Government Response to Application for Bail Pending Sentencing — United States v. Jacob Carter (Dkt. 180)

Summary

A letter from the United States Attorney's Office, Document 180, filed 03/21/24, in United States v. Jacob Carter, et al., 21 Cr. 681 (NSR), Southern District of New York, to the Honorable Nelson S. Román. The Government responds to defendants Anwar Salahuddin and Quadri Salahuddin's March 11, 2024, application for bail pending sentencing (ECF No. 177) and argues that it should be denied because they have not shown by clear and convincing evidence that they are not likely to flee. The letter recalls that a jury convicted them on February 9, 2024, of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft over fraudulent COVID-19 loan applications. The letter cites their challenges to the Court's authority and the prospective sentence as reasons for flight risk.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

         Case 7:21-cr-00681-NSR Document 180 Filed 03/21/24 Page 1 of 3
                                          U.S. Department of Justice
[Type text]
                                                        United States Attorney
                                                        Southern District of New York

                                                       United States Attorney’s Office
                                                       50 Main Street
                                                       White Plains, New York 10606

                                                        March 21, 2024

BY ECF AND EMAIL

The Honorable Nelson S. Román
United States District Judge
Southern District of New York
300 Quarropas Street
White Plains, New York 10601

              Re:     United States v. Jacob Carter, et al., 21 Cr. 681 (NSR)

Dear Judge Román:

         The Government writes in response to defendants Anwar Salahuddin and Quadri
Salahuddin’s March 11, 2024 application for bail pending sentencing. (ECF No. 177.) Because the
defendants have failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they are not likely to
flee, that application should be denied. 1

      I.      Background

       As the Court is aware, on February 9, 2024, a jury convicted the defendants of wire fraud,
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. (See Minute Entry for Proceedings
Dated Feb. 9, 2024.) Those convictions were in connection with the defendants’ role in submitting
over 1,000 fraudulent COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) applications to the
Small Business Administration (“SBA”), which resulted in the SBA’s transfer of than $8 million
of EIDL advances to which the applicants were not entitled.

       At the conclusion of trial, the Government moved for remand, and the Court heard the
defendants’ arguments for release and granted the Government’s motion. In so doing, the Court
observed:

           I’ve had the opportunity to preside over this case from the very inception of this
           case, and all three defendants have questioned the authority of the Court. There is
           a major change of circumstance, and for all the reasons outlined by the government,
           I’m going to grant the application, I’m ordering all three defendants remanded
           pending sentencing.

Feb. 9 Tr. 1811:23-1812:3.

1
    The Government does not contend that the defendants pose a danger to the community.
           Case 7:21-cr-00681-NSR Document 180 Filed 03/21/24 Page 2 of 3

                                                                                             Page 2


   II.       Applicable Law

          Under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a), the Court:

          [S]hall order that a person who has been found guilty of an offense and who is
          awaiting imposition or execution of sentence ... be detained, unless the judicial
          officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee
          or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released
          under section 3142(b) or (c).

18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). This statute “establishes a presumption in favor of detention,” and imposes
on the defendants the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they are not
likely to flee or pose a danger to others. United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 319 (2d Cir.
2004) (“Once guilt of a crime has been established in a court of law, there is no reason to
favor release pending imposition of sentence or appeal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
United States v. Scali, 738 F. App’x 32, 33 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Having been found guilty of multiple
felonies, [the defendant] no longer has a substantive constitutional right to bail pending
sentencing.”).

        Although 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), additionally provides for a defendant’s release if “if it is
clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person’s detention would not be
appropriate,” that statute is applicable only to persons subject to detention pursuant to Sections
3143(a)(2) or (b)(2), not to persons—like Anwar and Quadri Salahuddin—subject to remand under
Section 3143(a)(1). Thus, the question for the Court at this stage of the proceedings is whether the
defendants have established by clear and convincing evidence that they are not likely to flee.

   III.      Discussion

          The answer to that question is no.

        First, from the moment the defendants were charged in 2021 up to and through the
conclusion of their trial, they have consistently questioned and attacked the authority of the Court.
For example, for an entire day of trial, the defendants refused to answer any direct questions from
the Court, and even refused to stand when the jury entered the courtroom, in direct contravention
of the Court’s directive. The defendants’ express belief that they are not subject to the Court’s
jurisdiction and repeated refrain that the Court is not a “constitutional officer” raises serious
concerns about whether they would abide by the Court’s orders if released. Indeed, if the Court
were to release the defendants now, there is little reason to be confident that the defendants will
return for sentencing.

       Second, the defendants face a significant term of imprisonment, including a two-year
mandatory minimum sentence to run consecutive to any other sentence imposed. Based on the
Government and Probation’s calculations for Christal Ransom—the fourth defendant in this case,
who pled guilty prior to trial to the same offenses and for the same conduct for which the
defendants were convicted at trial—the defendants’ offense level is 30. At criminal history
category I, the defendants face 97-121 months’ imprisonment before the mandatory two-year
         Case 7:21-cr-00681-NSR Document 180 Filed 03/21/24 Page 3 of 3

                                                                                            Page 3


sentence for aggravated identity theft is added consecutively to it. This prospective sentence is
significant enough to provide an incentive to flee. See United States v. Scali, No. 16-CR-466-
(NSR), 2018 WL 3410015, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2018), aff’d, 738 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“Defendant’s conviction of crimes with an overall guidelines range of 87-108 months is a factor
that increases his risk of flight. Defendant faces the prospect of a long imprisonment that very
likely may make him reluctant to willingly submit to incarceration.”) (citing United States v.
Londono-Villa, 898 F.2d at 329-30 (2d Cir. 1990)).

       Third, as established at trial, the defendants have the means to flee. For example, at trial,
the Government played a recording of Anwar Salahuddin speaking to a friend about how Quadri
Salahuddin allowed a suspicious amount of cash pile up in one of his bank accounts, calling
Quadri’s behavior “a bad look.” For his own part, Anwar sent around stacks of cash to people on
Facebook to show how much money he was making from what he admitted was a “scam.”

        Finally, the defendants do not propose a bail package at all, let alone one sufficient to
address the concern of risk of flight. Although the defendants’ filing is styled as a petition by
“concerned tribal / community family of Mount Vernon, New York” that contains twenty
signatures of people who claim to “hold [them]selves accountable and responsible for the
defendants[’] continued appearance in court,” there is no indication that a single suitable signatory
is willing to put his or her own money up towards a sufficient secured or unsecured bond.

       In short, the defendants have reason to flee. They have the ability to flee. And their own
words and actions suggest that no combination of conditions set by the Court can address those
risks.

   IV.     Conclusion

       For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ application for bail pending sentencing
should be denied.


                                              Sincerely,


                                              DAMIAN WILLIAMS
                                              United States Attorney

                                          by: /s/
                                              Jeffrey C. Coffman
                                              Courtney L. Heavey
                                              Jared D. Hoffman
                                              Assistant United States Attorneys


File and source

File

180.pdf

Size

237,729 bytes

SHA-256

37cdab095583646fe68cf3952375f29a19a2ab9e3cd5afffeb1092266c8a710e

Our copy

180.pdf

Original

No public link identified.