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Case 4:23-cr-00136-ALM-BD Document 769 Filed 08/20/25 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
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United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
§
v. § Case Number 4:23-cr-136
§ Judge Mazzant
OLABODE THOMAS AJIBOLA (2) §
DUMBOR JOSEPHINE BARIBE (11) §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant Dumbor Josephine Baribe’s Motion for Acquittal
(Rule 29 F.R.C.P.) (Dkt. #604). Also pending before the Court is Defendant Olabode Thomas
Ajibola’s Motion for Acquittal (Rule 29 F.R.C.P.) (Dkt. #627). Having considered the Motions,
the relevant pleadings, and the applicable law, the Court concludes as follows:
1. Defendant Dumbor Josephine Baribe’s Motion for Acquittal (Rule 29 F.R.C.P.)
(Dkt. #604) should be DENIED; and
2. Defendant Olabode Thomas Ajibola’s Motion for Acquittal (Rule 29 F.R.C.P.)
(Dkt. #627) should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government. The First
Superseding Indictment (the “Indictment”) charged Defendant Ajibola and Defendant Baribe
(collectively, “Defendants”) with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1349 (Count One) and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Two). Defendants were alleged to have conspired to engage in a
scheme to defraud the United States through the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) and the
Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program (“EIDL”). Broadly, the Indictment asserted that
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Defendant Bello, the (now convicted) ringleader of the conspiracy, pulled Ajibola and Baribe into
a plan to submit fraudulent applications for PPP or EIDL loans (Dkt. #376 at p. 7). They, along with
several other co-defendants who pleaded guilty, were successful in that endeavor. After Defendants
obtained the ill-gotten funds, Defendants did not use them for permitted purposes under the PPP
or EIDL program (Dkt. #376 at p. 7). Instead, the Government alleged that Defendants paid Bello
a kickback, transferred the money from their business accounts to their personal accounts, and
spent lavishly on personal items (Dkt. #376 at pp. 7–8). The case proceeded to a jury trial on
January 13, 2025. Three days later, a jury found each Defendant guilty on both Counts (Dkt. #541).
On March 6, 2025, Defendant Baribe filed her Motion for Acquittal (Dkt. #604). Defendant
Ajibola filed his Motion for Acquittal the same day (Dkt. #627). The Government responded to
both Motions jointly on March 31, 2025 (Dkt. #631). The Court now takes up the matter.1
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal “challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict.” United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1998). The issue is “whether, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational [finder of fact] could have found
the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Boyd,
773 F.3d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States
v. Miller, 588 F.3d 897, 907 (5th Cir. 2009)). “The standard does not require that the evidence
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion
except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt
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Because neither Defendant ordered a transcript, the Court relies on its recollection of the evidence presented at
trial, citing occasionally to the factual allegations raised in the Government’s Response (Dkt. #631). Needless to say,
though the Court may cite to the factual assertions raised by the Government, the Court does not rely upon the
Government’s recollection of the trial record; the Court only cites it to anchor the Government’s position.
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beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). The factfinder
is “free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence,” and “it retains the sole
authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” Id.
(quotations and citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
Through their separate Motions, Defendants seek a judgment of acquittal “on both counts
and on each and every element of the counts” (Dkt. #604 at p. 1; Dkt. #627 at p. 1). The Court will
proceed to test the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury convicted each Defendant in
order, beginning with Count 1, conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
I. Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud
To establish conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, the
Government had to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant
and at least one other person made an agreement to commit the crime of wire fraud; (2) that the
defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement; and (3) that the defendant joined in the
agreement willfully, that is, with the specific intent to further its unlawful purpose. United States v.
Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403, 414 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Sanders, 952 F.3d 263, 273 (5th Cir. 2020).
“Criminal conspiracy can be established on circumstantial evidence alone.” Sanders, 952
F.3d at 273. “Indeed, a jury can infer from the surrounding circumstances whether a defendant
participated in and knew of the conspiracy.” Id. “‘What people do is . . . evidence of what lies in
their mind.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ganji, 880 F.3d 760, 768 (5th Cir. 2018)).
Baribe and Ajibola claim that there was “no evidence” to satisfy any element of a violation
under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Dkt. #604 at p. 3; Dkt. #627 at p. 3). Both Defendants claim that they
“only worked” with Bello, a “master manipulator of people” who “took advantage” of them (Dkt.
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#604 at p. 3; Dkt. #627 at p. 3). Both Defendants also argue specifically that the evidence was
insufficient to show that they had the requisite intent to defraud such that their convictions may
stand (Dkt. #604 at p. 3; Dkt. #627 at p. 3). According to Baribe, the evidence adduced at trial
showed that she owned a catering company with paid employees and spent money in furtherance
of that business (Dkt. #604 at p. 3). Baribe argues that, at trial, her daughters testified that she
trusted Bello when he offered to assist her obtain a PPP loan (Dkt. #604 at p. 3). All the evidence,
according to Baribe, suggests that Bello created and submitted fraudulent PPP loan applications
bearing her company’s name, from his IP address, at his house, all without her knowledge (Dkt.
#604 at pp. 3–4). Though Baribe concedes that she did send Bello money after securing the PPP
loan, she claims that “Bello lied to her and told her that the money she sent him was to develop a
website and grow her business” (Dkt. #604 at p. 4). Thus, Baribe argues that the evidence only
could have established that Bello “took advantage of a hard-working mother with a six[th]-grade
education”—not that she is a co-conspirator in this fraud scheme (Dkt. #604 at p. 4).
Ajibola’s arguments track Baribe’s (Compare Dkt. #604 at pp. 3–4, with Dkt. #627 at pp. 3–
4). He also contends that the evidence did not establish his specific intent, nor any other element.
According to Ajibola, the trial evidence showed that he owned a trucking business and that Ajibola
trusted Bello, who had previously prepared Ajibola’s taxes, when Bello offered to help him get a
PPP loan (Dkt. #627 at p. 3). Just as Baribe argues, Ajibola maintains that the PPP loan application
tied to him and his business, submitted from Bello’s IP address, was the product of fraudulent
documents that Ajibola was completely unaware of (Dkt. #628 at pp. 3–4).
For its part, the Government holds firm and defends the jury’s verdict. The evidence at
trial aligns with the Government’s position. The trial record supports conviction and will not
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tolerate a judgment of acquittal. When “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict,” the Court concludes that a rational factfinder “could have found the essential elements
of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Boyd, 773 F.3d at 644. As the Government
points out, the trial record includes numerous text exchanges that Bello and Baribe shared related
to the procurement of a PPP loan for Baribe’s catering company (See Dkt. #631 at p. 8). And while
Baribe now claims that her catering company was totally legitimate, the trial testimony showed that
Baribe had neither W2 employees nor W2 payroll expenses to ground the PPP loan for which she
applied (See Dkt. #631 at p. 8). The loan application bearing her company’s name said otherwise.
The jury heard evidence that Baribe did receive a PPP loan for her company, Josephine Catering
Services, to the tune of $141,373 (See Dkt. #631 at p. 8). The jury also heard that, after receiving
those funds, she deposited $42,411.90 (30% of the PPP proceeds) into a bank account bearing a
company name affiliated with Bello (See Dkt. #631 at p. 8). Throughout trial, the Government
offered a significant quantum of evidence—and particularly text messages—which suggested that
Bello agreed with Defendants that he would receive a kickback of this magnitude in exchange for
helping them submit the PPP application and secure a PPP loan. And after receiving forgiveness
for the PPP loan, Baribe paid Bello more. The evidence at trial showed unequivocally that Baribe
did not use these PPP funds for permissible business purposes as required. Thus, though Baribe
argues that she did not agree to enter into any fraudulent scheme with the specific intent to further
the agreement and to defraud, her conduct says otherwise. The loan application affiliated with her
and her company say otherwise. The financial transactions made after procurement of PPP funds
say otherwise. As does all the evidence at trial. And while Baribe continues to claim ignorance to
the scheme in which the evidence showed she took part, the jury rejected those arguments in
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convicting her. In light of the evidence, that decision was reasonable. Accordingly, Baribe is not
entitled to a judgment of acquittal on Count I.
The same is true for Ajibola, but even more so. In the Court’s view, the evidence at trial
incriminated Ajibola even more than it did Baribe. As the Government points out, the evidence at
trial shows that Ajibola managed a company known as Preferred Oil & Gas services, LLC
(“Preferred”) (Dkt. #631 at p. 6). Ajibola and Bello exchanged several text messages about
obtaining a PPP loan in the name of Preferred (Dkt. #631 at p. 6). As was the case with many of the
companies involved in the scheme the Government showed evidence of at trial, the trial record
shows that Preferred did not have W2 employees, nor did it pay W2 payroll expenses. No less,
Bello’s IP address was used to submit two PPP loan applications on Preferred’s behalf, each of
which misrepresented Preferred’s employees and payroll expenses (See Dkt. #631 at p. 7). The
Government showed the jury evidence that Ajibola received two PPP loans for Preferred, each of
which were $111,332 (See Dkt. #631 at p. 7). Like Baribe, immediately after receiving the proceeds,
the evidence showed that Ajibola deposited $33,399.60 into an account Bello controlled, as Bello
instructed Ajibola. Thus, though Ajibola maintains that no rational trier of fact could conclude that
the Government proved each element of conspiracy to commit wire fraud beyond a reasonable
doubt, that position is simply not grounded in reality or the evidence. His conduct, his text
messages with Bello, his transactions, and the fraudulent loan applications are sufficient to sustain
his conviction. Underlying all of Defendants’ conduct was the testimony of co-conspirators who
pleaded guilty prior to trial. That testimony—which summarized the entire scheme—certainly
established that Bello is a “master manipulator” and that he took advantage of his co-conspirators.
But it also corroborates the other evidence that incriminated Ajibola and Baribe. That testimony
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showed that Ajibola and Baribe’s conduct, from beginning to end, aligns with the overall scheme.
That co-conspirator testimony also supported the law enforcement agent testimony the
Government offered as to the financial transactions. Hence, this convergence further buttresses
the jury’s verdict. Because a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the Government carried
its burden as to each element of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, Ajibola is not entitled to a
judgment of acquittal. See Boyd, 773 F.3d at 644.
II. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering
Having disposed of Defendants’ arguments against their conviction as to Count I, the Court
turns to Count II, conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Dkt.
#376 at p. 18). Defendants’ arguments fair no better.
To prove conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), the
Government had to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the
defendants and at least one other person made an agreement to commit the crime of money
laundering; (2) that the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement; and (3) that the
defendant joined in the agreement willfully, that is, with the intent to further the unlawful purpose.
United States v. Cessa, 785 F.3d 165, 173 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 573–
74 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 1999).
Turning back to Defendants’ arguments, Baribe and Ajibola once more submit that the
evidence cannot sustain their convictions under § 1956(h). Not so. Defendants arguments assert
generally that no element is satisfied, once again focusing on the lack of intent (Dkt. #604 at p. 5;
Dkt. #627 at p. 5). As the Government points out, the trial record showed that both Defendants did
in fact engage in multiple financial transactions of greater than $10,000 with fraudulently obtained
PPP proceeds (See Dkt. #631 at p. 8). The evidence at trial also showed that those kickback
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transactions to Bello were orchestrated and planned via text message. That suggests an agreement.
And beyond these kickback transactions with the fraudulently obtained funds, the trial record
showed that Baribe and Ajibola alike engaged in extensive personal spending with their ill-gotten
gains. Certainly, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is clear that
a rational trier of fact could determine that the Government carried its burden to prove that
Defendants violated § 1956(h) beyond a reasonable doubt. See Boyd, 773 F.3d at 644. Accordingly,
neither Defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on Count II, either.
CONCLUSION
. It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Dumbor Josephine Baribe’s Motion for
Acquittal (Rule 29 F.R.C.P.) (Dkt. #604) is hereby DENIED. It is further Ordered that Defendant
Olabode Thomas Ajibola’s Motion for Acquittal (Rule 29 F.R.C.P.) (Dkt. #627) is also DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 20th day of August, 2025.
___________________________________
AMOS L. MAZZANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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