Defendant Aimee Marie Bock's Sentencing Position and Memorandum (D. Minn., Doc. 878)
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Defendant Aimee Marie Bock's Sentencing Position and Memorandum, filed 05/18/26 as Doc. 878 in United States v. Aimee Marie Bock (1), Criminal No. 22-cr-223 (NEB/DTS), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Through counsel Kenneth Udoibok, Bock asks for a sentence of time served or no more than 37 months. She argues that the PSR loss calculation is defective, including its use of gross reimbursements and the $243 million attributed to her, and she objects to the role, obstruction, sophisticated means, disaster benefits and charitable misrepresentation enhancements. She asks that the zero-point offender reduction apply and that restitution and forfeiture be limited to amounts reliably attributable to her. The table of contents also lists arguments about the Minnesota Department of Education and sentencing disparities.
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“Defendant Aimee Marie Bock's Sentencing Position and Memorandum (D. Minn., Doc. 878).”
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CASE 0:22-cr-00223-NEB-DTS Doc. 878 Filed 05/18/26 Page 1 of 75
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Criminal No: 22-cr-223 (NEB/DTS)
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
vs. DEFENDANT AIMEE MARIE BOCK’S
SENTENCING POSITION AND MEMORANDUM
Aimee Marie Bock (1),
Defendant.
Table Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S LOSS CALCULATION IS DEFECTIVE. .................. 3
A. The PSR’s loss calculation fails based on multiple independent reasons. ........... 3
1. The PSR incorrectly used gross reimbursements as loss. ........................................... 3
2. The Government failed to deduct the fair market value of services provided. ........... 4
3. Documented food purchases between $28 million and $33.1 million derived from
food vendors in the program lend impetus to Ms. Bock’s argument about the
unreliability of the Government’s loss amount. .......................................................... 6
4. The fair market value of meals served is a multiple of the raw food cost. ................. 7
5. No attempt was made to value educational and enrichment services. ...................... 10
6. The mandatory fair market value credit changes the total loss calculation. ............. 11
7. The Government’s financial tracing methodology is unreliable. .............................. 13
8. Post-notice of fraud payments by MDE breaks the causal chain. ............................. 15
9. Being that the Minnesota Department of Education had reports of program integrity
concerns about FOF as early as April 2020 and took no appropriate actions,
attribution of the $243 million loss amounts to Aimee Bock alone is unfair. ........... 16
10. The Government’s own evidence contradicts its loss figure..................................... 19
...................................................................................................................................... 21
III. WHAT WOULD BE A JUST AND FAIR SENTENCE CONSIDERING THE
CONDUCT OF OTHER AGENCIES DURING THE COVID-19 FOOD PROGRAM
IN MINNESOTA? ....................................................................................................... 21
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A. Although the jury convicted Ms. Bock of all charges, the Government’s failure to
prove the actual loss amount is attributable to the Government witness, who did not
know the food program that was the subject of Ms. Bock’s prosecution. .................... 23
B. MDE intentionally misled the Government, as shown by MDE’s statements to
the Government’s investigating agents when compared to MDE’s record. MDE’s
conduct resulted in the Government’s failure to show the accurate loss amount
attributable to Aimee Bock. .......................................................................................... 26
1. What do legitimate programs actually spend on food? ............................................. 27
C. Restitution requires proof of actual or proximate loss caused by the offense
conduct, not speculation. ............................................................................................. 30
1. The same deficiencies apply. ..................................................................................... 30
2. USDA’s failure to seek repayment underscores the uncertainty. .............................. 30
D. Forfeiture ............................................................................................................ 31
1. This Government’s forfeiture theory should not substitute USSG’s loss. ................ 31
2. Forfeiture is limited to personal proceeds. ................................................................ 33
3. FOF and Aimee Bock provided lawful services requiring the deduction of direct
costs of providing lawfully delivered services. ......................................................... 34
4. Ms. Bock’s actual personal proceeds are limited. ..................................................... 35
5. Forfeiture may not duplicate restitution. ................................................................... 36
E. Being that the amount of loss cannot be determined properly, the Court must use
the amount of “gain” as the alternate vehicle to determine loss. ............................... 37
F. Corrected Guideline Calculation........................................................................ 38
1. Charitable or educational misrepresentation (¶ 103): +2 should not apply. ............. 38
2. Sophisticated Means (¶ 104): +2 should not apply. .................................................. 38
3. Federal Disaster or Emergency Benefits (¶ 105): +2 should not apply. ................... 39
4. Role Enhancement (¶ 107): +4 should not apply. ..................................................... 40
5. Obstruction of Justice (¶ 108): +2 should not apply. ................................................ 42
6. Zero-point offender reduction (¶ 110): -2 should apply. ........................................... 44
IV. § 3553(a) SENTENCING ARGUMENT ........................................................... 44
A. The Nature and Circumstances of the offense. ................................................... 44
B. History and characteristics of the defendant. ..................................................... 45
C. The need for the sentence imposed. .................................................................... 46
D. The advisory Guideline range overstates culpability. ........................................ 47
E. A below-guideline sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary. .......... 48
F. Avoiding Unwarranted Disparities (§3553(a)(6)) .............................................. 49
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V. THE ARCHITECT OF THE FOF FRAUD WHO FLED THE UNITED
STATES SHEDS LIGHT ON THE FOOD PROGRAM FRAUD. ............................. 54
VI. THE SPONSOR WHO WAS NEVER CHARGED IN THIS CASE WILL
SHOW THE NATURE OF BOCK’S PROSECUTION AND WILL INFORM THE
COURT ABOUT THE PROPER SENTENCE FOR AIMEE BOCK. ........................ 58
1. Roster Fabrication ..................................................................................................... 59
2. System Manipulation................................................................................................. 60
3. Running Known Duplicates ...................................................................................... 60
4. Self-Awareness .......................................................................................................... 61
5. The payment chain .................................................................................................... 62
6. The FBI never investigated Ms. Loman because Aimee Bock is who it wanted. ..... 62
VII. THE COURT MUST NOT ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO TURN
MDE’S PROGRAM OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY INTO AIMEE BOCK’S
BURDEN. .................................................................................................................... 64
A. MDE is the agency that approved all meal claims, paid all meal claims, and
then blamed the sponsor, Aimee Bock, who complained. ............................................ 65
1. Ms. Roase's 4.1 Percent in context. ........................................................................... 70
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 71
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I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Aimee Bock (referred to as “Defendant Bock,” “Ms. Bock,” or “Aimee
Bock”) respectfully submits her position regarding sentencing. Ms. Bock requests that
the Court impose a sentence of either time served or no more than 37 months’
imprisonment. Ms. Bock further requests that, should the Court order restitution and
forfeiture, the amounts be limited to those the United States of America (hereinafter
“Government”) can reliably prove and that are lawfully attributable to Bock.
This is a case in which the Court must sentence Ms. Bock based on what was
proven against her, not on the sheer size of the broader public controversy, not on the
conduct of every site operator and vendor who passed through the program, and not on
the Government’s most maximal framing of aggregate program loss, given that the
Government failed to conduct food analysis to determine the fair market value of the loss.
Aimee Bock acknowledges that the jury returned guilty verdicts against her. But
sentencing requires individualized judgment. From the outset of this case, including when
the Government executed its search warrant at Aimee Bock’s residence on January 20,
2022, Ms. Bock directed Government agents to a red folder and boxes in her office.
Inside were records of organizations and individuals that Ms. Bock had terminated or
denied participation in the food program for multiple reasons, including fraud. The
Government later prosecuted some of those entities. Aimee Bock was not credited for
proffering that information to the Government.
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When the Government and the public labeled Aimee Bock the “mastermind” of
the FOF fraud, the Government knew that former FOF employees and consultants,
including Aimee Bock’s codefendants Hadith Yusuf Ahmed (hereinafter “Hadith Ahmed”
or “Ahmed”) and Abdikerm Abdelahi Eidleh (hereinafter “Eidleh”), were the recruiters
and organizers of the fraud and the “masterminds” of the FOF fraud regimen. Eidleh and
Ahmed knew that Bock did not speak Somali. They used Bock’s unfamiliarity with
Somali to isolate her from uncovering their fraud.
Across the entire COVID-19 food program in Minnesota, Aimee Bock is likely the
only person recorded as having terminated or dissociated from people or entities due to
concerns about fraud or program integrity. Not other sponsors. Not the Minnesota
Department of Education (hereinafter “MDE”), the agency charged by the United States
Department of Agriculture (hereinafter “USDA”) with implementing and overseeing the
food program in the State of Minnesota.
Ms. Bock’s Presentencing Investigation Report (“hereinafter “PSR”) objections
assert that MDE retained approval and oversight authority; that site operators, vendors,
and other sponsors were involved in submitting or generating disputed claims; that Ms.
Bock did not personally prepare meal counts; and that some suspected fraudulent sites
allegedly continued operating elsewhere after FOF sought to terminate or flag them. See
generally Bock Sent. Ex. 1, pp. 1-6; Bock’s PSR Objections and Exhibits.
While this request does not disregard the jury’s verdict, it begins where sentencing
law requires: the verdict, a correct United States Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter
“USSG” or “Guidelines”) analysis, and an individualized application of 18 U.S.C. §
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3553(a). What loss is properly attributable to Ms. Bock? Which enhancements are
proven? What amount is lawfully recoverable through restitution and forfeiture? And
what sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary for Ms. Bock? This Court
exercises broad discretion in the types of evidence it may consider when imposing a
sentence. Therefore, Ms. Bock’s life and the characteristics of the offense are relevant
information in fashioning an appropriate sentence. See United States v. Schmidt, 571 F.3d
743 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, Ms. Bock’s life during her operation of FOF, as well as the
nature of the food business during the COVID-19 pandemic, is relevant.
II. THE GOVERNMENT’S LOSS CALCULATION IS DEFECTIVE.
The Government bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the amount of loss attributable to the offense. In USSG § 6A1.3 cmt., the Sentencing
Commission found that the preponderance standard “is appropriate to meet due process
requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the
guidelines to the facts of a case.” Id. The Court may not engage in “speculation” when
establishing loss. United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 754-55 (8th Cir. 2008).
Where the Government fails to present sufficient evidence to support a non-speculative,
reasonable loss estimate, no loss enhancement should apply. See United States v.
Adejumo, 848 F.3d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir. 2017)(vacating restitution where the
Government failed to prove the victim’s ultimate loss).
A. The PSR’s loss calculation fails based on multiple independent reasons.
1. The PSR incorrectly used gross reimbursements as loss.
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The PSR relies — directly and indirectly — on the Government’s global figure:
FOF received $242,807,755 (hereinafter “$243 million”) in total program payments from
the MDE. See PSR ¶¶ 32, 46, 53, 90, 102. This is not a loss figure. It is a gross
reimbursement total that encompasses every program, every site, and every year of
operation — including periods, sites, and claims that were never alleged to be fraudulent.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been clear: loss must be tied to fraudulent
conduct, not to total receipts. United States v. Markert, 732 F.3d 920, 931 (8th Cir. 2013).
Aggregate substitution — using total receipts when the Government has not proven that
every dollar was fraudulently obtained — is reversible error. Id.; Chalupnik, 514 F.3d at
754-55; United States v. Frazier, 651 F.3d 899, 903-05 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Petruk, 484 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107
(2nd Cir. 2006). The federal food program, through MDE and FOF, reimbursed sites for
meals. The Government and the PSR do not attempt to separate valid reimbursements
from fraudulent ones. They improperly treat the entire payment stream as a loss. See PSR
¶¶ 31-40, 46, 53, 102.
2. The Government failed to deduct the fair market value of services provided.
The Guidelines require that the loss shall be reduced by the fair market value of
services rendered to the victim by the defendant or others acting jointly with the
defendant before the offense was detected. See, e.g., USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(ii). The
Markert court explained that the Guideline’s application note codifies the net loss
approach developed in case law, recognizing that “the offender who transfers something
of value to the victim generally is committing a less serious offense than an offender who
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does not.” Markert, 732 F.3d at 932; see, e.g., United States v. Ruballo, 833 Fed. Appx.
275 (11th Cir. 2020)(The method for calculating actual loss, as opposed to intended loss,
under the Sentencing Guidelines is largely the same as the method for establishing actual
loss to identifiable victims under the MVRA). Critically, the credit is for the fair market
value of the services rendered — not the raw cost of ingredients or inputs.
The legal standard asks what the victim received, measured at market rates, not
what the defendant spent. In a food-service context, the fair market value of a meal is the
price a willing buyer would pay for that meal in the marketplace — not the wholesale
cost of the food used to prepare it. This distinction is fundamental. The principle that the
fair market value of a meal in a food-service context is determined by the price a willing
buyer would pay for the meal in the marketplace, rather than the wholesale cost of the
food used to prepare it, is supported by the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of “fair market
value” in a wildlife context. In United States v. Hughes, 795 F.3d 800 (2015), the court
emphasized that when statutory terms are undefined, their ordinary meaning applies.
Specifically, the court stated that “fair market value” is the price at which property would
change hands in a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither under
compulsion to buy or sell, and both informed of all relevant circumstances. The court
further clarified that the “fair-market retail price” is most naturally understood as the
price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the item in question, which, in this
context, would include meals in a food-service setting.
Additionally, in United States v. Oehlenschlager, 76 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1996), the
court noted that when determining market value under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
5
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the fair-market retail price should be used when reasonably available. If the retail price is
difficult to ascertain, a reasonable estimate based on reliable information may be
employed. This reinforces the principle that retail value, rather than wholesale cost, is the
appropriate measure of fair market value in contexts where retail pricing is relevant, such
as food service. This principle underscores that valuation is based on market prices rather
than the cost of inputs, such as the wholesale cost of food. Here, the Government failed
to deduct the fair market value of services rendered in determining the loss amount.
3. Documented food purchases between $28 million and $33.1 million derived from food
vendors in the program lend impetus to Ms. Bock’s argument about the unreliability of
the Government’s loss amount.
The record contains between $28 million and $33.1 million in documented food
purchases from vendors, based on 14 subpoenaed vendor records. The data is obtained
from Sysco invoices with delivery dates and driver signatures; Afro Produce invoices
with ship-to addresses; Restaurant Depot transaction records; US Halal Foods; Shanghai
Wholesale; Costco; Sam's Club; Upper Lakes Foods; Star Distribution; Premium Fresh
Produce; and other sources obtained by the Government. See (Food vendor records
produced in discovery GJS-00393994-GJS-00950383 1). The Government’s own
subpoenas produced much of this evidence. None of it was credited against loss.
The FOF network encompassed over 250 sites. The Government subpoenaed food
records from a limited number of vendors and did not conduct a comprehensive
accounting of food purchases across the entire network. Many sites purchased food from
1
Records and materials with the “GJS” designation represent Grand Jury Subpoenas.
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local vendors, ethnic grocers, wholesale markets, and direct suppliers whose records were
never subpoenaed. The $28-$33.1 million represents the captured discoverable record.
(Food vendor records produced from discovery GJS-00393994-GJS-00950383 as well as
FOF records). The Government failed to conduct any total food expenditure across more
than 250 sites during the food program period. It possessed the subpoenaed invoices and
receipts. The Government’s notion of loss amount is speculative and unreliable.
4. The fair market value of meals served is a multiple of the raw food cost.
The $28-$33.1 million figure represents raw food purchases — the cost of
ingredients. It does not reflect the fair market value of the meals those ingredients
produce. Across the food service industry — from publicly traded restaurant chains to
institutional providers to nonprofit school meal programs — raw food costs consistently
account for approximately 25–35% of the fair market value of meal service. The
remaining 65–75% comprises labor (food preparation, service, supervision), facilities
(kitchen equipment, utilities, site costs), transportation (delivery, cold chain), supplies
(packaging, disposables, sanitation), and operating margin.
FOF sites were operated primarily by restaurants and community food service
organizations — not school districts. These operators had the same cost structure as any
commercial food service operation. Publicly available data from the National Restaurant
Association, publicly filed annual reports from major restaurant companies for fiscal
years 2020 and 2021, and the USDA School Nutrition and Meal Cost Study all confirm
that raw food costs account for roughly one-quarter to one-third of the price of a meal in
commercial food service and approximately 45% in nonprofit school programs operating
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at cost with zero margin. See, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Service, School Nutrition and Meal Cost Study,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/research/school-meals/nutrition-meal-cost-study.
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The commercial ratio is the appropriate comparator here. Trial II, Bock Ex. D1-156; see
also National Restaurant Association (2020); 2020 State of the Restaurant Industry
Report, Washington, DC: National Restaurant Association. https://restaurant.org/.
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This comparative structure supports the proposition that: food cost alone does not
represent the total value or cost of a meal; operational overhead is the dominant
component in both systems; and commercial food-service benchmarks are economically
comparable to institutional meal-service models.
If raw food purchases of $28-$33.1 million represent approximately 25–35% of
the fair market value of meal service, then the total fair market value of meals produced
and distributed through the FOF network ranges from $80 million to $132 million. Even
at the most conservative estimate — $28 million in food costs at 35% of fair market value
— the credit exceeds $80 million. At the midpoint — $30.5 million at 30% — the credit
exceeds $100 million. Here, the PSR applies none of these credits.
5. No attempt was made to value educational and enrichment services.
In addition to meal service, FOF sites provided educational and enrichment
programming — a regulatory prerequisite for at-risk afterschool reimbursement under 7
C.F.R. § 226.17a(b), for example, the prosecution called Mind Foundry a “shell
company.” Shell companies don’t have attendance sheets, payroll records, employee
training materials, or curriculum developed over five years. See
https://www.mindfoundry.ai/. The requirement that at-risk afterschool programs provide
“educational or enrichment activities” is explicitly supported by USDA regulations and
statutory provisions. Specifically, 7 CFR § 226.17a, at-risk afterschool care center
provisions, state that to be eligible for reimbursement, an afterschool care program must
include “education or enrichment activities” as part of its organized, regularly scheduled
activities in a structured and supervised environment. These services were provided and
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had measurable market value. The PSR and the Government did not attempt to quantify
or credit that value. The amount of service credit should reduce the loss amount.
6. The mandatory fair market value credit changes the total loss calculation.
Even if the Court accepted every other aspect of the PSR’s methodology, the
failure to apply the mandatory fair market value under USSG Application Note 3(E)(ii)
independently requires recalculation. An $80 million credit against a claimed loss of $243
million reduces the operative figure by one-third, before addressing any other
deficiencies identified in this memorandum. At the $100 million midpoint, the loss is
reduced to $143 million. At the upper end, a $132 million credit reduces it to $111
million. Either figure eliminates the 26-point enhancement (threshold: $150 million) and
reduces the loss enhancement to +24 ($65 million to $150 million) or lower, depending
on which additional deductions apply 2.
In United States v. Parish, 565 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2009), the court emphasized that
in mortgage fraud cases, the loss calculation must account for the fair market value of the
collateral at the time of sentencing. Specifically, the court noted that the loss is calculated
as the amount of fraudulently obtained loans minus any payments made on the loan
principal and the collateral’s value at the time of sentencing. This approach aligns with
Application Note 3(E)(ii), which requires reducing the loss amount by the fair market
value of the collateral.
2
This credit figure due Ms. Bock would grow exponentially and reduce the enhancements, if the Government
conducted a food cost analysis for all FOF sites or even all the purchase records that the Government possessed.
The Government obtained these records during its investigation of FOF.
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In United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2011), the court reiterated
that the loss amount in fraud cases involving loans should be calculated as the unpaid
balance on the loan minus the fair market value of any pledged collateral. The court
rejected arguments that failed to consider the impact of fraudulent schemes on the
collateral’s value, affirming that the fair market value of collateral must reflect its actual
protective value at the time of loss determination.
In United States v. Martinez, 690 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 2012), the court addressed
situations where the fair market value of collateral could not reasonably be determined. In
such cases, the court allowed the use of the defendant’s gain as an alternative measure of
loss, as permitted under Application Note 3(B). This decision underscores the importance
of accurately estimating the fair market value of collateral, when possible, as it directly
impacts the loss calculation. In United States v. Liveoak, 377 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2004),
the court clarified that the loss amount must be reduced by the fair market value of
property or services returned to the victim before the offense was detected. This
reinforces the requirement under Application Note 3(E)(ii) to credit the fair market value
of returned property or services against the calculated loss.
In United States v. Karie, 976 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2020), the court highlighted that
the district court must account for the fair market value of legitimate services or property
provided by the defendant when calculating loss. This ensures that the loss calculation
reflects only the net harm caused by the offense, consistent with Application Note
3(E)(ii).
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Here, without proper calculation, the amount of loss becomes unreliable, leading
to guesswork, given that the Government could have obtained all receipts supporting the
meal purchases and delivery. See, e.g., Gov’t Trial Ex. X-52, X-55(a), X-60, X-61.
7. The Government’s financial tracing methodology is unreliable.
The Government appears to have used financial tracing as a proxy for program
loss — tracking dollars through bank accounts rather than analyzing whether the meals
those dollars paid for were served. That approach is fundamentally unreliable in a food-
program case because dollars paid do not map one-to-one to fraudulent meals. A financial
tracing model ignores critical program-specific variables: meal composition and
compliance with USDA component rules; portion sizes and yield conversions under the
USDA Food Buying Guide; differences in menu design and procurement costs across
sites; contract pricing and negotiated food costs; waste, spoilage, and shrinkage;
legitimate claims that may overlap with questioned periods; and the possibility that some
claims at a given site were fully valid even if others were not. See (Trial II Tran. Vol.
XVII at 3775 line 9; D1-184 p.42-49).
The relevant proof is not simply how much money changed hands, but how much
reimbursable food-service output was delivered. The USDA Food Buying Guide converts
food items into approximate meal equivalents — that analysis was never performed.
Without it, the Government cannot reliably identify actual loss. The Eighth Circuit has
rejected restitution calculations grounded in speculation or unsupported assumptions.
Chalupnik, 514 F.3d at 754-55. A tracing model that measures only expenditures, rather
than reimbursable meal production, fails to satisfy that standard. Further, the
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investigation covered only a portion of the relevant sites. The Government cannot
extrapolate from a partial record to a program-wide loss figure unless it proves that the
sample is representative and the method reliable. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
of 1996 (hereinafter “MVRA”) does not authorize restitution by guesswork. See 18
U.S.C. § 3664(e). The Government bears the burden of demonstrating, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the amount of loss sustained by a victim because of the
defendant’s offense. This principle ensures that restitution is based on actual, provable
losses directly caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664; United
States v. Forrest, 153 F.4th 671 (8th Cir. 2025); United States v. Adetiloye, 716 F.3d 1030
(8th Cir. 2013). General invoices that purport to indicate the amount of the loss but do
not provide further explanation are an insufficient method of proof. United States v.
Haileselassie, 668 F.3d 1033, 1037 (8th Cir. 2012).
The chart below illustrates one of many steps the Government should have taken
to determine the cost of meal portions in accordance with USDA guidelines. That way,
the fair market value would have been discernible.
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See https://education.mn.gov/MDE/dse/FNS/SFSP/Claim/PROD083244. The
investigation methodology report on more than 250 claimed food distribution sites is
instructive. Government agents observed South Cross and one other site, Crystal
Community, three times. Each time, food was being distributed — a refrigerator truck, a
work van, and a line of cars. Then they stopped. It found food, but the Government
refused to obtain the data on food purchased and the analysis. Trial I, Tr. Vol. XXII
5336:21.
8. Post-notice of fraud payments by MDE breaks the causal chain.
The MVRA requires more than a but-for causation statement. The offense must
proximately cause the claimed loss. United States v. DeRosier, 501 F.3d 888, 896 (8th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Beston, 43 F.4th 867 (8th Cir. 2022); Chalupnik, 514 F.3d at
753-55. In United States v. Chaika, 695 F.3d 741, 748-49 (8th Cir. 2012), the court held
15
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that restitution cannot be awarded for losses caused by factors other than the defendant’s
offense. It emphasized that restitution must be based on direct and proximate harm and
that the court may decline to award restitution if determining causation involves complex
factual issues that would unduly burden the sentencing process.
The PSR herein failed to show that Ms. Bock was the proximate cause of the loss
amount. Many of the actors were entities outside Ms. Bock’s control. MDE was notified
of fraud but failed to take independent action to prevent it. Eidleh and Ahmed recruited
sites intended to commit fraud, unbeknownst to Ms. Bock. The causal connection to the
amount of the fraud cannot be borne by Ms. Bock alone. See Bock. Sent. Ex. 1 at 6; Sent.
Ex. 2-0058; Ex. 2-0004; Ex. 2-0019.
9. Being that the Minnesota Department of Education had reports of program integrity
concerns about FOF as early as April 2020 and took no appropriate actions,
attribution of the $243 million loss amounts to Aimee Bock alone is unfair.
MDE apparently had concerns about FOF’s “program integrity” as early as April
2020 but took no appropriate action. See Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. II 372:13, 403-404; Trial I,
Exhibit D1-552. MDE’s failure to act despite knowledge of program integrity negates the
claim that Aimee Bock bears sole responsibility for the loss amounts. For example, in
Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 2003), the court emphasized the obligations of
state agencies administering Medicaid programs under federal law. State agencies must
adopt a fraud detection and investigation program that meets strict federal standards.
Specifically, the agency must conduct a preliminary investigation upon receiving any
complaint about Medicaid fraud or abuse.
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If the preliminary investigation provides reason to believe that fraud or abuse has
occurred, the agency must request a full investigation from the state’s Medicaid fraud
control unit. The agency must also report its findings to the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, which may lead to federal or state enforcement actions. See
generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 455.14, 455.15(a), 42 C.F.R. § 455.17(b); Hays v. Hoffman, 325
F.3d 982, 986. Hays v. Hoffman underscores the proactive role state agencies must play in
maintaining program integrity. United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2003),
highlighted Congress’s intent to protect the integrity of federal funds by safeguarding the
agencies that administer them. The decision noted that maladministration or corruption in
one part of an agency could affect the allocation and use of federal funds throughout the
agency, given the fungibility of money.
This supports the principle that state agencies have a duty to address fraud or
integrity issues to safeguard federal program funds. In United States v. Pintar, 630 F.2d
1270 (1980), the court rejected arguments that there was no interference with federal
programs despite alleged fraud. It emphasized the Government’s interest in ensuring that
federally funded projects are administered honestly, efficiently, and free of corruption and
waste. This case supports the proposition that state agencies must act to prevent fraud or
misuse of federal funds to uphold program integrity.
Here, MDE’s own employees, such as Emily Honer and , raised
concerns about fraud or program integrity as early as April 2020. But MDE took no
action. Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 372:13; Bock Sent. Ex. 1 at 6; see also, ‘An open
secret’: New records reveal officials failed to act on fraud warnings, The Minnesota Star
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Tribune, May 17, 2026, https://www.startribune.com/an-open-secret-new-records-reveal-
officials-failed-to-act-on-fraud-warnings/601838325. MDE was aware of fraud but
refused to take appropriate steps to prevent it. Even though Ms. Bock notified it of the
existence of fraud, it did not act as a normal state agency would. Trial II, Bock Trial Ex.
D1-869, D1-606, D1-612, D1-613, D1-620, D1-1008; Bock Sent. Ex. 1 at 53-76. It is
undeniable that MDE contributed to the increase in the loss amount because MDE
management directed MDE employees to stop investigating fraud. Bock Sent. Ex. 2-
0058-0067. Fraud was formally reported to the FBI in April 2021; Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol.
V 932:10.
The Government now seeks to attribute approximately $100 million, at least
$98,257,883.06, representing the loss between April 20, 2020, and January 20, 2022, to
Ms. Bock. That loss amount, MDE, could have been prevented but was paid out after the
reported program integrity notice. Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 372:13, 932:10; Trial II,
Bock Trial Ex. D1-869, D1-606, D1-612, D1-613, D1-620, D1-1008; Bock Sent. Ex. 1 at
p. 6, 53-76; Bock Sent. Ex. 2-0058-0067. Those payments cannot automatically be
attributed to Ms. Bock’s offense conduct. Once MDE had notice or suspicion of fraud, its
decision to continue disbursing funds reflects its own independent administrative choices
— including reconfiguring its claims-processing system to bypass its safeguards, auto-
processing every claim without human review, and continuing to pay for nine months
after the FBI referral without issuing a single deficiency notice. Trial Tr. Vol. IV 905:13;
Trial Tr. Vol. III 482:24, 488:10, 499:2-7. The regulatory structure under 7 C.F.R. Part
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225 places claims approval authority and oversight responsibility with MDE — not with
the sponsor alone.
7 C.F.R. § 225.11 — Corrective Action Procedures — governs the Summer Food
Service Program (hereinafter “SFSP”) and establishes mandatory corrective-action
obligations when a state agency identifies “serious deficiencies.” The regulation defines
serious deficiencies, including submitting false information, failing to maintain adequate
records, submitting false claims, and committing operational violations. Once
deficiencies are identified, the regulation requires escalation, corrective action, and,
potentially, termination and disqualification procedures.
7 C.F.R. Part 225 — Monitoring and Oversight Duties. Part 225 imposes oversight
duties on state agencies administering federal nutrition programs. These duties include
site and reimbursement approvals, monitoring, corrective action, and enforcement
responsibilities. The framework establishes that state agencies are not passive processors
of claims but active program-integrity gatekeepers. The burden of oversight and
responsibility for loss cannot be borne by Ms. Bock alone.
These requirements are reinforced by case law, which holds state agencies
ultimately responsible for ensuring adherence to federal laws and regulations. See
Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992); S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299 (7th
Cir. 1995); Bliek v. Palmer, 102 F.3d 1472 (8th Cir. 1997) (Iowa food stamp program)
10. The Government’s own evidence contradicts its loss figure.
The Government’s forfeiture evidence identifies alleged personal proceeds totaling
$5,241,522.79 traceable to Ms. Bock. The defense disputes the $5,241,522.79 figure for
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reasons outlined in Section II supra. But even accepting the Government’s number
arguendo, the gap between $5.2 million (traceable, transaction-based, supported by
financial analysis) and $243 million (gross reimbursements, unsupported by program-
specific analysis) exposes a fundamental breakdown in the “reasonable estimate”
requirement. The PSR ¶32 alleges “more than $242 million” misappropriated — itself
internally inconsistent with both the $243 million total reimbursement figure and the $5.2
million forfeiture figure. Ms. Bock is also held responsible for $8.5 million in losses
attributable to Partners in Nutrition (hereinafter “PIN”). See Bock. Sent. Ex. 1, p. 47.
The PSR does not specify the amount misappropriated by Ms. Bock individually.
The conclusions are vague and unsupported by the trial evidence as applied to Ms. Bock.
If the Government can trace only $5.2 million in proceeds from a $243 million scheme,
the loss figure is not $243 million. The facts show that, based on the Government figure,
the amount traceable to Ms. Bock is $678,032, as shown below. This figure does not
exclude the disputed amounts of her salary during her participation in the food program,
the sale of her childcare facility, and South Cross site rent payments, as shown below. See
Trial Tr. Vol. XV 3399:10; see also, Gov’t Trial Ex. X-39, p. 3.
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III. WHAT WOULD BE A JUST AND FAIR SENTENCE CONSIDERING
THE CONDUCT OF OTHER AGENCIES DURING THE COVID-19
FOOD PROGRAM IN MINNESOTA?
Aimee Bock was convicted at trial on all charged counts. The jury’s verdict stands.
This memorandum asks a different question — the one the verdict does not answer, but
that is important: What sentence would be just and fair, considering other participants? To
answer that question, the Court must ask what the $243 million loss represents. How it
was calculated, who calculated it, what they understood about the program they were
measuring, the conduct of other agencies, and whether the number reflects the harm
Aimee Bock caused or something else entirely. The evidence shows the answer is
something else entirely.
The staggering loss figure was intended to advance the Government’s narrative
that Aimee Bock stole from Minnesota’s poor children. It is not what she stole. It is what
MDE paid to FOF across every program, every site, and every year — the total gross
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receipts of a nonprofit sponsor organization that, at its peak, operated 384 Child and
Adult Care Food Program (hereinafter “CACFP”) sites and served as the fiscal conduit
for hundreds of community-based food distribution programs during a pandemic that
closed every school cafeteria in the state of Minnesota.
Meals were served — Agent Brian Pitzen himself acknowledged at trial that
“there’s no question that some food was distributed.” Trial Tr. Vol XIX 4544:3. Teachers
and staff were paid. Rent for facilities where programs were operated, equipment used,
and transportation to deliver food to sites across the state were paid. The 10-15%
administrative fee that the USDA’s own regulations authorize sponsors to retain for
managing the program, not as profit but as a cost of doing business, is built into the
reimbursement structure by design. 7 CFR 225.6(d)(3).
The fair market value of services rendered “shall be reduced” from the loss total.
§2B1.1, App. n.3(E)(ii). The word is “shall.” It is not discretionary. United States v. Luna,
968 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Liveoak, 377 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2004). The
Eleventh Circuit vacated a sentence for failure to apply this credit in United States v.
Ruballo, 833 Fed. Appx. 275 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, no one — not the Government, not
the probation office, not a single witness at either trial — ever calculated the net loss. No
one determined how many meals were served across FOF’s 384 sites. No one measured
the food that was purchased. In United States v. Hartstein, 500 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir.
2007), when a defendant challenges the loss figure, “the Government must present
evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove the existence of the disputed facts.” In
United States v. McKanry, 628 F.3d 1010, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 2011), the estimate must not
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fall outside the realm of permissible computations but must be reasonably foreseeable.
$243 million — with no fair market value credit, no separation of legitimate costs, no
accounting for the regulatory agency’s own role, and no net-loss analysis of any kind —
is outside the realm of permissible computations and unforeseeable.
A. Although the jury convicted Ms. Bock of all charges, the Government’s
failure to prove the actual loss amount is attributable to the Government
witness, who did not know the food program that was the subject of Ms.
Bock’s prosecution.
The person who calculated that number was FBI Forensic Accountant Pauline
Roase. See United States of America v. Abdiaziz Shafii Farah, et al. Trial Tr. Vol XX, Vol
XXI, Vol. XXII, and Vol. XXIII; United States of America v. Aimee Bock, et al. Trial Tr.
Vol. XV, Vol. XIV; see also ECF Doc. 781(Pauline Roase’s Forfeiture Declaration)
(Bock’s loss amount, $246,045,149.65; MDE’s Claims for FOF, $246,045,149.65; Bock’s
Money Judgment ($5,241,522.79)). Ms. Roase was the Government’s primary financial
witness at both trials, and she testified for days in each. In Trial II, the jury saw her
charts. She presented the entity-level financial summaries, the food expenditure
percentages, and the total program payout figures that underpin the $243 million total. In
Trial I, she did not understand the program she was analyzing. On cross-examination at
Trial I, she was asked directly:
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Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXII 5336:37. On direct examination at Trial II — by her own
counsel — she was even more candid: “I don’t have experience in this type of field.”
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. XIV 3288:23. She admitted it took her months to understand the
program. When asked on cross-examination:
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Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXII 5461:62. She could not name the five components of a
reimbursable meal. When asked — milk, vegetable, fruit, grain, meat alternate — she got
four:
Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXII 5337:8. She had not reviewed the USDA regulations
governing the program:
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. XV 3463:9. She did not apply generally accepted accounting
principles. “I was not auditing their company.” Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXIII 5495:13. She
did not review books and records. She did not calculate EBITDA — and when asked
what it stood for, she said: “Oh, my God.” Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXIII 5494:23. She did
not review tax records. She did not know the cost of basic food items.
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Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXII 5364:25). When confronted with the SEC’s definition of a
“shell company” — a company with no or nominal operations — and asked whether
Bushra Wholesalers (which had employees, a warehouse, and distributed food) fit that
definition, she conceded: “I would not categorize it as a shell company.” Trial II, Trial Tr.
Vol. XXIII at 5493:12. She had never visited a single site:
Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXII 5437:15. This is the witness whose work product produced the
$243 or $246 million figure the Government uses to seek a life sentence against Aimee
Bock. It explains the Government’s failure to segregate the loss amount properly. The
government’s version of the loss amount remains speculative.
B. MDE intentionally misled the Government, as shown by MDE’s statements
to the Government’s investigating agents when compared to MDE’s
record. MDE’s conduct resulted in the Government’s failure to show the
accurate loss amount attributable to Aimee Bock.
FOF was a sponsor of CACFP and SFSP. Emily Honer was MDE’s supervisor for
the CACFP and SFSP, and the programs at the center of this case. She was MDE’s
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primary liaison with the . In her first interview with , she
established the premise on which the entire financial investigation was built:
“The money provided for this program is for the reimbursement of food expenses
and nothing else.”
Bock Sent. Ex. 2-0002. Her statements became the organizing principle of FBI Forensic
Accountant Pauline Roase’s actions in the case. It is why Ms. Roase categorized every
non-food expenditure as evidence of fraud. It is why Ms. Roase concluded that Safari
Restaurant spent “only 4.1% of its program reimbursements on actual food” — and the
reason the prosecution presented that number to the jury as proof that 95.9% of program
money was stolen. It is a reason $246 million in gross receipts is called “loss.” See Doc.
781, p. 3. There is one problem. The statement is incorrect. And MDE’s own records
prove it.
1. What do legitimate programs actually spend on food?
Every school district in Minnesota files MDE’s WebFOCUS Food Service
Financial Reports through the same CLiCS system Emily Honer supervised. Trial II,
Trial Tr. Vol. II 343:12. The following data is from School Year 2020 — the same year
the Government alleges that FOF fraud began: See ECF Doc. 1. ¶¶ 29-30 (Indictment).
In legitimate child nutrition programs — the programs Honer herself supervised — food
accounts for only 25-40% of total costs. The single largest expense category is not food.
It is labor: the people who prepare, transport, serve, and clean up after meals. Labor
accounts for 43-53% of program spending. Supplies, equipment, transportation, and
overhead account for the rest. Under Emily Honer’s “food expenses and nothing else”
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framework, between 60% and 75% of spending by Minnesota’s largest school districts
would be classified as misuse of program funds.
If Ms. Roase or the Government had applied her methodology to Minneapolis
Public Schools’ CACFP operation — the same program type as FOF — she would have
concluded that Minneapolis spent “only 37% on food” and that 63% was non-program
spending. By the Government’s logic, Minneapolis Public Schools are committing
CACFP fraud. Legitimate school districts do not just spend money on non-food items.
They generate surpluses that was evidence of wrongdoing.
Below is the SFSP program for St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Rosemount—the MN
Department of Education Data Reports and Analytics Food Service Financial Report:
https://pub.education.mn.gov/MDEAnalytics/DataTopic.jsp?TOPICID=396.
District Program Revenue Expense Surplus Margin
St. Paul SFSP $16,219,804 $12,773,044 $3,446,760 21%
Minneapolis SFSP $7,849,449 $6,429,523 $1,419,926 18%
Rosemount SFSP $1,614,229 $620,777 $993,452 62%
As shown above, St. Paul Public Schools generated a $3.4 million surplus in its
SFSP operations in SY2020. Rosemount retained 62% of its revenue after expenses.
MDE accepted these reports without question. If a surplus is evidence of fraud, every
school district in this table should be under investigation.
Emily Honer that “the program was not designed to make a profit.”
Bock Sent. Ex. 2-0106. She told them: “Uncooked beans and rice are not allowable items
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and are not reimbursable.” That is a fabrication. The USDA’s own meal pattern charts list
“Cooked dry beans or peas” as an allowable meat alternate and “Cooked cereal or cereal
grains” as an allowable grain component. Bock Sent. Ex. 6 p. 20. The USDA does not
regulate the form in which food is purchased — it regulates what is served to the child:
five components (milk, vegetable, fruit, grain, meat/meat alternate) at minimum serving
sizes. Bock Sent. Ex. 7 p. 11. Whether the rice arrives at the kitchen in a fifty-pound bag
or a pre-cooked pouch is not a problem. School cafeterias in America buy dry beans and
cook them.
Ms. Honer’s misunderstanding of the food program persisted throughout both
trials. She told the FBI that enrichment activity “was always still required” during the
pandemic — contradicting the USDA’s “Nationwide Waiver of Activity Requirement in
After-School Child Nutrition Programs.” Trial I, Tr. Vol. VI 1470-72; see e.g., Trial II,
Bock Exhibit D1-164. Even in normal times, the regulation requires enrichment to be
“offered,” not that children participate in it. See 7 CFR 226.17a(b). Ms. Honer described
the program as requiring attendance tracking “like the elementary schoolteacher taking
attendance every day,” Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. II at 354:10 — then acknowledged that
parents could pick up ten days of meals in a single visit. Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III 521.
The investigation was built on the program as Emily Honer wished it existed —
not the program as the USDA designed it, not the program as MDE’s own school districts
operated it, and not the program as approximately 120 USDA waivers had transformed it
during the worst public health crisis in a century. And every number that flows from that
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foundation — including $243 million — inherits the error. Trial II, Bock Ex. D1-163-
182.
C. Restitution requires proof of actual or proximate loss caused by the
offense conduct, not speculation.
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (hereinafter “MVRA”) requires proof of
actual, proximate loss caused by the offense of conviction. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664(e).
The MVRA is compensatory, not punitive. Restitution may not exceed the victim’s
actual, provable loss, and the Government may not use a defendant's receipts or aggregate
reimbursements as a proxy for loss. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d at 754-55; Frazier, 651 F.3d at
903-05; Petruk, 484 F.3d at 1038.
1. The same deficiencies apply.
The loss calculation challenged above is the same as the one underlying the
restitution request. For the reasons set forth above — treating gross receipts as a loss, no
fair market value credit, an unreliable tracing methodology, including post-notice
payments without causation analysis, and internal inconsistency — a preponderance of
the evidence does not support the restitution figure. The Court should deny or
substantially reduce the requested amount.
2. USDA’s failure to seek repayment underscores the uncertainty.
The defense understands that USDA has not requested repayment from MDE
despite the public nature of this case. That fact does not preclude restitution, but it
underscores the absence of a clear, reliable calculation of loss. The former lead
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prosecutor, Joseph Thompson, publicly declared that fraud losses in Minnesota were in
the tune of $9 billion. See https://minnesotareformer.com/2025/12/18/u-s-attorney-fraud-
likely-exceeds-9-billion-in-minnesota-run-medicaid-services/. The president of the
United States, Donald Trump, when sending federal agents to Minnesota, alleged that the
fraud was in the $19 billion range. https://www.startribune.com/trump-repeats-claim-of-
19-billion-in-minnesota-fraud-heres-what-the-numbers-show/601588451. The Court
should require the Government to explain whether the alleged loss belongs to USDA,
MDE, or both; whether any offsets, recoveries, or recoupments have been made; and
whether the restitution figure duplicates a sum already borne, shifted, or absorbed
through administrative channels. The MVRA permits only actual loss, not duplicative
recovery. United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2008). These findings are
required under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).
D. Forfeiture
1. This Government’s forfeiture theory should not substitute USSG’s loss.
The Government’s forfeiture theory further shows why a mechanically extreme
sentence would be unsound. The forfeiture motion and Ms. Roase’s declaration assert that
Ms. Bock’s $5,241,522.79 preliminary judgment consists of seven categories: the seized
FOF Bank of America balance, the $310,000 Cosmopolitan/Safari payment, deposits
from FOF to Ms. Bock’s personal accounts, School Age Consultants payments, South
Cross rent payments, payments to Handy Helper’s LLC, and wages paid to Empress
Watson. See Gov’t Trial Ex. X-39 p.3; ECF Doc. 781 (Roase’s Forfeiture Declaration).
The Preliminary Order for forfeiture was then adopted as a money judgment in that
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amount, and specific assets, including bank funds, a Porsche, cash, electronics, jewelry,
and other property, were forfeited. ECF Doc. 784.
Ms. Bock does not ignore that order. But the existence of a preliminary forfeiture
order does not answer the Guidelines question, and it certainly does not justify sentencing
as though every dollar ever paid through FOF was Ms. Bock’s personal theft. For
example, there is no scenario in which the $74,108.50 checks Ms. Bock obtained through
a personal injury settlement should have been seized or forfeited. See Bock Sent. Ex. 3;
Trial II, Gov. Ex. S130, p. 1-2, Ex. 8 at p. 35-40. The Government was aware of this
because of Ms. Bock’s administrative forfeiture notice. Id. Furthermore, the
Government’s own forensic declaration confirms the defense’s point: when the analysis
shifts from broad-scheme rhetoric to traceable categories, the amount shrinks
dramatically. That does not exonerate Ms. Bock from her guilty verdict. It does, however,
expose the danger of using the largest available number as a proxy for blame.
Because criminal forfeiture is part of sentencing, not an element of the offense, it
is governed by a different inquiry. Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 38–39 (1995).
The forfeiture motion itself argues that gross receipts are forfeitable and that expenses do
not offset forfeiture. That position may be the Government’s strongest forfeiture
argument under Eighth Circuit precedent, but it is not a reason to inflate the prison
sentence. If anything, it is a reason for restraint: the Court should recognize that
substantial economic punishment has already been or will be imposed through forfeiture
and seizure and avoid duplicating that severity by imposing a prison term based on an
overstated loss figure.
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2. Forfeiture is limited to personal proceeds.
Criminal forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982 requires that the property subject to
forfeiture be traceable to the offense. “Proceeds” means the defendant’s personal gains
from the criminal activity — not the gross revenues of every entity involved in the
offense. United States v. Garbacz, 33 F.4th 459, 472 (8th Cir. 2022), discusses forfeiture
under both criminal and civil forfeiture statutes. The court emphasized that under 18
U.S.C. § 982 (criminal forfeiture), the property must “constitute or be derived from
proceeds the person obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the offense.” Id.
Similarly, under 18 U.S.C. § 981 (civil forfeiture), the property must “constitute or be
derived from proceeds traceable to the offense.” United States v. Garbacz, 33 F.4th 459,
472. The court upheld the forfeiture of two statues purchased by the defendant, finding
that they were traceable to proceeds obtained through a wire fraud scheme. The evidence
showed that the defendant used stolen funds to pay off credit card debt incurred in
purchasing the statues, thereby satisfying the traceability requirement. In United States v.
Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998) elaborates on the concept of property “traceable to”
an offense. The court explained that property is traceable to an offense when its
acquisition is attributable to the criminal scheme rather than untainted sources. For
example, if proceeds from a money laundering scheme are used to purchase a specific
item, that item is subject to forfeiture as property traceable to the offense. The court
further clarified that proof of the proceeds used to acquire the property is sufficient to
establish traceability.
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Here, the Government’s forfeiture figure of $5,241,522.79 aggregates funds that
flowed through organizational accounts, not Ms. Bock’s personal accounts. The bulk of
this amount represents money received by FOF as an organization and disbursed to sites,
vendors, and third-party operators whom Ms. Bock did not control. 3
3. FOF and Aimee Bock provided lawful services requiring the deduction of direct
costs of providing lawfully delivered services.
This is not a case in which the defendant fabricated an entirely fictitious
enterprise. FOF was a real organization that operated real food distribution sites,
purchased real food, employed real staff, and provided real services to real communities
— including during a pandemic that shut down school cafeterias across the state. The
offense was not the provision of the services. It was the way claims were submitted and
reimbursements obtained. When the underlying activity involves the provision of lawful
goods and services in an unlawful manner, forfeiture must be calculated on a net basis —
deducting the direct costs of providing those services. The operative phrase is traceable
to the offense. United States v. Asomani, 7 F.4th 749 (8th Cir. 2021). Direct costs in FOF
are considerable: Estimate of food purchases by a few sites: $33.1 million documented
from subpoenaed vendors; Site operational costs: rent, utilities, and equipment in just a
few locations; Labor: staff wages for food preparation, distribution, and enrichment
3
Ms. Bock is entitled to a $74,108.50 refund. This amount was earned through a personal injury settlement, as
shown by her attorney’s IOTA-drawn check, which is unconnected to the food program fraud at issue. Ms. Bock
raised this objection administratively when the government seized the amount. Bock Sent. Ex. 3.
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programming; Transportation and logistics: delivery, storage, and cold chain. See Section
III supra; see also, Trial II, Gov’t Trial Ex. X-39 p.3.
The Government did not analyze these costs. It did not separate organizational
expenses from personal proceeds. It did not determine what portion of the $5.2 million, if
any, represents a net gain to Ms. Bock personally after deducting the costs of operating
the program.
4. Ms. Bock’s actual personal proceeds are limited.
Trial II, Gov’t Trial Ex. X-39, p. 3, establishes the Government’s basis for
forfeiture of Ms. Bock’s assets. The evidence shows Ms. Bock’s personal financial
benefit as approximately: Direct payroll: $257,362.60; a single payment from
Cosmopolitan Business Solutions for $310,000; and FOF rent payments for the South
Cross site totaling $110,670. After accounting for organizational costs, vendor payments,
and third-party disbursements that flowed through FOF but were never retained by Ms.
Bock, the net personal proceeds are approximately $678,032.65. ($257,362.60—2020-
2022 salary, $310,000—purchase of childcare, $110,670.05—rent payment for South
Cross building; a 2013 Porsche that was valued at $9,000, custom jewelry, etc., now
subject to forfeiture. See Trial II, Govt. Trial. Ex. X-39.
Considering Ms. Bock’s argument, without waiving her objections, Ms. Bock
believes that a generous forfeiture should be limited to $413,600. 4 See Id., at p.3. Ms.
4
Ms. Bock seeks the Court to note that money paid to Mr. Watson was compensation for work he performed for
FOF, not Ms. Bock. Also, donations to FOF remained with FOF even after Ms. Bock’s termination. $257,362.60
represents the entirety of Ms. Bock’s compensation for work for FOF, of which she paid appropriate taxes. There is
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Bock is entitled to a refund of the amount she received from a personal injury settlement,
in addition to her salary. Bock Sent. Ex. 3, Personal Injury settlement checks. That sum
of $413,600, which effectively measures her personal benefit from the offense, is orders
of magnitude smaller than the $242 million or $44 million figures suggested by the PSR
and the Government.
5. Forfeiture may not duplicate restitution.
To the extent the Court imposes both restitution and forfeiture, the awards must
not be duplicative. Any forfeiture order should be offset by restitution amounts to avoid
an impermissible double recovery. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2). The same core defect
infects the PSR’s Guidelines loss calculation, the Government’s restitution request, and
its forfeiture theory: each improperly equates total program reimbursements with fraud
proceeds without proving actual loss, crediting the fair market value of meals and
services provided, accounting for MDE’s independent oversight failures, or
distinguishing legitimate claims from illegitimate ones. The Government bears the
burden on each issue, and it has not carried that burden. Accordingly, the Court should
recalculate loss based on reliable evidence rather than gross receipts; apply the corrected
offense level under the Guidelines; deny or substantially reduce restitution to proven
no evidence that her salary was inappropriately high for an organization of FOF’s size. $2,879.30 was paid to Ms.
Bock's minor son for assisting in food delivery. In sum, the only amount the Government could arguably claim is
forfeitable is $103,600 that she obtained from contributors to Ms. Bock School Age Consultants, LLC, an entity not
involved in the food program, and $310,000 from Cosmopolitan Business Solutions, LLC, for a total of $413,600.
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actual loss; and limit forfeiture to Ms. Bock’s proven net personal proceeds—
approximately $413,600—while ordering the return of $74,108.50 to Ms. Bock.
E. Being that the amount of loss cannot be determined properly, the Court
must use the amount of “gain” as the alternate vehicle to determine loss.
Application Note 3(B) of the USSG provides: “The court shall use the gain that
resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a loss, but it
reasonably cannot be determined.” Loss cannot reasonably be determined in this case.
The financial analysis was built on a false premise that MDE’s own data disproves. No
fair market value analysis was ever conducted. MDE’s own conduct inflated the loss in
ways that cannot be separated from Aimee Bock’s. The IRS agent Roase, who prepared
the roster analysis, did not review the regulations governing whether rosters were even
required. Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. XV 3463:9.
The Government never measured what was legitimate — it measured gross
receipts and labeled them losses. Under these circumstances, the Court should use gain as
the basis for determining loss. Ms. Bock’s gain was approximately $413,600, without
waiving objections, and at most $1.2 million, resulting in a criminal offense level of
approximately 19 or 33. With a criminal offense level of 33, 251 fraud defendants were
sentenced nationwide over the last decade. The median sentence was eight years'
imprisonment. For female defendants with a criminal history category of I, the median
was seven years’ imprisonment. Even at a criminal offense level of 43 — the
Government’s position — the median for the closest comparator group, female, criminal
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history category of 1, and a four-point role enhancement, is 10 years’ imprisonment. Not
40 years, not life. Not 20 years. 10 years. See Supra IV (f).
F. Corrected Guideline Calculation
The PSR calculates a total Offense Level of 43 — the maximum — resulting in a
Guideline range of life imprisonment. That calculation is the product of six contested
enhancements stacked atop a defective loss figure. If the enhancements are evaluated
individually against the evidence, the result is fundamentally different. The difference is
19 offense levels, from life imprisonment to 30–37 months. If the Court agrees with Ms.
Bock’s calculations, the numbers are remarkably different: (7+12=19)(30-37 months).
1. Charitable or educational misrepresentation (¶ 103): +2 should not apply.
The PSR asserts that Bock misrepresented that she was acting on behalf of a
charitable or educational organization. FOF was a registered 501(c)(3) nonprofit. It was
approved by MDE as a CACFP sponsor. It operated food distribution sites serving
communities during the pandemic. The organization’s charitable purpose was real — the
fraud was in the claiming, not in the organizational identity. This enhancement is
designed for defendants who create fictitious charities. FOF was a real organization
performing real charitable work. The enhancement requires that misrepresentation itself
be part of the offense conduct, not merely that a nonprofit was involved.
2. Sophisticated Means (¶ 104): +2 should not apply.
The PSR bases this enhancement on Bock’s creation of a GoFundMe account to
receive kickback payments and her disbursement of MDE funds to shell entities
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controlled by site operators and vendors. The defense contends that a GoFundMe account
does not constitute “sophisticated means” within the meaning of §2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The
commentary defines sophisticated means as “especially complex or especially intricate
offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” A GoFundMe
account is a publicly visible, easily traceable consumer platform — the opposite of
concealment. The disbursement of program funds to site operators is how the program
was designed to work; the fact that some operators were engaged in fraud does not
transform routine fund distribution into sophisticated means. Besides, the monies raised
were not used by Ms. Bock. If anything, it was used by FOF after Ms. Bock was
terminated. See ECF Doc. 837, 837-1; see also, Trial II, Bock Ex. D1-303, D1-311, D1-
322, D1-711-714 5; see also, Govt’s Ex. X-39 p.3; S-30 at p.23.
3. Federal Disaster or Emergency Benefits (¶ 105): +2 should not apply.
The PSR applies this enhancement because the offense involved conduct described
in 18 U.S.C. § 1040 — fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits.
The defense contends that CACFP reimbursements are not “emergency benefits” within
the meaning of the statute. CACFP existed before the pandemic, continued during the
pandemic under expanded waivers, and continues today. The pandemic waivers
broadened eligibility and simplified administration, but the underlying program —
reimbursement for meals served to children — is a permanent federal nutrition program,
5
While these exhibits were not admitted at trial, they were disclosed and available to the government before the
trial. It is likely that the probation officer reviewed these records when writing the PSIR. See e.g., PSIR ¶ 31
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not an emergency relief program. Applying this enhancement to every CACFP fraud case
during 2020-2021 would convert a general nutrition program into an “emergency benefit”
program based solely on the timing of the offense. See 7 C.F.R. § 226.1.
4. Role Enhancement (¶ 107): +4 should not apply.
The PSR asserts that Bock was an organizer or leader of criminal activity
involving five or more participants. The defense contends that Bock’s role as the
executive director of a nonprofit sponsor does not equate to organizing or leading
criminal activity. The evidence at trial established that the fraud was organized by others
— primarily Mr. Eidleh and Mr. Ahmed, who recruited 90% of the site operators, created
the shell companies, trained the participants, and extracted the kickbacks. Trial I, Trial
Tr. Vol XIII 2976:2 and 3028:13; Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol XXI 5146:25 – 5147:6; Bock Sent.
Ex. 2-0115-0135; Ex. 2-0136; Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol XII 2784; Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol XIII
2890, 3077.
Bock’s failure to detect or prevent fraud is not the same as organizing it. The §
3B1.1 enhancement requires that the defendant organized or led the criminal activity, not
merely that the defendant held an administrative position within an organization where
fraud occurred. In United States v. Adejumo, 772 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2014), the court found
the evidence insufficient to support the enhancement because there was no proof that the
defendant recruited, planned, or organized others' activities, or exercised decision-making
authority over their participation. The court noted that the enhancement requires evidence
of directing or procuring the aid of underlings, which was absent in that case. Similarly,
the trial record in the case at bar shows no evidence that Ms. Bock recruited, planned, or
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organized others’ activities, or exercised decision-making authority over their
participation in the conspiracy. Rather, Eidleh and Ahmed were the masterminds.
Furthermore, the PSR applies a four-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(a) on the
ground that Ms. Bock was an organizer or leader of criminal activity involving five or
more participants, or that was otherwise extensive. That conclusion is too broad as
written. There is no dispute that Ms. Bock was the executive director of FOF. But status
is not the test. Section 3B1.1 asks whether the defendant organized or led criminal
participants. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The Eighth Circuit requires specific findings
on contested enhancement facts, not a rote adoption of the PSR’s narrative. United States
v. Mayer, 130 F.3d 338 (8th Cir. 1997).
The defense objections properly note that the evidence does not support portraying
Ms. Bock as the direct organizer or supervisor of every alleged co-conspirator across the
full universe of site operators, vendors, and satellite entities. Even the Government’s trial
theory, as described in the Court’s post-trial order, was that Ms. Bock oversaw the
scheme through her role as executive director of FOF. That is not the same as proving
she personally directed each independent operator’s criminal conduct, supervised each
separate entity, or exercised decision-making authority over all of the actors whose losses
are being loaded onto her at sentencing. Besides, the Government knows that the “master
minds” were Messrs. Eidleh and Ahmed.
A four-level leader enhancement carries enormous downstream impact in a case
already pushed to offense level 43. If the Court finds some aggravating role, it should still
distinguish between leadership over FOF’s internal operations and leadership over the
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broader and diffused conduct of outside operators. The present record supports, at most, a
narrower finding unless the Government can tie specific outside participants to Ms.
Bock’s active supervision, direction, recruitment, or control. See PSR ¶ 107; see also
Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol XIII 2976:2 and 3028:13; Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol XXI 5146:25 – 5147:6;
Bock Sent. Ex. 2-0115-0135; Ex. 2-0136; Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol XII 2784; Trial II, Trial Tr.
Vol XIII 2890, 3077. Messrs. Ahmed and Eidleh were the organizers and recruiters of the
fraudulent sites. They deceived Ms. Bock. The Government knew the masterminds of
the fraudulent activities. Id.
The internal FOF staffing structure shows that there were other organizers of the
fraud program. See, e.g., Gov’t Trial Ex. V-1, V-3, and V-15 indicate that Bock did not
have complete organizing authority or a leadership role. FOF comprised of other
managers, directors, supervisors, employees, and consultants with operational-level
authority. See Trial II, Trial Tr. X 2190, see also Bock Sent. Ex. 2. Even the September
12, 2022, surreptitious recording orchestrated by , with Ahmed
against , showed how Eidleh taught Ahmed to commit fraud at FOF. The
Government’s narrative that Ms. Bock was the mastermind collapses under scrutiny.
5. Obstruction of Justice (¶ 108): +2 should not apply.
The PSR applies a two-level obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The addendum identifies two possible theories: first, that civil litigation against MDE
delayed scrutiny; second, that the Court may consider whether Ms. Bock committed
perjury at trial (PSI ¶¶ 94-95). Neither theory, on the present record, justifies an
automatic obstruction finding. That is not how § 3C1.1 works. An enhancement requires
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a willful attempt to obstruct or impede the administration of justice, such as refusing to
appear, fleeing, or threatening witnesses. Where the defendant objects, the Government
must prove actual obstructive conduct with reliable evidence. United States v. Eagle, 133
F.3d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1998). And where the claimed obstruction rests on trial testimony,
the court must make the specific findings required by United States v. Dunnigan, 507
U.S. 87, 95 (1993), rather than simply inferring obstruction from a guilty verdict.
The defense objections correctly note that the PSR identifies no classic obstructive
conduct, such as destruction of records, witness tampering, threats, or materially false
statements to federal investigators. Instead, the PSR’s principal theory appears to be that
FOF’s civil litigation against MDE was meritless and delayed the fraud investigation. But
invoking the judicial process to challenge state action—even aggressively or
unsuccessfully—is not obstruction. Courts should be especially cautious before
converting litigation conduct into a sentencing enhancement, particularly when the
litigation predated the federal prosecution and involved contested questions about MDE’s
site approvals, payments, and stop-pay conduct. In any case, FOF and Ms. Bock were
successful in state court on the petitions at issue.
In addition, the discrimination lawsuit commenced on June 27, 2021, and was
voluntarily dismissed on January 27, 2022, after the Government executed a search
warrant at Ms. Bock’s residence. The lawsuit had no impact on MDE’s approval of
claims or sites’ submission of meal counts for reimbursement. MDE voluntarily ended
the “stop pay” action. FOF v. MDE 62-CV-20-5492, Friday, April 30, 2021, Mo. Hr. Tr.,
D1-780 p. 37; see also, Trial II, Trial Ex. D1-796; see also, Trial II, Govt. Trial Ex. V-1. p
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8; June 2024 Office of the Legislative Auditor Report, MDE Oversight of FOF,
www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/sreview/pdf/2024-mdefof.pdf.
6. Zero-point offender reduction (¶ 110): -2 should apply.
The PSR denies the two-level reduction under § 4C1.1 because Ms. Bock is
disqualified by an aggravating role adjustment under § 4C1.1(a)(10). If the Court does
not apply the role enhancement as argued above, this disqualification falls away. Ms.
Bock had zero criminal history points. She meets every other criterion for the zero-point
offender reduction. The two-level reduction should apply.
IV. § 3553(a) SENTENCING ARGUMENT
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that sentencing courts retain broad
discretion to depart downward when the advisory range substantially overstates the
defendant’s culpability, history, likelihood of recidivism, or personal gain. See United
States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461–64 (8th Cir. 2009).
A. The Nature and Circumstances of the offense.
The offense conduct in this case was serious. Ms. Bock does not minimize the
jury’s verdict or the public concern generated by the FOF prosecutions. Yet § 3553(a)
requires individualized sentencing, not collective punishment. The Government’s own
filings distinguish between the total loss allegedly flowing through the broader sponsor
network and the amount allegedly obtained by Ms. Bock personally. The forfeiture
motion seeks a personal money judgment of approximately $5.24 million, rather than the
hundreds of millions of dollars attributed to the broader scheme. That distinction matters
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because the Guidelines loss table can dramatically inflate advisory sentencing ranges in
large fraud cases. The Eighth Circuit has cautioned that the amount of the loss is not
always a reliable proxy for moral culpability. See United States v. Spencer, 700 F.3d 317,
327 (8th Cir. 2012).
The record also reflects substantial failures by state oversight authorities during
the COVID-era expansion of federal child nutrition programs. MDE approved
reimbursement claims, authorized site operations, and permitted continued program
participation during the relevant period. The defense presented evidence that MDE
officials expressed only limited concerns about fraud during significant portions of that
period. Although those failures do not excuse criminal conduct, they materially
distinguish this case from traditional fraud schemes driven solely by concealment and
sophisticated deception. The program operated amid unprecedented pandemic-era
regulatory waivers, reduced in-person oversight, and extraordinary administrative
expansion.
B. History and characteristics of the defendant.
Ms. Bock is a 45-year-old first offender with no prior criminal history or history of
violence. Despite her mental health struggles, she earned a bachelor’s degree, raised two
incredible young men who attend college, maintained stable employment, and spent years
working in nonprofit and food distribution efforts before these offenses. Bock Sent. Ex.
(Filed under seal). The PSR confirms that she falls within Criminal History Category I.
The absence of any prior criminal conduct is highly significant under § 3553(a). See
United States v. Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 831–32 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Unlike many defendants who appear before this Court for major fraud offenses,
Ms. Bock did not enter the criminal justice system with a history of financial crimes,
theft, or recidivism. Her lack of criminal history strongly indicates that she poses a low
future danger to the public. See United States v. Goff, 20 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that the lower limit of the range for Criminal History Category I is set for a
first offender with the lowest risk of recidivism).
Since her detention following trial, Ms. Bock has reportedly maintained a clean
disciplinary record in custody, except for the allegation that she used her son to release
protected materials to politicians and the press. She was attempting to expose the
excesses of MDE and to challenge her prosecution. She has already endured
extraordinary punishment beyond formal sentencing: the destruction of her professional
reputation, financial ruin, public humiliation, asset forfeiture proceedings, and the
certainty that she will never again hold a comparable professional role. The Eighth
Circuit recognizes that collateral consequences may appropriately inform the sentencing
analysis under § 3553(a). See United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 633 (8th Cir.
2008).
C. The need for the sentence imposed.
General deterrence is an important consideration in white-collar cases. But
deterrence does not require a sentence approaching the functional equivalent of life
imprisonment for a first offender. The Eighth Circuit has emphasized that district courts
possess discretion to conclude that lengthy guideline ranges in economic crime cases may
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exceed what is necessary to achieve deterrence and respect for law. See Feemster, 572
F.3d at 464.
A sentence between time served and 37 months would constitute substantial
punishment under the circumstances of this case. Ms. Bock has already spent significant
time in custody following the verdict. She faces massive restitution exposure, extensive
forfeiture, permanent felony convictions, and lifelong professional consequences. Those
sanctions collectively provide meaningful deterrence to others who might contemplate
similar conduct. Specific deterrence and incapacitation concerns are minimal here. Ms.
Bock’s age, lack of criminal history, public exposure, and complete financial collapse
make recidivism highly unlikely. Empirical sentencing data consistently demonstrate that
older first-time offenders convicted of nonviolent economic crimes present among the
lowest recidivism risks in the federal system.
D. The advisory Guideline range overstates culpability.
The advisory range in this case is driven overwhelmingly by loss calculations and
enhancement stacking. In large fraud cases, the Guidelines often yield ranges that are
disconnected from individualized culpability. The Eighth Circuit has acknowledged that
district courts may vary downward when the advisory range fails to reflect the realities of
the defendant’s conduct and characteristics. See United States v. Jimenez-Gutierrez, 491
F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2007).
Here, the advisory range substantially overstates Ms. Bock’s personal culpability
because it attributes to her the full financial scope of a massive, decentralized network
involving numerous independent actors, vendors, and site operators. Even accepting the
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jury’s verdict, the sentencing record does not support treating Ms. Bock as personally
equivalent to every participant who submitted inflated claims, falsified meal counts, or
converted funds for personal luxury spending.
The Court also should consider sentencing parity. Many defendants nationally
convicted of serious fraud offenses with offense levels in the highest guideline categories
receive sentences measured in years rather than decades. A sentence within the requested
range would still represent serious punishment while avoiding unwarranted disparities
under § 3553(a)(6).
E. A below-guideline sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary.
The Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit both require individualized sentencing
grounded in the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50; Feemster,
572 F.3d at 461. This Court need not impose a sentence driven primarily by Guideline
mathematics when the resulting range exceeds what is necessary to achieve the purposes
of sentencing. Several mitigating considerations justify a substantial downward variance:
(1) Ms. Bock’s complete lack of prior criminal history; (2) the unprecedented and chaotic
regulatory environment during the COVID-era food programs; (3) state oversight
failures; (4) the absence of violence, threats, or physical harm; (5) the already
extraordinary collateral consequences of conviction; (6) her low likelihood of recidivism;
(7) her mental health struggles; and (8) the substantial financial forfeiture and restitution
already imposed. For these reasons, the defense respectfully submits that a sentence
between time served and 37 months is sufficient to satisfy the purposes of sentencing
under § 3553(a).
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Such a sentence would promote respect for law, provide just punishment, afford
adequate deterrence, and avoid imposing a punishment greater than necessary for a first-
time, nonviolent offender whose advisory guideline range materially overstates her actual
culpability. The nature of Ms. Bock’s prosecution and the conduct of MDE highlight the
reason that this Court must watch out for unwarranted disparities in Ms. Bock’s sentence.
F. Avoiding Unwarranted Disparities (§3553(a)(6))
Section 3553(a)(6) requires this Court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct.” Aimee Bock, through counsel, compiled 10 years of the United
States Sentencing Commission’s individual offender data — every § 2B1.1 defendant
with a Criminal History of 1, from FY2015 through FY2024 — totaling 40,543 cases.
Bock Sentencing illustrations below, A through D, present self-evident findings. Among
40,543 defendants, 911 received more than ten years. That is 2.25%. A life sentence for
fraud, as Ms. Bock’s PSR portends, has never been imposed on the dataset. In the
offense level of 43 — the Government’s position — all 88 defendants received below-
guidelines sentences. See Illustration Exhibit A. The median was 12.2 years; one in four
received 6 years or less. Where the Guidelines as here recommend life imprisonment, no
court has followed such a draconian recommendation.
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At an offense level of 25 — the defense’s calculation, as detailed in the PSR
addendum — not one of 626 defendants received more than ten years. See Illustration
Exhibit B. The median was 42 months. The highest sentence was 119 months, one month
below the ten-year mark.
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The amount of the loss does not determine what courts impose. The correlation
between loss and sentence is R² = 0.033 — loss explains 3.3% of sentence variation. As
loss increases, courts depart more, not less: below-Guidelines rates climb from 48% at the
lowest bracket to 90% at $65M–$150M. See Illustration below:
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Among the 15 defendants sentenced for $200M–$300M in losses — Ms. Bock's
range — sentences range from 3 months to 20 years. The median is 11 years. Eighty
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percent received below-Guidelines sentences. See Illustration below.
With Ms. Bock’s personal gain of $413,600 or $1.2 million, the USSG’s data
speaks clearly. At the Government’s own offense level, the national median sentence is
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12.2 years, and half of all defendants received less. At the PSR Addendum’s offense
level, no defendant in a decade received more than ten years. Among defendants at Ms.
Bock’s loss amount, 80% received below-Guidelines sentences. Even the most severely
sentenced CACFP defendants in the country — whose conduct was worse by every
measure — did not receive life. Any sentence that materially exceeds the national median
at offense level 43 would place Ms. Bock beyond the norm of judicial practice across the
country. The Court is respectfully invited to consider what that would say about the
proportionality of the sentence to the conduct.
V. THE ARCHITECT OF THE FOF FRAUD WHO FLED THE UNITED
STATES SHEDS LIGHT ON THE FOOD PROGRAM FRAUD.
On January 20, 2022, called Mr. Eidleh to his home in Burnsville,
Minnesota. He was not in Burnsville. He was in Somalia. He told the he had left
because of his mother's health. He told them he would come back to cooperate. He said,
“looks like I need a lawyer.” Bock Sen. Ex. 2-0136. He asked what he was being
charged with. Then he took down the case agent’s contact information, hung up the
phone, and never returned. Id. Before he left, he collected three months of kickback
payments in advance from — cash, not checks, so there would be no
record. He did not call to explain. He did not say goodbye to the people whose lives he
had woven into a fraud so comprehensive that federal agents would need four years, 47
indictments, and the largest pandemic fraud prosecution in American history to begin to
untangle it. See ECF Doc. 1; see also Zara Frost, https://feedingourfuture.substack.com.
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When Aimee Bock founded FOF in 2019, she hired Mr. Eidleh as an independent
contractor. Bock Sent Ex. 2-0121-0135. Bock brought him on as a translator and
recruiter. What Eidleh built under that title was something else entirely. He was one of
the master minds. Not Aimee Bock! According to the own interviews — 47
separate reports mention Mr. Eidleh by name — he recruited ninety percent of
the sites that operated under FOF. He was “the primary point of contact at Feeding Our
Future for many of the sites.” He “handled the site applications, gathering the rosters and
meal counts from the locations.” These are not the words of defendants seeking leniency.
These are the words of Ahmed, codefendant, Government witness, and Mr. Eidleh’s own
recruit, speaking under proffer to federal agents. Bock Sent Ex. 2-0121-0130.
Sites did not simply join the food program through FOF. They joined through
Eidleh. described it: “Eidleh was known to be 'the guy' because of his role
controlling entry into the food program through FOF.” When tried to bypass
Eidleh and go directly to Bock, his application went nowhere. When he returned to
Eidleh, the terms were explicit: “Give me 10%, and I’ll get you in.” Ten thousand dollars
up front, plus ten percent of every monthly reimbursement. Ms. Bock was not aware of
Mr. Eidleh’s conduct. Bock Sent. Ex. 2-0091-0104.
This was not a single transaction. It was a system. Eidleh created an archipelago of
shell companies — Bridge Consulting and Logistics, Hope Suppliers LLC, Eidleh Inc.,
Bridge Logistics, Eidleh Relief, Oscar Express, and others — ten active LLCs registered
in his name with the Minnesota Secretary of State as of October 2021. Each served the
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same function: to receive payments from sites that Eidleh had enrolled in, disguised on
the memo line as consulting fees or equipment purchases.
He did not merely collect money. He taught people how to commit fraud. He
provided pre-filled meal count sheets to Hanna Marekegn at Brava Cafe and instructed
her to copy them. He gave her a clicker and told her to keep it on hand in case she was
inspected. When she told him the per-meal reimbursement seemed small, he told her:
“You get money by increasing the quantity of meals claimed.” Trial II Trial Tr. Vol. X
2120:4. He trained Lul Ali at Lido Restaurant to fill out fraudulent sheets and prepare
fake invoices. Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III 605:13. He told Qamar Hassan at S&S Catering
that she was approved for 1,000 meals per day. He showed her what to put on the forms.
He told Abdulkadir Awale exactly how much to write on the checks and to whom. Trial
II, Trial Tr. Vol VIII 1720:20.
He did not suggest. He directed. He did not enable. He designed. He embedded
family members in FOF management — all
— in staff positions that gave them access to documents, monitoring records, and
internal operations. filling
out fake monitoring sheets without conducting actual site visits. Bock Sent Ex. 2-0025-
0234.
The Government interviewed thirteen or more FOF employees. At Trial II, it
called one: Genesis Alonso, a junior staffer who started after Eidleh's departure. The
reports from the witnesses the Government did not call uniformly describe the same
thing: an organization in which Eidleh, not Bock, built and operated the fraud. The Court
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may consider these reports at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and USSG §6A1.3.
Bock Sent. Ex. 2.
When Bock discovered Eidleh was taking kickbacks, she removed him. (“There
were rumors that Eidleh had stolen from Bock and was forced to leave.” Bock Sent. Ex.
2-0029. When she discovered Hadith Ahmed was stealing, she pushed him out, too.
“Bock said Hadith had stolen from FOF.” Id. FOF’s preoperational visit process resulted
in the rejection of approximately 80-90 site applications deemed unsuitable. See Trial II,
Trial Tr. Vol. XVII 3835-36.
None of this undoes the fraud. The jury found Bock bears criminal responsibility,
and the Court accepted that finding. But there is a difference. A difference that matters at
sentencing. A difference that matters under § 3B1.1 and § 1B1.3 — between the person
who designed the fraud and the person who failed to detect it. If Mr. Eidleh
independently recruited sites and directed fraud at those sites, the losses from those sites
may fall outside the scope of Bock’s jointly undertaken criminal activity. See United
States v. Adejumo, 772 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2014). The Government has the burden of
proving otherwise.
About forty-seven people have been charged. The man who built the machine is in
Somalia. The woman who failed to stop it is before this Court. This Court should
sentence Aimee Bock for her actions — not for what Eidleh built. In this instance, a time-
served or 37 months’ sentence is appropriate.
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VI. THE SPONSOR WHO WAS NEVER CHARGED6 IN THIS CASE
WILL SHOW THE NATURE OF BOCK’S PROSECUTION AND
WILL INFORM THE COURT ABOUT THE PROPER SENTENCE
FOR AIMEE BOCK.
Ms. Bock acknowledges that the Government has sole discretion in its charging
decision. United States v. Jacobo-Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2001). This Court
enjoys wide latitude in assigning weight to the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including the
nature of the offense. United States v. Gamar Ahmed, 103 F.4th 1318 (8th Cir. 2024). The
actions of the Government and other parties are essential to this Court when fashioning
an appropriate sentence. MDE’s conduct regarding Kara Lomen is highly revealing.
When Bock fired Abdiaziz Farah over kickback allegations, someone else took
him in. Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol VIII 1720:20. Kara Lomen was the Executive Director of
Partners in Nutrition — Minnesota’s largest CACFP sponsor, larger than FOF by every
metric the state tracks. PIN received $204.7 million in MDE payments between 2020 and
2022 — 46% of the combined FOF and PIN total. PIN had 488 CACFP sites in 2021,
compared with FOF’s 384. PIN enrolled 681,161 children, compared with FOF’s 246,718
— nearly triple. In 2022, PIN had 561 sites, compared with FOF's 312 — nearly double
— and 669,139 enrolled children, compared with FOF's 126,978 — more than five times
as many.
Ms. Lomen held the identical structural role as Bock: sponsor, Executive Director,
CLiCS access, claims submission authority, and MDE contact of record. Ms. Lomen
6
Portions of this material will be redacted in accordance with privacy concerns and subject to this Court’s
Protective Order.
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personally processed CLiCS claims. In her own words: “I ran them myself.” After Bock
fired Abdiaziz Farah, Lomen became his primary enabler. The text message records
between them, over 2,000 messages over 17 months. Trial I, Ex. D1-144.
1. Roster Fabrication
On September 13, 2021, Farah told Lomen he had “mastered the rosters.” He had
obtained apartment resident lists from property managers — not lists of children who
attended programming, but lists of every minor living in the building with their dates of
birth:
“So I have mastered the rosters with all the necessary info you need. Andrew
pointe / Winfield / Cliff hills / Clifton townhomes.”
“The apartment manager got me all the current residents with all details.”
“All minors with dob.”
“Now that's an intelligent move.”
Trial I, Tr. Vol. XIX 4614:15; Trial I Exhibit H-531 Lomen’s response was not
to report this to MDE. It was to manage the overlap:
“Right now, you have a lot of kids that are on both Park View and Cedar Run, so I
just want you to pick which one you want them on.”
She identified children appearing on multiple site rosters simultaneously. Instead of
flagging duplicates as evidence of fraud, she asked Farah which site should get the claim.
Two weeks later, the problem persisted:
“You have kids that were marked for the same meals on the same day at different
sites. It won't pay both which site do you want me to pay them through?”
Children simultaneously claimed at multiple sites. Lomen’s response: “Pick one.” Trial I,
Tr. Vol. XIX 4616:3.
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2. System Manipulation
The same night as the roster fabrication exchange, Lomen disabled CLiCS error-
checking: “I will turn off the errors so you can enter the meal counts and info but we
need to get them in ASAP before anyone notices lol.” Trial I, Trial Tr. Ex. H-53l. This is
not willful blindness. This is a sponsor executive with administrative access to the state’s
claims system, deliberately disabling error validation, with full knowledge of what she is
doing: “As long as nobody notices but me lol.” She coached Farah to prepare for
monitoring visits — not to be compliant, but to appear compliant:
“Then just make sure that sites are doing them at the point of service before
monitoring starts lol.”
She found ways to manipulate the approval process: “I will work on it and find a
way to sneak it in lol.”
Trial I, Tr. Vol. XIX 4618:15. The Government knew a mastermind but chose Aimee
Bock to recoup $243 million.
3. Running Known Duplicates
In January 2022 — six days before the search warrants that would bring the entire
scheme to an end — were still at it:
“The mind foundry sites have tons of duplicates do you want me to run them as is
or wait for parent forms so I can add kids back in?”
On January 7, 2022, Lome knew the claims contained duplicate names.
whether to submit them anyway. He told her to run them. She did.
“I can run them now and run adjustments later.”
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Six days later:
“I did some magic and you are getting lots of adjustments.”
On January 13, 2022, : “You are amazing always!” The next day — the
last day of the scheme, one week before the FBI executed search warrants across the
Twin Cities — the results:
“November, we ran with the duplicates, and they were paid a total of 29041 meals
for $122,582.06 they had a check this week.”
“December has not been processed, yet we are waiting to hear if we should run it
as is or if they will get forms for the duplicates. They currently have 36390 meals
after disallows.”
On January 14, 2022, MDE paid $122,582 for a single month at Willmar sites alone.
Claims submitted with known duplicate names. Claims that processed
through CLiCS. Trial I, Exhibit D-64.
4. Self-Awareness
knew her operations would not survive scrutiny. When told her
MDE was cracking down on other programs, her response was not concerned. It was
ironic: “Someone should tip them off to crack down on us too.”
On August 15, 202, there was the same exchange: “The people with us will be
protected.” knew it was fraud. She offered protection to participants. She
continued for five more months. credited her directly: “You taught me well.”
On November 8, 2021, the Government was aware of this information, yet Ms.
Bock was tagged as the mastermind. The Government produced nothing remotely
mirroring when the jury convicted Ms. Bock.
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5. The payment chain
The text messages confirm how the money flowed. On April
2, 2021, in the earliest WhatsApp message in the thread, :
“ told me she can submit claims, which is good.” Trial I, Ex. D1-146, p.
825. Direct evidence from own words that controlled claims submission.
The payment chain ran: → Family
member → (vendor payments).
confirmed: “I'm waiting on get checks.” : “Pick up checks from
today coz she has more payments for sites.” The scale: $571,105 in
October 2021 reimbursement. $609,000 in November. All flowing through . All after
Bock fired Farah from FOF.
On August 12, 2021, he had money for him and wanted to
“chat offline.” In the same exchange:
Farah: “And you take care of our sister.”
Julius: “Most definitely she’s well taken care of lol.”
The next day, August 13, they met at a Burnsville address.
6. The FBI never investigated because Aimee Bock is who it wanted.
Agent Kary confirmed under oath:
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Trial II, Trial Tr., Vol. VIII at 2035:13. Lomen was named a co-conspirator in the court's
Bail findings, Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXVI 6311:11. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
confirmed that MDE relied on affidavits from federal law enforcement connecting
Partners in Nutrition to individuals alleged to have diverted food-program funds for their
personal use. See In re Partners in Nutrition, 995 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 2023).
Lomen’s email was never searched. Her phone was never extracted. Her CLiCS access
logs were never forensically analyzed. Yet the full weight of the federal Government was
disproportionately placed on Ms. Bock, tagging her as “the mater mind.”
Under § 3553(a)(6), the Court must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities.” The disparity between a potential life sentence for the woman who
fired Abdiaziz Farah and other fraudulent sites — and nothing for the woman who
became his biggest enabler, turned off errors notification in the claims system, ran claims
with known duplicate names, acknowledged her own operation wouldn’t survive
investigation, and was credited by her co-conspirator as his teacher — is not a disparity
the statute can justify.
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VII. THE COURT MUST NOT ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO TURN
MDE’S PROGRAM OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY INTO AIMEE
BOCK’S BURDEN.
Ms. Bock does not argue that MDE’s failures negate the verdict. But MDE’s role
remains highly relevant to sentencing attribution, relative blame, and the risk of
exaggerating Ms. Bock’s personal culpability. The defense’s objections note that MDE
was also responsible for program oversight, approval, and administration, and that the
PSR understates or omits MDE’s role. Ms. Bock’s objections argue that MDE—not Ms.
Bock—had final authority to approve site participation and reimbursement submissions,
and that MDE failed to segregate, or halt claims it now characterizes as obviously
fraudulent. Even claims that Bock raised concerns were approved. That matters in at least
three ways. First, it weakens any simplistic claim that every dollar reimbursed through
FOF should automatically be treated as solely Ms. Bock’s personal handiwork. Second,
it supports the defense’s argument that the record must distinguish Ms. Bock’s conduct
from that of many other actors operating within a system that MDE itself approved, paid
for, or failed to stop in real time. Third, it bears on parity and fairness. The defense has
consistently argued that similar conduct within the PIN sphere did not result in parallel
treatment of comparable gatekeepers. Whether or not the Court accepts every aspect of
that comparison, caution is warranted before sentencing Ms. Bock, as though she alone
personified the entire breakdown of the program.
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A. MDE is the agency that approved all meal claims, paid all meal claims, and
then blamed the sponsor, Aimee Bock, who complained.
This Court must not ignore MDE’s conduct in the success of the largest Covid-19
child nutrition fraud in the country. MDE did not merely misinform the FBI. MDE’s own
institutional conduct — across years of decisions, each documented in the two trial
records before this Court — approved, enabled, and sustained the flow of $246 million.
Then, in Trial II, MDE asked this Court to attribute it all to Aimee Bock. MDE
physically visited Safari Restaurant in June or July 2020. Honer confirmed it under oath:
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III 513:24-514:2. Then MDE approved the site. Honer admitted she
had concerns. She admitted MDE had the authority to deny. She chose not to:
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Trial II, Trial Tr., Vol. III at 514:18. MDE visited. MDE saw. MDE approved. MDE had
the authority to deny. MDE chose not to. Then MDE’s human reviewer approved Safari's
application for 5,000 meals per day:
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 506:11. MDE staff then went further — reconfiguring CLiCS
itself to make the approval possible: “In order to bypass claim edits for the COVID-19
waivers of noncongregate and child care, the site was listed as a nonprofit until June 30th,
2020.” Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III 500:15. MDE didn’t just approve 5,000 meals a day at a
single restaurant. It reconfigured its computer system to bypass its safeguards and make
that approval work. When Honer was later asked whether 5,000 meals a day was
realistic:
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Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 544:7. MDE approved a capacity that it now calls unrealistic.
And then MDE’s CLiCS system auto-approved every subsequent claim at that rate —
without a single human being ever looking at one:
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 499. $246 million through a computer system with no human
checkpoint. That was MDE’s design. MDE never issued a serious deficiency notice to
Safari. Never issued one to Empire Cuisine. Never issued one to any site, the
Government now calls the centerpiece of the fraud. When asked whether MDE’s silence
communicated compliance, Honer resisted:
Trial II, Trial Tr., Vol. VII1 533:16. MDE had the authority to tell sponsors that the
numbers seemed unreasonable. MDE had the authority to claw back funds. MDE
exercised none of it:
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Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. VII 1534:23. MDE referred its concerns to the FBI in spring 2021.
Then it lifted the stop pay on April 29, 2021. Then it continued paying claims —
including claims Honer had concerns about — for eight or nine more months:
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. VII at 1540:2.
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. VII at 1541:6. MDE management told Honer to stop investigating.
Defense counsel confronted her with her own FBI interview:
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Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. VI at 1439:13. Honer’s response is a non-denial — “I do not
remember” — but the Government’s own disclosure from her on a March 2022 FBI
interview contradicts her assertions. Bock Sent. Ex. 2-0013. The agency that now asks
this Court to attribute $246 million to Aimee Bock directed its own program supervisor to
stop looking for fraud. And while Honer was telling the FBI the claims were fraudulent,
MDE's Assistant Commissioner was testifying under oath in a state court:
Q. Does MDE, to your knowledge, have any reason to suspect there's been
intentional acts of fraud with respect to CACFP or SFSP?
A. No.
Daron Korte Dep., July 29, 2021, 15:24-16:3. Bock. Sent. Ex. 5. The same agency. The
same time period. One story for the FBI. A different story under oath. MDE disclaimed
responsibility for site inspections:
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 464. MDE disclaimed authority over fraud:
Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. III at 465:20. MDE admitted it did not conduct monitoring visits at
the sites: “We did not conduct monitoring visits on the sites, no.” Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol.
VII 1530:8. What does this mean for the amount of loss? The Government’s approach to
$243 million is simple: take what MDE paid FOF and call it a loss. But MDE’s own
school district data shows that the correct analytical framework is fundamentally
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different. Using the framework below, $182 million represents 75% of the $243 million
and falls into cost categories that are legitimate in every school district in Minnesota. The
potentially attributable loss is the surplus plus any above-benchmark or diverted spending
— not the entire $243 million. This is not a defense estimate. It is MDE’s own cost
structure, applied to FOF’s revenue. The Government is free to argue that FOF’s actual
cost structure was different. But it must present evidence to support that argument — not
simply assume that every non-food dollar was stolen, as Roase did based on Honer’s
false premise.
1. Ms. Roase's 4.1 Percent in context.
At trial, Ms. Roase's headline finding was that Safari spent “only 4.1% of its
program reimbursements on actual food.” Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. XIV 3288:10. The
prosecution presented this as devastating proof: 95.9% of every dollar was stolen.
MDE’s own data provides the correct benchmark — and it tells a different story:
Entity Food Percentage Non-Food Government theory:
Percentage “Not Spent on Food.”
St. Paul NSLP 25% 75% 75% “diverted.”
Minneapolis NSLP 33% 67% 67% “diverted.”
Minneapolis CACFP 37% 63% 63% “diverted.”
St. Paul SFSP 40% 60% 60% “diverted.”
Safari (Ms. Roase) 4.1% 95.9% 95.9% “diverted.”
Based on the above, Safari’s 4.1% is comparatively low. She excluded food vendors
whose invoices she found “not satisfactory" — a subjective standard she never
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documented. Trial II, Trial Tr. Vol. XV 3366:18. The FBI “didn’t need to” search the
Bushra food warehouse. Trial I, Trial Tr. Vol. XXIII 5509:14. Had Ms. Roase included
the $463,000 in Manmabuyu food invoices, she excluded Trial I Exhibit D5-34, and the
food purchases from vendors she chose not to examine, Safari’s food percentage would
be higher. The exact figure cannot be determined — because the investigation chose not
to look.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Bock respectfully asks the Court to:
1. Sustain the defense objections to the PSR’s overbroad loss attribution. PSR ¶ 102;
2. Reject the four-level organizer/leader enhancement or reduce it to the extent the
record supports a narrower role finding. PSR ¶ 107;
3. Zero-point offender reduction should be applied. PSR ¶ 110;
4. Two points obstruction of justice enhancement should not apply. PSR ¶ 108;
5. Two points enhancement for federal disaster or emergency benefits should not
apply. PSR ¶ 105;
6. Two points enhancement for sophisticated means should not apply. PSR ¶ 104;
7. Two points enhancement for charitable or educational misrepresentation should
not apply. PSR ¶ 103;
8. Limit restitution and forfeiture to amounts lawfully and reliably attributable to
Ms. Bock’s own conduct; and
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9. Impose a sentence of time served or at the most 37 months, followed by an
appropriate term of supervised release with mental-health treatment and vocational
programming conditions.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH UBONG UDOIBOK, P.A.
May 18, 2026 /s/Kenneth U. Udoibok
Kenneth U. Udoibok (#0262523)
Flour Exchange Building, Suite 5010
310 4th Ave. S. Mpls, MN 55415
Phone: (612) 808-6031
k@kenulaw.com
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
AIMEE MARIE BOCK
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