Eleventh Circuit Opinion — U.S. v. Shaquandra Woods (S.D. Ga.)

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An unpublished per curiam opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States of America v. Shaquandra Woods, No. 24-11500, dated May 14, 2025, filed July 21, 2025 as Document 418 in the district court case, D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cr-00016-RSB-CLR-1 (Southern District of Georgia). Circuit Judges Rosenbaum, Lagoa and Hull affirm Woods's jury conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and 75-month prison sentence. The opinion recounts trial evidence connecting Woods to twelve EIDL and PPP loan applications, eleven of which were fraudulent, and a guidelines range of 87 to 108 months. It addresses Woods's arguments on a material variance between the single-conspiracy indictment and the trial evidence, the admission of testimony about a threat, and the guidelines calculation.

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“Eleventh Circuit Opinion — U.S. v. Shaquandra Woods (S.D. Ga.).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-4-22-cr-00016-dkt-418-af34fc13d5/, SHA-256 f9c8292887e4d7668474b0c347b2cb2fc4028d67d730f31400680d20ac695e3d.

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11500
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
versus
SHAQUANDRA WOODS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cr-00016-RSB-CLR-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11500

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury trial, Shaquandra Woods appeals her conviction
and 75-month prison sentence for conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. Woods argues that the
district court: (1) plainly erred by permitting a material variance
between the single-conspiracy indictment and the trial evidence of
multiple conspiracies; (2) abused its discretion by admitting a
co-conspirator’s testimony about a threat Woods made; and
(3) erroneously calculated Woods’s advisory guidelines range.
After careful review, we affirm Woods’s conviction and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Woods’s Offense Conduct
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Woods, an attorney,
fraudulently applied for, or helped friends and family members
fraudulently apply for, emergency business loans.
Under the Coronavirus Aid Relief and Economic Securities
(“CARES”) Act, the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) funded
two loan programs: (1) the Economic Injury Disaster Loans
(“EIDL”) and (2) the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). Both
programs required that (1) the borrowing business be in operation
before a certain date in 2020 and (2) that the loan amount be based
on its gross revenue for the twelve months preceding the
pandemic.
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The trial evidence connected Woods to twelve loan
applications, eleven of which were fraudulent. 1 Specifically,
Woods submitted four EIDL loan applications for businesses she
solely owned, including S.A. Woods Law, PLLC; EZE Trace, LLC;
EZ Legal Solutions, LLC; and S.A. Woods Enterprise, LLC.
Woods also submitted three PPP loan applications for her
businesses.
Woods also helped submit EIDL applications for:
(1) COVID Trucking, LLC, owned by her husband Quentin
Bostick, Sr.; (2) Actually Living Life Management Consulting, LLC,
owned by her friend Cleopatra Smith; (3) D’Evils Limited Co.,
owned by her husband’s nephew, Jeremial Coleman; (4) an
unincorporated sole proprietorship, owned by her cousin Kenneth
Jackson; and (5) an unincorporated sole proprietorship, owned by
her friend Courtney Gilchrist.
In broad outlines, Woods’s fraud involved creating sham
businesses, falsely reporting those businesses were in operation
prior to the pandemic, reporting false revenue for the businesses to
maximize the loan amount, and creating and submitting false
supporting documentation, including bank statements, corporate
documents, and tax records. Woods also recruited other
participants to apply for loans and, for a fee, submitted their
applications and other paperwork and either communicated

1 The government conceded that Woods’s first loan application in April 2020

for an EIDL loan of $6,500 for her law practice, S.A. Woods Law, PLLC, was
not fraudulent.
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directly with the SBA or the third-party lender on their behalf or
coached the applicants on how to do so.
Woods also worked with her tax preparer, Amber Childers,
and Woods’s cousin Ashlee Parker, an accountant with her own
tax business, to create false documents that Woods submitted in
support of fraudulent loan applications.
B. Indictment
In a second superseding indictment, a federal grand jury
charged Woods with: (1) conspiring with others “known and
unknown” to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349
(Count 1); (2) four counts of making and presenting false, fictitious,
or fraudulent claims to the SBA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 and
2 (Counts 2-5); and (3) two counts of knowingly making and using
false writings and documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(3)
and 2 (Counts 6 and 7).
With respect to the wire fraud conspiracy charged in Count
1, the second superseding indictment alleged that Woods and her
co-conspirators agreed “to obtain monies and funds owned by and
under the custody and control of the Small Business
Administration by means of false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations, and promises.” The indictment alleged that the
objects of the conspiracy were for the conspirators “to enrich
themselves by obtaining EIDL proceeds unlawfully” and for
Woods “to enrich herself by charging fees to EIDL applicants for
completing and submitting their EIDL applications, which
applications [Woods] knew to be fraudulent.”
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As to manner and means, the indictment alleged that Woods
(1) “would complete and submit online EIDL applications for
businesses purportedly owned by her and by others;” (2) “would
falsely assert in the applications that the businesses were in
existence prior to January 31, 2020;” (3) “would falsely and
fraudulently inflate and misrepresent in the applications the
businesses’ gross revenues in the 12 months preceding January 31,
2020;” (4) “would enlist the assistance of co-conspirators to create
false and fraudulent tax documents for submission to the SBA in
support of the false and fraudulent applications;” (5) “would enlist
the assistance of co-conspirators to call the SBA and falsely
represent themselves as an applicant’s employer and convey false
information to the SBA in support of the false and fraudulent
applications;” and (6) “would charge applicants approximately 10%
of any funded EIDL as a fee for her services.”
Woods entered a not guilty plea.
C. Pretrial Motion in Limine
Pretrial, Woods filed a motion in limine to prevent Parker,
Woods’s cousin and co-conspirator, from testifying about a
statement Woods made to Parker. Woods told Parker she believed
Gilchrist was cooperating with government investigators. Woods
also told Parker that Woods’s brother-in-law could “get rid of”
Gilchrist, another co-conspirator. Parker interpreted Woods’s
statement to mean Woods could have Gilchrist killed. The district
court denied Woods’s motion.
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The district court explained that evidence of a defendant’s
statement threatening a potential government witness was
regularly admitted as evidence of a defendant’s consciousness of
guilt, knowing participation in criminal activity, and lack of
mistake when engaging in criminal activity. The district court
found that, while threat evidence is prejudicial, its probative value
was not outweighed by any unfair prejudice.
The district court granted the government’s motion to
dismiss Counts 2 through 7. Count 1 went to trial.
D. Trial on Count 1 (Wire Fraud Conspiracy)
During a four-day trial, the government introduced many
exhibits and the testimony of five co-conspirators—Smith,
Gilchrist, Childers, Parker, and Coleman—and Agent Justin Lott
from the SBA Office of the Inspector General. Agent Lott
investigated the fraudulent loans.
In defense, Woods presented several character witnesses,
then testified herself and denied any wrongdoing. Woods denied
preparing and submitting loan applications for anyone else except
Gilchrist, denied being paid $10,000 to submit Gilchrist’s loan
application, and denied supplying fraudulent information or
creating false documents for any loan applications.
Woods did admit preparing loan applications for her own
businesses. But Woods claimed that she submitted multiple loan
applications with different information only because she was
following the SBA’s instructions to correct mistakes in earlier
applications. She denied intending to defraud the government.
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The jury found Woods guilty.
E. Sentencing
The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) recommended:
(1) a base offense level of 7, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(a)(1) and
2X1.1(a); (2) a 14-level increase based on the intended loss amount
(more than $550,000, but not more than $1,500,000), pursuant to
§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(H); (3) a 2-level sophisticated means increase,
pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C); (4) a 4-level leader or organizer role
increase, pursuant to § 3B1.1(a); (5) a 2-level obstruction of justice
increase, pursuant to § 3C1.1. Her total offense level of 29 and
criminal history category of I yielded an advisory guidelines range
of 87 to 108 months’ imprisonment.
Woods objected to the PSI’s offense-level increases for the
loss amount, sophisticated means, and role in the offense. Woods
withdrew her objection to the obstruction-of-justice increase.
Overruling Woods’s objections, the district court found Woods’s
offense level was 29 and criminal history category was I, yielding
an advisory guidelines range of 87 to 108 months.
The district court heard testimony from six favorable
character witnesses, including Woods’s family, friends and two
pastors. Taken together, they described how Woods overcame a
difficult childhood, completed her college education while a single
mother, attended law school, and became an attorney. Both
counsel presented arguments. The government requested a
sentence within the advisory guidelines range.
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In mitigation, Woods pointed to the facts that: (1) she repaid
her loans and completed 130 hours of community service since
trial; (2) Parker, the only other conspirator to serve any time,
already completed her 12-month sentence; (3) Woods had no
criminal history; and (4) despite being born to a 16-year-old,
drug-addicted mother, Woods “battled incredible odds” and,
through courage and willpower, become an attorney. During her
allocution, Woods emphasized that she could no longer be an
attorney, described seeing her mother overdose on crack cocaine,
and asked for mercy and to be “allowed to go home” to her
children.
After stating that it had considered, “through the lens of
[§] 3553(a),” the witnesses’ testimony, counsels’ arguments, the
PSI, Woods’s sentencing memorandum, and letters supporting
Woods, the district court imposed a 75-month sentence. The
district court explained that it varied downward from the advisory
guidelines range of 87 to 108 months because the sophisticated
means guidelines enhancement overrepresented the seriousness of
Woods’s offense and because Woods’s culpability was “already
reflected by the leader or organizer enhancement.” The district
court added:
You know, sometimes the guidelines get it right;
sometimes they get it wrong. Here, this is the sentence
I would give regardless of what the guidelines say. But
given that sophisticated means enhancement, I kind
of had to step back from the guidelines and say what
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is the appropriate sentence in this case, regardless of
what the guidelines say. When I think about the totality
of the circumstances, this is the sentence that I’ve
landed on as the appropriate sentence.
(Emphasis added.) The district court acknowledged that while the
sentence was below the advisory guidelines range, it was still a
“very serious sentence” that it “would give regardless of what the
guidelines say.”
In explaining the chosen sentence, the district court referred
to Woods’s history and characteristics, including her difficult
upbringing, her laudable achievements, and her supportive family
and friends. The district court stressed the seriousness of Woods’s
offense, noting that Woods “stole from the American people’s
benevolence during one of the darkest chapters in our nation’s
history” and “took from the well that was meant to give water to
those who were truly suffering.” The district court pointed out
that “it wasn’t just an incident,” rather “[i]t was a long scheme” that
“took a lot of actions,” and “when you all were caught, you told
Courtney Gilchrist, don’t worry, I’m going to come up with a
story.”
The district court also emphasized Woods’s trial testimony,
which had “sullied this courtroom . . . with falsehood after
falsehood after falsehood.” The district court described Woods as
being “one of the worst liars” the court had seen, telling obvious
lies and doubling down on them in the face of the government’s
contradictory evidence. The district court found Woods
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committed “rampant perjury,” rather than fulfill her duty of candor
as a lawyer.
After the sentence, Woods did not object to the sentence or
the manner in which it was imposed.
II. VARIANCE FROM THE INDICTMENT
Woods argues the government’s trial evidence proved
multiple separate conspiracies and thus constituted a material
variance from the indictment, which charged a single conspiracy.
We ordinarily review de novo whether a material variance
occurred between the indictment’s allegations and the evidence
presented at trial. United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1198
(11th Cir. 2021). However, because Woods asserts her material
variance argument for the first time on appeal, our review is for
plain error. See United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2015).
A. Material Variance
A variance is not material if, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy existed.
United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1327 (11th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Three
factors inform that inquiry: (1) whether a common goal existed;
(2) the nature of the scheme underlying the crimes charged; and
(3) the overlap of participants. Richardson, 532 F.3d at 1284.
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As to the first factor, a jury reasonably could have found that
the co-conspirators shared a common goal—falsifying applications
to obtain PPP and EIDL loans—and each conspirator’s actions
facilitated the achievement of that goal. See Calderon, 127 F.3d at
1327 (explaining to be “common,” a goal need only be “similar or
substantially the same rather than shared or coordinate”).
“It is irrelevant that particular conspirators may not have
known other conspirators or may not have participated in every
stage of the conspiracy; all that the government must prove is an
agreement or common purpose to violate the law and intentional
joining in this goal by co-conspirators.” United States v. Edouard,
485 F.3d 1324, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted and
alterations adopted). The jury reasonably could have inferred that
these co-conspirators intentionally joined in the conspiracy’s
common goal and that Woods, as a “key man,” directed,
coordinated, and facilitated the venture as a whole. See Richardson,
532 F.3d at 1284-85.
As to the second factor, the trial evidence amply supported
a jury finding that the nature of the scheme was that Woods, with
assistance from her co-conspirators, would submit falsified PPP
and EIDL loan applications to the SBA or a third-party lender. The
co-conspirators assisted Woods by agreeing to be the applicant-
owners of the sham businesses, by creating false documents that
Woods submitted in support of the fraudulent loan applications,
and by falsely communicating with the SBA, as directed by Woods,
during the loan application process.
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As to the third factor, trial evidence demonstrated a
significant overlap of participants. For example, apart from the fact
that Woods worked directly and significantly with the co-
conspirators: (1) Woods and Bostick are married; (2) Woods,
Parker, and Jackson are cousins; (3) Parker, who was Gilchrist’s
sorority sister in college and prepared Gilchrist’s taxes, created a
false Schedule C for Gilchrist’s loan application at Woods’s
direction; (4) Woods and Gilchrist were friends and attended
Florida Coastal Law School together; (5) Woods and Gilchrist both
knew Smith, who worked at the law school; and (5) Childers, who
was Bostick’s and Woods’s tax preparer, falsified tax documents at
Woods’s direction for loan applications by Woods, Jackson, and
Bostick.
Based on the trial evidence of the loan-fraud conspiracy’s
common goal, underlying scheme, and overlap in participants, a
reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
a single conspiracy existed. Thus, there was no material variance
from the indictment, much less plain error.
We also reject Woods’s argument that her scheme was a
“hub-and-spoke” conspiracy, with herself as the “hub” and each
co-conspirator as a wholly separate spoke, creating at least four
different conspiracies. This ignores that all of the so-called spokes
were relatives or friends of Woods, all were using the same type of
false documents to make the same type of fraudulent loan
applications, and often the co-conspirators even directly interacted
on the same loan application.
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For example, let’s take COVID Trucking’s EIDL application.
Bostick was the listed owner, Woods incorporated the sham
business and falsified the information in the application, Parker
falsified a bank statement, and Childers created a fake 1099.
Similarly, Parker also created falsified bank statements for Woods’s
and Gilchrist’s loan applications. And Childers also created fake
1099 statements for herself, Jackson, and Woods. And, of course,
Woods submitted false applications on behalf of herself, Bostick,
Gilchrist, Smith, Coleman, and Jackson. The trial evidence
revealed that the co-conspirators knew of each other’s existence
and had reason to know that they too were fraudulently receiving
funds from the SBA. There was substantial evidence that the
co-conspirators were aware of the nature and scope of Woods’s
scheme, significantly distinguishing this situation from a hub-and-
spoke or rimless-wheel conspiracy. See United States v. Seher, 562
F.3d 1344, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d
796, 807 (11th Cir. 2004).
B. Substantial Prejudice
Our above determination that there was no material
variance “necessarily ends our inquiry . . . .” United States v. Alred,
144 F.3d 1405, 1415 (11th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, even if a
variance arguably occurred, Woods’s claim still fails. We will
reverse a conviction based on a variance only if “the variance (1)
was material and (2) substantially prejudiced the defendant.”
United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1450 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added); see also Wilson, 788 F.3d at 1312 (quoting United States v.
Flynt, 15 F.3d 1002, 1005 (11th Cir. 1994)). “[T]o show substantial
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prejudice from a variance, a defendant must show that the proof at
trial differed so greatly from the charges that he was ‘unfairly
surprised and was unable to prepare an adequate defense.’” Wilson,
788 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Alred, 144 F.3d at 1415); United States v.
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1500-01 (11th Cir. 1986).
Here, the wire fraud conspiracy in Count 1 clearly charged
Woods with preparing and submitting fraudulent loan applications
for her businesses and those of her co-conspirators and enlisting her
co-conspirators to create false documents and to make false
representations to the SBA about the loan applications. The trial
evidence established Woods was involved in all of the fraudulent
loan applications. Woods could not have been surprised or unable
to prepare an adequate defense. On appeal, Woods does not even
contend that she was unfairly surprised or unable to prepare an
adequate defense.
Rather, for the first time in her reply brief, Woods argues
that, despite this Court’s long-standing precedent requiring the
defendant to show substantial prejudice in material-variance cases,
the burden as to prejudice actually rests with the government,
citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). Woods’s
Kotteakos-based argument fails for two independent reasons. First,
we do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.
United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1185 (11th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).
Second, and in any event, Kotteakos articulated the general
harmless-error standard that applies “when the issue was properly
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preserved by timely objection.” See United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d
1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, however, our review is for plain
error, meaning that Woods, not the government, must
demonstrate prejudice to her substantial rights. See Wilson, 788
F.3d at 1312 (stating, on plain error review, that the defendant “fails
to show a variance occurred that substantially prejudiced his
rights”). As explained above, Woods has not shown substantial
prejudice arising from any material variance. 2
III. RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE
Woods challenges the district court’s admission of co-
conspirator Parker’s testimony about a threat Woods made about
co-conspirator Gilchrist.
A. Testimony Admitted
Co-conspirator Parker testified that once the FBI began
investigating the loan applications, Woods told Parker she
suspected Gilchrist “had someone on the phone with her” when

2 In timely objection criminal cases, we apply harmless error review of
nonconstitutional errors, which “requires reversal only if it resulted in actual
prejudice because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353
(11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); Kotteakos, 328 U.S.at 764-65. The
government bears the burden to show the error was harmless under the
Kotteakos standard. Pon, 963 F.3d at 1227; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760-61. Even
if a material variance arguably occurred and Woods had timely objected at
trial, the trial evidence showed Woods was the key man and involved in all
the fraudulent loan applications, and the government thus has shown any
material-variance error was harmless.
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Woods tried to talk with Gilchrist. Later, Woods showed up at
Parker’s house, acted very nervous, patted Parker down for
listening devices, and said she believed Gilchrist had told the FBI
what they did. Parker told Woods that she had spoken to the FBI
and that the FBI knew everything about Woods.
After Parker took her daughter to cheer practice, Woods
followed Parker to a Chick-Fil-A, where they spoke in Parker’s car.
Woods was upset with Gilchrist and believed Gilchrist “had set her
up.” As to the threat, Parker testified as follows:
Q. So I’ll ask you again. Was there ever a
conversation between you and the defendant about
whether something might happen to Courtney
Gilchrist?
A. Yes. She talked about getting rid of Courtney.
Not specifically her, but she felt like her sister’s
husband could have Courtney killed.
Q. Now, were those her words? What did she
actually say?
A. Get rid of her.
Q. And how did you understand that?
A. Kill her. Get rid of her.
The district court admitted Parker’s testimony pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). We review the admission of
evidence under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 747 (11th Cir. 2010).
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B. Rule 404(b) Principles
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of the defendant’s other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the defendant’s character
“in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However,
such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
When a defendant pleads not guilty, her intent becomes a
material issue, which the government may establish through
qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence. Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1345.
“[E]vidence that a defendant threatened a witness is relevant to
show consciousness of guilt, a permissible purpose under Rule
404(b).” United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1152 (11th Cir. 1997);
see also United States v. Fey, 89 F.4th 903, 910-11 (11th Cir. 2023).
Rule 404(b), however, does not apply to evidence that is intrinsic
to the charged offenses. United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1393
(11th Cir. 2015).
Evidence of other bad acts, whether “inside or outside the
scope of Rule 404(b), must still satisfy the requirements of Rule
403.” Fey, 89 F.4th at 911. Testimony that the defendant sought to
have a witness killed is not necessarily more prejudicial than
probative. Id. at 913. The trial court must judge the threat’s
potential prejudice in the same manner as it would for other
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potentially prejudicial evidence. United States v. Gonzalez, 703 F.2d
1222, 1223 (11th Cir. 1983).
C. Analysis
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
Parker’s testimony about Woods’s threat under Rule 404(b). As a
threshold matter, we reject the government’s contention that
Parker’s testimony about the threat was intrinsic evidence to which
Rule 404(b) does not apply. Parker’s testimony was extrinsic and
within the scope of Rule 404(b). See Fey, 89 F.4th at 910-11.
Woods’s threat to “get rid of” Gilchrist, even if an attempt to
conceal the fraud, was made after the conspiracy to obtain PPP and
EIDL loans through falsified applications already was completed
and was not part of the same transactions as the charged crime. See
id. at 911.
Although extrinsic evidence, Parker’s testimony was
admissible under Rule 404(b). To be admissible under Rule 404(b),
evidence of other bad acts must: (1) be relevant to an issue other
than the defendant’s character; (2) be sufficiently supported by
proof to enable a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant committed the act(s); and (3) possess probative
value that is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice and
otherwise comply with Rule 403. Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344. Rule
404(b) is a rule of “inclusion which allows extrinsic evidence unless
it tends to prove only criminal propensity.” United States v. Sanders,
668 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, we view the disputed evidence “in a light most
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favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and
minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” United States v. Smith,
459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).
As to the first prong of the Rule 404(b) test, Parker’s
testimony about Woods’s threat, which was prompted by Woods’s
fears that Gilchrist was cooperating with the FBI, showed Woods
wanted to eliminate any possibility of the government finding out
about their loan-fraud conspiracy. As such, evidence of Woods’s
threat to Gilchrist was relevant to show consciousness of guilt,
knowledge of the criminal activity, and lack of mistake. See
Eduoard, 485 F.3d at 1344; Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1152.
The second prong is also satisfied. Parker, an accomplice in
the conspiracy who created falsified bank statements for Woods
and other co-conspirators, provided sufficient proof of the extrinsic
act to support the jury’s conclusion that Woods threatened “to get
rid of” Gilchrist in an attempt to cover up the conspiracy. Parker
gave a detailed account of how Woods showed up at her house,
patted her down, believed that Gilchrist set her up and told the FBI
about the conspiracy, and how Woods followed Parker to her
daughter’s cheer practice and then to Chick-Fil-A before making
the threat.
Woods describes Parker’s testimony about the threat as
“false” and “clearly improbable.” But, in denying Woods’s motion
for a new trial, the district court determined that the government’s
cooperating witnesses were “remarkably credible.” Furthermore,
“the uncorroborated word of an accomplice . . . provides a
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-11500

sufficient basis for concluding that the defendant committed
extrinsic acts admissible under Rule 404(b).” United States v.
Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1047 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks
omitted).
As for the third prong, the probative value of Parker’s
testimony is not substantially outweighed by its possible prejudicial
effect. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The evidence was highly probative of
Woods’s consciousness of guilt, knowing participation in the fraud
scheme, and the absence of mistake. Evidence that Woods was
upset and, in front of Parker, contemplated “[g]et[ting] rid of”
Gilchrist after concluding Gilchrist was cooperating with the FBI’s
investigation undermined Woods’s own trial testimony that she
was entirely unaware of, and had nothing to do with, the
fraudulent loan applications and false documents created to
support them. While the evidence of Woods’s threat was
prejudicial, it was not unfairly so and was not more prejudicial than
probative. See Frey, 89 F.4th at 913; United States v. Nerey, 877 F.3d
956, 976-77 (11th Cir. 2017).
IV. GUIDELINES CALCULATIONS
Woods argues the district court erred in calculating her
advisory guidelines range as 87 to 108 months. She challenges the
calculation of the loss amount under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) and the
4-level organizer-leader role increase under § 3B1.1(a). On appeal,
the parties agree that if Woods’s objections to the calculations had
been sustained, her advisory guidelines range would have been 46
to 57 months’ imprisonment. The district court’s 75-month
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sentence thus would have constituted an 18-month variance from
the top of that range.
A. Keene Statement
The problem for Woods is that the district court, after
imposing the sentence, stated three times that it would have
imposed the same 75-month sentence regardless of the guidelines
calculations. Under our precedent, a guidelines calculation error is
harmless when (1) the district court stated that it would have
imposed the same sentence, even if it had decided the guidelines
issue in the defendant’s favor (sometimes called a “Keene
statement”), and (2) assuming an error occurred and the lower
guidelines range applied, the sentence is substantively reasonable.
United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 18 (11th Cir. 2022); United States
v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006).
Woods does not dispute that the district court made a Keene
statement. 3 And, as discussed below, the 75-month sentence was
substantively reasonable.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
The substantive reasonableness of a sentence is measured
based on the totality of the circumstances and considering the 18

3 Woods argues Keene “represents the view of a substantial minority of the

Circuits” and “should be abandoned by this Circuit.” Under our prior panel
precedent rule, we are bound by Keene. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d
1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
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22 Opinion of the Court 24-11500

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. 4 United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189
(11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). While “the district court has discretion
to impose a sentence outside of the guideline range, a major
variance requires a more significant justification than a minor one.”
Grushko, 50 F.4th at 20 (concluding, in a Keene statement case, that
a 58-month upward variance from the defendant’s alternative
advisory guidelines range was substantively reasonable). We do
not presume that a sentence outside the advisory guidelines range
is unreasonable. Id.
The district court thoroughly explained why it chose a 75-
month sentence “regardless of what the guidelines say.” The
district court emphasized that: (1) Woods’s offense was not a single
incident of fraud, but rather “a long scheme,” with many actions
taken over a long period of time; (2) Woods’s offense was
“immoral” because she stole federal funds meant “to help real
businesses” that were “truly suffering” survive the COVID-19
pandemic, one of the country’s “worst economic disasters”;
(3) once the conspirators were “caught,” Woods told Gilchrist not

4The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the
sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
and provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence;
(4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with
needed education or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the sentencing guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy
statements of the sentencing commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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24-11500 Opinion of the Court 23

to worry because Woods was “going to come up with a story”;
(4) Woods repeatedly and blatantly lied during her trial testimony;
and (5) by stealing from the American people and committing
perjury in court, Woods violated the public trust and her duty of
candor as a lawyer.
The district court’s explanation was amply supported by the
trial record and was more than sufficient to justify an 18-month
upward variance. See id.
Further, the record belies Woods’s claim that the district
court “failed to recognize” her remarkable background and
personal characteristics. The district court heard testimony from
Woods’s character witnesses, Woods’s allocution, and the parties’
arguments and explicitly considered Woods’s sentencing
memorandum, character letters, and the PSI, all of which together
described in detail Woods’s difficult childhood and how she
overcame it to become a college graduate, a lawyer, a good mother
to her children, and a valued member of her community. During
the sentencing, the district court referred to Woods’s background
and positive personal characteristics several times. It noted that her
witnesses spoke glowingly about her; that Woods “overcame so
much,” “attained a legal position,” and had “been successful at
everything [she had] done in [her] life”; and that Woods is “a good
mother” who worked with the homeless. The district court agreed
with Woods’s pastor that “the dichotomy here is so difficult”
because despite all the good things Woods did in her life, “in this
crucible moment,” she took “from the well that was meant to give
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24 Opinion of the Court 24-11500

water to those who were truly suffering.” There is no merit to
Woods’s claim that the district court “trivialized” or “fail[ed] to
adequately consider” her history and characteristics.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we affirm Woods’s conviction and
75-month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

David J. Smith For rules and forms visit
Clerk of Court www.ca11.uscourts.gov

May 14, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES

Appeal Number: 24-11500-AA
Case Style: USA v. Shaquandra Woods
District Court Docket No: 4:22-cr-00016-RSB-CLR-1

Opinion Issued
Enclosed is a copy of the Court's decision issued today in this case. Judgment has been entered
today pursuant to FRAP 36. The Court's mandate will issue at a later date pursuant to FRAP
41(b).

Petitions for Rehearing
The time for filing a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir.
R. 40-2. Please see FRAP 40 and the accompanying circuit rules for information concerning
petitions for rehearing. Among other things, a petition for rehearing must include a
Certificate of Interested Persons. See 11th Cir. R. 40-3.

Costs
No costs are taxed.

Bill of Costs
If costs are taxed, please use the most recent version of the Bill of Costs form available on the
Court's website at www.ca11.uscourts.gov. For more information regarding costs, see FRAP 39
and 11th Cir. R. 39-1.

Attorney's Fees
The time to file and required documentation for an application for attorney's fees and any
objection to the application are governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.

Appointed Counsel
Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming
compensation via the eVoucher system no later than 45 days after issuance of the mandate or
the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or
cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher
system.
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Clerk's Office Phone Numbers
General Information: 404-335-6100 Attorney Admissions: 404-335-6122
Case Administration: 404-335-6135 Capital Cases: 404-335-6200
CM/ECF Help Desk: 404-335-6125 Cases Set for Oral Argument: 404-335-6141

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