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Home Source documents Court filing — No. 4:22-cr-00016 (Dkt. 410)

Court filing — No. 4:22-cr-00016 (Dkt. 410)

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  Case 4:22-cr-00016-RSB-CLR Document 410 Filed 06/14/24 Page 1 of 6




                      IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                     FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
                               SAVANNAH DIVISION


 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        v.                                                 CASE NO.: 4:22-cr-16

 SHAQUANDRA WOODS,

        Defendant.


                                           ORDER

       For the below reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Release Pending

Appeal, (doc. 404), and DENIES as moot Defendant’s Contingent Motion for Extension of Report

Date, (doc. 406).    These motions are frivolous, and counsel should not have filed them.

Defendant’s last-minute effort to delay her sentence is merely the latest chapter in her attempt to

dodge the consequences of her malevolence. The Court encourages Defendant to accept those

consequences and turn her focus to receiving correctional treatment and rehabilitation.

                                        BACKGROUND

       On December 8, 2023, a jury found Defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud

as charged in Count One of the Superseding Indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.

(Doc. 324.)   On March 29, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial.

(Doc. 380.) The Court rejected, on multiple grounds, Defendant’s contention that the Government

presented insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. (Id.) The Court explained that

the “[t]he jury heard and saw copious evidence that Defendant conspired to submit fraudulent loan

applications to obtain money intended to help small businesses weather the COVID-19 pandemic.”

(Id. at p. 1.) The Court sentenced Defendant to seventy-five months imprisonment on April 16,
  Case 4:22-cr-00016-RSB-CLR Document 410 Filed 06/14/24 Page 2 of 6




2024. (Doc. 391.) At sentencing, the Court overruled Defendant’s objections to the United States

Probation Office’s Presentence Investigation Report. (Doc. 400, pp. 53—136.) Defendant’s

Guideline range of imprisonment was 87 to 108 months. (Id. at p. 137.) However, the Court varied

downward and sentenced Defendant to 75 months of imprisonment. (Id. at pp. 177—78.) The

Court stated that “this is the sentence I would give regardless of what the guidelines say” and that

“it’s still a very serious sentence, but a below-guidelines sentence, and it’s a sentence I would give

regardless of what the guidelines say.” (Id. at p. 178.) Defendant appealed her conviction and

sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on April 30, 2024.

(Doc. 394.)

       At sentencing, the Court originally ordered that Defendant report to serve the imprisonment

portion of her sentence on May 16, 2024. (Doc. 380, p. 181.) But upon a request from Defendant’s

counsel, the Court delayed Defendant’s report date to June 17, 2024. (Doc. 393.) Now, nearly

forty days after this Court’s Order for extension and seven business days before she is due to report

to serve her sentence, Defendant requests to remain on bond until the resolution of her appeal.

(Doc. 404.) Defendant has also asked to extend her report date until the Court rules on her Motion.

(Doc. 407.) The Government opposes Defendant’s Motions. (Docs. 408, 409.)

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Section 3143 of Title 18 of the United States Code outlines the appropriate circumstances

for an appeal bond. That section reads:

       (b) Release or detention pending appeal by the defendant.--
       (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the judicial officer shall order that a person
       who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
       and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless
       the judicial officer finds--
               (A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or
               pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released
               under section 3142(b) or (c) of this title; and



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                (B) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial
                question of law or fact likely to result in--
                       (i) reversal,
                       (ii) an order for a new trial,
                       (iii) a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment, or
                       (iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total
                       of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal
                       process.

18 U.S.C. § 3143(b). Put another way, the “burden is on the convicted defendant” to show:

        (1) that the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other
        person or the community if released; (2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay;
        (3) that the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact; and (4) that if that
        substantial question is determined favorably to defendant on appeal, that decision
        is likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial of all counts on which
        imprisonment has been imposed.

United States v. Giancola, 754 F.2d 898, 901 (11th Cir. 1985). The standard is conjunctive,

meaning that a defendant must show all the above elements. United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d

725, 731 (11th Cir. 1993).

        In this context, a “substantial question” is “one of more substance than would be necessary

to a finding that it was not frivolous. It is a ‘close’ question or one that very well could be decided

the other way.” United States v. Fernandez, 905 F.2d 350, 354 (11th Cir. 1990). “A court may find

that reversal or a new trial is ‘likely’ only if it concludes that the question is so integral to the merits

of the conviction on which defendant is to be imprisoned that a contrary appellate holding is likely

to require reversal of the conviction or a new trial.” Giancola, 754 F.2d at 900v (quoting United

States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985)).

                                             DISCUSSION

        Defendant has not shown that her appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact. Even

if she had, she has not established that a ruling in her favor would result in reversal of her

conviction, an order for a new trial, or a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment.




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       Defendant’s only argument to overturn her conviction is that the Court erred in declining

to grant her motion for a new trial. (Doc. 404, p. 6.) Defendant’s sole argument for a new trial

was that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. (See doc. 356.) The Court laid

waste to that argument in its Order denying her request for a new trial. (See doc. 380.) The Court

detailed the voluminous evidence of Defendant’s guilt. (Id.) The Court need not rehash that

analysis here. See United States v. Langford, No. 7:08-CR-245-LSC-PWG, 2010 WL 11508317,

at *2 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2010) (unnecessary to discuss arguments raised in defendant’s motion

for appeal bond that court addressed in order denying motion for new trial). Defendant does not

offer a single argument as to how the Court erred in its analysis. Indeed, she does not even discuss

the Court’s Order. Rather, she once against makes a specious conclusory argument and blatantly

ignores the overwhelming evidence of her guilt. Defendant’s counsel should not sign and file a

Motion before this Court contending that one of the Court’s orders was erroneous without even

endeavoring to discuss the contents of that order. The only development since the Court’s denial

of Defendant’s request for a new trial, is the introduction of more evidence of her guilt. At

sentencing, the Government introduced airtight electronic evidence that Defendant lied to the

Court and to the jury when she testified at trial that Kenneth Jackson was at her home in

Jacksonville, Florida on the date that his fraudulent loan application was submitted from that

location. (Doc. 400, pp. 33—38.)

       Defendant also contends that her appeal will question “[w]hether the Court [e]rred in its

[d]etermination of the Sentencing Guidelines [r]esulting in an [u]nreasonable sentence.”

(Doc. 404, p. 6.) Once again, she offers no analysis of this issue or even a sentence explaining

why this is a substantial question. Defendant would be hard pressed to contend that the Court’s

Guidelines calculation resulted in an unreasonable sentence when the Court sentenced her below




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the Guidelines range and stated that it would impose the same sentence regardless of the Guidelines

calculation. (Doc. 400, p. 178.) In the wake of such a statement, the sentence will stand on appeal

unless it is substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2020). To determine whether a sentence was substantively reasonable, the Court of Appeals

considers “the totality of the circumstances and whether the sentence achieves the sentencing

purposes stated in § 3553(a).” Id. at p. 1222. The Eleventh Circuit would vacate Defendant’s

sentence “only if [it is] left with the ‘definite and firm’ conviction that the district court committed

a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that is outside

the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010)). Defendant has not addressed the Section 3553(a)

factors in her Motion for Release Pending Appeal much less explained how her sentence falls

outside the range of reasonable sentences called for by those factors. Indeed, considering

Defendant’s significant fraud in this this case, her rampant perjury, and her continued refusal to

recognize her criminality in the face of overwhelming damning evidence, she should feel fortunate

that she did not receive a higher sentence. Even if the Eleventh Circuit vacates Defendant’s

sentence, on resentencing, this Court would not likely impose “a sentence that does not include a

term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(iii).




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                                        CONCLUSION

       Defendant has failed to prove that her appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact.

She also has not shown that a ruling in her favor would result in reversal of her conviction, an

order for a new trial, or a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment. Thus, the Court

DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Bond Pending Appeal, (doc. 404). The Court also DENIES as

moot Defendant’s Contingent Motion for Extension of Report Date. (Doc. 407.)

       SO ORDERED, this 14th day of June, 2024.




                                     R. STAN BAKER, CHIEF JUDGE
                                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA




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