Order — United States v. Eugene Cooper, Jr. (Southern District of Mississippi, Document 28)
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Order in the Southern District of Mississippi, Northern Division, denying defendant Cooper's motion to dismiss an indictment under a Second Amendment challenge. The order states that on September 10, 2024, a federal grand jury indicted Cooper for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, and that Cooper has prior state court convictions (burglary, 1994; fondling, 1995). It states that the Court agrees the Diaz case controls, that Cooper's burglary conviction is analogous to the predicate theft offense in Diaz, and that permanently disarming him is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The order concludes that Cooper's as-applied challenge fails.
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“Order — United States v. Eugene Cooper, Jr. (Southern District of Mississippi, Document 28).”
Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-3-24-cr-00089-dkt-28-s-d-miss-f628e708a4/
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Case 3:24-cr-00089-CWR-ASH Document 28 Filed 06/18/25 Page 1 of 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
NORTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CR-89-CWR-ASH
EUGENE COOPER, JR.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is Eugene Cooper, Jr.’s motion to dismiss. Docket No. 19. After
reviewing the factual allegations, arguments of counsel, and legal standard governing this
Second Amendment challenge, the Court denies the motion.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On September 10, 2024, a federal grand jury indicted Eugene Cooper, Jr. for violating
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. There is no
dispute over Cooper’s felony status at the time of his indictment: he has prior state court
convictions for burglary in 1994 and fondling in 1995.
Cooper has moved to dismiss the indictment. His main argument is that § 922(g)(1) is
unconstitutional as applied to him because the government cannot prove that disarming him
“fits within any tradition of serious and permanent punishment for offenders convicted of
similar crimes in the Founding Era.” Docket No. 19 at 9 (quotation marks omitted). 1
1
Cooper also argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face, unconstitutionally vague, and violates
the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. His arguments are foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent. See
Case 3:24-cr-00089-CWR-ASH Document 28 Filed 06/18/25 Page 2 of 3
II. Legal Standard
Courts apply the standard articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
Bruen to determine whether an individual’s conduct is protected by the Second Amendment.
597 U.S. 1 (2022). First, courts must ask whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
an individual’s conduct.” Id. at 24. If so, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate
that the challenged statute or regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition
of firearm regulation.” Id. To meet this burden, the government need not identify a “historical
twin,” but must point to a “well-established and representative historical analogue.” Id. at 30
(emphasis in original).
Because the Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]he plain text of the Second Amendment
covers the conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(1),” the Court will proceed directly to the second
step: whether the government has shown “that the Nation has a longstanding tradition of
disarming someone with a criminal history analogous to” Cooper’s. United States v. Diaz,
116 F.4th 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2024). “Simply classifying a crime as a felony does not meet the
level of historical rigor required by Bruen and its progeny.” Id. at 469. The question is whether
the government has provided historical analogues specific to Cooper’s predicate offense(s)
that “impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and whether that
burden is comparably justified.” Id. at 467 (quotation marks omitted).
III. Discussion
The government contends that Cooper’s Second Amendment challenge “fits
comfortably in the holdings of . . . the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Diaz.” Docket No. 24
United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2024); see also United States v. Cooper, No. CR 23-131, 2025
WL 316341, at *5 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 2025).
2
Case 3:24-cr-00089-CWR-ASH Document 28 Filed 06/18/25 Page 3 of 3
at 3. In that case, the Fifth Circuit found that colonial-era laws often punished theft-related
convictions with executions. The appellate court reasoned that “if capital punishment was
permissible to respond to theft, then the lesser restriction of permanent disarmament that §
922(g)(1) imposes is also permissible.” Diaz, 116 F.4th at 469.
Upon review, the Court agrees that the Diaz case controls the outcome of Cooper’s
motion. Cooper was convicted of burglary in 1994. “Burglary is a ‘species of theft.’” United
States v. McCuin, No. 1:24-CR-38-TBM-BWR-1, 2025 WL 1285680, at *7 (S.D. Miss. May 1, 2025
(citation omitted). Because Cooper’s “burglary conviction is analogous to [Diaz’s] predicate
offense for . . . theft,” id., the Court finds that permanently disarming him is “consistent with
the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation,” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. Accordingly,
Cooper’s as-applied challenge fails. 2
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Cooper’s motion is denied.
SO ORDERED, this the 18th day of June, 2025.
s/ Carlton W. Reeves
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2Because the Court concludes that Cooper’s burglary conviction satisfies Bruen, it need not address
whether his fondling conviction supports disarmament.
3
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