Opinion — Chanel Rodriguez Valerio v. Luis Soto, No. 3:26-cv-03337 (D.N.J.)

Summary

An Opinion, Document 11, filed 05/18/26, in Chanel Rodriguez Valerio v. Luis Soto, et al., Civil Action No. 26-3337 (ZNQ), District of New Jersey, by District Judge Quraishi. The Court dismisses Petitioner's habeas petition without prejudice for lack of administrative exhaustion and denies Petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order without prejudice as moot. The opinion states that Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who entered on a non-immigrant visitor visa on February 5, 2025, was arrested on March 11, 2026. It states that a bond hearing set for April 9, 2026 was deemed withdrawn when Petitioner asked for more time, and that Petitioner never filed a new request.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“Opinion — Chanel Rodriguez Valerio v. Luis Soto, No. 3:26-cv-03337 (D.N.J.).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-3-26-cv-03337-dkt-11-d-n-j-2489b8cae8/, SHA-256 0c97930873a7b3285b4766e14227c66702ad01a4d8fadf0bbae00e8fd2f063e4.

Full text

Case 3:26-cv-03337-ZNQ Document 11 Filed 05/18/26 Page 1 of 5 PageID: 225

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHANEL RODRIGUEZ VALERIO, Civil Action No. 26-3337 (ZNQ)

Petitioner,

v. OPINION

LUIS SOTO, et al.,

Respondents.

QURAISHI, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) and motion

seeking a temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 2.) Following an order to answer, the

Government filed a response to the petition (ECF No. 7), to which Petitioner replied. (ECF Nos.

8-10.) For the following reasons, Petitioner’s habeas petition shall be dismissed without prejudice

for lack of administrative exhaustion, and Petitioner’s motion shall be denied without prejudice as

moot in light of the dismissal of his petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic who entered the United States

on a non-immigrant visitor visa on February 5, 2025. (ECF No. 7-1 at 12.) Although that visa

expired and required Petitioner to depart as of August 4, 2025, Petitioner did not depart but

remained in the United States. (Id.) On March 11, 2026, petitioner was arrested during a targeted

enforcement operation and was placed into immigration detention pending the outcome of his

removal proceedings. (Id.) Following his arrest, Petitioner initially requested a bond hearing

1
Case 3:26-cv-03337-ZNQ Document 11 Filed 05/18/26 Page 2 of 5 PageID: 226

before an immigration judge. (Id. at 8, 10.) A bond hearing was scheduled for him for April 9,

2026. (ECF No. 7-2 at 2.) When Petitioner appeared for the hearing, he requested more time to

prepare, and the immigration judge therefore deemed the request for a bond hearing withdrawn.

(ECF No. 7-3 at 1.) Petitioner did not file a request for a new bond hearing, but instead requests

that this Court order his release without requiring him to go through this process as he believes it

unlikely to produce his release. (See ECF No. 8.) Although Petitioner has now been ordered

removed by an immigration judge, he has appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration

Appeals and does not have a final order of removal at this time. (See ECF No. 10 at 1-2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody”

and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989).

III. DISCUSSION

In his habeas petition, Petitioner seeks to challenge his ongoing immigration detention

under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under that statute, the Government is authorized to detain, conditionally

parole, or release an alien subject to removal proceedings prior to the issuance of a final order of

removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018). Where the Government

chooses to detain an alien, the alien may request a bond hearing before an immigration judge, and

to appeal any adverse decision as to his bond request to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See,

2
Case 3:26-cv-03337-ZNQ Document 11 Filed 05/18/26 Page 3 of 5 PageID: 227

e.g., Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2018); see also

8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (alien detained under § 1226(a) “may, at any time before [a removal order]

becomes final” request a bond hearing before an immigration judge). At a bond hearing under the

statute, the alien bears the burden of proving that he is neither a danger to the community nor a

flight risk. Id. at 279. Where the immigration judge denies bond and the underlying bond hearing

was not otherwise held in a fashion violative of Due Process, “[n]o court may set aside any action

or decision taken by [the immigration judge] . . . . regarding the detention or release of any alien

or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)). Even

where denied bond, however, an alien detained under the statute can request further bond

redeterminations based on changed circumstances at any time prior to the issuance of a final order

of removal. See Borbot, 906 F.3d at 275.

In this matter, although Petitioner did originally request a bond hearing, he withdrew that

request by seeking more time to prepare for his bond hearing. He did not, however, thereafter file

a new request for a bond hearing after withdrawing his initial request as he is permitted to do under

§ 1226(a) and its regulatory framework. Petitioner’s failure to seek a new bond hearing and go

through the bond hearing process, however, is fatal to his ability to seek habeas relief in this matter.

As one court in this district has explained,

Immigration detainees seeking to invoke this Court’s habeas
jurisdiction . . . must exhaust all administrative remedies before they
may seek habeas relief in federal court. See Duvall v. Elwood, 336
F.3d 228, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2003); Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 503-
04 (3d Cir. 1994). “[E]ven when an alien is attempting to prevent .
. . [removal] proceeding[s] from taking place in the first instance and
is thus not, strictly speaking, attacking a final order of [removal] . .
., it is well settled that judicial review is precluded if the alien has
failed to avail himself of all administrative remedies.” Duvall, 336
F.3d at 233. Because the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional,
the failure of a habeas petitioner to present his claims first to the
immigration courts is “fatal to the District Court’s jurisdiction over

3
Case 3:26-cv-03337-ZNQ Document 11 Filed 05/18/26 Page 4 of 5 PageID: 228

[his] habeas petition.” Id. [Wh]ere, [the petitioner] has an
administrative remedy available [he must make use of that remedy
before he can challenge his detention in federal court] – [i.e.,] if [a
petitioner] wishes to seek his release [from detention under §
1226(a)], he must [first] seek[] a bond hearing before an
immigration judge. . . That [a petitioner] has not done so renders his
[habeas petition seeking a bond hearing or release] unexhausted,
which in turn deprives this Court of jurisdiction over the claims
raised in his habeas petition.

Jelani B. v. Anderson, No. 20-6459, 2020 WL 5560161, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2020).

Because Petitioner did not request a new bond hearing after withdrawing his initial request,

and never went through the bond hearing process, his request for release in this matter is

unexhausted and must be dismissed as such. Id. Petitioner must fully exhaust his claims by going

through the bond hearing process before he may seek habeas relief. Id. Petitioner’s habeas petition

shall therefore be dismissed without prejudice at this time. 1

1
Nothing in this Court’s decision should be read to prevent Petitioner from filing a new habeas
petition should the immigration judge refuse to provide him a bond hearing after requesting one,
nor from filing a habeas petition challenging the fundamental fairness of any bond hearing he does
receive once the process before the immigration judge is complete. See, e.g., Ghanem v. Warden
Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 21-1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022). The
Court’s ruling in this matter is limited to the current procedural posture of this case – Petitioner
cannot obtain relief based on an alleged denial of due process in relation to his detention under §
1226(a) where he has not yet gone through the procedures available to him in the immigration
courts. Petitioner is entitled to seek a new bond hearing before the immigration judge at any time
prior to his removal order becoming final, and cannot proceed before this Court until he does so.
4
Case 3:26-cv-03337-ZNQ Document 11 Filed 05/18/26 Page 5 of 5 PageID: 229

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE as his claims have not been properly exhausted. Petitioner’s motion

seeking a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as

moot in light of the dismissal of his habeas petition. An appropriate order follows.

Date: May 18, 2026
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

File and source

File: 11.pdf
Size: 172,270 bytes
SHA-256: 0c97930873a7b3285b4766e14227c66702ad01a4d8fadf0bbae00e8fd2f063e4
Our copy: 11.pdf
Original: archive.org