Ruling — United States v. Oscar Hills, IV (Middle District of Louisiana, Document 135)

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Ruling and order in the Middle District of Louisiana criminal case against Oscar Hills, IV, denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for selective or vindictive prosecution. The Indictment, handed down by the Grand Jury on June 1, 2023, alleges a scheme to defraud Company 1 and the United States through the Small Business Administration with false Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Loan applications. It alleges that, in the name of Bootstate Financial Group, Defendant sought approximately $675,272 in PPP funds and used proceeds for a trip to Hawaii. The Court states that Defendant offered no evidence of vindictive or selective prosecution and will have an opportunity to present evidence at trial before a jury.

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“Ruling — United States v. Oscar Hills, IV (Middle District of Louisiana, Document 135).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-3-23-cr-00047-dkt-135-m-d-la-57c7c30ddf/, SHA-256 0b0fb512f7ef0b220818121909f0a1827803304f900da76a488163d0997f6795.

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Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 1 of 12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRIMINAL ACTION

VERSUS

OSCAR HILLS, IV NO. 23-00047-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND OEDEK

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 111).1 The

Government opposes the Motion. (Doc. 113). Defendant filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 115).

For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 1, 2023, the Grand Jury for the Middle District of Louisiana handed

down a four count Indictment against Defendant Oscar Hills, IV. (Doc. 1). Counts

One and Two charge Defendant with wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. {Id.).

Counts Three and Four charge Defendant with unlawful monetary transactions, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. (Id.).

The Indictment alleges that Defendant devised a scheme and artifice to

defraud Company 1 and the United States through the Small Business

Administration ("SBA") by filing false and fraudulent applications for

Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") and Economic Injury Disaster Loan ("EIDL")

funds. (Id. at 4). The Indictment further alleges that Defendant used those funds for

his own personal enrichment. (Id.).

1 Defendant filed additional exhibits accompanying his Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 112).
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 2 of 12

A. Indictment Allegations Regarding the PPP Loan.

The Indictment contains the following allegations regarding the PPP Loan. On

May 5, 2020, Defendant allegedly signed and submitted a false and fraudulent PPP

Application to Company 1 in the name of Bootstate Financial Group ("Bootstate")

seeking approximately $675,272 in PPP funds. (Doc. 1 at 5). Bootstate was allegedly

a Louisiana non-profit corporation formed around April 17, 2020. {Id. at 1). Defendant

was allegedly Bootstate s sole owner, officer, and registered agent. (Id.).

In the PPP Application, Defendant allegedly certified that Bootstate was "in

operation on February 15, 2020, and had employees for whom it paid salaries and

payroll taxes or paid independent contractors." (Id. at 5). Defendant also allegedly

certified that the funds would be used to retain workers and maintain payroll," and

for other business-related expenses. (Id.).

Defendant allegedly falsely represented that Bootstate had 40 employees and

an average monthly payroll of $270,109. (Id.). Defendant also allegedly submitted an

IRS Form 941 for the period of January to IVIarch 2020 indicating that: (1) Defendant

paid Bootstate's employees more than $785,000 in wages, tips, and other

compensation; and (2) Defendant withheld more than $101,000 in federal income

taxes in the first quarter of 2020. (Id.). These statements were allegedly false.

(Id. at 6).

As a result of Defendant's allegedly false representations in the PPP

Application, Company 1 allegedly disbursed $675,272 in PPP loan proceeds to

Defendant s bank account. (Id.). Defendant allegedly used the PPP loan proceeds to:

2
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 3 of 12

(1) purchase a 2010 Dodge Viper; (2) travel to, and stay in, Hawaii; and (3) for other

non-business-related expenses. (Id.).

B. Indictment Allegations Regarding the EIDL Loan.

The Indictment contains the following allegations regarding the EIDL Loan.

On March 30, 2020, Defendant allegedly submitted a false and fraudulent EIDL

Application to the SBA in the name of Baton Rouge Teen Summit Foundation

("BRTS") seeking approximately $150,000 in EIDL funds. (Doc. 1 at 6). BRTS was

allegedly a Louisiana non-profit corporation formed around March 2002. (Id. at 2).

Defendant was allegedly BRTS's sole owner, officer, and registered agent. (Id.).

In the EIDL application, Defendant allegedly certified that he would use the

EIDL funds solely as working capital to alleviate economic injury caused by the

disaster occurring on January 31, 2020, and continuing thereafter. (Id. at 6-7).

Defendant also allegedly represented that BRTS was a non-profit organization with

25 employees that performed outreach activities. (Id. at 7).

Defendant allegedly claimed that, for the 12-month period preceding

January 31, 2020, BTS s operating expenses were $184,300, its cost of operations was

$1,033,300, and its gross revenues were $50,000. (Id.). Defendant allegedly knew that

BRTS did not have those revenues, costs, and expenses. (Id.). The SBA allegedly

approved the BRTS EIDL Loan application based on Defendant's alleged

misrepresentations. (Id.).

On July 7, 2020, the SBA allegedly authorized the disbursement of $149,900

in loan proceeds to an account held by Defendant in the name of BRTS. (Id.).
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 4 of 12

Defendant then allegedly used the proceeds for personal enrichment and expenses.

(Id.). Defendant also allegedly used the money to pay Bootstate and the

East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriffs Office for back property taxes. (Id. at 7-8).

The Indictment also contains forfeiture allegations. (Doc. 1 at 9-10).

II. PKOCEDUEAL HISTORY

On June 1, 2023, Defendant was indicted for two counts of wire fraud and two

counts of unlawful monetary transactions. (Doc. 1). Defendant appeared before the

Magistrate Judge on June 29, 2023, and entered a plea of not guilty to each Count in

the Indictment. (Doc. 8). The Magistrate Judge released Defendant on conditions.

(Doc. 8). The case was later declared complex. (Doc. 16).

Defendant has been appointed several attorneys in this matter, each of whom

have withdrawn. (Doc. 5; Doc. 7; Doc. 26; Doc. 27; Doc. 29; Doc. 39; Doc. 40; Doc. 79;

Doc. 83; Doc. 84; Doc. 93). On November 18, 2024, Defendant moved to proceed pro

se. (Doc. 89). Following a hearing, the Court granted Defendant's IVIotion, finding that

his decision to proceed pro se was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

(Doc. 93; Doc. 94). The Court appointed standby counsel to assist Defendant.

(Doc. 104). Because the Government was not present for the entirety of the hearing,

the Court scheduled a Faretta hearing at the Government's request. (Doc. 118;

Doc. 119).

During the Faretta hearing, the Court explained to Defendant the risks of

proceeding pro se and the benefits of being represented by Counsel. (Doc. 124). The

Court asked Defendant a series of questions to ascertain whether his decision to
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 5 of 12

proceed pro se was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (Id.). After

exhaustively describing the risks associated with proceeding pro se and the benefits

of obtaining Counsel, the Court asked Defendant whether he still wanted to proceed

pro se. (Id.). Defendant confirmed, under oath, that he wished to proceed pro se. (Id.).

Thus, the Court found that Defendant's decision to proceed pro se was made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (Id.). The Court permitted Defendant to

proceed pro se. (Id.).

Later that same day after the Faretta hearing, Defendant filed a Motion to

Appoint Counsel. (Doc. 122). That Motion remains pending and is scheduled for a

hearing. (Doc. 130).

Defendant filed the instant pro se Motion to Dismiss, asking the Court to

dismiss the Indictment based on lack of sufficient evidence and selective and

vindictive prosecution. (Doc. 111). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion is

denied.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Failure to State an Offense

Defendant moves to dismiss the Indictment for failure to state an offense.

(Doc. 111). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v) allows a defendant to

move to dismiss an indictment that is legally defective for failure to state an offense.

A court can rule on such a motion when the alleged infirmity is a legal question

requiring no determinations of fact. United States v. Fontenot, 665 F.3d 640, 644

(5th Cir. 2011). The court must take the allegations of the indictment as true.
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 6 of 12

United States v. Hague, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1998). To be legally sufficient,

an indictment need only: (1) enumerate each element of the charged offense; (2) fairly

inform the defendant of the charges filed against him; and (3) provide the defendant

with a double jeopardy defense against future prosecution. United States v. Gaytan,

74 F.3d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Wilks,

No. OR 21-63-SDD-SDJ, 2023 WL 1978903, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 13, 2023)

(Dick, C.J.).

B. Selective Prosecution

In our criminal justice system, the Government retains broad discretion to

prosecute individuals. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). "[S]o long

as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense

defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file

or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher

v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Therefore, a selective prosecution claim is not a

defense on the merits to the criminal charge, but instead, an independent claim that

the prosecutor brought a charge for reasons forbidden by the Constitution.

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).

To succeed on a claim of selective prosecution, a defendant must meet a "heavy

burden." United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 445 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting

United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978)). First, a defendant

must make aprima facie showing that he has been singled out for prosecution while
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 7 of 12

others similarly situated who have committed the same acts have not been

prosecuted." Id. (citing United States v. Tibbetts, 646 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Second, a defendant must demonstrate that "the government's selective

prosecution of him has been constitutionally invidious." Jennings, 724 F.2d at 445.

Even if a defendant demonstrates that he was singled out for prosecution, "selective

prosecution, absent some invidious element, may not be challenged." Id. at n. 12

(citations omitted). To show "invidiousness," a defendant must demonstrate "that the

governments selective prosecution is actuated by constitutionally impermissible

motives on its part, such as racial or religious discrimination." Id. (citation omitted);

see also United States v. Young, 231 F. Supp. 3d 33, 104 (M.D. La. Feb. 6, 2017)

(deGravelles, J.) ("Thus, the Defendant must . . . demonstrate that the government's

discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith in

that it rests upon such impermissible considerations [such] as ... the desire to

prevent his exercise of constitutional rights." (quotation omitted)); see also

United States v. Sterling, No. CR 20-00052-BAJ-RLB, 2021 WL 3271596, at *4

(M.D. La. July 29, 2021) (Jackson, J.).

C. Vindictive Prosecution

In general, there are two ways in which a defendant can prove a claim of

vindictiveness. First, a defendant may prove actual vindictiveness by presenting

objective evidence that the prosecutor's actions were designed to punish a defendant

for asserting his legal rights." United States v. Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353, 359

(5th Cir. 2008). "Second, in certain circumstances, a defendant may show sufficient

7
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 8 of 12

facts to give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Id. "[C]ourts will apply [the

presumption of vindictiveness] only where there exists a realistic likelihood of

vindictiveness." Id. at 359. "The defendant has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, prosecutorial vindictiveness." Id.; see also

United States v. Fields, No. CR 20-76-SDD-SDJ, 2021 WL 357374, at *3

(M.D. La. Feb. 2, 2021) (Dick, C.J.).

IV.DISCUSSION

Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the Indictment for insufficient evidence

and for selective and vindictive prosecution. (Doc. 111). The Court will address each

argument in turn.

A. Insufficient Evidence.

Defendant seeks to dismiss the Indictment for insufficient evidence, citing

purported evidence to "debunk" every allegedly false statement in the Indictment.

(Doc. Ill at 4). Defendant claims that the evidence provided with his Motion

exonerates him of all charges. {Id. at 31). The Government responds that a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence requires a factual analysis and cannot be raised by

pretrial motion. (Doc. 113 at 2). The Court agrees.

The Court has held: [I]t is for the jury to test the sufficiency of evidence; the

Government does not have to prove the allegations in the charging document."

United States v. Tucker, No. CR 20-43-SDD-RLB, 2020 WL 4370132, at *2

(M.D. La. July 30, 2020) (Dick, C.J.). Courts "should not inquire into the sufficiency

of the evidence before the indicting grand jury, because the grand jury proceeding is

8
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 9 of 12

a preliminary phase of the criminal justice process and all constitutional protections

will be afforded during trial. Id. (citing United States v. Odiodio,

2005 WL 2990906 at *14 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2005); United States v. Maceo,

873 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, "[a] district

court lacks authority under Fed. R. Cr. P. 12 to dismiss an indictment on the basis of

a sufficiency-of-the-evidence defense that raises factual questions." Id. (citing

United States v. Richard, 2016 WL 837268 at *2 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2016);

United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 1975)). Because the Court cannot

address factual questions or weigh Defendant's proposed evidence on a Motion to

Dismiss, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for insufficient evidence is DENIED.

Defendant will be provided an opportunity to present evidence to the jury at trial.

B. Selective and Vindictive Prosecution.

Defendant also moves to dismiss based on selective and vindictive prosecution.

(Doc. 111). Defendant contends that the Government "went out of their way to get

their man even when the evidence proved that Defendant did nothing wrong."

(Id. at 19). Defendant describes the Government's investigation and subsequent

Indictment as a "continued witch hunt." (Id. at 20). Defendant reasons that he

presented the Government with evidence showing that he was innocent, but the

Government persisted in its position and secured an Indictment against Defendant.

(Id.).

Defendant also argues that the Government engaged in selective and

vindictive prosecution by using two of the Defendant's clients as key witnesses.
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 10 of 12

(Id. at 21). Defendant refers to the Government's evidence as "suspect" and contends

that the Government has abused its authority by pursuing- this "baseless case."

(Id. at 27-32). Defendant proceeds to argue the merits of his position. (Id. at 20-21).

The Government responds that Defendants Motion contains baseless,

conclusory allegations against the Government and the prosecuting attorneys

without ever citing facts or the applicable law in this area. (Doc. 113 at 4). The

Government also argues that although Defendant's Motion treats the selective and

vindictive prosecution claims the same, the legal standard, and therefore the

analysis, differs with respect to each claim. (Id.). The Court will address Defendant's

arguments concerning vindictive and selective prosecution in turn.

Turning first to vindictive prosecution, Defendant has the burden of proving

prosecutorial vindictiveness by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.

Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353, 359 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). In general,

there are two ways in which a defendant can prove a claim ofvindictiveness. First, a

defendant may prove actual vindictiveness by presenting objective evidence that the

prosecutor s actions were designed to punish a defendant for asserting his legal

rights, such as pursuing an appeal. Id. (citing United States v.

Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 & n. 19 (1982); United States v. Johnson, 91 F.3d 695,

698 (5th Cir. 1996)). Second, in certain circumstances, a defendant may show

sufficient facts to give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Saltzman,

537 F.3d at 359.

Courts may only apply the presumption of vindictiveness when there exists a

10
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 11 of 12

"realistic likelihood ofvindictiveness." Id. (internal quotations omitted). To determine

whether the presumption of vindictiveness applies, "the court must examine the

prosecutor's actions in the context of the entire proceedings." Id. at 359-360 (internal

citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has held:

There is no presumption of vindictiveness if in the context of the entire
proceedings "any objective event or combination of events in those
proceedings should indicate to a reasonable minded defendant that the
prosecutor's decision . . . was motivated by some purpose other than a
vindictive desire to deter or punish appeals."

Id. at 360 (citing United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455, 466-67 (5th Cir. 2001);

additional citations omitted). Even if a defendant establishes a realistic likelihood of

vindictiveness, the Government still has an opportunity to proffer legitimate,

objective reasons for its conduct. Id.

Here, Defendant has offered no evidence to show that the Government has

engaged in vindictive prosecution. Defendants argument that the "Government

pitched [a] false narrative to the grand jury and acquired a fraudulent indictment [,]"

that the "Government still convened a grand jury and indicted" after Defendant

provided the Government with evidence showing Defendant was innocent" does not

persuade otherwise. (Doc. 111). Defendant will have an opportunity to present

evidence at trial before a jury. The Court cannot find that Defendant's arguments

bearing on the merits of his defense provide a basis for vindictive prosecution.

Defendant relies on the same arguments to support his claim of selective

prosecution. The United States Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a

selective prosecution claim is not a defense on the merits to the criminal charge, but

11
Case 3:23-cr-00047-BAJ-SDJ Document 135 05/12/25 Page 12 of 12

instead, an independent claim that the prosecutor brought a charge for reasons

forbidden by the Constitution. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).

Defendant has offered no evidence to indicate that the Government brought the

Indictment for reasons forbidden by the Constitution, much less sufficient evidence

to satisfy Defendant s "heavy burden" to prevail on a defense of selective prosecution.

United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 445 (5th Cir. 1984).

Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for selective or vindictive

prosecution is DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. Ill) is

DENIED.

^.
^
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this ^ day of May, 2025

a.
JUDGE BRIAN A. JAQ^ON
UNITED STATES DIS^ICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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