Order — United States v. Christopher Lee Montgomery (Western District of Oklahoma, Document 71)
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This Order in United States of America v. Christopher Lee Montgomery, Case No. CR-19-247-G, from the Western District of Oklahoma, reminds counsel, in accordance with the Due Process Protections Act, of the prosecutor's disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. It quotes Brady that suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to punishment. A footnote says the Act, effective October 21, 2020, requires that the parties be informed of an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5. The order states that possible consequences of a violation may include exclusion of evidence at trial, a finding of contempt, granting of a continuance, and dismissal of the charges with prejudice.
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“Order — United States v. Christopher Lee Montgomery (Western District of Oklahoma, Document 71).”
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Case 5:19-cr-00247-G Document 71 Filed 09/22/21 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CR-19-247-G
)
CHRISTOPHER LEE )
MONTGOMERY, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
In accordance with the Due Process Protections Act,1 counsel are reminded of the
disclosure obligations of the prosecutor under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
its progeny. In particular, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373
U.S. at 87. “[E]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469–470 (2009). A “reasonable
probability” does not mean that the defendant “would more likely than not have received
1
The Due Process Protections Act, PL 116-182, [S 1380], effective October 21, 2020,
requires that the parties be informed regarding an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 5. By this legislation, subsection (f) of the Rule has been redesignated as
subsection (g), with new subsection (f) hereinafter designated as “REMINDER OF
PROSECUTORIAL OBLIGATION.” The amendment serves to remind prosecutors of
their obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), and its progeny.
Case 5:19-cr-00247-G Document 71 Filed 09/22/21 Page 2 of 2
a different verdict with the evidence,” only that the likelihood of a different result is great
enough to “undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S.
73, 75 (2012).
Possible consequences for a violation of this Order may include, but are not limited
to, exclusion of evidence at trial, a finding of contempt, granting of a continuance, and
dismissal of the charges with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of September, 2020.
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