Report and Recommendation — United States v. Kelvin Tyrone Williams (Document 41, filed August 3, 2020)

Summary

Report and recommendation in United States v. Kelvin Tyrone Williams, No. CR420-010, in the United States District Court, Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division, Document 41, filed August 3, 2020. It states that Williams is indicted on one count of possession of a firearm and one count of possession of ammunition by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and has moved to suppress evidence discovered in searches of a car and a home (Doc. 31). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion be denied without a hearing, because the facts alleged in the motion establish that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The report states that written objections may be filed within 14 days of service.

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“Report and Recommendation — United States v. Kelvin Tyrone Williams (Document 41, filed August 3, 2020).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-4-20-cr-00010-dkt-41-8324e2f74f/, SHA-256 e4606ef58cec0ee4cecb726874e231cc3c9121696e826ce9e1b21aeaec3153b3.

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Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 1 of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
SAVANNAH DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
v. ) CR420-010
)
KELVIN TYRONE WILLIAMS, )
)
Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Kelvin Williams is indicted on one count of possession of a firearm

and one count of possession of ammunition by a prohibited person, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See doc. 1 (Indictment). He has moved

to suppress evidence discovered in a search of his car and a search of his

home. Doc. 31. The Government opposes. Doc. 36. Because Williams’

motion alleges facts inconsistent with his assertion that those searches

violated the Fourth Amendment, his motion should be DENIED.1 A

hearing is not necessary.2

1
In reaching its conclusion, the Court has largely ignored the Government’s response.
It has not done so because that response is inadequate or mistaken. The question prior
to a hearing, however, is not the strength of the Government’s arguments and evidence
but the sufficiency of defendant’s allegations. See n 2, infra.
2
The Eleventh Circuit requires that motions to suppress “must in every critical
respect be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the
court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented.” United States v. Richardson,
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 2 of 9

According to Williams, a warrant was issued for his arrest by a

Chatham County, Georgia judge on June 8, 2019. Doc. 31 at 1. Early the

next morning, officers of the Port Wentworth Georgia Police Department

observed his vehicle, a Dodge Charger, and initiated a traffic stop. Id. at

2. Significantly, as discussed below, he concedes that officers ran the

vehicle’s tag before the stop, and it “came back as registered to Elisa Baker

and Kelvin Williams.”3 Id. at 3. He was arrested pursuant to the warrant.

Id. The vehicle was impounded and a warrant was obtained to search its

contents. Id. That search revealed two .22 caliber bullets and “a piece of

a B[e]retta gun handle.” Id. Based, at least in part, on that evidence,

officers obtained a search warrant for Williams’ residence. Id. That

search produced a revolver from Williams’ nightstand. Id.

764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). “In short, the motion must
allege facts which, if proven, would provide a basis for relief[,]” and has discretion as
to whether a hearing is necessary. Id.
3
The Government’s response provides a more detailed factual recitation. See doc. 36
at 3–5. There appears to be no dispute as to the relevant facts, however. The
Government’s presentation makes clear that (1) a warrant was issued for Williams’
arrest sometime in the evening of June 8, 2019, doc. 36 at 2–3; (2) Officer Wilson, the
officer who initially observed the Charger, was aware of the arrest warrant, id. at 4;
(3) Wilson observed a vehicle he suspected to be Williams’ and confirmed the
registration, id. at 4; (4) the information was communicated to Savannah Police,
including Officer Michael Gonzales, who initiated the stop, id. at 4–5.

2
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 3 of 9

Williams’ argument for suppression of the evidence depends upon

his contention that the original traffic stop violated the Fourth

Amendment. See doc. 31 at 3–4. He contends, “[b]ecause no basis existed

for the officers to have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Williams was in the

vehicle nor did the officers observe any traffic violations, the stop . . . was

illegal . . . .” Id. at 4. Because that initial stop was illegal, the subsequent

search of the vehicle was tainted, and further evidence discovered in that

tainted search was used in securing the warrant for his home. Id. All the

evidence discovered in the search of the car and his home should be

suppressed, he contends, as fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. Williams’

argument must fail, regardless of any argument or evidence the

Government might present, because his own allegations belie his premise

that “no basis existed for the officers to have reasonable suspicion that Mr.

Williams was in the vehicle.”

Williams’ motion depends entirely4 upon whether the initial stop of

his vehicle was illegal. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “a traffic

4
The Court does not discount the possibility, raised by the Government’s submission,
that there are additional reasons, other than the one discussed below, why Williams’
motion fails. Those arguments are moot, however, given the fact that Williams’ own
allegations establish a sufficient factual basis for reasonable suspicion.
3
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 4 of 9

stop is a constitutional detention if it is justified by reasonable suspicion

under Terry [v. Ohio] or probable cause to believe a traffic violation has

occurred under Whren v. United States, [cit.].” United States v.

Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). Furthermore,

“[r]easonable suspicion is determined from the totality of the

circumstances and collective knowledge of the officers.” United States v.

Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court assumes, for

purposes of this analysis, that Williams is correct that officers lacked any

probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred. See doc. 31 at 3. The

validity of the stop, then, depends upon whether officers had, at least,

reasonable suspicion.

“Reasonable suspicion requires that officers possess a ‘minimal level

of objective justification for making the stop.’” United States v. Mosby,

2015 WL 128189, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2015) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow,

528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). “‘[R]easonable suspicion’ is a less demanding

standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less

than preponderance of the evidence,” but more than an “inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528

U.S. at 123–24 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Courts have

4
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 5 of 9

routinely recognized that an officer’s reasonable belief that an individual

is subject to an arrest warrant provides reasonable suspicion for such a

stop. See, e.g., United States v. Provens, 2009 WL 10695199, at *3 (N.D.

Ala. June 25, 2009) (“Little authority is required to support the conclusion

that police may conduct a traffic stop for the purpose of executing an arrest

warrant for someone in the car.”). The question, as Williams recognizes,

is whether officers could have reasonably believed that he was in the car.

The Supreme Court has recently resolved precisely the question

upon which Williams’ motion depends. In Kansas v. Glover, the Supreme

Court recognized that an officer’s inference that the registered owner of a

vehicle was driving it, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, was

perfectly reasonable. ___ U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2020) (“We hold

that when the officer [conducting a traffic stop] lacks information negating

an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle, the stop is

reasonable.”). In its opinion, the Court expressly rejected the Kansas

Supreme Court’s determination that it was unreasonable to infer, from

registration information, that the registered owner was likely to be the

driver. See id. at 1188 (registration information, fact that the vehicle

observed matched the registration, and information concerning the

5
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 6 of 9

registered owner’s revoked license, “provided more than reasonable

suspicion to initiate the stop.” (emphasis added)).5 As Justice Kagan

succinctly states in her concurrence, “[w]hen you see a car coming down

the street, your common sense tells you that the registered owner may well

be behind the wheel.” Id. at 1191(emphasis added) (Kagan, J., concurring).

Williams concedes that officers 6 stopped his vehicle “[a]fter running

the tag number,” and determining it was “registered to Elisa Baker and

Kelvin Williams.” Doc. 31 at 3. Williams cannot plausibly claim, given

that he was in fact driving, that those officers had some information

negating the inference that he was driving. Given the Supreme Court’s

analysis in Glover, then, Williams’ contention that “no basis existed for

the officers to have reasonable suspicion that Mr. Williams was in the

vehicle,” doc. 31 at 3, simply defies common sense. Once the officers

5
Arguably, the facts here provide more support for the officers’ inference than the
facts in Glover. The Court’s opinion discusses, and rejects, Glover’s argument that the
fact that his license was suspended weakened the inference that he was driving the
vehicle registered to him. See Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1188–89. There is nothing in the
facts alleged here to suggest any information mitigating the inference that the
registered owner of the vehicle was its driver.
6
Again, the Government’s presentation of the facts, though consistent with Williams’,
serves to emphasize the stop’s legitimacy. In particular, the Government’s brief points
out, with citations to the record, the specific communications among law enforcement
officers supporting the “collective knowledge” of the facts supporting reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. See doc. 36 at 3–5.
6
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 7 of 9

reasonably inferred from the registration information that an individual

who they had a warrant to arrest was (or even might be) driving the

vehicle, they clearly had reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to

conduct the stop. See, e.g., Provens, 2009 WL 10695199, at *3 (“At the

very least, the admitted existence of the . . . arrest warrant provided the .

. . police with reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop for

investigative purposes.”).

Given that the facts alleged in Williams’ motion establish that police

had reasonable suspicion to stop the Charger, his motion has failed to

establish his entitlement to a hearing. Richardson, 764 F.2d at 1527. In

summary, he alleges that: (1) a warrant was issued for his arrest, doc. 31

at 1; (2) officers knew of the existence of that warrant, id. at 1–2; (3)

officers knew before initiating the stop that Williams was a registered

owner of the Charger, id. at 3. Those facts and the common-sense

inferences they support establish the officers had reasonable suspicion, at

least, to stop the Charger. Since the initial stop was valid, any reliance on

the resulting evidence does not impugn the validity of the subsequent

warrants; there was simply no poison in the tree to taint its fruit.

Williams’ suppression motion, therefore, should be DENIED. Doc. 31.

7
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 8 of 9

This Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the

district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)

and this Court’s Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party

may file written objections to the R&R with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations.” Any request for

additional time to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for

consideration by the assigned district judge.

After the objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this

R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The

district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and

recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of

rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonette v. V.A. Leasing Corp.,

648 F. App’x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. United States, 612 F.

App’x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).

8
Case 4:20-cr-00010-RSB-CLR Document 41 Filed 08/03/20 Page 9 of 9

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED, this 3rd day of August,

2020.

____________________________________
Christopher L. Ray
United States M i
agistrate Judge
Southern District of Georgia

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