n.52. Also, as courts have noted, the standard does not require
that defendants "fully comprehend the intricacies of some of the defensive
theories offered by their lawyers," Hogan, 986 F.2d at 1373, or "have a high level
of ability or performance," Merriweather, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 1307 n.62, or "be as
intelligent and reasonable as his lawyers." Indeed, as succinctly noted by the
Eleventh Circuit, neither low intelligence nor mental deficiency "can be equated
with mental incompetence to stand trial." Medina, 59 F.3d at 1107.
Id.
Here, the evidence is much more compelling that the defendant is competent,
and malingering. Three psychologists who have examined the defendant have found
that he is malingering symptoms, or that some of his presentation is consistent with
malingering. Even if the defendant suffers from some of the symptoms mentioned, he
is not nearly as impaired as the defendant in Rodriguez.
II. The Evidence Supports a Finding of Competence
A. The Competency Evaluation Reports and July 10, 2024 Competency Proceeding
On February 2, 2023, Dr. Danziger attempted to interview the defendant at the
Orange County jail. Government Exhibit 4. Dr. Danziger noted that “no records were
found indicating the defendant has been evaluated by the jail psychiatrist, nor by the
jail mental health staff.” Id., at ¶ 4. According to Dr. Danziger:
The defendant presented with a very childlike demeanor, staring ahead,
seemingly frightened, and entirely unable to provide me with even the simplest
of historical information. The defendant was unable to tell me how old he was
or his date of birth. He told me he lives with his mom and his dad, but he could
not tell me their names, did not know what city he lived in, and did not know
his address. He could not tell me anything about his education, where he grew
up, or anything about his upbringing and background.
Id., at ¶ 6.
13
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 14 of 24 PageID 1272
According to documents provided to Dr. Micono, the defendant served as the
"Technological Operations Manager," for Aslan International Ministry, Inc. for four
years. His specific duties included managing four employees and three volunteers,
"supervising the day-to-day operations media team." Micono report, dated April 17,
2023, pg. 2. ASLAN International Ministry, Inc. (“ASLAN”) was originally
established in Ohio on June 16, 2005. On June 5, 2018, Dr. Evan Edwards, on behalf
of ASLAN, filed an application to conduct business in Florida as a Foreign Not For
Profit Corporation. In the application, Dr. Evan Edwards was listed as the registered
agent, Chairman, and President of the business, Joshua Edwards (Evan Edwards' son)
was listed as the Vice President and a Director; Dr. Joy Edwards (Evan Edwards'
daughter) was listed as the Secretary and a Director; W.G. was listed as the Vice
Chairman, and M.B. was listed as a Director. The application indicated that the
purpose of the business was "religious." See Exhibits 5 and 6.
Further, the defendant was examined by Dr. Abdelaal at MCC Chicago. Dr.
Abdelaal concluded:
In accordance with Title 18, U.S.C., §§ 4241 and 4247, it is my opinion that the
defendant is not currently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings or to assist properly in his defense.
Competency Exhibit 2, pg. 20. Dr. Abdelaal also found that:
In this case, three of the four features of malingering are noted. Although I was
unable to administer a competency specific instrument with the defendant, the
defendant has had two previous competency evaluations and, in my opinion,
there is sufficient collateral information (i.e., behavioral observations, phone
calls, previous documented reports and evaluations) to support that the
defendant is malingering competency specific deficits and cognitive impairment
with regard to his presentation. Specifically, it is my opinion that the defendant
14
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 15 of 24 PageID 1273
is intentionally presenting in a manner to appear to lack any competency related
knowledge and ability to assist defense counsel.
Exhibit 2, pg. 17-18.
Dr. Abdelaal expounded on her report at the July 10, 2024 competency hearing.
Dr. Abdelaal testified that the defendant as able to communicate and interact with staff
at MCC Chicago. Transcript of hearing, July 10, 2024, United States v. J. Edwards, No.
6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP (M.D. Fla.) pgs. 18-19. 2 The defendant also spoke to
another BOP psychologist, and responded to her questions, but then “stated that he
couldn't speak with her.” Id. The psychologist met with the defendant on several
occasions and he stated “that he couldn't do anything without his attorney or that his
attorney told him not to participate, similar to what he said to me and several other
staff members, including a case manager who helps with facilitating legal calls.” Id.
In short, the defendant was able to, and did, interact and communicate with BOP staff
and psychologists in a coherent and intelligent fashion.
Dr. Abdelaal reiterated that the defendant was malingering, or faking
impairment. Id., at 31. Specifically, Dr. Abdelaal testified:
So it was my opinion that he was malingering, which is essentially a response
style, and he was appearing -- attempting to appear more impaired that he
generally is, if there is any impairment.
2
The government notes that the defendant agreed “it's clear that the Court can consider
hearsay and pretty much anything that's part of the record as part of its competency
determination.” Transcript of hearing, pg. 5. See also United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 923
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
15
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 16 of 24 PageID 1274
Id. It is highly significant that the defendant refused to interact with BOP staff, and
Dr. Abdelaal, by reference to his attorney:
He wouldn't sign the voluntary statement of understanding of form and said that
he couldn't speak to me without his attorney. And, then, from that point
forward, that's what he repeatedly stated when I tried to meet with him or when
I tried to engage with him on the unit even briefly. He told me that he couldn't
speak to me without his attorney. And he wouldn't speak with me.
Id., at 14.
Agent Mondejar, who was in the unique position to observe the defendant when
he was initially arrested and when he was present at his initial appearance, also
testified at the July10, 2024 competency hearing as follows:
Q. Okay. And during what you've just described, did Mr. Joshua Edwards speak
to you at all?
A. Yes, ma'am. He was asking what was going on and if his dad
was okay.
Q. And you were able to understand and comprehend what he was
saying to you?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. All right. At some point was Mr. Joshua Edwards Mirandized?
A. Yes, ma'am. Mr. Edwards was escorted out of the house by myself, another
task force officer, and at the time was the assistant to the SAC force, Secret
Service. We escorted him to one of our vehicles that we had running, with AC
on, placed him in the back seat, read him Miranda warnings verbally. He said
that he understood, and he wanted his lawyer.
Q. Okay. Did you have any other interactions with him that day?
A. Yes, ma'am. We proceeded to, once we made the arrest of his father, Evan,
placed him in a van with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, EMTs. For that
purpose, Josh was asking about his dad, so we put him in the same van with his
father. He was asking what the procedure was. . . .
Transcript of hearing, pgs. 79-80. Agent Mondejar further testified:
16
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 17 of 24 PageID 1275
Q. So during that process when you were putting him in the vehicle with his
father, he was speaking to you?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And that was intelligible to you. You could understand what he was saying?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. Was he responding to you appropriately?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Id., at pg. 80
The most powerful aspect of Agent Mondejar’s evidence was his testimony
about observing the transformation of the defendant from someone who was
interacting intelligently with law-enforcement to someone who presented as a person
unable to interact with anyone. The intervening event was the defendant’s contact with
his father. Agent Mondejar testified:
A. He was escorted inside a cell with his dad. They started talking. I couldn't
hear very well what they were saying, but they started talking one or two
sentences, and then they switched to whispering in each other's ears.
Q. Okay. At some point that day, did Mr. Joshua Edwards' behavior change?
A. When we were in initial appearance.
Q. And can you describe that for the Court?
A. After coming back upstairs from U.S. Marshals, I was sitting at a table with
you and the other agent. I observed Josh. He stood up. And they were standing,
talking to the judge, and he was looking up at the ceiling, not paying attention,
not talking to the magistrate, not acknowledging the lawyer or the judge.
Transcript of hearing, pg. 82.
B. There is Strong Evidence of Malingering
17
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 18 of 24 PageID 1276
Powerful evidence supports the fact that the defendant is malingering.
Malingering is a psychological term that means, in essence, a defendant is faking
symptoms of a mental illness to evade punishment. See DeBruce v. Commissioner, 758
F.3d 1263, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014). The DSM defines “malingering” as:
The essential feature of malingering is the intentional production of false or
grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external
incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial
compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs.
DSM-5-TR, pg. 835.
The defendant displayed at least three of the four criteria found in the DSM-5-
TR for malingering, and Dr. Abdelaal so found.3 Abdelaal Report, pg. 17. (“In this
case, three of the four features of malingering are noted”). Dr. Danziger also opined
that the defendant was malingering. Danziger Report, ¶ 15 (“It is my opinion, more
likely than not, based on the information available to me, the defendant’s presentation
is feigned and most consistent with malingering”). Additionally, Dr. Micono indicated
that the defendant may be malingering. Micono Report, pg. 13 (“As a result, possible
malingering is being noted”). In fact, there is no psychological evaluation that states
with any certainty that the defendant is suffering from any mental disorder.
3
The DSM-5-TR states that malingering should be strongly considered if any combination of the
following is noted: (1) Medicolegal context of presentation (e.g., the individual is referred by an
attorney to the clinician for examination, or the individual self-refers while litigation or criminal
charges are pending); (2) Marked discrepancy between the individual's claimed stress or disability and
the objective findings and observations; (3) Lack of cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and
in complying with the prescribed treatment regimen; and/or (4) The presence of antisocial personality
disorder. Id.
18
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 19 of 24 PageID 1277
The government suggests that the motive to escape liability for engaging in an
$8 million COVID Fraud scheme is a powerful motive to malinger mental health
symptoms in the context of a competency assessment. Being a non-violent crime, the
defendant may very well expect that his charges will be dismissed if he is found
unrestorable at some point in the future. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d)(2), 4246(d), Request
for Leave to Dismiss Indictment, United States v. McMullen, No. 8:21-cr-382-SDM-
CPT, Doc. 111 (M.D. Fla., Jun. 17, 2024). But see United States v. McAfee, No. 18 Cr.
425 (JFK), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5760, 2021 WL 106268 (S.D. N.Y., Jan. 12, 2021).
The evidence that the defendant is malingering mental health deficits is strong.
All the mental health professionals who have evaluated the defendant have suggested
or opined that he is malingering. Defendant meets the definition of malingering by
intentionally misrepresenting and exaggerating his symptoms to avoid entirely or
receive diminished repercussions for his criminal behavior. See United States v.
Daughtry, No. 23-11695, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11760, *2, 2024 WL 2182343 (11th
Cir., May 15, 2024). Here, the defendant has presented in a starkly different fashion
depending upon the circumstances. Dr. Danziger observed the defendant presenting
with “a very childlike demeanor, staring ahead, seemingly frightened, and entirely
unable to provide me with even the simplest of historical information. The defendant
was unable to tell me how old he was or his date of birth.” Danziger report, ¶ 6. This
presentation is in stark contrast to his observed behavior on other occasions: refusing
19
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 20 of 24 PageID 1278
participation and articulating that it was based upon advice of counsel, provided MH
staff background information about his education, reading the forms given him and
inquiring whether “he would need to sign” which is what the form stated. See Abdelaal
and Micono reports. The defendant was also observed interacting in an appropriate
and coherent fashion with other inmates and watching television/playing board
games. Abdelaal Report, pg. 6. All told, the defendant’s presentation of significant
impairment is selective, inconsistent, and contrary to any identified mental illness. The
defendant is malingering symptoms of mental impairment and he is neither suffering
from any significant or identifiable mental illness.
C. There is No Mental Disease or Defect Rendering the Defendant Incompetent
There is no credible support for any claim that the defendant is suffering from
“a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a). Dr. Abdelaal opined that “a
diagnosis of Other Specified Personality Disorder is assigned at this time” along with
malingering. Abdelaal Report, pg. 17. Dr. Abdelaal also opined that “defendant's
presentation during the present evaluation . . . is inconsistent with an individual with
Autism Spectrum Disorder, Intellectual Developmental Disorder (i.e., Intellectual
Disability), or any other neurodevelopmental disorder.” Id., at 18. Dr. Danziger
diagnosed the defendant with “Probable Malingering.” Danziger Report, ¶ 4. Dr.
Micono wrote an opinion of “Rule-Out” Malingering and Autism Spectrum Disorder.
20
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 21 of 24 PageID 1279
Micono Report, pg. 13. Consequently, the defendant lacks a diagnoses that would
support a mental incompetency claim under § 4241.4
D. The Defendant has a Factual and Rational Understanding of the Proceedings
A detailed analysis of the elements of an incompetency claim under § 4241 and
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975) is obviously complicated by the
defendant’s malingering. Nevertheless, an abundance of evidence establishes that the
defendant has a factual and rational understanding of the proceedings against him.
The government understands that the concept of “rational understanding” is difficult
to define, and it means more than simply being oriented to time and place and having
some recollection of events. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. Dr. Abdelaal opined:
Regarding the prognosis pertaining to the defendant's ability to understand the
proceedings and assist defense counsel, his prognosis is considered to be stable
and that he should be able to understand the proceedings and assist defense
counsel should he choose to do so. Further, as discussed above, the defendant
has the capacity to understand the proceedings and assist defense counsel, and
to my knowledge, there is no plausible explanation as to why that would have
changed nor is there a mental illness to my knowledge that would account for
the defendant's presentation across evaluations and during the present
evaluation period. It is my opinion that the defendant's presentation and refusal
to speak to defense counsel is intentional and volitional and not due to a mental
illness . . .
Abdelaal Report, pg. 20. The strongest corroborative evidence of the defendant
capacity is his repeated invocation of his consultation, or the specter of his
consultation, with counsel. The defendant’s repeated statements that “My lawyer told
4
The government respectfully disagrees that incompetence, within § 4241, can arise outside the
realm of mental illness, as the statute requires “a mental disease or defect.” See United States v. Madison,
No: 6:17-cr-15-Orl-37LRH, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244730, *9, 2020 WL 8461574 (M.D. Fla. Oct.
29, 2020) (stating, “[A] defendant can be competent to stand trial despite being mentally ill and
similarly a defendant can be found incompetent to stand trial without being mentally ill.”).
21
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 22 of 24 PageID 1280
me not to sign anything without talking to him” and that he could not “answer any
questions without my lawyer” in response to questioning are contextually appropriate
and portray knowledge of the significance of the proceedings and role of counsel.
E. The Defendant is Able to Assist Properly in His Defense
This prong concerns the ability of a defendant to effectively participate in his
defense by communicating effectively with his counsel. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72,
Cooper, 517 U.S. at 356-57. “It is worth emphasizing that the Dusky standard refers to
the ability of a defendant to communicate with his attorneys, not his willingness to
communicate with his attorney.” United States v. Merriweather, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1304 (N.D. Ala. 2013), quoted in Madison, No: 6:17-cr-15-Orl-37LRH, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 244730, *103. Stated simply, the defendant’s ability to communicate with MH
professionals, when he chooses to do so, as well as his 498 calls to his family during
the period in which he was at MCC Chicago for competency restoration establishes
the “ability” prong of the competency standard. As important, the defendant was able
to navigate a complex, and detailed, TruPhone process to reach
22
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 23 of 24 PageID 1281
his family members. See transcript of hearing, July 10, 2024, United States v. Edwards,
pgs. 15, and 19-24.
WHEREFORE, the government respectfully requests that this Court issue an
order finding the defendant competent to stand trial.
Respectfully submitted,
ROGER B. HANDBERG
United States Attorney
By: /s/ Kara M. Wick______
Kara M. Wick
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0085578
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
E-mail: Kara.Wick@usdoj.gov
By: /s/ James D. Peterson
James D. Peterson
Trial Attorney
Bar No. VA 35373
United States Department of Justice
1331 F Street N.W. 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20530
Desk: (202) 353-0796
E-mail: James. D.Peterson@usdoj.gov
23
Case 6:22-cr-00201-WWB-LHP Document 218 Filed 09/05/24 Page 24 of 24 PageID 1282
U.S. v. JOSHUA EDWARDS Case No. 6:22-cr-201-WWB-LHP
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document was filed using the CM-ECF
system and served upon counsel of record:
Andrew C. Searle, Esq.
/s/ Kara M. Wick______
Kara M. Wick
Assistant United States Attorney
Florida Bar No. 0085578
400 W. Washington Street, Suite 3100
Orlando, Florida 32801
Telephone: (407) 648-7500
E-mail: Kara.Wick@usdoj.gov
24
File and source
- File
- 218.pdf
- Size
- 195,099 bytes
- SHA-256
- bbe3877afa702cf9db2e2b48d0325b691e9c3fb4c2a0ca4680b6d191c499f286
- Our copy
- 218.pdf
- Original
- No public link identified.