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Home Source documents Court filing — No. 7:21-cr-00440 (Dkt. 158, S.D.N.Y.)

Court filing — No. 7:21-cr-00440 (Dkt. 158, S.D.N.Y.)

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       Case 7:21-cr-00440-NSR          Document 158       Filed 10/15/25      Page 1 of 7


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                                                              10/15/2025

                               Plaintiff,
                                                                21-cr-440-02 (NSR)
 -against-
                                                               OPINION & ORDER
 ANDREA AYERS

                               Defendant.


NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge:

       Pro se Defendant Andrea Ayers (“Defendant” or “Ayers”) moves for a sentence reduction

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), citing the allegedly “unduly punitive, inhumane, and

psychologically damaging conditions” she experienced while housed at the Metropolitan

Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn. (ECF No. 151, Motion (“Mot.) at 1.) Defendant

specifically requests that, in light of the atypical and extreme conditions of confinement she

allegedly endured at the MDC, the Court reduce her total term of imprisonment or, alternatively,

convert the remainder of her custodial sentence to supervised release or home confinement. (Id. at

2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for a downward

sentencing variance.

                                        BACKGROUND

   A. Factual Background

       On April 2024, the Court sentenced Defendant Andrea Ayers to 42 months’ imprisonment

following her guilty plea to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with a scheme to

defraud a federal pandemic relief program. (See ECF No. 147, Judgment.) Between June and July

2020, Andrea Ayers, along with co-defendants Alicia Ayers and Traci Proctor, engaged in a

coordinated scheme to defraud the U.S. Small Business Administration’s Economic Injury


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Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) Program. (Compl. at 4-8.) They conspired to obtain federal relief funds

by submitting fraudulent online applications using the personal information of approximately 300

individuals. (Id. at 4.) The scheme involved transmitting false representations to the SBA through

interstate electronic communications, including fabricated information about business ownership,

employee numbers, and revenues. (Id.) In total, approximately 315 fraudulent applications were

submitted, seeking over $3 million and resulting in the disbursement of roughly $1.69 million,

portions of which were kicked back to the Defendants. (Id. at 4–5.)

       Defendant voluntarily surrendered in August 2024 and was housed at the MDC in Brooklyn

for approximately eight months while awaiting judgment before being transferred to Alderson

Federal Prison Camp (“FPC”). (Mot. at 2.) In her motion, Defendant alleges that during her time

at MDC she endured “unduly punitive, inhumane, and psychologically damaging conditions,”

including lockdowns, extreme temperature fluctuations, and inadequate hygiene and medical care.

(Id. at 1.) As attachments to her motion, Ayers submitted copies of what appears to be a BP-8

Informal Resolution form and a BP-9 “Request for Administrative Remedy” that she had filed

with the warden on March 7, 2025, seeking application of FSA time credits. (Id. at 4-5.) While her

BP-8 form was signed by the Unit Manager and Counselor, her attached copy of the BP-9 neither

included a response nor signature from the Warden. (Id. at 5.) Ayers is currently serving her

sentence at Alderson FPC, with a projected release date of June 6, 2027. (Opp. at 3.)

   B. Procedural History

       The Government filed a complaint against Ms. Ayers on March 21, 2021, for conspiracy

to commit wire fraud (Count I), wire fraud (Count II), false statements (Count III), and aggravated

identity theft (Count IV). (ECF No. 2, Complaint (“Compl.”) at 1-3.) On April 26, 2024, the Court

imposed a total term of 42 months’ imprisonment for Ms. Ayers (See generally Judgment.)

Defendant submitted several letters to the Court over the course of the proceedings, addressing


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issues related to her finances (ECF Nos. 127–128), medical accommodations (ECF No. 139), the

Court’s final judgment (ECF No. 144), and the calculation of First Step Act (“FSA”) time credits

(ECF No. 148). Most recently, on September 8, 2025, Defendant filed an instant pro se motion

seeking a reduction of her sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), based on the conditions of

her confinement at MDC. (See generally Mot.) On September 24, 2025, the Government filed a

letter in opposition. (ECF No. 157, Opposition (“Opp.”))

                                      LEGAL STANDARD

       Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the FSA, a court may reduce a term of

imprisonment only after the defendant has exhausted administrative remedies, and only if, after

considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it finds that “extraordinary and compelling

reasons” warrant such a reduction and that the reduction is consistent with applicable Sentencing

Commission policy statements. See United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2021);

United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2021) (finding that both “extraordinary and

compelling reasons” and support of Section 3553(a) factors are required for relief.) The exhaustion

requirement is mandatory and not subject to judicial waiver. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638–

39 (2016). Once exhaustion is satisfied, the Court must determine whether the defendant has

demonstrated: (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons; (2) that a reduction is consistent with

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (the relevant Sentencing Guidelines policy statement), which is now binding

and requires, among other things, that the defendant not pose a danger to the community; and (3)

that the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a reduction. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(a)(2), (b).

       Application of the § 3553(a) factors requires the Court to consider, among other things,

“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”

the need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide

just punishment,” “to afford adequate deterrence,” and “to protect the public from further crimes


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of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States v. Daugerdas, 613 F. Supp. 3d 807, 812

(S.D.N.Y. 2020). The defendant bears the burden of satisfying each of these requirements. See

United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir. 1992).

                                          DISCUSSION

       The Court DENIES Andrea Ayers’s motion for a sentence reduction because she has not

exhausted administrative remedies, fails to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances, and

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh against reduction in her sentence.

   A. No Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

       Ayers fails to demonstrate she exhausted administrative remedies. Under § 3582(c)(1)(A),

a defendant may seek a sentence reduction only after either (1) fully exhausting administrative

appeals within the BOP regarding a sentence reduction, or (2) thirty days have passed since the

warden received such a request. United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2021). Under

BOP regulations, an inmate must follow a four-step process to exhaust administrative remedies:

(1) raise the issue informally with staff via a BP-8; (2) file a BP-9 to the warden; (3) if denied or

if the warden fails to respond after 20 days, appeal to the Regional Director using a BP-10; and (4)

if still denied, file a final appeal to the BOP’s Central Office via a BP-11. United States v.

D'Acunto, No. 18 CR 14 (VM), 2020 WL 1904007, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2020); Dov v.

Warden, No. 21 CIV. 8570 (SLC), 2022 WL 17730112, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2022) (“If the

request is denied or the Warden fails to respond within 20 days, the third step is to appeal to the

BOP Regional Director.”) Although Ayers attached a BP-8 Informal Resolution form and a BP-9

“Request for Administrative Remedy,” she stopped at step two. Her BP-9 attachment was unsigned

by the warden; therefore, Ayers should have proceeded to filing a BP-10 appeal to the Regional

Director and then a BP-11 to the BOP’s Central Office.




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       Even under the thirty-day-lapse provision, assuming the warden received Ayers’s BP-9

form and this attachment was the final submission of the form, Ayers still fails to satisfy the

requirements under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Her BP-9 form—unsigned by the warden and limited to the

computation of First Step Act program credits—did not identify any “extraordinary and

compelling reasons” that would warrant a sentence reduction or excuse compliance with the

exhaustion requirement. Because Ayers neither submitted a qualifying sentence reduction request,

as discussed in greater length below, nor pursued the BOP’s administrative appeal process to

completion, her motion must be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

   B. Failure to Show Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons for Sentence Reduction

       Even if Ayers had exhausted administrative remedies, she has not demonstrated any

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” to permit a sentence reduction. Ayers’s allegations consist

primarily of generalized descriptions of MDC conditions, such as lockdowns, temperature

fluctuations, hygiene issues, including rodent infestations and unsanitary cell conditions, and

delayed medical conditions. (See Mot. at 2.) However, such conditions do not constitute

“extraordinary and compelling” circumstances especially since Ayers did no allege that these

conditions continued after her transfer to Alderson FPC. See United States v. Sarnelli, No. 22

CRIM. 116 (NRB), 2025 WL 268678, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2025) (rejecting defendant’s claim

that restrictive lockdown conditions and limited outdoor time constituted “extraordinary and

compelling” circumstances where such circumstances did not continue after his facility transfer.)

While courts in this Circuit have acknowledged the harsh conditions of confinement at the MDC,

those conditions—standing alone—have been found insufficient to warrant a sentence reduction

where they were already accounted for at the time of sentencing. See United States v. O’Berry, No.

18 Cr. 277 (PAE), 2024 WL 5244936, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2024) (finding that a defendant

could not rely on harsh MDC conditions to justify a sentence reduction where such conditions had


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already been considered at sentencing). Here, the Court similarly took those conditions into

account when imposing Ayers’s sentence. Although the Advisory Guidelines range was 63 to 78

months of imprisonment, the Court sentenced Ayers to 42 months—a term substantially below the

Guidelines range. (ECF 85, Final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) at 26.)

       Ayers’s allegations are also conclusory and nonspecific; she fails to connect her claims of

inadequate medical care, exposure to violence, or lockdown conditions at the MDC to any

particularized events or identifiable injuries. See United States v. Farmer, No. 19-CR-427 (LTS),

2022 WL 47517 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2022) (finding that “generalized statements about the

conditions of confinement do not constitute compelling reasons for compassionate release.”) Ayers

further fails to allege that she was subjected to sexual or physical abuse while in custody within

the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(4), nor does she provide individualized evidence of harm or

family circumstances. Therefore, Defendant has not demonstrated any “extraordinary and

compelling reasons” warranting a sentence reduction.

   C. The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors Weigh Against Sentence Reduction

       The Court further finds that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh

against granting Ayers early release. Application of § 3553(a) requires the Court to consider the

offense’s nature, the defendant’s history, and the need for punishment, deterrence, respect for the

law, and public protection. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Ayers’s total offense level was 26, and her

advisory Guidelines range 63 to 78 months. (PSR ¶¶ 42, 92.) Although the Court imposed a

sentence of 42 months—well below the guideline range—the seriousness of her conduct remains

substantial. Over the course of several weeks in 2020, Ayers organized and led a conspiracy that

used the identities of approximately 300 individuals to submit more than 300 fraudulent EIDL

applications, seeking over $3 million in pandemic-relief funds. (PSR ¶¶ 18–20, 23.) The scheme

resulted in actual losses exceeding $1.69 million to the U.S. Small Business Administration, funds


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intended to assist small businesses struggling during the COVID-19 crisis. (Id.) Her role as a leader

who recruited participants and collected kickbacks demonstrates both planning and exploitation of

a program designed to help those in need. See United States v. Broadus, 2020 WL 3001040, at 3

(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2020) (denying compassionate release where a defendant’s leadership in a

serious fraud undermined respect for the law).

         While Ayers has no prior criminal convictions and complied with pretrial supervision,

those mitigating factors were already considered at sentencing. A further reduction would not

reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, or

afford adequate deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Given the magnitude of the loss, the

number of victims, and Ayers’s leadership role in orchestrating the fraud, sentence reduction

would undermine these statutory purposes. Accordingly, the § 3553(a) factors weigh strongly

against reducing her sentence.

         In sum, the Court DENIES Ayers’s motion for sentence reduction because she has not

exhausted administrative remedies, fails to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances

warranting a downward sentencing variance, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh against a

sentence reduction.

                                         CONCLUSION

         For the reasons stated above, Defendant Andrea Ayers’s motion for a downward sentencing

variance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed

to mail a copy of this Opinion to the pro se Defendant (#35921509) at FPC Alderson, Unit B1,

P.O. Box A, Alderson, WV 24910 and to show proof of service on the docket.

Dated:    October 15, 2025
          White Plains, New York




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