Government's Consolidated Response to Motions in Limine — United States v. Aimee Marie Bock et al. (D. Minn., Doc. 452)

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The Government's Consolidated Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine, filed 01/14/25 as Doc. 452 in United States v. Aimee Marie Bock et al., Criminal No. 22-223 (NEB/DTS), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The government opposes motions by Bock, Salim Said, Abdulkadir Nur Salah and Abdi Nur Salah. It argues that evidence of Abdi Nur Salah's failure to disclose consulting payments to the City of Minneapolis is intrinsic evidence or admissible under Rule 404(b), and states that it likely will not seek to introduce evidence of Abdulkadir Nur Salah's gang affiliation. It also responds to his Rule 404(b) motion and to Bock's motion regarding trips and expenses, arguing that a Las Vegas trip she cites was paid with food program money. The response is dated January 14, 2025.

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“Government's Consolidated Response to Motions in Limine — United States v. Aimee Marie Bock et al. (D. Minn., Doc. 452).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-united-states-v-bock-et-al-feeding-our-future-dkt-452-d-m-d797b39d35/, SHA-256 6445068b4c19d5c25fddbbc37da84a228be90436544cadbc1a01a5dc99a25275.

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CASE 0:22-cr-00223-NEB-DTS Doc. 452 Filed 01/14/25 Page 1 of 41

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Criminal No. 22-223 (NEB/DTS)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
GOVERNMENT’S CONSOLIDATED
v.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS IN LIMINE
1. AIMEE MARIE BOCK,
3. SALIM SAID,
4. ABDULKADIR NUR SALAH,
and
6. ABDI NUR SALAH,

Defendants.

The United States of America, by and through its attorneys, Andrew M. Luger,

United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota, and Joseph H. Thompson,

Harry M. Jacobs, Matthew S. Ebert, and Daniel W. Bobier, Assistant United States

Attorneys, respectfully submits the following consolidated response to the

defendants’ motions in limine. Dkt. #407, 423-433, 441-448.

I. Abdi Nur Salah’s Motion to Preclude Evidence of His Failure to
Disclose Consulting Payments (Dkt. #407).

Salah moves to preclude admission of evidence (which the government

identified in its 404(b) notice) that he failed to disclose to his then-employer, the City

of Minneapolis, the income he earned from entities involved in the fraud scheme.

Because this evidence is intrinsic to the charged crimes, and, in all events, is

admissible prior bad act evidence, the Court should deny Salah’s motion.

During the fraudulent scheme, Abdi Salah worked as a Senior Policy Aide for

Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey. Like many government entities, the City of
CASE 0:22-cr-00223-NEB-DTS Doc. 452 Filed 01/14/25 Page 2 of 41

Minneapolis required city employees to obtain written permission before accepting

outside employment or entering into consulting contracts to provide services outside

their city employment. This policy applied to Abdi Salah. Nevertheless, he failed to

disclose his involvement in the federal child nutrition program and with entities

involved in the program, including Stigma Free International, Tunyar Trading,

Optimum Community Services, and The Produce LLC. Abdi Nur Salah also failed to

disclose his ownership and involvement in various entities used to receive and

launder fraud proceeds, including Stone Bridge Development LLC, ANS Properties

LLC, Five A’s Projects LLC, and Gophers Logistics Inc.

A. Evidence of Salah’s Failure to Disclose Consulting Payments Is
Intrinsic Evidence.

The government disclosed this evidence as potential 404(b) out of an

abundance of caution, but the evidence is admissible intrinsic evidence. Intrinsic

evidence provides “the context in which the charged crime occurred.” United States v.

Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2006). Intrinsic evidence “complete[s] the story,”

tends to logically prove an element of the charged offense, or shows consciousness of

guilt. See United States v. Forcelle, 86 F.3d 838, 842–43 (8th Cir. 1996).

Evidence of Abdi Salah’s non-disclosure of consulting payments intrinsic

consciousness-of-guilt evidence. See United States v. Frost, 234 F.3d 1023, 1025 (8th

Cir. 2000) (holding that a prior bad act was intrinsic consciousness-of-guilt evidence

when it was “direct evidence of fraudulent intent,” an element of the charges). In

Frost, the court found that deposition testimony in which the defendant denied

signing documents at issue in his fraud case was intrinsic evidence. See id. The

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CASE 0:22-cr-00223-NEB-DTS Doc. 452 Filed 01/14/25 Page 3 of 41

testimony was direct evidence of fraudulent intent and consciousness of guilt—

therefore in constituted evidence intrinsic to the overall scheme. Id.

Similarly here, Abdi Salah’s non-disclosure demonstrates his fraudulent intent

and consciousness of guilt. He did not disclose information that would have been a

red flag that he was participating in a fraud scheme.

B. Evidence of Salah’s Failure to Disclose Consulting Payments Is
Admissible 404(b) Evidence.

Even if Salah’s non-disclosure of consulting payments were not intrinsic

evidence, it still would be admissible as bad-act evidence under 404(b).

Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible for purposes other demonstrating

criminal propensity, including showing “knowledge or intent.” See United States v.

Harry, 930 F.3d 1000, 1006 (8th Cir. 2019); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence need

only be: (1) relevant to a material issue; (2) similar in kind and not overly remote in

time to the crime charged; (3) supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) higher in

probative value than prejudicial effect. Id. (cleaned up).

In this case, such non-disclosure shows Salah’s fraudulent intent, knowledge

of the criminal nature of his actions, and lack of mistake in the participation in the

fraud scheme, as demonstrated by the fact that he did not disclose fake consulting

payments to a governmental entity when required to do so.

Application of the multi-factor Rule 404(b) test for bad act evidence

demonstrates that this evidence is admissible. First, it is relevant to a material issue,

namely Salah’s intent to commit fraud. Second, the bad act is similar in kind because

it involves a false statement and took place at the same time the fraud scheme was

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occurring. Third, there is sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Salah

committed this bad act, including the City of Minneapolis’s policy and the fact of

Salah’s nondisclosure. Finally, the evidence is highly probative because it shows

Salah’s knowledge and intent, and it far outweighs and limited prejudice of failing to

adhere to the City’s disclosure policy.

For these reasons, evidence of Abdi Salah’s non-disclosure of consulting

payments is admissible as intrinsic evidence, and, in the alternative, as 404(b) prior

bad act evidence. Salah’s motion should be denied.

II. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion to Preclude Evidence of Salah’s
Gang Affiliation (Dkt. #423)

Salah moves to preclude admission of evidence, including evidence the

government found in his text messages and on his Google drive, which the

government identified in its 404(b) notice.

The government believes it likely will not seek to introduce this evidence at

trial. However, upon discovering it, the government disclosed it consistent with the

requirements of Rule 404(b). Several witnesses interviewed by the government

during its ongoing investigation into the broader Feeding Our Future scheme have

reported being afraid to come forward or speak honestly and having received threats

against doing so, including from defendants charged in the Feeding Our Future cases.

The government accordingly provided notice of Salah’s gang affiliation so that, in the

unlikely scenario that these issues arise during trial and become an issue of witness

credibility, the defense will have received pretrial notice.

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The government submits that the Court should reserve judgment on admission

of this evidence until and unless such issues arise in the trial.

III. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion to Exclude Certain 404(b)
Evidence (Dkt. #424)

Salah moves to exclude evidence related to two items the government included

in its 404(b) notice. Before reaching the substance of his objections, however, Salah

contends the Court should disallow such evidence because, he contends, the

government’s 404(b) notice was insufficiently detailed. The Court should reject that

invitation for two reasons. First, even assuming the government’s notice was

insufficient, this response provides an extensive explanation of how the government

intends to prove up and use both of the objected-to items. 1 Trial is more than three

weeks away, which is more than the “reasonable” advance notice required by Rule

404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Crow Ghost, 79 F.4th 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2023)

(approving 404(b) notice given 22 days before trial and amended 14 days before trial).

Second, as stated in the 404(b) notice and as described in detail below, each of the

objected-to items is intrinsic to the charged conspiracy. The government included

them in its 404(b) notice out of an abundance of caution, but as the discussion below

makes clear, this bad-act conduct is intrinsic and so not subject to Rule 404(b)’s notice

1 This is also true of the other items identified in the government’s 404(b) notice that

the defense challenges via in limine motions and which the government addresses
herein.

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requirements. See United States v. Beltz, 385 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2004)

(“Evidence that is relevant to the crime charged is not other crimes evidence.”).

A. Immigration Records

Salah first objects to the introduction of an immigration record he signed and

submitted to the United States government in which he failed to report as income the

millions of dollars of fraud proceeds he obtained from the charged scheme. He

contends such evidence should be precluded by Rule 403, that the government cannot

prove by a preponderance that such misstatement was intentional, or that the

government could do so, but not without a mini-trial delving into “the rules of the

forms and … why Salah had to submit them.” Dkt. #424 at 6. He is wrong on all

counts.

This conduct falls squarely within the charged conspiracy. Salah is charged

with participating in a conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering. That is,

a conspiracy to “conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds” of the fraud scheme. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(a)(1)(B). The evidence will show that: (i) Salah used Safari to run a bogus food

site that falsely claimed to be serving 6,000 meals to kids, day after day, week after

week; (ii) from such claims, Safari (and its co-owner, Salah) received millions of

dollars in fraud proceeds; (iii) Salah and his co-conspirators repeatedly acted to

conceal the location, source, and ownership of fraud proceeds, including through the

use of shell companies, a web of complicated transfers, and purchases; and (iv) when

submitting an official application to the U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office

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for Immigration Review, Salah reported his income from Safari as $0 / week. Such

evidence will establish that Salah acted on this occasion consistent with his and his

co-conspirators other steps taken in furtherance of the scheme, that is, to conceal,

especially from the government, the millions of dollars he obtained in fraud proceeds.

This misrepresentation is intrinsic to the scheme. 2

Proving as much will not require a deep dive into immigration proceedings in

general nor into Salah’s in particular. The jury need only understand that: Salah

submitted this form to a government office; the form required full and accurate

disclosures; and Salah reported $0 in Safari income. The government does not intend

to introduce anything further about Salah’s immigration status, which would have

2 That differentiates this case from Salah’s citations. In some of those cases, there

was no rationale whatsoever for the relevance or probativeness of the challenged
evidence. See United States v. Limon-Urenda, No. CR 13-4067-2-MWB, 2014 WL
11322259, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 2014) (defendant charged with drug trafficking;
government offered no argument for probativeness of immigration status); Lucas v.
Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2013) (immigration status not
relevant in civil action brought by alien against former employer because Fair Law
Standards Act does not preclude “illegal aliens … from recovering unpaid wages”). In
others, limited references to immigration status did not warrant reversal. See United
States v. Ceja-Rangel, 688 F. App’x 203, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (no error in kidnapping
case where government made one reference to immigration status); United States v.
Diaz, 494 F.3d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 2007) (no mistrial warranted in drug trafficking case
for introduction of defendant’s immigration status); but cf. United States v. Amaya-
Manzanares, 377 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (remanding for consideration of
“debatable” Rule 403 question of whether the government could introduce, against a
defendant charged with using a forged green card, evidence that she had entered the
country unlawfully). Indeed, Salah’s only Eighth Circuit citation supports the
government’s argument. United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162 (8th Cir.
2008) (finding no error, and observing that unlawful entry into the country—unlike
an “immigration violation[] … involv[ing] a false statement”—bears debatable
probativeness as to defendant’s character for truthfulness).

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less probative value. But it should be allowed to introduce evidence of, and prove, the

knowing misrepresentation by Salah in these government submissions—especially

given that said misrepresentation is in lockstep with his charged concealment

activities undertaken elsewhere in furtherance of the conspiracy. The government

submits that, to the extent the Court harbors any Rule 403 concerns regarding these

documents, a combination of redactions and limitations of the scope of this inquiry

will more than suffice to eliminate unfair prejudice given the uniquely and highly

probative nature of this bad act conduct.

Finally, Salah argues these misrepresentations should be disallowed either

because they could have innocently resulted from the “complex” nature of the form or

because the form may have been prepared by Salah’s attorney instead of Salah alone. 3

These are grounds for cross examination and for closing argument, but such

contentions go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. The government’s

position, which it intends to prove at trial, is that this submission is simple. Salah

was asked to report his income from the Safari entity he used to wrongfully reap

millions in taxpayers dollars. He reported those earnings as $0.

B. Cosmopolitan’s Tax Records

Salah next objects to the introduction of 1099s issued by Cosmopolitan

Business Solutions—the entity controlled by Salah and co-defendant Abdi Nur Salah,

3 Of course, this second contention is not tenable because it ignores black letter law

that a principal is responsible for the acts of his agent. See, e.g., Krekelberg v. City of
Minneapolis, 991 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2021). If Salah intends to defend on the
ground that his immigration attorney advised against reporting any Safari income,
Salah can call the attorney to testify to as much.

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and which operated Safari Restaurant. These 1099s include bogus Tax Identification

Numbers (TINs), which the government intends to prove Cosmopolitan deliberately

included to frustrate IRS efforts to investigate the flow of funds—in short, to help

conceal fraud proceeds.

Salah objects, arguing this bad act is too “far afield” of the charged misconduct,

too ministerial in nature to be probative, or (contradictorily) too complicated for the

government to prove. Again, he is wrong on all counts.

This conduct falls squarely within the charged conspiracy. Both Salahs are

charged with participating in a conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering.

By using fake TINs, the Salahs precluded (or attempted to preclude) the IRS from

comparing the 1099s against other records for the 1099 recipients to get an accurate

figure for their income (which, to be clear, chiefly consisted of fraud proceeds).

This is not some ministerial error, like the blown filing deadline in United

States v. Reiss, No. 04-cr-156, 2005 WL 2337917, at *3 (D. Minn. June 9, 2005)

(Salah’s case). Rather, the government intends to prove this conduct was a knowing

and deliberate fraud, consistent with and in furtherance of the concealment

conspiracy. It is intrinsic conduct. 4

This act will not be difficult for the government to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence. Testimony at trial will indicate the conspirators knew of the importance

of Tax and Employer Identification Numbers (TINs / EINs) and used them

4 For this reason, Salah’s discussion and citations concerning the government’s
obligation to prove up a separate, “subsequent scheme” are off-point. Dkt. #424 at 8
(citing United States v. Thomas, 791 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2015)).

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strategically in the scheme. In particular, the conspirators created shell companies,

purportedly to operate food-distribution sites, and used them to launder the food-

program proceeds obtained after claiming meals they did not serve. An important

early step in establishing those shell companies was securing, for each, an EIN. As

the evidence at trial will show, the conspirators consistently followed a pattern: they

created a shell company by registering with the Minnesota Secretary of State,

obtained an EIN from the IRS, and then immediately—usually within days—began

claiming reimbursements for purportedly having served thousands of meals per day.

Thus, the government will establish that the defendants: (i) understood these

tax IDs and used them in the scheme; (ii) repeatedly acted to conceal the location,

source, and ownership of fraud proceeds, including through the use of shell

companies, a web of complicated transfers, and purchases; (iii) the TINs on these

1099s are fake; and (iv) the use of fake 1099s frustrates government efforts to follow

the scheme’s proceeds. Such facts (among others) will establish by a preponderance

that Cosmopolitan deliberately used bogus tax IDs in furtherance of the charged

concealment scheme.

Contrary to Salah’s insistence, such proof does not require the government to

present any complicated tax concepts to the jury. To appreciate this bad act evidence,

the jury need only hear what tax IDs are and how they work generally—evidence the

government intends to introduce irrespective of this particular bad act evidence,

given its need to explain the defendants’ serial applications for such IDs as part of

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the scheme. Such presentation simply does not implicate any of the “notoriously

complex” tax concepts about which Salah expresses concern. Dkt. #424 at 9.

Finally, Salah argues that by proving up Cosmopolitan’s deceptive 1099s, the

government will unfairly ascribe responsibility to Salah. He points out that

Cosmopolitan was co-owned by his co-defendant, Abdi Nur Salah, and the deceptive

conduct (once proved) might not have been Abdulkadir’s doing. This misses the mark.

This is not a case of “vilification by association,” as Salah contends, but rather run-

of-the-mill conspirator liability. Simply put, under the law, it does not matter whether

only one Salah, or both together, chose to use the bogus TIN. The government will

show by a preponderance that such use occurred during and in furtherance of the

conspiracy and was foreseeable. That makes both Salahs responsible for the

misconduct.

The use of bogus TINs in the Cosmopolitan 1099s is intrinsic to the charged

conspiracy. Salah’s motion seeking exclusion of this probative and central conduct

should be denied.

IV. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion to Preclude Improper
Questioning (Dkt. #425)

As explained below, the United States anticipates that it will need to recall

certain witnesses to allow for the orderly presentation of evidence. Accordingly,

pursuant to Rule 611(a), the United States requests leave to recall witnesses to

facilitate orderly presentation of evidence.

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A. Challenge to “Summary” Testimony

Abdulkadir Nur Salah seeks an order precluding the introduction of improper

lay witness testimony. He claims such order is necessary to prevent government

witnesses from expressing a view concerning the amount of meals defendants claim

to have served. But nothing is per se improper about such testimony.

It is black letter law that lay witnesses can testify to their “perceptions based

on [their] experience.” United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2015 (citing

Fed. R. Evid. 701)); accord United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 797 (8th Cir.

2003) (courts have “latitude [to] permit a witness to state his conclusions based on

common knowledge or experience”). The testimony Salah envisions falls squarely

within that rule.

For example, the government anticipates calling at trial multiple witnesses

who have owned or worked in restaurants, or who operated legitimately in the food

program and provided meals. Such witnesses can testify to the significant logistical

demands of their kitchens, like hiring and training cooking and cleaning staff,

coordinating and paying for deliveries of ingredients, maintaining sufficient space to

store those ingredients, and allowing staff sufficient time to prepare the meals. Such

witnesses also can provide their lay opinions as to whether the number of meals

defendants claimed were prepared in and/or served from the kitchens of small

restaurants across the state (including Safari) seem high given the timeframe of such

claims. (For example, defendants claimed that Safari—a small restaurant located on

Lake Street in Minneapolis—consistently prepared 6,000 meals a day, every day,

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seven days a week.) Comparing those kinds of figures to one’s personal experience is

prototypical lay witness testimony permissible under Rule 701.

To be clear, however, the rules also permit such conclusions and/or opinions

from witnesses who haven’t personally worked in food service, which is not the only

experience that can provide proper and relevant foundation. To the extent Salah

intends to object to his envisioned testimony on such grounds, 5 he should raise those

objections if and as they arise at trial.

B. Leading Questions

Abdulkadir Nur Salah seeks an instruction precluding leading questions. The

government recognizes, and will abide at trial by, the rules of evidence. It did so in

the Farah trial—and Salah’s citation to seven objections over the course of a six-week

trial does not demonstrate otherwise. The government submits that the parties

should make such routine objections as trial as they arise, and the Court will then be

best positioned to rule on them.

V. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion to Preclude Use of Legal Terms
(Dkt. #426)

Defendant Abdulkadir Nur Salah moves to preclude the government from

using certain terms, including “victims,” “fraud,” and “scams.” See Dkt. #426 at 1. He

argues that such terms are overly prejudicial and cannot be used by anyone other

than an expert witness. He is wrong in both respects.

5 Salah cites three objections from the trial in United States v. Abdiaziz Farah, 22-cr-

124. These were not improper-opinion objections, but rather objections that
individual lines of questioning were leading or lacked foundation. Again, the Court
will be best positioned to rule on such objections at trial, as they come.

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First, Courts have routinely found that such language does not run afoul of

Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Such terms, which merely describe the charged

conduct, are appropriately used by the government in its arguments to the jury. As

the Eighth Circuit has explained, “[t]he use of colorful pejoratives is not improper.”

United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 1998) (appropriate for government

to describe defendant in opening and closings as a “con man” where that language

described the crime). For the same reason, such terms are also permissible from

witnesses on the stand. For example, in United States v. Lussier, this Court denied

the defendant’s motion to preclude the government and its witnesses from using the

term “victim,” explaining that “[t]he term ‘victim’ is not inherently prejudicial.”

No. 18-CR-281 (NEB/LIB), 2019 WL 2489906, at *5 (D. Minn. June 15, 2019). This

Court emphasized that “victim” is a term “commonly used in the English language

that does not by its nature connote guilt.” Id.

That ruling accords with decisions by the Eighth Circuit and other Courts of

Appeals permitting the use of the term “victim” in the context of jury instructions.

See United States v. Washburn, 444 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that “the

use of the term ‘victim’ in jury instructions is not prejudicial to a defendant’s rights”);

Server v. Mizell, 902 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Granbois,

119 F. App’x 35, 38–39 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); see also United States v. Hsia, 24 F.

Supp. 2d 14, 26-27 (D.D.C. 1998) (refusing to strike words such as “unlawful,”

“secret,” “disguised,” “illegal,” “covered-up,” and “falsely,” because those words, read

in context, were relevant to the offenses charged and were not overly prejudicial).

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And, insofar as such descriptive language comes from the mouths of the defendants

or their co-conspirators, they underscore the illegality of their scheme. United States

v. Atkins, 52 F.4th 2022, 753 (8th Cir. 2022) (finding that “the district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting [into] evidence” depictions “of a defendant using

vulgar [and] highly inflammatory language” because they “were highly probative of

[the defendant’s] plan to recruit woman . . . for prostitution”).

Second, Salah suggests that in fraud trials, none of the challenged terms can

be uttered by anyone apart from a Rule 702 expert. He invokes no Eighth Circuit

authority in support of that proposition, and the government is not aware of any.

Testimony is not transmogrified into expert opinion merely because a witness

characterizes some part of the defendants’ conduct as a “scam”; it is black letter law

that lay witnesses can testify to their “perceptions based on [their] experience.”

United States v. Turner, 781 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2015); accord United States v. Espino,

317 F.3d 788, 797 (8th Cir. 2003) (courts have “latitude [to] permit a witness to state

his conclusions based on common knowledge or experience”). Under the law, a

witness’s use of such terms is afield of testimony going to the ultimate legal issue in

a case. See Kostelecky v. NL Acme Tool/NL Indus., 837 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1988)

(Defendant’s negligence case affirming district court exclusion of testimony that

accident “was caused by the injured’s own conduct”).

And, contrary to Salah’s suggestion, a witness’s informal use of a term that

may also be legal in character does not inexorably turn that testimony into improper

“legal conclusion” evidence. See United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d 235, 242 (7th Cir.

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2011) (holding witnesses’ use of the word “fraud” in the colloquial sense, “employing

the vernacular of their financial professions,” was not improper lay testimony);

United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977) (testimony not

objectionable when average laymen would understand the terms used and ascribe

them the same basic meaning intended by the witness).

The Court should reject Salah’s attempt to shoehorn garden-variety, lay

witness testimony into Rule 702.

VI. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion to Preclude Improper Expert
and Lay Opinion Testimony (Dkt. #427)

Abdulkadir Nur Salah moves to impose limitations on, or disallow altogether,

the testimony of FBI Supervisory Forensic Accountant Mark Danielson. He raises

two arguments. Because both arguments rely on a misapprehension concerning the

testimony Danielson will offer, the government first explains his anticipated

testimony.

Danielson is an FBI Supervisory Forensic Accountant with more than 15 years

in law enforcement. He has participated in dozens upon dozens of criminal

investigations concerning suspected money laundering. In doing so, he has evaluated

all manner of related transfers, including those made in cash, tangible goods, real

estate purchases, and other assets. As his title suggests, he has supervised teams of

other FBI forensic accountants conducting this work.

Here, Danielson will provide testimony, on the basis of his training and

experience, explaining what money laundering is and how it works. This is important

testimony in this case, especially, where three of the defendants (including Salah) are

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charged with participation in a sprawling money-laundering conspiracy involving

over a dozen shell entities and hundreds of related transactions. The charged money

laundering scheme involved the purchases of, among other things, luxury vehicles

and real estate (including two mansions, a culinary school, and a bar). A presentation

of the concepts underlying money laundering—presented from Danielson’s personal

experience—will assist the jury in understanding the complex network of laundering

activity in this case.

Danielson will not, however, be called upon to apply those concepts to any

particular transactions. This moots Salah’s chief concern, that the government will

ask Danielson whether the defendant’s particular transfers constituted money

laundering. The government will not do so. Nor will the government seek to introduce

through Danielson testimony about his (limited) involvement in the investigation in

this case.

A. Danielson’s Limited Role Moots Salah’s Concern Regarding
“Undifferentiated Expert Testimony.”

Salah expresses concern that Danielson will play a “dual role” at trial,

providing testimony both as an expert and based on his role in the investigation.

Danielson will not do so. As described above, the government will not call upon him

to testify to any facts related to the investigation. He will not play any “dual role” in

this case.

Salah extends his concerns about dual-role testimony to the government’s two

summary witnesses: case agent Jared Agent and primary case forensic accountant

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Pauline Roase, both from the FBI. 6 He needn’t. Neither was disclosed as an expert in

this case nor will be called upon at trial to act as such. Neither will occupy the dual

role that concerns Salah.

B. Danielson’s Anticipated Testimony Does Not Require Rule 702
Expertise.

Salah objects to Danielson acting as an expert at trial, both because Salah

contends Danielson cannot so qualify and because Salah believes Danielson “will

simply characterize certain straightforward bank transactions as though they are

criminal by labeling them as money laundering.” Dkt. #427 at 4-5.

First, the government believes that Danielson can present the anticipated

testimony without being certified as an expert. 7 The government will call upon

Danielson to explain how money laundering works in general, based on his decade-

plus of investigative experience. That testimony likely will include description of how

criminal actors engage in money laundering, for example through the formation and

use of entities like LLCs, and through the purchase of high-value assets, like real

estate, vehicles, or luxury goods. Such testimony arises directly from Danielson’s

personal experience. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (lay witness testimony appropriate when

based on personal knowledge).

6 The Eighth Circuit has approved of summary witnesses. See, e.g., United States v.

Beckman, 787 F.3d 466, 480–81 (8th Cir. 2015) (rejecting challenge to summary-
witness testimony from case agent).
7 As explained in the government’s timely disclosure, the government disclosed

Danielson as an expert out of an abundance of caution, to ensure the defense received
notice lest the Court later determine that his anticipated testimony could only come
from an expert. For the reasons stated here, however, his testimony does not require
Rule 702 expertise.

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If, instead, the government intended to introduce testimony from Danielson

opining as to whether the transactions of defendants bore the hallmarks of money

laundering, then he would first need to be certified as a Rule 702 expert. The

government will not elicit any such testimony from Danielson. (If the government so

intended, however, Danielson’s extensive technical background in this area would

qualify him, and such testimony would be permissible. See, e.g., United States v.

Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1996) (approving of IRS agent acting as money

laundering expert, citing among other “overwhelming evidence … to support the

guilty verdict” that the expert testified that “both the transactions at issue fit several

money laundering patterns”)).

Salah’s objections to Danielson’s testimony should be rejected. Danielson will

not introduce the testimony Salah envisions. Instead, he will provide the type of

personal-experience testimony that any lay witness may give.

VII. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion Regarding Voir Dire (Dkt. #428).

Defendant Abdulkadir Salah files a motion in limine regarding voir dire. First,

the defendant requests an order allowing attorney voir dire. The government defers

to the Court on its practice for conducting voir dire, but believes that voir dire

conducted by the Court is by far the most fair and efficient process for conducting voir

dire—especially in a case where the selection process is likely to be extensive as it is,

and the further delays imposed by permitting attorney questioning is not necessary.

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Second, the defendant requests that the Court include in its voir dire questions

“regarding both implicit and potential explicit biases regarding race, ethnicity,

nationality, national origin, language, and religion.”

Of course, the government believes that voir dire should include questions

intended to identify bias. The government is firmly committed, as it the Court and

defense counsel, to choosing an unbiased jury. It is the government’s understanding

that all potential jurors in this district are shown a video on implicit bias prior to the

jury selection process. This video is designed to ensure potential jurors can recognize

and set aside any implicit bias, whether racial or otherwise. Questioning potential

jurors to ensure they can set aside any biases is absolutely appropriate.

But voir dire should have limits on the questions asked to potential jurors and

should not contain questions that are intended to lay a foundation for later jury

nullification arguments. Considering the nature of the charged fraud, and the events

surrounding it, the government does not believe that the Court should further

highlight the race or ethnicity of the defendants during jury selection or otherwise

take any steps to suggest to potential jurors that they should handle their jury service

differently based on the race or ethnicity of the defendants. And the government

objects to any suggestion that the qualification or fitness of potential jurors in the

state and District of Minnesota depends on the racial and ethnic makeup of their own

community and whether and to what extent they have had contact with people with

background in East Africa.

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The defendant argues that the government “seeks to have it both ways”—

meaning that the government intends to introduce exhibits such as “emails that

specifically mention race and racism regarding several food distribution site owners

of Somali decent.” In reality, the government seeks to have it only one way: it objects

to injecting race or national original as a jury nullification strategy into this case. The

injection of race into the jury selection process is especially problematic here, where

the defendants are charged with levying false accusations of racism against

government employees who raised concerns and tried to stop their fraudulent

scheme. See Dkt. #1 ¶34 (“When MDE denied Feeding Our Future site applications,

BOCK and Feeding Our Future filed a lawsuit accusing MDE of denying the site

applications due to racial animus in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”).

That is precisely what happened in the recent trial of United States v. Abdiaziz

Shafii Farah, 22-cr-124 (NEB/DTS). In that case, the defendants attempted to inject

race into the trial in a manner that seemed to invite jury nullification. In addition to

levying false accusations of racism against the government, they regularly asked

government witnesses extraneous and irrelevant questions about the defendants’

race and culture. As just one example, defense counsel asked one FBI agent whether

he had ever had “spicy camel liver” for breakfast (the apparent suggestion being that

because the agent had not, he was somehow unable to understand the fraud scheme

or the defendants’ conduct).

The government is committed to selecting a fair and unbiased jury. However,

the government contends that voir dire questions about a potential juror’s contact

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with the East African community is unnecessary. All defendants and parties,

regardless of race or ethnicity, are entitled to the same rights in our criminal justice

system. Whether or not a potential juror has known or had contact with people of a

certain race or ethnicity does not determine whether they can serve as a fair and

impartial juror. The government objects to any question that suggests—to both

potential jurors and the community at large—that people who live in communities

without a sizable East African population or people who have not had contact with

people from the East Africa are somehow less fit or qualified to serve as jurors. This

is not true and is counter to our jury system.

VIII. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion Regarding Foundation for
Admission of Video Evidence (Dkt. #429).

Defendant Abdulkadir Salah filed a motion in limine asking this Court to

“establish certain principles regarding the proper foundation for video evidence in

this case.” The government is confident that the Court will follow and apply the

Federal Rules of Evidence in determining whether the proponent offering video

evidence has laid proper foundation for authenticity and relevance.

To be clear, the only video exhibit that Salah included on his exhibit list is

video surveillance that was conducted by the government. The government has great

confidence that Salah will be able to establish authenticity of that exhibit (either

through a government witness or his own witness). To the extent that the defendant

has filed this motion to get clarity about the admissibility of a video exhibit that he

has not disclosed and has not included on his exhibit list, the government cannot—

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and frankly should not have to—weigh in on the admissibility of an undisclosed piece

of evidence in the abstract.

Salah references the Abdiaziz Farah trial, “anticipating” that similar issues

relating to video evidence may arise here. In that trial, defendants repeatedly

attempted to introduce videos (and photographs) into evidence without any basis to

properly authenticate the videos. The Court correctly denied the admission of those

exhibits. But the damage had already been done. Often, in the course of offering these

(ultimately not admitted) videos, defense counsel played the videos and narrated

their contents in detail, all in front of the jury, under the guise of “laying foundation.”

However, the witnesses through whom the defense counsel attempted to introduce

such videos did not take the videos, had never seen the videos before, and had no

basis to testify that the videos were what they claimed to be. Such procedure was

prejudicial, and the government has submitted a motion in limine for an order that

foundation for such exhibits (those with which the witness is unfamiliar) should be

laid outside the presence of the jury.

The defendant’s motion does not seek any particular procedure, nor “at this

time, seek admission of any specific piece of evidence.” But if the defendant intends

to offer video exhibits that it has not disclosed to the government and has not included

on its exhibit list, he should disclose and identify such videos now, so that the parties

and the Court can address their admissibility in an efficient and fair manner outside

the presence of the jury.

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IX. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion Seeking Additional Peremptory
Challenges (Dkt. #430).

Salah filed a motion in limine asking the Court to increase the number of

peremptory challenges for the defendants to a total of eighteen peremptory strikes.

Under the local rules, the defendants are entitled to ten peremptory challenges. The

government believes that number is sufficient and appropriate for this trial. 8

The defendant offers several reasons for why he requires additional

peremptory challenges. Each should be rejected.

First, the defendant contends that additional peremptory challenges are

necessary “given the significant pretrial publicity initiated by the United States in

this case.” The government rejects the defendant’s contention that it somehow

“initiated” significant pretrial publicity. In all events, any possible prejudice that

could arise from whatever publicity occurred here (in the normal course of the

Department of Justice’s operations) will be appropriately addressed via the Court’s

voir dire.

Second, the defendant argues that additional peremptory challenges are

necessary because of “the heinous actions of certain defendants in [the Farah case]

8 Salah invokes the Farah trial, which involved an unusually high number of
contemporaneously-tried defendants—originally eight—and in which the Court
allowed those eight defendants a total of eighteen peremptory challenges. By
applying the local rules here and allowing the defense a total of ten challenges, the
Court would already be providing an even higher ratio of challenges-to-defendant
than it provided the defendants in Farah.

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involving juror tempering.” Again, this issue can and should be addressed via cause

challenges during voir dire; it does not warrant additional peremptories.

Finally, the defendant claims that additional peremptory challenges are

necessary because the “complexity and length of the United States’ exhibit and

witness list” necessitate “a jury with the fortitude to remain engaged throughout the

trial.” The government has tremendous faith in the jury system and rejects the

defendant’s contention that somehow the jury will be disengaged or lose interest if he

is not given extra peremptory challenges.

X. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion Regarding Evidence of Other
Conspiracies (Dkt. 431)

Salah seeks to exclude evidence concerning food distribution sites not

mentioned in the indictment, on the basis that such sites purportedly necessarily bear

“no connection” to Salah. Dkt. #431 at 3. He contends such sites put him at risk for

“spillover” of evidence from conspiracies charged against him with evidence from one

or more conspiracies he is not.

As a threshold matter, it simply is not the case that only evidence particularly

detailed in the indictment pertains to Salah. There are dozens and dozens of overt

acts taken in furtherance of the charged conspiracy—which, to be clear, includes

Salah—beyond those specified in the indictment. 9 That makes sense, given the sheer

breadth of that conspiracy, through which Safari (of which Salah was co-owner)

9 The indictment here, like each of the other Feeding Our Future indictments, charges the

defendants with participation in the single, program-wide conspiracy that “obtained and
disbursed more than $240 million” in food program funds. Dkt. 1 ¶ 29.

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claimed to have distributed over 3,900,000 meals to children and thereby obtained

over $12,000,000 in food program funds. Evidence of such acts is admissible,

including against Salah. See United States v. Longs, 613 F.3d 1174, 1176 (8th Cir.

2010) (“A single conspiracy may exist even if the participants and their activities

change over time, and even if many participants are unaware of, or uninvolved in,

some of the transactions.”); United States v. Kirby, 692 F. App’x 334, 337 (9th Cir.

2017) (government’s proof in conspiracy cases not limited to acts identified in

indictment); United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 2003) (same).

Still, Salah expresses concern that certain evidence introduced concerning

Aimee Bock’s misconduct could spill over to him. His proposed remedy is that such

evidence—inculpatory to, at least, co-defendant Bock—be excluded entirely. This is

not a serious proposal. “Spillover,” which occurs when a jury is “unable to

compartmentalize the evidence as it related to separate defendants,” United States v.

Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 818 (8th Cir. 2004), is not properly addressed by an

exclusion order that badly prejudices the government’s case, but by severance, see

United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir. 1989) (Salah’s case in which court

rejected claim by defendants that they should have received separate trials due to

spillover concerns).

In this case, several defendants (though not Salah) sought severance. E.g., Dkt.

##197, 187, 204. Then, upon agreement of all parties, the Magistrate Judge denied

those severance motions as moot. Dkt. #326. Amended trial notices followed, dividing

the fourteen defendants charged in this case into three discrete trials. Dkt. ##359-

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361. That was the correct disposition then and should not be revisited now, especially

given the Eighth Circuit’s “strong presumption” in favor of joint trial. United States

v. Lewis, 557 F.3d 601, 609 (8th Cir. 2009) (joint trial “gives the jury the best

perspective on all of the evidence and therefore increases the likelihood of a correct

outcome”). A defendant may only overcome that presumption by showing prejudice

that is “severe or compelling.” United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir.

2008).

No such prejudice exists here, and Salah’s proposal to hamstring the

government’s case because he believes it is stronger against Bock than against him

should be rejected. See United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 765 (8th Cir. 2006)

(“Severance is never warranted simply because the evidence against one defendant

is more damaging than that against another, even if the likelihood of the latter’s

acquittal is thereby decreased.”).

Instead, to the extent the government introduces evidence at trial against only

one specific defendant, the appropriate and more administrable and just approach is

to simply use the Eighth Circuit’s “Separate Crime” instruction:

A separate crime is alleged against the defendant in each count of the
Indictment. Each alleged offense, and any evidence pertaining to it,
should be considered separately by the jury. The fact that you find the
defendant guilty or not guilty of one of the offenses charged should not
control your verdict as to any other offense charged against him or her.
You must give separate and individual consideration to each charge.

Dkt. #419, Proposed Jury Instruction No. 88. Salah’s authorities recognize this as the

preferred solution. See United States v. Ghant, 339 F.3d 660, 663 (8th Cir. 2003);

United States v. Jones, 880 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir. 1989) (with Ghant, Salah’s cases in

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which court rejected spillover arguments in light of trial court’s cautionary

instructions). That is why the parties have jointly proposed that instruction, which is

more than sufficient to address the concern—and to enhance and protect judicial

economy and party resources—given that “jurors are presumed to follow the court’s

instructions.” United States v. Muhammad, 819 F.3d 1056, 1063 (8th Cir. 2016).

Salah’s motion should be denied.

XI. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion Regarding Co-conspirator
Statements (Dkt. #432).

Salah moves the Court to prohibit the conditional introduction of “any alleged

co-conspirator statement that does not involve a co-conspirator whose conduct is

clearly within the scope of this Indictment’s language.” Dkt. #432 at 3. Salah does not

explain the parameters of such scope, yet he asserts that co-conspirator statements

beyond it should be permitted only after the government establishes, for each such

statement, that it was made by a co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance

of the conspiracy. The wooden approach requested by Salah would grind these

proceedings to a halt. The indictment in this case charges fourteen individuals (four

to be tried in this trial) with joining an expansive conspiracy with numerous

additional co-conspirators. If the Court had to first adjudicate every single co-

conspirator statement that the government wishes to introduce, a likely weeks-long

pretrial hearing would be required.

Even so, Salah argues that for this trial, the Court should undertake those

pretrial proceedings and depart from the Eighth Circuit’s Bell procedure. See United

States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978). He says such departure is necessary

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because (he predicts) the government will conditionally introduce co-conspirator

statements and then fail to substantiate them under Bell. In such event, the

defendant contends that a curative instruction will not suffice. Bell does not disagree.

It holds that while a curative instruction may suffice in some instances, others will

require declaration of a mistrial upon appropriate motion.

The government understands its obligations under the Bell procedure and will

meet them. The potential seriousness of the remedy for a failure under Bell is

incentive enough for the government to be cautious and selective when seeking

conditional admission. The government will conduct itself accordingly, and submits

that proceeding via the Bell procedure, with respect to all proffered co-conspirator

statements, is the only administrable way of trying a case involving a conspiracy as

large as the one charged here. Otherwise, the Court and parties alike will be

compelled to extend this matter (and likely each of the Feeding Our Future trials to

come) for weeks or months more. Salah’s motion should be denied.

XII. Abdulkadir Nur Salah’s Motion Regarding Purported Hearsay
Emails (Dkt. #433)

Salah moves the Court to preclude introduction of any communications made

to the Minnesota Department of Education accusing the defendants of wrongdoing.

He contends admission of such communications would violate the Sixth Amendment’s

Confrontation Clause and the prohibition against hearsay.

The Sixth Amendment is not implicated here. The Sixth Amendment is

concerned with testimonial hearsay. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). But

the communications Salah challenges are neither testimonial nor hearsay.

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Testimonial statements are those made under oath, in police interrogations, or

in circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the

statement would be used in later prosecution. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.

Here, Salah challenges an unsworn email communication sent from a Gmail

account to MDE. Such informal communications are not “testimonial,” even when

sent to state government employees. MDE are administrators and, to a point,

regulators. They are not law enforcement, and here there is “no indication anyone

made [this statement] with the expectation [it] would be used in a prosecution.”

United States v. Garcia, 778 F. App’x 779, 786 (11th Cir. 2019) (rejecting Sixth

Amendment challenge to Instagram posts and messages); Michigan v. Bryant, 131

S.Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (“[T]he most important instances in which the Clause

restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those in which state actors

are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for

trial.”).

Moreover, statements that are not hearsay “are outside the Sixth

Amendment.” United States v. Smith, 816 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Giles

v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008)). Such is the case for exhibit A-70, which

the government intends to offer not for the truth asserted but for its effect on the

listener—MDE. See United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1170 (8th Cir. 2014)

(cleaned up).

The government submits that, to the extent Salah believes at trial that any

other offered exhibit runs afoul of these prohibitions, he should object at that time,

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when the Court will be faced with the exhibit in question—and the government’s

response—and be better positioned to rule.

XIII. Aimee Bock’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Allegations Beyond
the Indictment (Dkt. #441)

Bock asks the Court to preclude evidence or argument relating to four issues

not detailed in the indictment: Handy’s Helpers / Empress Watson; School Age

Consultants; fraudulent activity at additional food-program sites; and Feeding Our

Future’s administrative fee. Bock’s argument fails, however, given the well-

established rule that in conspiracy cases, the government “can submit proof on the

full scope of the conspiracy; it is not limited in its proof to the overt acts alleged in the

indictment.” United States v. Kirby, 692 F. App’x 334, 337 (9th Cir. 2017); see United

States v. Rosenberger, 502 F. App’x 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2012) (same); United States v.

Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 2003) (same).

Handy’s Helpers / Empress Watson. The government intends to prove at trial

that Empress Watson—Bock’s then-boyfriend—operated a company nominally

providing handyman services, but which Bock actually used to receive fraud and

siphon off fraud proceeds from Feeding Our Future. In particular, Bock caused

Feeding Our Future to pay Watson’s company with food program money, purportedly

for work done. Bock insists such payments were “fair, market compensation”; the

evidence will show otherwise. Regardless, FoF’s transfers to Handy’s Helpers are

intrinsic to the charged scheme, and their admission should not be precluded in

limine.

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School Age Consultants. The government intends to prove at trial that Bock

created a company called School Age Consultants purportedly for the purpose of

providing certain training to nonprofits, but which Bock actually used to receive and

launder kickbacks from food program participants. In particular, Bock at times

demanded that food program participants under FoF sponsorship pay checks—each

for thousands of dollars—to School Age Consultants purportedly to defray FoF legal

expenses arising from its litigation against MDE. This evidence, too, is intrinsic to

the scheme, and its admission should not be precluded.

“Claims other than those identified in the indictment.” Bock seeks preclusion of

evidence concerning any food program site, or apparently any claims related to any

such site, not explicitly mentioned in the indictment. This request seeks an artificial

constraint on conspiracy evidence intolerable under black letter law. As described

elsewhere in these consolidated responses, once a conspiracy is established, any acts

committed or statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible as to

all other members of the conspiracy. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see also United

States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 819 (2004). Moreover, “[a] single conspiracy may

exist even if the participants and their activities change over time, and even if many

participants are unaware of, or uninvolved in, some of the transactions,” United

States v. Longs, 613 F.3d 1174, 1176 (8th Cir. 2010), and the government may

introduce evidence of all such activities and transactions—including those not

identified in the indictment, United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir.

2003). To be clear: the indictment alleges that Bock oversaw a massive scheme to

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defraud the federal child nutrition program involving sites and entities under the

sponsorship of Feeding Our Future. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 29 (“Feeding Our Future

fraudulently obtained and disbursed more than $240 million” in food program funds.).

The government could have charged all 70 FoF defendants in a single indictment.

That the government chose not to do so to keep the discrete “clusters” it charged more

administrable at trial does not change the nature of the conspiracy nor somehow

restrict the government’s ability to put on proof of that conspiracy in this, or any

other, FoF trial. The Court should reject Bock’s invitation to upend settled conspiracy

law.

Feeding Our Future administrative fee. Bock next argues the government

should be precluded from arguing that FoF’s administrative fee was improper. To be

clear, the food program permitted sponsors to retain a small administrative fee,

intended to cover the necessary expenses incumbent to legitimate sponsor activities,

like training, site monitoring, and claim review and submission. The program did not,

however, permit sponsors to devise and operate a massive fraud scheme to inflate

their take, in the form of a wrongfully ballooned administrative take on the order of

millions of dollars, as FoF did. The evidence will show as much, and to the extent

Bock seeks to exclude evidence of that knowingly fraudulent conduct, her motion

should be denied.

XIV. Aimee Bock’s Motion to Preclude “Evidence Related to Bribery.”
(Dkt. #442)

This motion rehashes the arguments already made, and rejected, concerning

the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024). The Court

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has rejected the defense’s efforts to seek dismissal of the indictment’s bribery charges.

Dkt. #402 at 14-20. That conclusion was correct, and it should stand.

XV. Aimee Bock’s Motion to Preclude Evidence Relating to False
Assurances. (Dkt. #443)

Bock moves to exclude all evidence that Bock or Feeding Our Future “made

false assurances,” or otherwise failed in its obligations as a sponsor within the food

program. He argues such exclusion is appropriate given a rash of purported discovery

violations, including that the government “chose not to produce 10 terabytes of data

from Feeding Our Future employees.” Dkt. #443 at 2. As discussed at length in the

government’s response to Bock’s motion for a continuance, Dkt. #391, the government

did no such thing. More than two years ago, the government disclosed the existence

of, and made available to all defendants, the data about which Bock now complains—

namely data obtained from devices seized from FoF and its employees. Bock is simply

wrong to assert that the government has withheld these materials. Bock’s motion

should be denied.

XVI. Aimee Bock’s Motion Seeking Specificity As to Defendants and
Charges (Dkt. #444)

This motion appears to contain two different requests. Both should be denied.

First, Bock seeks an order requiring the government to “affirmatively identify,”

for each individual exhibit it seeks it introduce, “the defendant(s) that relate” to that

exhibit. Dkt. #444 at 3-4. He asks that such order further obligate the government

“to label its proposed exhibits with the individual defendant it relates to.” Id. This

request ignores the nature of the charged offenses.

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A conspiracy is an agreement or an understanding between two or more

persons to accomplish by joint action a criminal or unlawful purpose. See United

States v. Hansen, 791 F.3d 863, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing jury instructions

on the “three essential elements of conspiracy”). The essence of the crime of

conspiracy is the unlawful agreement between two or more people to violate the law.

See United States v. Francis, 916 F.2d 464, 466 (8th Cir. 1990) (gist of offense of drug

conspiracy is unlawful agreement; once agreement is made conspiracy is complete).

Once a conspiracy is established, any acts committed or statements made in

furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible as to all other members of the

conspiracy. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see also United States v. Mickelson,

378 F.3d 810, 819 (2004) (“Co-conspirator statements are admissible … if the

prosecution demonstrates that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant and the

declarant were members of the conspiracy, and (3) the declaration was made during

the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”). That is true even if a defendant

was not involved in and had no knowledge of those actions and conversations. See,

e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180–81 (1987) (co-conspirator’s out-of-

court statements to an undercover agent—in a conversation defendant was not a part

of—were properly admitted against the defendant).

Against that backdrop, Defendants’ efforts to unnecessarily complicate the

exhibits and evidence in this case fall flat. To the extent the actions of one actor within

the conspiracy were performed in furtherance of the conspiracy, those actions can

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indeed be imputed to every other conspirator as evidence of the conspiracy charged.

See id.

For those instances in which the government seeks to introduce evidence only

as to one specific defendant—for example, Abdi Nur Salah’s involvement in the

operation of a food site called Optimum Community Services 10 under the sponsorship

of Partnership in Nutrition—the appropriate and more administrable approach is to

simply use the Eighth Circuit’s “Separate Crime” instruction See supra (discussing

the parties’ jointly submitted instructions in Dkt. #419); United States v.

Muhammad, 819 F.3d 1056, 1063 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[J]urors are presumed to follow

the court’s instructions.”).

Bock’s other request in this motion is for an order precluding the government

from presenting “improper argument” in jury addresses. Dkt. #444 at 3. The

government will not do so. Rather, the government intends to prove that Bock and

her co-defendants are guilty on the basis of evidence admissible against them and

will argue only that their conduct provides the jury the basis to return guilty verdicts.

The government is well aware of the ethical and legal limitations on what it may

argue at trial and will abide by those limitations.

10 Abdi Nur Salah operated Optimum with other charged defendants and co-
conspirators, but that group did not include the other three defendants set for trial
in February.

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XVII. Aimee Bock’s Motion to Preclude Testimony of Hadith Ahmed
(Dkt. #445)

Bock moves to preclude some or all testimony of cooperator Hadith Ahmed, a

former Feeding Our Future employee and “site supervisor” who has pled guilty.

Ahmed testified in the Abdiaziz Farah trial in spring 2024, explaining that he

repeatedly solicited and took kickbacks and failed to exercise the supervision the

program required. He also testified that his conduct was representative of Feeding

Out Future’s sponsorship generally—that is, that Feeding Our Future was not in the

business of adhering to the food program’s requirements in good faith but rather

operated to enrich its operators and conspirators.

Bock, however, insists that Ahmed should be precluded from testifying in this

trial because, she says, the government has failed to produce related, exculpatory

evidence and because Ahmed “lacks credibility.” Dkt. #445 at 8. Both arguments

should be rejected.

Yet again, Bock accuses the government of having failed to comply with its

discovery obligations. Yet again, she is wrong. She says that “[f]or over three years,”

the government has held Ahmed’s Feeding Our Future cell phone and iPad. False.

The government never obtained those devices in its investigation. (Ahmed left

Feeding Our Future long before the government executed its search warrants on

January 20, 2022.) She also says the government has not disclosed Ahmed’s Feeding

Our Future emails. But again, the government cannot disclose what it does not have.

Law enforcement did not undertake a complete collection of Ahmed’s FoF emails. To

the extent the government has some of those emails, it obtained them from warranted

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searches of other email accounts that happened to have corresponded with Ahmed.

Such emails have been produced.

Because Bock cannot accurately invoke any discovery violation, she resorts

instead to baselessly impugning the government attorneys’ integrity. Citing

unspecified “media reports,” Bock insists that the testimony the government elicited

from Hadith in the Abdiaziz Farah trial is disproved by a handful of text messages

purportedly drawn from those devices Bock argues the government has long had and

withheld—though it hasn’t and didn’t. She insists the government thus “made an

intentional and deliberate decision not to produce” those devices. She suggests that

in the last trial, the government suborned perjury. Dkt. #445 (citing Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264 (1959)).

The government invites Bock to withdraw this baseless accusation. The devices

she accuses the government of withholding were not withheld. When Ahmed testifies

at trial, Bock is free to cross examine him to the extent she believes his prior

testimony is inconsistent. But identifying such purported inconsistencies now—on

the basis of three text messages, no less—hardly justifies exclusion, much less

grounds for a Napue violation. 11

11 Bock’s misfire here may owe to her apparent reliance on the one “media report[]”

she cites. That source is an online blog, established four months ago, authored under
a pseudonym, and dedicated entirely to discrediting the government’s prosecution of
the broader Feeding Our Future scheme. The entries on that blog also routinely
violate the protective order in place in the Feeding Our Future cases that precludes
the public disclosure of confidential materials provided to defendants. The blog
entries also routinely cite and purport to display materials and communications the
government does not have. The government believes the text messages Bock cites in

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XVIII. Aimee Bock’s Motion Regarding Feeding Our Future’s
Administrative Process (Dkt. #446)

Bock next argues that the government should be precluded from introducing

at trial at evidence that Feeding Our Future’s “process for working with sites and

reviewing and processing their claims”—that is, any evidence concerning the program

responsibilities FoF is charged with having violated in furtherance of the scheme.

She maintains such evidence should be precluded because, on one occasion after more

than a year of MDE expressing concerns about FoF’s deficient performance, and after

FoF sued MDE, invoking purported racial discrimination and seeking an order lifting

the MDE stop-pay, MDE sent a letter approving of an FoF corrective action plan.

As the evidence will show at trial, that letter does not represent, as Bock

contends, an “administrative determination” that FoF acted properly in all respects

or at all times. And even if it did, that still would not be grounds for exclusion of other

inculpatory evidence. MDE is not an arbiter of criminal liability. The jury is—and the

jury is entitled to hear the government’s admissible evidence of the same.

XIX. Aimee Bock’s Motion Regarding Undisclosed Expert Testimony
(Dkt. #447)

Bock moves to exclude a catalogue of certain kinds of testimony, including

concerning the number of meals a site could reasonably serve in a day and the costs

vendors could expect to pay for program-qualifying food, all on the basis that such

testimony cannot possibly come from anyone other than a Rule 702 expert. The

her motion are of that kind; again, the government never obtained the FoF devices
from which those messages purportedly came.

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government will not elicit expert testimony from non-expert witnesses. Certain of

Bock’s categories of testimony, however, are admissible as lay opinion under

Rule 701. As described above, the government anticipates calling at trial multiple

witnesses who have owned or worked in restaurants, or who operated legitimately in

the food program and provided meals. Such witnesses can testify to the significant

logistical demands of their kitchens, like hiring and training cooking and cleaning

staff, coordinating and paying for deliveries of ingredients, maintaining sufficient

space to store those ingredients, and allowing staff sufficient time to actually prepare

the meals. Such witnesses also can provide their lay opinions as to whether the

number of meals defendants claimed were prepared in and/or served from the

kitchens of small restaurants across the state (including Safari) seem high given the

timeframe of such claims.

Bock’s motion should be denied. She can raise such objections at trial to the

extent she believes they are warranted by particular testimony.

XX. Aimee Bock’s Motion Regarding Trips and Expenses (Dkt. #448)

Bock moves to exclude evidence about any “trips, expenses, or spending” of

individuals other than Bock herself. However, such spending, whether by Bock, her

fellow defendants, or unindicted co-conspirators, is intrinsic to the charged conspiracy

and is admissible under black letter law.

Lifestyle evidence—that a defendant spent, or spent lavishly—is admissible to

show motive. See United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 631 (8th Cir. 1994) (evidence

of accomplice’s lifestyle was relevant to motive of avoiding currency reporting); see

also United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 829 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Expensive trips,

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gambling, and other instances of free spending and high living may be pertinent in

crimes involving a motive of enrichment.”); United States v. Jackson-Randolph, 282

F.3d 368, 378-80 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court decision to allow lifestyle

evidence of motive and stating that government need not demonstrate a “direct

connection” between such evidence and illegitimate sources).

The one example Bock gives—concerning a July 2021 trip to Las Vegas—falls

squarely within these principles. Empress Watson (Bock’s then-boyfriend) took that

trip. As the evidence at trial will show, he paid for that trip using food program money

paid into his company, Handy’s [sic] Helpers, by Feeding Our Future. Such spending

of fraud proceeds by a co-conspirator is admissible. The motion should be denied.

Dated: January 14, 2025 Respectfully Submitted,

ANDREW M. LUGER
United States Attorney

/s/ Joseph H. Thompson
BY: JOSEPH H. THOMPSON
HARRY M. JACOBS
MATTHEW S. EBERT
DANIEL W. BOBIER
Assistant United States Attorneys

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