Order — United States v. Quartez Davis (Middle District of Florida, Document 83, filed October 24, 2025)

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An Order in United States v. Quartez Davis, Case No. 8:24-cr-159-VMC-TGW, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, Document 83, filed October 24, 2025, on the defendant's Motion in Limine (Doc. # 71). The Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. It states that the United States agrees not to introduce evidence about the Hillsborough County case, the black duffel bag or the red bookbag, and limits criminal history to the stipulation that Mr. Davis is a felon and to impeachment if he testifies. The Court generally excludes passenger Mariah Chestnut's narcotics charges, warrants and criminal history, and denies the motion as to Officer Mathison's observation of a bulge in Mr. Davis's waistband.

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“Order — United States v. Quartez Davis (Middle District of Florida, Document 83, filed October 24, 2025).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-8-24-cr-00159-dkt-83-m-d-fla-fff03cc373/, SHA-256 f100da31a9466f49beef41abdb15b64c30255a33a878e4de4beac296ab15f90b.

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Case 8:24-cr-00159-VMC-TGW Document 83 Filed 10/24/25 Page 1 of 12 PageID 205

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No. 8:24-cr-159-VMC-TGW

QUARTEZ DAVIS
______________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant

Quartez Davis’s Motion in Limine (Doc. # 71), filed on October

15, 2025. The United States of America responded on October

22, 2025. (Doc. # 78). For the reasons that follow, the Motion

is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

This case arises from a traffic stop during which a

firearm was found in the vehicle Mr. Davis was driving. On

April 11, 2024, Mr. Davis was indicted on one count of

possession of a firearm or ammunition by a convicted felon.

(Doc. # 1). The indictment states that Mr. Davis has multiple

prior felony convictions, including for armed robbery with a

firearm, armed burglary of a structure/conveyance, and grand

theft of a firearm. (Id. at 1). The case is set for trial

beginning on October 27, 2025.

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Mr. Davis seeks to exclude any evidence, mention, or

reference at trial concerning six categories of evidence: (1)

Hillsborough County Case # 2023-848280, including but not

limited to the license plate on the vehicle Mr. Davis was

driving; (2) the black duffel bag on the rear passenger seat

and its contents; (3) the contents of the red bookbag found

on the rear passenger side of the vehicle; (4) the passenger

Mariah Chestnut’s criminal history, outstanding warrants, and

any evidence pertaining to her drug trafficking and

possession charges; (5) the bulge noticed in the waistband of

Mr. Davis’s pants; and (6) Mr. Davis’s being on probation at

the time of the arrest and his criminal history. (Doc. # 71

at 1).

The United States has responded (Doc. # 78), and the

Motion is ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

“A motion in limine presents a pretrial issue of

admissibility of evidence that is likely to arise at trial,

and as such, the order, like any other interlocutory order,

remains subject to reconsideration by the court throughout

the trial.” In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06–

md–1769–ACC-DAB, 6:07–cv–15733–ACC-DAB, 2009 WL 260989, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). “A court has the power to exclude

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evidence in limine only when evidence is clearly inadmissible

on all potential grounds.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines “relevant evidence”

as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant evidence is

inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402.

All relevant evidence is admissible unless “its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the

jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.

402, 403; United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1524 (11th

Cir. 1994). Use of Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence is

an “extraordinary remedy” whose “major function . . . is

limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative

force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial

effect.” United States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1155 (11th

Cir. 2001).

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III. Analysis

Mr. Davis seeks to exclude numerous categories of

evidence. Importantly, the United States concedes that it

will not seek to introduce evidence for many of the

categories. Specifically, the United States agrees to not

introduce evidence concerning (1) the Hillsborough County

case; (2) the black duffel bag and its contents; and (3) the

red bookbag and its contents. (Doc. # 78 at 1-2).

As to the other categories of evidence, the United States

either agrees to a partial limitation or opposes exclusion

entirely. The Court will address each of these categories in

turn.

A. Probationary Status and Criminal History

Mr. Davis seeks to exclude “[e]vidence of [his]

probation status at the time of arrest and his criminal

history (beyond the stipulated fact that he is a convicted

felon)” because this evidence “constitutes inadmissible

character evidence under Rule 404(b).” (Doc. # 71 at 11). The

United States “is in agreement with defense to exclude any

mention of [Mr. Davis’s] probationary status and criminal

history, with the exception of the stipulation to [Mr.

Davis’s] prior felony conviction(s) and to the extent it

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becomes admissible if [Mr. Davis] chooses to testify.” (Doc.

# 78 at 5).

Therefore, the Motion is granted in part and denied in

part as to this category of evidence. Mr. Davis’s criminal

history may only be admitted into evidence for two purposes.

First, the stipulation that Mr. Davis is a felon, to which

the parties have agreed, will be admissible. (Doc. # 80).

Second, Mr. Davis’s criminal history will likely be

admissible for impeachment purposes if he testifies at trial.

Indeed, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)(B) provides that

evidence of “a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction,

was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one

year” “must be admitted in a criminal case in which the

witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence

outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.” Fed. R.

Evid. 609(a)(1)(B). “[I]f more than 10 years have passed since

the witness’s conviction or release from confinement for it,

whichever is later,” evidence of the conviction is admissible

only if “its probative value, supported by specific facts and

circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial

effect” and “the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable

written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has

a fair opportunity to contest its use.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).

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The Court cannot determine outside the context of trial

whether the probative value of this evidence outweighs its

prejudicial effect to Mr. Davis if he testifies.

B. Mariah Chestnut

During the traffic stop that led to this case, Mr. Davis

was the driver of the vehicle, and a woman named Mariah

Chestnut was in the passenger seat. (Doc. # 71 at 3). Ms.

“Chestnut was found to have an active warrant out of

Hillsborough County,” and her purse contained cannabis,

fentanyl, and cocaine. (Id. at 3-4). She “was charged with

trafficking fentanyl, possession of cocaine, and possession

of cannabis over 20 grams.” (Id. at 4).

According to Mr. Davis, “[t]he criminal history,

outstanding warrants, and drug-related charges of the

passenger who is not a defendant in this case constitute

inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b). This

evidence does not pertain to Mr. Davis’s actions or state of

mind, but rather to the character and conduct of a third party

who is not on trial.” (Id. at 9).

The United States is in partial agreement with excluding

this evidence. Specifically, it agrees “with excluding any

testimony regarding [] Mariah Chestnut’s criminal history,

outstanding warrants, and any evidence pertaining to the

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narcotics charges.” (Doc. # 78 at 2). However, “if [Mr. Davis]

intends on asserting that Mariah Chestnut was the

owner/possessor of the firearm,” the United States maintains

that “her charges (notably that she was not charged with

anything related to the firearm) and search of her purse would

become relevant.” (Id.).

The Court agrees with Mr. Davis and the United States

that Ms. Chestnut’s narcotics charges, outstanding warrants,

and criminal history should generally be excluded as

irrelevant. Thus, the Motion is granted in part. But the Court

cannot determine at this time that there are no circumstances

under which evidence about Ms. Chestnut’s charges or criminal

history could be admissible. As the United States notes, this

evidence may become relevant if Mr. Davis asserts that the

firearm at issue belonged to Ms. Chestnut.

Likewise, the Court is not yet aware whether Ms. Chestnut

will be a witness at trial. Ms. Chestnut’s criminal history

likely would be admissible for impeachment purposes if she

testifies. Again, Rule 609(a) allows for “attacking a

witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a

criminal conviction.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). Evidence that a

witness who is not the defendant has been convicted of “a

crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by

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death or by imprisonment for more than one year” “must be

admitted, subject to Rule 403.” Id. at (a)(1)(A). Such

evidence must also be admitted “for any crime regardless of

the punishment, . . . if the court can readily determine that

establishing the elements of the crime required proving — or

the witness’s admitting — a dishonest act or false statement.”

Id. at (a)(2).

Thus, the Motion is denied to the extent it seeks to

exclude this evidence if Mr. Davis puts it at issue during

trial or if Ms. Chestnut testifies.

C. Observation of Mr. Davis’s Pants before Stop

Law enforcement had observed Mr. Davis before he got in

the vehicle and before the traffic stop was performed. The

United States summarizes Officer Mathison’s intended

testimony about his observations thusly: “While observing

[Mr. Davis] exiting a Dollar General and walking to the

vehicle, Officer Mathison observes [Mr. Davis] with a

noticeable bulge in his waistband. [Mr. Davis] then drove to

another nearby location. While at this location, law

enforcement then stops the vehicle and orders [Mr. Davis] out

of the vehicle. Once [Mr. Davis] exits the vehicle this time,

Officer Mathison observes that [Mr. Davis] no longer has the

same bulge in his waistband. A firearm is subsequently

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recovered from under the floormat of the driver’s side

floorboard of the vehicle.” (Doc. # 78 at 3).

Mr. Davis moves to exclude “the unsubstantiated mystery

bulge noticed in Mr. Davis’s pants” under Federal Rules of

Evidence 403, 602, and 701. (Doc. # 71 at 9). According to

Mr. Davis, Officer Mathison “did not see an actual object,

nor did he provide any description or details to substantiate

that the alleged ‘bulge’ was a firearm. Without having

actually seen a firearm, Officer Mathison lacks the personal

knowledge required by Rule 602 to testify that the ‘bulge’

was, in fact, a firearm.” (Id. at 9-10). He also argues that

Officer Mathison is a lay witness and any “opinion that this

‘bulge’ was a firearm exceeds the scope of permissible lay

opinion testimony under Rule 701.” (Id. at 10).

The Court disagrees. Rule 602 states in relevant part:

“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is

introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness

has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove

personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own

testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. And Rule 701 provides that a

lay witness may only offer opinion testimony “that is: (a)

rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to

clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to

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determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of

Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701.

Here, Officer Mathison observed a bulge in Mr. Davis’s

waistband that he considered consistent with a firearm, based

on his experience as a law enforcement officer. A short time

later, Officer Mathison observed that Mr. Davis did not have

the same bulge in his waistband when he left the vehicle

during the traffic stop. This is personal knowledge

sufficient to satisfy Rule 602. Visually perceiving an object

in a person’s waistband is “rationally based on [Officer

Mathison’s] perception” and is helpful to determining whether

Mr. Davis possessed the firearm.

Furthermore, Officer Mathison’s observation that the

bulge was consistent in size and location in the waistband

with a firearm, although partially based on his professional

experience, was “not based on scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Indeed,

the Eleventh Circuit has clarified that “[a] witness is

permitted to deliver [] lay opinion testimony based on his

professional experiences as long as the testimony is

‘rationally based on’ those experiences, rather than on

scientific or technical knowledge.” United States v.

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Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Here, the

Coast Guard witnesses compared the packages they saw on the

FLIR to packages they had seen in previous cocaine

interdictions, an assessment of ‘the appearance’ and ‘size’

of objects that required no scientific or technical

knowledge.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v.

Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1577 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding it proper

under Rule 701 to admit a police officer’s lay testimony that

a particular mark on a victim was consistent with a stun gun

where the opinion was based on his personal observation of

the mark and his nineteen years of experience as a police

officer).

Nor is exclusion of this testimony under Rule 403

appropriate. Any undue prejudice does not outweigh the high

probative value of this testimony. As the United States

correctly notes, “[w]hether or not [Mr. Davis] was in

possession of the firearm is the central issue of this current

case, and any testimony regarding the bulge is . . . relevant

and admissible to establish the element of possession.” (Doc.

# 78 at 3). Thus, the Motion is denied as to this category of

evidence.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

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Defendant Quartez Davis’s Motion in Limine (Doc. # 71)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth herein.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

24th day of October, 2025.

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