Report and Recommendation — United States v. Marvin Antwon Williams (Document 40, filed January 23, 2024)
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Report and Recommendation in United States v. Marvin Antwon Williams, CR423-076, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, Document 40, filed January 23, 2024. It states that the defendant faces two counts of arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) and moves to suppress statements he made to an investigator, arguing he had invoked the right to remain silent. The magistrate judge notes the motion was fully briefed with a hearing on January 22, 2024, and applies Miranda v. Arizona and Berghuis v. Thompkins. It concludes that the Government showed the statements were uncoerced because the defendant did not unequivocally invoke the right, and recommends that the Motion to Suppress be DENIED, with objections due within 14 days.
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“Report and Recommendation — United States v. Marvin Antwon Williams (Document 40, filed January 23, 2024).”
Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-4-23-cr-00076-dkt-40-6a1620c853/
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Case 4:23-cr-00076-RSB-CLR Document 40 Filed 01/23/24 Page 1 of 6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
)
v. ) CR423-076
)
MARVIN ANTWON WILLIAMS, )
)
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Marvin Antwon Williams faces two counts of arson under 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i). See doc. 1 (Indictment). After being detained and Mirandized,
see Gov. Ex. 1, at 7:23-26; 22:54-23:07, Williams told the Savannah Fire
Department Investigator interviewing him that “he started the fire in the
lane and the devil started the fires in the house, but the devil used
WILLIAMS’ hands to do it,” doc. 28-1 at 1. Williams moves to suppress
those statements, arguing that he had invoked the right to remain silent
and the responding officers should not have questioned him. See
generally doc. 28. The Motion to Suppress is fully briefed, see id.; doc. 32,
and the Court held a hearing on the Motion on January 22, 2024, see doc.
39 (Minute Entry).
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Case 4:23-cr-00076-RSB-CLR Document 40 Filed 01/23/24 Page 2 of 6
Statements made during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible
unless the Government establishes that the accused “in fact knowingly
and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441
U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Government must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) a Miranda warning was given; (2) the suspect understood his
Miranda rights; and (3) the suspect made an uncoerced statement.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010). Williams does not
dispute that he was Mirandized or that he understood his rights. See
generally doc. 28. His motion turns on the third prong–whether his
statement was uncoerced. Id. at 2-3.
If a person in police custody indicates that he “wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
473-74 (1966). “[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise.” Id. at 474. If Williams invoked his right to remain silent and
responding officers did not end the interrogation, his statements
regarding who set the fires is “the product of compulsion” and therefore
inadmissible. See id.
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Case 4:23-cr-00076-RSB-CLR Document 40 Filed 01/23/24 Page 3 of 6
The right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously and
unequivocally. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381-82. “If the suspect’s
statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal [invocation], the officers
have no obligation to stop questioning him.” Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994) (holding that the invocation of the right to
counsel must be unambiguous and unequivocal); Berghuis, 560 U.S. at
381 (determining that “there is no principled reason to adopt different
standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda
right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in
Davis”). Whether an invocation of the right to remain silent was
unambiguous and unequivocal is an objective inquiry; a suspect “‘must
articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a
reasonable police officer under the circumstances would understand the
statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.’” Medina v.
Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1101 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Coleman v.
Singeltary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Williams claims he invoked his right to remain silent when he told
officers: “[D]on’t ask me no questions.” Gov. Ex. 1, at 23:07-10; doc. 28 at
1. But “don’t ask me no questions” was only the first part of Williams’
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Case 4:23-cr-00076-RSB-CLR Document 40 Filed 01/23/24 Page 4 of 6
statement. After reviewing the body camera footage submitted into
evidence, the Court finds that Williams’ complete response to being
Mirandized was to say: “Y’all don’t ask me no questions. You feel me?
Just say what you gotta say, but I ain’t gonna answer too many
questions.”1 Gov. Ex. 1, at 23:07-14. By immediately following his
request that he not be asked questions with a declaration that he would
not answer “too many questions,” Williams injected ambiguity into his
attempted invocation. Id. (emphasis added). Williams’ statement
implies that he is willing to answer some questions–just not too many.
An unwillingness to answer “too many” questions is not the same as
unequivocally and unambiguously refusing to answer any questions. Cf.
United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 477 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[A] suspect’s
refusal to answer certain questions is not tantamount to the invocation
. . . of the constitutional right to remain silent.”). A reasonable officer
under the circumstances would not have understood Williams’ refusal to
answer “too many questions” as an assertion of the right to remain silent.
1 At the hearing, defense counsel argued that the Savannah Fire Department
Investigator questioning Williams spoke over or interrupted this statement. See
generally doc. 39 (Minute Entry). The Court finds that Williams’ statement was
continuous and that the investigator did not ask Williams any questions until
Williams finished saying that he would not “answer too many questions.” See Gov.
Ex. 1, at 23:07-15.
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Case 4:23-cr-00076-RSB-CLR Document 40 Filed 01/23/24 Page 5 of 6
See Medina, 59 F.3d at 1101. The investigator was under no obligation
to cut off questioning. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381.
The Government has sufficiently demonstrated Williams’
statements to investigators were uncoerced, as Williams failed to
unequivocally and unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent.
Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381-82, 384; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
Therefore, Williams’s Motion to Suppress should be DENIED. Doc. 28.
This report and recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the district
judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
this Court’s Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party may
file written objections to this R&R with the Court and serve a copy on all
parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendations.” Any request for additional time
to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the
assigned district judge.
After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this
R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The
district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are
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Case 4:23-cr-00076-RSB-CLR Document 40 Filed 01/23/24 Page 6 of 6
advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of
rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonette v. V.A. Leasing Corp.,
648 F. App’x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 F.
App’x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this 23rd day of
January, 2024.
_______________________________
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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